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Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. V

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No. 1

PATRIARCHAL ORGANIZATIONS

The intimacy existing between man, the individual, and humanity is but an aspect of that vaster intimacy between him and all Nature, visible and invisible. Individuals and groups of individuals use this indissoluble intimacy for a variety of purposes, in a variety of ways. The friend or lover uses it to exhort one individual; a prophet to exhort the masses; a priest or politician to exploit the many; a tradesman to exploit the purchaser. One poet or philosopher may inspire thousands without particular effort and without ever knowing how deep his influence has penetrated. On the other hand, a statesman or even a saint, meaning to do good, often succeeds only in precipitating harm; fine deeds, even those which spring from noble motives, sometimes fail in their intended purpose. Advice given so that good may result may not only confuse the recipient but may even push him into doing wrong.

In the stupendous and baffling task of reconstructing the social order, different schools of educators use this principle of intimacy differently; but most of them seem convinced of the final efficacy of action from without. By legislation, by direct influence exerted over the feelings, by a pull of a muscle or a push to the mind of humanity, reformers expect to restore order here, there and everywhere. Modern knowledge supports the doctrine of reform from without. Belief in that doctrine is so strong that the very existence of its complement is not even suspected. The pivotal doctrine of the ancient spiritual philosophy is that man himself can and should regenerate himself. Unless the pupil is ready to receive instruction, the teacher can do but little. Lasting reform, like true immortality, has to be secured by the individual, not only with the aid received from others, but by self-effort and self-mastery within.

In the modern world-order the individual's place is determined on the principle of egocentricity. Egotism flourishes, and its catch-words are many, *e. g.*, "self-expression," "magnetic personality," "knowing and speaking one's own mind," etc. And universal and impersonal bases of conduct are never thought of. Thus the individual occupies a position detrimental to his own well-being and that of the society to which he belongs.

In our civilization the individual has lost his rightful position; family and state absorb him so completely that he has no time to ascertain if he can call his soul his own. That organizations are not the end but a means is recognized theoretically; practically, organized religion enslaves the soul; organized education curbs the mind; organized society colours the morals; organized politics dominates the body. The perception and conduct of the individual are, generally speaking, superior to those implicit in the programme of his party, club, or church. He suffers more than he recognizes from the limitations of the organizations to which he gives allegiance.

How to raise the status of the individual? This is the question, it seems to us, before modern civilization. Collectivism—socialistic or capitalistic or of any other type—is bound to fail if the individual is not given the place he deserves. On the other hand, individualism as a political philosophy has failed because it has not assigned its proper place and its legitimate value to the organization.

Organizations are necessary. They are but the manifestations of interdependence subsisting between the objects in, and the principles of, Nature. But interdependence is complementary to self-dependence; therefore, the value of any organization depends upon its inherent capacity to arm the individuals it affects with the power to raise themselves individually and with the faculty to enjoy freedom on all planes without injuring other units or groups of units. The moral elevation of the individual by state and society can take place only when the ideals and the programme of the latter energise him to soul-choice, to soul-induced action, to soul-devised effort. A new type of organization is overdue, an organization that—strange paradox—is not an organization, not to be governed by votes and committees and rules but by wisdom, sacrifice and discipline—a patriarchal order, in which the wise and the wealthy practise greater philanthropy and sacrifice than the ignorant and the poor, while observing the principles of universality and impersonality.

Our civilization needs such organizations—organizations which will free men and women to think for themselves while educating them in the *principles* of free thought, which will not interfere with their character but seek its ennoblement, and which, finally, will train their perceptions to recognize truer values so that the number of individual altruists will increase.

WHAT IS WORTH SAVING IN EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION?

[Professor Jean Guéhenno is Editor of the French international review, *Europe*, known for its interest in Indian literature and culture. In reviewing his *Conversion à l'humain* (*Conversion to the Human*) in our pages of December 1931 Mlle. Dugard wrote: "M. Guéhenno has not one of those highly detached minds for which a diagnosis is alone sufficient. After exposing the evil, he seeks the remedy." Other books of M. Guéhenno are *L'évangile éternel* (*The Eternal Gospel*) and *Caliban parle* (*Caliban Speaks*). The following article, especially written for THE ARYAN PATH, has been translated from the French.

This journal has steadfastly opposed the Eastern tendency to ape the West, while favouring the cultural *rapprochement* and exchange of views which would raise us all to a plane above and beyond geographic limitations.

While the West basked in the glamour of apparent material prosperity, the temptation was strong for the educated youth of the East to admire and imitate. The devastating failure of its formulae for success has left the West almost bankrupt in the very aspects of life which it had exalted, often at the expense of human and spiritual values. The proud western mind has now found "some cancerous growth within her own moral nature," said Dr. Tagore in a recent noteworthy lecture at Bombay. "The West," he added, was "producing in the countries with which it is in contact a diseased mentality." The poet however referred to that form of spiritual expression which "we find in the lives of the best individuals in western countries. . . In these individuals it reveals itself in loyalty to the cause of truth for which so many of them are ready to suffer martyrdom, often standing heroically alone against some fury of their national insanity." This is but another way of expressing the view of M. Guéhenno. Though the sense of human dignity may be, as our author claims, the flower of western culture, it will grow as fair in eastern lands.—Eds.]

What is worth saving in European Civilization? Such is the question that has reached me from a distant land and has reawakened in me an anguish of twenty years' standing. Perhaps in the midst of our present confusion, an effort to answer this question will help us to find a way out of the maze—if it be true that such a question moves us to probe into our innermost depths in order to find that which has always been the greatest hope

of that part of the human race to which we belong, namely the European.

Twenty years ago we lost our way. Sometime in 1917, when I was idly turning over the pages of an American magazine, I came across a hideous coloured illustration entitled *Finis Europae*—The End of Europe. Upon a road strewn with the wreckage of ruins, a terrified child, a young girl, was running, seeking a place of refuge. I, at

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first, believed in the completeness of this disaster. Now I know, or fancy I know, better, and am persuading myself to believe that we are not at the end but at a beginning. A new Europe is being born out of our sacrifices, our blood and our tears. Maybe the mortar used in the building of civilization would not harden unless it were mixed with human blood. When an old established system was dying, to give place to Christianity, St. Augustine uttered words which are doubtless applicable to all revolutions. "Flesh," he wrote, "must pass through the wine-press if spirit is to flow forth in its splendour." I should willingly adopt this as a motto for the history of our time.

Truly from time to time it seems that all is lost. The war, even though we were its victims, made us, in some sort, criminals. Every nation, under the stress of the will-to-live, jettisoned what renders life worth living. Who among us can say that his hands are free from the stain of blood? No matter; after so many follies, errors, and crimes, there still remains something within us which, if we are strong enough to salvage it, may, nay must, merit the esteem of the world.

Let us put aside that flimsy paper-soul which books and newspapers create for us. Let us put aside the false discussions and artificial problems which enmesh us, despite ourselves. There is, I think, nothing greater in the European consciousness than a certain sense of human dignity. Either this will be preserved and enlarged

and come to inspire more and more our social and political institutions—in which case Europe will be justified; or else it is decaying—and then Europe will ere long cease to deserve a place in the history of civilization.

Christianity is dying. Let it die, for it has ceased to nourish our souls. Once upon a time it helped us to become aware of our own souls, but now it has degenerated into a second-rate market of passion and self-interest. Too often it justifies the world we live in. Compromises, conciliations, are killing it. But even while Christianity is dying, something else is rising in its place, a Religion of Man, every day more demanding, every day more clearly defined. Nothing is more touching than the story of its development. I only know it as far as it has affected the small *canton* in which I live, but I am sure that in all the provinces and in all the literatures of Europe one can find sentiments and phrases akin to those I am about to quote.

I find the first notes of the new faith struck in the writing of Sénancour and Benjamin Constant. "In a world of mingled pleasure and pain," declares Sénancour, "it is incumbent upon man to increase joy, to fructify expansive energy and to oppose in all sentient beings whatever tends to degrade them or to promote suffering." Thus the man of Europe, becoming aware that he stands upon an earth subject to infinite vicissitudes and beneath a heaven which is deaf to his prayers, realizes that he is alone

and that his only resource is within himself. But this very thought gives him back all his courage: Man has no other Providence than man.

This is the faith really that inspired the noblest deeds of the nineteenth century; the romanticism of 1820, like the humanism of 1520, was a renaissance. It is but an expanded humanism, no longer restricted by the limits of Greco-Roman culture, but eager to promote the union of all races and all civilizations. A warm wave of human tenderness seems to have impregnated the atmosphere. The sense of human dignity grows side by side with the feeling of social solidarity. Michelet summed up the new creed in a striking phrase: "To be more and more ourselves, that more and more we may be brothers." Thus the history of Europe for the last hundred and fifty years, from the French Revolution to the Russian Revolution, from Condorcet to Lenin, has been, in its noblest manifestations, none other than the history of the gradual attainment, by a steadily increasing number of individuals, of human consciousness and human self-respect. And the Rights of Man proclaim the lawfulness and necessity of this growth, as Michelet has pointed out. Every man must enter the promised land.

But the unsteadiness and hesitation of the nineteenth century prove that the practice of a faith which is solely and purely human is most difficult. For such a long time, for centuries even, we have had all kinds of guides and systems.

Humanity has advanced, slipped back, lived as best it could, ingloriously maybe, but still it has lived. It is a big thing to take charge of oneself; it requires great courage to depend on nobody but oneself. Need we be surprised that some have refused to live according to so tragic a faith and have lamented the loss of the old prayers and the old consolations? Need we be surprised that even those men and nations who have accepted it should make mistakes and lose their way, now and again, since it is but a short time since they took up the guidance of their own destiny?

And the new faith has had from its birth its Pharisees. Over-confident idealism is beset by the risk of Pharisaic exploitation. The right of the majority has been legally recognized, and yet the sovereign people are humbugged. Already in the eighteenth century we find Diderot saying: "To own slaves is a trifle; what is intolerable is to have slaves and call them citizens." But that is precisely what we are still doing. Most of the constitutions of Europe seem to indicate that Europeans are masters of their own destiny, but a mechanism, most fatal and overwhelming, overshadows their lives, degrades their occupations and deprives them of their dignity the very moment it is proclaimed. We have to destroy this growth of Pharisaism. It is spread over Europe, over the world; it masks everywhere the reign of force and the tyranny of violence, and there will be neither peace nor order until it is destroyed.

In the enthusiasm for their new

faith Europeans have not thought that circumstances may be stronger than man. They overlook the insolent manner in which things go their own way, and they fancy that man is master. But now, intoxicated by our power, we have no longer the capability of regulating it, just as a disordered heart cannot control its pulsations. Thus "things" have taken their revenge. In this disillusionment, the slow conquests of reason do not satisfy us. We demand a miracle; we want history to read like a novel, and so once more we hand over to some outside agent—some saviour or tyrant—our lives and destinies which at one time we were so proud of ruling.

I cannot here enumerate all the causes of our failure, and I take up once more my main theme. It does not seem to me that our troubles—not even the Great War itself—point to a complete failure. All that is worth saving in Europe, all that she has ever offered that is useful or noble, may be found in the formulae and examples of a revolutionary humanism, at once clear and bold. But the important question is whether such a humanism will win through or be crushed.

There is no difficulty in classifying the parties and doctrines which actually divide Europe. The great line of demarcation lies between a dream of happiness and a dream of dignity and self-respect. I am not scorning happiness, I am sure that happiness is one of the main pillars of self-respect; but if Europe

is ready to sacrifice her honour to happiness, she will have lost the faith which made her greatness. Even now, our masters, those who hold sway over the material part of our civilization, declare themselves able and willing to furnish the masses, who have so long desired it, with a certain amount of happiness; they promise a peace and security such as has never before been known, provided the masses hand over absolute and complete control of *everything* to these masters. Europe is full of dictators ready to manufacture happiness for people, but they will do nothing to maintain the people's self-respect. And why? Because such men are not afraid of happy people, whereas they dread those who are animated by a sense of human dignity.

Which dream will prove the more powerful, that of happiness or that of self-respect. The "masters" are ready to degrade the masses; they are willing to amuse and to feed them, and so we have Americanism, Rationalization, Fascism,—a return to I know not what dark age. Shall we be content with the lot of happy slaves, or shall we maintain that the only happiness worth having is that which we have won for ourselves? Are we strong-minded enough to refuse, if we must, the offered *panem et circences*, for the sake of a happiness and glory that we alone can conceive? Thus only will Europe be justified; thus only will she save her faith. Her destiny depends on our courage.

JEAN GUÉHENNO

SPIRITUAL DEMOCRACY

Here are two articles.

A front-rank Indian educationist, with practical experience in the progressive State of Mysore, refers to the failure of Nationalism and warns his countrymen against repeating the mistake of the Western political states. His remedy? India should assimilate the forces of Internationalism.

The second article takes us a step forward. It evokes a vision—the creation of a new International, that of Aristocrats, the spiritually rich. Castes and classes are a natural phenomenon, they cannot be abolished; recognize them as a psycho-spiritual institution; with its aid create a new State, that of Spiritual Democracy.

I

NATIONALISM—THE GREAT EVIL

[**N. S. Subba Rao, M. A. (Cantab.)**, has been Director of Public Instruction in Mysore State since 1928. He was President of the Indian Economic Conference in 1929 and of the All-India Educational Conference in 1931. He attended the Round Table Conference of 1930 in an advisory capacity, and served as Secretary of the Committee appointed by the Indian Princes' Delegation to examine the question of an All-India Federation in relation to the Indian States. —EDS.]

I

Great technological discoveries promise men the blessings of plenty without the pressure of drudgery. A new and prosperous era in the economic history of the world seems to be opening, but the economic machine has collapsed. Everybody apprehends war; furtively and shamefacedly every one is preparing for it. Yet conferences follow in rapid succession to deal with the pressing problems of the hour, but "they dare not devise good for man's estate."

Why is this? Has half a century of education of democracy been fruitless? Has leadership lost its hold on the masses? Must we in

impotent despair look forward to the collapse of civilization?

II

This is the theme of the lectures delivered last year under the Halley Stewart Foundation by Sir Norman Angell, author of the now famous work, *The Great Illusion*. Sir Norman has made it his mission in life to promote the cause of peace and international goodwill by instructing mankind. He has done this not so much by exposition of abstruse political doctrine or complicated economic theory, intelligible only to the learned, as by a patient and persistent exposition of the obvious and elementary truths which the least instructed

could understand if only they *would*.

Much of the economic disease from which we suffer is due to a failure to grasp the very few but very important truths upon which all the economic doctors are agreed. There is nothing inherently difficult in understanding the reason for the course advised by all the economists; the most urgent thing is to discover what stands in the way of that popular understanding.*

This is the pivotal problem of democracy: how comes it that when the way of escape from our economic and political ills is clearly and authoritatively indicated, "those who are to tread it do not believe it to be the way of escape, and refuse to follow it"?

Thus stated, it is seen to be "a problem of education, of politics". Although Sir Norman does not say so, it is also an indictment against human nature, against our leaders of the present day, and above all against the systems of organized education. The ordinary voter's "sober and more deliberate purpose is frustrated by other purposes," which are dictated by "normally unexamined impulses," and it is not the fitness of a candidate to participate in the Government of his country that wins votes, but entirely extraneous and irrelevant considerations like war service, athletic prowess, and the accident of a lucky marriage with a popular actress. The leaders do not lead but follow: apprehensive of being disowned by the multitude,

they are content to retain their hold on democracy by expressing "existing convictions in the most vivid way," and exploiting powerful popular passions.

The most serious failure is that of organised education. For, "the average educated man of all countries cannot follow the simplest, the most elementary, the most self-evident fact about the financial and economic apparatus which feeds and clothes us". The case is worse in respect to highly educated people. "To be highly educated did not mean to be politically wise," for "some of the most disturbing and disruptive of the movements which push Europe nearer to chaos . . find their main impulse in the educated classes, in the universities and professions". Everybody genuinely hates war, but everybody pursues policies which in the end must mean war, because they do not see the relation between the policy and its result, or the contradiction between conflicting purposes. It has been remarked caustically that this state of affairs is astonishing evidence of the adaptability of the human mind. Logically it is impossible to believe that a thing is round and also to believe that it is square, but psychologically there does not seem to be any particular difficulty about it. All that is needed is to keep the beliefs in separate compartments and to use them in turn as may be convenient.†

The mutually exclusive demands in the matter of Reparations and

* The quotations, in this article, when not indicated otherwise are from Sir Norman's book, *From Chaos to Control* (Allen and Unwin).

† *The Educational Frontier*, by Prof. Kilpatrick and others. 1933.

War Debts are an illustration in point.

III

It is only incidentally,—because that is not his main purpose,—but in no uncertain manner, that Sir Norman Angell tells us of the objectives that a sick world should place before itself: Reign of Law among Nations, and conscious collective control of world economic life or International Economic Planning. “A just, workable, stable international society” has to be evolved with “common rules of conduct and institutions for their enforcement”. It may seem a mockery even to state the ideals, when the Manchurian episode and the ignominious failure of the well-staged World Economic Conference are fresh in our minds. But not long ago it was difficult to convince men of the futility of demanding colossal reparations, and the absurdity of demanding reparations in one breath, and discouraging imports from Germany in the next. We may well hope that similarly men may yet come to see how their interests demand cessation of international anarchy, and reduction, if not elimination, of economic barriers between countries.

For the moment we are all, however, under the spell of the sovereign national State. It may appear hard to agree without

reservations with Bertrand Russell when he says that “Nationalism is undoubtedly the most dangerous vice of our time,” and “unless the virulence of Nationalism can be abated, civilization cannot continue”.* But Sir Norman shows with striking illustrations how Nations are personified, endowed with definite characteristics and qualities, in entire forgetfulness of the fact that nations are made up of separate and distinct individuals. The denigration of rival nations goes along with a corresponding exaltation of one’s own nation, and relentless pursuit of its power and prestige in entire disregard of the rights and interests of others. It is here that the menace of the sovereign nation State emerges, and Sir Norman has characterised elsewhere the absolute claims of national sovereignty as the supreme unseen assassin of our peace and welfare.† The remedy is obvious.

It frankly means the end of the sovereignty of the State in international affairs. It compels us to think of the *civitas maxima* first, and of the Nation State as a mere Province in that wider community.‡

IV

How is the needed change in opinion to be brought about? The schools must come to our aid.

The discussions ranging all the way from the observance of traffic regulations to world peace have a way of

* *Education and the Social Order*.

† “We are a nation; that is to say a corporate body, a personality, therefore, each national person is independent, a law unto itself, shall acknowledge no code regulating its relations with other similar persons. The ‘therefore’ of the above statement is the Supreme Unseen Assassin.” (*The Unseen Assassins*, p. 92.).

‡ Laski: *Nationalism and the Future of Civilization*.

terminating in the conclusion that the problem in hand is, in the final analysis, a problem of education, and more specially a problem of the Schools.*

Sir Norman would have the schools teach the young their "own nature and its relation to society, a whole range of simple social phenomena the comprehension of which is indispensable to the management of the world in which they live". Emphasis should be laid on understanding rather than on erudition and knowledge. What is needed is "not fresh knowledge, but greater skill in seeing the relevance to our problems of already known fact". The ordinary man should be equipped when he leaves the school with "the skill or habit of applying to social problems simple truths, inherent or self-evident in common facts of daily life".

This is, however, what the economists would call a "long period" result. The disaster towards which the world is heading cannot be postponed while a new generation is being trained to the tasks of peace, order, and co-operation.

The fate of democracy is not going to wait a long time to get itself decided. It will be decided not by those who are going to have to vote fifty years hence, but by those who have the vote now.†

It is imperative, therefore, that the education of the electorate should also be taken in hand. Education fortunately is no longer a matter of the schools, and the education which is begun in the

schools can now be continued, supplemented, and rectified, though it is frequently perverted, by the powerful agencies that have appeared on the scene in recent years,—the Press, the Radio, and the Cinema. The commercialisation of these instruments of further education is no doubt an obstacle in the way of their utilisation for educative propaganda of the type contemplated by Sir Norman, but the difficulty has to be faced.

This is but a part of our task, for intellectual preparedness is not everything. The schools are adjured to "make our millions aware that it is impossible to know the truth unless we are *prepared to hear both sides*: that there is a *moral obligation* upon all of us to be ready to do that."‡ In other words, moral preparedness is the accompaniment of intellectual receptivity, if not its condition precedent. To make this operative on the plane of international relationships is perhaps the most difficult task before the advocates of Internationalism. We all realise that greed lies at the root of the other baser passions of mankind,§ and are ashamed in our individual lives to own to it or its corollaries. These evil passions when transferred to the sphere of national rivalries become, however, transformed into virtues; and Jingoistic conquests, espionage, repudiation of treaties and engagements,

* Prof. Kilpatrick, *op. cit.*

† Jacks: *Education Through Recreation*.

‡ The italics are mine.

§ *Bhagavad-Gita*, II. 62-63.

wholesale massacre of non-combatants, do not strike the guilty nation as acts of moral depravity, and no sense of shame is roused by them. It should be the first task of leaders of thought to expose the sway of such perverted moral values in the international sphere. These explain why people do not hear both sides,—there are no two sides equally worthy of a hearing: there is only a right side and a wrong side.

V

International co-operation and economic reconstruction of the world are not seldom thought of in terms of Western States, and the place of Asiatic and other "backward" countries in the world order hardly obtains the consideration its importance calls for. The Asiatic countries which now participate in the limited activities of the International Labour Office are already apprehensive that their special problems and difficulties do not receive adequate attention, and there is a move to form an advisory conference of Asiatic countries. The economic future of Asia and Africa is generally visualised in terms of the consuming power of the masses in these continents, which may be raised by international economic action, so that the products of Western industry can be absorbed. The claim

to "Independence" in the subject countries is resisted by Imperialists, and these find an unexpected ally in Sir Norman, who supplies them with "a moral case" and points out that the claim to "Independence" is an anti-social claim.*

It is hardly a matter for wonder that the Asiatic peoples,—those of them at any rate who hear and read of these things,—hardly display any enthusiasm for projects of international co-operation. Their inevitable reaction to Western Imperialism, which frequently masquerades as Internationalism, is increased devotion to Nationalism.

Nationalism breeds Imperialism, and the latter, at long last, breeds Nationalism again in the peoples whom it subjects to its control.†

This is an unfortunate consequence, immediately and ultimately. Immediately, it adds to the difficulties of bringing about international harmony, because the subject peoples are aggressively nationalistic, and will remain so, unruffled by Bertrand Russell's refusal to admire them.‡ It constitutes a danger in the distant future, *for even after the Western powers have shed their nationalism and formed an international polity, a large section of humanity will lie outside the fold, and offer an asylum for the discarded favourites of the West.* It would be an unhappy and unexpected result that Nation-

* *The Unseen Assassins.* But the Imperialist would be chilled by Sir Norman's dictum that "No 'law and order,' no material benefits will ever reconcile the normal human being to the acknowledgment of that kind of inferiority".

† Laski, *op. cit.*

‡ "Nationalism is vicious as a principle, and is not to be admired, even in nations fighting for their freedom."—Bertrand Russell, *op. cit.*

alism expelled from Europe should be welcomed in the East, and like Coriolanus seek to revenge itself by shaking the new order of things in the West to its foundations.

It is a stupendous and an almost impossible task that faces us. Those of us who believe in International good-will and harmony must join hands in active co-operation with one another in all parts of the world, some to seeking persistently like Sir Norman Angell to open the eyes of the West to the evils of nationalism in its midst,

and others endeavouring to arrest the insidious growth of the same noxious political weed in the East by instructing the young not to be led away by its seeming attractions, and opening their eyes to the havoc it has caused and is causing in the West. Burke has said that in order to ameliorate the evils of an age we should agree with whatever was best in that age. Our hope of rising out of the evils of the present age lies in agreeing with the forces of Internationalism.

N. S. SUBBA RAO

II

ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY

[The Editor of *The Bookman*, **Hugh Ross Williamson**, is author of an impressionist play, "In a Glass Darkly," a critical study of *The Poetry of T. S. Eliot*, and a historical biography of *John Hampden*. The reader will do well to bear in mind, in connection with this article, the root meaning of the term, "aristocracy"—"the rule of the best". How to insure that, is the outstanding political problem of our day.—EDS.]

Democracy, they say, is dying. The event, moreover, provokes very little mourning. After the funeral, "nil nisi bonum" may be observed, but at the present stage of the process a catalogue of crimes is more in fashion. For what, we are asked, has democracy finally resulted in? An age of bread and circuses, an era of mob-rule, where individuality is suppressed, where original thought is proscribed, where everyone reads the same newspapers, listens to the same "canned" music, wears the same clothes, becomes hilarious in the same amusement parks, stares

at the same films, lives in the same kind of house. Democracy, which was the goal of political progress, has turned out to be nothing but an ordeal by slogans. Democracy, which was to have been the final and finest form of government, has, by endorsing the patent fallacy that one head is as good as another, destroyed the possibility of effective government. So, with a sigh of relief we see the old democracy out and welcome the new dictatorship in.

Yet, before the final acquiescence in the demands for "efficiency," it might be as well to notice that

dictatorship is merely an intensification of all the evils of democracy. It means the sacrifice of even a variety of slogans to the triumph of one. Under democracy individuality may be a nuisance, but under dictatorship it becomes a crime. The newspaper-opinions which democrats bandy about in public-houses are certainly a poor substitute for personal opinions, but they are better than the one-and-only opinion which is all that dictatorship allows. The films of the proletariat may be rubbish, but they are not propaganda, and an interest in bread and circuses is perhaps less reprehensible than an enthusiasm for bombs and manoeuvres.

It seems, indeed, that dictatorship is the logical outcome of democracy, not because—as is so often stated—it is the “swing of the pendulum” reaction from it, but because it is an inevitable development of it. Democracy and dictatorship are, in point of fact, only two forms of the same evil thing. And that thing is plutocracy. If democracy is to save itself, it can do so only by becoming the great movement which the idealists meant it to be. It must become, in short, aristocratic.

“You will confer the greatest benefit on your city,” said Epictetus, “not by raising the roofs but by exalting the souls of your fellow-citizens. For it is better that great souls should live in small habitations than that abject slaves should burrow in great houses.” That is the creed of aristocracy and in-

dividualism. It should also be the creed of democracy and socialism. But to plutocracy, under whatever disguise it masquerades, it is the antithesis. And because democracy has forgotten it, because, when at the cross-roads, it followed the way of plutocracy and dictatorship instead of that of aristocracy and individualism, we are lost in the maze of contemporary chaos.

It is not difficult, of course, to see why the democrat was an easy prey to the plutocrat. In the first place, he did not realise his danger. He persisted in regarding the aristocrat as his enemy long after he ought to have made him his ally. The men of England who, in 1832, battled against the squires for reform may have imagined that they were helping to destroy tyranny, but the event proved that they only succeeded in establishing the monstrous regiment of Victorian capitalists, compared with which the Whig Oligarchy seemed liberal and humanitarian. And the same mistake was made elsewhere and at other times.

In the second place, the worship of wealth is, in a sense, a corollary to universal franchise. The doctrine of the equality of all men before the ballot-box results in a philosophy different from that implicit in the dogma of the equality of all men before God. With the emphasis on a material right comes the endorsement of material standards and the man who attaches an almost mystical significance to his ability to mark a voting-paper not infrequently measures his happiness by his

ability to "keep up with the Joneses". The real indictment of our modern pluto-democracy is that it uses as its measure of things the criterion which can be understood by everybody—material wealth. Its idols—footballers, boxers, film stars, best-selling authors, kings of commerce—are finally reducible to this common factor. The footballer, for whom thousands of pounds is paid, is usually inferior as a sportsman to any boy in a village team. A best-selling author is a synonym for a bad artist. A king of commerce is great only in the sense that he is more magnificently dishonest than his rivals. Yet they, wealthy and successful, are the heroes of the mob, because, by the only standards it can understand—ability to earn a lot of money—they are worthy of the honour.

In the third place, the democrat really had a good case for his insistence on material prosperity, and it is here that the crux of the matter lies. It is useless to advise a man to lead the Good Life (in the aristocratic sense) when he is struggling to keep alive on starvation level—though, even then, it may be possible for him to lead a good life, (in the ethical sense). It is useless to urge the finer points of aesthetic appreciation on a man who has to spend his days searching for employment. A certain level of material security and comfort is necessary before a civilised life is possible at all, and it is hardly surprising if many honest and sensitive men have made the mistake of saying: "The other things

must wait until we have achieved that level." That attitude, though natural, is a dangerous one because the abrogation of the true standards, even for a moment and with the best intentions, must result in the selling of the pass.

The full meaning of the betrayal, we are witnessing now. The issues have become inextricably confused. We ask for leadership and we are offered a dictator, and in our rightful haste to repudiate the one, we may have the misfortune to lose the other. We shrink from the materialism of Communism and, in so doing, find ourselves opposing those who, neglecting the materialism, see only in Communism a burning passion for social justice—the very men with whom we should most desire to co-operate. We attack the mob-mind and mob-values created by our "democracy" and yet are haunted by the fear that, in doing so, we may damage the cause of true freedom.

Perhaps the confusion can be best epitomised by quoting the verse of an old hymn which it has become the fashion to cite in angry ridicule:—

The rich man in his castle,
The poor man at his gate,
God made them, high and lowly,
And ordered their estate.

Only in an age obsessed with materialism could this be read as a Divine authorisation of poverty. To say, as one writer has said, that it was probably drink, not God, that had brought the poor man there, is an epigram worthy of the age. The verse is common-

place enough, but the truth it expresses has so far ceased to be a commonplace that it is almost a paradox. For plutocracy knows but one criterion, and the existence of a Divine law, ordering alike the lives of rich and poor, is an intrusion if not actually an impertinence.

Another example is the caste system, against which so many and so bitter vituperations are hurled. As I write, there is, I believe, in the press a little book on this very point, proving that democracy is incompatible with caste distinctions. Undoubtedly this is true of pluto-democracy, which insists that all barriers shall give way to mere wealth. But the great idea at the root of caste—that individuals have *different* responsibilities and rights—hardly conflicts with the ideal of democracy that every citizen shall be free to develop his distinctive powers for the best and most effective service of the state.

If, then, democracy is to recover and save us from experiencing plutocracy at its worst in the form of dictatorship, it must retrace its steps until it finds once more the aristocratic ideal. It must insist

on individualism, but in its highest not in its lowest form—not the individualism of *laissez-faire* which applauded the triumph of one at the expense of the many, which demanded above all things to be served; but the individualism which realises that the well-being of one depends on the well-being of all, that a man cannot be saved apart from the community, and which asks for a position in the state in which it may be used to the limit of its capacity. Democracy must abandon its belief in the material things which unite men and foster the differences which divide them—for to confound unity with uniformity is to put a premium on decay. Democracy must cultivate the faculty of *disbelief*, for a habit of scepticism is the surest antidote to the poison of a slogan. At the beginning of the century a peer said, jestingly, "We are all Socialists now." Now we must answer, seriously, "We are all aristocrats now."

The way may be difficult, beset with the dangers of misunderstanding. But it is the only way by which civilisation can be saved.

HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON

MODERN EUROPEAN DRAMA AND RELIGION

[**Paul Banks**, who contributes this stimulating article on the religious element in the modern European drama, is the author of *Metropolis, or the Destiny of Cities*, and *Patient Albion*. His work as a dramatic critic has received high praise.—EDS.]

Nothing could be more abundantly clear to ordinary common-sense than that human conduct and aspirations cannot be fully understood or explained by a single biological motive—either the instinct of self-preservation or even the will-to-power. There are quite, quite clearly at least three prime-movers, to borrow a term from engineering, at work in every human being: a desire for power, a longing for instinctive contentment—which may fairly be called the wish for happiness—and, in addition, another, even more essential to the true nature of man than either of those mentioned. Indeed, on behalf of the fulfilment of this further aim—expressed in the fewest possible words, the maximum of self-knowledge and awareness—both the will-to-power and the wish for happiness have had to be rigorously held in check. The care of this treasure, for such this *consciousness* is, although grossly neglected by what must be called the “reducing” schools of biology and philosophy, is an important part—though not the whole, of course—of the service rendered to mankind by religion. It is the part that concerns us in this discussion of religion and modern drama.

In an essay on realism in the theatre, Mr. Ashley Dukes, whose

work and views in this field are entitled to sincere respect, stated that realism could not exist in a thing so patently unreal as the theatre. At the play, he said, people want to enjoy the illusion of seeing themselves not as they are, but as their betters. For a brief hour, he claimed, we demand the illusion that we strut the world as heroes and heroines, or at least as ladies and gentlemen. There is, of course, a type of play very much in public demand which corresponds exactly to this claim. In it the humble girl is in the end loved for herself alone, and possibly exalted to high social rank at the same time. Sometimes the girl becomes an operatic star in one night. Alternatively, some neglected and ill-treated lad, very much akin to the people in the audience, finds his hidden merit recognised, or his lost birth-certificate discovered, and rises to fame. All such plays, and there are many varieties, have exactly the same effect on the audience as the fairy-tale on the child. Indeed, they are the same tales, with added complexity and decoration: “Beauty and the Beast” and “King Cophetua and the Beggar-Maid,” which give the child the illusion of happiness, and, say, “Cinderella,” “The Ugly Duckling” and “Jack the Giant Killer,”

which similarly give the child the illusion of power. It is a curious fact that it is exactly these plays which are generally represented on the stage "most realistically," that is to say, with the greatest verisimilitude to the actual world.

It begins to be evident already that the reduction to one thing of people's motive for theatre-going as surely leads to error as the reduction to one thing of mankind's motive for living. The theatre is not only a place where tired business men may enjoy an hour's illusion of harem happiness. It is not only a place where frustrated human beings return to the contentment of childhood under the magic of Mr. Milne or the greater magic of Sir James Barrie. It is not only a place in which the down-trodden may dream of power, of being heroes, millionaires, or even clever criminals. Everything, as a matter of fact, which is regarded as major art in the theatre awakens the beholder to the religious exercise of his consciousness, and develops it in range, intensity and responsibility, in relation to the family, society, and the universe.

By the European Renaissance the explicitly religious Greek tragic theatre, with its office of "justifying the ways of God to man," had passed. The equally religious miracle and morality plays of the Middle Ages, which held the field just as long as the European consciousness remained static, had also passed. It is true that the drama illustrating the way of salvation to all men came to a

kind of maggot-life again in the nineteenth-century melodrama, a sort of morality play according to the gospel of Samuel Smiles and other preachers of the virtues of honesty, temperance, thrift and ambition—the virtues, that is, of most obvious value to the imperialist shopkeeper. With Marlowe and Shakespeare, nevertheless, the current of true drama, along with the entire current of human life, became more and more secularised. Drama divided itself from religion, and made its way as a distinct art, more and more humanist. Man, the puppet of fate, even man, the Child of God, earning salvation by obedience alone, had ceased to be a satisfying conception. Man, while remaining the child of God, found that he had to shoulder adult responsibilities, and to exercise and develop his consciousness in a very rapidly expanding—in every sense—world and universe. Shakespeare's Hamlet receives neither help nor hindrance from religion. He is called upon to exercise his own will, to make his own decisions, and to act as a free, responsible and conscious entity, in spite of all the forces working both to hinder the making of decisions and even to break down his mind.

Everything after Shakespeare's "Hamlet" that considered the mere avoidance of the Seven Deadly Sins and the keeping of the Ten Commandments as enough for salvation was really a looking backward to the Golden Age, to an unchanging environment for which static instinct was adequate. From

that time drama has, notwithstanding its secularisation, continued to be essentially religious. In it is reflected the in-breathing and out-breathing of the mind of man in its struggle for greater conscious self-command; not under the authority of Church or Bible, of course, but certainly under the authority of the individual soul's desire for that conviction of integrity which is much the same thing as obedience to the God within. Increasingly, in the age of so-called growing democracy, the problems of human responsibility were found to be insoluble by the institutional Churches, which not only feared to assert much of their own lore and wisdom, but largely gave themselves over to the mere imperialist will-to-power of the age, and as a consequence neglected the will-to-human-consciousness. Grappling with those problems became the serious task of the drama.

No matter how purely aesthetic and non-religious Shakespeare may have felt while writing "Othello," the character of its great tragic central figure has entered into everyday life and speech; as the very symbol, indeed, for the pride of possession that fears dispossession to the degree of blinding itself and of destroying both love and life. It is impossible not to meditate on the character of Macbeth, driven by ambition untempered by the love of his fellows to folly upon folly, until he finds himself a cipher, unrespected by any man. And it is equally impossible not to be exalted by the absolute

integrity of spirit, achieved through faith, love and sacrifice by Romeo and Juliet against the whole world.

While these characters of drama work out their fates and destinies on a human plane, still they are, it is therefore evident, largely bound up with the Seven Deadly Sins. But for Pride, no Othello; but for Covetousness, no Macbeth; but for Self-love, no Hamlet. The *social* consciousness manifest in these plays, moreover, is still feudal. Kings, Queens, nobles and ministers are endowed with the author's own wisdom, and for their rank tragic dignity is reserved. Common folk serve only for knaves, fools and clowns. Between Shakespeare and the nineteenth century, the original exercise of human consciousness and its extension to embrace other human beings is reflected chiefly in comedy, from Molière to Sheridan. It had been recognised, of course, ever since Livius Andronicus, that the function of comedy was to hold the mirror up to everyday life, and Molière himself defined it in the same terms. But only from Molière was the job taken seriously, and from his time comedy and tragedy have gradually grown nearer and nearer the same thing. Even in the work of the good-humoured Sheridan, everything savouring of hypocrisy is as surely ridiculed as in the work of his successor, in our day, George Bernard Shaw. It began to matter less what people did and thought than whether they *knew* what they did and thought; which is why the critics of the time could enjoy, say, the works of

Wycherley and Congreve, in spite of the totally immoral frankness and realism of these authors about much that had been previously hidden under the cloak of sentimental prudery.

The new current received a further powerful impulse from the anti-romantic movement in France started by Zola, and carried on in Norway by Ibsen, in Sweden by Strindberg, and by followers everywhere. This movement was, of course, linked with the developments following the French revolution and the belief that while all men should count, none should count too much. The feudal noble had had to take second place, in human interest if not in property, and the call to conscious human responsibility had now to be made to merchants, professors and burgomasters—the new middle class who far too early had settled down to value only respectability, success in life and civic honours. The men and women of this class were the material of the new drama, just as kings and nobles had been in their immortal aristocratic state, or lovers in their immortal adolescence. Ibsen, too often supposed to have been merely a propagandist for middle-class emancipation and, in particular, for feminine emancipation, was the observer and dramatist of the light, which only he saw, on the newly significant social class. He dramatised their corruption, inefficiency and hypocrisy. He exposed the vanity and the failure to accept conscious responsibility of all intellectuals, idealists, career-

ists and middlemen whatsoever. He was the flagellant prophet of a corrupt Vaisya-Sudra civilization. Before his time these people had existed only as the menials of aristocracies. All that Shakespeare had required were apothecaries, servants, or messengers, lacking character, human distinction or even names. In the drama of Ibsen the middle classes had become significant for combined comedy and tragedy.

In Strindberg's work also the conflicts, doubts and aspirations of a newly awakened man, more unsure in the swirl of the family and of society than the ancient Greeks in the swirl of the universe, are the centre of dramatic significance. Indeed, Strindberg dramatised the human spirit's doubt—which has since threatened the absolute wreck of European civilisation—of the sufficiency of science and reason. Both Strindberg and Ibsen, in fact, struggled to revive human consciousness and spiritual responsibility in an age when these had become almost submerged by trade; when the attainment of even happiness was believed to be dependent on the gaining of power; and when the will-to-power philosophy actually came to birth.

Although the alarm to rouse all European mankind was sounded before 1848, the awakening has been slow. The artist hardly dared to look at the folk face to face. Such men as William Morris and Ruskin, having glanced at the common people, at once looked away, to rest their eyes on the pleasanter visions of Greece, Italy,

Gothic architecture and the Norse sagas. These writers, disliking the look of stunted bodies and souls, nevertheless pleaded, of course, for social reform on the folk's behalf, but their pleadings became only period literature. It was the caricaturists, born and bred among the people, who saw them first without disgust; for example, Charles Dickens and Phil May. The painter came next, but he hated and feared the people, and they became in his eyes merely "Caliban seeing himself in the glass". At last, however, the drama—which can be created only out of love—began to turn its lamp on the common folk, as in the class-conscious "mass" drama of Toller and others, and in a drama more related to the individual consciousness composed by the American Irishman O'Neill and the Dublin Irishman O'Casey. O'Neill's genius lay in the light his artist's eyes threw into the soul of all oppressed human beings, black or white; O'Casey's in his making the audience laugh uproariously at the comic irresponsibility and prodigality of his characters—while at the same time, of course, doing something else. Those irresponsible and prodigal characters were burned, during the laughter, deep into the audience's mind, to become tragic figures

which shamed the very laughter they had caused, and provoked fresh meditation.

There is no longer any question, therefore, whether what we demand from the theatre is either "realism" or "unreality". It is neither something indistinguishable from actual life, though minor play writers suppose it is, nor a pleasant day-dream softening the harsh corners of the world for the time being; nor is it even the nursery experience of seeing ourselves as Ugly Ducklings, about to fly away as beautiful wild swans. Such dreams have their place in the theatre of entertainment and consolation. But there is, besides, a theatre from which the audience, small or great, demands what may fairly be called *reality*; a theatre in which day-dreams of happiness and power have absolutely no place, and in which, on the very contrary, the essentially religious function is fulfilled of awakening the human mind to the truth about itself, of stimulating love, understanding and forgiveness for one's fellows; and, besides, of creating the will to secure the gift of full consciousness in every individual member of mankind. That is the theatre in which the true and the beautiful are not only expressed, but expressed in action, and, therefore, effect the good.

PAUL BANKS

TIPPOO SULTAN'S DREAMS

A GLANCE AT MOHAMMEDAN ONEIROCRITICISM

[This is the third article on Dreams contributed to THE ARYAN PATH by **Rodolphe Louis Mégroz**, whose critical and biographical studies no less than his verse, have established his place in the English world of letters. "Dreams in the Western World" appeared in March, 1931, and "Dreams of Future Events" in May, 1932. The part played by dreams in Tartini's composition of the "Devil's Sonata" and in Coleridge's writing of the poem, "Kubla Khan," are better known but no less thought-provoking than this account of the dreams of Tippoo Sultan.—EDS.]

One of the "Traditions" of the Mohammedan Mishkat declares: "the power of prophecy has passed away, yet revelation by dreams remains," and the student very quickly discovers that no literature is more eloquent of prolonged and intense interest in dreams than the Islamic. It is questionable if even the Chinese have set greater store by the study of dreams than the Mohammedan peoples from Syria to India. At least it can be said that such outstanding works as the Chinese *Mêng Shu*, or Book of Dreams, written during the T'ang dynasty, described as "a concise interpretation of various omens presented to the sleeper," and the *Mêng Chan I Chih*, in Seven Books written by Ch'en Shih-Yuan in 1562, have several counterparts in the Mohammedan literature.

There is, first, the great Arabic work of Khalil Ibn Shahin al Dahiri, entitled *The Book of Explanation of Dream Interpretation* which cites 31 other works on *Tâbir*, i. e., the science or art of dream interpretation.


There is the Persian *Kamil ul Tâbir*, or Complete Dream Book, and similar works by Jafar Sâdu,

Ibn Sirín, and other sages whose studies of dreams are for our present purpose chiefly interesting as the background to an exceptionally curious document which every visitor to the India Office Library in London must have seen.

This is the Register of his dreams compiled by the dreaded Tippoo Sultan of Mysore, who reigned from 1782 to 1799. The manuscript is in Persian, described by the orientalist N. Bland as "a wretched Shikestah". Most of the volume is blank. In the first 30 pages Tippoo wrote down an account of 39 dreams, some of the notes being very brief, others occupying a full page. This intrepid and ruthless warrior who took the symbol of the Tiger for himself, crafty politician who was more unscrupulous than his famous correspondent, Bonaparte, shows here a concern with his dreams that has at various times been displayed by other great leaders and men of action, including Napoleon.

But the tone of these notes reveals that devotion to his faith which caused Tippoo subsequently to be ranked by Mohammedans as a martyr. Besides the pious ex-

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pressions which occur in the accounts of the dreams, sometimes the Sultan prefixes to them the invocation, "Yá Kerím Kársár-Yá-Rahím-Yá Sádíc" (O Thou gracious Creator! O Merciful One! O Just One!). It has to be confessed that, so far as the easily available biographical material goes (and that is no doubt not partial but none the less significant), the Sultan's frequent invocations of the Divine attributes of mercy and justice were not followed by his imitation of them in everyday life! It will soon be seen from the examples which follow that the dreams recorded by Tippoo are in keeping with his known character while adding a few traits not generally realised, at least in the Western world.

The Register of Tippoo's Dreams has never been translated completely from the Persian into English, but six of the longer and more interesting ones and also an account written down by Tippoo of an Apparition described to him, were translated and put into an Appendix by Alexander Beatson in his book, "*A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultaun, and of the Siege of Seringapatam*" (London, 1800). Beatson was aide-de-camp to the Marquis Wellesley, Governor-General of India at the time of the war. Beatson says that the MS. book was found in a secret drawer of an escritoire in the Palace of Seringapatam by a Colonel William Kirkpatrick, who appears to have passed it over to Lord Wellesley.

First appears the account of the

Apparition communicated to the Sultan: it is interesting to us not only because of Tippoo's obvious interest in it but for its own representative character.

Meer Nasin Ally, and Abdul Kudoos Meer Meeran, on the 21st of the month of Zakery, of the year Shedab, 1226 from the birth of Mohammed, corresponding with the 28th December, 1798, represented, that a person of the Mohammedan religion, who had formerly been Adjutant of a battalion in the service of the Christians, came with his family to this place, namely, Kourial (or Mangalore) and stated in the following manner the reason of his having quitted that service.

That being one day at Calicut, at the house of the venerable Synd, and several persons of the Mohammedan religion being assembled there, he related to us, that two Hindoos and two Mohammedans, leaving their houses with an intention of proceeding to Chinaputtan (Madras) had arrived at the place where Baillie, the European, was defeated; when on a sudden a voice exclaimed: "Stand! ye unknown!" They asked repeatedly who it was, but the Mohammedans of the party not being able to distinguish, the voice again exclaimed: "In the name of God, stand!"

They thereupon stopped on the spot; and a person, covered with a veil, came, and standing before them asked whither they were going. They replied that they were proceeding to Madras. The apparition then said, "My sons, of such and such names, are at such and such a place: urge them to avoid as much as may be in their power, the service of the Christians. They have a sum of money in their house; let them engage in commerce or in agriculture, or in the service of a Mohammedan prince; or, otherwise, like me they will be involved in every kind of calamity."

They asked what calamity had befallen him. The apparition then removed the veil from his face, when it

appeared he bore the countenance of a hog. He carried them forward some paces, and then assumed another figure. He gave the word of command in European, and deploying a regiment of hogs in line, he put them through their manual exercises. After this he again covered his face with the veil, and coming before them he related his whole story as follows :

That he was a commander under Baillie, the European, and during the battle he fired upon the Mohammedans, and loading a second time he was giving the word of command in the language of the Christians, to fire, when at that very moment he was struck on the head by a sword. And instead of repeating the Kulmech Shehadut (or ejaculations, professing the belief in the unity of God and the mission of the Prophet) the same word of command still remained upon his tongue.

"On this account," said he, "I bear the countenance of a hog, and these other hogs are the persons who fired upon the Mohameddians."

Having said this, he vanished. The travellers went on, and upon their arrival at Madras by means of the names and description which had been given to them they found out the sons and related the whole of the above story, upon which the sons abandoned the service of the Christians.

The Baillie (or Bailey) referred to was the Colonel in command of British forces that Tippoo routed in 1780 and 1782 while his father Hyder Ali was still alive. Tippoo had acquired some knowledge of military tactics from the French officers in his father's service.

In Mohammedan oneirocriticism swine symbolise bad or degraded people, and the same idea occurs in Greek mythology. It is interesting to compare with the above vision and also with the Greek story of Circe the Mohammedan

story of Nushirwan's dream. Nushirwan was a prince of the Sasanian dynasty. In his dream he was drinking out of golden goblet when a black hog approached and thrusting its head into the goblet it drank also. The Prince consulted his minister Burzurjmihr, who expounded the dream. Nushirwan's favourite princess, he said, had a black slave who was her lover. He suggested that the women of the harem should be ordered to dance undressed in the presence of the king. One of them showed hesitation in complying and being protected by the others, was hauled forth and discovered to be a Hindu male slave. So was the wazir's interpretation verified. The imagery of the dream is so obvious as not to require any further explanation.

To return to Tippoo, here is one of his dreams translated by Beatson :—

On the 12th of the month Behauree of the year Herausut, 1124 from the birth of Mohammed (about 19th May 1796), on the night of Thursday, the following day of which was Friday, and towards the morning, this servant of God had a dream.

Methought it was represented to the presence that a Frenchman of rank was arrived. I sent for him, and he came ; and when he came into the presence I was absorbed in business ; and when he came near I perceived him, and I rose up and embraced him. I caused him to be seated and enquired after his health. And methought the Christian said, "I am come with ten thousand men for the service of the Khooda-dauid Sircar (God-given Sircar). I have disembarked them all on the shore of the sea. They are all men of bold aspect, of robust form, and young. Having disembarked them all on the

shore of the sea, I am come to present myself."

And methought I said unto him: "It is well done; by the favour of God all the preparations of war are here in readiness, and all the followers of Islam are, tribe by tribe, ready to prosecute the holy war."

At this moment the morning dawned, and I woke.

The old English proverb that the wish is father to the thought is very applicable to such dreams as this. If Tippoo's dream had been realised in time, the history of India might have been completely different since the end of the eighteenth century. We have only to remember how Tippoo was about to begin his intrigues with France, and that those intrigues played a large part in the attempt of the French under Napoleon to conquer Egypt. His ultimate defeat and the fall of Seringapatam might certainly have been prevented or at least indefinitely postponed if he had not been disappointed in his expectations of French military support.

The next dream is dated by Beatson about 1786. It should be noted here that the dates are reckoned by Tippoo from the birth of the Prophet, a system invented by himself, instead of the orthodox Mohammedan calculation from the hejira (16 July, 622). This dream is placed by Tippoo "prior to the night attack upon the Marhattas" at Shanoor.

Methought a young man of a beautiful countenance, a stranger, came and sat down, and methought I jested with him in the manner that a person playfully talks with a woman; at the same time I am saying in my heart, "It is

not my custom to enter into playful discourse with any one." In the instant the youth rose, and, walking a few paces, returned, when he loosened his hair from beneath his turban and opening a fastening of his robe he displayed his bosom, and I saw it was a woman. I immediately called and seated her, and said unto her: "Whereas I before looked upon you as a woman, and jested with you, it now appears that you are indeed a woman, in the dress of a man. My conjecture has well succeeded."

In the midst of this discourse the morning dawned, and I awoke. I imparted my dream to the people about me and interpreted it thus: that please God these Marhattas have put on a clothing of men, but in fact are in character all women. By the favour of God and the aid of his prophet, on the 8th of the month and year above mentioned, on the morning of Saturday, I attacked the army of the infidels by surprise. I myself advancing with two or three hundred men, penetrated the camp of the infidels, crushing them as I went, as far as the tent of Hurry Punt Parkiah, and they all fled like women.

The date of the attack given above is two days later than that which is attached to the dream. The dream was on the Thursday night. His hatred of the British and desire to crush the Nizam and the Marhattas, and his fierce ambitions dominate most of the dreams recorded in the MS. volume. There are nine other dreams of Tippoo translated into English by N. Bland in a scholarly article on the Mohammedan Tâbir in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1856), all of which confirm the preceding observations. Even the last two dreams that Bland gives us are dominated by Tippoo's grandiose

ambition, although they have a special interest because they relate encounters with apparitions of the poets Sádi and Jámi, of whom the Sultan speaks with reverence, showing his respect for literature.

In fact one might say that Tippoo's dreaming would have been more fruitful to him if he had understood the wisdom in Tábír. In reading an article by W. Q. Judge in *The Path* (Aug. 1888) on "The Three Planes of Human Life" * I was especially struck by the application of certain theosophical principles not only to Tippoo's vain dreaming but to the dreaming of most of us. In the article, which describes the states of Jagrata, Swapna and Sushupti (waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep) the writer stresses the importance of purifying the waking state so that the experiences derived from Sushupti and passing through Swapna should not be all lost. He says:—

Jagrata acts on Swapna producing dreams and suggestions, and either disturbs the instructions that come down from the higher state or aids the person through waking calmness and concentration which tend to lessen the distortions of the mental experiences of dream life. Swapna again in its turn acts on the waking state (Jagrata) by the good or bad suggestions made to him in dreams. All experience and all religions are full of proofs of this. In the fabled Garden of Eden the wily serpent whispered in the ear of the sleeping mortal to the end that when awake he should violate the command. In Job it is said that God instructeth

man in sleep, in dreams and in visions of the night. And the common introspective and dream-life of the most ordinary people needs no proof. Many cases are within my knowledge where the man was led to commit acts against which his better nature rebelled, the suggestion for the act coming to him in dream. It was because the unholy state of his waking thoughts infected his dreams, and laid him open to evil influences. By natural action and reaction he poisoned both Jagrata and Swapna.

Although the theosophical terms are exchanged for others, the same predominating principle of self-purification as the basis of right-dreaming and true interpretation runs through all the books of dream wisdom, the most deservedly famous of which in the ancient world is that of the Greek Artemidorus, whose system of interpretation no doubt greatly influenced Arabic teachers. There is no radical difference between the dreams of a Tippoo Sultan or a Bonaparte and the dreams of the majority of spiritually undisciplined people, except only that blindness to the light and deafness to the voice of wisdom has more widespread and damaging consequences in the world when the vain dreamer possesses great power. It may be that one road to the millennium is by right-dreaming, and that indeed there can be no earthly paradise of goodness and beauty that is not a final conscious realisation of the divinity that we attain in the pure dreamless sleep of Sushupti.

R. L. MÉGROZ

* Reprinted in *U. L. T. Pamphlet—No. 11*, on the subject of Dreams.

THE VISION OF EROS IN JESUS AND SHAKESPEARE

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In Hindu philosophy Kamadeva—the God of Love—has two aspects—personal and impersonal. These correspond with the Greek Cupid and Eros—the former blind, the latter endowed with vision.—Eds.]

I do not consider Shakespeare as a "teacher" in any usual sense. He is the most inclusive of poets. What is true of him is, usually, true of Western poetry as a whole. His work is therefore a pointer indicating fundamental tendencies of the Western mind; the great poet being not merely an entertainer but rather one who gives concrete and symbolic embodiment to those dark or bright impulses which mould the later history of the race. Great poetry is thus intrinsically prophetic. For these reasons I consider Shakespeare important.

In his early work we have two kinds of play: histories and the romantic comedies. The first analyse closely the intricacies of national life, the calls of King or party, the stress and turbulence of civil war, the glitter of martial honour and the glamour of royalty; the epic nobility of England's troubled and blood-stained story. These plays are concerned primarily with the body politic, and the concept of "order" is fundamental throughout. Within their plots, however, we have frequent reminder of the individual's spiritual longing, and this is, in Shakespeare, usually a matter of human love. This is the dominant

theme of the other group, the romantic comedies. In them the fleeting dreams of romantic happiness that torture and deceive the tragic destinies of mankind are endowed with a more than kingly authority and assurance. The history plays are realistic, the comedies romantic. The one group shows life as it is; the other, as we might well wish it to be.

The second half of Shakespeare's work marks a change in style. Henceforward he blends the two modes, relating the individual's pain and frustration, his romantic desire, his conflicting allegiances, to the body of which he forms part. Though the stress is on the individual, the relative importance of state-order is never neglected. So we have "Hamlet," the problem plays "Troilus and Cressida" and "Measure for Measure," "Othello," "Macbeth," "Lear" "Timon" and "Coriolanus". In various ways the protagonists are shown as at odds with their environment; all, in various ways, fail to project their passionate instincts into harmonious action; but with all we feel the conflict is itself of some mysterious creative significance. Herein, by close understanding, we may penetrate the mystery of suffering and evil, their necessity

and creative strength. Succeeding these plays we have "Antony and Cleopatra". This is scarcely a tragedy in the usual sense. The protagonists, it is true, are again at odds with their environment; but they accomplish, poetically, an apocalyptic love-union with each other in their dying. The play is toned brightly to harmonise with this revelation as we are lifted to a height where human desire and failure radiate outwards a conquering brilliance, a light which is immortality. This play is probably the closest approach the human mind has ever made to revealing the mystic riches of death.

Beyond this, no poet can well be expected to advance. But in his final plays Shakespeare creates a series of love-parables whose plots of loss in tempest and reunion to music correspond, as I have shown in *Myth and Miracle*, to the vision of immortality more directly exposed in "Antony and Cleopatra". In these last plays from "Pericles" to "The Tempest" the interest is almost entirely concentrated on personal love, loss, and reunion. "Cymbeline," it is true, has a complex plot involving national issues and warfare: but even there the most vital effects tend towards the transcendental and mystical. In Shakespeare's former work we saw two main themes: personal love and state order. The final plays reveal a spiritual rather than political salvation. Here we are concerned primarily with love, birth, death and resurrection.

What are we to make of this conclusion? Chiefly this, I think:

that the ultimate realities for humanity are matters not of statecraft but rather the vast simplicities of life, love, and death. For through love alone can life become significant and death a positive, not a negative, experience. So in Shakespeare love at the last is divinely guarded. Tossed by jealousy, wrecked by unfaithfulness, it yet reaches the magic island in whose music all is restored and forgiven. National problems have ceased, it would seem, to weigh down and impede the poet's personal aspiration and visionary wisdom.

Yet this love is not a tranquil emotion: nor is it only spiritual. Rather it is a warm, passionate, unrestful, very human love. Let us call it Eros. Now Jesus also preaches love: love universal. This is to be distinguished from the Shakespearian Eros in that it is not limited to individual persons. Jesus repudiates those who are not prepared to leave their families for the sake of the Realm of God. To him mankind in general is the only true family. Yet this love is vastly beyond the comprehension of most of us: since it is not only a matter of dutiful sacrifice but, properly understood, is itself rich with romantic splendours and romantic pain. Not transcendental merely, but instinctive; not merely divine, but natural. We must pay exact regard to Jesus' imagery. Continually he embodies his teaching in concrete poetic figures: the vine, fig-tree, harvest; flocks of the field and birds of the air; food, drink, clothing, money; and the marriage-banquet. Here is a symbolism sug-

gesting life, growth, richness and all creative excellence. Therefore the love to which he calls us is the consummation and direction, in no sense the negation, of the richest instincts in man; as though the Realm of God were the natural and instinctive goal of the human race and Jesus came, not to demand a sacrificial and other-worldly pilgrimage, but to point the way to fulfilment of our deepest and most universal desires; to reveal, not only God, but Man, to mankind.

Therefore the New Testament can be shown to solve the Shakespearian antinomy of state-order and the individual's romantic pain. In terms of the Gospel of Love—and only in such terms—the two converge. It is significant that Shakespeare continually sees the community as a "body," an organism, of which the individual is as a limb: whereas St. Paul, too, sees the brotherhood of man as a "body," the Body of Christ. Perfect love thus fulfils the creative purposes of individual and state alike. And, like the Shakespearian Eros, Christian love is, in St. Paul's writings, the very gateway to immortality.

Throughout Shakespeare the direct influence of Christianity is powerful. Not only are there passages—the most beautiful in English religious literature—of direct Christian sentiment; but one play in particular, as I show in *The Wheel of Fire*, is almost a thesis on Christian ethics. Numerous single persons are, in their contexts, Christ-figures of a sort. That is, they express an inclusive love, a universal wisdom: such are King

Henry VI, the Friar in "Romeo and Juliet," Theseus in "A Midsummer Night's Dream," the Duke in "Measure for Measure," Cerimon in "Pericles," Prospero in "The Tempest". These saintly figures are not, however, quite so richly conceived as, say, Cleopatra or Hamlet. Shakespeare does not, perhaps cannot, create a universal love as glamorous and compelling as a purely human romance. It is as though he is intellectually aware of the saintly consciousness while not having experienced it with the strongest emotional fervour. He knows, however, that, at its best, the saintly ideal can reconcile the conflict of personal desire and state-order: observe how his Henry VI, the Duke in "Measure for Measure," and Prospero are all studious characters to whom government is painful; but how the two latter, after sacrificing political duty to personal aspiration, eventually undertake again, with deeper insight, the responsibilities of ducal authority. And perhaps this is why Shakespeare wrote one more play after "The Tempest". For long he had been engaged on spiritual and personal problems: perhaps his own problems. What religion there is in the tragedies and final plays is, more or less, the result of his own religious speculation. But in "The Tempest" he sees the convergence of human charity and state-order, as Prospero leaves his magic island and returns to the world of men. Therefore in "Henry VIII" Christian Orthodoxy floods in to possess, for the first time, a

Shakespearian play with assertive splendour and transcendental statement. Here angelic figures tread the stage, and England's futurity is shown as something of prophetic wonder. The grand sequence of plays ending in "The Tempest" has driven the greatest poet of the modern world through the agonies and paradisal ecstasy of Eros to a self-forgetting nationalism and the peace of Christ.

But Shakespeare's saints, such as Prospero, remain austere, a little colourless. Put them beside Cleopatra, and they show, like Octavia, "a statue rather than a life". We have yet unresolved our antinomy of Christ-love and Eros. It presses hard on us to-day. Either we give our allegiance to Eros; most artists do this, and, also, the philosophers and scientists, since under "art" all such studies may be subsumed; and each and all again are subject to Eros. Or we may give our allegiance to Jesus, sacrificing the urge of instinctive desire to an ethical purpose which we have never vitally experienced, rigidly subduing our aspirations to the limits of communal morality. Neither ideal is complete. Many -- indeed most -- suffer inward tension and torment, divided between these directions. Yet only in so far as we can see, feel, and make them to converge do we help onward the great purposes of incarnate life. But every such attempt itself involves a conflict. And yet this is,

fundamentally, the only true Christianity. For Jesus is not, finally, to be equated with Shakespeare's saintly persons: rather in him we find a blending of saintly peace and universal assurance with the unrestful propulsive quality of Eros. He is, as it were, driven on by a mighty power that leaves him no rest, driving him from his family and home into the romantic drama of his tragic ministry. He is a God-tormented lover, suffering from Eros like Desdemona or Troilus. Thus to follow him is no peaceful task. It involves conflict, unreachable desire, agony: for without the throes of continual birth there can be no truly creative life. Herein, as I see it, is the strength of creative Christianity, the partiality of all wisdom-religions and the fallacy of passive mysticism. So the Eros and the Christ are one. And whenever we forget that Jesus calls us not only to a mystic tranquillity but also to an impassioned adventure; to a love which is bitter-sweet as Eros, as life-giving and yet as ruthless as He; to a surrender as final and irrevocable as the surrender of the most passionate love; until, indeed, we include the myriad complex passions of Shakespeare's tragic and romantic world in a richly passionate Christianity--until then, we talk of things we do not understand and offer up incense to an abstraction.

G. WILSON KNIGHT

INDIAN MISREPRESENTATIONS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

[That some Indian authors have been as unsuccessful as Western Orientalists in interpreting the thought of India to the Occident is the thesis of our learned contributor. **Dr. R. Naga Raja Sarma**, son of a distinguished South Indian Pandit, brings to this critique the fruit of training under Indian Pandits of various schools, in addition to his formal education, which culminated in the doctorate in philosophy conferred by Madras University. His doctoral dissertation is regarded as the first authoritative exposition of the works of Madhvacharya, the founder of the Dvaita system of Vedanta, little known in the Western world. Dr. Naga Raja Sarma is lecturer in philosophy at Government College, Kumbakonam, and a contributor to serious journals.—EDS.]

It is a fact to which chronologists, chroniclers, and critical historians have borne eloquent testimony, that the culture and civilisation of ancient India had once reached a point of perfection in respect of secular and spiritual disciplines which engendered envy in some and despair in others. That was long, long before the dawn of modern European and American civilisation. Under the intoxicating influence of successful scientific discoveries and their application to making life more and more attractive and comfortable, Western civilisation increasingly inclines to an unmitigated glorification of the deeds of man, and to what it describes as a rational elimination of man's allegiance to his Maker, with a concomitant callousness to moral and religious values. When, through a concatenation of circumstances, into an analysis of which it is needless to enter in the course of the present investigation, the destinies of India became firmly and definitely linked with those of Western nations through commercial and political allegiance, interest in India's culture gradual-

ly developed. The vast and almost inexhaustible mass of Sanskrit literature (I am dropping all reference to non-Sanskrit literature for purposes of this discussion) began to be studied and investigated. The Vedas, which are admitted to be the earliest documents available of some sustained rational activity of man, were translated and their contents made available for critical scrutiny by Western savants and connoisseurs. With the advance of time and with a gradual growth of interest in ancient Indian literature, the Epics, the Upanishads, the Bhagavad-Gita, the Brahma Sutras (Vedanta Sutras) and commentaries on the said Sutras (aphorisms or apothegms) by Sankara and Ramanuja, were placed before the Western public. Dramas and prose compositions, treatises on grammar and rhetoric, works on arts and crafts, medical books, and works in Sanskrit on politics and state-craft have been studied by Western scholars in translations and monographs. The six famous schools of thought, the Darsanas—Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Sankhya, Yoga, Purvameemamsa or Karma-

Meemamsa, and Uttara-Meemamsa or Vedanta—in their turn have received some very close and systematic attention at the hands of Western writers. 28.555

I

As far as I have been able to attempt an analysis, the work done up to the present by Western scholars and researchers in the field of Sanskrit language and literature can be conveniently assigned to three categories: (1) A group of investigators has confined itself to philological problems; and comparative philology with especial reference to Sanskrit has absorbed the best attention of many a scholar. (2) Sympathetic admirers of Indian philosophical systems, who, dissatisfied with the solutions offered by Western schools of theology and metaphysics, on the problems of life and death, here and hereafter, would gladly turn to Eastern wisdom for spiritual inspiration, guidance and consolation, constitute the second category. Scholars belonging to this category have applauded unreservedly the excellence of the philosophical truths proclaimed by the Upanishads and the Darsanas, gladly and readily running the risk of unpopularity at home. (3) Hostile critics urged by a megalomaniacal contempt for Eastern culture and civilisation have not hesitated to condemn Indian philosophy as a worthless discipline, and as an unsystematised inchoate nebulousity of Maya, Karma, Samsara, and Moksha. A strange yet simple piece of illogic makes them conclude that a coun-

try politically subordinated to another and unprogressive in sciences and industries could never have developed or constructed useful systems of philosophy and attractive systems of morality and religion. These distinguished die-hards constitute the third category.

Three other minor categories are also discernible: (a) Missionary and ecclesiastical workers whose vision is beclouded by theological prejudices and predilections write and speak disparagingly of Indian philosophy and religion, believing that to be the best way of carrying on intellectual proselytization. They form a category to reckon with. (b) Those who think in terms of the League of Nations and Intellectual Co-operation and of International Committees associated with it, admit sometimes in a patronising, and at other times in a sycophantic, manner that Indian philosophy has a message of its own for the West. (c) University teachers and enterprising publishers who, when they find books on Indian philosophy marketable, occasionally utter a word of praise for the religions and philosophies of India.

II

Indian scholars, who were the first to turn to advantage the Western system of education introduced by the rulers, have contributed what they could to an interpretation of Indian philosophy and religion to the West. With increased and ever-increasing facilities for travel, with the perfection of the means of international communica-

tion, and with a gradual breaking down of the barriers of sacerdotalism, blind orthodoxy, and conservatism, many Indian teachers, professors, and researchers have worked at different foreign universities interested in the advancement of Eastern learning. The earliest attempts at exposition of the doctrines of Indian philosophy betray a lack of adequate command over the technical philosophical terminology that has been current coin in Indian thought from time immemorial. Indian scholars who had drunk deep at the fountain of Western education ignored their own culture and philosophy; as a result, the orthodox Pandits, who had cultivated the spirit of obscurantism, since they rightly considered that philosophical pearls should not be cast before those unable to appreciate them, became the custodians of the traditionally transmitted truths of religion and philosophy. The English-educated and *pro-tanto* civilised refused to come to any intelligent understanding with the Pandits, whom they considered hide-bound by orthodoxy and conservatism.

Foreigners took merely anthropological interest in writing expositions and attempting critical studies of Indian philosophical systems. They failed in a majority of cases sympathetically to appreciate and understand the genuine significance and spirit of the texts studied by them. They restricted their activities to some ancient treatises and ignored altogether the extensive mass of controversial literature. The early Indian at-

tempts at interpretation of Eastern wisdom to the West reveal not a very precise or commensurate control over the terminology of European philosophy.

III

The Indian stir or unrest has had its repercussions on Indian philosophy and religion. During the last decade or two, expositions of Indian philosophy by Indians acquainted with the systems and the terminology of the West (especially philosophical technique and terminology in English) have been published. Two outstanding attempts at an interpretation of Indian Darśanas to the West are, respectively, by Sir S. Radhakrishnan, D.Litt., and Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, Ph. D. The former completed his survey of Indian thought in two volumes, *Indian Philosophy*, devoting the first to the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Gita, Jainism, and Buddhism, and the second to the six well-known systems -- Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Sankhya, Yoga, Purvameemamsa, and the Vedanta. The latter has published two volumes, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, the first of which contains an account of the philosophy of the Vedas, the Brahmanas, and the Upanishads, together with a treatment of Jainism, Buddhism, the Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Sankhya, Yoga and Purvameemamsa systems, and a part of the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara; while the second deals with the remaining part of the Advaita Vedanta, Yoga-Vashishta, speculation in medical literature, and the philosophy of the Gita. Subse-

quent volumes of his *History of Indian Philosophy* have been promised by this writer.

It cannot be denied that both the authors have done splendid service in the cause of Indian philosophy. Their scholarship is widely recognised and admired. They have an international status as philosophers.

IV

Whether the portraiture of the "Decline of the West" painted by Spengler be faithful or not, whether or not the forebodings of Dean Inge prove true, there is no doubt that Western civilisation, with its exaggerated emphasis on the glorification of the work of man and with its portentous preoccupation with the values of comfortable existence, self-aggrandisement, and exploitation of the weak by the strong, is now realised to be incapable of affording genuine spiritual satisfaction or consolation. Occasionally at least the West is sure to look to the East for spiritual guidance. Ancient Indian philosophy has a message universal in appeal. It is natural that Indians acquainted with the texts, traditions and truths of the Vedānta are the best fitted to interpret and convey the message to others.

Unfortunately, modern Indian attempts are too strongly coloured by the conclusions of Western orientalist, philologist, chronologist and others to be entitled to be described as faithful to the original texts and traditions. Personal influence at Western seats of learning, and Western publications have exercised a subtle

hypnotic effect over the minds of modern Indian interpreters of Indian philosophy to the West, who have emphasized either doubtful parallelisms between Western and Eastern doctrines or have destroyed the individuality of Indian doctrines altogether. This is indeed a deplorable state of affairs.

Modern Indian attempts, further, reveal a nervous anxiety to fall into line with Western concepts, and a pathetic susceptibility to the critical judgment of Western scholars. It is too late in the day to contend that a doctrine not accepted by the Western critical intelligentsia or connoisseurs is *per se* devoid of philosophical value or significance. It is the duty of Indian scholars to interpret the doctrines embodied in their sacred texts faithfully, without distortions or torturing of texts, and regardless of any nervous fear of whether or not such an interpretation will be favourably received in the West.

Consider, for instance, cardinal doctrines like "Karma," "Maya," and other intricacies of Indian metaphysical system-building. If doctrines like these have been held by Western critics to be unsound and unsatisfactory there is no reason to be disconcerted or disheartened. It is the duty of Indian scholars to express and expound, in terminology that is current coin, the truths of Indian philosophy embodied in the ancient Sanskrit texts and treatises, without taking liberties with the language used, and without doing violence to terse technical terms and to the spirit and import sought to be

conveyed by them. Whether modern critics of philosophical tendencies will admire Indian doctrines or will condemn them should be a question of absolutely minor importance. Indian doctrines have to be presented to the Western world in their pristine purity and in their indigenous historical and philosophical settings. The dishing and garnishing of Indian doctrines are detrimental alike to consumers and to the culinary artists of Indian philosophy.

V

Miss Mayo seems to have studied Indian social customs and conditions just with a view to slinging mud at them. She does not appear to have moved even her little finger to better them. Bettering is India's look out. Mud slinging is hers. There have been critics of Indian thought of her calibre. The Vedas and the Upanishads have been described to be the babblings of child-humanity. On the other hand the Upanishads have been admitted

by yet others to have been the solace of their life and the solace of their death.

If, in any keen struggle of existence, Indian systems of philosophy prove weak and unequal, let them perish. Nobody need be sorry for any such outcome of that struggle. If the systems survive, they survive on account of their inherent virility and vitality. The tardy and grudging recognition of the value of Indian systems and reference to them as if they existed merely on sufferance, are repugnant to those whose conviction of the intrinsic worth and spiritual satisfyingness of the Indian systems is deep and grounded on a correct understanding of the genuine significance of the texts and traditions.

I propose to show, by the courtesy of the Editors of THE ARYAN PATH, that from the treatment of the problem of Indian philosophy attempted by Drs. Radhakrishnan and Das Gupta the genuine Indian orientation is absent.* The opinions

* Defiance of tradition by the author of *Indian Philosophy* is palpable when he uncritically adopts the rendering of "Vishishtadvaita" as "Qualified non-Dualism" which is "Qualified Monism" (Vol. 1, p. 259, and Vol. 2, p. 661). It is *not* Monism at all. It is Pluralism, as it admits three entities which are irreducible to one another, Chit, Achit, and Isvara (animate, inanimate, and the Supreme). The Supreme is immanent in matter. It is likewise immanent in finite spirits. *Chidvishishtachidvishishtayoh a dvaitam. i. e., "The Supreme in immanence with matter is 'Achid-vishishta.' The Supreme in immanence with finite spirits is 'Chid vishishta.' The Supreme is One."* Or the immanence may be expressed in respect of the manifest and unmanifest stages of existence of both matter and spirit. *Shuluchi-lachidvishisht-Sukshma-chidachidvishishtayoh advaitam.* "The Supreme is immanent in matter and spirit-manifest. It is equally immanent in matter and spirit-unmanifest. The Supreme is One." Ramanuja's Monism is neither qualified nor modified. It is not Monism at all.

Defiance of tradition by the author of *A History of Indian Philosophy* is equally painful. In rendering the term "Asitah" which occurs in *Brihadaranyaka* (3-9-26, again 4-2-4, and 4 5-15) he suggests, "It is evidently the ablative of *asi* a sword," and complains that "Deussen, Max Müller, and Roer have all misinterpreted this passage". (Vol. 1, p. 45). I regret to note that Dasgupta, Deussen, Max Müller, and Roer are in the same boat. The term is emphatically *not* an ablative, nor is there any reference to the sword. Sankara interprets it as "A-baddhah." The term "Asitah" means *not in bondage*, hence free. Followers of the school of Madhva have adopted the same interpretation (*Brihadaranyaka-khandartha*). The term should be interpreted in no other manner. It is on a par with terms like "Asangah," "Agrahyah," etc., occurring in the same context. (For Sankara's interpretation, see *Brihadaranyaka*, p. 515, Anandasrama Press, Poona, Edition.)

and judgments of Western orientalists, chronologists, and philologists in respect of Indian philosophical problems and issues have influenced them in no small measure.

The Upanishads, the Bhagavad-Gita, and the Vedanta Sutras form three textual totalities or unities around which destructive and constructive philosophical attempts have centred. A rational philosophical quest is always directed to the solution of three problems of fundamental importance. The problems relate (1) to the elucidation of the nature of the Finite and the Infinite, (2) to a determination of the philosophical status and characteristics of external reality, and (3) to an explanation of the final goal and destiny of man-liberation from the ills of recurring cycles of births and deaths (phantasmagoria of metempsychosis, in the words of a Western interpreter of the Upanishads). The three problems have been thoroughly discussed in the Gita, the Upanishads and the Sutras. I shall narrate the conclusions embodied in these texts, taking care to preserve

intact the genuine Indian orientation, which I submit is missing and absent from the works of the two doctors. Thus, the Gita, the Upanishads and the Sutras will form respectively, the subject-matter of exposition, in the three succeeding contributions. If the series enables the readers of *THE ARYAN PATH* to arrive at a correct estimate of the value and the spiritual satisfyingness of the solutions contained in ancient Indian texts of the permanent and persistent problems of philosophy, it will have fulfilled its purpose. At the suggestion of the Editors the series has been made pre-eminently descriptive and expository. It is neither artificially academic nor combatively controversial, though it would be easy to establish the conclusions of the series by means of the standardised species of Vedantic debate—Vada-Jalpa and Vitanda. The main thesis of the series is that Indian philosophical truths should be expounded as they are, without torturing texts and traditions.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

MY NOTE BOOK

Modern Knowledge and Ancient—Disappearance of Soul—Science—Coins—Conventional and Intrinsic Values—The Absolutely Intrinsic forever Unknowable—Bio-Chemistry in 600 A. D.—Men and Things Radio-Active.

[Friends and admirers of A. R. Orage, Editor of *The New English Weekly*, describe him as a practical mystic, others as an impatient idealist; either way, he and his newspaper are forces to reckon with in the building of a new society everywhere. In this quarterly instalment of his "Note Book" he makes use of Analogy, which is the guiding law in Nature, the only true Ariadne's thread that can lead us, through the inextricable paths of her domain, towards her primal and final mysteries.—EDS.]

Suppose that the capacity to carry on the discipline of modern science were to atrophy in the world, but that our text-books remained to be discovered by a future generation,—what would our remote descendants make of them? If they had reason they could not but conclude that our scientific dissertations appeared to exhibit reason. And since many of them would appear to refer to practical results they could not but conclude that there seemed to be method in our unintelligibility. Ultimately, perhaps, or possibly through the agency of a few people who had preserved the traditions, our science might begin to be understood; and little by little, if all went well, our text-books would be read as intelligently as they were written. I am often tempted to employ this parallel when reading the "ancient scriptures". Nobody with reason can deny that, however indecipherable, fantastic and irrelevant they may appear, they have the form and formality not only of reason but of exact reasoning. And nobody, again, of any judgment

can deny that at least they appear to be concerned about practical matters and about practical matters of obviously the very highest importance to the authors. Of relatively late years, moreover, the parallel can be carried into the field of interpretation and revival. Many of us remember, as one of our greatest experiences, the translation into modern language of some of the ancient texts by Madame Blavatsky. It is true that even Madame Blavatsky could not reduce the ancient wisdom to the level of our ordinary understanding; but without the smallest doubt she convinced many of us, first, that the ancient wisdom of the soul was once a science; secondly, that its disappearance from the world was not on account of its supersession by a superior science, but on account of some temporary occultation of the higher faculties of man; thirdly, that the tradition of the science remained and possibly continued to be taught by its masters and practised by its pupils; and, finally, that it was concerned with the highest values, without the realisation of which all our

civilisation is doomed merely to creep, as it were, on the ground. What, and much more, the translation of the Rosetta tablet was to our knowledge of Cuneiform, Madame Blavatsky's discovery of a key to the ancient science was, and will be, to the world's knowledge of its own spiritual past and future. It is even unimportant to inquire whether Madame Blavatsky did anything else, or, indeed, was anything else than an inspired "reader" of the long-dead and forgotten language. In the history of values still to be realised she will rank as the great re-discoverer and initiator.

* * *

Another analogy. We have all seen children playing with coins of different values and discriminating them, not by their conventional differences, but by properties irrelevant to their value: their size, for instance, or their colour and polish. The realisation of relative monetary values, irrespective of irrelevant signs, is one of the landmarks in the development of the child's mind. The parallel in the case of grown-ups is their almost universal failure to discriminate values in almost every other department of life save in precisely the department of money. It would almost seem, in fact, that with the successful effort to overcome childish ignorance in the matter of money-values, the majority of mankind ceased making any effort to discriminate other values. This is not to say that mankind in general does not love to play with values—the values, for instance of Biology

and Ethics, Art and Religion, Science and Philosophy (I have named, in their proper ascending order, all but the comprehensive seventh value). These values have the attraction for mankind that coins have for children. But it is obvious that, in the first place, their discrimination is not according to their proper relative qualities,—or mankind would agree about them; and, in the second place, that very few people are even interested in their proper relation—or all our differences of opinion would at least be referred to the ultimate conventions. A dispute among children concerning the relative value of coins would only occur when one of them began to question the arbitrary discriminations. Thereafter, presumably, either they would all accept the definitions of grown-ups, or, at worst, they would continue to "play" but in the knowledge that they were only "making believe". In the case of adults and the higher values, however, not only do the majority "play," but they decline to listen to what they regard as "authority" (though real authority is only the declaration of the convention) and, in consequence, they continue to play without even the suspicion that they are playing. *De gustibus*, they say, *non est disputandum*; exactly as children might say that the difference of coin-values is a matter of taste and not of reason. On the contrary, I look forward (as well as backward) to a culture in which precisely matters of taste in values are subject to dispute and final settlement; in which, perhaps,

only such matters are considered worth disputing.

* * *

In using the word "convention" for the proper order of relative values I am again employing analogy. But the analogy this time is rather more subtle. We know very well that the relative values of coins is conventional in the sense that they are man-made. On the other hand, though man-made, and therefore not intrinsic, the vast majority of people are unaware that they are so, and, what is more, these conventional values work *as if* they were intrinsic. Though gold and silver and copper have no intrinsic differences of value, the man-made convention of their difference acts as if they had; in other words, in the society where they are current, copper, silver, and gold of equal quantities command relatively different responses from society. What I wish to, if I dare, suggest, is that the differences of values in the universal field are as much a convention as the differences of value in coins; only that, in the larger field, the convention is Logos-made, and the "society" in which they are current is our world. Only such a supposition, I think, gives meaning and importance to values at all. If their ordering is not due to intelligence, if their currency with their established difference is not intentional and purposive, if they are not, in fact, instituted (on the analogy of money-values) for and in the interests of the Great Society, then no dispute as to their relation is more than a waste of words and a mock-

ery of reason. It is true that in accepting the highest values as only a convention (albeit Logos-made and not man-made) we are still removed from the absolute intrinsic; but, in the first place, the absolutely intrinsic is forever unknowable, being, as it is, the Potential of an infinity of Actuals; in the second place, the convention, though not absolutely intrinsic, may be intrinsic in our Actual world; and, finally, exactly as the convention of money-differences works *as if* the differences were intrinsic, so the conventions of value in the Great Society of our world may, and I think, do work as if they were intrinsic. I forbear to risk vulgarising the conception by reminding myself that Emerson said that "our world" is like a shop where you can buy anything in stock with the proper values.

The history of Bio-chemistry, we are told, though short, is already glorious; but the science has a long, long way to go before even beginning to catch up with its predecessors in sixth-century Hindu thought, and still further to pass it. My friend A. E., the well-known Irish poet, painter and mystic, remarked to me the other day that the faculties of man are "radio-active"; their presence, or rather, the substance of their presence, produces effects of an entirely different order from the effects of their manifest activity. And it was thus that he accounted for the extraordinary "influence" that people, and not only people, but all things,

exert on each other unconsciously and untraceably. Without accepting as precise the phrase "radio-active" (and I am sure that A.E. had no intention of strictly scientific meaning) the suggestion of reciprocal bio-chemical influences arising from the neighbouring or even remotely separated "presences" of beings is distinctly valuable, and points, perhaps, to a field of observation and experiment so far untilled by the young science of Bio-chemistry. It is too soon, in fact, to demand any psychological results of the new science.

Much, much remains to be re-done, even in the matter of metabolisms, before the modern bio-chemist can begin to compare with his Hindu forerunners. On the other hand, the greatest service to the new science, next to that of working practically in it, is to keep its windows open on the widest possible vistas; and to be unsatisfied, if not dissatisfied, with anything less than its achievement of the understanding of the psychology of chemistry—or, as the ancients called it, Alchemy.

A. R. ORAGE

CULTURAL INSULARITY

The great philosophers and teachers are the glory of humanity. No country can claim them as its peculiar property or demand credit for their appearance in its midst. Nor does the message of the world's great thinkers and teachers belong to any given age. The hall-mark of truth, as of art, is its universality. That which is true, like that which is beautiful, possesses a validity that is of place as little as of time.

But there is pride of time, subtler and more widespread than pride of place. It exalts the present era. The latest scientific theory, the book just off the press, the *dernier cri* in art, drama, education, philosophy—that is the best. "The new age speaks; let all the voices of the past be still!" Such pride we

could imagine the leaves feeling that flutter for a season on a tree. "See, we have life and motion, all the rest is dead wood merely, that we try to hide." But where were they without the moving sap that courses through the trunk we see, and from the roots deep hidden from the sight of man? The first step towards their fall is their insulation against the life of the parent tree.

The lesson for our modern age is not to insulate ourselves against the living stream of thought that is our heritage, the message of past eras that, assimilated, still can give us strength. Let the Wise speak, be they of ancient or of modern times, of this land or of that, nor heed the clamorous throng who would deny them hearing!

PH. D.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

MAN VERSUS THE MACHINE*

[D. L. Murray, author, journalist, and critic, has written several thoughtful articles for THE ARYAN PATH. In our first volume appeared "Is A New Religion Emerging?" More recently he has contributed "Natural and Spiritual Mysticism," "Plato's Message for the Moderns," and "Plato, the Religious Seer," the last of which appeared in April of the last year. In this article he analyses a symposium of South African thought on the present world picture.—EDS.]

This volume represents the laudable endeavour of the Witwatersrand University to fulfil that part of its educational work which comprises "the spread of culture among the people as a whole". In a series of ten admirable lectures some of its most distinguished teachers (including also General Smuts, the author of the now famous "Holistic" philosophy) seek to give the general public a conspectus of the changes brought about in the modern world-view by recent advances in science, psychology, economics and philosophy. It is impossible not to be struck by the vigour and freshness with which these S. African teachers attack their difficult problems, and if no closely coherent system of thought emerges from their contributions this does not destroy the value of what, after all, is primarily a voyage of spiritual exploration.

In view of the diverse character of the volume it was an excellent idea to get Prof. R. F. A. Hoernlé to exercise the co-ordinating function belonging to his status as a teacher of philosophy and sum up the principal conclusions of the

enquiry. Readers might do worse than follow the example of the present reviewer, who began with Prof. Hoernlé's lecture, though placed last in the book. It is a shrewd and lucid piece of analysis, and this reviewer's gratitude for it is not dimmed by the fact that the theories of the previous contributors with which he is most in sympathy are in the main those about which Mr. Hoernlé feels most doubt. This is particularly so in the case of Prof. J. Y. T. Greig's outspoken denunciation of the tyranny of machinery in modern civilisation in his lecture "Literature in the Machine Age." Prof. Greig points out that since about 1800 English literature has been essentially a literature of revolt or escape, the work of minds "ill at ease" in their environment—a fact which is hardly to be denied. It is as true of the great poets, for the most part, as of Carlyle, Newman, Arnold, Ruskin or Morris. For Mr. Greig the explanation of this fact is to be sought in the progressive dominance of the machine over man and the disillusioned literature of the latest age of all

* *Our Changing World-view. Ten Lectures.* (University of the Witwatersrand Press, Johannesburg. 10s. 6d.)

shows that this state of spiritual unrest has only been intensified and exacerbated since the War. He maintains that—

in the latter half of the eighteenth century, European man, led, I regret to say, by the British people, turned up a blind alley in pursuit of a will-o'-the-wisp called Power over Nature, and has been racing at a constantly accelerating speed along this blind alley ever since.

With Mr. Greig's main position this writer is in hearty agreement, though some discrimination is in our opinion needed when we come to consider the five evils which Mr. Greig attributes to the dominance of the machine in modern life. These evils are

(1) "In proportion as it has bestowed on man increased power over Nature, it has withdrawn him from the influences of Nature."

(2) It has established a false scale of values. "The good life is being measured in terms of enamelled bathtubs."

(3) The products of the Machine Age are "increasingly all of a pattern, standardized, stereotyped, without variety and without individuality".

(4) So far from increasing profitable leisure, "experience shows that mechanized work renders nine-tenths of the world fit only for mechanized play".

(5) The Machine Age is driven more and more to the belief that "power is itself a good, an end in itself instead of just a means that can be used for good or evil ends at choice."

It must be owned that (2) and (5) hardly seem *necessary* consequences of a Machine Civilisation. A religious community existing for religious contemplation or a philosophic community existing for intellectual research might

regulate the material basis of its life by Machinery without being false to its own scale of values. The assumption of (4) that "mechanized play" is bad depends on proving that "mechanized work" is bad, and the assumption of (1) depends on proving that Nature is a better environment than machinery. The real spear-point of the charge lies in (3) the destruction of vital individuality by the machine.

To maintain this we must have some clear idea (as Mr. Hoernlé rightly insists) of what we mean by a "machine". Those, for instance, who praise a windmill and condemn a steam-mill are really only preferring a machine that does not destroy the beauties of the countryside to a machine that does. And a sailing-boat is as truly a machine as a steam-ship. A machine can hardly be distinguished in the last resort from a tool, and without tools even the rudest civilisation is impossible. The real case for those who think along the lines of Mr. Greig lies in pointing out that in proportion as the machine is independent of the *living* control of the human factor, it (being a dead thing) tends to produce lifeless results. The painter's brush is a machine (or a tool) but it is so exquisitely responsive to his hand that the work he produces with its help has the immediate stamp of life and individuality. The sailing-ship (all seamen agree) gives more scope to the human agent than the steam-ship, hand-printing than machine-printing and so forth.

To allow machinery on a large scale to dominate the life of man, says Mr. Greig, "makes steadily and inevitably for the elimination of the arts, crushes out and destroys those human values which the arts have always fostered and upheld, and substitutes for them other values definitely lower in the scale." But it does not simply devastate the arts; since faculties and organs atrophy by disuse it must in the long run destroy the human type itself. If the machine is to be hands, limbs, eyes for us, we shall ultimately (like the "Martians" of Mr. Wells's fantasy) lose the very structure of human beings. The machine, which begins beneficently by enlarging and enhancing human faculty, ends by eliminating it and by disuse annihilating it. It begins as Life organizing matter for its purposes, and ends as matter becoming the substitute for Life. That is the case against the Machine Age, in the opinion of the present reviewer an unanswerable one.

Mr. Hoernlé in criticizing Mr. Greig occupies himself especially with one of the obviously deleterious consequences of machine domination, *viz.* that it does not so much "save labour" as "save labourers," — produce unemployment on a colossal scale. But since workless men draw no wages, there are fewer and fewer purchasers left for the goods that the machines are producing, so that in the end they destroy their own reason for being. Mr. Hoernlé replies to this that we must accept the fact of permanent

unemployment on the widest scale to be produced by machinery and reverse our traditional judgment that work is a blessing and idleness a misfortune or a crime. Much less must we continue to deprive men of their share in the output of machinery because they have not helped to produce it. "Leisure" will be the great fact in an age of perfected mechanization and the task before us is to find worthy employment for the hours of leisure.

Assuredly Mr. Hoernlé's view is the only rational and humane one to take in a machine-driven civilization, but what forms is this "noble employment of leisure" to assume? We can only think of three: (1) passive enjoyment, (2) active occupation of a non-productive character, (3) the "theoretic" life or life devoted to the things of the mind. The first of these, embracing trivial relaxations and watching or listening to the activities of others, artistic or skilful or sporting, is no doubt an element in the good life; but to make it the *predominant* element would surely degrade the race and justify the old denunciations of the idler. The second, active work which is not *real* work, would seem to be only the useless duplication of the energies of machinery! Mr. Hoernlé speaks of "skilled handicrafts". But if our clothes, furniture, housing, etc., are to be supplied by machinery, what need but luxury is served by handicrafts supervening? Mr. Hoernlé speaks of time to "cultivate their gardens," but if agriculture is interesting why res-

strict men to the production of the superfluities? Mr. Hoernlé holds that leisure will produce a "renaissance of the arts"—as if all history was not there to prove the creed of William Morris that great art is the expression of joy in action and work, not the embellishment of the lazy moment. Art is truly renascent when the tools and dwellings and clothing of man's daily life are made beautiful, not when ingenuity and fancy relieve the gaping stretches of inactivity. Machine-civilization promises to make whole populations of "idle rich"; one would have supposed that the proverbial *cnui* of the "idle rich" in the past would have set up a warning signal against that ideal. The violent sports to which the leisured classes are prone only show the impulse to creative energy which is inherent in man, deprived of its legitimate outlet. He must work, and will expend his bodily energies in the void of unending "games" if he is forbidden to employ them for more useful purposes.

As for the life of "theoria," Mr. Hoernlé begins his lecture by a humorous deprecation of the current belief that a "philosopher" is essentially a man employed about nothing worth while. He may be assured that the alleged futility of philosophers would become a very real one in a world in which the "mind" was radically divorced from action, and philosophy had no material but the day-dreams of a humanity which had resigned to machinery all effective contact with Nature and with Life.

We would not presume to say

to what extent Prof. Hoernlé's philosophic thought has been moulded by Hegel; but it is curious to note the extent to which he is in agreement with such a thorough-paced Hegelian as the late Bernard Bosanquet in his conservative distrust of theories that innovate on the assumptions of 19th century science and economics—your Hegelian distrusts any attempt to divert or reverse the set currents of thought as they have evolved in history. So, while coming to terms with the Machine Civilization, Mr. Hoernlé also criticizes the endeavours of other contributors to the volume, General Smuts, Prof. J. P. Dalton and Dr. Robert Broom, to re-introduce in one form or another the idea of *spontaneity* in the material world or in biologic evolution. His dialectics are (legitimately) effective against writers who, being more concerned perhaps with the conceptions of Science than those of Philosophy, have not at all points made their beliefs clear or distinguished sufficiently between physical and spiritual determination or rounded off their notions of creative freedom. The departure from the rigid conception of necessary causation which is involved in recognizing the *spontaneity* of Life (like Free Will and the power of Choice in man) still offers to Mr. Hoernlé the unacceptable paradox of "More out of Less" or "Something out of Nothing". Yet universal determination, such as to preclude genuine novelty, something unplanned and unpredictable, in the course of evolution, only presents us in the

end with the "block Universe" which is another form of mechanical theory—only here the whole cosmos is reduced to a machine, however stately its disguise of "spiritual" attributes.

A similar unwillingness to abandon the assumptions of mechanism is disclosed in Prof. C. S. Richard's lecture on "Our Changing Economic World" where, amid much that is valuable, we find the ideal of national self-sufficiency in economics condemned as unsparingly and uncompromisingly as if these were still the days of the triumphant Manchester school. No doubt Mr. Richards is not bound to Mr. Greig's revolt against the Machine Age; but local self-sufficiency is the only alternative to

machine mass-production, treating the world as a single unit. In the view of those like the present writer who consider the dominance of the Machine a menace to man's faculties and liberty, it is vital to the *spiritual* health of particular communities that they should preserve a balance of agriculture and industry (country and town values) and produce so far as possible the articles that they need by their own labour and with the stamp of their own individuality. . . . But to pursue these reflections would lead into the field of politics, and it is enough now to thank the bold and clear thinkers who have in these lectures provided such food for reflection.

D. L. MURRAY

A WAY TO JESUS*

[**Humbert Wolfe** combines in himself poetic genius and practical common sense—both of which are active, otherwise he could not have produced *The Uncelestial City* nor could he hold, as he does, the position of Principal Assistant Secretary to the Ministry of Labour. Mr. Wolfe first wrote for us in May 1931, and since then has contributed from time to time articles. His review of Mr. Andrews's book reveals him in both of his aspects—as poet and as man of affairs.—EDS.]

Some preliminary explanation of how I found it possible to comment upon *Christ in the Silence* is needed. At first sight it was a book of which for every reason I found myself unsuitable as a reviewer. In the first place Mr. Andrews does not address himself to the intellect. His way is through the emotions to communion. That has always been a way that I have distrusted, or perhaps envied.

Like T. H. Green, to whom Mr. Andrews refers, I have said of those to whom it was available, "You are very fortunate." In the second place it is an exposition, a very personal exposition of the way to Jesus intended primarily for those who have either lost the way or desire to find it. It is, moreover, a book for disciples. It has that atmosphere of intimate colloquy that belongs particularly

* *Christ in the Silence*. By C. F. ANDREWS. (Hodder & Stoughton, London. 5s.)

to small gatherings of the anxiously eager for revelation. I have no right to be of that company. I have, indeed, lost the way which Mr. Andrews follows and illuminates, but I have lost it because I never had it, and I cannot pretend that I am in search of it.

It would be right and honest, therefore, I thought as I read these loving pages, to entrust comment to more sympathetic hands. I will send it back, I said to myself, and ask that a work so informed with eager piety should be saluted by one of the same temper. But even as I came to this conclusion a doubt began to assail my mind. There was in the book so much and such simple goodness, so palpable and so modest a humanity, that gradually the figure of Mr. Andrews, quite apart from his teaching, began to crystallize in my mind. I saw him incessantly toiling, and never for himself. I watched him as a young man radiantly accepting Canon Ottley's guidance. I followed him in his journeys East and West (particularly East), and always he cared for others and never for himself. If he was occupied with the Kingdom of God, it was as a guide and never as one entering himself in triumph. More and more in his own despite there emerged the portrait of something very like a Saint. Clearly, Mr. Andrews would shudder if this name were applied to him, I thought, because being, as it seems, salt he cannot be aware of his own savour. For that is the way of salt. Nevertheless in this patient, honest

and entirely unliterary writing, there is a purpose so direct, a mission so evident that it compels not only the attention but the admiration of those who have forgotten the simplicities of life and of the heart. And, I said to myself, I have always believed that in the order of importance to mankind the saints are before the artists. The artists make the Bethesda pool of beauty, but the saints trouble it at certain hours so that it becomes the water of healing.

Nor was this conviction my only reason for paying a tribute to what Mr. Andrews had written in words and in a manner wholly alien to my cast of mind. I found that when all questions of Faith and unfaith were left on the one side, what he taught and what he believed was that the only way of saving for this storm-tossed world was through love and suffering. All about me I heard the raucous voices proposing a score of other remedies for the disease in the soul of the world. "Let us stimulate trade and abolish or increase tariffs," cried this one. "Let us multiply or destroy machinery," cried that. "Let us root out or enshrine capitalism," cried a third. "Let us have one man or a hundred million as the ruler," screamed another. "Action, action, action," they shouted in common. "Kill the capitalists, exterminate the Communists, drive out colour, worship (or denounce) gold. Do everything," they shouted, "but look into the silence of the heart lest we see, if not God, at least His

shadow in that dark glass." Mr. Andrews, on the other hand, goes back to the individual heart. The world, he knows, can only be won on the battlefield of the private spirit. All the Stock Exchanges of the two hemispheres supported by massed Dictators are idle straws in that wind. "Back to ourselves—and through ourselves to something beyond ourselves in love and suffering," whispers Mr. Andrews in the silence. That seems to me to be a more excellent way, and therefore, still not without a sense of unsuitability, I have ventured to say a word upon *Christ in the Silence*.

I cannot, and Mr. Andrews would not have me, unless it were my conviction, reach his goal, though it is my goal too, by his path. Nor am I moved, as he is moved, by the many testimonies from all parts of the world that he adduces to the truth of his gospel. But I can and do say two things. First, that for those who honourably profess the Christian faith, here is a man whom, both because of his words and acts, they can follow with enrichment. Mr. Andrews is not a scholar in the Gospels. He cannot resolve, nor does he seek to resolve, the intellectual tangles that the Scriptures present to metaphysically-minded persons. His way is the lover's way, the road of acceptance. Like Mother Julian of Norwich he would and does say, "Beseeching is a true, gracious, lasting will of the Soul." He will be beseeching his Lover's grace, not expounding and analyzing it. To those, therefore,

to whom this way of love is open, this is a lover's manual. Here set by the side of great earthly lovers are the names of lovers of the unearthly such as Sadhu Sundar Singh and Kagawa, who have suffered all for the beloved, and whose sufferings must be a light to others.

This much for the words. For the acts these are manifest in every page. Mr. Andrews has been the chosen friend of Gandhi and Tagore. He has striven in India and in South Africa for the true peace, the peace, resting not on treaties signed with fleeting political signatures, but on the treaty of the enfranchised heart. He has seen a light in the East and he has followed it not for his own sake but, like the Kings, to worship and to bring gifts.

The book therefore has importance entirely divorced from the formal doctrine which it advances even for those who cannot receive that doctrine. Mr. Andrews typically and rightly begins his work with the cleansing of the Disciples' feet. He urges that fundamentally, if the world is to be saved, we must return to the surrender of self to others, to some reconciliation of the One and the Many. What a platitude that is, and yet, like other platitudes in its time and in its place it has the gold trumpet of destiny at its command. The world is distracted by the impossibility of the Many, or bewitched by the temporary triumph of the One. But by another path is their hope of escape. The release is in the unity of the

two, when souls are again so precious that we are prepared to lose them so that the world may gain them. That is plain sense stated in terms of concrete mysticism. It is also inspired teaching, and there has been no time since it was said, "I have overcome the world," that it was more needed.

Mr. Andrews in the chapter entitled "The Glory of the Cross" tells a story of a visit paid by

Dame Clara Butt to Rabindranath Tagore. At the end of the visit she asked if she might be allowed to sing one song. On the permission being most gladly granted, she sang the negro spiritual which begins:—

"Were you there, when they crucified My Lord ?

Were you there ?"

Mr. Andrews, I think, was there.

HUMBERT WOLFE

"LET INDIA BEWARE!"*

[*Max Plowman* reviews the book of an Indian publicist who has been both a preoccupied professor and an active politician ; while the author derives his inspiration from western thinkers, "Burke at the head of them," the reviewer warns India against "modelling herself upon patterns in the West confessedly outmoded. Let her not barter it (her genius) for a mess of politics."—Eds.]

These are the days when people living in the West are being driven to first principles, not from choice, but by the terrible urgency of circumstance—when the insecurity of life which was manifested by a continental upheaval in war has shaken men out of the acceptance of traditional ideas and compelled them to question those attitudes toward the State, the Nation and the World which their fathers accepted as basic. As we behold the kaleidoscopic rise and fall of states, the ready-made, quick-change policies of governments, the running hither and thither to find even the most temporary solutions of disastrous social evils, there is forced upon us more and more the necessity of asking

primary questions. From the easy acceptance of Nationalism, Imperialism, Hereditary Aristocracy, Landed Privilege, Industrial Supremacy, Democratic Government, the individual is driven back to the elementary question: "What is your life?" For we begin to realise that unless the whole mechanism of the State works for the purpose of maintaining individual well-being, then man is a slave to circumstance—a slave toiling to support an organisation that has no ultimate justification—a menial creature who has made the means of life his end. Overwhelmingly the truth has been borne in upon us that the State is not an end in itself.

Religion alone determines the

* *The Making of the State*. By M. RUTHNASWAMY, M. A. (Cantab.) (Williams & Norgate, London, 21s.)

purpose of life. Only in religion can man find scope for consciousness. Only in that awe and worship before the mystery and beauty of life which consciousness realises can man find the kind of satisfaction in living that gives worth to life. Man is integrated by worship, and by nothing else. When he loses the sense of religious purpose he begins to return to the condition of the animal without the animal's innocence. He becomes bestial, predatory, self-destructive, perforce, because he perverts his nature by denying his spiritual energies; he harnesses to the ends of self-aggrandisement the powers which can find their real satisfaction only in pure worship. Nothing but the rediscovery of vital religion in the West can give its peoples a standpoint from which to rebuild and co-ordinate its misshapen and antagonistic States.

The problem before India is of course very different. She stands at the gateway of new inheritance with everything to make. She does not look to the revolution, but to the making of the State. Is she then the less in need of a clear understanding of first principles?

It would be notoriously unfair to complain that Mr. Ruthnaswamy's book is unprincipled. His matter is history, and his purpose the exhibition of historic example for the encouragement and warning of his fellow-countrymen. A barrister-at-law by profession and a conservative by temperament, he presents the case for the history of States without outstanding political bias. But in spite of a plethora of pre-

cepts, his treatise is wanting in principle: it does not go back to first principles at a time when these are most urgently in need of definition. No doubt he would plead that his object is confined to the presentation of historic examples in order that the student may be free to draw his own conclusions; and this he has accomplished quite ably. But is it enough to-day? History teaches; but it may easily mislead. History is true only when it is regarded from the standpoint of "becoming": it is false and misleading when the continuous ascending effort of mankind is lost sight of. Despite the proverb, it never repeats itself. Moreover, the present seems to be the moment, above all others in recorded history, when the political historian must be capable of examining the past in the light of the present, rather than seeing the present in the light of the past. For what is plain to everyone to-day is the fact that if the States of the world continue to act solely according to the rules of historic precedent, then civilisation itself will be destroyed. And it will really be destroyed for want of first principles. It will be destroyed because men have persisted in modes of living which they should have historically outgrown—because they have failed of the courage to enquire of themselves what are the primary needs of the life of man, and to make those needs the determinants of their forms of government.

The simple truth now borne in upon Western civilisation by years of acute suffering is that self-

sufficient States existing by their own autonomy, proud of their independence, and seeking primarily their own enlargement, are things that belong wholly to the historic past. Communication has contracted the globe until States which existed in isolation and independence are now, as it were, called upon to live under one roof. Therefore the principles of living which applied to them in their isolation and independence are no longer valid, and if applied can only lead to chaos. A new and original effort towards accommodation is required of mankind. In the accommodation of its people to a common form of government, the compact State served its day. But something greater is now required. The Federation of States is merely a further accommodation to include a greater number of units. That Federation is the immediate task of Western civilisation.

Mr. Ruthnaswamy writes for

India, and in effect exhorts his country to learn of the West. India can learn, and in fact is learning, the lesson he proposes, with amazing rapidity. But ultimately, apart from the matter of religious toleration—the all-important lesson of liberty of conscience—it is only in external matters that India has much to learn from the West. India a State is a rightful and legitimate ambition; but in her natural desire for freedom and independence, let India beware of modelling herself upon patterns in the West confessedly outmoded. Her genius is religious in essence. Let her not barter it for a mess of politics. True to her own character she can learn with proud humility those lessons of household management which the West can teach. True to her religious genius she will be saved from that obsession with power which denotes the retarded growth of irreligious men.

MAX FLOWMAN

ROGER BACON*

[H. Stanley Redgrove reviews two important publications on the life-activities of Roger Bacon—the thirteenth-century adept in Alchemy and Magic Arts. This article is especially interesting in view of a contribution by Mr. Geoffrey West on "Paracelsus," the fifteenth-century Alchemist and Adept, which will appear next month.—EDS.]

It has been truly said that "a prophet is not without honour, save in his own country". One might well add: and in his own time. Certainly, this addition is true of Roger Bacon, undoubtedly one of the most adventurous thinkers

which the thirteenth century in Europe produced. Restricted, during his lifetime, in his scientific activities by the Franciscan Order, of which he was a member, he was, although his works were not altogether without influence

* *The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon*. A Translation by ROBERT BELLE BURKE. 2 vols. (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia [Humphrey Milford, London.] \$ 10.)

The Cipher of Roger Bacon. By WILLIAM ROMAINE NEWBOLD. Edited with Foreword and Notes by Roland Grubb Kent (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia [Humphrey Milford, London.] \$ 4.)

in fruitful quarters, chiefly remembered by succeeding ages in terms of the fantastic and wholly misleading picture drawn of him by the author of *The Famous Historie of Fryer Bacon*, on a MS. copy of which work it is thought possible that Greene's famous (or, perhaps, one should say, infamous) play, *The Honourable History of Friar Bacon and Friar Bongay*, was based. Not until the publication, in 1733, of the major portion of Bacon's *Opus Majus*, under the able editorship of Dr. Samuel Jebb, did it begin to be at all generally realised how great a man Roger Bacon was, nor, even if he was necessarily a child of his age, how he had a spiritual kinship with a generation which was yet to be born.

In 1914, the septcentenary of the birth of Roger Bacon was celebrated at Oxford; and, in spite of the outbreak of the European war in that year, 1914 saw much activity devoted to determining Bacon's correct position in the history of human thought. Nor has that activity ceased; and, seeing that nowadays Latin is in every sense of the word a dead language, a big debt of gratitude is due to Professor Burke for an admirable and complete translation of the *Opus Majus* published in 1928.

This must be regarded as Bacon's most important work and the one containing the completest expression of his philosophy. It was, however, written under peculiar circumstances and with a special object. It was addressed to Pope Clement IV, and was designed to win from him approbation of Bacon's views, and the means for furthering studies along Baconian lines. Hence, although I do not doubt the sincerity of Bacon's religious sentiments, nor that he quite honestly believed that advancements in the study of languages and mathematics, and, above all, in "experimental science" (child of his own mind), would serve to illumine the Bible and cement more firmly the foundations of Christian doctrine, yet I cannot escape from the suspicion, to which I gave

expression in a short study of Bacon I wrote in 1920 (*Roger Bacon, the Father of Experimental Science, and Mediaeval Occultism*) that, "possibly, the utility of the sciences for theology is with Bacon not so much the *reason* as the *excuse* for their study".

The outstanding features of the *Opus Majus* are, in my opinion, the importance which Bacon attached to mathematical knowledge, an importance which even the more famous Francis Bacon (whose philosophy in certain respects so closely resembles that of Roger's) failed to realise, and his wholly novel emphasis on the necessity of experimental study. It may seem trite to modern ears to insist that—

Reasoning draws a conclusion and makes us grant the conclusion, but does not make the conclusion certain, nor does it remove doubt so that the mind may rest on the intuition of truth, unless the mind discovers it by the path of experience.

We need, however, to think ourselves back into the mental atmosphere of the age in which Roger Bacon lived. Men resolutely shut their eyes to Nature. They believed that all knowledge might be gained by the processes of logic from certain fundamental principles; and were capable of believing that, let us say, A was B, if this conclusion could be reached by a process of syllogistical reasoning, although the fact that A was nothing of the sort stared them in the face all the time.

It is true that Bacon did not clearly distinguish between "experiment," which is deliberate, and "experience," which is fortuitous. Moreover, of experience he recognised as valid two kinds, that gained through the natural senses, and a spiritual insight or divine inspiration which gave an even surer sense of certitude. Regarding the latter I leave those to debate the question who desire; but there is no doubt that the failure to distinguish between "experiment" and "experience" not seldom led Bacon astray.

There is no doubt that Bacon envis-

aged the production of instruments which would make small things appear large and distant objects near. It is very doubtful, however, if he himself constructed a compound microscope or a telescope. Nor is it certain, as is commonly supposed, and as I myself thought in 1920, that he was the discoverer of gunpowder,* which did, however, become known in Europe during his day.

The formula for gunpowder is supposed to be concealed in a cryptic passage at the end of Bacon's *Epistola . . . de secretis operibus naturae et de nullitate magiae*, the whole of the last three chapters of which are, apparently, written in cipher, a subject in which Bacon is known to have been interested. In 1904, Lt.-Col. H. W. L. Hime thought he had discovered the key to this cipher; and, applying it, extracted a formula (though not a very good one) for gunpowder. At a later date, the late Professor Newbold applied a totally different key and obtained . . . a different formula for gunpowder! Actually, the passage in question does not appear in the form in which it was deciphered in any MS. copy of the work. It would seem to be no more than a copyist error, and some doubt has been expressed as to whether the three cryptic chapters were not in their entirety the work of a hand other than Bacon's.

Professor Newbold's studies first arose in connection with a remarkable MS. discovered by Mr. W. M. Voynich in Europe in 1912. This MS. is written in a cipher which has so far baffled all experts to read. In addition to the text, it also contains a number of remarkable drawings of herbs, of astronomical subjects, and of subjects which Professor Newbold characterised as "biological". As a result of a study of this MS., Professor Newbold was

led to the opinion that it was the work of Roger Bacon, and that it had been written, under a microscope, in a most complex cipher, in which each seeming character of the text was really a complex of signs derived from Greek shorthand,† themselves when transliterated constituting a work in cipher, requiring to be decoded along lines similar to those applicable in the case of the last three chapters of the *Epistola* and certain other Latin works.

Professor Newbold had only decoded a very small portion of the MS. when death overtook him; but the results of his work were published under the very conscientious and painstaking editorship of his friend, Prof. R. G. Kent, in 1926.

Unfortunately, more recent scholarship has subjected Newbold's work to devastating criticism. In particular, Professor Manly's article on the subject, published in *Speculum* for July, 1931, made it abundantly clear that Newbold had not discovered the key to the Voynich MS., (which may not be the work of Bacon), and that the cipher he thought he had discovered in the Latin works existed only in his own imagination.

There is not the shadow of a doubt that the messages Newbold read from the Voynich MS. and the Latin works were not written by a thirteenth-century philosopher, but came from his own subconsciousness. The interesting question is why the subconsciousness of Newbold should devise a formula for making copper, a commentary on the works of Lull, and a wholly mythical story of an uprising in Oxford. The problem resembles that connected with the very numerous automatic writings which have a similar origin.

H. S. REDGROVE

* Madame Blavatsky writes thus of Roger Bacon in her *Glossary*:—"He was a wonderful physicist and chemist, and credited with having invented gunpowder, though he said he had the secret from 'Asian (Chinese) wise men'."—EDS.

† Concerning these signs, Newbold wrote "After nearly two years of . . . practice I am able to see distinctions which no one else can see, but even to my eye these distinctions are often of the most fugitive and elusive character. I frequently, for example, find it impossible to read the same text twice in exactly the same way." Comment on this seems needless.

Cry Havoc! By BEVERLEY NICHOLS (Jonathan Cape, London. 7s. 6d.)

"Cry Havoc, and let slip the dogs of war!"—It is now over nineteen years since that fateful late afternoon of Monday, August 3rd, 1914, when the then Sir Edward Grey made the speech on the floor of the House of Commons that sent millions of men to their deaths on the field of battle, leaving in the wake of their lifeblood a welter of national and international chaos of an intensity unique in history. And while conferences come and go, and the international machinery of collective life and intercourse, long gone out of gear, goes from bad to worse, with all the orthodox theories of finance and economics threatening to tumble about our ears, two groups of people, normally a generation apart in years and outlook, are gravitating together in a unity of purpose epitomised in the phrase "Never Again!" One group comprises the millions of men and women who fought and lived through the carnage of the Great War: for they not only suffered the experience of War itself, but are also enduring the aftermath of the futile consequences in which the world is now finding itself. The other group is the younger generation who knew not War, but who have been denied that fair heritage of a world of peace, order, contentment, and the reasonable right to that amity with their neighbours which is an essential factor in the ordered evolution of mankind to the highest forms of the ethical and the spiritual life.

Mainly to this latter category belongs Beverley Nichols, the distinguished young author of the book which forms the subject of this review. In *Cry Havoc!* he has given to the world a message and a challenge neither of which are new. The flood of literature on pacifism and "no more war" is colossal. Much of it has been contributed by men standing high in the estimation of nations. Their words, written or spoken, have carried weight—but they have so often, sooner or later been

either forgotten or altered. Beverley Nichols has, on the contrary, given a message to the world that has surely come to stay. Why?

There is first of all a passionate sincerity far beyond the best that has hitherto emerged in the print of the Press. The author of *Cry Havoc!* has poured out his soul in a reality of expression that is far more moving and impressive than that eloquence which comes from the mere trickeries and technique of good writing. His book bears the stamp of vivid truth to a degree that is bound to influence mankind.

No one following, or attempting to follow, the marching and the counter-marching of international events can pretend for a moment that an acceptance which, after all, is almost instinctive in civilised mankind, of a theoretical plea of "No More War" can mean its achievement in practice. Beverley Nichols has no illusions on this score. On the basic plea he cannot be clearer:—

I publicly proclaim . . . my desire to be shot in the nearest backyard, within twenty-four hours of the declaration of war, rather than shoot, or gas, or drown, or otherwise murder any of my fellow men.

But he at once makes it clear that mere "conscientious objection" will get us nowhere. Pacifism must no longer be passive. Then what is to be done about it? Play upon the emotions? What guarantee is there that the same wild audience that will cheer the eloquent pacifist to the echo will not also, given a *casus belli* between two nations, equally cheer the responsible politician who, with or without the sincerity of that other politician who spoke his words on August 3rd, 1914, plays with knowledge and skill upon the vagaries of the mass psychology of a crowd? So we read: "it is useless to attack this hydra-headed monster of war in a state of wild and unreasoning emotion."

There are other basic difficulties. Hope for the future lies with our younger generation. But there is the

natural romanticism of youth, across whose young brains, as Beverley Nichols reminds us, "there flashes the silver of ancient swords" and over the shallow waters of whose understanding "there flutters the reflected gold of flags flying in forgotten winds," whilst "down the long corridors of youth there echoes a sweet trumpet call to battle". To them the anti-war propagandist films at the cinema are not a message of bloody death, but of glory and adventure.

Then there is also the heritage of history—a long, long record of the clashes of nation against nation, with always the destruction of life and property as the stock method of "persuasion". And lastly, and to a great degree linking up with these facts of history, there is the biological background of a world of animal and vegetable life in which strife and killing is ever going on around us, summed up by the stock phrases of the Western scientist—"the struggle for existence" and "the survival of the fittest".

Against this array our author sets, trenchantly, poignantly and sincerely, the plea that the human soul *must* use the gift of civilisation to a better and a higher purpose. That view must prevail, and the more people, young and old, one can persuade to read *Cry Havoc!*, the sooner will the great task be done. Do the publishers, one wonders, realise the opportunity that is in their hands? *Cry Havoc!*, at 7s. 6d.

per copy, is now at least in its third edition within a short time of its first issue. Let them reprint it at 6d. per copy, and not only will they count their readers in millions, but they will also have done a service to mankind that will be almost incalculable.

Readers of *THE ARYAN PATH* are, one hopes, in entire accord with the message of *Cry Havoc!* But they will find especial interest in two groups of chapters in particular. The verbal duel between Yeats Brown of *Bengal Lancer* fame, and Robert Mennel, the Quaker conscientious objector to whose fine stand for his principles Beverley Nichols pays eloquent tribute, must, for example, have a special significance and interest in its handling of the Indian theme, with special reference to the North Western frontier. Equally interesting, and perhaps more impressive, is the portion of the book dealing with armament and the significant peep behind the scenes in the sphere of armament production. For here one is inevitably reminded of an article written long ago by Madame Blavatsky in *Lucifer* under the title "The Blessing of Publicity". Space compels no more than a reference to the remarkably close parallelism of thought and example between the great exponent of Theosophical doctrine of fifty years ago and the youthful apostle of international pacifism who has now given to the world, in *Cry Havoc!*, a new message of hope for the retrieval of mankind from the ruin that threatens it.

IVOR B. HART

My Philosophy. By SIR OLIVER LODGE. (Ernest Benn, London. 21s.)

Of the purpose of his book, Sir Oliver Lodge writes:—

The Ether of Space has been my life study, and I have constantly urged its claims to attention I always meant some day to write a scientific treatise about the Ether of Space; but when in my old age I came to write this book, I found that the Ether pervaded all my ideas, both of this world and

the next. I could no longer keep my treatise within the proposed scientific confines; it escaped in every direction, and now I find has grown into a comprehensive statement of my philosophy. (Foreword).

Our senses tell us that there is a material world full of things which we can investigate: our instincts and intuitions tell us that there is a mental and spiritual world where also we can feel at home. But the object of this book is to show that there is also an etheric or metetherial world, which spreads over both the other regions, and

may be the means of reconciling them or of enabling us to attend to either or both without dislocation or shock My hypothesis is that this same almost unexplored physical substance (the Ether) operates also in the region of life and mind, and ultimately will be found to be the physical vehicle utilised in the spiritual region, so as to constitute the mechanism whereby spirit and matter interact, and that it will ultimately form a bond of union between the two domains experimentally known to humanity. (p.36)

To carry out the purpose thus indicated, Sir Oliver sketches the history and development of the Ether hypothesis in modern physics from the time of Newton onwards. His exposition of its bearing on light, gravitation, electricity and magnetism, is admirably lucid, and he succeeds in making difficult ideas understandable to unscientific minds. The almost entire absence of mathematical formulæ is a most commendable feature of the book from the layman's point of view. Sir Oliver very definitely aligns himself with the physicists of the older school who believed in the Ether as a substantial reality, and he deprecates those ultra-modern theories—popularised by Sir James Jeans—which will have none of it, but try to reduce the Universe to the thinking—or dreaming—of a divine mathematician.

Now although some of Sir Oliver's doctrines as to the part played by the Ether in physics may be open to dispute by other men of science, there is no question but that they are based on profound knowledge, illuminated by deep and earnest thought, and set forth in a style that is at once clear and interesting. When he leaves physics for psychology, however, his treatment of his subject matter is less satisfactory. While his application of the Ether hypothesis to psychical problems is in many respects helpful and suggestive, yet we venture to think it would have been much more so had Sir Oliver's study of the religions and philosophies of the past, especially those of India, been anything like commensurate with his knowledge of physical science. For him, coherent

philosophic thought appears to have been born with the foundation of the Royal Society; and he is apparently quite unaware that some of the theories, which he seems to have deduced *de novo*, are immemorably old: for example the existence of an etheric (or astral) body as the link between the mind and the physical body, which was propounded in English print by H. P. Blavatsky nearly sixty years ago as being the traditional teaching of the Occultists of all ages. Significant of Sir Oliver's disregard of the past is the fact that the index to his book contains no mention of any Greek or Indian thinker: in fact the only ancient authors referred to are Ovid and St. Paul!

Sir Oliver Lodge's philosophy may be summed up as Spiritism, interpreted in the light of the Ether theory, and tinged with Christianity. He frankly accepts the spiritist hypothesis, which he defines as

that we are spirits here and now, operating on material bodies, being, so to speak, incarnate in matter for a time, but that our real existence does not depend on association with matter, although the index and demonstration of our activity does In brief, we are immortal spirits in temporary association with matter. Probably it is through this bodily restriction and isolation that we become individualised and acquire a permanent personality. . . . (pp. 291, 297)

But is not this idea of "permanent personality," which is the cherished belief of both Christians and Spiritualists, incredible in the light of what we know about the personality? Born in time, it goes through a succession of changes and developments, and at last dies: it is essentially the creature of time and change; and, as such, how can it be or become permanent? Far more consistent with both our knowledge and our aspirations is the ancient doctrine that the real man is to be regarded as a pilgrim through matter, who assumes and doffs one personality after another until he becomes perfected in love, wisdom and strength. This teaching insists on the impermanence of the personal man,

but holds that, just as a lasting perfume may be distilled from blossoms which fade and die in a few short hours, so from the experiences of a fleeting

lifetime, which in their details pass into oblivion after death, the pilgrim spirit may extract something which belongs not to time but to eternity.

R. A. V. M.

Inland Far. The Bedford Edition of the Works of CLIFFORD BAX (Lovat Dickson, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

Somebody once said that you could drag a cow through all the picture galleries of Europe, but that—at the end of the trip—it would still be only a cow. In other words, it is not what we do but what we become that is important.

Most books of reminiscences—and there has been a plague of them—are boring beyond endurance. The reader is put in the stocks and pelted with anecdotes. The writer is so in love with his subject-matter that he assumes it is equally interesting to everyone. Imagining that he is exhibiting his wealth, he reveals an inner poverty. The facts that it is not easy to recapture atmosphere; that it is difficult to convey a thrill; that conversations which seemed brilliant at the time often become dull or unreal when printed—are all ignored. They cast no shadow therefore over the writer's sunny exuberance.

But Mr. Clifford Bax has not written a book of reminiscences. His sub-title is: "A Book of Thoughts and Impressions." It is true that he is concerned with memories, but these are not anecdotes—they are milestones. They serve to indicate an inner progression. They reveal the road which led to a philosophy.

Every man has to come to terms with actuality. The duration and intensity of the conflict is the measure of the man. Where the conflict is brief, or non-existent, it is because the individual accepts prevailing conditions and is concerned only to exploit them

in his own interest. Many a man in Hamlet's place would have been happy enough. He would have taken his world as he found it, and made the best out of it. Hamlet's life was a tragedy because he was sensitive. And a sensitive does not come to terms easily with actuality, for he cannot accept the ready-made, the second-hand, the traditional. He must earn his values.

There is one passage in Mr. Bax's book which best reveals his philosophy:—

Even under sore stress, I should feel that life is a dream, alternately terrible and enchanting; that the tangible world is a phantasmal picture; that something in every man exists beyond it; and that one day, whether here or not here, I shall wholly wake up and perceive, with compassion and mirth, how crazily the real is distorted in our eyes during this familiar process of living These are not convictions to which I have dragooned my mind, they are modes of being that I cannot undo.

This philosophy was, perhaps, inevitable for one who, as a youth, found that "the greatest writers began to seem like children. They had known nothing that is essential, had drawn life only from the outside, had seen man only in his mortal aspect; and could I have felt sure that his visions were valid, I had sooner have talked with Swedenborg than with Shakespeare."

There is space only to invite attention to pages 203-210, which are concerned with writers and reading—and to add that Mr. Bax's book takes the reader to many places, and introduces him to some eminent people and to a host of well-known ones.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

Brutes and Beasts. By JOHN SWAIN (Noel Douglas, London.)

The author of this book claims that he has merely attempted to bring within its scope the main ancient modes of cruelty to form a comparison with the cruelty at present practised. In fulfilment of his purpose he has assembled a collection of sufficiently horrible accounts of cruelties perpetrated on animals in the past, derived from such sources as the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Lecky's *History of European Morals* and Fairholme and Pain's *Century of Work for Animals*. It cannot be regarded as a well balanced book and it contains certain inaccuracies and these defects detract from its value as a moral appeal. The details of horrible barbarities, openly practised by our ancestors, do not help to bring home to the average citizen the defects of existing legislation which it is the work of the humanitarian to endeavour to remove. The author's real attitude is sometimes not easy to determine: his views on certain present-day evils are strongly, even violently, expressed, but on others he shows a curious laxity, or inconsistency.

It is impossible in a short review to deal with all the topics covered but, to take the two most prominently controversial subjects, we find the author in the chapter on Hunting introduces a recital of pathological cases of sadistic aberration from medical text books and then adds: "And thus you have the spirit of fox-hunting in a nutshell. Sexual vice and cruelty go hand in hand together down the ages." This of course is nonsense to anybody conversant with the facts, and is calculated to alienate readers who, however much they may desire to see drag-hunts replacing fox-hunting, know that their aim will never be accomplished, but only retarded, by exaggerations of this type. The author is on safer ground when he deals with otter hunting and hare coursing and hunting, as in these sections he has put on record first-hand descriptions from witnesses which have educational value. He

makes an error in stating (p. 110) that deer brought to bay are "dispatched either by a humane killer or with a gun". This amelioration of the deer's fate has been partially, though not completely, achieved under pressure of public opinion, but there is still much clinging to the old ritual with a knife among old fashioned devotees of the chase.

On the subject of vivisection, which occupies forty pages, the author's position seems to be that vivisection has benefited the human race but should be under more satisfactory inspection. He tells us:—

If vivisection was abolished, there can be little doubt that vivisectionists . . . would practise it in secret without the limits of the Act. This could not be helped. If vivisection is wrong, it must be abolished, and one does not amend our laws forbidding murder because murders are perpetrated. But the effect of abolition in England would increase to a vast extent legal and unrestricted vivisection, as vivisectionists would carry out their experiments outside the British Isles.

The statement, twice repeated, that the R. S. P. C. A. does not oppose vivisection is erroneous. It is, and always has been, opposed to all experiments calculated to cause pain, and it was the R. S. P. C. A. which was largely instrumental in securing the limitation of experiment in this country. The Bill which emerged as the Act of 1876 as originally drafted by the R. S. P. C. A. would have provided much more effective limitation and complete inspection, but, like so many private members' bills in Parliament, it was mutilated by so-called amendments. It is of course true that this century-old Society, while maintaining its original policy, leaves the active propaganda against vivisection to the half dozen organisations which have been expressly formed to educate public opinion on the subject. Incidentally it may be mentioned that our Scots brethren would not appreciate the reference to their own Society as a "branch" of the English R. S. P. C. A. Finally the author holds the strange view that some opponents of vivisection hold, "that if vivisection was abol-

ished, the first step would be taken towards the abolition of the slaughter of animals and *lead to the self-abuse of vegetarianism*" (p. 183—italics ours). We cannot pretend to understand this extraordinary statement and imagine that to our Indian readers it will be equally unpalatable. Shortly, this

book, while containing much that is interesting and covering a very extensive range, falls short of the kind of volume we anticipated from its subject matter, of which it is impossible not to realise the importance for the ethical advancement of humanity.

EDITH WARD

Renascent India. By H. C. B. Zacharias, Ph. D. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

The major portion of this book has to do with Indian politics, with which THE ARYAN PATH has no concern, but the first chapter treats of the social reform movement and may be fittingly noticed here. The author shows sympathetic discernment and insight in dealing with the services of such great leaders as Ram Mohan Roy, Keshav Chander Sen, Dayanand Saraswati, Ranade and others in the field of social reform, but many readers will feel that his treatment of the late Mr. Tilak is tinged with prejudice, and that Sir Syad Ahmad's great work for the social uplift of his community should not have been overlooked. The author's handling of the different aspects of the philosophy and technique of Satyagraha, as taught by Mr. Gandhi, is excellent, and although there is some confusion of thought owing to his Roman Catholic predilections, he appears to have taken special pains to set out, in a spirit of impartiality, what he considers to be the merits and demerits of Mr. Gandhi's teachings.

Of special interest to the readers of this journal will be the comments of the author on the part played by the late Mrs. Besant and her Adyar Theosophical Society in connection with the social and religious development of India. People who derive their inspiration from Adyar will certainly chafe at Mr. Zacharias's remarks, but we venture to state that those who will take the trouble to study the subject impartially, will find reason to endorse the author's views. Although

Mr. Zacharias himself has no clear conception of true Theosophy as propounded by Madame Blavatsky, his knowledge is quite sufficient to point out most correctly that the activities emanating from Adyar have not been in harmony with the teachings of Madame Blavatsky. Of this "Theosophical" Society, he writes :—

I think it is no exaggeration to say that, in India at least, it is already a thing with only a past and without a future.

This is a perfectly valid statement, we think, as far as the Society under discussion is concerned, but true Theosophy, as propounded by Madame Blavatsky is a living and vitalizing force ever finding wider and wider acceptance among the intellectual classes, as is made abundantly clear in the pages of THE ARYAN PATH.

Mr. Zacharias is a devout Roman Catholic, and this fact has in more places than one led him to express views which will almost certainly provoke a smile from his Indian readers. For instance, as regards Ranade, he says :—"To a Catholic it must remain a real mystery how such a man, possessed of so many parts of the Truth, failed to see Truth as a whole—as we see it." And, while dealing with the "Inner Light" implicitly followed by Mr. Gandhi, our author says :—

He lacks in matters of faith and morals the objective norm and criterion of Truth, which the Catholic possesses in the magisterium of a Church divinely founded for that purpose.

But such minor blemishes as these cannot detract from the solid value of the author's survey of the social and religious development in India since the 'thirties of the last century.

J. P. W.

Why We Oppose the Occult. By EMILE CAILLIET, trans. by George Franklin Cole. (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. \$ 2.)

The author of this singular work is Assistant-Professor of Romance Languages and Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania. As he wrote it in French, he cannot be held responsible for the many departures from English usage and grammar perpetrated by the translator, Assistant-Professor of French in the same University, who ought to know, for instance, that our language speaks of Leiden or Leyden, not Leyde, that *bouc* means a he-goat, and that the correct translation of *le démon* is "the Devil".

The "We" of the title seems to signify the consensus of civilised opinion; under "the Occult" the author includes almost every conceivable practice or belief which involves the assumption of anything supernatural or non-human, except rites of worship directed towards a deity conceived as beneficent. He deals, uncritically and in a way indicative of wide but very ill-digested reading, with savage magic, including some ritual which does not imply the invocation of any spirit, but merely the concept of *mana*; with ancient and mediaeval divination and witch-craft (as regards the former, about three-quarters of his references are erroneous, one of the absurdest being a confusion of Lucian with Lucan); finally with modern spiritualism, and what he refers to by the odd name of metaphysics, meaning, it would seem, an attempt at the philosophic and scientific study of mediumistic phenomena. In all these he finds a large common element, neglecting the wide differences existing, for instance, between the practices of savage and barbarian medicine-men and the numerous and interesting forms of learned magic which have made their appearance from time to time in Europe. He entirely sympathises with the opposition such practices have generally excited, at least in recent times; but he denies that it is intellectual

in its origin, the logical and scientific objections to spiritualism, especially, being a mere mask for something quite different. This is "the ancestral fear of the dead" which such phenomena as those of the séance "bring to the threshold of consciousness" (p. 171). His conclusion (p. 184) is that "the occult is absolutely to be rejected," that "for our times, supreme wisdom consists not only in keeping well away from that descent to Avernus, but even in banishing its thought". It constitutes, it would seem, a grave danger, not so much from ordinary ghosts as from other and less desirable denizens of the spirit world.

It is to be noted that all this is contained in a treatise purporting to be philosophical. Presumably it will be news to the author to learn that, among men of any scientific training who disbelieve in alleged supernatural phenomena, their disbelief is as unemotional as their rejection of the theory of phlogiston, and dictated by the same reasons, namely distrust of some of the evidence and conviction that the rest of it can be better explained in other ways.

H. J. ROSE

[The author of this book holds a "theological" view of the Occult, rejecting it, in his conclusion, "because in the last analysis it 'comes from the Evil One'." But he does not deny its existence. The reviewer does not state his position, unless we are to infer from his closing paragraph that he is in sympathy with those men of "scientific training, who disbelieve in alleged supernatural phenomena". It seems to strike neither author nor reviewer that there may exist a science of Occultism as accurate, if not more accurate, than modern physical science. On what logical basis, therefore, can either the theologian or modern scientist afford to dispense with a careful study of the supernatural phenomena which are engaging the attention of thousands, often in a most unscientific and dangerous manner?—Eds.]

CORRESPONDENCE

THE SUFIS AND REINCARNATION

[**Dr. R. A. Nicholson** is Professor of Arabic and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. He is respected as an authority on Persian and Islamic Literatures and has numerous volumes to his credit, among them the recently edited *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi*, with translation and commentary, which was reviewed in *THE ARYAN PATH* for July.—Eds.]

It is a dangerous thing to interpret a few verses of Sufi poetry in their literal and obvious sense, without reference either to the historical development of mysticism in Islam or to the general principles and tendencies of the author's doctrine or to other passages in his writings which prove that this interpretation is impossible. Your correspondent, J. S., seems to assume, as a matter of course, that Rumi's words, "First you were mineral, later you became a plant; then you became animal . . . ; afterwards you were made man," express "faith in transmigration," and he proceeds to argue that, having gone so far, the poet was logically bound to go further and believe that the disembodied soul, as a rule, must return to earth for a new series of reincarnations. The fact is, however, that Rumi, like all the great Sufi teachers, unequivocally repudiates the heresy of *tanāsukh*. His idea of spiritual evolution is something quite different and is based on a theory of the soul which I have explained elsewhere* in words that perhaps I may be allowed to repeat here:—

The Sufis, following Aristotle, distinguish three categories of soul—vege-

table, animal, and reasonable. The vegetable soul is common to plants, animals, and man; its functions are growth, nourishment, and reproduction. The animal soul is shared by animals and man; its functions are perception and sensation, and its motive faculties desire and anger. The reasonable soul, or principle of reason, is peculiar to man and is the only part of him that survives death. These three souls are combined in the individual human soul and may be regarded as the first three steps of the ladder to be climbed when it begins its life on earth.

• Thus the ascent of the soul, as Sufis conceive it, is essentially a transmutation of its lower elements, a process of interior purification, which culminates in union with the World-soul. Just as "you become a plant" means "you become endowed with the functions of the vegetable soul," so "you will become an angel" means "you will be freed from the contamination of the body and not only reach, but finally surpass, the angelic nature". There is no assurance of "jumping directly to a state of angelhood". The unpurified soul is punished in Hell: in other terms, it survives in a state of selfhood which cuts it off from the beatific Vision enjoyed by the righteous. But this punishment is not eternal; ultimately all souls are saved, for the Divine

mercy knows no limit. Purged of ignorance and unbelief, every soul receives in proportion to its original capacity the knowledge and

faith that enable it to realise its unity with the Spirit whence all come and whither all return.
Cambridge. R. A. NICHOLSON

THE MYSTICAL AND THE OCCULT

While feeling a certain amount of sympathy with Mr. Lawrence Hyde's ideas it is clear that the difference between the mystical and the occult he endeavours to make is almost entirely one of nomenclature. Considering the pseudo-theosophical sources consulted by him one can scarcely wonder at his attitude; and his tilting at all the self-styled occultists whose reported explorations of the Unseen Universe are all mutually exclusive, is a needed protest; but why should brain-spun fancies be accepted by him as genuine Occultism?

One feels a serious doubt, however, when Mr. Hyde begins his criticism of *Light on the Path* as to whether he has really read it. To dub the book as teaching a "kill-out" doctrine would seem to indicate that only one half of the rules had been read and that the complementary aphorism to each of the few rules which contain these two words had been entirely overlooked. Yet it is only when the complete idea is studied that the paradox is resolvable. Moreover, it is just those explanatory sentences which give the "sublimation" Mr. Hyde thinks is lacking. He desires the point to be followed up. We do so with pleasure since *Light on the Path* itself says "the whole nature of man must be used wisely by the one who desires to enter the way" and that "the way is not found by devotion alone, by religious contemplation alone, by ardent progress, by self-sacrificing labour, by studious observation of life". We are afraid that Jesus could not pass Mr. Hyde's test as he is reported to have said that only "he who loses his life for my sake shall find it," but would have to be relegated to the ranks of the "kill-outs".

Perhaps the counsel given by Krishna to Arjuna may offer a solution,

Children only and not the wise speak of renunciation of action and of right performance of action as being different. He who perfectly practises the one receives the fruits of both. That man seeth with clear sight who seeth that the Sankhya and the Yoga doctrines are identical. (*Bhagavad-Gita*, v. 4-6)

London.

J. O. M.

THE NAZI POSITION

I am sorry to see that even you, a journal standing for independent thought and dispassionate inquiry, have entirely failed to understand what is happening in Germany. Your verdict is not that of a judge who has heard both parties, but is one-sidedly prejudiced by the reports of emigrants hostile to the present German Government. We have had a revolution, yes, but one of the least bloody and best justifiable ones the world has ever seen, and the cause of it is those who now complain. It is true that at the beginning there were a few outrages, also that the final settlement is hitting a number of innocent sufferers, but it is equally true that the change, on the whole, is for the best of the country. The general corruption under the past Government had taken formidable dimensions, and there is ample evidence now to show that this was first of all due to the growing Jewish influence which was driving with rapidity to the very catastrophe that unhappy Russia has undergone by the very same influence. Jews in responsible positions were twenty times as many when the new revolution broke out as at the end of the War. Surely, Germany has a right to refuse to be governed by foreigners, though domiciled, whose chief characteristic is their tenacity in preserving their race. Still we have

no persecution of Jews here; even Government posts, which will be barred to them henceforth, have not been taken away from those who have fought for Germany and not afterwards taken to political activity on the side of the Left, while even those who are dismissed are as a rule allowed a pension.

The ideal of Universal Brotherhood may seem to require internationalism; but the barbarous treaty enforced on Germany at Versailles has shown how far we are still from that ideal and that nothing can save Germany but a strong nationalism coupled with socialism. *Nationalsozialismus* is the stepping-stone to Universal Brotherhood. The time for the "citizen of the world" has not yet come except for very few; but that a nation can be made to rise within itself above caste and class prejudice and feel a great brotherhood has probably never been shown more effectively than is now the case in Germany.

The Svastika is neither a peculiarly Indian symbol nor is it being insulted by "Hitlerism" as you say. It is pre-Aryan, and nobody can tell where it originated. Having been known in Germany since prehistoric times, and meaning, as it does, the rise of a benign power or lucky time, it could be adopted with perfect right by a clean and hopeful Germany rising from an abyss of corruption. It is not, of course, by itself an anti-Semitic symbol, but has come to be understood in this sense also, because in its meaning is involved that of the preservation of the nation from the disruption, which latter in this country meant Jewish influence more than anything else.

The danger Germany has escaped is, *mutatis mutandis*, the same which Arjuna depicts in the first discourse of the *Bhagavadgita* (vs. 40 fl.). The "caste-confusion," i.e., in our case "race-confusion," had reached a point where only drastic measures, such as those taken against the Jews, could still help. Germany has a great leader

now, who is an example of self-sacrifice (drawing, e. g., no salary and abstaining from meat, alcohol and tobacco), and under his guidance is regaining her health. She is going through a marvellous rebirth, indeed, which is manifest everywhere, especially in her youth. Those are sadly mistaken who still believe, on the authority of dishonest reports, that we are in the clutches of the Dark Powers. To them I can say nothing better than "Come and see!"

Kiel, Germany. F. OTTO SCHRADER

[Our esteemed correspondent mistakes a little the position of THE ARYAN PATH in regard to the anti-Semitic stand of the Hitler Government. As repeatedly affirmed, THE ARYAN PATH is a non-political as well as a non-sectarian journal; but protest against acts, by whomsoever committed, which negative the spirit of Brotherhood, is well within the lines of its scope and purpose. It would be manifestly unfair to arraign the German people for race prejudice, because, unfortunately, that feeling sways most people in the world, either consciously or unrealized by themselves. It is one thing, however, to feel race prejudice, but to recognize it as unworthy and something to be overcome as far as possible, and quite another thing to accept it as a basis for State policy. In taking the latter course, Germany made herself, as it were, a focal point for the forces aroused by race antagonisms; and injustice and suffering were bound to manifest themselves.

Dr. Schrader's statement that Hitler is a vegetarian and abstainer from wine and tobacco carries no guarantee of his purity of motive or of spirituality. Many who dabble in the occult arts and even pursue questionable magic practices abstain from wine, tobacco, and meat. The significance of the fact lies in its probable relation to Hitler's alleged leanings to what he understands by "occultism",—Eds.]

ENDS AND SAYINGS

" ————— ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

In a remarkable article, "Twilight of the Gods," in the October *Living Age* (U. S. A.), the Editor points out that organized religion is losing ground throughout the world. We summarize it here :—

Every social upheaval of recent years has been accompanied by a religious upheaval of corresponding violence. The plight of Greek Catholicism in Russia is well known. In the Latin lands, which long were its chief stronghold, Roman Catholicism has lost much ground, as witness the anti-ecclesiastical stand of the revolution in Spain, as of the earlier bourgeois revolutions in France and Italy. In France, the placing of the monarchist organ, the *Action Française* on the papal Index in 1926 affected its circulation little, although most subscribers were nominal Catholics. The Vatican has recently come tractably to terms with the German leaders who have humiliated Catholicism in that country. The Church's losses in Western Europe have been only partly compensated by gains in Poland and Eastern Europe. Nor are the Protestants in Europe in much better state. German Protestantism has been made frankly subservient to the Nazi dictatorship; and non-church members are reported multiplying faster than members of any of the confessions. The Church of England is claimed to have declined in the number and mental vigour of its candidates for ordination and the growing vogue of Buchmanism, with its "confessional" week-end house parties, is a sad commentary upon the intellectual power of England's spiritual leaders.

The churches in the United States have shown some growth in numbers since the turn of the century, but an

officer of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America recently saw one of the most conspicuous features of the depression in the fact that "No matter how badly the nation has suffered, it cannot be said that any large number of people have gone to the churches for solace." In Mexico the churches were closed in 1926 by Government decree, and, when reopened, were claimed to be under Government ownership and control.

Islam also has lost ground wherever, as in Turkey, it has come into conflict with national loyalty. The writer excepts such peoples as the Arabian Wahabis, among whom a zealous and even militant form of Mohammedanism persists, but he believes that, as such communities disappear before the advance of industrialism, their religion will vanish with them. The author claims the rapid growth of religious indifference in India, and cites in proof the undermining of the Hindu doctrine of untouchability, which he ascribes to political motives. In China the hold of organized religion was never strong. While Christianity has made no progress among the masses, more Chinese leaders hold the foreign faith than even religious indifference in the West would brook. Japan has reconciled the conflict between religion and patriotism more successfully than any other country, for there the Mikado's divine descent assures him the devotion of both the patriot and the priest.

The writer protests against the assumption that the trend away from church and mosque means a trend towards materialism. Men are as willing as ever to fight unselfishly for a cause, although the causes for which they will fight and die no longer include organized religion or the mysteries with

which it has concerned itself. But the fear of death outlives the collapse of beliefs in specific dogmas, and the writer notes an unfortunate tendency, as organized religion fails, for its late devotees to turn to spiritualists and astrologers, psychologists, faith healers, and the like, for reassurance and for consolation.

From his examination, the Editor of *The Living Age* concludes :—

In those countries where organized religion has collapsed most completely, the most complete kind of revolution has occurred. In those countries where industrialism has advanced furthest, organized religion has declined proportionately to industrial advance. The future of organized religion would therefore seem to be most precarious in those countries where it has already been weakened by advancing industrialization but where no revolution has yet occurred. But if revolution is a portent of religious collapse, may not religious decline also be a portent of impending revolution ?

In the main, we find the position of the Editor of *The Living Age* well-founded. We take issue with him, however, on one point. We question the claim that people are not getting more materialistic. What is the turning he deplores to Buchman, Coué, Freud, and Mrs. Eddy but a blind, panic-stricken snatch at something tangible, as drowning men grasp straws ? The Coué mantram, absurd as it seems to the philosopher, yet fills the empty shrine of many an uncured idolater whose old idol has crashed.

The weakening of the hold of organized religions upon their followers is surely matter for congratulation, but man cannot stop with bare negation. Agnosticism is but a temporary halt. Men do not need

dogmatic creeds, but they do need a secure basis upon which to reconstruct their crumbling faith—the basic truths which are our heritage—stripped of the centuries' overgrowths of creed and superstition. Those and an understanding of psychology would quickly rout the hosts of charlatans that batten upon human hopes and fears. A sound philosophy of life is indispensable to happiness of mind, and mankind never was in greater need than now of the primitive soul-satisfying philosophy of the ancient world. Theosophy, pure and unadulterated, is such a philosophy ; but even Theosophy has not escaped the corrupting influence of the priest and his credulous victim. To free the victim of religious fear, to arm the weak with the strength of his own soul, to supply the aspirant to a better life with adequate knowledge—these are among the tasks of this journal.

A sound philosophy of action implies sound knowledge of psychology—as far as the modern West is concerned, a very unreliable science, young and fanciful. We obtain a good idea of its topsy-turvy nature in a recent article by W. Drabovitch entitled "Fragilité de la Liberté. Essai de Psychologie Sociale," in *Mercure de France* for 1st October, 1933, in which the psychophysiological explanation of our inability to acquire permanent liberty is offered, together with a concrete remedy for the situation.

Basing his arguments on Pavlov's experiments in Russia and Janet's

in France, the writer deals with three important points : (1) the law of inhibition, (2) the high nervous tension necessary to perform any action (leading in many cases to hysteria), (3) the shifting or changing of energy from a weaker tendency or centre of action to one more powerful and forceful. The use and appreciation of liberty exacts great nervous tension. We might, if forced to a state of liberty when all our inhibitions were against it, become gibbering maniacs. When we have a certain amount of material comfort we are able to keep up this high tension for a while, but as soon as depressing events arise, we fall short and, as a collectivity, become a soft mass to be shaped and guided under the skilful hands of a demagogue. The only way to remedy this situation is to gain a balance, an equilibrium, between our inhibitions and the processes causing excitement. This would lead to self-mastery and self-discipline. W. Drabovitch explains :—

Avec les réflexes basés sur l'inhibition, le freinage, on exerce à l'inhibition les turbulents ; avec les réflexes stimulants on exerce à l'excitation les apathiques, les déprimés.

This method, on a small scale, is already being applied to children. W. Drabovitch generously admits that his plan does not exclude other methods, but he hopes that France will soon found an experimental laboratory based on these principles, in order to educate "the reflex of liberty" which is to go hand in hand with national defence.

We sincerely hope that this will

not come about, either in France or in any other country. W. Drabovitch's wish both annoys and saddens. It proves once more that the modern tendencies of psychology and sociology are still based on purely materialistic and mechanistic theories. We are urged to consider ourselves so mechanical that the mere flashing of certain stimuli will produce an equilibrium point, which is erroneously labelled "self-mastery". We are not souls, then, not real thinking beings with the power of choice. Man is no longer a sublime creature, acting from inner convictions, following the precepts of his highest thoughts and aspirations. Man is just a robot, and his "self-discipline" is imposed from without by means of calculated stimuli. These theories have long been basic in modern psychology. Psychologists scorn the existence of mind, spirit, or soul, and, calling themselves Behaviourists or by any other name, they explain the most complex of man's reactions by the simple formula S . . . R. And yet they glibly talk of self-control and, like W. Drabovitch, may even misquote such great words as those uttered by Clemenceau, "Les républiques les plus républicaines ne seront un progrès que si elles peuvent mettre l'homme en état de se régler". If we follow W. Drabovitch, self-control is not the control of the personality, of all thoughts, actions and desires by that which is higher, the immortal ego, but a balance depending only upon whether or not outside stimuli strike our inhibitions.



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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THE INNER AWAKENING

In the article immediately following this one, J. S. Collis deals with an important subject in a very understanding way. Conversion as an inner process of human consciousness is not only distinguished from proselytism (which generally is an acquiescence in force or persuasion applied from without) but a very correct word is used to define it - Birth. Second Birth as an expression is of very ancient origin. "The Twice-Born," in Sanskrit, *Dwijā*, now applied to the men of the three "higher" castes, is as crude a use of the term as the word "converted" when applied to those who change one outer form of creed for another, which, as Mr. Collis points out, makes them "less rather than more" of men. We purposely adopt "The Inner Awakening" as the title of this article, because, from one point of view, it indicates better the process of Conversion or Second Birth.

The experience of Conversion is difficult to describe because of two reasons: only the Twice-Born are capable of understanding the process described. If it is beyond the capacity of ordinary minds to appreciate fully the mathematical genius of an Einstein, it is a thousandfold more difficult for the Nicodemuses of this world to fathom the meaning of a Jesus. The second difficulty presents an even more serious obstacle: Inner Awakening is a continuing process; the upward progress of the human Ego is a series of progressive awakenings, and so there are many Conversions, each of which, verily, is a New Birth. Thus a man born of water and of the Spirit has one kind of awakening, and his experience differs from that of one who is born of fire and of the Spirit. At each of the numerous Awakenings, a new creature is born, as Paul, himself a Twice-Born, wrote to the Corinthians and the

Galatians. It is not only "the birth of a new vision," as Mr. Collis points out, but also the birth of a new Being. Just as at birth the embryo ceases to be and the child begins to live, so also at Second Birth the man of flesh and blood ceases to be and the man of wisdom and compassion starts his upward journey.

We agree with Mr. Collis that a proper understanding of the subject would lead to "a good deal more Conversion". Such men and women, in whom spiritual stirring brings about an Inner Awakening naturally and in the process of evolution, are eager to share the enrichment of their consciousness with their fellows. Thus Mr. Collis, who writes out of his own experience. And what is his prescription?—Surrender. "Surrender ourselves to life," and he is careful enough to insert the direction—"Give up intellectualising." But what portion or aspect of our being shall we give up?

Mr. Collis calls the Second Birth an emotional experience—which will be in conformity with other descriptions of the Converted if he means transcending all feelings represented by the pair, attachment-aversion. Giving up and killing out of feelings means purification of the personal emotions, including erotic desires—the death of blind Cupid which brings to birth the radiant Eros, the elimination of passion and the emergence of Compassion, the eradication of loves and the cultivation of Love for the universal whole.

And in what does giving up

"intellectualizing" consist, if meditation and contemplation are the very exercises which develop the new vision? Again, what is implied in the process of surrendering? Is it not the development of adaptability of the New Interior Being to the New Vision and the New Life, implying the abandonment of the old ways and habits of the antenatal existence before the Second Birth? And how can the New Life be lived without true spiritual Will which flieth like light and cutteth obstacles like a sharp sword?

Mr. Collis gives his own version about casting out Fear, unfolding Faith, and obeying the Holy Ghost—these are well recognized methods; fearlessness is the first of the qualities the sixteenth chapter of the *Gita* names as necessary for the development of divinity in man; the *Gita* also defines Faith, in the seventeenth chapter; the Holy Ghost as an aspect of Krishna is also recognizable in that Book of Discipline. And we can name, too, their equivalents in Buddhistic, Pythagorean or other traditions.

While many reading Mr. Collis's prescription will only say, "how can these things be?"—a few at least who accept that Inner Awakening as a logical possibility may question the validity of that prescription or demand more detailed definitions, especially as his programme has several lacunae in important places.

That raises a very vital point—a fundamental problem. Between the general Occidental view about mystical experience and that of

Eastern Occultism there is a remarkable difference. Since the days of Pythagoras and the passing of the Greater Mysteries, the positive teaching of that philosophy and its practice which leads to Conversion or Second Birth have fallen into neglect; the very existence of soul-science as a definite system of learning is denied, and its pursuit looked at askance. In Eastern Occultism the tradition still persists of the Guru preparing the Chela for Second Birth; we are not referring to the religious ritual among the Hindus and the Parsis of giving the Sacred Thread, similar to the First Communion of the Roman Catholics—all of which have meaning as symbols but are a grotesque farce as believed in and practised to-day. Nor do we refer to the exploitation of credulous people by self-styled occultists and gurus. However superstitiously interpreted, the view prevails that

with the aid of Instruction the aspirant hatches out the disciple from within himself; that with the aid of the Guru the Chela fecundates his own heart till the Adept is born in him. In Oriental Esotericism the Guru is called the Father, for he passes on his seed of Wisdom to the Chela; the Guru is also called the Mother, for the disciple is like a foetus nourished and nurtured for a period till he is born. We can well understand the bias and the suspicion of the earnest and honest seeker, Eastern or Western, against this traditional view of the institution of Chelaship, so basely exploited by the priest, by the charlatan, by the ambitious. But the truth must be told: the Path to the Second Birth exists; man has to energize himself to take each step; and lest he take it in the wrong direction, he should seek the knowledge and guidance of those who have walked that Path.

WHAT IS CONVERSION ?

[Concerning this article, **J. S. Collis** writes: "I have been careful to make it simply the expression of personal experience, a sincere report of how one man sees the matter—not meant at all as an exhaustive or scientific approach." It is in response to his request for comment, that the Editorial this month was written.—EDS.]

It is the hour when a man attains Religion and comes to comprehend the meaning of Faith. Of all the words that have become famous for the amount they are mishandled, Conversion is the most celebrated. More liberties are taken

with it than with the word Romance. Mr. Middleton Murry has a special liking for it and, having once used it in its proper sense of Re-birth, later on, without warning, does not hesitate to use it in his well-known manner in

quite a different sense. It is generally misunderstood; which is unfortunate, for a proper understanding of the matter would lead to a good deal more Conversion.

We must never ask—Conversion to what? It cannot be to one of many things, or even to one of two things. It always means the same. It is the coming to a point in a man's life when he accepts the Universe with a wider vision than before, when the Self is no longer at odds with the Not-Self, when the inner life ceases to be strangled in conflict but converges in harmony, and the burden of the mystery is turned into love.

I have defined the word in its *full* sense. There is no point in using any word, least of all Conversion, in anything less than its full sense! Otherwise we immediately deliver ourselves into the hands of the clergy or the moralists or the psychologists. A clergyman will inform us without hesitation that "conversion is generally accompanied by the giving up of some bad habit or vice," and will add that it is associated with the formation of new intellectual beliefs; while the typical psychologist, by correlating it (quite accurately no doubt) with sexual development, will generally imagine that it is something much less than it is, and in the end gets caught with his readers in the machinery.

The result is the phrase "He has been converted," now conveys to us the idea that the man in question has become less rather than more, has been narrowed rather than

widened, and even in some way has lost a portion of his humanity. For we have degraded the meaning of Conversion. We allow it to be said: "He has been converted to Roman Catholicism" or "to Communism". But to embrace a new system of thought or a new way of life is not the essence of Conversion, which is an emotional experience, and *cannot* come by taking thought, but only as a thief in the night. Many truly converted men and women have subsequently intellectualised that emotion into conventional religious channels, owing to tradition, imitation, or stupidity; or they have launched crusades. They have done these things in their folly and in their glory, but we should not forget that what they have subsequently done is not so important as their primary conversion. They also needed to understand their experience.

Nor should we ever allow it to be said: "He has been converted by the Priest," or "by the Salvation Army," or by some Hot-Gospeller. For thereupon a wholly wrong idea of the real thing is conveyed. A man cannot be converted by the will of anyone to anything. It is the final moment of a long process of growth that we are speaking of. It need not be dramatic, nor happen at a special hour; it can be the accumulated result of many glimpses. There have been and there will be again dramatic conversions with dramatic results, but the average man is only depressed by knowing about these things, for he feels

that such an experience, such stimulus, and such power will never be his. It is our task to tell him that conversion into the grace of vision need not be dramatic nor sudden, and is open to all.

So we ask again—What is Conversion? And though the negative method is objectionable, we use it here. We say: It is not a question of coming into the possession of some new beliefs—it does not touch dogma or doctrine; it is not a question of repentance, nor does it deal in the conviction of sin; it is not a question of renunciation. It is a question of *birth*.

It is almost as if a new instrument of apprehension is born, by which the recipient can not only accept the universe and his own destiny, but can do so cheerfully. This instrument has sometimes been called Imagination, and sometimes Love. How can this child be brought forth? Chiefly by Surrender. Not by Will. To despise the Will would be foolish; we can never have enough Will. But we must understand its function. Its business is to make us *determined* to do certain things, even if those things are to avoid being a hard determined character, to be pliable, to be mentally unresisting, to appear for a time weak and will-less in the eyes of men. We must be determined to give up intellectualising, and surrender ourselves to life.

The chief bogey with which the intellect inflicts us is Fear. We are not as afraid as the animals—who live perpetually in a state of physical fear. We have made a

great advance there; and being no longer on the *qui vive* continually regarding personal danger, we have had the leisure to think. Unfortunately we have also had time to think up new fears. We are no longer afraid of being eaten, but we are afraid of evils we invent such as Money, and evils we think such as Sex, and evils we feel and then intellectualise such as the cruelty of Nature and the unfairness of Pain. To refuse to feel Fear in the face of death or in the face of life, is to flout the rationalising mind, and to make profound personal surrender.

To what end?—it may be asked. Unless such a line of action leads to some good result it will certainly lead to a bad one. On the face of it a greater chaos and even more unhappiness would seem to follow if we started such a method of advance. Yet it does not follow. That is the secret. To those who are without faith, who simply do not believe in life, such procedure must sound fantastic. Yet faith can hardly be attained any other way.

For we are attending her at the miracle of a remarkable growth—the birth of a new vision. The tendency of everyone is to reject and run away from a vast number of things, to love only that which is lovely, and to be for ever *judging*. But if, perhaps, for some years, we refrain from these inclinations; if we accept the ocean, for instance, without labelling it good or bad, but saying only It Is; if we go on from this and accept beetles rolling balls of dung in the same spirit; if

we go further and accept wicked men at their wickedness with no intention of casting any stone; if we let all the various forms of life receive our affirmation; if we allow all the occupations, all the religions, all the expressions of men to parade before us, rejecting and scorning none—then something will happen to us. This exercise will perform a function in our minds. We will not perceive that process at work. If we try and look we will see nothing. But while we are looking the other way, while we are otherwise engaged, that hidden process will continue making advances by short rushes, until one day we discover that we are seeing more and loving more. This in its turn brings strange effects. We find problems which used to worry us terribly now disappearing, not by process of being solved but by process of being dissolved. They do not come before us as problems in the old way. The mind has made some advance of which we were unaware. Finally we discover that we have obtained a *centre* within us. That is the last thing we would expect after so much relativity and pliability—but that is what we find. From this centre we act and choose—though still we need never judge.

We have surrendered ourselves to life and in return we have been given joyous intuitions. And of course this is really to be expected. For life *is* all right, and does for ever flow in righteousness—otherwise all would be chaos. If we act on that assumption and attempt to

identify ourselves with that flow by listening for the deepest voice of life, we must inevitably meet with the reward of greater insight and happiness. But here we come to the last point I wish to put forward. The following out of this line of action is very likely to lead to an hour of crisis. That hour may come in the most unexpected way and under circumstances perhaps fantastically trivial. The sign of that hour will nevertheless be the same: it will come in the form of the desire to be loyal at all costs to a small, thin voice that demands a given action, while there are a thousand excuses, a thousand reasons for taking a line of less resistance. A sinking feeling will follow the recognising of that voice. It is a crisis. If that Holy Ghost is obeyed then the servant will henceforth understand the meaning of mysticism and the essence of religion. He will no longer understand the matter from *outside* only. Such an hour cannot help demanding the courage to throw aside Fear and take an awful plunge. I started this article by saying that the average man is depressed by the Conversions of Saints because of the spectacular quality of their experience. In urging that he also can reach the grace of vision I did not and do not intend to suggest that the Road—the Open Road as Whitman called it—is easy to travel at first, or at any time free from danger. It demands courage, and courage is so rare a gift.

THE FIRST ABYSS

A CHAPTER IN AUTOBIOGRAPHY

[In the following narrative, the experience recorded marks a definite stage in the life of the aspirant. All life may be allowed hypothetically to be a probation, but only those to whom this is a fact of interior knowledge observe the inner processes, as **Theophilus** does in the person of John Easterly. "Come out from among them and be ye separate," is the first-fruit of such observation. This involves an inner separation which naturally causes despondency, as may be seen in the case of Arjuna. As long as it is recognized that such a separation must come, struggle is inevitable and the Abyss will seem to exist still for the struggler, just as it did for John Easterly. Karmic bonds cannot be broken, they must and do in the process of time fall asunder. H. P. Blavatsky once wrote:—"Shall I risk to be ordered to leave my wife, desert my children and home if I pledge myself?" asks one. 'No,' I say, 'because he who plays truant in one thing will be faithless in another. No real, genuine MASTER will accept a chela who sacrifices *anyone* except himself to go to that Master.'"—EDS.]

Up to the age of forty-nine, John Easterly had lived the regular, reasonably successful life of an English civil-servant. He had married early, and had two children, a son of fourteen and a daughter of eleven.

He and his wife were of very different temperaments. She was emotionally generous, active, happy in company, and, in religion, an Anglo-Catholic, delighting in the drama of the ritual, and intelligent enough to find a meaning in its symbolism.

In his youth, John had accepted without question the Evangelical creed of his parents. He had been taught to fear the terrors of Hell, and sin had been figured for him as the temptation of a personal Devil, lord of a hierarchy of evil spirits. Yet during the various religious crises that attacked him between the ages of fifteen and eighteen, it was the positive thirst for righteousness rather than the dread of everlasting damnation

that had been the generating impulse. And when, at Cambridge, he lost his faith in his parents' creed, he had a sense of great release, as if he were now free to seek the truth without that horrible compulsion of fear which numbs the Spirit.

At first, in too violent a reaction against the toils that had hitherto confined him, he sought an explanation of the Universe in the teachings of Science. The imperative dogma of his early training had taken shape for him as a kind of fetish that must be utterly destroyed, if he were ever to seek knowledge with an open mind. And in the process of destruction, he slipped unconsciously into a new slavery that if it had not been for the secret urgency of his spirit might have held him for the rest of his life.

This new idol of materialism he had so fervently acclaimed laid no demands on its worshippers, and his acceptance of it called for no

devoted service. Wherefore, although he eagerly welcomed any new pronouncement of Science that served to ridicule the childish beliefs in which he had been trained, he had none of the passion of the devotee. Science for him was always a defence rather than a creed, a means for the eradication of those thought-habits that had been impressed upon his sensitive young mind.

This phase lasted for twenty years. In that time the two beliefs he had so far held had cancelled one another, and he prided himself on being free from superstition and prejudice. Some men would have remained at that stage of development for the rest of their lives. He had friends and office-colleagues who were in that state, men so finally restricted by habits of thought and judgment that no further progress was possible for them. But John, moved, though he was unaware of it, by the desires of his spirit could not stop thinking about the nature of man and the Universe.

So, by degrees, he came to recognise that Science explained nothing save in its own terms. It had cognisance of matter only by material means. It observed, measured, weighed and collated its results, but those results were only closer approximations to the rules or laws that material phenomena appeared to obey. With the origin of those laws Science was not concerned, yet that was the great question which remained as a perpetual source of wonder in John's mind.

At this time he became occasion-

ally conscious of a queer dissatisfaction with the life he was living. In the theatre or the cinema, he would find himself asking what he was doing there, what this attempted preoccupation with amusement indicated, why he should find any pleasure in either intellectual or emotional distraction? And distraction from what? Was not everything he did throughout the day, year after year, a form of distraction, without ulterior object, nothing more than a means of getting through life to attain the goal of death?

He was forty-nine when he happened one day to catch sight on the outside stall of a second-hand bookseller, a shabby little volume with the title *The Voice of the Silence*. That title instantly arrested his attention. He seemed to recognise it as a description of something known rather than as something seen or heard. Was not this, he asked himself, the voice arising from somewhere within his own consciousness that reproached him with wasting his life? He picked up the little slender book and read "The Mind is the great Slayer of the Real." He saw instantly that that was true. It put in one concise statement, his whole criticism of Science. Had he not known within himself that there must be a reality behind all the illusions of matter, an "origin" of which Science was debarred by its own methods from taking cognisance?

He turned back to the book, and on the opposite page, his eye caught the sentence :—

. . . if thy Soul weeps inside her castle of illusion . . . know, O Disciple, thy Soul is of the earth.

The first quotation had filled him with the pride of one who finds confirmation of his own discovery. The second was an accusation. Again he had found a description of himself. It was true that when he had had that sense of deep dissatisfaction at the theatre, his Soul had wept "inside her castle of illusion," but he had been inclined to count that as some kind of virtue, an evidence of aspiration on which he might congratulate himself. But here, he read, and instantly believed, that this weeping of his Soul was an evidence of failure.

Now within the slight compass of *The Voice of the Silence* is contained all the wisdom that any man may need to realise his immortality; but however great may be his intellectual powers, he will not truly comprehend a single passage in that book until he has found the truth of it within himself. And John only now on the very threshold of self-knowledge was able to comprehend little more than those two quotations he first read. Nevertheless standing there in the busy street before the bookseller's shop, he knew with a great certainty that a new way of thought and of life was opening to him. In that hour he had regained faith in some immortal essence that inhabited his body.

In the days immediately following he had a sense of great peace and happiness, accompanied by a tolerance, that he believed to be love, for the weakness of mankind.

But that feeling of serenity did not endure. He found himself continually snared by the circumstance of his daily life, and longed for the quiet of segregation from the world. It seemed to him, then, that unless he could go alone into the wilderness, the hope of immortality would be lost to him. He read and re-read *The Voice of the Silence*: but he had not learnt "to separate Head-learning from Soul-wisdom," and he had no true understanding of its meaning. He believed that his first step must be a complete renunciation of all the world he had so far known, that he must go to India and find a Guru. Yet how could he leave his wife and children? If he gave up his post in the Government service, they would all be penniless.

There had never been any real community of feeling between him and his wife, and now the breach that separated them was so far widened that his home life became almost intolerable. He had told her of his discovery on that first evening believing that she who had often deplored his agnosticism would be pleased by what she might regard as his "conversion." But even at that first confession she had regarded his new faith with suspicion, and when she realised the form his renunciation might take, she fought with all the strength of her powerful personality to restrain him.

"This *religion* of yours," she said contemptuously, "is nothing but selfishness. Your one idea is to save your own soul, which seems to me to be just an exaggerated

form of egotism. It means nothing to you, I suppose, but that is surely what Christ meant when he said 'Whosoever will save his life shall lose it.'"

He had no answer to that. All his sense of peace and happiness had left him, and he braced himself for the coming struggle. For he realised that he could not run away. That would be an act of fear and weakness. Before he could make what he thought of as "the great renunciation," he must convince his wife, teach her to understand his new faith. For the means of doing that he read and pondered *The Voice of the Silence*, and since his Soul had begun, however vaguely and tentatively, to remember, he realised by degrees that reason and argument were useless, and that only by love could he hope to win her allegiance and sympathy.

That task, however, proved to be almost hopeless. It offended her that he should wish to bear love to all men. She was greedy for possession. She wanted all of him, not some part of that universal charity he was attempting to teach himself. She complained that his new-found gentleness and forbearance with their children was a sign of weakness. She blamed him for ceasing to find fault with the failings of their acquaintances, for his apparent willingness to condone in others such flagrant evils as selfishness, cruelty and lust. And always she reverted to her first ac-

cusation, charging him with self-seeking, with having no object in view other than the desire to save his own soul.

And John found, he still finds, no answer to that charge. He has not yet learned to merge the personal into the impersonal self, and so the conflict within him still rages. His reason admits the truth of his wife's contention, and there are long periods during which he seems to himself to have fallen back into his old indifference. That dream of drastically cutting himself off from Western life has slipped into the realms of fantasy. He knows, now, that he is not yet fit for the humblest stage of chelaship to any Guru. Indeed, it seems to him that he has failed utterly and most lamentably to cross the first Abyss that separates the careless multitude engrossed with the things of this world from those disciples who would take the initial step on the path that leads up to the first of the Seven Portals.

But although he is still unaware of it, the first Abyss already lies behind him. When out of his own inner wisdom he recognised the first elementary truths to be found in *The Voice of the Silence*, he had made a choice from which no retreat is possible, had become an element in the "great general circulation" and was compelled henceforth "to obey its forward impulse."

They've no retreat who kindled at the spark
Which man unto himself makes manifest,
And brightening shall illumine all the dark.

THEOPHILUS

PARACELSUS

"THE GREATEST OCCULTIST OF THE MIDDLE AGES"

[**Geoffrey West** has prepared for THE ARYAN PATH a series of studies on the life and mission of several Western Occultists, beginning with "the Father of European Occultism". The following is in two parts, the second of which will be published next month.—EDS.]

The modern study of Theosophy, for the West at least, begins, and in a sense ends, in the work of H. P. Blavatsky. To those teachers who went before her, she has done more than anyone to draw our attention. And she has had, as yet, no successor.

Thus, while in essence Theosophy is universal beyond localization, it comes to us in a specifically Eastern form, and, as such, one which the average, even the average intelligent, European finds so intensely disturbing to his whole mode of thought that his inclination is to reject it out of hand. True, there are increasing signs to-day of a widespread change or development of outlook. The existence and power of psychic and spiritual factors, the validity of a knowledge and wisdom anterior to Francis Bacon and even Aristotle, are no longer denied with nineteenth-century confidence even by the so-called trained scientist. Yet these tendencies must develop far before anything approaching the Theosophical standpoint becomes widely acceptable, and meanwhile it is inevitable that the casual observer should tend to attach doubt if not downright disbelief to almost all its most eminent exponents through

the ages. For every one of them, regarded from the strictly Western point of view, was odd, dabbled in the marvellous, taught the incredible, performed the impossible. These trailing clouds of glory, warrants of power for him who believes, the sceptic deems but the dubious clammy cobwebs of impostorship. And yet, somehow, the conviction persists of their understanding, insight, achievement, knowledge. Self-assured investigators may "expose" them again and again—and still they stand, to demand, and to receive, attention.

Regarding the universe as it is depicted to him by the modern astronomers and physicists, man shrinks to a bewildered atom amid these cold immensities, stoical or whimpering in his fearful loneliness. He seems to bear the burden of all time and space, indeed of eternity, upon his single shoulders. Western science proffers him no key. In its confessed failure to describe the photon, we have the analogue of its failure to describe being. Certain factors (speed) can be given only by omitting other factors (mass)—or *vice versa*. Analysis, in the last resort, must always fall short. What then?, one asks, and turns to find Theosophy

whispering of a key whose essence is a knowledge not of the intellect but of the being, an act not of a partial but a total perception, suggesting that it is the saint rather than the scientist who is the ultimate "seer" of the true nature of reality, for he alone is fully attuned *as an organism* to perceive organically the object of attention whatever it may be.

We ask: Were these Theosophical teachers, bearing the reputation and seeming to the first glance the very figures of impostors, really of this higher calibre? Not only, what did they teach, but what were *they* that we should listen to them? Let us take a few, some half-dozen, not wholly at random and yet without any attempt at a complete conspectus; say—Paracelsus, called the Father of European Occultism; four such diverse eighteenth-century personages as the Comte de Saint-Germain, Mesmer, Louis Claude de Saint-Martin, and Cagliostro; and last, and inevitably, H. P. Blavatsky. Let us seek to see them in some sort as they truly were, with Western and yet with understanding eyes; and, having regarded them one by one, to see what significance they hold for us, the West, to-day, and for the future development of Theosophy in the West.

* * * *

Paracelsus—why, and how justly was he termed the Father of European Occultism? Wide factors are involved in the answering of such a question. Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim—he adopted the name of Paracelsus at the age of

seventeen—was born at a critical, in fact decisive, moment of the world's historical and spiritual development. The Renaissance was spreading its ferment over Europe, with the wave of the Reformation close behind. New discoveries, new curiosities, new ideas were active in every field of thought and action. The modern world was dawning after the long night of the Dark Ages.

The previous thousand years had been dark indeed. The bright illuminations of Alexandria and the East, of Rome even, had been persistently and ruthlessly stifled by an all-powerful Church whose lust for temporal power had blinded its spiritual understanding. The torch of Neoplatonism raised by Ammonius Saccas in the third century was extinguished in Alexandria with the mob-murder of Hypatia in 415, and before the end of the sixth century its last reflection seemed dead in the wider world. Simply, it vanished, for over nine hundred years. Then, suddenly, we find it in revival, even before Paracelsus. How had it survived to emerge after all these centuries? What ark had borne it safely across this protracted flood? For answer we must look to the persistence of the specifically Kabbalist knowledge, Jewish in form but of a more ancient and wider origin, which remained a national possession, a traditional wisdom passing from teacher to student, initiate to initiate, "face to face and mouth to ear," in Palestine, in Egypt, in the Near East, then more and more widely over Europe as the Jews

were scattered westward. From the twelfth century forward there were known to be Kabbalist schools in Spain, Italy and Germany at least. It was thus that the essential hermetic knowledge, directly deriving from the teaching of Simeon ben Yohai but clearly allied both to that of Ammonius *and* to the Gnosticism of Simon Magus, was never lost, though often distorted, misunderstood, and misapplied.

In the strict sense Paracelsus taught nothing new; but very little study of the "alchemystical philosophers" who preceded him is necessary to realise that. Practically without exception his main principles were the common possession of the other outstanding occult initiates of his own day. On the face of the facts there is no particular reason why his teacher Johannes Trithemius, or Cornelius Agrippa, his fellow-pupil under Trithemius, should not have achieved as he did. Madame Blavatsky has declared Trithemius to be the greatest Kabbalist of his day, and he was a master of the arts of magnetism and telepathy, magic and alchemy. Agrippa too had both wisdom and great energy.

Paracelsus, unlike either of them, was primarily neither scholar nor mystic but physician. He lived and died—whether the latter by violence or disease—a doctor. Perpetually questing, in Browning's words, "to comprehend the works of God, and God himself, and all God's intercourse with the human mind," he applied his knowledge, as he won it, first and foremost to the art of healing. His purpose and his

task led him into many strange paths, but he forsook neither.

His comparatively brief life—he died at forty-eight—falls into three periods, the first of youth's dedication to an aim, the second of conscious pupillage culminating in attainment of understanding, the third of the master, the man of knowledge speaking with authority, demonstrating his powers in action and teaching with tongue and pen. And in each phase he was a wanderer, without—once boyhood passed—a home, poor in friends though with, alas, no lack of the harsh coin of others' hatred. He was born in 1493 near Zurich in Switzerland, but was only nine when his father, the distinguished doctor Wilhelm Bombast von Hohenheim, was appointed town-physician at Villach in Carinthia, whither the two of them, for Theophrastus was an only child and his mother was already dead, went to live. There he had his first schooling, but when sixteen returned to Switzerland to the University at Basle. Later he studied at Wurzburg as the pupil of Trithemius, and then in the laboratories of Sigismund Fugger, a noted alchemist, at Schwatz in the Tyrol, where he wrote his earliest work.

Clearly his transcendent aim was fixed, but, it soon appeared, he had to follow it in his own way. He had in boyhood been his father's constant companion, accompanying him upon his medical visits and learning from him both theory and practice of chemistry, alchemy, surgery and medicine generally. And having thus had his first lessons in, as

it were, the world, he never took kindly to the study. Scholastic methods he found pedantic, unprofitable. He was never a reader of books, save "the great open book of nature, written with the finger of God". Like all the great figures of the Renaissance, he relied upon his own living perceptions: while he could recognise the profound qualities of such a teacher as Trithemius, the world was, first and last, his ultimate laboratory.

In this assurance, in 1516, aged twenty-three, he deliberately set forth as a pilgrim upon the roads of Europe, of which, in the next five years he left little unvisited, travelling unburdened, learning as life might teach, and despising no knowledge whatever its source. He passed in turn through Vienna, Cologne, Paris, Montpellier (very stronghold of orthodox medical opinion), Italy, Spain, England, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Bohemia, Poland, Transylvania, Wallachia, Croatia, and the Balkans, whence he entered Russia, penetrating as far as Moscow. In Russia he became acquainted, either as prisoner or guest, with the Tartar ruler, and accompanied his son to Constantinople in 1521. There he is said to have lived for some months in the house of a great occultist, under whose tuition he received "the Philosopher's Stone"—his final initiation into that higher occult and spiritual understanding which thenceforward he owned in higher degree than any other Western student of his age.

Who was this instructing occultist? Some would say Solomon

Trismosinus, a reputed initiate whose very existence, however, some well-informed students of the period would deny. It has also been declared that Paracelsus himself penetrated to India and even Tibet, but he himself stated explicitly: "I visited neither Asia nor Africa, although it has been so reported." Presumably the basis of the legend is the extent of his knowledge, and its consonance with Eastern teachings, but he had his teachers, and—truth knows no geographical limitations. He did in fact say that "all Wisdom comes from the East: from the West we can expect nothing good," but H. P. Blavatsky on the other hand suggests that identical teachings do not necessarily derive one from another, "for an eternal truth may as well be recognised by one seer as by another".

He was now a master, in the realms alike of occult knowledge and medical practice—the one implied the other. But his wanderings were no more ended, and one might almost say that his troubles were only beginning. All not simply blinded by prejudice could not but recognise him as a truly distinguished physician, and his powers were manifest in his seemingly almost miraculous cures; but these very things roused professional jealousy against him wherever he went, and he could not long settle in any place, to draw about him a circle of student disciples, before his very life was threatened and he was forced to fly. (Admittedly his vigour and bluntness in controversy, or in denouncing the

laziness and ignorance of the doctors as a whole, and his quite evident contempt, did nothing to allay their resentment !) He had thus to leave Bohemia, Poland, Wurttemberg, Strassburg, Basle (where he had been appointed town physician and professor of medicine in the University), Nuremberg, and other places. For a while he was reduced to absolute poverty, possibly relieved in 1537 by receiving some property from his father who had

died in 1534. Not until the spring of 1541 did he find, at Salzburg where he was welcomed by the Duke Ernst of Bavaria, another occult student, what might have been a home. But his rest was brief, for he died in the following September, murdered at last, some have said, by his old enemies, though other evidence suggests a natural death from an incurable disease contracted in the course of his wanderings.

GEOFFREY WEST

THE TRANSLATION OF ANCIENT INDIAN TEXTS

The spiritual grandeur and depth of the Sanskrit texts are largely denied to the Western reader. With all due respect to the Orientalists to whose arduous labours we owe the existing translations, it must be conceded that through them we can see but as "through a glass, darkly". Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy takes this general position in introducing a few of his own "Versions from the Upanishads," in the first biennial issue for 1933 of *Indian Art and Letters*. However, the more or less literal translation of a text is the smallest part of the problem. It may be compared to the mechanical processes of developing and printing in the photographer's art, which are valueless unless the film has first been properly prepared and exposed, with due regard to the effects of light and shade which best bring out the salient features

of the view. Be he never so learned, if a translator of the sacred text of the ancient Aryans lacks spiritual insight, he must fail in conveying their true import, because he cannot see it himself; at best he can achieve textually accurate word-for-word translations, as stiff and wooden as a northern tree in midwinter.

If we compare the death-like rigid stillness of the wintry tree with the beauty and poetry of motion of its summer garb of living green, we can picture the contrast between the average uninspired literal rendering of the Orientalist, and one by a translator who added heart understanding to brain perception. The old Indian texts have a message of which the present-day West stands in need. We have been told what they say; now let some qualified translators tell us what they *mean*.

PH. D.

ASPECTS OF MODERNISM

[**Nolini Kanta Gupta** is a disciple of the well-known Aurobindo Ghose, once a front rank politician, now a recluse who has attracted a number of devotees to his Ashram at Pondicherry. Our contributor is the author of over a dozen books in Bengali, and of *The Coming Race* in English.—EDS.]

Unity was the sheet-anchor of Science up to now. But the latest theories seem to break up the universe into a mass of independent constituents each acting for itself. No doubt there is one Force still (if magnetism and electricity can be reduced to one formula as is sought to be done by Einstein), but it is a discontinuous unity in its manifestation at least. Science seems to be coming away from a materialistic Advaita towards a re-statement of the Samkhya idea.—SRI AUROBINDO

Every age has claimed to be modern and sought to establish its characteristic newness, the hallmark that separates it from the preceding age.

How then does the twentieth century propose to mark out its difference from the past? "Science and the scientific outlook," many would answer. But to others that difference itself might appear antiquated. For, strictly speaking, science was the key-note of the nineteenth century; and although we of the twentieth are enjoying its fruits, putting it to more practical use than our predecessors did, yet it is they who embodied its spirit, its special and proper rule of light and life. We have not discarded the gift, but assimilated it and even seem to have outgrown it; we have added to it or extended and developed it.

Science indeed gave a very decided turn to the slowly advancing humanity. It brought with it something that meant in the march of evolution a *saltum*, a leap wide and clear; it landed man all of a sudden into a new world, a new state of

consciousness. It is this state of consciousness, the fundamental way of being, inculcated by the scientific spirit, that is of capital importance and possesses a survival value. It is not the *content* of Science, but its *intent*, not its riches, but its secret inspiration, its motive power, that will give us a right understanding of the change it has effected. The material aspect of the event has lost much of its value; the mechanical inventions and discoveries, bringing in their train a revolution in the external organization of life, have become a matter of course, and almost a matter of the past. But the reactions set up in the consciousness itself, the variations brought about in the very stuff and constitution of life still maintain a potency for the future and are to be counted.

The scientific spirit, in one word, is rationalisation—rationalisation of Mind as well as of Life. With regard to Mind, rationalisation means to get knowledge exclusively on the data of the senses; it is the formulation, in laws and principles, of facts observed by

the physical organs, these laws and principles being the categories of the arranging, classifying, generalising faculty, called reason; its methodology also demands that the laws are to be as few as possible embracing as many facts as possible. Rationalisation of life means the government of life in accordance with these laws, so that the wastage in natural life due to the diversity and disparity of facts may be eliminated, at least minimised, and all movements of life ordered and organised in view of a single and constant purpose (which is perhaps the enhancement of the value of life). This rationalisation means further, in effect, mechanisation or efficiency, as its protagonists would prefer to call it. However, mechanistic efficiency, whether in the matter of knowledge or of life—of mind or of morals—was the motto of the early period of the gospel of science, the age of Huxley and Haeckel, of Bentham and the Mills. The formula no longer holds good either in the field of pure knowledge or in its application to life; it does not embody the aspiration and outlook of the contemporary mind, in spite of such inveterate rationalists as Russell and Wells or even Shaw (in *Back to Methuselah*, for example), who seem to be already becoming an anachronism in the present age.

The contemporary urge is not towards rationalisation, but rather towards *irrationalisation*.

Orthodox science itself is taking greater and greater cognisance to-day of the irrational movements of

nature, even of physical nature. Intuition and instinct are now welcomed as surer and truer instruments of knowledge and action than reason.

Another special feature of the modern consciousness is its "multiple sightedness". The world, as it is presented to us, is no more than an assemblage of view-points; and each point of observation forms its own world-system. There is no one single ultimate truth; if there is any, there is no possibility of its being known or perceived by the mind or the senses. Things exist in relation to one another and for us they have no intrinsic existence apart from the relations. The instrument itself that perceives is the resultant of a system of relations. A truth is only a view-point; and as the view-point shifts, the truth also varies accordingly. The cult of Relativity is a significant expression of the modern consciousness.

Intimately connected with relativity and multiplicity is the principle of fragmentation or atomism (perhaps one should now say "electronism")—that forms another characteristic element of modernism. The universe, on a final analysis, is now found to be a concourse of vagrant electric charges. Even likewise, human personality too has no longer its old-world character and consistency of being made of one undivided piece—a monolithic structure; it is a composite of innumerable personalities, big and small, apparent and hidden, all huddled together in a case called the body, which itself is

not more stable than the shifting desert sands.

It is this pluralisation which has resulted in a necessary polarisation in the human consciousness. We have gained a power which was not only rare but perhaps totally absent in the old world, at least in the general mind; we have reached in a novel way that very wideness or wholeness which was at the outset negated by the urge towards separateness and parcellation. Thus the modern mind can take in more view-points than one—even contrary ones—at the same time. The individual has acquired the capacity—to put it in popular language—to enter into another's skin, not to be confined to its own outlook, limited within its linear groove, but to be able, with ease and grace to look through the eyes of others, even though they be on the other side of the arena. A wide and supple, large and subtle perception that goes round the entire contour of the observed object, not a perspective but a global view, is a characteristic capacity of the modern mind. We can see the same thing from all angles and distances; we can turn our gaze upon ourselves; we can see ourselves not only with our own way of looking but also as others see us, with equal detachment and impartiality. At least this is the character of the cultured, the representative man of to-day. Modern art too has sought in some of its significant expressions to demonstrate this protean nature of truth and reality, to bring out the simultaneity of its multiple modes, to give a living sense of its tangled

dynamism.

We spoke of the extreme atomism of modern Science that has thrown into the background the solid unity of creation and is laying emphasis for the moment more upon the division and scattering of forces than upon the cohesiveness and identity of the substratum; still that unity has not been abrogated but has been maintained on the whole, even if as an underlying note. Not only so, the reign of multiplicity, by a curious detour, is working towards a discovery of enhanced unity. The plurality of the modern consciousness is moving towards a richer and intenser unity; it is not a static, but a dynamic unity—a unity that does not suppress or merely transcend the diversity and disparity of its components but holds them together as an immanent force, and brings forth out of each its fullness of individuality. In the same way the present day movement towards internationalism or supra-nationalism has produced a rebound towards regionalism or infra-nationalism. And the voice of anarchism tends to be as insistent as that of collectivism.

The consciousness of yesterday was a unilateral movement. It rose up high and descended deep into the truth of things, but mostly along a single line. In the horizontal direction also, when it travelled, it effected a linear movement. The consciousness of to-day is complex and composite; it has lost much of the vertical movement; it does not very easily soar or dive, precisely because it has

spread itself out in a multitude of horizontal movements. Our modern consciousness is outward-gazing and extensive; it has not the in-gathering and intensive character of the old-world consciousness; but what it has lost in depth and height, it has sought to make up in width.

Simplicity and intensity, sublimity and profundity were the most predominant qualities of man's achievement in the past; what characterises human endeavour in the present is its wideness, richness, complexity. It can also be noted that the corruptions of these qualities likewise mark out their respective ages. Fanaticism, for example, the corruption of a good and noble thing, fidelity, means an unilateral mind carried to its extreme; it is a characteristic product of the middle ages in the West as in the East. The modern world in its stead has given us dilettantism and cynicism, corruption of largeness and catholicity.

Consciousness has two primary movements. In one it penetrates, enters straight into the heart of things; in the other it spreads out, goes about and round the object. The combination of the two powers is a rarity; ordinarily man follows the one to the exclusion of the

other. The modern age in its wide curiosity has neglected the penetrative and intensive movement and is therefore marred by superficiality. It is eager to go over the entire panorama of creation at one glance, if that is possible, to have a telescopic view of things; but it has been able to take in only the surface, the skin, the crust. Even the entrance into the world of atoms and cells—of protons and electrons, of chromosomes and genes—is not really a penetrative or intensive movement. It is only another form of the movement of pervasion or extension: it is still a going abroad, only on another line, in a different direction, but always fundamentally on the same horizontal plane. The microscope is only an inverted telescope. Our instruments are the external mind and senses and these move laterally and have not the power to leap on to a different level of vision. The earlier ages of mankind, narrow and circumscribed in many respects, possessed nevertheless that intensive and in-gathering movement, which is a kind of movement in the fourth dimension; it was a sixth sense leading into the Behind or Beyond of things.

NOLINI KANTA GUPTA

THE INDUS VALLEY CIVILIZATION

TWO VIEWS

I

[H. G. Rawlinson, C. I. E., is well known for his work on Indian History and is a contributor to the *Cambridge History of India*.—Eds.]

In a brilliant article contributed to THE ARYAN PATH in January 1930, Professor S. V. Venkateswara described the remarkable finds at Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa, which have revolutionized our views upon the early history of India. It is necessary, however, to consider the significance of these discoveries in somewhat greater detail. Two conclusions are, I think, beyond doubt. The inhabitants of the Indus valley were emigrants from Mesopotamia, who came to Sind at an early date, say about 4,000 B. C., through the Bolan Pass, bringing with them the Sumerian culture of their original home, which they afterwards developed upon their own lines. And secondly, they were the Dāsas or Dasyus, those swarthy, noseless, phallus-worshippers, dwelling in walled cities, whom the nomad Aryans encountered when they penetrated through the passes into the land of the Seven Rivers, and finally overcame. A third conclusion, that they were also the progenitors or relatives of the Dravidians, though it appears to the present writer to be highly probable, is still only an hypothesis.

But what is really of the greatest interest to us at the present moment, is the indebtedness of the Aryans to their earlier predecessors.

It has been the fashion to attach a greatly exaggerated importance to Aryan achievements in the region of primitive culture, and this view has recently been exploited for political purposes by Herr Hitler. The claim is, indeed, as old as Nietzsche, who was never tired of exalting the "blond beast" of the Baltic. Others have spoken with religious fervour of Vedic Sanskrit as the earliest of languages, quite oblivious of the fact that the Vedas are a modern document in comparison with early Egyptian or Sumerian. Many of us, despite the warnings of philologists and anthropologists, still persist, in talking of an Aryan *race*, as though all peoples speaking an Aryan tongue belonged to the same family of nations, whereas there is, ethnologically, no connection between the Celts of Western Europe for instance, and the Aryas who descended in the third millennium B. C. into Seistan and the Punjab. In the same way, Hindus of to-day are fond of describing themselves as Aryas, despite the fact that modern research has proved that the Rajputs are Gujaras by origin, the Marathas a mixed race with Dravidian, Scythian and indigenous elements, and the Bengalis to a great extent Mongolian. Such Aryan blood as originally came into India was absorbed, centuries

ago, by the countless waves of invading hordes which followed.

The Aryans were late-comers into the cultured world which had grown up round the shores of the Mediterranean in the Chalcolithic age, and which had spread to the banks of the great rivers, the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates and the Indus. The Aryan-speaking tribes were nomadic and primitive peoples, who, like their successors, the Goths and Huns in the third and fourth centuries A.D., quickly overcame the luxurious and decadent civilizations which they came up against, but eventually settled down, losing their nomadic habits and intermarrying and absorbing the culture of those whom they overthrew. In nearly every case it was much the same. In the Indus valley, the fierce Aryan invaders ousted the peaceful, indolent and artistic inhabitants of Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa after a series of struggles which still find echoes in the Vedic Hymns. In Greece the Hellenes overthrew the Minoan-Mycenean civilization and absorbed it. In Italy, the Italians did the same with the Etruscans. "The glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome" were built upon Semitic foundations. The great Semitic empires of the Mediterranean had been flourishing for centuries when the Aryan tribes were still savages, picking up shells upon the shores of the Baltic.

Three of the great religions of the world, Judaism, Christianity, and Mahommedanism, are of Semitic origin. The discoveries at

Mohenjo-Daro make us wonder whether the Semitic element in Hinduism is not its most important factor. Siva-Mahādeva is the "Great God," *par excellence*, of the Hindu Pantheon. It has long been felt that his supposed identification with the Vedic deity Rudra is unsatisfactory. It is also significant that his worship is particularly popular in Dravidian India. With him is associated the practice of Yoga, spiritual exercises of the utmost religious significance. The clue to the mystery is provided by the Indus valley seals which depict a three-headed, horned god seated in a Yogic *āsana*, and surrounded by beasts. Here then we can trace clearly the origin of Siva, the Mahāyogi, the Lord of Beasts. In the Indus valley seals may be also traced the Great Mother, the Sacred Snake, the worship of the Sacred Tree, the *Lingam* and the *Yoni*, and much of the background of primitive Buddhism, as we meet with it at Bharut and Sanchi.

Lastly, the Hindus owed to the Indus Valley folk the art of writing; Professor Langdon has shewn conclusively that the Brahmi script is derived from the Indus Valley pictographs. Further archaeological discoveries will no doubt confirm the view that the Hindu religion, and Hindu art and culture, are, like the Hindus themselves, largely non-Aryan in origin. The Aryan myth must take its place among the many exploded theories whose debris encumbered the shelves of the historian.

II

[S. V. Venkateswara, M. A., Principal of the Government Victoria College, Palghat, is the author of *Indian Culture Through the Ages*.—EDS.]

Prof. Rawlinson's article is interesting. He builds his conclusions and bases his hypotheses on what were once "accepted" views, views which, in the light of modern researches, prove misty as moon-shine. His conclusions are certainly not "beyond doubt". The inhabitants of the Indus Valley were culturally pre-Sumerian, not Sumerian, and were thus more probably emigrants from India into Mesopotamia than immigrants into India. Nor could they be affiliated to the Dasyus of the *Rg-Veda* who dwelt in walled cities which were of stone, whereas the Aryan cities, like those of the Indus Valley, were built of burnt brick. The Aryan invasion of India is a myth of the nineteenth century which has clouded the vision of the historical student. It has never been proved that the Vedic Aryans migrated from the passes, through Seistan, into the land of the Seven Rivers. It can be proved that they expanded to that region from their earlier home to the north and east of the Panjab. The iconography of the Indus Valley seals can no more be proved to be non-Aryan in origin than the Vedas or the sacred thread (*upavita*). The "blond beast" of the Baltic was the sworn enemy of bestiality, and his glory has been neither unmerited nor oversung.

I

Scholars have assumed that the

Aryans came to India from the West. It is an assumption based on the supposition that Central Asia or South-Eastern Europe was the bee-hive of nations, that races speaking languages belonging to the same family should have expanded from a central home, and that ancient migrations should have been, as in historical times, to India from the West, and not from India westwards. All these positions have to be reconsidered, as the difficulties in their way are increasing with our knowledge. As accepted views die hard, it demands in the scholar both care and boldness, and a mind free from prepossessions and prejudices.

The hypothesis of a Central Asian or South-East European home was based on the assumption that there we have the dividing line between the *Šatam* (Asiatic) and *Centum* (European) groups of languages. Recent discovery of *Tokharian* to the north-east of the Panjab and of *Nasili* in Hittite Cappadocia, which are both of the *Centum* (not *Šatam*) group, has knocked the bottom out of these assumptions. The Hittites knew the Zimalia (Himalayas), and their worship of Vedic gods was probably derived from that region. Hittites called themselves *Khatti*, which corresponds to our *Kshatriya* (Pali, *Khattiyo*). On an unprejudiced view both *Centum* and *Šatam* languages could be traced to the belt of the Himalayas.

Aryans have shown a meticulous care in preserving ancient myths and traditions, and there is nothing in these to indicate a home or an earlier seat outside of India. Scholars are agreed that the earliest stratum of Aryan literature in existence is that embodied in Books II to VII of the *Rg-Veda*. These reveal familiarity with the Himalayan region. One of the peaks of this mountain chain (Mūjavant) in south-western Kashmir, was the home of the Soma plant, a *sine qua non* of Vedic social life and sacrificial religion. There is no reference to the Salt Range, or to salt at all, though rock-salt abounds in the Panjab. The very first mention of salt-ground (*Usha* and *Ūsha*) occurs in the texts, not of the *Rg-Veda*, but of the *Yajur-Veda*.

As regards the river system, the Jhelum (Vitastā) is mentioned only once, and the Rāvi (Irāvati) plays the most prominent part, being the scene of the Battle of the Ten Kings. The Bharatas beat their foes on the Beas and Sutlej, when their priest was Visvamitra. It is interesting that, in the earliest stratum of the *Rg-Veda* (III. 33), the sage Vasishtha celebrates the crossing of the rivers from the eastern side, showing that the home of these Aryan forces was east of the Sutlej. When the battle was fought on the Rāvi, Vasishtha was the priest of the Bharatas (*Rg-Veda*. VII. 18 33; 83). Soon after, Sudas, the hero, was called away to his eastern border where he defeated his neighbours on the river Yamunā (Jumna). One

hymn clearly describes Indra as Lord of the East and the conqueror of the region of the several rivers. The Ganges is mentioned in one, and a king of the Gangetic region in another passage of the earliest stratum (VI. 45. 31). The Sarasvati, between the Sutlej and the Jumna, is the most important stream of the river system reflected in the *Rg-Veda*. This was the heart and centre of Āryāvarta, and the habitat of the Aryans reflected in Books II to VII was the region between the Himalayas and the great Indian desert of Rājputāna. It was bounded by the upper course of the Rāvi on the west and by the Ganges on the east.

It is only in the latest chronological stratum of the *Rg-Veda* (Book X) that the Panjab, regarded by Max Muller as the earliest home of the Aryans in India, is disclosed clearly to the view. The rivers are enumerated (X. 75. 5) in regular order from east to west, commencing with the Ganges, and closing with the eastern Afghan rivers. But the horizon of the bards expanded beyond the lands occupied by them. In one passage (*Rg-Veda* v. 53.11) the Maruts are invoked from the far-off regions of Swāt, Kābul, Kurram, Gumal and Rasā as well as from the familiar region of the Indus, and of the Sarayū in the far east (Gudh). But there is no mention in the entire body of the *Rg-Veda* of the numerous mouths of the Indus. Clearly enough, the southward migration to Sindh was not yet an accomplished fact. The Panjab and Sindh are, indeed, so far

from being conspicuous that Prof. A. B. Keith, still a protagonist of the Aryan invasion theory, is constrained to remark as follows :—

If, as may be the case, the Aryan invaders of India entered by the western passes of the Hindu-Kush and proceeded thence through the Panjab to the east, still that advance is not reflected in the *R̥g-Veda*.

He might have added that it is not reflected even in the Epic and Puranic traditions, some of which are regarded, by scholars like Paragiter, as going back to pre-Vedic times.

II

The antiquities of Sindh and the Panjab have been already described and discussed in the THE ARYAN PATH (January 1930), when I showed that they are pre-Sumerian in age. A year later, Prof. Langdon announced (*J.R.A.S.*, 1931) the discovery, in the pre-Sumerian ruins at Kish, of a seal which is rectangular in shape and covered with pictographs, quite similar to the seals of the Indus Valley. Dr. Frankfort has shown that the evidence of ceramics points in the same direction. The pottery of pre-dynastic Egypt points to Sumeria, and that of the latter to Seistan and the Indus Valley. (Frankfort: *Studies in Pre-historic Pottery*, Vol. II). Verily, Vedic culture is not modern as compared to Egyptian or Sumerian. *It may now be considered as generally accepted by scholars that the antiquities of India are pre-Sumerian in date and belong to the fifth millennium B. C.*

The internal evidence of the *R̥g-Veda* points to a *much earlier period*. The finds are of the age of bronze and copper implements, but the *R̥g-Veda* indicates the use of bone and stone implements. I would refer for details to my article in the "Proceedings" of the fifth Oriental Conference (Lahore, 1928) on "Traces of the Stone Age in the Vedic Texts". The fighting implements *adri* and *asani* (*R̥g-Veda* I and VI) refer to sling-stones. *Vajra* was the club of stone. *Dhishan* is the sharpened neolith (*svadhili*). The knife commonly used for cutting the sacrificial grass was made out of the rib of the horse, and was therefore known as "parśu" or "asva-parśu". The axe used in cutting trees and felling forests was known as "parśu" from which the *pilakku* of Babylonia and *la-brys* of Crete have alike descended.

Secondly, human figures in the finds are draped in the *Upavita* mode of India. This mode of tying the robe is peculiar to India, and was discovered here during the later Vedic Age. The robe passes round the upper left shoulder and is tucked up after it passes under the right arm. In a later text (T. A. I. 2) of the *Yajur-Veda* we find it described in detail. The Devas and Asuras were at war. The Asuras fell upon the Deva forces in overwhelming numbers. The Devas then discovered this expedient for overcoming them. They found that sexual energy was located in the left half of the body of man. If it was localized and focused, it could be transformed

into power. This was the secret the Devas discovered. They marched into battle with an animal skin or a piece of cloth covering their left side in the manner described above. Thus were the enemy overcome. It is interesting that, while the *R̥g-Veda* is full of references to shields and coats of mail, there is no allusion to this discovery or to the *Upavita* custom to which it led, in the entire range of *R̥g-Vedic* literature.

Thirdly, the details of the social picture revealed in the finds accord with the age of the later Vedic texts. The Earth Goddess appears in the finds. She finds mention for the first time in the latest book of the *R̥g-Veda* (x, 18). There is no clear passage in the *R̥g-Veda* showing animals associated with a God or Goddess even as vehicle (*Vāhana*). The animals which we find portrayed around the divine figure on the seal have a parallel in the four animals depicted around the central figure of a god in the *Yajur-Veda* (T.S. v. 3.1). The animals in the seal are the elephant, rhinoceros, crocodile, lion or tiger, and, in the text, the goat, sheep, tiger and lion.

The humped bull appears prominently in the ruins. The Vedic word for the hump is *Kakut* or *Kakubh*. It occurs in the earliest books of the *R̥g-Veda* entirely in the sense of a mountain-peak or a prominence (e. g., *Kakubh Parvatā-nām* in *R̥g-Veda* iv. 19. 4). Nor is there any other word denoting the *hump* in the earliest Books (II to VII) of the *R̥g-Veda*. The earliest reference I find to *Kakubh* as

denoting the hump of the bull is in the eighth book (*Kakubhogavām*: *R̥g-Veda* vii. 120, 21) and to *Kakut* in the same sense in the tenth Book (*Kakudmān R̥shabhah* in *R̥g-Veda*, x. 72; 101. 7).

The tiger appears on the seals, but that animal is conspicuous by its absence in the *R̥g-Vedic* texts, though there are numerous references to it in the other Vedas. A *naga* figure was unearthed at Mohenjo-Daro, and Nagas are mentioned in the *Yajur-Veda*. The bronze or copper knife (*Lohitasvaditi*) appears first in the *Atharva-Veda*, as do bangles and bracelets (found in the Indus Valley) as indispensable items of woman's jewellery.

It will be clear from the foregoing considerations that *the finds at Mohenjo-Daro belong to the later Vedic period and that practically the whole of the R̥g-Vedic hymns (except perhaps the tenth and latest book) are anterior to the finds in date*. The lower limit to the age of the *R̥g-Vedic* hymns is, therefore, the fifth millennium B.C. On the strength of the astronomical data of the *R̥g-Veda*, I have already shown that the earlier limit of the Veda has to be pushed to about 11,000 B. C. (THE ARYAN PATH, April 1931.) The hymns, therefore, give evidence of the migrations to India and of the contact of India with foreign peoples in the period ranging from the eleventh to the fifth millennia B. C.

III

Blond or brunette, the Aryan represented a type of culture. It absorbed and assimilated whatever

was worthy and of good report, and thus preserved these elements for the benefit of posterity. There was no vandalism like that of the Goths and the Huns of later times. What was unholy but had the seeds of greatness, was purged and purified, transmuted and sublimated. What the Aryans touched, they adorned. Their syncretistic activity resulted in a cultural synthesis

so well organised that every limb and joint was flesh of its flesh and bone of its bone. If their outlook was comprehensive, they also supplied a scale of values, and a purpose and direction to life. Aryans turned the search-light inwards—along the PATH which led inward to the Holy of Holies and upward to the Sublime and Most High.

S. V. VENKATESWARA

EASTERN LITERARY INFLUENCE

The philosophers of India are so many Luqmāns, only so much better for their critical faculty. They are great astronomers mapping out the skies. Great scholars like Aristotle and Plato derived their wisdom from India. Science and the Arts were obviously born here. India is the land of wisdom and experience. Her wisdom translated made Greece great and thence it travelled to other countries as well.

These are the words of a seventeenth century Hindu genius who condensed the 24,000 Sanskrit verses of Valmiki's *Ramayana* into 6,000 Persian verses without "any important omissions from the main stream of the story". Girdhar Das of Delhi was busy with his Persian translation when another genius, Tulsi Das, the famous narrator of the same epic in Hindi, was passing away. These facts are recorded in *Islamic Culture* of last October by Professor Sri Ram Sharma who "accidentally discovered," a manuscript, only three copies of which are known to be extant.

The story of this *Rama Namah* recalls the pioneering work of Akbar the Great, and his learned

grandson, Dara Shukoh, who introduced the Upanishads to the Persian speaking world in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. A century and a half later, the famous Anquetil Duperron translated the Upanishads from the Persian manuscripts into Latin in 1801-02. The Upanishadic ideas have been influencing the West ever since.

Of Upanishadic influence on the literary culture of the West, a good instance may be found in the Czech poet, Julius Zeyer. Dr. V. Lesny of Prague points out, in an article in the November *India and the World*, how the literary activities of Zeyer synchronised with the awakening of the West to keen appreciation of the literary marvels and glories of Sanskrit literature.

Such demonstrations of the spiritualising influence of the Upanishads on Western thought call for our heartfelt gratitude towards those who translated these spiritual treasures and made them available for distant nations.

D. G. V.

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE GITA

[Last month we published the introductory article of a series of four studies by **Dr. R. Naga Raja Sarma**. It was entitled "Indian Misrepresentations of Indian Philosophy". Below we print his second article, "The Truth about the *Gita*". In this our author continues his examination of the expositions of Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Dr. Surendranath Dasgupta from the view points of Advaita-Monism and Dvaita-Pluralism in the light of the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Next month we will publish his third—"The Philosophy of the Upanishads". —EDS.]

Of the three Prasthanas (textual totalities on which the three schools of Vedanta, Advaita, Vishishtadvaita, and Dvaita are grounded) the *Upanishads*, the *Gita* and the *Sutras*, the *Gita* has a special appeal as containing the direct teachings of Avatara—God Incarnate—communicated for the spiritual benefit of erring mankind. When Arjuna refused to obey the call of Duty and allowed himself to be overpowered by sickly sentimentality and a philosophy of inactivity, or of fighting shy of activity just when intense activity was demanded by a situation of supreme significance, Krishna had to convince him that he should do his duty as a Kshatriya, and to show him his proper place in the cosmic scheme. While the former was confined to ethical indoctrination, the latter had to range over a survey of the problems of philosophy. No critic of the *Gita* need wonder, therefore, why on the battlefield a philosophical address should have been delivered by Krishna. The philosophical disquisition was intended to show Arjuna, egocentric and awe-struck, his proper place in the cosmic scheme.

The philosophy of the *Gita* has

been traditionally interpreted as a continuation and accentuation of the quintessence of the philosophy of the Upanishads. Two illustrious traditions have to be carefully studied and examined. Sankara interpreted the teachings and doctrines of the *Gita* in the light of Monism. Ramanuja and Madhva (Anandatirtha) followed the tradition of Pluralism. For purposes of this contribution I shall confine myself to the interpretation of the *Gita* by Sankara as typical of the Monistic traditions and to that by Madhva as typical of the traditions of Pluralism. My complaint is that Dr. Sir S. Radhakrishnan, the author of *Indian Philosophy* and Dr. Surendranath Dasgupta, author of *A History of Indian Philosophy*, in their anxiety to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, have missed the genuinely preserved and transmitted traditional orientation of the teachings of the *Gita*.

Sankara firmly maintains that the doctrine of *Tattvamasi*,—Thou art That—of the fundamental and foundational oneness between the Finite and the Infinite, finds expression in the *Gita*. The first six chapters (*Shatka*) of the *Gita* deal with the finite selves, who are

counselled to abandon all activity—good and bad—which contains the powerful potentiality of the recurring cycle of births and deaths. The second six elucidate the nature of the Infinite in so far as it admits of elucidation at all. The third six deal with the affirmation of identity between the two. Sankara's position is this. The Infinite—Brahman—is the only Reality. The finite manifestation of organised and unorganised matter and spirit is all illusory, or mere appearance of Brahman. The fundamental and foundational identity between the finite and the Infinite is obscured by ignorance (*Avidya*). At the dawn of real, genuine knowledge or illumination (*Samyag-Darsana*), finiteness or finitude and all physical and psychical ills associated with it vanish. Sankara has clearly exhibited his remarkable skill in interpreting the stanzas of the *Gita* in support of his doctrine of identity between the finite and the Infinite.*

Madhva, on the contrary, maintained uncompromising opposition to Monism, and argued that the Finite and the Infinite could never be identical with one another. Difference is the law of life. The Infinite is the Supreme. The finite is under the complete sway and control of the Infinite. The Infinite is independent of all else (*Svatantra*). The finite is ever dependent on the Infinite (*Paratantra*). Both are real with the same degree of reality.

The enjoyment of eternal and unalloyed or unadulterated spiritual bliss is the birthright of finite selves (*Jivas*). So long as the finite selves are caught up in the cycle of births and deaths, their birthright is denied to them. If they earn the Grace of Deity by undergoing the requisite, prescribed spiritual discipline, they can enjoy their birthright. Madhva has singled out highly significant stanzas from the *Gita* which proclaim the difference between the finite and the Infinite.† The central doctrine of the *Gita* according to Madhva is difference between the finite and Infinite. The finite selves have lost their way and are groping in the dark. By leading a life of devotional contemplation on the greatness and majesty of the Supreme and a life of disinterested service to his fellowmen, a genuine aspirant may secure permanent freedom from the recurring cycle of births and deaths.

II

The external reality is the environment in which the lot of individuals is cast. The origin, evolution, and destruction of the cosmos of matter and spirit are described. Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Space, are the constituents. The microcosm is a miniature copy of the macrocosm. Caste distinctions with corresponding duties attached to them emanate from Deity! According to Sankara the

* *Vide*, *Gita*, ii, 72; viii, 3; vi, 29-32; xiii, 2. Other stanzas conveying more or less pointedly the doctrine of Monism may be easily found.

† *Vide*, *Gita*, ii, 12; iii, 23; iv, 8; v, 29; vii, 16; ix, 34; xv, 16-17. Other stanzas of identical and similar import will readily suggest themselves to students of the *Gita*.

‡ *Vide*, *Gita*, vii, 4; xiii, 26; iv, 13.

external reality is mere appearance. It has no better status than an illusion. The appearance is due to an erroneous ascription of the attributes of the real to the unreal and of those of the unreal to the real, and to an erroneous identification of the real and the unreal with one another (*Adhyasa*).

To Madhva, the external reality is as real as the Supreme. Man has no control over the environment which is external reality. The environment is made by *Purusha*-Deity in conjunction with *Prakriti*-Nature for the benefit of man. The world is not illusory appearance. It is stubbornly real. It is the theatre in which individuals play their parts and disappear from view. Class and caste distinctions and the duties relating to them are all real.

III

What is the goal of man's spiritual endeavour according to the *Gita*? What is the conception of Moksha? Sankara admirably sums up the message of the *Gita* thus :—

Asya-sastrasya-samkshepatih—prayanam-param-nisreyasam—sahetukasya-samsarasya—atyanta—uparamalakshanam—taccha—sarvakarmasanyasapoorvakat—atmajnyana—nishtaropat-dharmat-bhavati.—

The goal of man's spiritual endeavour is residueless riddance of the ills of existence and of the transmigratory cycle. This freedom from the transmigratory cycle is secured by knowledge of the Oneness of Atman and by the equally important abandonment of all activity and attachment to the illusory values of existence.

In a brilliant discussion on the central doctrine of the *Gita* contain-

ed in the stanza “sarvadharmaparityajya” (xviii, 67). Sankara reiterates his views with remarkable force and emphasis. His commentary is :—

“Avidvad-vishayam-karma-vid-vadvishaya—sarvakarma—sanyasapurvikanjyananishta.”

Activity has a fascination for and binds the ignorant. The enlightened take their bold, firm stand on knowledge of the Oneness of Atman and abandonment of all actions and programmes.

Sankara does not ask us to lie as idle and actionless as a stone, and hence modern attacks on Sankara emanate from sheer ignorance. Realisation that the world-order, world-values, and world-transactions are confined to the realm of illusion engendered by ignorance of the basic oneness of existence, and pursuit of a programme that will enable one to realise that oneness, are the essential elements of the message of the *Gita* as interpreted by Sankara.

To Madhva the world is real. Programmes secular and spiritual are real. Duties relating to this or that station in which one may find oneself are to be discharged in the firm belief and conviction that the Supreme Lord makes each and every individual an instrument for the working out of His Will and Plan.

Svadharmenaiva — Bhagavadardhanasyaiva-kartavyatvam—tad-jnana-deva-mokshah . . . (*Gita Tatparya*.)

Worshipping the Lord is the only Supreme Duty of Aspirants. That worship is best achieved by the performance of one's less supreme duties secular and spiritual in respect of a station. Liberation is possible only from a right knowledge of the Lord.

In the discharging of the said duties, contact with others and conflicts with others' interests, are inevitable. If one would realise that one is just made an instrument for the working out of the plan of the Supreme Lord the conflicts would vanish. Moksha or final release is freedom from the transmigratory cycle and realisation of one's inherent bliss, ever in the service of the Lord and His creatures. Both the Acharyas have admitted that countless lives or rebirths would be necessary before attainment of final freedom from the chain of births and deaths.

IV

The message of the *Gita* must be interpreted in reference to the conditions and circumstances that elicited it. Reference to other factors is irrelevant. When confronted with a supremely significant crisis in life Arjuna developed a sickly sentimentality and turned faint of heart. He had developed fear on the one hand and on the other hand ego-importance—arrogance—to the extent of believing that if he refused to fight peace would reign. To Arjuna's conceit a death blow had to be administered. Exhibiting before him an abstract categorical imperative like a copy-book maxim would not make him do his duty. His place in the scheme of things had to be made clear to him. The Lord made him act and do his duty by making him realise his place in the cosmic scheme.

If one desires Sankara's interpretation of the message of the *Gita*,

it will be easy for him to find its essentials. Arjuna failed to realise that his duties had to be done as long as he continued to live in a realm of ignorance-ridden values. When ultimately he realised this he agreed to fight. If one is to interpret Arjuna's initial hesitancy to fight and subsequent readiness for participation in the Mahabharata War, in the light of Madhva's commentary on the *Gita*, one has to explain that Arjuna shrank from doing his duty at first, on account of his entertaining in his mind sickly sentimentality and moral sophistry, and later discharged his duty as a Kshatriya when the Lord taught him the doctrine of the dynamism of duty and indicated his own humble place in the cosmic scheme. If a cock refused to crow, the dawn would not be delayed. If Arjuna refused to fight, arrogating to himself the right to regulate cosmic affairs, the Mahabharata War was not to be abandoned. Arjuna later realised that he was merely an instrument in the hands of Krishna and agreed to do his duty at the Lord's bidding.

The synergy of duty and faith in divine guidance is the quintessence of the *Gita*. Modern civilised man thinks that he has done this and that. He prides himself on this discovery and that achievement. He glories in having vanquished his enemies. An unmitigated glorification of the deeds of man is the way to moral and spiritual damnation. The fifteenth chapter of the *Gita* makes this matter perfectly clear. A rational, responsible individual is called upon to

realise that he is just an instrument in the hands of Divine Law for the working out of its will. With the realisation of this truth an individual should discharge his duties secular and spiritual. He should help others to realise their instrumentality and do their duties. Glorification of the deeds of arrogant, power-intoxicated man must cease. Glorification of the works of God must commence. Secular and spiritual duties should be discharged with clear awareness that individuals are instruments for the working out of the Lord's plan and that their thoughts and actions are under the censorship of the Immanent Lord.

V

According to the author of *Indian Philosophy*, "the *Gita* asserts the truth of advaita or non-dualism". (Vol. I, p. 537). If it does, the doctrine of *Adhyasa* (Superimposition) must be found in it. But the author is emphatic that "This theory is not found in the *Gita*, however much it may be implied by it." (Vol. I, p. 539). Again when he observes, "there is no need to subordinate it (Karma) to the method of wisdom as Sankara does," (Vol. I, p. 572); when he dogmatises to the effect that "even Sankara's non-dualism admits *real* [italics mine] changes in the world". . (Vol. I, p. 548); when he blows hot and cold in the same breath and now accuses Sankara of not being "faithful to the intention of the author of the *Gita*" (Vol. I, p. 549) and now patronisingly judges that it would be easy for Sankara

"to press all these passages into the service of his non-dualism," (Vol. I, p. 550); and above all when he utters the conventional lie of philosophic civilisation that "absolute monism is therefore the completion of the dualism" (Vol. I, p. 565) and proclaims in an atmosphere of sensational discovery that "the *Yoga-sastra* of the *Gita* is rooted in Brahmanavidya" (Vol. I, p. 532)—it is obvious that (in other contexts as well), the traditional orientation is absent from *Indian Philosophy*.

The author of the *History of Indian Philosophy* completely throws Sankara overboard. "The view taken in the present exposition of the *Gita* philosophy is diametrically opposite to that of Sankara," is his emphatic declaration. (*A History of Indian Philosophy*, II, p. 438). "The *Gita* is neither a practical guide-book of moral efforts, nor a philosophical treatise." (II, p. 501). "The main purport of the *Gita* view of God seems to be that ultimately there is no responsibility for good or evil . . ." (II, p. 528). "The *Gita*, therefore, is not to be looked upon as a properly schemed system of philosophy, but as a manual of right conduct . . ." (II, p. 534). These estimates are sufficient to convince one that genuine Indian orientation is totally abstracted from the *History*.

VI

The *Gita* is a systematic philosophical construction as well as an ethical code or a code of morality. Arjuna's initial hesitation and final readiness for the fight constitute

the key to an interpretation of the message of the *Gita*. Sankara's clarion call to exalt wisdom—Samyagdarsana-Brahmajnyana—as the values of the world are all error-ridden, must arouse even the heaviest of moral and spiritual sleepers. Madhva's insistence on application to one's duty in a spirit of dedication of all activity to the Lord and to the service of the Lord's creatures is bound to awaken from moral stupor and spiritual slumber those who are responsive. Man must abandon or repudiate the attitude of the cock that refuses to crow with a view to delaying or denying the onset of dawn.* The texts cited proclaim the truth that Prakriti, Svabhava, Karma would drive individuals along channels of conduct dug in the expanse of space and time by the Lord. Arrogating to oneself powers and privileges, rights and responsibilities which are not one's own is the root of all

moral evil. No violence is done to the freedom of the will if one acts in the belief that one is only an instrument in the hands of the Lord. Unless modern man decides in favour of the moral ideal of *Daivi Sampat* (Divine Life or Existence), he can never find abiding spiritual bliss. The secular and spiritual programmes which the modern man at present hotly pursues point to a totally different ideal, indicated by *Asuri-Sampat* (Demoniacal Life or Existence). Exaggerated glorification of the deeds of man must end in moral catastrophe. The deeds of the Lord must be glorified. Dedication of even the innermost thoughts and feelings, of cognitions, emotions, and volitions to the Lord, and the discharge of duty in that spirit of dedication and of willing service to the Lord's creatures are the central doctrines of the *Gita* according to the traditionally transmitted truths of the Vedanta.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

CIVILIZATION TO-DAY AND YESTERDAY*

[Dr. Kalidas Nag, M. A., D. Litt. (Paris) is the Editor of *India and The World* and head of "The Indian Bureau" at Calcutta. In the following able review he contrasts the failure of a modern who is caught up in the maelstrom of the "New Barbarism" and the success of another who reveals the value of the old-world ideal of "Self, the criterion of Supreme Values.—EDS.]

There is so much of random talk, incoherent writing and vulgar propaganda with regard to civilization that we almost feel provoked to generalize that the less civilized a nation is the more it talks about civilization. From that point of view it appears as another name for a psychic neurosis called *megalomania*. Plato and Tacitus, Bacon and Sir Thomas More seldom flattered their nations, and they have immortalised themselves by leaving to posterity rare documents of human observation. In *The Republic*, *The City of God*, *The New Atlantis*, and *Utopia*, they have furnished historical and cultural data of rare value without bothering about any cult, brand or caste of specialized civilization. With the Industrial Revolution, western man discovered the publicity value of national civilization, and this came soon to be an academic stunt. François Guizot (1787-1874) was composing the first formal treatise on the subject *Histoire de la Civilization en Europe et en France*, when Hegel was developing his *Philosophy of*

History just over a century ago. The English historian Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862) and his colleagues went on developing further the thesis, till the eminent scientist Alfred Russel Wallace (1822-1913) complacently generalized on *The Wonderful Century*—a very *nave* apotheosis of the fateful nineteenth century, mother of so much evil and so little good in this century of ours.

Meanwhile, the New World cut asunder its political ties with Europe, and started a new career of its own. The violent assertion of national rights in Europe, instead of developing, as it should, tolerance and sympathy for other nations, led to a savage race in Imperialistic aggression and to an outrageous exploitation of the non-European nations of Africa and Asia, from Turkey and Persia to India and China, stopping only with the sobering blow from Japan in 1905. The resultant clash of interests between the Orient and the Occident contributed to an insipid and interested debate on the "East and West" relations,

* *Civilizing Ourselves: Intellectual Maturity in the Modern World.* By Everett Dean Martin. (W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., New York. \$ 3.)

For *To-day: Modern Thoughts secured on the Fame of Marcus Aurelius.* By Archibald Weir, M. A. (Basil Blackwood, Oxford. 8s. 6d.)

camouflaging the injustices, and other abnormalities of the Occident and exaggerating the weaknesses and aberrations of the Orient. Thus the *inferiority* of Eastern, as against the *superiority* of Western civilization, came to be preached as an axiomatic truth, doing as much violence to sanity as to history. For the East and the West have seldom been isolated completely and the cultural problems of both appear to-day as strikingly similar as they should be, guided as they are by universal laws of socio-economic Sciences. Intensive researches of Ernest Renan, Count Gobineau, Gaston Maspéro, Flinders Petrie, Max Müller and others, brought a new interpretation of *Oriental culture* to the West, which began to feel for the first time somewhat sceptical about the dogmas of Western infallibility and Eastern inferiority. Still, for the overwhelming majority, ill-informed and miseducated by the party pamphlets pouring out from the Western publishing world, the modern man has little to learn from, and good deal to avoid, in the culture of the Orient,—which however happens to be the cradle of human races and religions, anticipating by centuries many of the so-called discoveries of the Occident. So much so that the American author of *Civilizing Ourselves* under review, innocently indulges in such sweeping generalizations as the following:—

Our culture is secular. Mediaeval culture was sacred. A sacred culture can get along with psychological adolescence since it is organized to express

precisely the psychic attitudes of half-grown-up people . . . All previous civilizations, with the possible exception of that of Athens in the Periclean Age, and that of China at the time of Confucius, have required of people only certain docile attitudes.

This is only a tiny sample of the mature thinking of this *naïve* American author, who is out to prove that "Civilization in the past has seldom demanded that people grow up mentally" (Chapter I), and that psychological maturity is the prize reserved only for our twentieth century species! How this champion of the New World civilization could then end his book with the chapter entitled "The New Barbarism," we find it difficult to understand!

Think of the disclosures of the Seabury investigation of the government of New York in 1932. Think of Bill Thompson and Al Capone in Chicago. Think of Indiana under the Ku Klux Klan government. . . . Think of the shame and horror of the whole nation when within the last year there was perpetrated the most infamous kidnapping outrage in American history. Think of the official failure and the appeal to the underworld for the return of the Lindbergh child

We appreciate the candour of many such confessions of the author, who is ever striving to attain intellectual maturity and moral equilibrium. But neither psychology nor history being his strong point, Mr. Martin fails either to realise himself, or to explain to his American readers, that there must be something wrong in the modern man's pretension to maturity of *thinking*, not to speak of honesty of *dealing* and charity of *being*—qualities which certainly

are not monopolies of modern individuals or communities. At heart the writer is a reformer and for purposes of *vulgarisation* has condensed some valuable information about social progress, scientific advancement and civic amenities to the credit of modern civilization. But he has not succeeded in convincing us of the old world, with a few millennia of historical experiences, that with the political aggrandisement or economic exploitation and resultant material comforts and glamour hedging round human existence of to-day, the *intellectual* or, for that matter, *moral* life of modern humanity has shown that amount of improvement which we would be so glad to associate with modernism. Even with their increased equipment and power modern men and women are less happy, and the modern state and society less stable and equitable, than formerly. The weight of Armaments is crushing creative life out of every so-called "great nation," and "Love thy neighbour" as a principle of social existence has been replaced by "Rule thy neighbour," as the author has himself admitted. Thus democracy is proving fast to be a failure and the dread of a chaotic Dictatorship (unredeemed by the Nietzschean vision of the Superman) is haunting the spirit of the author at the close of the volume, which is very symptomatic of the uncertainties convulsing modern mind. To be born with an inherited faith in Progress as an ever "marching forward," and to grow old to see every day the crumbling of

faith in Progress, in Justice, in Humanity, is indeed pathetic. How to save modern man from this progressive disintegration of his moral personality?

These fundamental problems of modern man have been brilliantly tackled by a distinguished Oxford philosopher, Mr. Archibald Weir, who, apparently preoccupied with eternal problems like *Self, Our Single Life, Light: A Philosophy of Consciousness*, etc., still names his profound study: *For To-day*. This topical directness and healthy altruism relieve the tension of his metaphysical lapses or trances which provoked the shrewd critic of the *Times Literary Supplement* to remark:—

The fact that his book is not very easy to read does not mean that it is not well worth reading. His thought has mystical affinities but vital equilibrium is worth more to him than any kind of penetration that must be forced. His ideal is Manhood . . .

With rare historical intuition Mr. Weir plunges into the mystic past, not with the obsession of an antiquarian but with the agonizing search of an ultra-modern spirit for spiritual equilibrium and serenity, without which progress seems meaningless and modernism a mockery. The centre of that equilibrium, as the author has discovered, is neither State nor Society, however great and fascinating,—but *Self*, the criterion of supreme *values*.

The Greek text entitled "To Himself" is popularly known as the *Meditations of Marcus Aurelius*, an anthology of ancient wisdom, attributed to the Philosopher-Emperor

Aurelius who guided the destinies of the Roman Empire embracing three continents between 161-180 A.D. The historicity of the author or group of authors of the *Meditations*, printed first by Xylander in 1558, may be a matter for dispute. But what is crystal clear is the fact that the ancient thinkers, as represented by the text and in the brilliant commentary of Mr. Weir, were not only far above the limitations of the ancient world, but were soaring in the region of eternity far above the storm clouds of space-time complexes. The basic problems of *modern* man must be the same as those of man of all ages because *Self*, the basis of human evolution, is a spiritual constant, and *Order*, a Cosmic equilibrium, is a thing sought after by all beings in different ways and by diverse names.

The main feature of the world in which self has need of thought and wisdom is the presence of other beings biologically related to one another and to self's body . . . social co-operation is the leading ordinance imposed on humans.

The author is modern enough to realise that --

The world has grown so big that it can only subsist by well-planned order. And every day democracy gives demonstrations that it is too vicious to plan, and too stupid to preserve the order it inherited.

Thus, according to the writer, everything of the *inherited* order is not bad because it comes of the Past; so everything that is *acquired* in the Present is not good because it is modern. This is not only

sound philosophy but good history, which knows no frontiers of cults or colours or nationalities, but is the faithful record of the ups and downs in human life *as a whole*. This fine *sense of totality* adds a halo, as it were, round the many plastic projections of human problems by the author, who, like a classical sculptor, suggests more movement by the apparently static calm than the hustle of most of our modern artists. From the sordid self-advertisement of modernism he looks up to the archetypal beings of all ages and climes, whom he significantly calls "authentic leaders" and who are "visited by authoritative monitions enlarging the scope of life far beyond the limit of material needs. . . rising to a view of man's horizon".

Here time ceases to be a barrier for it loses in eternity the keynote of the symphony of history. Hence Mr. Weir writes :--

For that matter we may wait on the Edicts of Asoka for encouragement in the *ascent to manhood*. When once the bond of modernism has been established there is no limit to the range of our communion with those who have well nigh overcome all want of finish in humans. (*Italics ours*).

In the most remarkable chapter entitled "The Inward Search," of rare Oriental flavour, Mr. Weir again writes :--

The condition for this *glimpse of the divine* is to withdraw from the insufficiencies that ever irk human existence. Saints and sages have in all ages striven to comply with this condition, were they emperors like Asoka and Marcus Aurelius or destitute hermits in the desert.

From the desert wastes of Asia and the forests of India have come flashes of intuition and sparks of Reality that are eternal treasures of human civilization. The "forest books" *Aranyakas* and *Upanishads* have evolved a science of Self (*Atma-vidyā*) which flowered into a philosophy of altruism, *Maitri* of Gautama Buddha as early as the sixth century B. c.

The logical corollary to that was the universal progress of *Kalyana* (well-being) worked out through Government machinery for the first time in history by Emperor Asoka, four centuries before Marcus Aurelius.

"All activity of my Self exists in trust for the sake of others." These profound words from the Girnar Rock Edict of Asoka have been very appropriately quoted by Mr. Weir in his final chapter on "Humility". He is the first British philosopher, after Mr. H. G. Wells, to pay a fitting tribute to this Indian pioneer of human progress. We hope that Mr. Weir will find time to study the sublime paradoxes of *Atman* (Self) of the Upanishadic age and *Anatta* (No-self) of Buddhism, and work out a new synthesis of philosophy of consciousness in the East and West. He may understand then how Asoka the powerful

Emperor of India humbly sent his mission of fraternity to the Hellenic enemy countries of Syria and Maccdon. He may even go further back and probably guess how Zeno (340-260 B. c.), the father of Stoicism, could echo the philosophy of the Upanishads by saying that "God is the soul of the world and that man's supreme good consists in living in accordance with the perfect life of the universe." This spiritual contact between Greece and India may have been before Alexander's meeting the Indian Gymnosophists and long before Marcus Aurelius (in his apocryphal literary incarnation!) imported the Self cult from the Orient into the Occident possibly through Mithraism, Manichaeism and other Oriental faiths and cults sweeping the later Roman Empire. Truth defies geographical and anthropological limitations and pretensions. Modern civilization is dangerously near sacrificing our Soul in order to gain (?) the world! The warnings of Asoka and Jesus have been nobly voiced by Marcus Aurelius and his profound commentator Mr. Weir, who deserves the special gratitude of the moderns for having saved them from the fatal self-complacency of Modernism.

KALIDAS NAG

Modern Man in Search of a Soul.
By C. G. JUNG. (Kegan Paul, Trench
Trubner & Co., London. 10s. 6d.)

In this book which consists mostly of popular lectures on psychological subjects, Dr. Jung among other things clearly points out in what respects his own system of Analytical Psychology differs from Freud's Psychoanalysis and Adler's Individual Psychology. Freud and Adler overemphasize the pathological aspect of life and interpret man too exclusively in the light of his defects. Both of them are one-sided. Their systems are really psychologies without the psyche and are suited only to people who have no spiritual needs or aspirations. Dr. Jung says :-

I do not doubt that the natural instincts or drives are forces of propulsion in human life, whether we call them sexuality or the will to power ; but I also do not doubt that these instincts come into collision with the spirit, for they are continually colliding with something, and why should not this something be called spirit?

It is a relief to turn from the extravagant claims and repulsive assertions of psychoanalysts to the sane and balanced utterances of Dr. Jung, based on his wide experience as a psychiatrist. Dr. Jung states his views with great caution and moderation. He knows that he is dealing with a very complex mass of materials which have not yet been reduced to order :—

It is in applied psychology, if anywhere, that to-day we should be modest and grant validity to a number of apparently contradictory opinions ; for we are still far from having anything like a thorough knowledge of the human psyche, that most challenging field of scientific enquiry. For the present we have merely more or less plausible opinions that defy reconciliation.

Accordingly he keeps his mind open. He pays attention not only to other aspects of the question on hand but also to the bearing of the other questions of human life on this question. In these days of minute specialisation what we sorely need is *integral thinking*. And integral thinking is just what is most characteristic of Dr. Jung's book. His outlook is not confined to the four walls of his consulting room, nor is

the psyche that he is in search of the psyche only of the neurotic patients who come to consult him. He takes into account all the different manifestations of the human psyche at different levels—in literature, in art, in science, in religion, as well as in dreams and fantasies. To him the unconscious is not a demon or a monster, but a perfectly natural existence, like the shadow cast by an object. Freud and his followers have no doubt done a great service by drawing our attention to the shadow-side of the human soul—its unsuspected hollows and its heaps of putrid matter hidden away in the dark corners. But after all, as Dr. Jung says, the essential thing is not the shadow, but the body which casts the shadow. Moreover, to change our figure, if the conscious self is like a spectrum of colours, why should we take into account only the infra-red rays at one end of it and ignore the ultra-violet rays at the other end? Man has no doubt inheritances from the brute, but in spite of all his lapses he is evidently crawling up towards God. A genius in literature or art is not simply one who has dived deep into the pool of primitive desires but one who has soared high and brought the fire of heaven to the earth. His source of strength is not what humanity has been, but what it is going to be.

To a Hindu reader Dr. Jung's book is welcome not only on account of its sane and integral thinking, and its faith in the adventure of the spirit, but also on account of its approximation at various points to the traditional thought of his own country. The author's concept of the collective unconscious and his idea that a person's unconscious is not confined to the experiences of a single life but goes beyond to the experiences of the race are akin to the Hindu conceptions of *Karma* and *Samsara*. And his doctrine of psychological types and the stages of life has its obvious affinities with the philosophical justifications of the Hindu system of *Varna* and *Asrama*.

The modern man has to combine the knowledge of the West with the wis-

dom of the East. It will not do for him, either in the West or in the East, to repeat mechanically the old formulas in religion. The West has emphasized the study of Nature and the East the intuitions of the Spirit. The human soul being linked to both Nature and Spirit can afford to neglect neither. Dr. Jung says:—

When the primitive world disintegrated into spirit and nature, the West rescued nature for itself. It was prone to a belief in

nature, and only became the more entangled in it with every painful effort to make itself spiritual. The East, on the contrary, took mind for its own, and by explaining away matter as mere illusion (*Maya*), continued to dream in Asiatic filth and misery. But since there is only *one* earth and *one* mankind, East and West cannot rend humanity into two different halves. Psychic reality exists in its original oneness, and awaits man's advance to a level of consciousness where he no longer believes in the one part and denies the other, but recognizes both as constituent elements of one psyche.

D. S. SARMA

The Great Illusion, 1933. By SIR NORMAN ANGELL (W. Heinemann, Ltd., London.)

Sir Norman Angell's famous pamphlet, published and republished before the war, enjoyed the wrong kind of success; everyone had heard of it, many claimed to agree with it, and very few really understood its purpose. He has been driven countless times to deny that he said "war was impossible," when he had believed and said that war was, though not inevitable, extremely probable. A less crude understanding was to read his thesis as no more than "War does not pay". The author does indeed argue, as a matter of common-sense, that the cost of any war is sure to exceed the return from it. But his argument goes much further than that. What he really says is that the policies, which have in the past made war inevitable, do not pay, and could not pay, even if victory in war cost nothing. That is the point and paradox of the book. He argues that annexation of territory does not really enrich the nationals of the annexing power; that an indemnity is more damaging to receive than to pay; that the world's trade has grown so interdependent that a country, which destroys its rival's trade, simply dislocates its own. But because newspapers and politicians and electors do not realise the economic futility of imperialism, they continue, he says, to speak and act in its terms, while they deplore its consequences. They risk everything for a prize which

is not worth having at all.

Sir Norman Angell can fairly claim that the events of the last twenty years have borne out his judgment. The policies which led up to the war—whoever may be held responsible for them—have brought misfortune on everyone alike. They have benefited no one since. Englishmen are no better off for the annexation of the German Colonies in Africa; the payment of reparations has done more harm to the Allies than to Germany; and as for the destruction of a rival trade system—the biggest step taken along that road was the partition of the Austrian Empire, and it was the consequent, if long-delayed, collapse of the Austrian National Bank which precipitated the miseries of the last two years.

The new matter in *The Great Illusion, 1933*, is a preface of 80 pages, in which the relevance of the original treatise to present problems is discussed and upheld; and a batch of notes on specific points, of which the most interesting discusses the Japanese adventure in Manchuria, which will, in the author's opinion, turn out to be of very little value to Japan. The middle part of the book is substantially the original *Great Illusion*, with some chapters actually repeated verbatim.

One may ask with wonder how it is that nations still tread the wrong path when history and Sir Norman have conspired to show them the right one. Perhaps one may look for the loophole in the chapter headed "But some profit by war". It may be true, as the

author says, that, in any nation, the section which profits directly by war—armament makers, for instance—is very small. But the sections which profit—at the expense of their fellow countrymen, often, as well as of foreign rivals—by the policies which lead to war may be considerable, both in size and in influence; and governments, whether democratic or autocratic, dominated by sectional interests, may consciously

though not avowedly follow sectional policies. The crude and bellicose nationalism, which is spreading in Europe to-day, brings with it the imminent danger of war. But it may not be wholly without a countervailing advantage, if it makes each nation more of a unit than heretofore. International co-operation is only stable if it rests on national solidarity.

PATRICK MONKHOUSE

Dante's Inferno: With a translation into English Triple Rhyme. By LAURENCE BINYON. (Macmillan and Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

It is safe to say that Dante's great poem has never yet been translated really successfully into English. The cause lies both in Dante himself and in the language which he used. For although Dante's style, as Mr. T. S. Eliot has pointed out in a recent essay, was alike simple and European, it had a strength, intensiveness, and actuality which no translator, who is not also a creator of genius, could hope to reproduce. Moreover Dante was able almost to create his language through the abundance of elisions which were possible where so many words ended in a vowel. And by this means he was able to combine a subtle fluidity with a strength and concrete directness which no other poet has equalled.

In the same way he rendered his abnormal vision in terms of normal fact, actualising the imaginary so that it seemed as real to men as walking across the street, and yet without ever reducing the sublime to the commonplace. For within the solid substance of his power there burns such a fire of passion, even if it be sometimes of partisan passion, that the reality of what he writes is never in doubt. To transfer this quality of reality to an English translation is immensely difficult. And on the whole perhaps the prose translators, and notably John Carlyle, have succeeded better than the versifiers. For they at least have

not been tempted to sacrifice Dante's rock-like substance to elegancies of style. On the other hand the prose translator inevitably inclines to greater literalness than the versifier, with the result that the spiritual actuality of the original becomes an uninspired matter-of-factness. An unimaginative accuracy was the fault, too, of Cary's blank-verse rendering and in any case blank-verse could not by its nature suggest the music of Dante's *terza rima*.

It is the virtue of Mr. Binyon's rendering of the "Inferno" that he has boldly rhymed as the Italian does. His aim, too, has been to produce what could be read with pleasure as an English poem, while keeping as close to the original as possible. He has not therefore sacrificed the spirit of the original to the letter, and the grace of his own work as a poet is a sufficient guarantee that his translation from a literary point of view will be a sensitive one. And such, indeed, it is. It moves with a felicitous suavity from first line to last. Yet a lack of inner force, of the ruthless intensity of genius, disqualifies him from ever really communicating the essential quality of Dante. His rendering is probably as concise as English and the craft of a cultivated man of letters will allow. But it lacks the stark inevitability of the original, and for this defect no adroitness can compensate. And because the reality of passion actualised in words is lacking, the limits of the theology to which Dante subscribed and the sadism he often indulged at the expense of sinners or

heretics are at times unpleasantly exposed, despite the veil of allegory. But if Mr. Binyon's rendering has more literary charm in it than strength and

compulsion, it is very readable and combines grace with fidelity to the original more successfully perhaps than any of its predecessors.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

Self-Restraint Versus Self-Indulgence.

By M. K. GANDHI. (Navajivan Karyalaya, Gandhi Road, Ahmedabad. Re. 1)

The quality of the relation that exists between men and women constitutes, together with the quality of religion, the touchstone of any and every civilization. In this frank booklet Mr. Gandhi comes to close quarters with the modern problem of this relationship, drawing his facts and illustrations mainly from France and India. In regard to France Mr. Gandhi makes copious quotations from M. Paul Bureau's "D' Indiscipline des mœurs," which show French society as the victim of a passion, powerful in itself, and overwhelmingly powerful for evil when depraved by a false and futile ethic and when blown up into a condition of fever by a vast commercialised exploitation of what is called sex-appeal. Popular novels, theatres, cinemas have, in a world that has only lately learnt to read, created a kind of underworld, an artificial mental life of unregulated sexual imagination. If the picture of France is true it shews one vice as the root of a great national decay. In regard to India Mr. Gandhi has scathing criticisms to make. "We are offspring in many cases of child marriages." "If we are not to remain mentally and physically weak . . . we must conserve and add to the vital energy we are daily dissipating." "We sing hymns of praise and thanksgiving to God when a child is born of a boy father and a girl mother. Could anything be more dreadful." "The tuition that is needed . . . is not that of indulgence with artificial means, but complete restraint."

Mr. Gandhi is in energetic and absolute opposition to all methods of birth-

control save the method of moral restraint. As a remedy for a deeply infected condition of licence he offers Brahmacharya, that is, a religious self-control which secures complete abstinence, both of deed and thought, whether in the married state or not. The only breach of this abstinence that is allowed is for the strict purpose of propagating the race. "The law of Nature is that Brahmacharya may be broken only when the husband and wife feel a desire for progeny." If this should depopulate the world "that is none of our business." It is God's.

With this extreme form of asceticism many moral thinkers in the West find it hard to agree. The Pope agrees in condemning all control of birth save by moral restraint, but he adds that the marital relation has a secondary purpose of mutual love as well as the primary purpose of procreation. The Bishops of the Anglican Communion also recognise this secondary purpose. Further they decide that there are conditions which may righteously allow other methods than those of moral restraint, although these latter when possible are far better. This opinion finds support in a recent book* by a religious and highly experienced London Magistrate who fears the decay of the race through the reckless breeding of children, often mentally deficient or weakly or ill-nurtured. But Mr. Gandhi's prophetic earnestness in warning against the danger of new devices and the appalling effects of licence on national welfare appears to be amply supported by a new scientific book† which seeks to shew throughout human history the close connection between strict regulation of sexual life and any kind of cultural or national

* *Marriage, Children and God.* Claud Mullins (George, Allen & Unwin, Ltd.)

† *Sexual Regulation and Human Behaviour.* J. D. Unwin (Williams & Norgate. 7s. 6d.)

progress.

There we must leave this great problem, but with a final appreciation of Mr. Gandhi's courage and sympathy. His correspondents are a great company, some idly babbling of sexual freedom, most exhibiting a sincere desire to find the right way out of distressing moral perplexities and a most touching confidence in the good-

ness and wisdom of their great counsellor. Mr. Gandhi's last words are contained in the later Prefaces, and of these wise practical words there is not one which does not deserve the cordial support of every man who cares for his kind, and who sees the value to self-control of "some kind of absorbing service requiring the concentration of mind, soul and body".

G. E. NEWSOM

Hosanna! By BERNARD NEWMAN. (Denis Archer, London. 7s. 6d.)

We have never before seen, and hope never to see again, on the title page of any book a recommendation placed before the author's name. "*Hosanna!* The Remarkable Novel by Bernard Newman." And the publishers on the book-jacket claim that the end of the story "holds a message for to-day that will be the subject of burning controversy up and down the country, more intense than was caused by *The Brook Kerith* or *When It Was Dark*". The publishers are optimistic! *The Brook Kerith* won its place in literature by the imagination and power of its author. *When It Was Dark* created a momentary stir, mainly because the Bishop of London recommended it publicly, and, some thirty years ago, the Bishop of London had great influence over a large section of the youth of his country. But why not mention also *The Master Christian* and *Barabbas*, by Marie Corelli, which enjoyed enormous popularity and created quite sufficient controversy?

Hosanna essays an impossible task—to portray history as it might have been if Jesus had yielded to the persuasions of a party of Nationalistic Jews, the Zealots, and allowed himself to be made in reality their king, becoming their accredited leader. Now the historic evidence of the life of Jesus is slight, and it might be legitimate for an author to imagine Jesus as a political leader rather than a spiritual one—in which case he must throw overboard much of the Gospel narratives. But it would seem that Mr. Newman

does not question the main facts of the Gospel story. Miracles and the Temptation in the Wilderness are admitted, and it is after his conquering the powers of evil, that we are asked to imagine Jesus as yielding against his better judgment and with misgivings to the persuasions of the Zealots.

If the story had been written of a man of great possibilities, but with some hidden inherent weakness, such as the Greeks delighted to portray, it would have been credible and interesting. As it is, the story carries one on, and the Jewish background is well done. But to take the figure of Jesus and deliberately imagine him making a choice which he never made and which we understand the author does not contemplate that he made is in our opinion useless and illegitimate speculation.

There may be, however, some difference of opinion as to this, but surely there can be none in saying that Mr. Newman should have known better than put into his hero's mouth the following:—

"Oh, it might have been! Ah, Mary, that is the saddest phrase in the world—'it might have been!'"

Shades of Whittier, Maud Muller and her Judge!

If we were to permit ourselves to speculate, we might wonder how far in the writing of this book Mr. Newman has been influenced by a study of Gandhiji. But we must not, lest we should be guilty of phantasy, which is at the opposite pole from true imagination, and is profitless.

T. L. C.

Krishnamurti. By CARLO SUARÈS.
(Les Éditions Adyar, Paris.)

As a Marathi Theosophical magazine has quite recently put it, Mr. J. Krishnamurti has for some years been a person of international fame, and it is natural that even a strictly neutral man in the street in India should feel some interest in one more book on this interesting young man. M. Suarès writes as a disciple, one might say, an adorer. Krishnamurti is for him *the* Teacher, the teaching is for him *the* message the world has been yearning for. And it is this message, that is elaborated in the book. And what is this message that is to free suffering humanity from its numerous ills? It is, that "the fundamental contradictions of all civilizations" are "built upon the illusion of the 'I'." Man must free himself "from the 'I' and its creations, *i.e.*, from the entire set of past values"; man must "free himself from the sense of self". All these "past values,"—such as "beauty, truth, morals, religion, progress,"—"all these are illusions." "All that men have set up as 'truth' is opposed to this liberation [of the man from 'I'], for these 'truths' promise to the self a future." But "the present is the only eternity: that which the 'I' calls its future is merely a projection of its past," and, therefore, equally illusory. In these circumstances the idea of progress is another illusion: "the ego has no future; therefore it cannot progress." Forget or bury the past, don't care a rap for the future; live in and for the present, the only eternity. It is true that in the excerpts cited in the book, Krishnamurti himself talks of "the goal which man must reach"; he talks of "planning" life, and of his own "past lives". And M. Suarès also says that "nothing can be built without foundations". Somehow these ideas which refer to the past and the future as realities do not square with the "message," but, then, the disciple has once for all disposed of all such doubts by putting in this caveat: "His [Krishnamurti's] vaporous dialectic is deliberate, and so much the

worse for the superlogical minds who are not pliable enough to accept these adjustments."

"You must become a law unto yourself," says this "Master" to his disciples. Morality, religion, ["religions are errors," says Krishnamurti], ideals, truth, progress—all these are unreal bogeys which a man must lay if he would liberate himself. He has attained this liberation; and, as he himself has said, "Every liberated man reaches Truth, as Christ or Buddha did"; and he modestly calls himself "the embodiment of Truth". Evidently this Truth with a capital "t" rises above the plodding reason to which the "superlogical minds," that are not "pliable enough" as we are told by M. Suarès, cling in their blindness due to illusion. As a matter of fact, Krishnamurti's "message" is only a rose-watered and dithyrambic version of our old friend the "dialectic materialism" of Karl Marx and his ferocious disciples; and even M. Suarès is constrained to admit that in all this Marx and Engels and Lenin and Krishnamurti are in accord. And, in the sphere of psychology, the denial and sublation of the ego, the "I"—which we are asked to regard and prize as *the* message brought for suffering humanity—well, it is as old as Buddhism, if not older.

To those of us who have seen the same excited and perfervid reception given to a dozen other "messages" in the last half a century or so, the "message" of Krishnamurti and the fevered raptures of his disciples appear a trifle boring. But those who know the *man* Krishnamurti's past, his dreadful hot-house training from tender boyhood onwards as the vehicle of the Avatar that would never come, cannot but sympathise with and admire the man if, as is stated, he has brushed aside "this formidable paraphernalia of sixteen years," and broken through the numerous concentric cordons of "Masters" and "initiators".

It is amusing to read how the poor man is being "persecuted" because he will not proclaim himself as

the promised Messiah: "Finally, a question is thrust upon him...—Are you Christ come back to earth? And the answer comes immediately, clear, lucid, terrible:—Friend, who do you think I am?" And the admiring disciple adds: "There will never be another

answer." But we do hope there will be; we hope the time will come when Krishnamurti will give a specific answer which will be more honest than the semi-Biblical "Friend," etc., which sounds perilously like angling for Messianic honours.

J. S.

The Headquarters of Reality: A Challenge to Western Thought. By EDMOND HOLMES (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London. 5s.)

Those who have kept themselves abreast of the general trend of thought in the West are aware that the *intelligentsia* are passing through a period of great spiritual unrest and despondency. They are veering around to the view that Western civilization has all along rested on an unstable basis, that the foundations of that civilization are slowly but surely crumbling away, that the superstitious teachings associated with the Churches are the very negation of the fundamental principles of all true religion, and that the various "isms" evolved by the West during two thousand years are inadequate to explain the meaning and the goal of human life. Some time ago the distinguished American writer, Mr. Will Durant, wrote :—

The result has been a kind of intellectual suicide: thought, by its very development, seems to have destroyed the value and significance of life. The growth and spread of knowledge, for which so many idealists and reformers prayed has resulted in a disillusionment.

It would be easy to quote other prominent Western writers testifying to the disillusionment, though very few have been able correctly to diagnose the cause of the present *malaise* or to suggest a real remedy. Students of Madame Blavatsky's works will recognise in the present religious ferment a fulfilment of her prophecy in *Isis Unveiled* (I, 38), where she points out that one cycle has almost run its course and that "an era of disenchantment and rebuilding will soon begin,—nay, has already begun."

What is the root-cause of the present spiritual restlessness in the West? The answer given by one of the great Masters of Theosophy was as follows:—

The world in general, and Christendom, especially, left for 2000 years to the regime of a personal god, as well as its political and social system based on that idea, has now proved a failure.

And it was recommended :—

Teach the people to see that life on this earth, even the happiest, is but a burden and delusion, that it is but our own Karma, the cause producing the effect, that is our own judge, our saviour in future lives, and the great struggle for life will soon lose its intensity.

There can be hardly any doubt that when once the West grasps the immemorial teachings of the great Eastern Sages and makes them the guiding principles of life and thought, the spiritual restlessness will give way to harmony and wholeness.

No greater service can therefore be rendered by Western leaders of thought than to study the esoteric philosophy of the East, and present it to the man in the street in a simple and intelligible form. Among English writers who have wisely devoted their energies in this direction, a high and honoured place is occupied by Mr. Edmond Holmes, the venerable author of *The Creed of Buddha* and other works, and a much esteemed contributor to this journal. It is with unfeigned pleasure that we read this, his latest volume.

The first part of this book, called "Without," is a scholarly survey of the fruitless attempts made by Western philosophers under the influence of Aristotle, whom Mr. Holmes not unjustly calls "the evil genius of Western thought," to explain the goal of human

life. As we read Mr. Holmes's devastating criticism of the various "isms" evolved by Western philosophers in their search for reality, we are forcibly reminded of the apt definition of Western philosophy and metaphysics as "a search in a black hole for a rat that is not there". Mr. Holmes's penetrating analysis of the various current philosophies leads him to the inevitable conclusion that they cannot in any degree help one to understand the universe and therefore must be brushed aside. Herein lies a great message for the West—although a message of negative value—*viz.*, that the Western mind should give up what Mr. Holmes calls "the externalist conception of reality"—

a conception which tends to lower reality to the dead level of mere existence; which finds the criterion of existence in the sense-perception of the normal or "standardized" man; which makes the analysis of sense-experience the pathway to ultimate truth; which therefore rules out the supernatural under all its aspects; and which leads at last either to the open dualism of Nature and the Supernatural (the latter being the externalist substitute for supernatural) or to the veiled dualism of a materialistic philosophy.

From these barren fields of Western philosophy, Mr. Holmes in the second part of his book, significantly entitled "Within," turns to the teaching of the Eastern sages; he finds in the philosophy of the Upanishads what seems to him—

to make possible the true solution of the problem—namely the transference of the quest of reality from without to within, and the consequent finding of the Real of all reals in the unexplored world—immaterial, formless, inconceivable, unknowable, unimaginable—into which each of us is admitted through the portal of his own self-consciousness: the world of self or Spirit.

In three illuminating chapters, "Brahma, the One Supreme Reality," "Brahma, as Atman" (*i.e.*, Supreme Reality as the Self), "Through knowledge of Reality to Salvation," Mr. Holmes has developed the famous teaching of the Upanishads, *That art Thou* :—

What that subtle Being is, of which this whole Universe is composed, that is the Real, that is the Soul, *That art Thou*, O Svetaketu. (*Chhandogya Upanishad*, vi, 14, 3)

The various ramifications of the effect of the great doctrine of the Self on one's whole mode of thinking and living are ably expounded by Mr. Holmes with the help of numerous quotations from the Sacred Books of the East. A careful perusal of this volume should bring home to the average Westerner the true meaning and goal of human life and dispel the doubt, the despair, the anguish he is experiencing at present. Here is a book small in size but great in learning, and it has an invaluable message for the West. Will the West receive it?

J. P. W.

Communication as Education. By B. K. WADIA. M.A., PH. D. (Las Palmas, Little Gibbs Road, Malabar Hill, Bombay).

In a recent broadcast speech Mr. H. G. Wells spoke of the shrinkage of the world through modern methods of transport and communication. Whether we liked it or not, he said, the eyes and ears of the stranger were in our homes and his knife at our throats. The author of this book, who has a special knowledge of American journalism, has taken the same theme—the vast material extension to-day of channels of communication—and sought to

lay bare their weakness and strength in a world economically, politically, and spiritually disintegrated. He sees the failure of the world system as due to shallowness in its means of communication, which give hardly any scope for reciprocal action and sharing. There is no assimilation. Communication fails to be effective. One party—the newspaper owner, the film magnate, the seller, or whoever he may be—tends to be thrustful and energetic; the other remains purely passive. That, we must all agree, is an unhealthy state of affairs.

Dr. Wadia interprets educative com-

munication as not unlike what is usually called communion, as can be understood when he says that this concept "leads to the inevitable conclusion that in its deepest and richest sense it [educative communication] must always remain a matter of face to face intercourse between individuals".

This is a suggestive line of research into the world crisis. But communication is not itself dynamic, however well developed or rich in meaning. Dr. Wadia undoubtedly ascribes too great a share in the present sickness of the world to weakness in communication; and too great importance among the means of communication to the modern

newspaper.

Dr. Wadia is probably right in regarding newspapers as in their nature a progressive force in society, and their present capture by established interests as contrary to their real purpose. Fortunately, as he makes clear, newspapers can overcome such abuses of their powers, and are still capable, as many notable journals witness, of genuine educational benefits to the community. He instances the value of Walter Duranty's reports on Russia in the *New York Times*, and Walter Lippmann's widely syndicated commentaries in the *New York Herald Tribune*.

G. W. WHITEMAN

The Conflict of Values. By J. R. BELLERBY (Richard Clay and Sons, Ltd., London. 6s.)

Our civilization is now definitely in the melting pot, and there has been an urge, political, economic, religious and social, demanding new criteria for fixing life's purposes and values. In this admirably thoughtful and interesting little book Prof. Bellerby suggests a remedy for modern ills, trying to arrive at a right judgment of ideals and of values. It is based on the author's *A Contributive Society*, whose principles it criticises and defends. The Ideal State is tersely defined by him as a condition, in which all men have *style*, either through being in love with *being* or through being in love with *doing*, requiring three basic conditions, well-balanced, *viz.*, political order, economic support and personal interest or activity. It is essentially a combination of ideals. In politics, the world will ultimately be an "an-archy,"—not chaos but Spirit Dominion, in which no "archy" or imposed government will prevail—a sort of Voluntary Socialism. In economics, a balance is struck between the two ideals of mass-production by machinery and handicrafts.

Let the machine first be used to create a maximum of leisure and of income. Then let the leisure and income be used for fine

arts, the work created being sold at prices below those of mechanically made goods. In time, handicrafts will grow, and the machine will be left with little else to perform than the lulk of the heavy monotonous work.

Incidentally, the author raises a mild plea in support of "The Neighbours," an order standing for his chosen ideals and dedicated to social experiment and enquiry. Its aims comprise the realisation of a Cosmic Consciousness, by the Quest after Beauty, Truth and Love; Maximum Contribution by the Members; Living within the Average Wage; Corporate Ownership of Capital, and Proper Security for the Capital provided.

Although it may not be a panacea for all the social ills of the present day, and is open to the criticism of being "Utopian," the scheme is creditable. It is the first to recognise the *need at every phase* of the adult's activity *for combination*, if one may so put it, of the "Vertical" and the "Horizontal" aspects of life, which is contained in the wonderful scheme, now inarticulate, prescribed for the Hindu during the various stages of his life—*Brahmacharya* (Abstinence and Discipline), *Gārhashthya* (Domesticity), *Vanaprastha* (Detachment), and *Sannyasa* (Self-Denial), leading ultimately to *Moksha* or Deliverance.

S. V. VISWANATHIA

A Short History of Religions. By E. KELLETT (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 5s.)

To be "the friend of all, the enemy of none" was the author's avowed aim in this necessarily brief consideration of dozens of religious creeds and sects. Among "The Religions of the Far East," he gives some thirteen pages to the philosophy of Theosophy, to which we shall restrict our comment.

Unlike so many authors of similar books, Mr. Kellett refers to personal attacks on H. P. Blavatsky only to dismiss them as beside the point.

Be that as it may, I pass it on one side. I shall try to give an account of the religion as it is, an account necessarily brief and imperfect, but, I trust, tolerably accurate as far as it goes.

This is a fair enough attitude. The exposition Mr. Kellett gives, however, shows but too plainly "the religion as it is". That is pseudo-theosophy. In justice to his readers, Mr. Kellett should have made certain that what he attributes to Theosophy is in the writings of Madame Blavatsky, who, he concedes a little doubtfully, may "be called the founder of modern Theosophy". He does not mention her again after this reference, and much that he gives as Theosophy is in flat contradiction of what she taught.

To cite an example or two:—

He claims that Theosophy and Spiritualism have much in common. "Both avail themselves of the clairvoyant and the medium; both claim to be able to hold intercourse with the spirit-world." Anyone at all familiar with Madame Blavatsky's writings knows that they abound in warnings against the dangers of mediumship and passivity; and that her explanations of the genuine phenomena of the séance-room rule out the agency of disembodied human spirits, *i.e.*, the spirits of the dead. No one possessing a Theosophical viewpoint would waste his time consulting a medium or wish to drag a soulless ghost to a séance, for he knows that the spirit of the

dead is beyond recall.

The God of Theosophy, as described by Mr. Kellett, would not be acceptable to a genuine Theosophist who holds that Deity is the omnipresent Reality, impersonal, because It contains all and everything, and therefore, cannot be described as "good," "loving," etc. The Logos of Mr. Kellett's description is absent in the philosophy of Madame Blavatsky, who defines it as Demiurgos, which is no *personal* deity, no extra-cosmic entity, but only the aggregate of all the Forces everywhere in Nature.

If we turn from such basic points to the fanciful miscellany which Mr. Kellett lays at the door of Theosophy, we find the clue to the source of his misinformation. Pseudo-theosophy sponsors such claptrap as the following claims, taken at random from Mr. Kellett's presentation: "maps and diagrams, dealing with the history of Atlantis thousands of years ago"; "'Count St. Germain' has been busy in Russia"; "The same Master, we are assured, or another, took the form of Francis Bacon"; "After a due probation in our world the souls pass . . . into Mercury . . . there may be Mercury-failures who revert to earth." All of this nonsense, and much more besides, is in the mingled blend of fantasy and fraud conveyed by the "successive revelations" made by various so-called Theosophists—some, no doubt, acting in good faith but self-deceived. None of the claims repeated can be found anywhere in Madame Blavatsky's books or articles.

How just an exposition of Christianity would be one which left out Jesus and the Sermon on the Mount and confined itself to creeds and superstitions of the church? If Mr. Kellett looks even a little into the basic teachings of Theosophy, he will see that, despite his good intentions, he has not been just. We hope that, if a later edition of his book is issued, he will make amends.

Wild Deer. By R. HERNEKIN BAPTIST. (Faber and Faber, London. 7s. 6d.)

There is an aspect of the colour question which is not often discussed, but which is not less poignant because less obvious than the problem of the white man's attitude to the black, and that is the problem of the Harlem Negro's relation to the African. Supposing an educated and sensitive American Negro is moved to return to the cradle of his race in search of contact with what for want of a better word I must call its "soul"—what would be his reception, of what service could he be to the African, and the African to him? This is the problem worked out by R. Hernekin Baptist, the author of *Four Handsome Negresses*, in the novel under review. The American Negro hero of the book, de la Harpe, a great singer, an artist in the true sense of the word, goes to Liberia to "find the souls of those who have never been transplanted from African soil, never breathed the bitter American air"; he goes eagerly, ardently, looking for the richer, fuller life of the spirit uncorrupted by Western civilization; nevertheless he is filled with the fear that

we, the dark races of the world, are born too late! Never shall a negro stand at his ship's rail, discoverer of new lands on this earth. He who has stood there for centuries as slave cannot enter the promised land. . . . There is even no place on the map to which a negro may point and say "*my country*" The only virgin country that is left for the negro to explore is in the kingdom of the spirit.

But, he reflects, if that is the only horizon left to the Negro race to explore they may still be discoverers, and that to good purpose, because this race reared in chains at least has never known weariness of spirit, cynicism, pessimism—the chains of the over-civilised white races.

Arrived at the Cape, de la Harpe goes first to his agent.

Upstairs a blare of records and gramophones being sold . . . Africa faded. He had the exact sensation of being in a small American town. He fought desperately to retain his identity, the identity of Robert de la Harpe, who had seen a vision that had brought him ten thousand miles to the country of his origin.

"The negro's *Mayflower*," he reflects, "is the slave ship. All American negroes would like to think that their ancestors had been brought over in chains," but—

What else has the negro to be proud of but that, having miraculously survived, multiplied, firmly planted his feet on the steep slopes of civilisation, he still gazes backward on the majesty of suffering . . . Upstairs a new record blared its appalling assemblage of civilised noises. Three months earlier it had vomited its unhappy laughter from every window and doorway in Harlem. Civilised laughter . . . De la Harpe shuddered. Was there still time to return to the dignity of the peasant, away from those offal-strewn steep slopes? Was there still time to stop this mad howling of slaves barred and chained in the walls of their freedom? In the prison house of civilisation what was to become of them all, and where would Peace be found? De la Harpe became aware that at the bottom of his two-fold mission to Africa was a third. The quest for Peace had brought him so far.

So de la Harpe brings his art to the Cape, comes to "sing the songs, even the loveliest flowering, of a doomed civilisation into the troll's ears of Africa's destroyers". He is received coldly—even, because of his friendship with a white woman, with open hostility. Only amongst the missionaries does he find peace and understanding. He goes to a dance-hall patronised—in every sense of the word—by white people who regard the coloured man as a cross between a caged beast and a child. He goes to the gold-mines and realises to the full the bitter wrong the white man has done the black—who is free to return to the kraal when his term of service is up, but who goes "carrying a load of disease and modern criminal knowledge which few slaves possess". More than all he has lost the treasure of Content, and like Cain he must wander, a mark on his brow, away from his people, which Mr. Baptist is not alone in regarding as the greatest racial tragedy of the coloured man.

Everywhere for de la Harpe is bitter disillusion; his attempts, through his art, to draw the white peoples nearer to the black so that they invite them, the Ishmaels, into "the great hearth of all the nations," are met either with apathy

or antagonism; and in his search for the soul of his people he finds "Africa dressed in the filthy loincloths of civilisation before he had seen Africa nobly naked".

When his dream is at breaking-point de la Harpe, this civilised American Negro who is at war with civilisation as the destroyer of his race, finds his way back to the kraal; new horizons open up to him a new vision; he sees at last, clearly, what he must do; his return to his own people must be not an intellectual conviction but a physical fact; he must mate with one of his own people, be adopted into the tribe, slough off America and revert to Africa, become the consort, and that proudly, of an African woman's breast "for the raising up of black leaders—Africa's defenders, her awakening children".

He allows a wife to be chosen for him, a young virgin girl, for whom, in spite of his civilised repugnance to the idea, he must pay sixteen head of cattle in accordance with tribal law, and marries her in accordance with tribal rite. For a long time he finds himself unable to approach her; he "had not reckoned with the protests of his own civilised nature". It is not a physical protest, but a spiritual one. He has married her not from any lust of the flesh such as at the urge of sexual starvation drives men to cohabit lovelessly with black women, but in a mood of high spiritual elation—and he "feared the taste on his palate of cold ashes". He is sensitive of her savage's child-like fear of him, and of his own remoteness from her. He cannot breed from her as though she and he were two animals of known pedigree brought together for the sole purpose of producing healthy stock.

He must wait and watch and listen, slowly learning the speech of her mind as well as the speech of her tongue. They must laugh and play together...there is a high, spiritual value in laughter. He would take her into the sea with him, wander in the bush, teach her how to keep order in the huts.

He grieves for the fear which he induces in her. But in the end his dream triumphs, and in joy and exaltation and sunlight he takes her to him for the procreation of new life, and in that moment she is no longer a human being he overshadows "but Africa herself, a nation to be".

I am not here concerned with "reviewing" as a novel this magnificent and impassioned thesis—for it is that—on the racial tragedy of the Negro; from the purely literary standpoint it has its faults—a tendency to rant and to redundancy, and I am at a loss to understand why the author throughout the book spells Negro with a small 'n'. I have here attempted to outline the story and the spirit of the book as fully as possible because as a profoundly moving and intellectually exciting study of the tragic problem of the American Negro in relation to the African, and of the despoliation of the black race by the white, it should not be missed by anyone interested in racial problems; it is an intelligent as well as impassioned statement of the case which it would be a presumption for an outsider such as myself to attempt to improve upon, and a statement of the case which all who have studied "the colour question" must endorse. The question left in the mind of the thinking reader is—Is the rebirth of Africa possible after five hundred years of bondage to the white man? And if so, whence cometh its help? The answer would seem to be through the escape of the educated Negro from civilisation—in terms of Americanisation—and his return to the kraal, that a black Saviour may arise for the leadership of his people. It is the problem of a scattered, homeless people, parallel to that of the Jews, those other "wild deer wandering here and there" homeless on the face of the earth.

The Death of Materialism. By WHATELY CARINGTON (W. Whately Smith). (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. 10s.)

The Theology of Evolution. By RONALD CAMPBELL MACFIE, M.A., M.B., C.M., LL.D. (Unicorn Press, London. 18s.)

Fifty years ago Materialism, like a victorious army, was capturing position after position and appeared likely soon to drive all its rivals from the field and to reign alone and unchallenged in Western science and philosophy. But now we see it in full retreat, and all the signs point to its complete debacle in the near future. The two works we are about to review are likely to hasten this very desirable contingency.

Mr. Whately Carington devotes the greater part of his book to a criticism of Materialism as a philosophy, and he takes special pains to batter and make untenable its last entrenchment—Behaviourism, demonstrating with witty and forceful logic that the Pavlov experiments do *not*, as is claimed, prove that consciousness is simply an unimportant side-product of the responses of material nervous matter to material stimuli.

In his last chapters, Mr. Carington discusses the results of modern psychical research and their bearing on the problem of mind. The reality of telepathy he considers to be thoroughly established, though he dismisses as unsound the theory usually adopted to explain it, namely, that there is a transmission of thought from brain to brain somewhat analogous to the electrical radiation through the ether in wireless telephony. His own belief is that—

Telepathy comes about, not by transmission of ideas, but by community of consciousness; not by transference of a Thought, but by identity of the Thinkers. (p. 222)

Which theory, he claims,—

will enable us to co-ordinate a whole host of phenomena ranging from mystical experience to the psychology of crowds. (*idem.*)

Following this conclusion, Mr. Carington has some very interesting things to say about Eastern and Western mysticism, the former of which, he con-

siders, “avoids many crudities and discontinuities . . . which seem inseparable from the Western view.”

Finally, Mr. Carington summarises his position in the following very significant words:—

The foundations of natural religion are clearly to be found in a study of the relations existing between the Universal Consciousness considered as a whole and those partially isolated concentrations thereof which we are accustomed to describe as individuals.

Spiritual progress can be rendered intelligible in terms of the expansion of the individual consciousness—its de-isolation, if you happen to like the word, its liberation from limitation if you do not.

The same conception yields a basis for Ethics, in that we shall define as “good” that which promotes this liberation.

Finally, altruism is rationalised inasmuch as we clearly cannot, even if we would, live unto ourselves alone. (p. 252)

In *The Theology of Evolution*, Dr. R. C. Macfie clears the way for his theology by a very trenchant, fully documented, and apparently entirely successful critical attack on Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, which has been for so long the chief pillar in the temple of Materialism. Dr. Macfie repeats, with a wealth of new illustrations, the old arguments against Darwinism which were advanced long ago by de Quatrefages and other nineteenth-century men of science, and he supplements and reinforces them by reasonings of his own.

While he regards evolution by the accumulation of selected minute changes as wholly incredible, Dr. Macfie considers that evolution by mutations—mind-guided mutations—is a *possible* theory though still unproven. Mutations arise in the germplasm, and, in our author's words:—

If we assume that all the somatic characters of all species of animals were originally determined by mutations of genes and cytoplasm we must also assume that the genes of germplasm in question suddenly and simultaneously and co-operatively mutated in such a fortunate way as at once to determine somatic characters developed and co-ordinated so far as to ensure viability, vital value, and evolutionary progress, so far at times—if they are to account for phylogeny—as to cross the gaps . . . between species, orders, etc. Only so could the mutations of the germplasm have

had evolutionary survival value and effectiveness. But such effective mutations of the genes can hardly have happened fortuitously . . . We have to recognise that the organism of every species of animal is holistic, that its evolution must have occurred as a whole in a whole, and that the mutations in its germplasm must have mutated together in the right direction . . . to produce the animal . . . There seems little opportunity for chance and selection in such evolution, where a little rift in the lute would make all the music mute—music as complex and perfect as a symphony of Beethoven. (pp. 163-64, 661-67)

If mutations, necessarily so complex and so perfectly co-ordinated, cannot be the work of chance, they must, Dr. Macfie argues, be mind-guided, planned, telic. He regards the mind-guidance as working not *on* the organism as a man might work on the keys of a typewriter, but *through* it—"from within outwards," in the phraseology of Occultism. The theology which Dr. Macfie builds upon these conclusions is of a lofty type. He envisages God as "the mind in all things," "in whom all

things live and move and have their being". "In our consciousness of the universe," he writes, "we partake of the infinite divine consciousness."

While the matter of *The Theology of Evolution* is of real and enduring value, its manner is less admirable. Dr. Macfie makes the mistake of attributing to the "unscientific layman," for whom his book was written (*vide* notice on the wrapper), an understanding of such words as *chromosomes*, *coelenterates*, *blastoderms*, *gastrula*, *metaphytons*, *polyphylogeny*, *zygotes*, which are only a few, taken at random, of the biological and zoological technicalities that are used freely and without definition throughout the book. The "unscientific layman" is likely to find the implied compliment somewhat embarrassing; but nevertheless, he will find it well worth his while to make the effort necessary for understanding Dr. Macfie's arguments.

R. A. V. M.

Modern Tendencies in World Religions. By CHARLES SAMUEL BRADEN, PH. D. (The Macmillan Company, New York.)

Religion Today. Ed. by ARTHUR L. SWIFT, JR., M. A., B. D. (Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York and London.)

Dr. Johnson who had a knack of putting even simple and obvious things in grandiloquent language once conceived the project of surveying mankind from China to Peru, with the results that are known to every lover of literature. Dr. Braden has been no less ambitious in the scope and design of his book, which is an eminently satisfying thing. In it he has subjected to strict, patient and thoroughgoing scrutiny the religions that prevail in India, China, Japan, Russia and the Islamic countries as well as Judaism, with the result that his readable book is also a mine of useful information. For the author religion is not static; it is constantly undergoing change and modification under the

stress of scientific discoveries, economic changes, political developments, intellectual advance and cultural progress. Another thing that emerges from the study of this book is that religion to-day is not decadent or dead but as vital as ever. Even those countries which disown the standardised and institutionalised religion, have a religion of a kind. For instance, even in Russia and China where organised religion is at a discount, the hero-worship of Lenin and Dr. Sun Yat Sen has become a sort of religious cult.

Whereas Dr. Braden draws the map of religion as it is to-day, the contributors to *Religion Today* tell us not only of its past and present but also about its future. While Dr. Braden is a historian in the limited sense of the word, the other writers are historians, philosophers, and prophets. They do not merely describe what is happening in the religious world now, but try also to read the present in the light of the past and the future in the light

of both. *Religion Today* is not merely a journalistic compilation but something to the making of which have gone the study, thought and living experience of such men as Reinhold Niebuhr and John Haynes Holmes. Every chapter is thus interesting in its own way, but the three most thought-provoking chapters are "The Dark Side of Religion," "The World's Living Religions" and "The Future of Religion". This volume will prove stimulating to all and provide much food for thought. But in the end the reader will come to agree mainly with John Haynes Holmes who says,—

So will the world become as one great temple, and men as one great family, and all true life divine. Longfellow caught the vision when he saw, in the happy days to come, that universal church,

As lofty as the love of God,
As ample as the wants of man.

Despite occasional inaccuracies and misstatements such as the one about Theosophy and its founder Madame Blavatsky, the book is valuable and will serve as a guide to intelligent persons in finding their way through the labyrinth and chaos in which all discussions about religion are usually involved these days.

DIWAN CHAND SHARMA

Religion and Communism. By JULIUS F. HECKER. (Chapman and Hall, London. 8s. 6d.)

The Communistic State passionately repudiates religion—not only the Greek Catholic Church, so long the tool of an oppressive State, and the extremist sects, but every creed and cult. It avoids active persecution, lest it blow the flames of fanaticism to white heat, but all religious propaganda is taboo, while the Union of Militant Atheists bends every energy to ridicule and undermine the people's faith.

In place of nominal religion, the Russian intelligentsia and many of the masses have embraced with fervour the broad humanitarian ideal—the achievement of a classless society with justice and opportunity for every man.

Membership in the atheist groups is on the increase, but negation cannot satisfy the human mind and heart. Dr. Hecker says that atheist ideology "exists in an emotional vacuum unsuited to human nature." Russian youth is generally apathetic to the appeals of the atheist organizations and is turning more to the positive religion of the state. Their ardour is devoted to the service of their fellow-men.

Our author quotes without assent the counter-revolutionary philosopher, Berdyaev, who asserts:—

Communism, both as a theory and as a

practice, is not only a social phenomenon, but also a spiritual and religious phenomenon. And it is formidable precisely as a religion... It takes possession of the whole soul and calls forth enthusiasm and self sacrifice.

This point was made in our pages four years ago by Mr. C. E. M. Joad in "The New Religion in Russia".

Every religion starts as a clear and unadulterated stream; all are polluted sooner or later with purely human speculations and inventions; not one escapes the hand of time. Here is a splendid opportunity to see one in the making. The philosophy of Marx and Lenin is already in process of hardening into dogmas; soon will come the priests, if, indeed, the official propagandists of the Union of Militant Atheists do not already fill that rôle. In their beginnings all the creeds have had just such zeal and ardour as have the Russian youth to-day. It is not fair to take a cult sparkling with youth to compare with an old religious current, far from its source and choked with mud of superstitions, creeds and rites.

The special weakness of the new cult lies in its materialistic basis. This new yoke of religion of the State, so joyously assumed by those so lately freed from their old bonds, must in its turn be cast off. Only the free soul and unshackled mind can hope to find the truth all churches obscure, even though the church be the State itself.

E. H.

The Future Life: A Symposium. (Martin Hopkinson, London. 3s. 6d.)

This work comprises a series of talks on survival and immortality which were broadcast from London in 1933.

To begin with, Professor C. G. Seligman gives an account of "The Ideas of Primitive Man," as far as the ideas of that very shy and elusive personage can be ascertained from what is known of his rites and customs, and from the conclusions that anthropologists have deduced from the information that various primitives have chosen to impart to European questioners. "The Ideas of Greece and Rome" are admirably summarised by Dr. Edwyn Bevan, who describes the very interesting myths about the Other World which have been preserved for us in the Homeric poems. These myths continued to be current throughout classical antiquity, and were retold by Virgil in his *Aeneid*. Side by side with them, however, there existed a more philosophical and semi-esoteric set of beliefs, which were attributed to the legendary teacher, Orpheus, and transmitted through the Pythagorean movement to Plato. The teachings of this school as to man's post-mortem destiny were substantially the same as those of the Indian religions, for it held that a man's future condition depended on his present conduct, and that the soul reincarnated after a period of ex-carnate happiness or suffering.

Only twenty-four pages are devoted to "The Great Religions of the East," but the Rev. Professor E. S. Waterhouse has succeeded in compressing into them a great many facts and some very pertinent comments. Generally speaking, he treats his subject with sympathy and insight. In discussing Buddhism, he agrees with Mrs. Rhys Davids that the *Anatta* doctrine (as sometimes misunderstood to signify that there is no self in any sense) was not likely to have been a genuine teaching of Sakyamuni. He writes:—

It is exceedingly unlikely that the Buddha would have departed so utterly from the thought of his own age, or would have made any im-

pression had he done so. The man, he said, is not his mind or his body, but that does not imply that he thought the man did not exist. He regarded man as . . . a wayfarer passing through stage after stage of a long journey, but beginning each fresh stage according to what he had become in the previous stages. . . But beyond all the stages there exists a final state, that called Nirvana.

Professor Waterhouse's treatment of the doctrine of Karma is less satisfactory, for he discusses it as though it applies strictly and solely to individuals, as indeed it is sometimes wrongly interpreted in the East. Rather naturally, he finds the doctrine in this form "too individualistic, ignoring mutual influence . . . producing a certain lack of sympathy with the world's ills . . ." The Professor is apparently not aware of the deeper and truer view of Karma, expounded by thinkers of the Mahayana, and summarised by Professor Suzuki in an article on "The Development of Mahayana Buddhism" (*The Buddhist Review*, April, 1909). This view of Karma was emphasised by H. P. Blavatsky in her *Key to Theosophy*, published in 1889, in which she taught that Karma is collective as well as individual, that every man's deeds affect every other man for better or for worse, and therefore that every man should order his life so as to promote the true welfare of the race. In this form, the doctrine of Karma is an enormous incentive to self-discipline and unselfish service; and it is significant that it has prevailed in Northern Buddhism side by side with that most noble of human ideals, the Bodhisattva, or man pledged to devote himself life after life to the service and enlightenment of his fellows.

"The Historical Development of the Christian Attitude" is dealt with by the Rev. S. C. Carpenter on mainly orthodox lines. To Mr. Carpenter's credit be it said that he does his best, within the limits of his orthodoxy, to evade the dogma of an eternal hell.

The remaining portion of the book is devoted to "Personal Points of View". Dr. Maude Royden would like to believe

in the survival of the personality with its "endearing imperfections". She frankly recognises, however, the difficulties inherent in this theory, and is thrown back on faith, which assures her that "God is Love and that in the terms of our own human and imperfect love we may interpret the heaven of his." Professor J. S. Haldane rejects personal survival, and holds that—

our existences are no mere individual existences, with a beginning and ending in time, but partake in the existence of God . . . in this sense . . . we have a future life beyond individual death, and a past life beyond individual birth.

Sir Oliver Lodge's beliefs are well known, having been expounded by him in more than one widely circulated book. One may, without disrespect, sum them up as Spiritualism plus the Ether of Space.

Proof. By the Rev. V. G. DUNCAN, B. Litt. (Rider and Co., London. 5s.)

Since the character of spiritualistic communications is coloured by the medium and sitters, the kindly character of the circle with which the Rev. V. G. Duncan is concerned can be seen by the eagerness of their "communicators" to help and make people happy; it is noted at least over thirty times in the séances recorded. Unfortunately kindness, allied to passivity, is no guide to the *terra incognita* of psychic phenomena.

What is proof of communication from the so-called dead? Can we trust those tricky instruments, the senses? Can we even trust our reason, when emotion bids it find arguments for belief? If we have no basis of knowledge, we can no more judge unfamiliar things than the scientists of the last century could explain a modern talk-film.

This book adopts, on the basis of incomplete understanding, the orthodox spiritualistic tenets, but it would be a misnomer to call them "proof". To *prove* the nature of the phenomena it

Unlike Sir Oliver, Professor Julian Huxley finds in Spiritualism no proof at all of survival. His attitude is the hereditary agnostic one, but with a distinct bias towards disbelief in any form of survival.

Mr. Christopher Dawson gives us an account of the Catholic doctrines of heaven, hell and purgatory, in which these very tangible and semi-material conditions of traditional Christianity are so rationalised and attenuated that, we fear, the robust theologians of a former age would not recognise them. That, however, is all to the good.

For Professor N. Kemp Smith, belief in immortality follows from, and depends on, belief in theism. The evidence for which, he holds, "is accessible to us only in the actual processes of actual living, practical, aesthetic and contemplative".

R. A. V. M.

is necessary to take into account the composite character of man, spiritual, psychical, physical; the powers of mind and of the image-making faculty, the function of the astral body, (which Hindus call *Linga Sharira*), its fate after death and the state of the man himself in "Heaven"; the existence of the Astral Light, "the book of the Recording Angel," that invisible register of nature that retains the impress of every event, every detail, however trivial; the nature of elemental and other superphysical forces on that astral plane, and finally the nature of mediumship itself. Without this knowledge, the "evidence" is misleading; for such books as this, though put forward in all sincerity, draw conclusions without sufficient data to base those conclusions upon. It is difficult to deal with spiritualism without causing pain to those who find comfort—fool's paradise though it be—therein. Yet better the pain of the breaking illusion than continued ignorance, for, in the long run, truth alone can satisfy.

W. W.

A LETTER FROM LONDON

Writing in this second week of December, 1933, I cannot profess any confidence that the New Year will bring the promise of a lasting European peace. The situation is definitely more threatening than it has shown itself in the last two months, and it may be well to regard it first of all in its superficial aspects.

The most obvious effect of Germany's secession from the League is that England is now exhibiting a marked uncasiness, which has found expression in the demand for an increased Air Force. The political reply to this demand, made with great insistence by the daily press, indicates quite clearly that the Government will, sooner or later, concede the increase, possibly on a generous scale. The speeches made by members of the Cabinet, more particularly the recent one by the Premier, lay continual stress on the fact that Great Britain has set an example in disarmament to the verge of the danger level, and that there has been no imitation of her sacrifice by the other great Powers. The protest that Great Britain is still eager to do anything she can in the cause of Peace, will now be made the justification for the increase in the Air Force, and the country as a whole will support it. In the recent by-elections, the huge majorities obtained by Nationalist candidates in November, 1931, have

been considerably reduced, and I can well imagine that in the New Year any further by-elections that may occur will be influenced by the Government's policy with regard to this question of a strong army in the Air. It is claimed, even by the more ardent militarists, to be a protective and not an aggressive force, a claim that will "save Great Britain's face" at Geneva.

How deeply this demand has affected the national mind is instanced by the fact that even in Pacifist propaganda increasing stress is being laid on the danger of invasion by air. The prescription in this case is the need for disarmament all round, but the effect on the majority who have listened to a vivid account of the horrors we may expect as a result of aerial invasion is largely to quicken the anxiety for adequate protection. At one such meeting, addressed by Lord Arnold, I found afterwards that a few genuine Pacifists resented the intimidatory sound of this warning, and protested that they were not to be frightened into adopting the cause of Peace. But the broad effect of such speeches, even from a Pacifist platform, will be to uphold the coming Government policy. The required increase will, no doubt, be conceded with an apologetic air, but the result will be to aid the steady revival of the old fallacy:

Si vis pacem, para bellum, which is already being dinned into the ears of the generation that was too young in 1914 to realise that nations "armed to the teeth," will inevitably fall upon one another at the touch of the first spark.

Another, although a very different indication of the increasingly unhappy spirit abroad in Europe, is De Valera's final renunciation of all allegiance to Great Britain. He tells us that the Irish people is, and has always been, an independent nation, that the British rule has always been upheld by *force majeure*, and that all free-born Irishmen desire nothing better than to conduct their own affairs with perfect liberty to regard England as an enemy. This pronouncement has been followed, (December 8th), by a special order to ban the Young Ireland Movement as an illegal organisation.

Now, without prejudice, we cannot by any possibility approve the attitude exhibited by this policy. The Young Ireland Movement claims little more as yet than freedom of speech, and to suppress that freedom by force of arms is to pursue precisely the same policy that in another connection is described as brutal and intolerable. Such action displays a complete lack of any ethical purpose, and is, also, quite absurdly illogical.

I hope, nevertheless, that the British Government will take no steps that may further embitter right feeling in Ireland. The only reasonable course will be to let Ireland go her own way. Unhappily, abstract reason plays a very small

part in politics. There are so many other issues to be taken into consideration, chief among them the feeling, generally uninstructed, of the Electorate. Ireland may well be heading for Civil War, for De Valera is no Hitler; but no purpose, ethical or political, can be served by British interference.

Going further afield, the chief signs in Europe point to increasing political unrest. France cannot find a Government in which it can put any trust, and recently Ministries have succeeded one another with a frequency that is becoming ridiculous. In this case, the ostensible crux is a financial one, but the underlying cause is the lack of confidence that demands an impressive leadership. We can see precisely the same symptoms in Spain. The recent elections, largely no doubt as a consequence of the woman's vote, have resulted in a marked movement towards the right,—the prevailing movement at the present time. But the Government elected is demonstrably unstable, and in Spain the extreme left, although the outrages in this second week of December have been temporarily suppressed, will remain a dangerous and highly explosive party.

The plain indication in both cases is that the trend is in the same direction as that so lately marked out for us by Germany. The bourgeoisie inevitably deprecates these frequent changes of Government. Manufacturers, traders, shopkeepers, the bulk of the professional classes, are weary of the instability evidenced by these

political vacillations, and if France or Spain could discover a strong man who would coerce them, the bourgeoisie would thankfully accept the appearance of oppression, if it would lead to those settled conditions in the country which would enable them to carry on business or profession in reasonable security. England solved the question characteristically by the election of a National Government, but in Europe it seems that a Dictatorship is becoming the more acceptable solution of political unrest.

Mussolini has given no hint of what might be his ultimate alliance, should he decide to make one. He has undoubtedly strong sympathy for the Nazi regime, which has so many points of similarity with Fascism in Italy; and when the U.S.S.R. delegate, Litvinoff, returned from the United States, he went first to Rome, and from there to Berlin, before returning to Moscow. Litvinoff's mission to America was to obtain political recognition of the Soviet Government, and to establish trade relations, and for the latter object he was prepared to pay liberally in promises. His visits to Rome and Berlin were presumably to sign a non-aggression pact on the same terms as that already entered into with France. But the curse of secret diplomacy, which should have been eliminated after 1919, is again lying heavily over Europe; and the general public has no means of knowing what mischievous treaties and alliances are being entered into by their own Foreign

Offices. Nevertheless, it would seem that Italy has few inducements at the moment to enter the lists of *welt-politik*, though in the future that terrible incentive to war, the "need for expansion," may become a factor of pressing importance.

Apropos of Russian ambitions, which, so far as the rest of Europe is concerned, will be the keeping of peace for many years to come, I recently read a French translation of a book by Ilya Ehrenbourg, entitled *Le Deuxième Jour*, dealing from the inside with the psychology of the younger Russian generation. This work is not propagandist, and is described as a novel, though it has neither plot nor, in the literary sense, development. And the picture of the young people accords so well with other reports of the same nature, that I believe it to contain a valuable core of truth. The essential point of interest is the young Russians',—men and women—worship of machinery. They have been brought up without any religion, save that of their Bolshevik principles, and the need for some object of adoration seems to have been partly filled by the worship of the machine. In Ilya Ehrenbourg's story, the characters are intimately concerned, chiefly as unskilled workpeople, in the erection of a great steel-works in S. E. Russia, under the direction of National and American engineers. And these steel-works, and more particularly the giant furnace, continually referred to as "*Le Géant*," are the writer's true protagonists. But what, one wonders, will be the influ-

ence on Russia's future of a young generation expending their idealism in extolling a force which to us is already becoming a curse. In Western Europe and the United States, this worship of the machine is beginning to decline. We are recognising, however reluctantly in some quarters, that the vast proliferation and perfection of machinery during the past hundred years has added its full tale of misery to balance the luxury and comfort it brought. As long ago as 1863, Samuel Butler, a writer of extraordinary penetration, foresaw this coming domination of mankind, and ten years later in *Erewhon*, he gave us a picture of a future race that had definitely abandoned machinery. And, now, in a country that is, in some respects, a century behind our civilisation, we are given a picture of young Russians fervently embracing the cult that we are coming to regard with doubt and suspicion.

In these letters to THE ARYAN PATH, written many weeks before they can be published, it is always necessary to include an element of anticipation; and I will close this contribution with a speculation of longer range that is constantly in my mind. In the future, five or possibly ten years ahead, I foresee the coming of a European War that will accord in many particulars with the forecast of Mr. H. G.

Wells's *War in the Air*, published in 1908. The chief instrument of destruction will be some form of the bombing aeroplane, directed, it may be, by wireless control and without a living pilot. There can be but one reply to this by a nation whose morale has not been shattered, and this reply is by retaliation, by sending its own air-squadrons in turn to destroy the chief towns of the aggressor. No conclusion could be arrived at by this method, except by the complete submission of the invaded, an object that would only be obtained after immense destruction. The outcome would almost certainly be the end of civilisation as we know it in Europe to-day.

And it seems to me that in some form or another this destruction of our Western civilisation is implicit in the conditions obtaining at the present time. They are too materialistic and amoral to survive. We look in vain, among those who have the governance of the nations, for a single figure that owes his eminence to a great spiritual ideal. That such a leader will come, I have no doubt. But I believe that it will not be until after the Armageddon that will destroy the vast mechanical edifices of life and thought which have been man's most notable achievement in the past hundred years.

J. D. BERESFORD

FRENCH NOTES

Three great men have died recently in France: Paul Painlevé, Albert Gammelte and Emile Roux. The scientific world mourns. Painlevé was a mathematician, at first a true descendant of Descartes, a master of Cartesian space. He stood against Einstein, but finally had to admit his defeat. Theories of relativity and *quanta* undermined his well-ordered schemes. But he was not blind; he accepted the superiority of others, and became one of the most devoted followers of the German mathematician. And Einstein is turned away from his country, his property confiscated; forced to flee for his life he seeks refuge among foreign friends. France looks on and wonders; the League of Nations only looks on—is made but to look on! And we all wait anxiously for the crisis to come.

The magazines contain articles on the Swastika, Hitler and the Nazis. Numerous books are published dealing with one or another of these subjects. They depict the awful threatening shadow of war. 1914 was not enough! M. Paul Darcy published a book recently giving specific figures and details about the German army, and the industrial mobilisation which is being prepared even now.* M. de Hauteclouque concludes his book

A l'Ombre de la Croix Gammelte† with a warning not to disarm under any circumstances, but to be ready for an attack; men seem indeed to be “malades de la paix” as M. Suarez so aptly puts it in the title of his last book.‡

The Swastika, which was always a protective and propitious symbol, is now made to stand for race-prejudice and nationalistic fanaticism. A good article on it appeared in *L'Illustration* (4th November). According to the author, C. Autran, the most ancient traces of the Swastika are to be found in Sumero-Babylonian lands; “thus in times and regions excluding in a radical manner the presence of ethnological, or linguistic ‘Aryan’ elements.” The widespread use of this symbol for decidedly religious and mystic causes, makes the Hitlerian Swastika appear out of place among its more peaceful and pious sisters. Although the Nazi movement may seem at first glance to be more political and national in its scope than mystical or religious, M. Grein expresses the view that this tribal fanaticism has taken the form of a religion for all the German people.§ The concept of a Universal God which more or less gained assent in the minds of civilized people has been shattered by Hitler and his followers. They have

* Paul Darcy—*L'Allemagne Toujours Armée*. Editions des Portiques.

† Xavier de Hauteclouque—*A l'Ombre de la Croix Gammelte*. Les Editions de France.

‡ Georges Suarez—*Les Hommes Malades de la Paix*. Grasset.

§ Jacques-Richard Grein—“Contre le Principe d'Hitler.” *Mercur de France*, Nov. 1st, 1933, pp. 569-600.

brought to the fore their mythology, they have fallen back upon their old particular divinity. Germany has gone back to its pre-Christian faith and her new God is exclusively German. It is bound to be a kind of Jehovah, the tribal deity of the Jews, with whom the Germans are binding themselves by the bond of hatred and persecution. The theological aspect and its moral counterpart have not been extensively discussed by the Nazis, but M. Grein feels that it is one of great importance and one that colours the real development of the movement.

National-socialism is entirely subjective. It no longer recognises the God of souls, it sees only the God of bodies, the physical creator—that is the God of "blood". . . It glorifies a terrible God, promoter of that huge "will" which is manifest throughout the whole of the world. The strong consciousness of this will has thrown down the weakening consciousness of ideas, soul, a Universal God.

The whole of Germany has now faith in this sectarian deity; and sectarianism in thought will naturally lead to sectarianism in action—dark and formidable.

The influence of Karl Marx is unquestionable. It awakened the proletariat. Throughout the world we find repercussions of his views. He is often misquoted, more often misjudged. He is condemned without a proper hearing, his ideas are pulled out of shape and deformed, and it is loudly proclaimed that they give birth to

injustice, fanaticism and cruelty. Again, he is extolled as a prophet and a saviour of humanity. And now he has been psychoanalysed. Mr. Otto Ruhle psychoanalyses Karl Marx, giving his biography and an analysis of his work. He finds the complexes that made Marx; he explains that ailments of the liver and the stomach can account for Marx's plan of industrial reconstruction. Psychoanalysis, one of the young daughters of science, looking serious, her hands full of charts and measures, her talk full of complexes and suppressed desires, often gives rise to laughter. Here is a case in point. *Le Mois* (Vol xxxiv) gives a brief account of Mr. Ruhle's arguments and ends with characteristic French wit: "Autrement dit: les maladies d'estomac servent parfois à quelque chose."*

And Karl Marx brings to mind Russia; yet its experiment in Communism has little connection with the state of which Karl Marx dreamed. After all these years we are not able to get a clear and definite picture of what the conditions in Russia really are. Leon Trotsky insists on the fatality of the Russian revolution, while M. Pierre Dominique insists on its beneficent and humanitarian aspects.† It is true, he explains, that there is wretched misery and poverty, but it is hardly more than under the Tzar. The economic question is of great importance naturally, but poverty is bearable if there is freedom of speech and of thought. The Sov-

* Translated into French—Bernard Grasset Ed.

† Pierre Dominique. *Sibérie Rouge*. Editions des Portiques.

iets have so dominated Russia that no one dares speak against the Government. Their one aim is to press the complete submission and devotion of the individual into the service of the state. All noble thoughts, and high aspirations are to be offered not to any spiritual goal but to that material Government. Not only is there no place for religion, but neither is there any encouragement for any idealistic, much less spiritual, reality. The official Russian Catholic Church has been abolished; the Government has become God and he is as autocratic and ruthless as his predecessor.

While Christianity looses sway in Russia, we are told that it is swiftly rising to the top in France. It is astounding to watch this renaissance of sacerdotalism. Catechism classes in schools, not long ago, were attended by a few, the majority proudly proclaiming that they were "libre-penseurs". But now thousands of children throughout the country attend catechism classes and go through their First Communion. It is a kind of mass movement swayed by feelings with a conspicuous absence of reasoning into which many non-believers are drawn, as they do not desire to appear different and out of place. There are a number of magazines and newspapers which follow a very definite programme of propaganda; but whereas before Catholicism meant monarchy, it has now shifted to the left and it shakes hands with communism. Thus the Vatican adapts itself to the world, supplying the demand of weak

mortals while the Immortals, among them Jesus Himself, wait and wait. But the Church has never been for the Immortals.

One of the most energetic magazines along these lines is *L'Esprit*, now in its second year. The number for October 1933 was devoted to a study of money, that power "which has made man, once free through spiritual evolution, fall back into a state of slavery". The contributors, a group of young men ardent and rebellious, make their position very clear. Modern society is but a sad failure. Materialism has brought us to this state—the selfish materialism which makes an individual think that he is an end in himself and that the collectivity is worth nothing. The despotism of profit, nationalism, racial prejudice, has also contributed to our present failure. Marxism or Fascism, Bolshevism or Hitlerism, are but tyrannies which destroy the little spirituality which remains. Thus they feel that everything must be changed—the whole democratic system and the capitalistic regime. And they want to work for an ideal state in which the dignity and honour of each individual will be fully established. They do not aim at the abolition of property, but they judge as illicit, banks, corporations, credits etc. The state should only be a centre of administration without omnipotent power; and money, the curse of the age, should not be used for speculation, for gain or for usury, but only as a means of exchange.

Besides the political and economic campaign, *L'Esprit* and its followers are trying to activate the cause of Christianity; not a stupid blind belief in church dogmas, but a return to the pure teachings of Christ and His disciples. They have had some very strong articles against the Church as an institution. They do not go so far as to demand its ruin, but they want its reformation along ethical and moral lines. We translate one or two striking phrases:—

Evil begins when money tends to mould the spirit of the Church and to make religious consciences false and hypocritical.*

Non emendus: God cannot be bought! And yet that is what the rich for centuries past have tried to do, not only by charity to the poor but by gifts to the Church which they thus wanted to bring under their sway.†

In short, Religion having accepted the domination of Money and the protection of those who possess it, everything went on as if it [religion] were twisting its moral lessons to serve them... The priests needed money, and thereby finding themselves compelled to please them or at least not to displease them, Catholic ethics were pushed towards a complete accord with capitalistic ethics.‡

Not only do these young men condemn capitalism in state and church but they find sanction for communism in the scriptures. It is the privilege of man to possess property and money; "he must not use them only for himself but he

must consider them the property of all and thus be more willing to use them for the service of others". These are the words of St. Thomas.

L'Ordre Nouveau is another publication of young France which follows more or less the principles of *L'Esprit*, and more especially the works of Robert Aron and Armand Dandieu. The latter died some time ago, but his friends have come together for the purpose of developing and promulgating his theories. They are naturally against Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini and now even against Roosevelt, because they clamour for individual freedom, and like *L'Esprit* want man to develop his inner spiritual faculties rather than follow materialism and the lure of money. *L'Esprit* has turned towards the true scriptures of Catholicism or rather Christianity in its pristine purity, not the present day priestcraft. That is, they are seeking for an expression of the immemorial truths of morality and ethics. And if these young people advertise revolution and seem too wild, the thoughtful see in them only an expression of the thousands who even now are tired of "war and pacifism, of Marxism and great capitalists, of the madness of production and the folly of squandering."§

M. D. C.

* "Argent et Religion"—Pierre-Henri Simon, *L'Esprit*, Oct. 1933, p. 35.

† *Ibid.* p. 36.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 41.

§ "A propos de la Nouvelle Génération"—Tz., *Journal de Genève*, Nov. 14th 1933.

CORRESPONDENCE

CASTE AS A COMPLEMENT TO DEMOCRACY

[That " individuals have *different* responsibilities and rights " is the great idea at the root of caste, as brought out by Mr. Hugh Ross Williamson in his article, " Aristocracy and Democracy," in the January ARYAN PATH. In this communication **Mr. G. Hanumantha Rao**, Lecturer in Philosophy in the Maharaja's College, Mysore, summarises the conviction of three other Western thinkers that some form of caste system is reconcilable with democracy. It may, indeed, be indispensable to its successful functioning and to the saving of modern civilisation.—EDS.]

It has been usual to represent India as the land of castes and Europe as the land of democracy. The cultures of these two have been painted in such contrasting terms as to render any thought of their synthesis inconceivable. But the trends of thought that are developing both in India and in Europe shew that such a synthesis is neither inconceivable nor impossible of realisation. We are witnessing to-day the great efforts that are being made in India to change the basis of caste from authority and tradition to reason and humanity, in order to make democracy a complement to caste. We find a feeling gathering in Europe that democracy is not an unmixed blessing, and some courageous thinkers, like Nietzsche in Germany, William McDougall in America and H. G. Wells in England, have gone the length of advocating the reconstruction of European society on a basis of caste. Their views on the question of caste are not easily available to the general reader.

The first modern philosopher to call the attention of Europeans to the need of reconstructing society on the basis of a rational system of caste was Nietzsche. He was led to such a line of thought through the great need which he felt for a higher species of mankind who could raise life to a higher level. He found the democratic society peculiarly unsuitable, and even opposed, to the realisation of the higher ideals. Though democracy arose with the

ostensible claim of fostering spiritual values, it had, in effect, turned out to be only a means of satisfying the baser instincts of egoism, envy and greed of the ordinary man. Democratic society, in his eyes, was scarcely a healthy social body ; it was a conglomerate of egoistic individuals. Though it presented the external marks of health, it was diseased at the very core. In Modern Europe, the streets are clean, the police are superabundant, manners are peaceable,* but underlying all these there is a feverish haste, an aimlessness, an overstimulation of the head and the senses, a growth of nervous diseases and insanity, and an increase of alcoholism, vice, crime, libertinism, pessimism and anarchism.† The cure lies in organising society on the basis of an order of rank. A society based on an order of rank consists of "three physiological types, conditioning one another but yet distinct from one another, each having its own hygienic, its own realm of activity, its own feeling of perfection."

They are not marked off from one another, but one class is predominantly spiritual or intellectual, another has predominant muscular and temperamental strength, while the third are those who are not distinguished in either respect, being the average ordinary individuals who constitute the bulk of the society The first class, who as the most spiritual are the strongest, are the supreme ruling class ; but they rule by the weight of their ideas and because they body forth a relative perfection of the human type The second class are their instruments for governing. They are the

* Nietzsche, *Werke* XIV, sec. 248, 417.

† Nietzsche, *Will To Power*, sec. 65, 67.

warders of justice, the guardians of order and security, the higher ranks of soldiers, above all the King as the highest formula of soldier, judge, and maintainer of the law. They take from the first class all that is gross and rude in the work of ruling—are their attendants, their right hand, their best pupils. The third class engage in manual labour, in business, in agriculture, in science (as distinguished from philosophy) in the ordinary forms of art—that is, any kind of work, which is special, professional, and more or less mechanical. They naturally incline in these directions as the others do in theirs; not society, but their own kind of happiness makes them intelligent machines—they delight in mastership along their special line.*

There is a certain tendency in Nietzsche to speak in highly exalted terms of the first class and to speak somewhat slightly of the last. But it must be noted that when he speaks contemptuously of the average man, he does so as a corrective to the excessive laudation of the common man which is characteristic of democracy. He is generally appreciative of the services which the average man renders to the community and urges that it would be unworthy of a deeper mind to consider mediocrity in itself an objection. He even speaks approvingly of the standardisation at which democracy aims.

The process of making man smaller which is going on under democratic inspiration must long be the sole aim, since a broad foundation has first to be laid on which a stronger type of man can stand.†

It must also be noted that Nietzsche does not stand in the way of any human being rising to the highest levels of life. He allows movement up and down the social scale. It does not matter to Nietzsche from *where one comes*; what matters to him is *whither one goes*. In fact, he looks upon the peasant blood as the best there is in Germany and as having the most promise of aristocracy.‡

In Nietzsche we have a thinker who is led to advocate the caste-organisation of society mainly in the interests of the higher values and of higher types of human personality. But the motives

that have drawn McDougall to a caste-organization are less exalted; his motives are mainly political and racial. He is characterised as a Nietzschean and he himself does not "dispute the accuracy of the classification". Yet, he differs from Nietzsche in the stress that he lays upon democracy. McDougall does not look upon democratic government as an end in itself or as an unmixed blessing, but still he is "in principle and sympathy a democrat".§ He believes that democracy is "the only form of government under which the nations of the earth can hope to go onward to the highest levels of civilization—levels at which a life of reasonable dignity and happiness shall be within the reach of mankind."§ But he does not believe "that such progress may be ensured by the simple expedient of giving one vote to every adult human being and leaving the rest to Nature".§ Such a formula may one day suffice, but before "the advent of that day of triumph for the democratic principle, our civilization must fight, in a life-and-death struggle with many opposing forces, with greed and cruelty, with sloth and levity, and dishonesty in private and public life."§ "Until such a day, instead of blindly, indiscriminately asserting the principle of 'one adult and one vote' we must deliberately assert the principle of 'one qualified citizen and one vote'." The franchise—municipal, state and federal,—must be denied to those who are obviously unfit to exercise it.

It was to separate the unfit from the fit that McDougall devised a caste-organization. It consists of three classes, A, B and C. Those who are unfit for citizenship are included in class C; those who are fit for it are included in class A; and between the two lies class B, composed of persons of a probationary status. Class A consists of persons who have an educational qualification of a

reasonably high level and who are free from crime. Class C consists of the mentally defec-

* W. M. Salter, *Nietzsche The Thinker*, pp. 427-8. † Nietzsche, *Will To Power*, sec. 890.

‡ Zarathushtra, III. xii. 12.

§ McDougall, *Ethics and Modern World Problems*, viii.

ient, the convicted criminals, the illiterates and the under-educated. The B class consists of candidates for admission to the A class, and they are required to spend at least twenty to twenty-five years of their lives as probationers. The children of parents both of whom belonged to the A class would have the status of the B class as their birthright, and on attaining adult life, they would be, if properly qualified, admitted to the A class. On the other hand, children born of parents, either of whom was of the C class, would have the status of the C class; if and when they passed the qualifying test, they would enter the B class as probationers; and only after twenty years of this probationary status, with due discharge of its recognised obligations, would they be admissible to the A class.*

For the above caste-organization McDougall claims three advantages. First, political power would remain in the hands of a reasonably select body of citizens. Secondly, it would preserve the qualities of superior strains while avoiding those features which condemn to stagnation every society founded on a rigid caste-system. Thirdly, it would fortify the nation against that most fatal tendency which has played a great part in destroying most civilizations in the past, namely, the tendency to die away at the top.

If Nietzsche is led to a caste-organization as a means to the evolution of a higher and more spiritual species of mankind and McDougall as a means to effective government, H. G. Wells is led to it both on political and on spiritual grounds. The assumption that men are unclassifiable because practically homogeneous, which underlies modern democratic methods and all the fallacies of equal justice, are alien to his mind. Alien to his mind is also the modern method of classifying men into labour and capital, the landed interests: the liquor trade and the like.† He classifies men on a psychological basis. Four main classes of men are distinguished, called respectively, the Poietic, the Kinetic, the Dull and the Base. The former two are the living tissue of the state and the latter are the fulcra and resistances, the bone and cover of its body. They are not hereditary classes,

nor are they the result of any special process of breeding. They are classes to which men drift of their own accord. Education is uniform until differentiation becomes unmistakable, and each man must establish his position with regard to this abstract classification by his own quality, choice and development. To the accumulated activities of the poietic or creative class, are due all the forms assumed by human thought and feeling. All religious ideas, all ideas of what is good or beautiful, all inventions and discoveries, enter life through the poietic inspirations of man.‡ The *Samurai* who belong to this class are the scientists, philosophers and statesmen. The kinetic class are distinguished by a more restricted range of imagination; their imagination does not range beyond the known, experienced and accepted, though within these limits they may imagine as vividly as or more vividly than members of the poietic group. They do not desire to do new things. Two extremes of this class may be distinguished according to the quality of their imaginative preferences. At one end is the mainly intellectual, unoriginal type which, with energy of personality, makes an admirable judge or administrator and, without it, an uninventive, laborious, common mathematician or common scholar or common scientific man; while at the other end is the mainly emotional, unoriginal man, who can be a great actor, politician or preacher.‡

Below these come the Dull who are altogether of inadequate imagination, the people who never seem to learn thoroughly, or hear distinctly, or think clearly. They are the people who in any properly organised state should as a class gravitate towards and below the minimum wage level that qualifies for marriage.§

The Base, may be poietic, kinetic or dull, though most commonly they are the last, and this definition concerns not so much the quality of their imagi-

* *Ibid.* p. 163.

† *Ibid.* p. 184.

‡ H. G. Wells, *A Modern Utopia*, p. 183.

§ *Ibid.* p. 186.

nation as a certain bias in it. They are egoistic and have no "moral sense". They are rated as antagonistic to the state organization.*

Considerations of space do not permit me to enter into an evaluation of the views of these three thinkers or to compare them with the system of caste as conceived by the Hindu tradition. The motives that have led them to a caste-organization of society are slightly different. Different, in certain details, are also their schemes of caste. But every one of them takes his start from contemporary democratic society. They are unanimous in declaring that democracy as it is, is subversive of the higher ideals of life. They are also one in urging that there are fundamental differences between man and man in nature and disposition, in edu-

cability and attachment to the different values of life. They can be narrowed down but they can never be annulled. Any one who takes a rational and not a sentimental view of life must admit that if a society would be normal and healthy it should integrate these differences. A society which thus attempts to integrate differences of nature, disposition and character, is a society based on caste. The greatest evil that such a society is open to is the tendency to multiply caste-distinctions and to make them rigid. But our western advocates of caste have taken care to safeguard it against that evil. Caste, as conceived by them, does not run counter to democracy, but serves as a complement to it.

Mysore.

G. HANUMANTHA RAO

THE MYSTICAL AND THE OCCULT

I

In Mr. Lawrence Hyde's article *The Mystical and the Occult*, which appeared in your issue for November, 1933, there occur a number of statements and implications that are open to challenge from the point of view of H. P. Blavatsky's Theosophy.

1. Mr. Hyde maintains that "True Occultism or Theosophy" and Bhakti or Mysticism are antithetical; in effect, he says that the former is concerned with knowledge about the Real, and the latter with entering into it, realising it.

2. That "the Occultist is an intellectualist".

3. That Madame Blavatsky was biased in favour of intellectualism, or the "understanding of the laws according to which phenomena appear," as opposed to Mysticism, which attempts to realise the unity of all things.

4. That Madame Blavatsky in her writings "never struck the more interior mystical note".

It should be noted at the outset that the essay on *Occultism versus The Occult*

Arts, on which Mr. Hyde bases his criticism of H. P. Blavatsky, contains only one aspect of her teaching about the Path that leads to Unity Enlightenment, and Emancipation. It was written for a special purpose, which was to deter students of Theosophy, whose zeal was greater than their discrimination, from rushing into ascetic practices adopted from Indian Yoga. The article was to warn them to learn to walk before attempting to run, to grow wings before essaying flight.

The fulness of Madame Blavatsky's teaching on the subject of the Path is to be found in *The Voice of the Silence*, which Mr. Hyde does not appear to have read. Now, if ever a book "struck the more interior mystical note," this one does; and if space permitted, one might quote passage after passage to prove it. The ideal which is held up in it as the goal of the Path is that known in Northern Buddhism as Bodhisattvaship, or complete consecration to the service of humanity and

* *Ibid.*, p. 187.

the universe—Christhood, if you will. The Bodhisattva is the very embodiment of that universal, unselfish love, which is the inspiring urge in all true mysticism. But love alone does not make the aspirant a Bodhisattva; he must also possess both wisdom and strength, otherwise his sympathy with, and desire to serve, his fellows may—as often happens—impel him to actions that are futile, unwise, and even positively mischievous. What use can a surgeon be to his patient if, in addition to compassion for his sufferings, he has not the knowledge to diagnose their cause, and the skill and firmness of hand to wield the curative knife?

Universal love and compassion may be evoked or strengthened by mystical meditation and aspiration; but wisdom and strength can be won only as the result of determined effort and the deliberate training of mind and will. Universal love and compassion are, as H. P. Blavatsky taught, the expression of the Buddhic principle in us—the inner Christ; but to become effectually operative for the good of mankind, they must work through a mind and emotional nature, which have been trained and brought wholly under control. Therefore it is that, as stated in *Occultism versus The Occult Arts*, every aspirant to the Path must some day go through a training like that outlined there. But that training by itself would not make a Bodhisattva. It is merely a stage, though an important stage, in a long course of effort, motivated by universal love and manifesting in unselfish service.

Pure intellectualism might make a dilettante in occult philosophy, but never an occultist; while yoga training undertaken to acquire occult power for selfish ends was held by Madame Blavatsky to be the foulest "desecration of the mysteries," leading only to sorcery or to that state of virtual annihilation known in Northern Buddhism as Pratyeka Buddhahship. On the other hand, mystic meditation, undertaken without know-

ledge and as an end in itself, is nearly always accompanied by devotion to some exoteric creed, whose unwholesome influence over the minds of the masses is fortified by the zeal and devotion of the mystic. Mystical contemplation, unguided and without knowledge, is apt to manifest itself outwardly as sentimentalism, and it not infrequently has been the cause of mental derangement.

So the mystic, if he is to perfect his mysticism, must discipline himself to acquire self-control and understanding; the occultist must be inspired by that universal love and compassion which is the realisation of the metaphysical unity that is at the back of phenomenal diversity. In a word, each must eventually follow the same Path to the same high achievement—or fail in his quest.

With regard to what H. P. Blavatsky says about obedience, it should be noted that this is required only in connection with the advanced training referred to, which can be undertaken only by those who have gone a long way on the Path and have attained a relatively high degree of self-mastery and self-knowledge. Only such can know with assurance how to choose the Master to whom he may rightly and safely yield obedience; for, to reverse the proverb, "no one is fit to obey until he has learned to command himself." For the average man or woman to give blind obedience to some alleged dispenser or vendor of occult secrets is an abominable and wholly dangerous thing, and contrary to all genuine Theosophical teaching.

It may be conceded to Mr. Hyde that true poetic feeling is quite foreign to certain neo-Theosophical writers; but one and all of the persons whom he mentions in this connection have distorted Madame Blavatsky's Theosophy in the light of their own psychic (not spiritual) experiences and revelations. A much truer notion of the Theosophical teachings as to the Path may be gained from the works of such earlier writers as William Q. Judge,

Charles Johnston, and Jasper Niemand, or, among those still living, to William Kingsland, and that greatest of all Western mystical poets AE. As to H. P. Blavatsky herself, let Mr. Hyde re-read *Occultism versus The Occult*

Arts after he has read *The Voice of the Silence*, and he will then be able to appreciate the exact position in her general scheme of the training described in the first named work.
London R. A. V. MORRIS

II

In the November, 1933, number of THE ARYAN PATH Mr. Lawrence Hyde states (p. 754) that "this [occult] philosophy, for all the authority behind it, invites criticism." It would be interesting to know what is this "authority" apparently recognized by Mr. Hyde. He is, doubtless, aware that he is not the first person to criticize the philosophy expounded by Madame Blavatsky. She herself welcomed informed criticism. She fought to liberate men's minds from external authorities and to induce them to rely on their own intelligence. She, therefore, defied both the authority of religions which impose stultifying "beliefs" on men, and the authoritative pronouncements of modern science regarding the nature of man and his evolution. She stated, however, that she did not write for the "average person". Real *Mystae* or Occultists (she used these terms with identical connotation) are exceedingly rare flowers at the present stage of human evolution; and individual judgment can be developed in "the great mass of mankind" only by first freeing them from the influences of *suggestion* and from ideas imposed on them by would-be holders of psychological, religious, "occult," or "mystical" authority.

As I understand Madame Blavatsky's writings it was no part of her work for intellectual and psychical freedom to set up any authority, human or divine. Her philosophy was rooted in her own experience and that of others attached to the School in which she was initiated. She was not a mere "thinker"; and she declared that each man has to gain self-knowledge ultimately in the same hard school of *experience*.

Mr. Hyde suggests as alternative

authorities "the teachings of modern psychology" and "the findings of modern science." As there are some fifty different schools of modern psychology any man-in-the street or modern intellectual can easily find an authority to lean on. Nor do men of science to-day speak with one authoritative voice on the *interpretations* of their "findings". They are, in fact, at an *impasse* and in disagreement amongst themselves.

It is significant that no experimental scientist of any note has ever publicly criticized Madame Blavatsky's scientific philosophy. On the contrary, many of her hints have been utilized in laboratory researches, and the accuracy of her statements has been demonstrated in every department of science. And the dogmatic authorities who opposed her and intrigued against her never attempted to refute her philosophy with facts or by logical argument. They either suspected or knew it to be true but preferred, not unaturally, to maintain the prestige of their own dogmas, by means of mass suggestion. By the same means they endeavoured to destroy Madame Blavatsky's reputation in order to put an end to her intellectual influence.

London.

W. W. LEISENRING

[Last month we published one criticism on Mr. Lawrence Hyde's article, and in this issue two further letters are included. We bring this correspondence to a close by quoting two direct statements on the subject by H. P. Blavatsky herself:—

"Real Occultism had been prevalent among the Mystics during the centuries that preceded our era."—*The Secret Doctrine*, I, xl.

"There is no essential difference between a 'mystic' and a 'Theosophist-Esotericist' or Eastern Occultist."—*Lucifer*, V, 157.—Eds.]

FEAR—NOT HATRED

I cannot pass without a protest the fantastic—and therefore harmful—statements concerning France contained in the "Letter from London" in *THE ARYAN PATH* for December 1933, p. 853. If the author had visited France now or at any time since the War, he could not possibly have found the country "hysterical with hate". If the state of public opinion must be defined in a single word, "fear" would be nearer the mark. No doubt some die-hard "patriots" might be found who hate the Germans, but they are generally ridiculed, and the public attitude ranges from distrust—which is not hatred—to an earnest desire for mutual understanding. The German language is more often heard in the streets than English, and this was the case even before the great influx of Jewish refugees.

The story of the anti-German wedding-party (which nobody here seems to have heard of before) has every appearance of being the invention of a journalist. Even supposing the potations of the wedding feast had dimmed the sight and the judgment of the revellers (who are said to be Parisians, and cannot have been so ignorant) there is no reason why the name of Hindenburg should have excited their wrath, as the old Marshal is esteemed on all sides as a true and blameless gentleman. Indeed, a year and a half ago, it was thought a curious turn of fate that the former Commander-in-Chief of the German Army should now appear as the representative of the more sedate and liberal element in his country. As a contrast to the retirement of our own Generals (whose only goal seems to be the French Academy), his election to the Presidency had

aroused many fears which his subsequent career entirely dispelled.

In the present cheerless and confused state of the world, *THE ARYAN PATH* will doubtless prefer to seek for such symptoms as may be found of good-will amongst men. In this connection, I think it should be noted that the last elections in France (1932) turned entirely on foreign politics, and the result was the overwhelming expression of a desire for peace and disarmament. Is it not significant also that Hitler himself thought fit to choose "peace" as the slogan for the recent vote in Germany?

As stated in the "Letter from London" the greatest danger, in France likewise, is felt to be the "silent but horribly powerful" influence of the private armament firms.

Paris.

JEAN BUHOT

[Our Correspondent emphasises a distinction which in our opinion is not really a distinction at all. Hatred and Fear are in reality two different aspects of one emotion. Where we hate, we fear; where we fear we hate. It may be that in France, just now, the Fear aspect is uppermost, but, underlying it, ready to raise its head at any moment, is its twin brother, Hate. There was no personal animus against France in the "Letter from London," but a statement of what the writer conceived to be the truth about the present situation. We would remind our esteemed correspondent that "perfect love casteth out fear". If, according to him, Fear rather than Hate would be the word applicable to the state of public opinion in France just now, it is obvious that Love must be absent.—EDS.]

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“ . . . ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS.

Sir Alexander Cardew writes in *The Rationalist Annual* an interesting account of how the Churches have supported and sustained slavery from the earliest times. Churches themselves owned slaves and Christian Councils forbade their liberation. Church Fathers like Chrysostom and Augustine busied themselves with the defence of slavery. Sir A. G. Cardew writes :—

Throughout those long centuries the Church not only recognized, but was *particeps criminis*, itself owning immense numbers of slaves and actually exerting all its authority against their emancipation when they were Church property. . . . In 1452 Pope Nicholas V granted to the King of Portugal the right to attack all heathen wherever he might find them, seize their goods, "and consign their person to eternal slavery" Thus the Popes of Rome may fairly be said to have presided over the commencement of modern slavery.

Turning to another great denomination of Churchianity, the Anglican, Sir A. G. Cardew points out how the English took up the slave trade; Sir John Hawkins was the first English slave trader --and his ship was called the *Jesus*! Protestant Churches in America for years upheld the cause of slavery and used all their influence on its behalf. Among all the Christians the credit of consistently denouncing slavery belongs to the Quakers. While the numerous Protestant

sects have finally acknowledged the iniquity of slavery, the Roman Church "still maintains that slavery is not contrary to religion". At the close of his article Sir A. G. Cardew refers to Christian Abyssinia and Islamic Arabia, where slavery still flourishes. He quotes a graphic and gruesome picture from Grühl's *The Citadel of Ethiopia* and says that even so eminent an authority on the subject as Sir John Harris does not seem to realize the actualities of the case. Referring to Arabia he says that slavery "was authorized by Muhammad and is sanctioned by the Koran".

There is little doubt that, throughout history, religious orthodoxy and theology—Christian or Pagan, Eastern or Western—have lent support to all forms of slavery. And why should such an indictment sound strange? It is but a natural sequence flowing from the pivotal doctrine of every organized religion, that pope and priest must save and therefore rule the souls and minds of their flock; if not with persecution, then by fear. Bodily slavery, horrible as it is, emanates from the archetype—spiritual slavery.

In India another variant of slavery flourishes—that of the depressed classes; it takes numerous

forms but is known under the generic name of Untouchability. Some religiously befogged minds among the Hindus resist the abolition of that slavery for which Gandhiji is labouring with might and main, and they do so in the name of religion. The Churches own millions of mind-slaves; so do the Brahmanical temples; and unless these slave-makers and slave-owners are defeated, souls and minds will continue to be corrupted and one or other kind of slavery will continue to flourish.

That Christianity has failed to satisfy the intellectual and spiritual needs of modern times is taken for granted, yet now and again apologists come forward to defend this dying creed. Thus, in an article, "Quo Vadis," in the December *Contemporary Review*, Sir Alfred Hopkinson speaks of the Bible as containing "much that is hard to understand, at times unintelligible and in places repulsive," but despite this he upholds the traditional Christian position and in all seriousness asks:—

Does not a candid view of all the evidence lead clearly to the conclusion that the facts of individual life and of history make any other position [than the Christian] clearly irrational?

The device of merely raising a rhetorical question cannot explain away the fact that the weight of authoritative opinion is against the inference drawn by Sir Alfred.

Further, Sir Alfred argues that the enormous increase in the sale of the Bible as recorded by the

Bible Society disproves the view that there has been a decay in the influence of Christianity. For the benefit of those who, like him, wax enthusiastic over the statistics given by that Society, we reproduce below some pertinent observations made by the *Times Literary Supplement* in its issue of December 14th.

Although more Bibles are sold now than ever before, the Scriptures are probably less read than at any time for some generations back. The chief cause of the decline in Bible reading is beyond dispute, and was recently stated by Prof. Burkitt with his customary vigour and clarity. The Bible is not now read so frequently or so intensely as by our grandfathers because it is no longer, except in special circles, regarded as an infallible book. That belief has now collapsed, undermined by the labours of generations of textual and historical scholars.

The most astonishing portion of Sir Alfred's article, however, is that where he deals with the religious state of India. He is opposed to a union amongst Christian bodies in Christian countries on the ground that an institution or a church organization may be suited to one class of people and not to another, but he thinks that Christianity independent of all organization, is the religion most suited to India:—

Such a Christianity is the great hope for India which is crying out for a religion based on an Incarnation, and not troubled by sectarian differences which really mean little there, though regarded as important here.

This interesting discovery that India is above sectarian differences but that England is not, is flattering to India but is wide of the mark.

In any case India, the seat of a mighty religious philosophy of its own, is not "crying out for" any religion, and certainly would not be tempted by Christianity.

Sir Alfred's article only shows how even among the thoughtful in England some are hopelessly out of touch with the realities of the present-day religious situation all over the world.

Mr. Hugh P.A. Fausset, a well-known contributor to THE ARYAN PATH, recently published an autobiography, *A Modern Prelude*, in which he attempts "to formulate a faith which would equally satisfy the demands of the modern mind and the deepest instincts of the self." This attempt has been designated by his reviewer, Mr. Wynyard Browne, in *The English Review*, as "A Refined Theosophy," a system of thought he does not think "likely to appeal to the Western mind".

Theosophy, an eclectic *fin-de-siècle* substitute for religion, however sensitive and well-informed, holds little hope for the future. And Mr. Fausset has little more to offer as a cure for "the modern neurosis" than a refined theosophy. All his constructive thought is vitiated by a persistent dualism, the ghost that haunts his inheritance, which gives rise to the ambiguous and dangerous distinction on which this book is based, between the personal self and the real self.

It is true that Theosophy is eclectic. It is true that it is *fin-de-siècle*, inasmuch, but *only inasmuch* as that for our era it was re-proclaimed in 1875. But why should

it not be suited to Western minds? Surely the problems which Theosophy has solved for countless generations in the East, and for many hungering souls in the West, know no territorial division. Is "the modern neurosis" peculiarly a Western product? Theosophy in its true sense is not a substitute for any particular exoteric religion, but represents at once an attitude to life and a method of living. We cannot, naturally, expect Mr. Browne to assent to this, but we do feel he may have been misled in his criticism of Mr. Fausset's distinction between the real and the personal self, by crude classifications of pseudo-theosophy. There are not two selves, in the sense of two actual tangible entities. Man is undoubtedly a unit, and is only divided for the purposes of study and analysis as the anatomist divides the body; and there is a correct division from the study of which Mr. Browne will profit. However, even he must admit that in every man there are two natures, one good and one bad--the former aspires to spiritual things, the latter clings to that which is of the earth, earthy. They have been termed, respectively, the noetic and the psychic. And this duality persists in every man. We feel that if Mr. Browne would look a little more closely into the "*fin-de-siècle* substitute for religion," he would find reasons to amend some portions of a review which is on the whole not unsympathetic.

EAUAS

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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THE CHALLENGE OF TOLSTOY

Leo Tolstoy belongs to the very small band of thinkers who regard the tenets of the Sermon on the Mount as not impossible of practice in daily life. Not only did he preach but he lived the Christian life according to his perceptions, thus shedding lustre on Christendom and casting shame on the churches. He was ridiculed and persecuted for this. One more example of how his views and convictions were suppressed is shown by the service which *The New York Times* has rendered in unearthing and publishing Tolstoy's address written in 1909 on the "vile and criminal business" of war. It was prepared by special request, and was read at the Stockholm Peace Conference in August, 1910. "To the peacemakers of that day it seemed to be too extreme in its conclusions. Better, so they thought, that it be not discussed. With due decorum, the document was consigned to the oblivion of the

archives and, in that year, the voice of Tolstoy was silenced by death."

We wish to draw attention to the two forces of Hypocrisy and Fear which permeate and envelop the motives and methods of most "civilized" men and women, a fact which the simple, straightforward and downright words of Tolstoy bring home to every thoughtful man.

Tolstoy throws out a challenge to (1) "all those who form the government" and (2) "the armies consisting of Christians and trained to murder" to declare themselves in favour of—

either Christianity with love for God and for your neighbour, or the State with armies and wars . . . If it is stated that Christianity forbids murder then there will be no army and there will be no government. If it is stated that we, the government, recognize the lawfulness of murder and reject Christianity—no one would want to obey such a government, which bases its power on murder.

His demand for a clear answer to this uncomfortable question is compelling because of its justice: Are you or are you not a Christian? If not, what are you? This was a challenge to hypocrisy, and it can be made to-day as in 1910.

This sin is not confined to the declaration of war and maintenance of peace alone; in every sphere of public life, hypocrisy prevails. A similar challenge if made must perforce remain unanswered by the leaders of "civilization" and their followers—in legislatures, in social circles, in places of worship, in editorial sanctums.

Hypocrisy is called one of the two unpardonable sins in Occultism because it deprives the aspirant of his vision of Reality, however limited. It creates a thick fog which deprives the hypocrite of his own vision. Trying to fool and dupe others, the hypocrite fools and dupes himself. It does not take very long for a sincere and pure-minded man to see through him. The safety of the modern hypocrite lies in the fact that most of the time he has to deal with hypocrites. Diplomats of one country are as befogged as those of another; egotists in one social set encounter egotists in another; Jesuits of the Orient are as astute as the Brahmins of the West; it is such befogged leaders who control the nerves and muscles of humankind. Mental and moral slavery extensively prevails, in spite of universal franchise and free compulsory education.

The remedy? It is implicit in Tolstoy's second assumption. He attacks the fear which obsesses

governments and nations and appeals to them to exorcise that ghost.

... just as sometimes a small amount of electric current is sufficient to turn a liquid into a solid body, so it may be that only a small effort—sometimes a single word—is required to lead us from the cruel and unreasonable life of the men of our time, with their divisions, armaments and armies, to a reasonable life, in keeping with the conscious requirements of present-day humanity.

He instances the simple utterance of the child in Andersen's fairy tale who saw the Emperor naked, and said so. "We must say the same; we must say what all know but do not venture to state." The fear which accompanies the herd instinct is intense. People are scared by what others say. The course of action of most men and women is determined not by them but for them. The arbitrary nature of what is "good form" and what is "not done" is hardly questioned. The political party, the social set, the religion and the nation to which a person belongs—these claim his unquestioned loyalty; so unquestioned that they have become veritable fetters of a slavery far more injurious than bodily slavery.

To cast out hypocrisy courage is needed; to cast out fear, perception. To fight the evils of world-wars we need to fight the egotism which begets hypocrisy and the cowardice which begets fear. This necessitates the assumption by men and women of what Emerson calls the "military attitude of the soul".

PSYCHISM: ITS DANGERS AND ITS USES

[**Hugh I'A. Fausset**, whose recently published autobiography *A Modern Prelude* has been much discussed, is the author of *A Study in Development*, *The Proving of Psyche* and other psychological studies. —EDS.]

The need of the majority of Westerners to-day to recover a spiritual centre is apparent enough. And it is becoming increasingly a felt need. Hence the number of men and women who, distracted by the clamour of a mechanised life, are seeking relief for their jaded nerves in practices commended to them by all sorts of guides, many of whom, whether they be Faith-Healers, Psychoanalysts, or self-acclaimed *Yogis*, lack the real spiritual insight which alone could qualify them for the responsible office which they so lightly assume.

The situation is, indeed, symptomatic of a period in which the old is dying and the new is as yet still struggling to be born. On the one hand we have the organised religions which, despite their deposits of traditional teaching concerning the states of "holy living and holy dying," are too compromised by their dogmas and too jealous of their vested interests to renew their spiritual knowledge by rediscovering its source in the ancient Wisdom-Religion. On the other hand many of the numerous modern religious cults lack altogether that basis of true piety without which the science of the

spiritual life cannot be safely practised or truly known. Nor do they possess, like the churches, any Scriptures or any body of doctrine or philosophy to restrain the excesses of irresponsible individuals. And since the modern world is full of neurotics, it is inevitable that psychism should be in as much demand as psycho-analysis and that many of those who advertise their capacity to meet this demand should be in some degree at least neurotics themselves, even when their motive is apparently disinterested.

Anyone who knows how very potent, both for good and evil, psycho-therapy in all its branches can be, will not belittle the dangers of the situation. Yet it is not by turning away in horror from psychism that these dangers may be eliminated but by learning to distinguish a true science of the inner life from a false. The orthodox Christian attitude to all such practices is, of course, a simple one. Summed up in a few words it is,— "Have nothing to do with them. Go to Church and say your prayers. Live a decent active life; think of others as much as you can and of yourself as little as you can. Trust in God and cultivate a healthy

mind in a healthy body. But as for more interior or self-conscious methods of discipline or of spiritual development, leave them to saints, cranks, and morbid orientals."

Such an attitude may at one time have been adequate for the majority of men and women in the West who were engrossed in the outward practical demands of life and had not yet been disintegrated by forces within and without. But to-day so simple and external a rule of life is insufficient. Madame Blavatsky divined truly enough that a disease of our cycle would be that of Psychism. Yet despite all the dangerous impostures associated with occultism and spiritualism to-day, the growing interest in them is not simply morbid. It is prophetic, surely, of a new kind of consciousness and of communion with the spiritual which is essential to man's development and even survival. It is because man has become imprisoned in a falsely rationalised universe of his own self-centred making that he is greedy for any psychic experience, however trivial or delusive, which seems to transcend the barren categories of thought, of which he is utterly weary. Yet it is only by breaking through these categories and transforming thought into spiritual experience that he can renew the springs of his life. It is a recognition of this necessity which gives force to the findings of the psycho-analysts, even if for the most part they reduce the spiritual to terms of unconscious instinct. But although the interpretation of

the spiritual, advanced by such a psychologist as Jung, is manifestly inadequate, we are in complete agreement with him when he writes that "we moderns are faced with the necessity of rediscovering the life of the spirit; we must experience it anew for ourselves."

This is the one way in which we can break the spell that binds us, not only to the "cycle of biological events," but to the prison of rationalistic thought. The logic of the lower individual mind (*Manas*) must be progressively sacrificed to the insight of the supra-individual Reason (*Buddhi*). Nor can we doubt that this process of growth towards the unity of a creative selfhood can be furthered by certain interior practices of which the virtue and validity have been incontestably proved. For it is by inner evolution rather than revolution that most modern men and women may find their true selves. Conversion of the old convulsive kind is, indeed, seldom possible, even if it were desirable, to-day through the very growth of that rational self-consciousness from which man is increasingly pining to be delivered. Delivery, it is true, can only come through a veritable rebirth from the darkness of egoistic error into the light of spiritual truth. But this second birth need not come upon a man suddenly or with sensational violence. And if we examine many past conversions of this violent kind, we shall generally find, not only that they occurred in predominantly simple people, but that while the nature of the individual thus possessed and torn

asunder was permanently changed on a certain level, the change did not affect the more interior levels of his being and may even have arrested the growth of certain finer faculties.

Modern psychology has at least sharpened our sensitiveness to the taint of egoism with which it is itself infected. And in many who have laid claim justly to conversion it is not difficult to detect an ego imperfectly redeemed. Such men have grasped too soon at the satisfaction and the renewed energy which Faith brings with it. And to-day although the disease of doubt has incapacitated so many, it has at least revealed to us how complex, deceptive and deeply-rooted egoism is, and how long and subtle a process of transformation is involved in really eradicating it. It is, for example, because the religious "group" movement, known as "Buchmanism," which advertises its activities most loudly in the West to-day, neglects to study the science of conversion and employs the old crude methods of revivalism, that it is also the most superficial.

Such methods are inadequate to-day because they reflect an attitude which is behind instead of in front of the consciousness of the age. They evade instead of truly solving the problem of the Promethean intellect and they disregard the more exact knowledge concerning subjective processes which is being acquired both from ancient esoteric and modern psychological sources. For although we cannot share Dr. Jung's belief that analyti-

cal psychology is going of itself to fill "that void which hitherto has marked the psychic insufficiency of Western culture as compared with that of the East," we do agree with him that we have reached a cultural level when we must forgo compulsion, whether emotional or doctrinal, and turn to self-development. For this, as he rightly adds, we must have knowledge of a way or a method. Such a way is not as unknown, as Dr. Jung supposes, nor are the findings and experiences of the psychologist as necessary to provide a foundation for it, as he suggests. Nevertheless both modern psychology and ancient psychism can contribute elements of value to that science of the inner life which it is urgently necessary that Western man should build up and practise.

The fascination, therefore, which psychic life exerts upon modern man is only in its morbid aspect a sign of decadence. It contains, as Dr. Jung remarks, the promise of a far-reaching spiritual change in the Western world, a breaking of the bonds of rationalism, an opening of the creative depths. Therein lies the danger. For in those depths move the forces of destruction as well as of creation. There is security of a kind in the narrow citadel of rationalistic consciousness. The elemental powers of darkness are refused entrance into it, even if the spiritual powers of light are shut out too. But when the sentry or censor is removed and the gates are flung open, strange and terrible monsters may well emerge from the swamps and hidden places of

the unconscious and defy the power of the individual, in whom the old inhibitions have been loosened, to control them. The history of modern psycho-analysis, and more particularly of that associated with the theory and technique of Freud, confirms the truth of this. Admittedly Freud's theory, despite its reduction of spiritual values to terms of sexuality, has proved its relevance as an effectual basis for treatment in certain neurotic cases. But only a man of the deepest imaginative insight could be safely trusted to know when and how to apply it; while, if misapplied, it might well have the most disastrous consequences. And the same applies to the loosening of complexes by other methods of analysis. No one will deny that such disabling knots in the personality should be untied. But to untie them too soon or in the wrong way may well result in a merely superficial adaptation of the individual to life and the arrest or distortion of his real spiritual growth.

And wilful experiments in psychic practices are even more dangerous, perhaps, than experiments in psycho-analysis. Here again we have to do with something of real potential value. The control of the mind or of the breath, the discipline of meditation in its various forms, the fostering of the intuitive faculty and the inner vision are all in some measure necessary to the growth of a new self and a higher consciousness. Yet the temptation to indulge in psychic practices for selfish ends is very great and many who are drawn to them to-day are

sensationalists seeking to tap reservoirs of power or to satisfy a morbid appetite for the occult. It cannot, therefore, be too strongly emphasised that such abnormal faculties as clairvoyance or trance-utterance have no spiritual value in themselves. Psychic faculties are simply unusual forms of sensitiveness, which are found sometimes in people of very elementary spiritual development, but which may, also, appear in those who have reached an advanced stage in true mystical unfoldment. And obviously it is only by these latter that such faculties can be spiritually employed. To seek to develop them as instruments of power or to exploit them for gain or self-advertisement or even to suppose that any true revelation of reality on other planes of life can be acquired through them by those who are not spiritually altogether emancipated from the desires of the lower self, is to be guilty of the gravest error.

Psychic practices of an esoteric kind can, in short, only be safely undertaken by those who have truly dedicated themselves to the mystical life and who are, also, in a position to receive really enlightened guidance. For those who act upon the knowledge that the only power one should desire is power over one's lower self and the capacity to be of service to others, they may well be aids to integration and to the growth of those finer spiritual faculties which are the higher senses of the reborn man. But without the self-surrender which is the fundamental condition

of any man becoming "a new creation" neither psychism nor psycho-analysis can further real organic growth. And they may well only intensify a disorganic state.

For egoism is far more of a menace in the new world of psychic and psychological experiment than it was in the old world of traditional culture, prudent rationality, and self-interested morality. These at least were safeguards against sub-rational forces, if they were also barriers against supra-rational inspiration. Doubtless in many cases the destructive impulses were only suppressed and either generated a sickly internal conflict or broke out eventually in violent insurrection. But at least the individual was not encouraged to stimulate powers within him which he was not morally advanced enough to control or direct aright. And this is the danger of both psychism and psycho-analysis in irresponsible hands. For in throwing off the rule of a limited reason, the individual is only too liable to abandon himself to a flux of unlimited instinct. The higher consciousness which he seeks in place of the old dead rationalism is not of course to be found in this way. It can only be realised by a long and patient course of self-discipline. The limited rationality, which it is desirable to outgrow, lies, in fact, between two extremes—the super-conscious and the unconscious. The faculty of the superconscious is the imagination or intuition; the faculty of the unconscious is instinct. Essentially psychic prac-

tices are intended to foster the growth of the imagination and to strengthen the creative will; while psycho-therapy aims at resolving disabling conflicts and inhibitions in the instinctive depths. And each, rightly administered, can be of creative and curative value. But wrongly administered and to the wrong people psychism can lead men out of the safe citadel of rationality into a wilderness of fantasy or even insanity, while psycho-analysis can inflame a "libido" which it is quite incompetent to sublimate or transform.

To conclude, therefore, we may say that in the new world of spiritual discovery and adventure which is opening out before us it is even more essential than it was in the old narrow world of rationalism to eliminate egoism. To undertake psychic practices in a spirit of curiosity or with a desire for enhanced personal power is a sin against the light. Similarly to believe that any spiritual value attaches to peculiar psychic experiences in themselves or to forget that the quality of any vision and its degree of reality depends on the spiritual grade of the recipient, is to be guilty of gross credulity and superstition. To qualify as a true visionary requires a moral elevation and a purity of motive far beyond that of ordinary mundane standards. And it is only those who are sincerely striving after such inward truth and have dedicated themselves to the mystical life who may safely practise its psychic science.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

NATIONALISM: PAST FAILURES AND FUTURE HOPES

[We purposely bring together articles written by eminent men residing in three different cities of the world. All of them deal with the subject of the influence of religion in national life.

Dr. Hans Kohn of Jerusalem regards Nationalism as destructive of universalism and looks forward to the emergence of a common faith and a universal religion.

Mr. Ramananda Chatterjee of Calcutta, taking advantage of the Ram Mohan Rai Centenary, appeals to his co-religionists to utilize the power of religion in the service of Indian Nationalism.

Mr. Philippe Mairet, joint Editor of *Purpose* (London), writes of the nationalistic renaissance in Asia, particularly in India, and points out that "the clear duty that presents itself to the political minds of Asia is to learn from the supreme mistake of Europe and avoid it". Ebs.]

I.—NATIONALISM AND RELIGION

The recent period of history which started with the French Revolution and with Napoleon's campaigns all over Europe has rightly been called the age of nationalism. But this age was in no way confined to Europe; its influence spread during the following decades over all countries of the earth, and even the most remote countries of Asia, living until then still under the ancient order of their religious traditions, have been touched by the new spirit. Only about thirty years ago Arminius Vambéry, a Hungarian scholar who had devoted his life to the study of the Middle East wrote:—

Religion absorbs the intellect of the Asiatic; it is stronger than his feeling of nationality, for the latter is almost everywhere of second importance.

The same thought was expressed by another scholar in a slightly different way:—

Each religion in the East represents a social group with a more or less self-contained culture, and in many respects the term, "Religion" rather corresponds to what we understand by "nation": indeed the Muslim is accus-

tomed to regard Islam and Christendom as two nations.

But those writers and many other observers forgot one important fact: that even in Europe nationalism and the idea of nationality and of all that it involves is only of rather recent growth, entirely unknown to the Middle Ages, and that the East and even Africa in our days are undergoing under the influence of Europe quick and radical changes in their mental outlook and social attitude. Very few decades after Vambéry had recorded his judgment about religion and nationalism in Asia, one of the progressive leaders of Islam in India, S. Khuda Buksh, wrote in the leading Muslim review in Calcutta that Islam has realized that its future lies in its powers of solidarity and that

that solidarity should draw its strength and sustenance from a scheme of things, real and vital, and that scheme is naught else save that of Nationalism, and Nationalism pure and undefiled. That such is the trend of events is clear to all who seriously scan the political horizon.

And an American missionary, Wilson Clash, corroborates from his observations the statement of the Indian leader :—

The youth of Islam to-day is thinking in terms of politics more than religion. He is often far more interested in his nation's welfare than in the spread of Islam.

The same is true about those old Asiatic religious civilizations outside the pale of Islam—Hinduism and Confucianism. India and China, up to a very recent date venerable, social and religious civilizations, are becoming nations. The Indian National Congress wishes to represent Indian nationhood and national aspirations above all religious and social cleavages of the still powerful past. The fathers and guides of modern China have not been disciples of Confucius, whose sayings and doctrine have moulded during 2,500 years the whole of China's moral and intellectual, social and personal life, but Christians of Chinese origin. It is only twenty years ago that the head of China was a priest-king, the Son of Heaven, and China a theocracy, but to-day nobody is surprised that in present-day China the religion of the ruler is not taken into account. Sun-Yat-Sen was a Christian; Tchang-Kai-Shek was baptized at the time he was the virtual dictator of the Chinese Republic—and this without any protest by Chinese youth, for their interest is entirely concentrated on the Chinese national renaissance.

This historical process by which religion is being displaced in Asia by nationalism as the determining

factor of history—a factor which sets its stamp upon the whole era—was gone through by Europe some hundred years earlier. As the Turkish and the Egyptian peasants a few decades ago considered themselves first of all Muslims, and then Turks or Egyptians, since they were much more united by their common religion than divided by their different ethnical origin or vernacular language, so too the peasants in Europe considered themselves not so very long ago as Christians and not primarily as citizens of different national states. One Church had catered in the same way to their intellectual and moral needs; the same social and religious traditions had governed their lives! All their social and personal life and activities, work and play, government and trade, arts and science, had been regulated and governed throughout Christendom by religion; nothing was left outside its pale. The educated classes of all nationalities then used one language—Latin. There were practically no national barriers, as there was no national consciousness in Europe at that time. Mediaeval Europe (and in many parts of Eastern or Southern Europe the Middle Ages continued into the nineteenth century) was entirely similar to the Orient of some years ago. Life in the East showed a few years ago the same distinctive features as life in the Occident a few centuries ago.

We can thus follow one historical process throughout the world: a universalistic religion like Christianity, Islam or Buddhism, which

tends to embrace the whole of humanity and which in its teaching does not admit any differences between men of different races, ethnical groups or nationalities, is being displaced by a nationalism which overstresses or over-estimates national or racial group consciousness and territorial frontiers. In this process there is a certain return to ancient times: in the past religious consciousness was not universal but tribal. Each tribe or ethnical group had its God. The God belonged to the tribe and the tribe to its God. God fought the wars of his tribe; he was elated by its victories and might become then the God of a mighty kingdom. He was annihilated if the tribe was destroyed by his enemies. The religious and ethnico-political consciousness of the group was identical. God was, for the tribe, "our" God; the aliens had their "own" Gods. Some of those tribes or nascent nations developed out of their ethnico-religious genius higher forms of religion, like the Persians under Zoroaster or the Jews under Moses. But even then their religions remained national religions. Allegiance to one's tribe or nationality and to one's God became identical.

But slowly men developed higher and more sublime notions of God. He became an absolute being which did not allow any other Gods besides himself; he became the God of all humanity, of the Universe. His word or the word of his prophets and apostles went forth to all men. The racial, ethnical or tribal relations of a man

lost their importance. New standards and values, identical for all men of the same faith, became important for salvation and redemption, for all that really mattered. Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, the three great proselytizing religions were striving to gain the whole earth as their dominion, directing man's soul and life towards one goal only—to gain Paradise or Nirvana, eternal life or eternal quietude, something to outlive all terrestrial bonds and allegiances. His religious preoccupations dominated the mind of man; in religion he found security against the dangers of destruction and death. Man has a natural longing to overcome the narrow limits set to his existence in space and time. He does not easily content himself with the short span of years allotted to him by the absolute power whose creature he is. He longs for immortality—to break the narrow limit in space and time which falls to the lot of mortal beings. And he finds this escape from the limitedness of his life in his belief in God, in his faith that he will live an immortal life in Heaven or be redeemed from all entanglements of human life in Nirvana. The mediaeval man knew exactly his position in space and time. Creation, the Fall of Man, Revelation, stood on the one side, Salvation and Redemption on the other; the time between did not have any great importance, it was preparation for the Life to come. Man lived on a small strip of earth, but above him was Heaven and beneath him was Hell, and he knew

that after a short time he would pass, for eternities to come, either to Heaven or to Hell. The place in which he had to live for a comparatively short time, the tribe or nationality to which he belonged, the vernacular he spoke, did not mean much to him; they did not decide and form his inner life, for what was essential was the word of God to all men.

This period of universalism, where religion dominated and nationalism meant nothing, or very little, to mankind, passed in Europe with the secularization of the social, political and intellectual life. Under the influence of rationalism the reality of Heaven and Hell began to be doubted. Creation and Salvation lost their dominating importance; life on earth, the number of years and the strip of soil, of each one gained in importance, became the basis of man's life, activities and thought. Man emancipated his life more and more from the ties of religion which he began to feel as fetters. But at the same time his longing for immortality, for the expansion of his personality, remained; and as he could not satisfy it any more in Heaven which was lost to him, he had to satisfy it on Earth. He had to look for a new point of attachment. He found it in the nation. There was a group of people of more or less the same origin as himself, living on the same soil, speaking the same language. As God, the Father in Heaven, receded slowly into the background, ancestry and descendants, united by common blood, gave to the individual secu-

rity in time; they rooted him in a natural way deeply into the past, they stretched his personal life far into the remote future. Man began to look for his immortality upon earth, by becoming a link in the chain of his people unified by a common history, common territory; by the homogeneousness of the blood which flowed in their veins and beat in their hearts, and by the conformity of their aspirations. Formerly only princes fought for the preservation or enlargement of their territories which were considered their personal property. Now the common people themselves took an active interest in their homeland, the land of their fathers and the land of their children. Nationalism became the driving force in the political, social, cultural, and personal life of the people. Religion often became only a subservient force or an ally of nationalism. National churches and religion were again being established; priests gave their blessing to national wars; sometimes the national and the religious body entered into a close union fighting for the same goal, a national goal, with the help of the weapons and symbols of both the age of religion and the age of nationalism.

The age of religion has at least in principle been an age of universalism, of the spiritual brotherhood of all mankind. Nationalism has even in principle destroyed this universalism, has set nation against nation, fatherland against fatherland. It seems to-day as if a new trend towards new forms of universalism can be noticed.

Nationalism has brought the world to a complete chaos and threatens human civilization with complete destruction. All nations of the earth are confronted to-day with the same harassing problems, the same alarming questions which ask for solutions that a disunited mankind cannot find. National ambitions are conflicting one with the other; the new means of communication have brought nations closer together and thus increased the dangers of conflict; all humanity has begun to be ruled by the machine, its exigencies and its implications. Only a common effort can render the new ways of communication, of science and technology, useful as means for the progress of a humanized civilization instead of, as now, weapons of internecine competition. Man

has learned in the age of nationalism to look upon earth as his real home, and by his discoveries and scientific research to make earth an inhabitable and dignified abode. But he will also have to learn again the eternal truth of universalism which was contained as a message in all the great religions, and to realize this truth in the life of the nations of the earth; otherwise mankind is in danger of decay both morally and economically. The spirit of the new age which is approaching will adopt the universal message; it may come in new forms, but it will certainly restore to life the glad tidings of a brotherly, united mankind, of an end to all strife and clash of nations, races and tribes—in a common faith.

HANS KOHN

II.—THE USE OF RELIGION IN NATIONALISM

Of the three maxims in politics, in ethics and in religion which Rammohun Roy often repeated, the one on religion was from the Persian poet, Sadi, and runs thus in English translation:—

The true way of serving God is to do good to man.

This puts us on the track of the mainspring of his multifarious activities for the welfare of his countrymen and of mankind in general. It was his religious faith. All earnest attempts at reform, whether religious, social, political, or of any other description, are based on faith in the ultimate triumph of truth and justice and

humanity, which is synonymous with a belief in the moral government of the universe. This is an essential element in religious belief. One would, therefore, expect to find Raja Rammohun Roy, the first all-round reformer in modern India, the first to act on the principle of the interdependence of different kinds of reform, above all and beneath all a religious personality. He "made no secret of the theistic passion which ruled his life".

The many and far-reaching ramifications of his prolific energy were forth-puttings of one purpose. The root of his life was religion. He would never have been able to go so far or to

move his countrymen so mightily as he did, but for the driving power of an intense theistic passion.

Yet, at the many meetings held on the occasions of the anniversaries of his death during a long course of years, and on the occasion of his centenary also, speakers and writers have, for the most part, dwelt on his achievements as a social reformer, a political worker, a *littérateur*, a linguist and an educationist—very often not even mentioning the fact of his having been a religious reformer, one who worked hard to uproot polytheism and idolatry.

This neglect of the religious side of his personality led the late Dr. Mohendra Lall Sirkar, a great physician and founder of the Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, to observe at the Rammohun Roy anniversary observance in Calcutta on the 27th of September, 1889:—

In connection with the versatility of the late Raja Rammohun Roy, I hope I shall be permitted to take this opportunity of saying that it is a matter of great rejoicing that he should be claimed by all sections of the community as a man who ought to be admired. Gentlemen, while it is a matter for rejoicing, I must at the same time raise my warning voice that we should not lose sight of the great central truth to the propagation of which the late Raja Rammohun Roy devoted his whole life, and that was the unity of the Godhead. The great aspiration of the late Raja Rammohun Roy was to enable the human mind to acquire the highest truth which it was capable of acquiring, and that was to have a just, correct, and true idea of the unity of the Godhead. I need not dwell and dilate upon the various reforms which he inaugurated; those reforms are

going on rapidly enough. But I must say—and say with the greatest regret—that the greatest reform at which he aimed, namely, to instruct his countrymen in the unity of the Godhead, has not made adequate progress. Of course, you will rejoice at the establishment of Brahmo Samajes throughout India as evidences of the progress of the great central truth which the late Raja Rammohun Roy tried to inculcate; but compared with the masses of this country, who are deeply ignorant of the very fact of the unity of the Godhead, these various churches are but infinitesimal drops to propagate that noble idea. We have not done sufficient to propagate this idea and to do real homage to the Raja. With all our boasted education, we are, gentlemen, practically atheists I am an outspoken man, and may be blamed for making these remarks, but still, when I recollect what the late Raja Rammohun Roy did for the abolition of idolatry, and what we have since been doing towards the same object, I must say that we cannot congratulate ourselves upon our energy.

At present there is little or no open advocacy of such idolatry as involves sexual immorality—at least among the educated classes—though widely prevalent idolatry of certain kinds in the South involves the immoral and degrading *devadasi* system. Among an appreciable section of the educated public there is condemnation—at least in theory—of such idolatry as involves cruelty to animals, though it is practised over wide areas on a large scale. But opposition to and condemnation of idolatry as an error, a superstition and an irrational practice unworthy of and unnecessary for civilized human beings, are practically confined to the Brahmo Samaj and some members of the Arya Samaj.

The discussion of this topic is not merely of academic interest. There is a great diversity of opinion on various matters of vital interest to the Nation. But perhaps the greatest measure of agreement that exists relates to the elevation of the political status of the people of India. Opinions differ as to what that status ought to be in the immediate future or ultimately ; and opinions differ also in relation to the methods to be adopted for winning that status. But all agree that a change for the better is necessary. It is also agreed that for effecting that change the people of India ought to unite and be better organized. What stands in the way of such unity and organization? I shall not here refer to all the obstacles that hinder unity or make unity difficult for all religious communities. I will take only the case of the Hindu community and refer to one or two obstacles which stand in the way of their unity.

It is a matter of common knowledge that caste and "touchability" and "untouchability" keep the Hindu community divided. But it is not always borne in mind that the worship of some particular god or goddess in preference to, or to the exclusion of, others is, or at least has been, another dividing factor. Sectarian quarrels—sometimes of a sanguinary character—between Vaishnavas and Saktas, Saivas and Vaishnavas, worshippers of Siva and worshippers of the snake-goddess, Manasā, and so on, used to disturb the mutual relations of different Hindu sects to

a great extent in the not distant past. Perhaps they have not yet disappeared from all parts of the country among all strata of Hindus. To the extent that they have disappeared, the result may be due to religious indifferentism or to the fact that present-day worship of some deity or other is not as sincere and ardent among all sections of the Hindus as it used to be in days gone by. In any case, it cannot be denied that the Hindus would be a more united and better organized people, if they individually and collectively worshipped One Deity in spirit and in truth, than they are now. If loyalty and obedience to one supreme political leader make for the solidarity and strength of a people or a political party, can it be doubted that devotion to the One True God would make a people united and strong? The growing feeling among Hindus that there ought to be collective or congregational worship among them, and the increasing practice of *sarvajmin* or all-caste Durgā Pūjā among Bengali Hindus, indirectly prove that unity of worship makes for national solidarity.

Faith in the Supreme Spirit has an energizing and strengthening effect, as it implies belief in the moral government of the universe, and faith in the ultimate triumph of truth, justice and righteousness. Hence worship of the One True Deity and meditation on Its attributes cannot but make for the vigorous conduct of all righteous national struggles and lead to their ultimate success.

For these and other similar rea-

sons Walter Bagehot wrote in his *Physics and Politics* :—

Those kinds of morals and that kind of religion which tend to make the firmest and most effectual character are sure to prevail, all else being the same ; and creeds or systems that conduce to a soft limp mind tend to perish, except some hard extrinsic force keep them alive. . . . Strong beliefs win strong men, and then make them stronger. Such is no doubt one cause why Monotheism tends to prevail over Polytheism ; it produces a higher, steadier character, calmed and concentrated by a great single object ; it is not confused by competing rites, or distracted by miscellaneous deities. Polytheism is religion *in commission*, and it is weak accordingly.

While literate Hindus or illiterate Hindus of some education will readily admit that the worship of the formless *Parabrahma* is the highest religion taught in the Hindu Shastras, at the same time, the vast majority of Hindus, in-

cluding many persons of remarkable intellectuality, will urge that the worship of *Parabrahma* is meant only for great sages and that image-worship is necessary for the generality of men, who cannot grasp the idea of the Formless Supreme Deity. But it is found that among some sects of Hindus, the Bāuls of Bengal, for example, even illiterate peasants are great devotees of the Formless Supreme Spirit. So it is hard to believe that those classes of Hindus who continue to produce successful students of metaphysics, higher mathematics, higher science, etc., some of whom are able to do very abstruse original work in philosophy and science, must be confined to the worship of images, and must not aspire to worship the Formless Oversoul in spirit and in truth, which is man's highest privilege, duty and bliss.

RAMANANDA CHATTERJEE

III.—NATIONALISM AND ARISTOCRACY IN ASIA

When, still dazed with the shocks of war, Europe looked round upon an altered world, she found her prestige as a continent dangerously diminishing. In actual military, political and materially productive power, she was still supreme, but three new factors threatened that supremacy. In the West was America, transformed into the world's greatest financial creditor and for the first time seriously arming. To the East was the violent industrialization of Russia ; and all Asia was stirring, as never before, to answer the challenging

questions raised by Western civilization.

Naturally, the group of peoples once called Christendom, and for so long an oligarchy of nations virtually ruling the world, felt with alarm these omens of declining power, and valued their leadership the more for the danger of losing it. It was natural that they should try to prevent the recurrence of their worse than fruitless quarrels, and the Western mind being always prone to ascribe its errors and to owe its salvation to some word ending in "ism,"—natural also

that good Europeans should lay the blame upon Nationalism, and seek a remedy in Internationalism.

But what is Nationalism? The question is easily answered: It means the direction of all activities to the good of the "nation," as an ethnic, political and cultural unity within a given geographical area. Such unity is never more than roughly true of any actual State, but Nationalism strives to make it so, by educating the facts into greater conformity. So Nationalism is a dynamic political conception of the State, influencing action in every department of the corporate life. But Nationalism is not the only view of the State that prevails in Europe, and it cannot be said to have been the sole cause of the War. Two other conceptions were fully as active throughout Western civilization—those of Plutocracy and of Democracy. Each is a standpoint from which the whole State can be viewed and action taken accordingly, and unfortunately the devotees of each view believe it to represent the whole truth about the State. They forget that Plutocracy, Democracy and Nationalism are abstract words standing for different aspects of one and the same living reality. And it is that reality, not one of its aspects, which made the War. It was Europe itself—or rather the general style of European life,—which led, and could only lead, to catastrophe.

This thought might be of value to the people of Asia—and perhaps especially of India,—now that they are seriously grappling with

modern problems. For they are already making use of this conception of Nationalism to arouse themselves to their new responsibilities, and they may well be daunted if "Nationalism" is only to lead them into an Asiatic war as monstrous and futile as the European, or into a world war even more disastrous. But does Nationalism always and necessarily produce Militarism?

We have seen that it does so, when it is the kind of Nationalism that grows up with Pluto-democracy. So, if Asia is importing from the West a style of modern polity describable in the terms of all these three conceptions, its breakdown in war will soon be predictable with almost astronomical precision. And in fact, Asia is at present importing ideas from all three categories, and moulding her new life accordingly—Japan especially, India largely, and China to a considerable degree. It is not too much to say that Asia is still copying the way of life which in the West is now breaking down in disillusion; and of the factors in that life which are named above, there is no doubt which has proved the worst for Europe and is the most ominous for Asia. For whereas Nationalism cannot be always or inherently wrong (for regional groupings have their right to exist) and Democracy must include at least some truth (for persons are individuals, also with a right to exist), we cannot say the same of Plutocracy, since the wealthy, as such, have no right at all to rule.

Even if the theorem "might is right" were true, it is doubtful

whether wealth could be said to have won legitimate power. Its present position in the West seems to be due to the fatality of European developments, or a coincidence of exceptional circumstances. It was only relatively, as the powers of the Church and the Feudal system weakened, that the merchant class grew in importance and in control of the situation. Land had formerly been the only sure physical basis of social power, but a variety of independent causes made it possible for the merchant class to learn how to control money, by developing new organs and a new technique of finance. By the creation of banking and joint-stock companies the financial credit of a nation could be mobilised for any purpose of which the merchant class approved, and these purposes soon came to include the support of governments committed to its interests. It was soon after this change that industrial production was revolutionised by the use of solar energy from coal, and by machinery. The immense technical undertakings and social changes which followed were only made possible by the new financial powers, which thus attained virtual control of the entire economic life, as the creditor invariably gains ascendancy over the debtor.

The new mercantile-financial class supported the doctrines of democracy, chiefly in order to lead the popular power against the declining rule of the feudal aristocracy, which naturally tended to obstruct the material changes brought about by commercial and

financial ambitions. Thus the Western world progressed to Plutocracy, to the rule of Money. But money is incapable of ruling in any true sense of the word. The merchant mind, even when it rises to the more abstract operations of the financial plane, can only organise for profit, never for the development of human order, happiness or culture.

Proof of this is clear from the last century of Western progress. During that time the financial class has steadily strengthened its grasp of the situation. It has always supported with its credit the most profitable industries—"profitable" meaning those which produce the greatest quantity with the least expense. It has worked therefore to increase production and decrease the consumption of goods. This process can only lead to increasing overproduction as fast as the quantitative technique of industry improves, and the surplus production must therefore be exported. Nor can it be even exported in the fair and equal exchange of trade, for the population which cannot afford to buy its own products cannot afford their imported equivalent. It is sent out of the country in return for interest-bearing bonds. These debts tend to become irredeemable, and they grow so large that even the interest on them cannot be accepted in goods, for the consuming power of the population remains little augmented. Yet in order to seek work for its increasingly-unemployed people, a plutocratic nation must always strive for new markets abroad in which

to sell (or oftenest in the result to give away) its produce. Naturally the competition between such nations leads irresistibly towards war.

No doubt the financial class, *qua* individuals, are no less patriotic in sentiment than other persons. But *qua* plutocrats they seek profit, and often by anti-patriotic means. Thus, when the Lancashire cotton industry is approaching ruin through unemployment, they finance the export of cotton-weaving machinery to India or to Japan, assisting competition which must obviously worsen Lancashire's predicament; and such anti-national behaviour is more the rule than the exception. The use of the money-power is a national and international, but even internationally it is not constructive. The complete inability of financiers to co-operate in any statesmanlike view of their function was fully demonstrated by the failure of the World Economic Conference.

No Indian patriot, versed in the lore of his native traditions, can be surprised by this impotence of Plutocracy for constructive rulership. It entirely confirms one of the leading principles of Indian sociology, that ancient science of social organisation, of which the system of castes was originally the exoteric embodiment. Here it was definitely laid down that the merchant caste (the *Vaishya*) was incompetent to govern. Its task was the organisation of the labour of the working caste (the *Sudra*), and of the material resources of the country by means of trade and

finance. The political leadership and discipline of the State were the duty and privilege of the warrior or *Kshatriya* caste, a class corresponding closely with the orders of chivalry in Mediaeval Christian civilization. Those of the *Kshatriya* caste, moreover, were bound by their own code of honour to pay respect to the caste of the teachers (the *Brahmana*) who were the exponents both of the moral wisdom and of the scientific theory of their times.

To adduce the authority of the caste tradition is, I am aware, to risk the impatience of good people both in Europe and India, who are impressed by the evils of "caste" in India, degenerating under present conditions. These evils, however, are irrelevant to the essential principles of the Aryan tradition, a tradition which, with its fourfold analysis of human society, is not only in agreement with the form of Christendom in its most creative period, but is the only universally reliable framework of sociology we possess. Like any other theoretical system it is susceptible of abuse; but I suggest that it may also be used, and with valuable effect, by those Indians who still cherish their understanding of its meaning. For if they look at Western problems in the light of their own tradition, they will see that both the Nationalism and Internationalism of Europe stand condemned for the same reason—that they tend to subordinate everything to *Vaishya* men and methods.

It is a curious fact that European idealists are generally unaware that

Western Nationalism and Internationalism are two manifestations of the same social complex. They associate the latter with the idealistic efforts of the League of Nations (always disappointing in their results), and fail to realise that even the League itself is largely involved with the machinations of a very real "Internationalism," which consists in frenzied efforts of each country to sell its products abroad, even if more cheaply and on more uncertain credit than at home. Against this international activity "Nationalism" retorts by building tariff walls to keep out the unwelcome wealth that would speedily ruin the industries of any nation which did not take such defensive measures. We often hear of international parleys and conferences to induce the nations to lower their tariff walls, but these conferences never propose that the nations should cease their aggressive over-production and under-selling; the nations are asked to give up their defences whilst the attacks continue, so it is no wonder that the talking invariably ends with inaction.

This direction by the merely mercantile mind has turned the magnificent productive powers of Western civilization against itself, and frustrated its cultural and political intelligence. Not that the *Vaishya* type is without virtues: it has great and distinctive virtues in its true function, but in public action it is naturally and necessarily opportunistic and incapable of true policy. What happens under its lack of rule is that impersonal facts

and arithmetical figures increasingly overrule the activities of society, with social consequences of the kind described in Indian scriptures as the "confusion of castes".

The vital question for Asia, therefore, is how to take what she wants from the West, both of technique and of intellectual realism, whilst escaping subjection to Western commercial and financial methods. It would now be impossible, even if it were desirable, for Eastern peoples to refuse to adopt and adapt Western scientific technique to their industrial life; and their intercourse with the West upon a basis of fair and reciprocal trading is of the highest cultural importance to humanity. The clearest duty that presents itself to the political minds of Asia is to learn from the supreme mistake of Europe, and avoid it, by preventing, before it is too late, the accumulation of the power of Credit and Finance in institutions outside their political control. They must curb in time the strong tendency of unregulated finance to exploit their industries for export, and to lead them into the international morass of debts and gold-politics. If they fail in this, the latest curse of the West will descend upon them—that of political apathy and despair, relieved only by illusory hopes of salvation through dictatorships.

There are many idealists in the West who look very far for the solution of this problem of political Nationalism exacerbated by financial Internationalism; they believe it can be solved by the abolition of national sovereignties in a world-

commonwealth. However attractive this may seem as an ultimate goal of mankind, it is at present far too abstract an ideal to inspire any useful action except upon the plane of culture. Nations happen to be the regional and political realities in which we now live: a complete transformation of their internal constitution will be necessary before they will be worthy to be members of such a planetary alliance. World-order can only be approached step by step with the attainment of internal harmony and social justice.

No nation can escape from this vital question of its own salvation into a phantasy of universal world-peace. Nor is there any escape by burying our modern talent of scientific technique, and refusing to use it—least of all, perhaps, for India, which especially needs to face the discipline of mechanism, to submit to the exigencies of physical law in the material world, not only for efficiency's sake but for the regeneration of her spirit. The adaptation of the East to the technical condi-

tions of modern life may well be more successfully achieved in India than elsewhere. For India is busily creating a new nation out of a population as numerous and various as that of Europe, a task which will tax and renew her *Kshatriya* virtues; and there is no reason why she should not set a new pattern of nationhood to the world, wholly different from the post-Renaissance conception of the nations of the West.

It was to India, in ancient times, that the eternal *Dharma* was revealed explicitly, as the four functions of social life and the only true theory of Aristocracy. If she remembers her own wisdom, not in words but in actions, India will not suffer her life to be ruled by money, a function that should serve it. In that case she will not only safely develop the technique which came from the West for the welfare of her own people, but may be able, by the living example of a new social culture, to lead Asia and the world in the ways of peace.

PHILIPPE MAIRET

The respective duties of the four castes, of Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Sûdras, are also determined by the qualities which predominate in the disposition of each, O harasser of thy foes. The natural duty of a Brahman compriseth tranquillity, purity, self-mastery, patience, rectitude, learning, spiritual discernment, and belief in the existence of another world. Those of the Kshatriya sprung from his nature, are valour, glory, strength, firmness, not to flee from the field of battle, liberality and a lordly character. The natural duties of the Vaishya are to till the land, tend cattle and to buy and sell; and that of the Sûdra is to serve, as is his natural disposition. Men being contented and devoted to their own proper duties attain perfection.

—*The Bhagavad-Gita*, XVIII, 41–45.

PARACELSUS

[**Geoffrey West** is the author of a splendid biography of H. G. Wells and numerous other books. He has a gift for painting backgrounds and when he couples it with spiritual detachment his biographical art easily achieves the rare combination of historic accuracy and freedom of interpretation. Five such excellent sketches he contributed to these pages in 1932, and this year he has prepared a new set of five.

The first part of the following article on "Paracelsus" appeared last month.—EDS.]

The personality of Paracelsus is difficult to determine, and even more so is his development, save in the very broad stages of apprenticeship and attainment. We have said that he had few friends, and even between himself and his disciples there seems to have been little intimacy. His mother died in his early childhood or perhaps infancy, and after that no woman seems to have so much as entered his life even passingly. He was quite careless as to his personal appearance, and equally indifferent as to the impression he might make upon friend or foe, sparing no one's feelings when occasion might rise to speak his mind. One feels he almost deliberately avoided personal relations, preferring to stand alone. He knew himself always as a God-dedicated man, his eyes unswervingly upon his goal, the real drama of his life within, in his steadfast growth to divine knowledge.

Many works have been attributed to him; some of the estimates are absurd, but the most cautious lists over one hundred on widely varied medical, magic, alchemical, astrological, botanical and philoso-

phical subjects. Only a few of these, however, are known to have been written by himself; the majority were either dictated to his disciples or set down by them from his oral teachings. Most were not published for some years after his death, and to settle their order of composition, or of the conception of the ideas they set forth, is an impossible task to-day. One can but note, and outline them in terms of, their general dominating consistency.

It should perhaps be noted, as a preliminary, that with all his profound insight, he remained to the end of his life, like his teacher Trithemius, a formal as well as devout Christian. The Bible was his earliest and his constant study. In the controversies of the Reformation his sympathies were in many respects clearly with his contemporary Luther, even to the point of distributing in some of his travels the latter's translation of the Bible, and so earning the hatred of the Swiss priests, but he never left the Catholic Church. Yet he could say, seizing the spirit beyond the letter, that "God only desires the heart and not the ceremonies," and

again that "We must read the Bible more with our hearts than with our brains, *until at some future time the true religion will come into the world.*"

Prayer, the aspiration towards the good; Faith, born of a deep knowledge of the soul; Imagination, penetrating to the holy heart of reality—these were the three unchanging foundations of his wisdom both as philosopher and as physician. Necessarily, for his understanding was the source of his power. The physician, he said, must have knowledge, primarily practical, of the world within man and the world without; but also he must have "virtue," a spiritual not intellectual quality. And in fact the basis of his medical practice was neither more nor less than a spiritual perception, the almost—or more than—clairvoyant ability to penetrate the mental or moral cause behind the physical symptom. For, like Mesmer after him, he held most diseases to be due to moral effects and thus capable of remedy only by moral treatment.

This was quite consistent with his philosophy, which was essentially Kabbalist if in some respects it developed a new insight. His universe was spiritual and one, a single essence in all its manifestations. All that was, visible and invisible, known and unknown, had come into being by the spontaneous breathing-forth of the indefinable, incomprehensible primordial cause, the ultimate creative power flowing downward in successive emanations from level to level, from purest spirit to grossest matter,

divided, limited in the captivity of form, yet one from highest to lowest, so that all "below" was ever pregnant with the qualities of all "above," and must ever seek to realise its potentialities in an upward "homeward" journey. Man epitomised the universe, as the Microcosm, all-potential, set in organic relation to the Macrocosm (the terms, H. P. Blavatsky points out, are identical with the Microprosopus and Macroprosopus of the Kabbalah), and, while possessing a certain effective independence, achieved a true liberation only as he attuned himself to universal being. Such harmony was the secret, the necessary condition, of all absolute insight, and its attainment life's highest—and only final—aim. Paracelsus notoriously defined the seven-fold constitution of man in terms familiar enough to later students of Eastern thought, but practically if not entirely unknown in the West in his day even by occult initiates. More simply, he saw man as a being spiritual, intellectual or astral, and physical or animal, each of these three qualities representing a universal level temporarily focussed in individuality, and each self-conscious and perceptive of itself in others according to its achieved degree of development, but also the higher knowing the lower. Thus the beginning of wisdom was self-knowledge, on the physical, then the intellectual, and finally the spiritual plane. "We cannot find wisdom in books, nor in any external thing; we can only find it within ourselves."

This conception of universal

spiritual unity, and the power of spirit to discern and influence spirit in whatever other form, and of the need to proceed first and last by spiritual understanding, at once underlies almost all his writings and makes them all but incomprehensible, where not definitely misleading, to those lacking such understanding. They must always be read not literally, but "*without and within*". It is not merely that his "salt" and "sulphur" and "mercury" are not the substances of the chemist's shop, but the symbols of spiritual elements. In his lifetime his more impatient and less perceptive disciples complained that he withheld his secrets from them; just so are his writings for those with souls as well as eyes to read.

He was an alchemist, but his art aimed at more precious ends than gold, seeking rather the control of the invisible elements in the universe by "the living power of the spirit". As astrologer too he was equally removed from the bald interpretations of superstitious ignorance. He even wrote categorically: "The stars control nothing in us, suggest nothing, incline to nothing, own nothing; they are free from us and we are free from them." Yet he recognised an astral and chemical affinity between the stars and man. It is indeed difficult to define his views in a few words, but, briefly, he held that man's astral or intellectual nature came from the stars (but the stars understood as symbols of mental cosmic states rather than physical bodies) and is subject to their

influence in the degree that he lacks spiritual development. "Such a person is blown about like a reed, and cannot resist the forces which are acting upon him, and the reason of this is, that he has no real self-knowledge, and does not know that there is in him a power superior to that of the stars." As chemist he undoubtedly discovered or distinguished many new substances and distillations; he has been credited at least with the "rediscovery" of both hydrogen and nitrogen. That he had occult powers born of his profound insight can scarcely be doubted, but few wonders are ascribed to him—even less than to most of his eminent successors; he was always healer, never magician, and he would use his knowledge neither to create faith nor to confound his enemies. Necromancy and sorcery—black magic directed to personal gain—he condemned absolutely, as one realising only too well the dangers of non-moral or evil will acting creatively upon the purely astral plane. He made a very detailed study of the occult properties of plants, and the existence and varieties of elementals and spirits good and evil.

But first and last he was a physician, and as such alone exercised his full powers. Health, he held, was the harmonious functioning in the individual of the universal life-principle, whose invisible vehicle was a magnetic force capable of control by the imagination and the will, and of use by such control for the curing of illness both mental and physical. This was precisely

the "animal magnetism" whose discovery Mesmer was to proclaim more than two centuries later, and Paracelsus also anticipated his follower in his use of the magnet in healing. He was also well acquainted with the principles and no little of the practice of the subsequent homeopaths. Seeing always with organic vision, he discerned his patients as organisms, having life as well as structure; he dissected the living body with the imagination, not the dead body with the knife.

We return at last to the problem of the claim of Paracelsus to be named the Father of European Occultism. We have seen that beside some of his successors, as say Saint-Germain, Cagliostro, or even H. P. Blavatsky, he scarcely appears as an occultist at all. But we have also seen that the occult knowledge was clearly there, that it lay at the bottom of all his work and teaching. And yet, again, he seems to have given to the West little that was in its essence new even in the West; if he saw more deeply in detail, there seems no doubt that his main principles were all implicit and mostly explicit in the enlightened Hermetic-Neoplatonic-Gnostic Kabbalism of Trithemius. Thomas Vaughan, Boehme, and probably Swedenborg all appear to have derived from him in many of their basic ideas.

Even on such grounds the claim might be allowed. But there is another too. For in the very dawn of our modern Europe, it was Paracelsus who, as occultist and

man of spiritual knowledge, chose the path of open understanding and open teaching. Burning at Basle in 1526 the books of Galen and Avicenna—the Aristotles of mediaeval medicine—he performed an act as symbolically momentous in its implications as Luther's burning of the Papal bull or his translation of the Bible into the common tongue. Paracelsus too lectured in the vernacular that all might hear him, and writing his books he proclaimed his knowledge, if with certain safeguards, where it might be understood by those capable of understanding. It is said of him that as a young man, against all the customs of the day, he directly refused to become member of a society of alchemists and thereby bind himself to secrecy, wishing to gain and give his learning freely. Certainly he did not, as those before him had done, seek to keep hidden the very existence of a secret traditional knowledge; and thereby he established a new tradition, in the West and for the West—a tradition of a declared knowledge open to all who both would and could follow it. Its dangers perhaps are only too plain, even in the examples of some of its greatest exponents. But it is, for better or worse, the Western tradition; the dangers have to be realised, not shirked. Some have accused Paracelsus of throwing pearls before swine—his was the deeper realisation of the presence even in the swine of the spirit which is the essence of the pearl!

GEOFFREY WEST

WHEN MAY WE COMPROMISE?

I.—THE ANCIENT VIEW

[Some ten years ago, **G. V. Ketkar** helped to found in Poona the *Gita Dharma Mandala*, in order to popularize the teaching of that Scripture given five thousand years ago by Sri Krishna on the battlefield of Kurukshetra.—Eds.]

Compromise denotes the adjustment of two divergent views or modes of thought. It is effected by mutual give and take. By that process a *via media* acceptable to both sides is found out. In cases in which mutual give and take is not possible, a workable compromise is often patched up by a policy of "live and let live". This is not a compromise in the strict sense of the term; it is mere avoidance of conflict. Synthesis, on the other hand, denotes something more than mere give and take. It is a blending of two views into one whole.

The Sanskrit word *Samanvaya*, (समन्वय), is a broader term and includes all the three ways of reconciling divergent views mentioned above.

The science of Compromise or *Samanvaya* is minutely systematised by Hindu pandits. It was necessary to develop that science in order to reconcile apparently divergent passages from authoritative religious texts. These rules of textual compromise are too technical for the common reader.

The *Bhagavad-Gita* is uniformly popular among all schools of Hindu thought. It is regarded as the synthesis of divergent views which evolved with the age-long growth of Hindu philosophy. We see sects

of Hinduism which greatly differ from each other doing homage to the *Gita* with uniform reverence. This unique character of the book is due to a large extent to its methods of compromise. A study of these methods will be useful not only to the philosopher but to the ordinary man of the world. If he does not accept all or any of the *Gita's* teachings, he may at least derive a great deal of practical wisdom from its methods of synthesis.

Often the misconception underlying a controversy is only about a single word. Controversy arising out of narrow definitions of a word can be reconciled by a broader and all-embracing definition of the crucial word. The word is thus preserved, but a new sense is given to it. The *Gita* has by several bold and comprehensive definitions reconciled opposite views of thought. Take for instance the definition of *Yadnya* or Sacrifice. The original meaning of this word was restricted to the rituals prescribed in Vedic literature. It was applied mainly to the offering of oblations in the sacrificial fire to Vedic Gods. As the Aryans advanced in philosophic thought this custom was thrown in the background. Yet the sanctity and reverence for the

word *Yadnya* (sacrifice) held their sway over the minds of the people. The *Bhagavad-Gita* has reconciled this divergence by widening the definition of *Yadnya* (sacrifice). The act of offering something in the fire is metaphorically applied to several practices necessary for the path laid down in the *Gita*. The material sacrifice of the Vedic literature is not excluded from the long list of sacrifices. Only it is given a lower place than the sacrifice of knowledge. Self-control, study and knowledge are included in the broad meaning given to the term *Yadnya* (*Gita*, iv, 25-30).

When there is unity in substance the *Gita* will not insist on the form. To those who fight for the form the *Gita* will point out the essential unity of the thing in itself. For instance, to those who insist on the words *Sanyasa* and *Naishkarmya*, i.e., renunciation and inactivity, the *Gita* brings reminder of their real meaning. "He who is free from attachment and is undisturbed in his contentment, although he looks to be active he is really inactive" (iv, 20). Those who insist on the word "actionless" may say that the sage is actionless. On the other hand, if others take him to be active the *Gita* says in the next verses (iv, 21-22) that his action is sinless and he is free from its bondage. To one who insists on renunciation or *Sanyasa* it is pointed out that "He is the real *Sanyasi* who does not hate and who has no desire" (v, 3). The substance of *Sanyasa* or renunciation does not lie in outwardly ceasing to act or wearing a particular dress. The real renun-

ation lies in the mind. If that is achieved the outward form is immaterial.

There are diverse ways of doing a thing, and while following your own way you must not forget that there are others. If you are performing a certain sacrifice please do not suppose that it is the only kind of sacrifice. "Many and various are the sacrifices offered to the Eternal" (iv, 32). Good things are often spoiled by narrow insistence that they are *the only good things*. One good thing need not be the enemy of other equally good things.

Another requisite for compromise is the avoidance of unnecessary and offensive language. Even after all the broader definitions, relative thinking and analysis, there may remain some small point of difference, which may be pointed out without giving offence. In doing this the *Gita* follows the way of speech which it describes in the seventeenth chapter as "speech giving no offence, truthful, pleasant and beneficial" (xvii, 15). People are attached to a particular form of expression or enunciation of certain truth. It offends them to change the mode of expression, which has acquired a sanctity by time, custom or authority. The *Gita* has ostensibly accepted several time-honoured propositions with almost imperceptible amendment.

The ancient rule was that all action that is done in the performance of the old kind of Vedic sacrifice (offering oblations in fire) was to be deemed righteous. All the rest was sinful action. The *Gita* after widening the meaning of

the word Sacrifice, *Yadnya*, in the manner stated above, has slightly but imperceptibly amended the old rule also. In order to make this amendment possible the *Gita* states the old rule negatively and introduces one additional adjective.

The world is bound by action, unless performed for the sake of sacrifice. Therefore for that sake and *without attachment* you should do your work (iii, 9).

The word मुक्तसंगः (without attachment) is purposely inserted, and the old rule is amended so as to suit the view of the *Gita*. The amendment is made as inoffensively as possible.

The time-honoured proposition was that he who followed the "Shastras," or writings that have become holy by tradition, can alone hope to attain salvation. Righteous action meant action according to the Shastras; while everything against the Shastras was condemned as sinful.

According to the *Gita* the real division between virtue and sin comes from the inward fact whether the self is overpowered by passion, hate or desire. He who is free from these is the truly righteous. He whose self is overpowered by these is sinful (xvi, 21-22). After describing this real difference in the following verse the *Gita* seems to accept the old rule. On closer examination we see the slight amendment with which the old view is accepted: "He who abandons the Shastras and follows his own desires does not get salvation" (xvi, 23). The word कामकारतः (following his own desire),

is purposely added.

In reconciling and synthesising the difference between various ways of viewing the highest ideal the *Gita* has followed a peculiar method. The highest ideal is regarded by the dualist as becoming of the nature of God (though not becoming one with God). Some regard the highest ideal as coming into touch with Brahman. Others regard it as merging in Brahman. The *Gita* has treated all the epithets as synonyms. You can touch yourself with your hand. You are of the same stuff as your hand is made of. But when your hand is hurt you say that you are hurt, and when something is placed in your hand you say that you received it. Similarly your relations with the Eternal may be viewed from different points. In the highest stage of perfection you may be termed as one with the Eternal or as in touch with the Eternal. The highest stage is a combination of all these relationships.

From the sixth to the fifteenth chapter we find the several old systems of knowledge regarded as differing only in expression and arrangement. Describe the division between spirit and matter as क्षर (mutable) and अक्षर (immutable), as क्षेत्र (field) and क्षेत्रज्ञ (Knower of the field), or as प्रकृति (matter) and पुरुष (spiritual person), or as अधिभूत (Supreme Spirit) अधिदैव (Purusha) and अधियज्ञ (Krishna embodied) —they are all systems teaching the same knowledge which is acquired by the practice of Yoga. As long as the knowledge itself is comprehensive and free from "dubious-

ness" (असंशयम्) and "complete" (समग्रम्) (vii-1) it is acceptable as a system of knowledge.

The world is dual—"divine" and "demoniac" (दैव and आसुर- chapter xiv) or triple—(सत्त्व, रज and तम, poise, activity and inertia, chapters xvii and xviii); as long as you endeavour to avoid the lower and try to reach the higher it does not matter how you divide, and what names you give to, the different stages.

The methods of compromise will be perhaps styled as too diplomatic to be suited to a philosophic book like the *Bhagavad-Gita*. But before pronouncing this hasty judgment, one must look to its purpose and the limits of its compromise. The limit is indicated by the two words *Shraddhā* and *Anasuya*, faith or sincerity, and honesty of purpose. Within that limit the *Gita* is full of kindness, sympathy and toleration, but it has no mercy for those who are without. The condemnation of those whose only aim of life is selfish and sensual, is very severe. There can be no compromise with

hypocrites, dilettantes, haters and self-seekers. Only honest and sincere differences can be compromised or tolerated. This will show that the *Gita* is not "facing both ways". When it becomes necessary to state its view explicitly it has done so unhesitatingly (xviii,6).

We have seen that the *Gita* does not effect compromises on account of want of boldness to enunciate the truth. It is because of a larger mental perspective and loftier point of view that the *Gita* sees unity in divergent opinions and beliefs. It looks at them from the highest point of view of Brahman, of salvation. Mistakes in method are tolerated if the movement or progress is unmistakably towards that ideal. From that lofty idealism, differences look insignificant. Only those who have their eyes fixed on a high ideal and who have sympathy for all sincere effort, can effect a real compromise. Otherwise a compromise becomes a makeshift. All compromises in the *Gita* are illuminated with such high purpose and a broad sympathy.

G. V. KETKAR

II.—THE MODERN VIEW

[C. E. M. Joad is a fighter and a philosopher. As the former he gives no quarter to compromise where principles are involved; as the latter, he has a true conception of tolerance and gives way on matters that are non-essential.]

Viscount Morley's celebrated essay on "Compromise," first published in 1874, has recently been reprinted by the Rationalist Press Association in the "Thinkers' Library" (Watts. 1s.). It is a work of high seriousness, the product of

an age in which men did not disdain to pay their readers the compliment of addressing them by argument based upon reason and addressed to it.

Morley's Essay is, indeed, with one exception, in matter the most

effective, in manner the most noble plea for intellectual integrity in English literature. The exception is his master J. S. Mill, who sharing Morley's passionate conviction of man's fundamental, intellectual and moral decency has alone matched the eloquence with which Morley expresses his conviction.

The object of the book is stated to be the establishment of the limits within which compromise in the matter of opinion is justified. Sometimes the expression of an idea is appropriate; sometimes to urge an opinion will give needless pain. There is, it is obvious, a time and a place for the advocacy of one's views; to press them in and out of season is not only bad manners but bad tactics. Fanatics and bores do not make converts. How far do such considerations justify us in compromising in the expression of an opinion?

"Are we only to be permitted to defend general principles on condition that we draw no practical inferences from them? Is every other idea to yield precedence and empire to existing circumstances?" Obviously not! "Our subject is" then "a question of boundaries."

Before I indicate the boundaries which Morley himself suggests, there are two general observations which will serve to show the first the standpoint, the second the occasion of the book. First, in Morley's view, the universe is fundamentally a moral universe. It contains, that is to say, moral as it contains physical laws. Our moral principles and maxims are simply

the spirit's intuitive recognition of a moral principle that transcends it. Hence, they are no more to be dismissed as *mere* conventions or conveniences than the laws which physics records:—"The claim of morality to our allegiance rests on the same positive basis as our faith in the truth of physical law. Moral principles, when they are true, are at bottom only registered generalisations from experience." And, as with morals, so also with truth. There are, then, objective truths which mind discovers not devises, objective moral principles which it discerns not invents. Recognition of these factors is the basis of the obligation to intellectual and moral integrity.

Secondly, a number of factors have combined in the modern world to obscure such recognition. Pre-eminent among these are the effects of the sciences, particularly those of anthropology and psychology, in sapping men's faith in the validity of their ideals by exposing their origin. The application of the theory of evolution to trace the growth of human sentiments and principles has diverted men's minds from the question of their truth:—"The devotees of the modern method are more concerned with the pedigrees and genealogical connections of a custom or an idea, than with its own proper goodness or badness, its strength or its weakness." The modern fashion, in fact, is not to consider whether an idea is true; it is to show why men came to think it true. The results of this method, valuable to the historian and the

anthropologist, are destructive to morals and religion. For men insensibly come to believe that in exposing the origin of a view they have somehow invalidated it. But we are no more entitled to infer that the discovery that religion began as Totemism and exogamy discredits the revelations of the mystics, than to argue that the fact that the savage can only count upon the fingers of one hand invalidates the multiplication table.

To lay bare the roots of things is no doubt valuable; but we must not make the mistake of supposing that they *are* their roots. To do them justice we must seek to interpret them not only in terms of what they began as but also in terms of what they are trying to become; we must judge them, in fact by their fruits as well as by their roots. And it is precisely this which, in opposition to the anthropological-psychological treatment of reason and morals, Morley sets out to do. What, then, is his answer to the difficult questions which he raises? What boundaries does he assign? How far does he permit us to carry compromise without impairment of integrity?

The gist of his answer consists in a distinction between three different though frequently confused things, the formation of opinion, its expression in speech and writing and its realisation in action. In the first sphere we should be absolutely uncompromising. No considerations of spiritual comfort or practical expediency should deter us from laying hold of what seems to

us the truth wherever we may find it, and following it wherever it may take us: "In forming opinions, a man or woman owes no consideration to any person or persons whatsoever. Truth is the single object."

In the second sphere compromise may be allowed its place. "The publication of opinion stands on another footing. That is an external act"; as such, it has consequences both to the author of the opinion, to those who receive it and to the opinion itself. If we wish to improve the world, we must avoid giving pain; if we wish to persuade, we must be conciliatory, as well as convincing.

The third sphere is the sphere of the statesman and the politician. His is the art of at once expressing and moulding the public opinion he expresses, the art which Machiavelli described in *The Prince*. Pursuing it, he must concentrate upon the present rather than look to the future; he must consider what is immediately feasible, rather than what is theoretically desirable.

The distinctions made, the statement of Morley's position is very simple: we must not allow the considerations which are proper to sphere three to invade sphere two; we must not allow the considerations which are proper to spheres three and two to invade sphere one. We must not, and we do. Hence, the spinelessness of contemporary thought, the illegitimate use of compromise, the unwillingness of men to put truth first.

Two related evils are specially denounced. First, the refusal to express opinions because the majority does not hold them; secondly, the refusal to advocate opinions because their realisation is not immediately practicable. These evils result from the invasion of spheres one and two by what Morley calls the "political spirit" appropriate to sphere three. We are never entitled to remain silent when it appears to us that a wrong course is being taken, merely because the majority does not agree with us, or because there is little chance of our protest prevailing:—"As if the mere possibility of the view being a right one did not obviously entitle it to discussion; discussion being the only process by which people are likely to be induced to accept it."

As an example of the current confusion to which Morley draws attention, the confusion, between sphere three and spheres one and two, I take an illustration from current controversy. Young men at English Universities, notably at Oxford, have recently in large numbers resolved that in no circumstances will they "fight for King and Country". The uncompromising terms of this resolution have been bitterly resented by the English papers which, while having no objection to the pious affirmation of pacifist opinions, regard with outraged horror the prospects of action in accordance with the opinions of which

they profess to approve, thus reflecting the attitude of the Christian Churches which, while paying lip service to the teaching of Christ on non-resistance, would be horrified at the suggestion that people should act as if He really meant what He said, or as if what He said was true. In this connection the following quotation from a leader in *The Morning Post* luminously expresses the attitude of mind which Morley denounces. "When the Archbishops and the Bishops enunciate such dubious propositions as that war is a 'crime,' they should remember that juvenile logic *takes them seriously* and carries their postulate to its natural conclusion that 'This House will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country'." (italics mine.)

Morley's own action at the beginning of the war, when he resigned from the Cabinet rather than lend his sanction to a course of which he could not approve, is an equally luminous example of the circumstances in which compromise is not legitimate.

The foregoing bald account gives little idea of the nobility of this book, or of the eloquence with which its dignity of thought is matched. It should be read especially in these days of spreading reaction as an abiding witness to the faith of a generation that still held liberty to be among the greatest of the goods.

C. E. M. JOAD

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

[This is the third of the series by **Dr. R. Naga Raja Sarma**, who holds that the works on Indian Philosophy by Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Dr. S. N. Dasgupta have been unduly influenced by western methodology. Dr. Sarma is fully aware that "both the scholars have done splendid service in the cause of Indian Philosophy" but he feels that they have been much too susceptible to the judgment of western scholars and have consequently failed to remain faithful to the spirit of the original Sanskrit Texts. To attempt an exposition of the ancient Hindu Texts so as to make these dovetail with the western philosophical method and parlance involves, according to Dr. Sarma, the serious risk of distorting their inner import.

Last month Dr. Sarma pointed out how "The Truth about the Gita" has been viewed in a false perspective by the two authors. In the following article Dr. Sarma takes the Upanishads as his basis for study. In the last instalment he will deal with the *Brahma-Sutras*.—EDS.]

The reactions of modern minds to the Upanishads range from one extreme of critical judgment to the other—that they are the babblings of infant humanity, or that they are the joy of life and the solace of death. Those who would tread the Aryan Path will have to acquaint themselves with the essentials of the philosophy of a body of texts or tracts which record the earliest Indian reflections on the problems of life and destiny. The Seers of the Upanishadic period were definitely dissatisfied with the values of life and the possessions and opportunities that it offered. Palatial buildings, attractive women, untold wealth, social adjustments, and exploitations seemed to them valueless. They emphasized the intellectual obligation to investigate the problems of life and destiny, and the moral obligation to regulate conduct in the light of the solutions one might succeed in finding. Philosophic contemplation was not the monopoly of man. Women of remarkably critical and speculative acumen participated in the quest after ultimate values

and the quest for God.

Metaphysical investigation has its origin in the mystery of existence itself. Why should anything exist at all? Who brought the universe into existence? Nachiketas (*Katha Upanishad*) and Maitreyi (*Brihadaranyaka*) rejected unhesitatingly the alluring and tantalising values of this life and wanted to possess the key to Immortality. The Infinite is the Supreme Power controlling the origin, evolution and destruction of the Universe. Fear inspired by the Lord makes the sun shine, and makes the fire burn, etc: "Bhayadasyagnistapatibhayattapati-suryah"—*Katha*, II, 6,3; "Bheeshasmat-vatahpavate-Bheeshodeti-suryah..."—*Taittiriya*, II, 8. The finite selves are caught in the meshes of transmigration. They are not free. They are under the control of that Supreme Power. Freedom and bondage are, respectively, the marks of the Infinite and the Finite.

Sankara, the celebrated champion of Monistic metaphysics, maintained that the relation between the Finite and the Infinite is

identity, and that the truth of the Upanishads is the equation between the two contained in the text "Tattvamasi," "That art Thou".* Madhva, the equally enthusiastic champion and illustrious vindicator of the Dualistic and the Pluralistic metaphysics, maintained that the Finite can never be identical with the Infinite. He based his conclusion on the text "Dva-suparna-sayuja". (Two birds or spirits in intimate union). The former text is to be found in the *Chhandogya* (VI, 8,7 *et seq*) and the latter in the *Mundaka* (III, 1).

II

The nature and characteristics of external reality—the world or the environment—naturally depend on the general metaphysical position from which the universe of matter and spirit is contemplated. Sankara and his commentators and followers hold that the universe of matter and spirit, with all of its wonderful multiplicity, is to be regarded as illusory, as mere appearance, and not; as reality. They contend that the texts of the Upanishads support the view of illusionism. ("Ekamevadvitiam," "One only without a second," *Chhandogya*, VI, 2, 1). If the fundamental or basic metaphysical doctrine that Reality is only one be granted, it logically follows that the world of multiplicity cannot at the same time be equally real.

This doctrine of the Upanishads is elaborately argued in later controversial works of Monists, like *Advaita-Siddhi* of Madhusudana Saraswati.

On the other hand, there are Upanishadic texts which proclaim that the universe of matter and spirit, the world of multiplicity, is perfectly real, as real as the Supreme Reality, and not a mere appearance. The Realists and the Pluralists of Indian Philosophy have championed this latter doctrine. The universe is not an appearance of the status of a mirage. It is the evolutionary field for the perfection of man and as such it is bound to be real. "Sa-iman-lokan-asrijata": "The Supreme Being Atman created these worlds (brought them into or endowed them with real Existence.)"—*Aitareya*, I, 2.; "Yathatathyatorthanvyadadhat": "The supreme being (Isa) brought into existence the objects or constituents of the external world in their fullest reality or with their birthright of reality."—*Isavasya*. This doctrine of Realism is demonstrated with all the paraphernalia of metaphysical debate in later controversial treatises like *Nyayamrita* and *Tarangini*, respectively, of Vyasaraja and Ramacharya.

III

Freedom from the ills of exist-

*It is highly interesting and intriguing to note that Madhva suggests that the famous Monistic text should be split up into *Atat-Tvamasi*, i. e., Thou art *not-That*, in the light of the nine illustrative instances mentioned in the said context, and that the very text cited by Monists supports his own Dualism between the finite and the Infinite. European students of Indian thought are yet to know the details of this revolutionary suggestion made by Madhva. For a full treatment of the topic see my *Reign of Realism*, pp. 69-72.

ence, from the recurring cycles of births and deaths, is the goal of moral and spiritual endeavour. The terms Amrita (the Immortal,) and "Immortality," (Amritatva,) are used in the description of the goal, "Amritamasnute". (A freed spirit enjoys immortality.—*Isa*-11.) Three important constituent elements reveal themselves when an analysis is attempted of the Upanishadic concept of "Mukti," or "Moksha" :—(1) Freedom from the ills of existence is prominently mentioned in many Upanishadic texts like those just cited. (2) Realization of the Immanence of the Supreme Over-lord of the Universe is another supremely significant element. The modern mind will ever continue to contend that it is foolish to sacrifice immediate pleasures and comforts in anticipation of the bliss that is to be. The bliss that is concomitant with realization of the majesty and immanence of Supreme Power defies all attempts at conceptual description. Absence of realization of the said Immanence is separation from Brahman. The realization is described as reaching Brahman, "Brahma-praptah" (He reached Brahman); "Brahma-samasnute" (He realises the Immanence of Brahman.—*Katha* II, 6, 14 and 18). (3) The third constituent element is enjoyment of one's own inherent bliss. This is not hedonic happiness. Hedonism as such is the lot of the pre-release career. The bliss that is enjoyed by those elect who have managed to climb up to spiritual heights at which the common run

of humanity would gaze with mute wonder, is totally free from the hedonic hue of the things of this life. Purified or spiritually rectified bliss is enjoyed by free Spirits. Pure bliss, knowledge, and existence would be seen to be the inherent characteristics of selves. But the bliss of the average man is obscured by encrustations of hedonism. All desires are fulfilled, and unalloyed bliss is enjoyed by free Spirits. The ecstatic state of bliss is described vividly in the *Taittiriya-Upanishad*. (III-10). The desires relating to the earthly career are thwarted and frustrated. "The desires of free Spirits, however, are all realized"—"Sarvamscha"—(*Chhandogya*, VIII, 12, 6).

IV

Champions of Monism maintain that when the fundamental Oneness between the Finite and the Infinite is realised, all awareness of difference and Dualism must disappear. A spiritual merger of the Finite into the Infinite occurs, and that is "Moksha". Supporters of Dualism and Pluralism maintain that free Spirits do not lose their individuality in the state of final release but retain the same intact. Whether the goal be Oneness or retention of spiritualized individuality intact, it is obvious that the Upanishadic texts can be cited in support of both the doctrines. The *Chhandogya* text "Ekamevadvitiyam" (Only one without a second) and the *Brihadaranyaka* text "Sarva-matmaiva-abhoot," (It is only the

one Atman that has projected the appearance of the *entire* universe) (VI, 2-1 and IV, 5, 15 respectively), have been tenaciously clung to by the Monists; and the Dualists and Pluralists have consistently appealed to "Etat-sama-gayannaste": "He sits singing this Saman"—He abides or rests in eternity singing this Saman (Ecstatic Euphony) (*Taittiriya*, III, 10, 5) and to "Yamevaisha-vrinute-tena-labhyah": "The Supreme Being can be realised only by him who is chosen and elect (of The Supreme being)." (*Mundaka* III, 2-3.)

V

When the author of *Indian Philosophy* remarks that "The Upanishads had no set theory of philosophy or dogmatic scheme of theology to propound," and that they "do not contain any philosophic synthesis as such of the type of the system of Aristotle, or of Kant, or of Samkara" (Vol. I, pp. 140, 141), he throws overboard the traditional interpretation of the sacred texts. When he asserts that the Upanishads "are not conscious of any contradiction between" Sankara's Advaita or non-dualism "and the modified position of Ramanuja" (Vol. I, p. 259), he appears in the role of an interpreter of the Upanishads, of a peace-maker whose offices will be repudiated by the custodians of the traditional truths of the Upanishads. It should be fairly obvious that, in any attempted elucidation of the relation between the Finite and Infinite, oneness or identity between the two and

radical difference between them cannot be reconciled with one another, however earnestly one may desire to bring about such a reconciliation. If one believes or endeavours to make out that the Upanishadic Seers did not perceive any contradiction or incompatibility between two doctrines that are radically opposed to one another, he is according them scant honour and does scant justice to their philosophical intellect and acumen.

From the author of *A History of Indian Philosophy* Sankara gets recognition. "But comparing the various systems of Upanishad interpretation," he writes, "we find that the interpretation offered by Sankara very largely represents the view of the general body of the earlier Upanishad doctrines..." (Vol. I, p. 42), and that "the sum and substance of the Upanishad teaching is involved in the equation Atman=Brahman." (Vol. I, p. 45). In holding these opinions he has exhibited himself to be a faithful follower of western interpreters. He surely could not have been ignorant of the Indian tradition that the Pluralistic Theism of Ramanuja and Madhva has been claimed to be the sum and substance of the Upanishads. If the highest teaching of the Upanishads be "That art Thou," and if the sum and substance of the Upanishads be the equation Atman=Brahman, he need not have made the Upanishadic sages unable to "ignore the claims of the exterior world" to which they had to accord a reality. Why make Upanishadic sages look ridiculous to

oblige modern research scholarship? If they were Monists, they surely felt no philosophic urge to grant any concessional reality to the Universe. If they were *not* Monists, surely then, they considered the Universe to be as real as the Supreme Brahman itself.

VI

Mincing matters is the most mischievous method of philosophic criticism or interpretation. The critical estimate that the Upanishads reveal a hotch-potch of philosophical tendencies in their incipency, such as Monism, Pluralism, Idealism, and Realism, is but a faint copy of the achievement of Western Orientalists. With the best of all possible good and sympathetic intentions, Western critics do not, perhaps they cannot, appreciate the genius of the indigenous system of the Vedanta. If the fragments of Heraclitus, dialogues of Plato, and the "Enneads" of Plotinus can be interpreted as containing systematic speculation on the life and destiny of man, there should be no difficulty in interpreting the Upanishads in a like manner. In interpreting them, however, the true traditional orientation should not be effaced or eliminated.

Western students of the Upanishads should be distinctly told that there has been a traditional Monistic interpretation of the doctrines, and a Pluralistic one equally halloved by tradition. Sankara is the champion of the Monistic tradition and Ramanuja and Madhva are the champions of the Pluralis-

tic. Sankara's great and fascinating doctrine of illusionism should not be diluted to meet criticism by Western scholars. When the author of *Indian Philosophy* writes that the "Upanishads support the doctrine of Maya *only in the sense* (italics mine) that there is an underlying reality containing all elements from the personal God to the telegraph post" (Vol. I, p. 197), he does violence to the genuine Vedantic tradition. If the author of *A History of Indian Philosophy* felt convinced that the "Sages of the Upanishads had already started with the idea that there was a supreme controller or essence presiding over man and the universe," (Vol. I, p. 43) he should have seen that the sages would not have established the equation between the Finite and the Infinite. The said equation and the controllership cannot be established as equally valid, without doing violence to genuine Vedantic traditions.

VII

One should not whittle down Sankara's Monism with a view to gaining recognition from Western critics. If the West can understand and admire the Monism of Kant and Spinoza, it should have no difficulty whatever in understanding and admiring the Monistic edifice of Sankara. When Sankara interprets the Upanishads on a Monistic basis and maintains that Brahman is the only reality, he stands committed to an illusionism from which no escape is possible. The illusionism, how-

ever, does not mean any repudiation of morality and religion, a practical programme of secular and spiritual activity. Bradley proclaimed that morality is an appearance; Sankara did the same, centuries ago. If the West can admire Bradley, it cannot condemn Sankara with any philosophical grace. Modern Eastern interpreters of Sankara should not whittle down Sankara's Monism or the Upanishadic Monism. The West must be told that Sankara's interpretation of the Upanishads is not the only one. Ramanuja's interpretation of the Upanishads and Madhva's are equally hallowed by Indian tradition.

VIII

If one elects to model conduct on Sankara's Monistic interpretation of the Upanishads, he will realize that the values of life are error-ridden. This realization will intensify moral dynamism, spiritual effort and endeavour. Though the values of life are "error-ridden" (Adhyasta) and appear in a plane that owes its phantom existence to failure to realize the Foundational Oneness between the Finite and the Infinite, no one is going to sit idle with folded hands, steeped in pathological quietism. The Oneness is going to be realized only by pursuing a programme of activity based on Truth (Satya), meditation on the nature of the Supreme (Tapas), on restraint of the passions (Brahmacharya), and on practised perception of the relation between the Finite and

the Infinite, (Samyag-jnyana). (Mundaka, III, 1, 5)

If, on the contrary, one chooses to regulate conduct on the basis of the Theism and the Pluralism of Ramanuja and Madhva, he should endeavour to earn the Grace of the Lord which alone will liberate him from the recurring cycles of births and deaths. On the Theistic and the Pluralistic view, the values of this life, though emphatically not error-ridden, will not attract genuine aspirants, as they are evanescent and obstruct smooth spiritual progress. One should shake himself free from the shackles of these values. (Putraishana-Vittaisana-Lokaishana.) The programme of the genuine aspirant will be one of selflessness, sacrifice and service, as he apprehends the import of the immanence of the Lord in the Universe. It will thus be obvious that Western attacks on Upanishadic illusionism are vain and futile. There is no illusionism according to Ramanuja and Madhva. Sankara's illusionism is no bar to moral vigour, no bar to constructive secular and spiritual activity, no bar to nation-building programmes, no bar to effecting an enthusiastic triumphant entry into the Kingdom of God. Whether one elects to act under the Monistic or Pluralistic programme, he will easily realise that the Upanishads seriously counsel abandonment of the feverish passion for the values of life. The modern world, if it likes, may find in the Upanishadic teachings a message of hope and of peace.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

CHRIST AND SATAN*

[John Middleton Murry has been busy with various activities—literary, philosophical, socialistic. Of late Socialism of a certain shade has been his main interest. To give expression to his views on problems philosophical and literary, he has recently started his new journal *The Wanderer*. In the following article Mr. Murry draws a suggestive contrast between the hopeful message of Dostoevsky and the ugly pessimism of Merezhkovsky who “seeks to impose this utterly alien conception on Jesus Himself”. Madame Blavatsky defined Pessimism as “that chronic suspicion of lurking evil everywhere”. In the true Esoteric doctrine “The real evil proceeds from human intelligence and its origin rests entirely with reasoning man who dissociates himself from Nature. Humanity then alone is the true source of evil.”—EDS.]

Merezhkovsky first made a name in England before the war, as the interpreter of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky: in particular of Dostoevsky, with whom he had a certain affinity. Therefore, one compares him instinctively with Dostoevsky: and, alas, the comparison is shattering to Merezhkovsky. Whereas Dostoevsky emerged, through intense suffering, spiritual and physical, into a new love of, and faith in mankind, Merezhkovsky's sufferings under the Bolshevik regime—he escaped to Paris, I remember, in 1921—have turned him into a hater of his fellows. Whereas Dostoevsky in *The Brothers Karamazov* prophesied the emergence in Russia of a new type of man, in the character of Alyosha—a man who should deliberately break away from the Church, and yet live the full free religious life taught by Jesus: a character which, there is some warrant for believing, is actually emerging in Russia to-day, in spite of all the superficial appearance of Atheism—Merezhkovsky

sees nothing in contemporary Russia save the manifestation of Anti-Christ. Essentially his book on Jesus, with all its curious panoply of erudition, expresses one immense revulsion from the present and from the travail of growth. It is an intensely *ugly* book; it represents the shrivelling process of a soul that has failed to respond to the education of suffering.

Inevitably it is vitiated by a colossal egoism. The purpose and intent of Christianity is really, for Merezhkovsky, to justify a “Christian” war of annihilation against modern Russia. Merezhkovsky represents Christ, the Soviet Union represents Anti-Christ. And although Merezhkovsky does not call, in so many words, for a religious crusade, his motive is unmistakable. To support this purpose he needs must have recourse to a kind of Manicheism. His figure of “the unknown Jesus” has no humanity. He is not conceived or imagined as Man. He is a mysterious and half-sinister power whose

function it is to defeat and annihilate his enemy, the Devil. Merezhkovsky insists on the reality of Satan: for him, indeed, it is the reality of Satan which gives meaning to Jesus.

If there is no Satan, then the Lord saw nothing fall from heaven and gave nothing to man on earth; his whole life was a struggle against nothing, for nothing.

Such a statement, I confess, fills me with horror; it is, I believe, precisely what Blake meant by an "hermaphroditic blasphemy". This is, indeed, "Religion hid in War". And perhaps we should go to Blake for the noblest modern statement of "the ancient and everlasting gospel" of which Jesus was the first clear spokesman to the West:—
 Satan, my Spectre ! I know my power
 thee to annihilate
 And be a greater in thy place and be
 thy Tabernacle,
 A covering for thee to do thy will, till
 one greater comes,
 And smites me as I smote thee, and be-
 comes my covering.
 Such are the Laws of thy false Heav'ns;
 my Laws of Eternity
 Are not such. Know thou, I come to
 Self Annihilation.
 Such are the Laws of Eternity, that
 each shall mutually
 Annihilate himself for other's good, as
 I for thee.

Of this gospel Merezhkovsky knows or wants to know nothing. He prefers to play the gospel of the "Unknown Jesus" against the gospel of the known Jesus, which is the same as the gospel of Blake. He wants to annihilate not himself, but the enemy; and therefore he

does not understand that the Satan, on whose objective reality he insists, is the projection of his own egoism. The inevitable corollary of this is that he regards the created world as inherently evil, and seeks to impose this utterly alien conception on Jesus himself. No one who happened to be ignorant of the New Testament and went to Merezhkovsky's book for an account of Jesus, would ever dream that the figure of Merezhkovsky's imagination was the author of the parable of the Prodigal Son, or of the saying that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like a lily of the field, or that the Kingdom of Heaven was of such as little children are.

In other words, Merezhkovsky's Jesus is not a teacher of profound spiritual wisdom who suffered death rather than betray his own insight, but a magical and supernatural figure whose real purpose is to avenge Merezhkovsky on his enemies. No one would deny that such a conception of Jesus, or Christ, has played a part in the Church tradition. D. H. Lawrence wrote well concerning it in the early chapters of "Apocalypse". But this is perhaps the least worthy of all the unworthy strands that have entered into the complex pattern of Christian tradition. It is unworthy of both the historical Jesus and the Eternal Christ: and no amount of esotericism or erudition can conceal its fundamental inhumanity.

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol. I. By C. D. BROAD. (Cambridge University Press. 21s.)

Mr. C. D. Broad has both explained and criticised at length in this first volume the philosophical system of McTaggart's *The Nature of Existence*. He has also in places entered into an independent discussion of some of the topics dealt with by that philosopher. He shows indeed great regard for the acuteness and the power of intellect of his one-time teacher, but one easily finds from his detailed criticisms that he is not much in sympathy with his philosophy. This is, however, what was to be expected. There is a wide gulf separating the two thinkers. The principal writings of McTaggart before he wrote *The Nature of Existence* related mainly to Hegel's philosophy. Whatever, therefore, his differences from Hegel in method as well as in substance, he has entered upon the philosophical quest in the same spirit of self-assurance and of boldness of speculation. Broad on the other hand is more modern, and his principal writings show much greater acquaintance with the present-day science and the Cambridge school of realistic thinking to which he belongs. Nothing, therefore, is more natural to him than a fundamental distrust in a metaphysical adventure such as McTaggart's. He writes:—

..... the omens are highly unfavourable for the success of any system of constructive metaphysics, such as McTaggart's, since even the best shots have hitherto bagged nothing in this field but chimeras. (p. 12)

That McTaggart's system on the whole fails to satisfy, may be granted. A purely intellectual construction of reality may indeed never succeed in satisfactorily answering the ultimate questions that suggest themselves to our thought; because an intellectual construction of reality would involve reason assuming the role of omniscience. The proper role of reason is analytical and critical; it is not intuitive; and intuition alone can ultimately resolve all our doubts. I do not suggest that mys-

ticism is the last word in philosophy. But I do suggest that reason must be guided by our intuitions, and these are not restricted to the sensible. He therefore argues well who sees well. Metaphysics as the science of the super-sensible is possible, because the super-sensible cannot be denied. It confronts us whenever we seek to go thoroughly into the meaning of our ordinary experience. We may have no intuition of a super-sensible reality such as God. But we cannot deny all intuition of the super-sensible reality which we call our self. And is not this self the image of God? Metaphysics can build from this as Advaitism does.

The philosophical conclusions of McTaggart cannot well be stated in brief. But there is no doubt that, according to him, reality is ultimately pluralistic, and that the elements of this pluralism are spirits. He reaches this conclusion by a very elaborate argument, the principal links of which are (1) that "substances" alone exist in the primary sense; (2) that every substance is infinitely divisible in some dimension or other; (3) that this infinite divisibility would lead to very unsatisfactory consequences, unless we can provide a sufficient description for every term in the series according to a rule which does not involve any reference to the infinite series of subsequent terms in which the substance can be subdivided; (4) that this rule can be no other than the principle of Determining Correspondence; and lastly (5) that this principle is only satisfied if spirits are the only true ultimate particulars, or in other words if they alone constitute the primary set of parts of the universe.

If the spiritual character of reality can be justified only by the above argument, it rests on very weak foundations. The basic assertion of McTaggart that every substance is infinitely divisible is not at all self-evident to us; and unless it is true the rest of the argument is quite pointless. That every thinkable or knowable content is infinitely divisible we do not

doubt. But there is no ground whatever for supposing that all reality is thinkable. As we said earlier, our self can neither be imaged nor even thought. Indeed we may be said to have a certain intuition of it. McTaggart thinks we know the self as that which has the character of being a self. But is this "being a self" an objective character at all? It is because of the fundamental non-objectivity of the self that we are told in the sacred Hindu scriptures, the Upanishads, that the self that sees cannot be seen, that the self that hears cannot be heard, and so on. Would it not be absurd to suppose that any such reality, if it existed, would be infinitely divisible? And yet McTaggart is either unacquainted with such views, or he has offered no knowing or intelligent criticism of the same.

Broad, to a certain extent, recognises the plausibility of the contention that the old orthodox Christian view of the soul as simple and indivisible might be correct. But his argument that certain statements about the soul that are unintelligible to us may represent fact is to say the least of it unphilosophical. The problem arises that a soul that is simple and therefore immortal could also never come into being. How can this be reconciled with the Christian ideal that the soul is created and comes into being? To justify this Broad argues:—

But I may have good reason to believe that there is a fact corresponding to a certain statement *S* which is unintelligible to me, and I may have good reason to believe that there is no fact corresponding to another statement *S'* which is equally unintelligible to me and is of the same general form as *S*. (p. 145).

But what are we to understand by "good reason" here? We may indeed never be able to know the unlimited and the infinite through our reason alone. But there are also in reality no limits to our reason. It is in fact our only instrument of truth, being capable of answering every legitimate question about metaphysical reality and of dissolving every illegitimate question through analysis; even intui-

tive perception has to be interpreted by reason. Unless then we have unlimited trust in our reason, and do not rest with mere belief that is not intelligible to us, metaphysics would be a poor intellectual game.

We now come to the more common objects of our experience. Here Broad agrees with McTaggart that a process has successive temporal parts and is therefore divisible in the dimension of time. But he thinks, as against McTaggart, that a *thing* cannot be divisible in this dimension. Now, if by a thing we mean something unchanging and eternally fixed, it cannot be so divisible. But then it cannot be said to have a history. If, however, as Broad thinks, it does have a history, can we draw a real distinction between a thing and a process? We think not.

It is really meaningless to say, as Broad says, that "the endless temporal divisibility of the history of a continuant would be compatible with the complete indivisibility of the continuant itself". (p. 350)

Broad combines with the above error another about events. He sees no clear impossibility in the notion of an instantaneous event. But an instantaneous event would have ceased before it started to be something. It could not begin to be, endure, and then cease to be. If it went through any of these crises, it would have to go through all of them; and is it conceivable that all these different crises, so incompatible with each other, could be rolled in one instant temporally indivisible? An instantaneous event is thus a contradiction in terms.

McTaggart defines substance as that which exists and has qualities. Different philosophers have disagreed with him for different reasons. But taking the definition to be correct, it at once follows that two substances will have two different sets of qualities. McTaggart expresses this fact in what he calls the principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse. According to this principle, "any two particulars must be dissimilar in some respect *which is not a mere*

analytic consequence of the fact that they are two". This appears to us to be quite obvious. Broad, however, thinks that the principle is not true and that exceptions are *conceivable*. He takes two sensibilia, such as two noises, which are in all respects exactly alike, and then goes on to say :—

It is then logically possible that there should be two sensibilia which were exactly alike in sensible quality ; which either had no temporal relations or were simultaneous ; and which had no spatial relations, and therefore could not have spatial dissimilarity.

We think that here logic is all against Broad. If the two supposed noises are exactly alike in every respect and have no relationship to a third something which can define them differently, by what logical conceivability can they still be spoken of as being two ? Broad has ruled out the possibility that one noise occurs in one place and the second noise occurs in a different place. According to him, we must not confuse sensibilia with certain physical events of which they are believed to be manifestations. He has also ruled out the possibility that they are heard by two different minds. What is it then that prevents this two-noises universe from becoming a one-noise universe ? It is just the logical inconceivability of regarding two such noises as two that is most evident to us. In reality, if two sounds cannot be distinguished in themselves as two particulars, they can only be distinguished because two different minds differently placed can vouch for their difference.

Another important point also requires to be considered here. If McTaggart's principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse is admitted, then every particular must have an exclusive description, *i.e.*, description which it alone has. When this exclusive description of a term "refers to no merely designated particulars, but consists wholly of universals, it is called a sufficient description".

The first question to be asked here

is whether an exclusive description can be couched in general terms and without reference to any designated term. This does not appear to us to be possible. A description which is wholly in general terms is a description of which we can never say that only one term can have it. In order that a particular should be exclusively described, its description should contain a reference to the whole universe of particulars which determine it to be what it is and where it is. It is, therefore, no exaggeration to say that to know a particular completely, we must know all its possible relations to other particulars, and therefore we must know the whole universe. But would not that involve an endless series such that no particular could be exclusively described ? An answer to this question depends upon what we think as to the nature of the universe. If the universe is a rounded-off whole in space and time, every particular can be exclusively described in relation to every other particular ; if not, then any description would be after all incomplete and cannot be properly exclusive. We here disagree with Broad's suggestion that A can have an exclusive description even when its relation to all the terms of an unending series is not defined. The series being unending, the exclusive description of any term is not an attainable possibility.

The whole problem of McTaggart's philosophy arises from the two propositions : (1) every particular must have a sufficient description, and (2) every particular is infinitely divisible. The details of his solution are not easy to follow. But it appears to us that the whole problem is unreal. McTaggart proceeds from postulates that *cannot* be accepted and definitions that are questionable. Broad's criticism of McTaggart is in several places fair and just. The book is therefore of great value to those who want to study McTaggart critically and evaluate his philosophy.

John Ruskin: An Introduction to Further Study of his Life and Work. By R. H. WILENSKI. (Faber & Faber, London. 15s.)

To a vast number of people Ruskin was the epitome of an age and the social conscience of a generation; yet he can be convicted of uttering in language that ranged from juvenile gusto to an elaborate and purple rhetoric, contradictory opinions on many subjects. He was obsessed by the idea of the moment, but he had not the concentration to push to its conclusion any of the grandiose schemes of his tormented mind; and, although he possessed that gift of a great writer which can make the trivial seem important, when reading his books one is aware of a lack of direction and of an unstable background.

It is this atmosphere of contradiction that Mr. Wilenski, through evidence taken from diaries and letters, tries to clear by collating the many-sidedness of Ruskin's pronouncements with the circumstances existing, and with his state of mind, when they were uttered. The result is a thoroughly worth-while book. It is scrupulously documented and consists of two parts: the first biographical, and the second analysing the development of Ruskin's ideas in the fields of Art, Social and Political Economy, and War and Religion.

Mr. Wilenski's thesis is that Ruskin was the life-long victim of manic-depressive insanity and personal obsessions, and that his writing and his lectures were actually ways of escape from himself and the means of rationalizing his self-indulgence. The relentless progress, and the results, of this mental illness from youth to old-age are worked out in an impressive way and told in a sympathetic narrative which, if it may appear at times controversial, is on deeper inspection hard to controvert.

To Mr. Wilenski Ruskin was a great, in the sense of being a good, man. His theories were essentially personal, for he could never have tied himself to

any organization. He said bewildering things about most of the subjects which attracted him, and he was able to flaunt embarrassing statements in (for instance) his lectures on religion, because he invariably followed the astounding with a quotation from the Bible; for he knew how to administer the final sedative to a disturbed audience. The mobility of his ideas, driven backwards and forwards by the compelling power of his mental illness, was such that anybody could quote Ruskin in any sense on any subject on which he had touched. Carlyle called him "a bottle of beautiful soda-water," and his writing was described by a contemporary as a "mass of soapsuds and whitewash," but his propaganda was vitally potent for he brought to it "all his resources—his gift for sonorous writing, his power to put down an exciting half-truth in an arresting phrase, his generous indignation, his bitter wit. He brought to it all his manic over-stressing and all the devices of the experienced showman to procure his effects."

He expounded the hidden fears and discontents not only of himself but of his age, and if the cure was too big for him to handle or was given too queer a twist for his followers to grasp, yet they accepted what a more clear-sighted generation might have discarded as emotive rhetoric, that drug which will induce most men and women to believe anything. Again and again in this book these unbalanced utterances are explained as Mr. Wilenski unearths some fact of Ruskin's life that brings us to understand, and so excuse, the lapse; till we realize that the impulse to preach, and the seeming arrogance, were purely the outcome of the continued illness of his mind.

Of his unfortunate marriage, of his Puritanical up-bringing and his mother-complex, and of his attacks of madness; of the chapters on Ruskin as an art critic, as a writer and as a student of war, there is not space here to write, but they are one with the rest of the book, well thought out, well

argued, and well expressed.

Mr. Wilenski has shown us, with immense ability and industry, the dependence of the public side on the personal side of Ruskin's career, and has revealed the difficulties that hampered all his strivings. We see a child who never grew up, and at the same time a manly genius of magnificent qualities and impregnable honesty, achieving greatness in the face of almost intolerable psychic handicaps. Intellectually ahead of his day, he saw what we now accept as the basic truth underlying many problems, but, goaded

by something beyond his control, it was in the development of those truths that he became lost among the clouds of his own obsessions. To generations who have known the War and the slump, the spectacle of Ruskin scolding, dogmatizing and wailing may be a little ridiculous; but Mr. Wilenski is a modern, brave enough to turn back to this nineteenth century thinker and to respect his thoughts as applied to our present-day troubles.

He has, indeed, set out to re-establish the right of a prophet to his title.

A. R. UBSDELL

The Pulse of Oxford. By D. F. KARAKA, with an introduction by Robert Bernays, M. P. (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 2s. 6d.)

This is a very readable little book, delineating the intellectual and social aspects of life in the University of Oxford. It is written by an Indian student who has achieved the distinction of being appointed President of the Oxford Union Society.

Perhaps the best portion of Mr. Karaka's book is that which deals with the pacifist resolution adopted by that Society in February 1933; a resolution which caused a great furore at the time. We are, however, more interested in "The Social Aspect". The young author treats it as "a fallacious theory" that "Oxford is the home of a debauched, degenerate, good-for-nothing type of youth, a waster of his own time and his father's money, indulging excessively in drink, and leading a life of general dissipation". On the other hand, we learn from this book that the University Journal, *Isis*, in April 1933 printed an article deploring "the pernicious erosion in the flower of English manhood caused by the steady growth of feminism," and stating that "every day more students are lured away from their books by the superficial charms of powdered sirens". With Mr. Joad's article, "The Revival of Hedonism," in

a recent issue of THE ARYAN PATH fresh in our mind, we are inclined to think that the *Isis* on the whole may have been right, and to regard our author's assurance that "the Oxford of to-day is not the place for the loosening of the moral fibre" (p. 69) as at least debatable. In fact, there is much in this book which goes to show that an average undergraduate at Oxford is inclined too much towards sense-gratification, and does not care for things of the Spirit

The fantastic Oxford Group Movement and the Student Christian Movement come in for good-natured sarcasm at the hands of the author, and he very admirably hits off the idiosyncrasies of the former. It is sad that there is no really sound organization at Oxford and other Universities for the spiritual upliftment of students for whom fortunately the creeds and dogmas of Christianity have now no meaning. Mr. Joad has written:—

For the first time in history there is coming to maturity a generation of men and women who have no religion, and feel no need for one. They are content to ignore it. Also they are very unhappy and the suicide rate is abnormally high.

Mr. Joad's own latest book *Counter Attack from the East* should form an excellent basis for discussion as to the right line for the alleviation of this sad state of things.

J. P. W.

Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy: Five Essays. By GEORGE SANTAYANA. (Cambridge University Press. 5s.)

Published under the auspices of the Royal Society of Literature, the five essays by Santayana respectively on Locke's Naturalism and the Philosophy of Commonsense, on the Ethical studies of Bradley, on the theory of Relativity and the New Physics, on Freud's view of Death, and on Julien Benda's view of the Infinite, notwithstanding their clearness and stimulating character, do not contribute anything substantial to a satisfactory solution of the persistent problems of Philosophy and of the problems connected with quest after the Infinite, *Brahma Jignyasa*, as understood by the Vedanta. Santayana who proclaims himself to be "the most recalcitrant materialist" (p. 66) pats Locke on the back for his naturalism and philosophy of commonsense; voices his undisguised disappointment with British and German Idealism; believes that the latest revolutions in science like those championed by Einstein would never yield "ultimate insight" (p. 79); reconciles himself to the inevitable fact that Death is the goal of Life, clutching at a suggestion made by Freud that death is just the manifestation in organic life of the phenomenon of inertia, and chronicles a confession of his faith that "conceived reflectively, . . . when deployed into the realm of essence, infinite or indeterminate Being truly contains *entertainment for all eternity* (p. 117). (Italics mine)

Santayana is by no means the first to avow recalcitrant materialism, and he will surely not be the last. Thousands of years ago, the CHARVAKAS had anticipated Santayana and others who think after him. Comfortable existence, social and national solidarity, exploitation of the weak and helpless, lip sympathy with suffering and starving fellowmen, an easy moral conscience which reacts with a subscription to a charity, grafted on to an Infinite in the realm of essence and to the notion of spirit as "actuality of feeling, of

observation, of meaning" (p. 120)—will never yield a profitable and logical system of philosophy, will never explain God's ways to man, and man's ways to his fellows. If Santayana does not feel the intellectual need for such an explanation, he is taking up exactly the attitude of the CHARVAKA who in the history of Indian thought maintained consistent and uncompromising materialism and counselled: "Eat, make merry and when the angel with the darker draught draws up to thee, take that and do not shrink."

Is Santayana's Infinite which is Essence, or which is in the realm of essence, a Power which is not ourselves that makes for righteousness? Is his materialism an explanation of the problem of evil, and of difference, inequality, and the countless contradictions revealed by life? Above all, is his materialism a dynamic inspiration for moral conduct? At the slightest touch of a critical, rational analysis Santayana's materialism, albeit recalcitrant, resolves itself into the well-known philosophy of bread-and-butter—a philosophy which can readily be embraced by the "thick" as well as the "thin" in the words of his guru—James. A materialism which freely employs in its jargon "spirit," "man in whom spirit is awake," "pure spirit," "Intuition of the Infinite," "realm of essence," loses itself in spiritualism, psychism, and other allied "isms". To the one significant question and the related minor ones summed up earlier, Santayana's materialism affords no answer at all. The Vedantic systems which proclaim that the whole universe of organised and unorganised matter and spirit is an emanation of God, and that realisation of His Immanence by devotional contemplation and service to His creatures, and riddance of the recurring cycles of births and deaths, would be the goal of the moral and spiritual efforts of aspirants—possesses greater survival value than Santayana's materialism. I may perhaps emphasize in conclusion that the two references to Indian doctrines made by

Santayana are not accurate. Karma is *not* a "myth." (p. 99) It is an inexorable Law. Whether union with Brahma (p. 116) is "conscious" or unconscious, or beyond the realm of the conscious and the unconscious, are yet unsettled problems of the Vedanta.

Santayana can throw no light on them. Yet, his present essays with their clear analysis and forcible style are refreshingly stimulating and thought-provoking as all his dogmatisms and pronouncements generally are.

A PEDESTRIAN ON THE ARYAN PATH

Essays in Zen Buddhism: Second Series. By Prof. DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI. (Luzac & Co., London, and the Eastern Buddhist Society, Kyoto. 20s.)

It is an arduous task to try to give an explanation of a form of mysticism which laughs at logic, ignores Scriptures and resolutely refuses to be tied down to any particular creed or set of ideas. It is true that the greatest intuitions of the human mind are personal experiences which cannot be described or communicated to others, still less condensed into a set of dogmas, but no religion is so intent as Zen Buddhism to sweep away every substitute and symbol of Truth, lest in our ignorance we should take the shadow of form for the substance of reality. Logical explanations, conceptions, beliefs—all intellectual attempts at divine knowledge are disposed of with a thoroughness which makes one feel somewhat taken aback. But there is method in the madness of Zen, and for many years Prof. Suzuki has striven to interpret this unique form of Chinese mysticism to the Western mind. In 1927 he published his first series of *Essays in Zen*, in which he outlined its history and gave an extensive account of its teaching and discipline; and now he has followed it up with the second series, dealing principally with Zen meditation. The book consists of some three-hundred large and closely packed pages, and it is a strange irony that so much should be written about a philosophy which has described sacred books and scriptures as "lists of ghosts and sheets of paper fit only to wipe the puss from your skin". Indeed, we are informed that a third and fourth series

of essays will follow, but it must be remembered that Prof. Suzuki's work is considerably enlarged by a certain amount of repetition and large quantities of illustrative material drawn from the dialogues and sayings of famous Zen masters.

Zen (which is a Japanese corruption of the Sanskrit *dhyana*) has been summed up as

A special transmission of Wisdom outside the scriptures;

No dependence upon words and letters;

Direct pointing to the soul of man;

Seeing into one's own nature,

and thus far it would seem to be much the same as other forms of mysticism. The difference, however, lies in the highly dynamic and thorough-going nature of Zen, which seeks to strip the Soul of every shred of intellectual and emotional veiling by an intense effort to see into one's true nature involving the use of a curious and unique method known as the Ko-an Exercise. Man carries about with him a vast burden of attachments, distorted ideas, emotions, selfishness, worries and hankerings; the purpose of the Ko-an is to empty the heart of all this rubbish until it feels that it possesses nothing and is possessed by nothing. This state is called the realization of *Sunyata* or Emptiness, akin to the "spiritual poverty" of Western mysticism which is attained, according to Tauler, "when thou canst not remember whether anybody has ever owed thee or been indebted to thee for anything." Such is Nirvana, where every fetter is broken and self is forgotten in the All Self. Now the Ko-an is a peculiar form of problem which may be compared "to a piece of brick used to knock at a

gate; when the gate is opened the brick is thrown away." An example of the Ko-an is the problem suggested by this dialogue :—

When Chao-chou came to study Zen under Nan-ch'üan, he asked, "What is the Tao (or the Way)?" Nan-ch'üan replied, "Your everyday mind, that is the Tao."

Or again :—

When asked why Bodhidharma brought the Zen teaching from India to China, a master replied, "It is like selling water by the riverside."

These Ko-ans are easy compared with Hakuin's famous problem, "What sound is made by the clapping of one hand?" On the face of it, it would seem that the Zen masters are talking mere nonsense, but Prof. Suzuki points out that the Ko-an is a problem for the intuition rather than the intellect—a problem so baffling and so fascinating that one's whole intellectual capacity is exhausted in trying to find the solution. When this *impasse* is reached the disciple feels as if he had come to the edge of a precipice, or as if he were a rat forced up a blind alley; there seems to be no way of escape, and the time has come for crossing the frontier between intellect and intuition. Prof. Suzuki writes :—

Psychologically, this is accomplished when what is known as "abandonment," or "throwing oneself over the precipice," takes place. This "abandonment" means the moral courage of taking risks; it is plunging into the unknown which lies beyond the topography of relative knowledge.

And with this act of abandonment and self-surrender there comes about the state of *satori*, the sudden flash of En-

lightenment brought into being by the giving up of all the fetters and attachments to which we look for the satisfaction and solution of our longings. But there can be no success in dealing with the Ko-an without that intensely positive and almost violent effort of searching which the Zen masters describe as "a great spirit of enquiry" to be persevered with "as if a poisoned arrow were piercing a vital part of the body, or as if one were surrounded on all sides by raging flames, or as if one were disgraced owing to one's inability to pay off a debt of a thousand pieces of gold". Such is the force of concentration required for attaining Enlightenment!

Besides being an interesting work from psychological and religious points of view, Prof. Suzuki's book merits the careful attention of scholars and orientalists. In addition to a thorough understanding of his subject, the author has a marked ability for scholarly research, and it is beyond question that he has done more to promote a knowledge of the history and psychology of Zen Buddhism than any other writer of the present day. His book is exquisitely illustrated with a number of collotype reproductions of old Chinese and Japanese pictures and its only disadvantage is that, being a collection of essays published from time to time in the *Eastern Buddhist*, it lacks continuity and good arrangement. And we would warn those wishing to read it not to do so without consulting his first series of Zen Essays, or a large amount of the present volume will be found hard to understand.

ALAN W. WATTS

Psychical Research: The Science of the Super-Normal. By HANS DRIESCH, translated by Theodore Besterman with a foreword by SIR OLIVER LODGE. (G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., London. 5s.)

Ever since the establishment of the Psychical Research Society in 1882, experimental work has been carried on in the domain of psychic phenomena

by eminent scientists, psychologists and others, and a mass of facts collected regarding telepathy, thought-reading, clairvoyance, mediumship, etc. It was, however, admitted by Sir Lawrence Jones, President of the Psychical Research Society, in an address delivered in November 1929 before the Oxford Society for Psychical Research, that

the phenomena of Telepathy, for instance, "have been classified and labelled but we are still ignorant of the underlying laws of thought which make such things possible". (THE ARYAN PATH, June 1930). A prominent member of the Psychical Research Society, Mr. W. H. Salter was constrained to admit in his article on Psychic Research in the latest edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* that "for the most part the 'debatable phenomena' of 1882 remain almost as debatable in 1929".

The paucity of results from all the experimentation and research of half a century are also admitted by Prof. Driesch. He refers to "our young science" (p. 87), and remarks:—

Only hypotheses are possible about the fundamental principles, hypotheses which must be advanced in full consciousness that tomorrow they may be demonstrated to be false. (p. 108)

This might be true of an absolutely new science, but what are called "psychic phenomena" were not only carefully studied but also were rationally explained in the East even before the dawn of civilization in the West. Five years before the establishment of the Psychical Research Society, Madame Blavatsky in her *Isis Unveiled* placed at the disposal of the Western world a mine of authentic information on the psychic phenomena which are being laboriously investigated in the West. Such, however, is the intellectual vanity of the West, that its scientists prefer to blunder on, fruitlessly deceiving themselves with the belief that they are investigating hitherto unexplored territory.

The whole structure of modern psychical research rests on the institution of "mediums". In this connection, Prof. Driesch makes certain extraordinary suggestions which, in the interests of the moral and spiritual well-being of humanity, must be unequivocally condemned. Prof. Driesch suggests in all seriousness that the number of mediums or "metagnomes" as he calls them, following Boirac, should be increased "by suggestive or chemical means"

which were described by him in 1927 in the *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*. Not content with this reprehensible proposal Prof. Driesch recommends that mediums should be treated *suggestively* in order that they may overcome certain limitations which act as hindrances to them. Our author says:—

The attempt should be made to educate mediums by Coué's method of suggestion, that, either with or without hypnotisation, they should be repeatedly and convincingly "suggested," "It will go all right in very strong red light (even in white light), without singing, without a chain," and so on; this should be done twenty to thirty times and more. (p. 24)

Prof. Driesch would not have written this and much else in his book if he had had any real knowledge about the constitution of man and the workings of the human mind. In an article on "Black Magic in Science" contributed to *Lucifer* in June 1899 (reprinted as U. L. T. Pamphlet No. 19) Madame Blavatsky said:—

Experiments in "suggestion" by persons ignorant of the occult laws, are the most dangerous of pastimes. The action and reaction of ideas on the inner lower "Ego," has never been studied so far, because that Ego itself is *terra incognita* (even when not denied) to the men of science.

Prof. Driesch is a reputed biologist and philosopher and was the President of the Psychical Research Society in 1926-27. Nevertheless, we doubt whether this book will evoke enthusiasm in any quarter. Sir Oliver Lodge in his Foreword refers to "the extremity of scientific caution which is displayed throughout."

Indeed, much of the book is taken up with the discussion of the possibilities of deception in psychical research, the forms of possible deception, and the precautions which should be taken in conducting experiments.

Barring men, who deny the possibilities of psychic phenomena, we think none will be better or wiser for reading this extremely dull and uninspiring book, while students of true occultism cannot help condemning it unequivocally.

J. P. W.

Indo-European Folk-Tales and Greek Legend. By W.R. HALLIDAY. (Cambridge University Press, London. 7s. 6d.)

This collection of the Gray Lectures for 1932 by the Principal of King's College, London, reflects the modern attitude towards folk-lore, the attitude of a superior and learned grown-up towards the babblings of infant humanity. Folk-tales are considered "genuinely works of art, if of a simple and relatively unsophisticated kind"; myths, the primitive attempts at science; fairy tales, primitive literature; and legend, primitive history. And the lecturer dismisses with mild amusement "the once fashionable attempts to give an explanation of legend as possessing some hidden esoteric meaning". This is a pity. One respects his patient research upon the correspondences between Greek and Indian tales, the variations due to the process of diffusion or to the jigsaw fashion of combination; upon the modifications produced by creative literary art, historical study, or motives of propaganda, and upon the ages of different versions, etc. But one can only regret the time thus spent on non-essentials. Folk-lore treated this way becomes unprofitable, merely a phase of the mania for collect-

ing and cataloguing objects and facts.

Certainly there have been many foolish, forced interpretations of myth and legend, and there has been, during the lapse of centuries, much distortion. The Greek myths, for example, are already caricatures. Yet despite the denial by modern authority, the fact remains that there was a definite basis of knowledge, a real meaning behind the folk-tales in the beginning. Universal Science has always existed, but every age has its ignorant rabble, its learned wiseacres, and its true scientists. Those men of knowledge who invented the pure myths and allegories had been taught the secrets of Nature that modern scientists have still to discover. Further, the science of Symbology has several departments; therefore each true allegory can have several interpretations, so that there is ample room for research along these lines for those who are attracted to the old tales. If the modern students could put aside preconceived ideas and take hold of the Ariadne's thread offered by the books of H. P. Blavatsky, they would find the way out of their labyrinth of details and guesswork into the understanding of the fundamental principles of the subject.

WINIFRED WHITEMAN

Modern Thought on Trial. By KENNETH INGRAM. (Philip Allen, London. 8s. 6d.)

Mr. Kenneth Ingram's decision to attempt a judicial examination of the ideas of the moderns at the bar of critical opinion was not taken lightly. As he says, however, the task cried out to be done, for there has been scarcely any sympathetic and impartial criticism based on true understanding. Born in the 1880's, matured before the war, but still young enough to be active in life and thought, Mr. Ingram has the double advantage for the task of personal experience of the pre-war social, moral and religious standards against which the moderns are in revolt, and in addition, of being

personally intimate enough with the moderns to understand their outlook sympathetically. As a general rule, you are all for the moderns or all against them, the third possibility being that you want to convert them to a philosophy of your own. The attempt, therefore, fairly to weigh the claims of tradition against the spontaneity and self-expression on which the moderns bet their lives, was one bristling with difficulties.

Every line of Mr. Ingram's book, however, is readable with interest. He has striven to be scrupulously judicial, and the case of the Self-Expressionists, in the first third of the book, is presented with knowledge and an unswerving determination not to misrepresent.

Throughout the trial, it is as if a kindly, liberal-minded father kept on saying to his children: "I believe in, and I can rationally demonstrate, the supreme truth and value of monogamy, permanent marriage, the family, God, Christianity, and the gradual humanisation of social conditions; and I think that your promiscuity, trial marriages, easy divorce, government crèches, atheism, contempt for religion, and discordant shouting for Utopia or Dictatorship this week, all wrong; but as I cannot stop you, go your way, don't be more extreme than you can help, and my blessing be upon you at any rate for your truthfulness." Mr. Ingram, therefore, gives no good hidings and never abuses; and it may be that his kindly manner will gain him the ear of the young Self-Expressionists who have at present only contempt for vows and little use for consciousness, so that they may elect themselves to the task of renewing personal responsibility and religious consciousness, and without giving up truthfulness or

spontaneity.

Mr. Ingram has well shown that very much of the traditional self-discipline is essential to the development of mankind, and that the old basis of fear of the body on which the acceptance of the discipline used to rest must be replaced by one from which all "puritanical" fear shall be cast out. One aspect of the issue, however, appears not to have been given full weight. The disillusion, unbelief, and hatred of moral codes experienced by youth seem largely the unavoidable consequence of the uncertainty and insecurity of the present world—in which youth is so little encouraged to fulfil itself in that instinctive happiness once possible through creating a family, and in the satisfaction of aspiration once possible through achieving a career. Youth, in other words, seems sick with discouragement, and to recognise this appears necessary for it to attack the problems of all kinds which it has inherited from its once falsely optimistic predecessors.

A. NEWSOME

Indian Patchwork: By EDWARD and MARY CHARLES. (Heinemann, London. 7s. 6d.)

The Indian Tangle: By SIR ALBION RAJKUMAR BANERJI, C.S.I., C.I.E. (Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

The Indian problem is stupefyingly complicated and distressingly chaotic. A successful solution is hard to come by, though a glib one may easily be got, at the price of disaster when put to the test. This is the impression one gathers from Mr. and Mrs. Charles's book. Every page is written over with tragic gloom and hopeless despair. Mr. Charles presents, in the form of a diary, some of his unpleasant and disturbing experiences while acting as Principal of a large Indian college. He conveys a picture of the Hindus as a degenerate, treacherous and disgusting race with whom the English come into contact to their own peril. He suggests that we Westerners are so ill-rewarded for our pains in trying to solve the

Indian problem which he regards as insoluble that it would be more profitable, in a larger sense, to get out of the country. Such is Mr. Charles's reading of the Hindu character after, one understands, six months' experience of India.

One turns with some relief to the happier pages of the other book. A while ago, Sir Albion Banerji was telling a group of us at the East India Association just what is wrong in India and just what can be done to put matters right. Now he has written this interesting volume as a development and expansion of his thoughts. It is especially valuable to everyone who wants to see the Indian problem in a clearer focus, because its author takes a detached, non-party attitude, and because he is not a politician, full of empty catchwords, but a practical administrator with thirty-five years' experience.

He gives here an extremely lucid

and able survey of the essential realities of India's present position, with a brief indication of the historic forces which have tied the country into its undeniable tangle. He defends the British rule where it is right to defend it, but he does not hesitate to criticise it where it is right to do that. "It is not reasonable to argue that the miserable lot of the teeming masses is due to any neglect on the part of British rule," he asserts. Farther on, he makes it clear that the loss of the British connection would bring about chaos and the break-up of India into unhappy fragments. Nevertheless he would have the British honour their pledges, surrender their monopoly of control, and grant the Provinces and

States full autonomy and responsibility. His practical policy also includes (1) a political truce with Great Britain, (2) an economic treaty with the British Empire, and (3) a great national effort to counteract the evil effects of communalism.

I take much pleasure in his hope that "India will wield a mighty influence in a new world still in the making if she conserves and not destroys her spiritual force and inspiration." Sir Albion's wide sympathies and successful record justify this addition to the long list of books about India. It constitutes an authoritative contribution of such value that one unhesitatingly commends it.

PAUL BRUNTON

Opening the Psychic Door: Thirty Years Experiences. By F. W. FITZ-SIMONS, F. Z. S., F. R. M. S., with Illustrations. (Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

This book is an addition to the already enormous literature of Spiritualism. Its author is evidently an earnest, sincere, high-principled man, but withal exceedingly credulous, by which we mean that, having satisfied himself that the phenomena he witnessed were not fraudulent, he has accepted them all at face value as the bona fide actions and utterances of incarnate human personalities. So convinced is he that he does not attempt to notice or discuss any of the alternative theories which have been put forward to explain the happenings of the séance room.

The greater part of the work is devoted to a summarised description of a long series of séances held in South Africa early in the present century. Both medium and sitters seem to have been good, kindly, well-meaning folk of English or Irish origin; and, as might be expected, the "spirits" who communicated were of the same type and nationalities. The communications received are full of ethical advice, but display a deplorable lack of aptitude

when dealing with metaphysical or philosophical questions. The following verdict on reincarnation by one of Mr. FitzSimons's "spirit" instructors is typical of the misunderstandings and bad logic which appear to be even more prevalent in the "higher spheres" than they are on earth:

... Reincarnation, in the way it is taught on earth, is not true . . . For a discarnate body to take possession of a physical body, with the object of reliving his or her earth life again, would not be logical, or even common sense. For instance, in order to take possession of the physical body of a baby, it would be necessary to eject its own spiritual body; where then would be the ultimate benefit? It would mean that one spirit, in pursuit of his own selfish desire to relive a life in the physical body in order to gain further experience, robs another soul of its body. Believe it, or not, my friend; at the moment of conception a new soul is created, and the tiny spirit, thus born, goes on unfolding evermore.

The "spiritual spheres," as described by Mr. FitzSimons's instructors, are simply this world over again: there are houses, nursing-homes, gardens, woodlands, in the after-life, cathedrals of the Anglican persuasion for the pious, and for evil-livers, slums or worse. The "spirits" talk English, and continue to use the English names that were theirs on earth. Granny is still Granny in this other-world, and

"spirit" children babble with gay irresponsibility through the mouth of the medium. Indeed, if the coloured frontispiece may be accepted as evidence, ex-carnate young women are given to the use of lipstick ! The whole conception of the post-mortem life, as depicted

in this and similar works, is naïve and childish.

Some of the psychic phenomena, however, described in Mr. FitzSimons's book, are of considerable interest, and some really striking examples of "spirit" photographs are reproduced.

R. A. V. M.

Little Arthur's History of the Twentieth Century. By CICELY HAMILTON. (J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London. 5s.)

The work describes in the form of a recital to little Arthur by his teacher, both of whom are supposed to be living in the distant future, the social and political maladies of the twentieth century, and how the world cured itself of them. It is a popular example of those Utopias which are the day-dreams of political thinkers, who seek to escape from the ills of their age and clime into the golden age. The work is written in a simple, vivid, and bantering style, and although all of it is not meant to be taken too seriously, three leading ideas stand out clearly, and no doubt represent the author's serious criticism of things as they are at present.

(1) The author believes that "a sense of their own responsibility in life is one of the best qualities that a man or woman can have," and therefore, she deprecates the present day social services as undermining individual responsibility. Hence her condemnation of extensive Education by the State, of the glorification of the Child, and the pampering of criminals. An extremely amusing account is given of the "monstrous regime" of Inspection, which ends in a revolt against Inspectors, and a "Social Service Massacre."

(2) "What we will not do out of wisdom or kindness, we will do because we hate or fear." Obviously a modern version of Frederick the Great's well-known estimate of "that damned race" of men. It is not a

matter, therefore, for surprise when we learn that the World State and the era of peace came to be as a result of a "Great Stampede" when London and Paris were threatened with aerial attacks. "When they had been thoroughly alarmed and saw what such panics meant in suffering and loss, they agreed together to give up sovereign rights."

(3) "The knowledge of what is called Applied Science because, it is a very great power, is also a very great danger to the world; and those who are trained to hold such power must be carefully chosen, and prove they are fit to be trusted."

The author describes an era of scientific brigandage which followed the spread of education and knowledge not accompanied by parallel moral development. To us in India the idea is neither novel nor alien. According to the doctrine of Adhikara (competence), a teacher should impart knowledge to the pupil by stages according to receptivity, and particularly after assuring himself of the moral fitness of the aspirant to knowledge.

On the economic side the author imagines production as having become so bountiful that unemployment of large numbers becomes inevitable, but those who are unemployed are given a living allowance and are known as "Parries" (short for parasites or Pariahs) as opposed to Citizens, who alone have a voice in public affairs,—another indication of the author's distaste for the present day schemes of Social Insurance.

N. S. SUBBA RAO

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

[A. E. Waite is well known for his many valuable books—veritable flames of old knowledge which are worth an exchange with more than one modern bulb. Every quarter he will give to our readers the benefit of his researches and reading of the many periodicals containing matter of interest.—Eds.]

Among things psychical, the outstanding event of these last months in London was a "social gathering" arranged by the National Laboratory of Psychical Research, when Monsieur René Sudre was entertained at dinner and welcomed by some ninety other guests, including many well-known and a few illustrious names.* The meeting, however, had other objects than to honour one who, "after Professor Charles Richet" is described as "the leading French investigator" in the realms of supernormal experiment. It was called: (1) To emphasise the importance of such experiment, if pursued on a scientific basis. (2) "To stress the necessity of research work being carried out at British Universities and by official science, and the establishing of lectureships." (3) To create "an international journal for the recording and co-ordination of scientific psychical research all over the world." It does not appear that the last of these schemes was more than the subject of commendatory allusion,[†] while the proposed work at Universities and the endowment of lectureships were mentioned twice

only;‡ the accent throughout being laid on the urgency of inducing authorised science to recognise the existence of a great body of parapsychological facts and its claim that they should be examined adequately. For the rest, the address of Monsieur Sudre on "the Bridge between Psychical Research and Established Science" may be not unduly regarded as of high importance within its own measures, assuming, that is to say, the reality of the phenomena and approaching their supernormal character apart from any spiritistic hypothesis. In the lecturer's considered view, there is "no scientific evidence for survival". So far the organs of Spiritualism have passed this over in silence.

The second event of the period was a flying visit to London of Dr. L. R. G. Crandon of Boston, U.S.A., whose wife is the famous and ever-debated medium, Margery.§ He was entertained at dinner by the London Spiritualist Alliance, gave interviews to representatives of two well-known journals¶ and lectured at the Rooms of the Alliance on Dec. 19th last, his subject being

* Bulletin VI of the National Laboratory, pp. 5, 6.

† *Ib.*, pp. 31, 38.

‡ *Ib.*, pp. 12 and 36.

§ *Light*, Dec. 15, 1933, p. 801.

¶ *Ib.*, Dec. 22, pp. 816, 817, and *The Two Worlds*, Dec. 22, p. 982.

"The Vindication of the Margery Mediumship."* The affirmations were (1) that the long-promised *apologia* of the American S. P. R. had been delayed by financial difficulties, but was now on the threshold, a volume of 500 pages, with 104 plates; (2) that the alleged identity between "Walter" thumbprints and those of a certain "Dr. Kenner" would be disproved therein; and (3) that further evidence of supernormal fingerprints and so forth, under test conditions, would be adduced. This is how matters stand at the moment, and it may be added that the President of the Alliance suggested to an approving audience that Dr. Crandon should convey "heartly thanks" to Margery "for her self-sacrificing work as a Medium". Whether this was precipitate or otherwise time may shew. Hereof are activities and rumours from the Land of Psyche.

Passing now towards another realm, Mr. A. Romney Green offers in a recent study† an instance of his personal predilections on a recurring question of the people, their preachers and their teachers. After ages of priests, prophets and philosophers, what in fact is the object of life? He cannot accept the answer of Mr. D. H. Lawrence and agree that "the great purpose of mankind" is "a passionate union in actively building a world," because he has failed to explain the "sort of a world" to which we must put our hand. He will not seek,

with Mr. H. G. Wells, the meaning of life in co-operation, for Wells in like manner has omitted to tell us with whom co-operation is proposed and for what purpose. Mr. Green on his own part suggests (1) that because the "fine arts contribute nothing to the material welfare of society," they must for such reason "be amongst the absolute ends of life"; and (2) that pure science is in the same position, even if incidentally useful. Following his own canon of criticism, the answer to this is *negatur*, because in his haste he forgets to inform us why, and this seems fatal. It happens, however, that Mr. Green ignores presently his triplicity of absolute ends and substitutes another, claiming that it will "appeal to the natural instincts of every unsophisticated person". The "ultimate aims of human life" are "to do adventurous things, to make beautiful things, to understand wonderful things"; and it is felt that even "the average man" will subscribe hereto. It is to be doubted very much, especially when the essayist's love of paradox leads him to affirm, on the score of adventure, that "to go to sea in a small boat is to seek the kingdom of heaven. . . ., however unconsciously". But Mr. Green must be dissuaded from believing (1) that either average people or natural instincts have any part as such in his posited absolute ends or ultimate aims; and (2) that his alternate trinity is a "more articulate mode of stating" that the end of

* *Light*, Dec. 29, p. 835.

† *The Contemporary Review*, No. 816, pp. 712-721, s. v. "The Objects of Life."

man is to "serve and to know God" and "to enjoy and glorify Him for ever". The latter definition belongs to the limbus of pietistic imagery which has passed with the pictured "eternity of antheing," or if it lingers still it is in the by-ways of religious emotionalism. Not all the wit of his pages nor all their paradox will veil the fact that his supposed "definition" is untrue within the measures that he applies it only. We do not reach heaven if we seek to cross the Channel, but we may get to the French coast uncomfortably; we do not attain our ultimate end of life by painting a first-rate picture, but we may find it hung on the line and we may sell it. In fine, we can miss that end, even when we have come to understand "many wonderful things"—for example, why our philosopher and friend persists in parading things material when he means to talk of the eternal. If we raise his second triplicity to that plane it begins to obtain at once; but at once also its clauses prove "familiar in our mouths as household words". Who has not heard that the quest of God is a Divine Adventure? Who does not know with Spenser that the "noble heart" is not alone "with child of glorious great intent" but actually makes and brings forth "the eternal brood of glory excellent"? And lastly, if we have not proved it in our own persons, have we not met with those who, because they have lived in sanctity, have found the Holy of Holies, to be that which it has not entered into the

heart of ("the average") man to conceive, and that which God has prepared for those who love Him? At best, therefore, Mr. Green has put some old wine into new casks, and it befalls that we savour it better when drawn from those time-immemorial vats from which we drank it, in very sacred cellars.

Those who are willing to agree that "there can be no religion without revelation" may find it profitable to examine a brief thesis by Canon D. S. Guy on "Experience and its Claims in Religion."* They will learn (1) that Theology is a science; (2) that "Christianity is a veritable science"; (3) that the Christian creeds "are a summary of truths learnt in the school of experience," not excepting that which passes under the name of Athanasius, damnatory clauses included. The office of experience is thus to promote dogma, while the office of evolving dogma is to extend the field of possible experience. It follows in the unwary hypothesis that a certain quality of inward life on the part of believers has not only given us the virgin birth in Bethlehem, the physical resurrection of Jesus, the ascent of his body into heaven and its location at the right hand of God the Father Almighty, but also the descent of the disembodied Christ into hell and the precession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Furthermore, "the Christology of the creeds" being "the result of the Church's experience," it follows also that no time limit can

* *The Contemporary Review*, No. 817, pp. 72-79.

be ascribed in the logic of the thesis to the extension of experience or the fuller evolution of doctrine therefrom. Canon Guy might reconsider Newman's Essay on Development from this point of view and also the position in which his affirmation places himself. The finding-in-chief of the last Vatican Council is as much, *ex hypothesi*, the result of experience attained through centuries in the Roman fold as the Pauline testimony that if Christ be not risen our faith is vain. But it fails otherwise fatally because, if a "school of experience" has provided the Christian religion with "creedal summaries" of truth, we have to remember that older schools have provided Oriental religion with different bodies of doctrine; and where is the canon of criticism by which we are justified in accepting one and rejecting all the rest? Where is the key of distinction between valid and illusory experience? It is obvious that the experience of sanctity is everywhere; but if creeds are results thereof it is obvious also that they exclude each other. The way of escape is to challenge the statement that creeds are born of experience: they are of revelation—if one cares to think it—of invention, imposture and so forth, or of growth from small beginnings. And as to experience, that which is valid in religion is that from which there issues no strife of sects. It is that of the inward man, who has sought and found it

at the centre of his own being, and the records of his experience have said *ab origine* the same thing everywhere, speaking "the same language," since it "comes from the same country."*

When Dr. Robert Assagioli,† writing from Rome, presents at considerable length his purified version of "Psychoanalysis and Psychosynthesis," it looks for a moment as if he were pointing a direct path from the Land of Psyche to the Land of Nous. He tells us that beyond the conscious self "there must be a permanent Spiritual Centre, the true Self"; that it is "fixed, unchanging, unaffected by the flow of the 'mindstream'"; that it is characterised by "real unity and uniqueness". Surely he speaks our own language and looks with us for an ever-expanding awareness of "superindividual Reality". It must be so; but the counsel is to greet him as "fellow-craft" in passing, and leave to whom it concerns (1) his arid study of ways and means by which we approach thereto, through Freudian and post-Freudian schools; (2) his unconvincing curriculum, its divisions and sub-divisions; and more than all perhaps (3) the illustrated diagrams which it is thought may prove helpful. *Non in dialectica complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum* should be the motto of every metaphysician, according to Professor Whitehead.‡ It is equally true that we shall not be saved by

* Cf. the pregnant dictum of Saint-Martin concerning "all true men."

† *The Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1934, pp. 184-201.

‡ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 380.

charts, by "technical procedure," or any "dramatic conception of our psychological life". Love is the key and Love the only way. So also regarding Miss Dorothy M. Emmet on world-salvation by incarnation of God in the world in the same periodical: she may be asked to remember that the one salvation is of the God, who is born within us, a truth which Professor J. S. Haldane, expresses in other terms when he says: "it is only within ourselves that we find the revelation

of God." Is not its work performed by the Divine Eros of Plato's "Symposium," a part haply of that "play of Divine Love" of which Sir Francis Younghusband speaks? —*Asiatic Review* (October)

Hereof are a few of many voices, witnessing at the threshold of the Land of Nous. But if there is one that sounds from within, it is Mr. R. G. Shahani who says that "the universe is a training ground for the Sons of God".

A. E. WAITE

UNITY BEHIND SEEMING DIVERSITY

The more we learn of the story of mankind in all its length and breadth the more fully do we realise that we are members of one another. Geographical, racial and linguistic barriers fail to impair the fundamental unity of civilization. . . . The study of comparative religion—one of the triumphs of the critical spirit—is at last enabling us to seize the underlying unit in what William James called the varieties of religious experience.

The above is an extract from the admirable address on "Unity of Civilization" delivered last November before the Ethical Union, London, by its President, Mr. G. P. Gooch. Many of the views expressed therein are but an echo of the teachings imparted by H. P. Blavatsky fifty years ago. She always emphasized in her works the fundamental unity behind all seeming diversities of race, religious creeds, etc., and she unequivocally condemned false nationalism and the conflicting religious creeds in vogue at the moment as formidable barriers

against the practical realization of this unity. During the last few years identical views have been expressed by several leading thinkers in the West, and Mr. Gooch is one more addition to the number.

Why is it that these fine ideals have failed to achieve any tangible results? The answer is furnished in the following words of a great Eastern Teacher to a Westerner in the early days of the Theosophical Movement:—

. . . . the philanthropy you Western thinkers boast of, having no character of universality; *i. e.*, never having been established on the firm footing of a moral, universal principle; never having risen higher than theoretical talk; and that chiefly among the ubiquitous Protestant preachers, it is but a mere accidental manifestation but no recognised LAW. The most superficial analysis will show, that, no more than any other empirical phenomenon in human nature, can it be taken as an absolute standard of moral activity; *i. e.*, one productive of efficient action.

P. J.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE SUFIS AND REINCARNATION

The all too brief pronouncement by Professor R.A. Nicholson in *THE ARYAN PATH* for January, 1934, on "The Sufis and Reincarnation" must be taken as decisive, coming as it does from such high authority. If, therefore, I pursue the subject further it is not by way of reply or rejoinder, but only because more light is needed by puzzled non-expert inquirers and amateurs like myself.

Professor Nicholson says that "Rumi, like all the great Sufi teachers, unequivocally repudiates the heresy of *tanāsukh*" (reincarnation). One implication of this unqualified statement is that if at all any Sufis have held the doctrine of *tanāsukh* they must have been insignificant persons who have no place in the long line of recognised masters of Sufism. I venture to think that this would be an overstatement; how, I shall proceed to show.

The author of that treasure-house of mystic lore, the *Dabistān*, does not appear to regard *tanāsukh* as a heresy in Sufism. According to him, the "Eastern" school of Sufis, whom he significantly derives from ancient Iranian mystics called "Azar-Hoshangiān" or "Yezdāniān," held definite dogmas about different kinds of reincarnation, such as *naskh* (man being reborn as man again), *maskh* (rebirth as animal), *raskh* (rebirth as vegetable), and *faskh* (rebirth as mineral).^{*} Elsewhere in the same book we find a Sufi master distinguishing between *burūz* ("manifestation" or incarnation of a perfect soul "for the sake of perfecting mankind") and *tanāsukh*, both taking place, according to this authority, "in the fourth month" (after conception).[†]

Turning to the monumental *Literary History of Persia* by Dr. Nicholson's great teacher, E. G. Browne, and espe-

cially to his luminous chapters on the Manichaeans, Ismailis and other esoteric sectarians, we find that the doctrines of *hulūl* (incarnation of the Perfect Man or the Deity), *rij'at* ("return" of the Imam after death), *tanāsukh* (ordinary reincarnation)—all deadly "heresies" according to Islam—were widely prevalent in Persia and other Islamic lands in the early centuries of the Hejira. For instance, the extreme Shiites known as "Ghulāt" (the name of one of their sub-sections, the "Mazdakiyya," is specially worth noting by the way), Carmatians, Ismailis, Bātinis, Hurūfis, and others held these doctrines of *hulūl*, etc. Coming to the Sufis, we are told that that prince of Sufi "masters," Mansur-i-Illāj, "certainly held all the cardinal doctrines of the Ghulāt (*i. e.*, the extreme Shiites)—*hulūl*, *rij'at* and the like". Of Mansūr's master, the no less celebrated Junayd of Baghdad, we are told that he was "not much more orthodox". And the third shining light of Persian Sufism, Bāyazīd of Bistām, held and uttered such fearful "heresies" that poor Rūmi has to make excuses for him in his *Mathnawi*. One of these utterances, as recorded by Browne *via* 'Attār, was:—"Verily I am God: there is no God but me; therefore worship me." Surely, reincarnation (*tanāsukh*) as a heresy is a mere peccadillo compared to this unpardonable sin against the Deity according to Islam. And let it be emphasised once more that there are no three names held in such reverence and esteem in the Sufi literature of Persia and India as are those of Bāyazīd and Junayd and Mansūr. (Browne: Vol. I, p. 310 ff.).

As Browne acutely observes:—

It is noteworthy that both Bāyazīd and

* *Dabistān*, by Shea and Troyer, Vol. III, pp. 149-150.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 277-278.

Junayd were Persians [and so was Mansûr, too, — a Persian of "Magian" descent], and may very likely have imported into the mysticism which they so ardently embraced ideas long endemic in their country, for it was certainly the Persian Sufis who went to the greatest lengths in developing the pantheistic aspect of Sufism. — Vol. I, p. 428.

How these ideas were "long endemic" in Persia becomes clear when Browne informs us, in another connection, how "the beginnings of Sufi doctrines . . . may in reality go back beyond the Muhammadan to the Sasanian times" (*Ibid*, p. 68). It would take us too far afield if we were to follow out in detail the fascinating vistas opened up by Browne's pregnant remarks on the possible indebtedness of Neo-Platonism itself—(which is held by scholars, including Dr. Nicholson, to have profoundly influenced Sufism)—to eastern, especially Persian influences. For Plotinus had sojourned in Persia, according to Porphyry, "expressly to study the systems of philosophy there taught." (p. 420) We can only note in passing that the teachings of Mâni in the third century of the Christian era, and of Mazdak in the sixth,—both avowedly influenced by Buddhism,—seem to have taken root in Persia though outwardly the heresies were wiped out by ruthless state persecution. Darmesteter, again, held that early Sasanian Zoroastrianism was influenced by the Logos philosophy of Philo Judæus,—who, also, believed in metempsychosis, as did the later Neo-Platonists. Whether we believe in this theory, or hold with Mills that on the contrary it was Zoroastrianism that markedly influenced Philo, the point to note is that the belief in metempsychosis was "long endemic" in Persia before Islamic Sufism came on the field.

Reverting to Rûmi himself, we find that the profoundest, the most disturbing, spiritual experience of his life was the intercourse with his wild and eccentric "master" in Sufism, Shamsuddin of Tabriz, who claimed to be at least the

equal of the Prophet of Islam, and of whom Rûmi himself has said in a Ghazal, "Shams-i-Tabriz Muhammad bud o ham bûd Ali (i.e., Shams-i-Tabriz was Muhammad and also Ali)—and has plainly hinted elsewhere that he was even more, i.e., "Nûr-i-pâk," the Holy Light.*

It is noteworthy that this strange man's father was, according to the account given by Dr. Nicholson, an Ismaili, though later in life he is said to have renounced Ismailism. How profoundly this man influenced Jalaluddin Rûmi, is best described in Dr. Nicholson's own words:—

He [Rumi] renounced his [own] teaching, and retired with Shams to solitary and desert places where in close communion they discussed the deepest arcana of mystical philosophy. [*Introduction to the Divân-i-Shams-i-Tabriz*, p. xxiii.]

So much for the spiritual background of the *Mathnavi* and the *Divân* from which we have considered the two passages disposed of by Dr. Nicholson in his brief note. I beg to submit for his consideration another remarkable passage from the Fourth Book of the *Mathnavi*; and I quote it from his own translation at some length:—

The man who lives in a city (many) years, as soon as his eye goes asleep, beholds another city full of good and evil, and his own city comes not into his memory at all, . . . Nay, he thinks that in sooth he has always lived in this very city and has been born and bred in it. What wonder then if the spirit does not remember its (ancient) abodes which have been its dwelling place and birthplace aforetime, since this world, like sleep, is covering it over as clouds cover the stars? Especially as it has trodden so many cities and the dust has not (yet) been swept from its perceptive faculty, nor has it made ardent efforts that its heart should become pure and behold the past. . . .

After this preamble comes the section headed "The Diverse Modes and Stages of the Nature of Man from the Beginning," † which runs:—

First he came into the clime (world) of inorganic things, and from the state of inorganic

* "Man Shams-i-Tabrizi nayam, man Nûr-i-Pâkam ay pisar."

† Unfortunately I have not Dr. Nicholson's edition of the original before me. The text before me (Lucknow, 1874) reads: "Bâyân-i-atwâr-i-Khilqat-i-Âdami dar fitrat," i.e., "Description of the (diverse) ways of the creation of Man in nature."

things he passed into the vegetable state. Many years he lived in the vegetable state and did not remember the inorganic state because of the opposition (between them); and when he passed from the vegetable into the animal state, the vegetable state was not remembered by him at all. . . . Again the Creator, whom thou knowest, was leading him (man) from the animal (state) towards humanity. Thus did he advance from clime to clime (from one world of being to another), till he has now become intelligent and wise and mighty. He hath no remembrance of his former intelligences (souls); from this (human) intelligence also there is a migration to be made by him, that he may escape from this intelligence full of greed and self-seeking and may behold a hundred thousand intelligences most marvellous. — [Nicholson's *Mathnavi*, Vol. IV, pp. 471-472.]

Whinfield, who gives this passage at p. 216 of his work on the *Mathnavi*, adds in a footnote, "This doctrine is not transmigration of soul (tanasukh), but evolution of soul based on Aristotle's 'De Anima'." It may be "evolution"; but it comes "in such a questionable shape" that one cannot help asking: "What is it that evolves, and how does it do so?" It is not necessary to cross the "t's and dot the 'i's in this passage from the *Mathnavi* quoted above to see that the doctrine inculcated in it looks perilously like progressive reincarnation; and it is, so far as I can judge, difficult to square with the teaching of Aristotle, who, in his "De Anima," is said by an authority on the subject to have defined the soul as "the entelechy of a natural body capable of life" and thus completely rejected "any attempt to make the soul a thing or an entity". If I may be allowed to venture a guess on a subject of which, I must confess, I know very little, perhaps the contact with Aristotle's "De Anima" that the early Sufis had was not direct but through the refracting medium of Neo-Platonism; for instance, Plutarch of Athens, who was a teacher of Proclus, "the chief representative of the later Neo-Platonists," and himself a devout Neo-Platonist, is known to have written a commentary on "De Anima" which is regarded as "the most important contribution to Aristotelian literature since the time of Alexander of

Aphrodisias".

It is undoubtedly true that Rūmi was a strictly brought up son of a strict Sunni religious teacher and himself occupied his father's "chair" after the latter's death. But late in life came the unsettling unorthodox influence of the Sufi "master" whom he repeatedly gives in his Ghazals honours that are rank blasphemy and deadly heresy in the eyes of any orthodox Sunni Muslim. Dr. Nicholson has recorded how Rūmi's own disciples bitterly resented Shamsuddin's esoteric teaching as "an insidious attempt to seduce their beloved Master,"—so bitterly and fiercely that, according to one account, Shams was entrapped and done to death by seven of them, including one of Rūmi's own sons! If, as we are told, Rūmi retired with Shamsuddin to desert places, "where in close communion they discussed the deepest arcana of mystical philosophy," would it be too extravagant to surmise that one of the mysteries so discussed was the "long endemic" doctrine of progressive transmigration of the soul? And would it be quite unthinkable that in the passage discussed above, as in the other two, Shamsuddin's "heretical" mysticism has temporarily taken full control of Rūmi's orthodox pen? For, immediately after this passage the poet reverts to orthodoxy, and decrees for the miserable erring human soul grim tribulations after death *till the crack of doom*. Surely, more light is needed to illustrate these passages so as to show clearly what it is that evolves under the "evolution" theory, and, if it be the individual soul, what is the process by which it "evolves" from the mineral to a superhuman and even divine state without going through a series of rebirths.

Bombay.

J. S.

P. S. After I had written the above I happened to read Dr. Nicholson's own confirmation of my conjecture about the Neo-Platonist source of the Sufis' contact with Aristotle. In his

translation of Sir Muhammad Iqbāl's Persian poem, "Asrār-i-Khudi," Dr. Nicholson says in a note (on Iqbāl's assertion that Plato's thought "has deeply influenced the mysticism and literature of Islam") :—

When the Moslems began to study Greek philosophy, they turned to Aristotle. The genuine writings of Aristotle, however, were not accessible to them. They studied translations of books passing under his name, which

were the work of Neo-Platonists, so that *what they believed to be Aristotelian doctrine was in fact the philosophy of Plotinus, Proclus, and the later Neo-Platonic school.* (*The Secrets of the Self*, p. 56)

I am naturally very pleased to find that what I had advanced as a mere conjecture has the support of Dr. Nicholson's own considered opinion, as the words italicised above clearly show.

J. S.

THE ANTIQUITY OF "MODERN" MAN

The discoveries of Dr. L. B. S. Leakey at the Kabirondo gulf of Lake Victoria Nyanza in Kenya have lately startled orthodox anthropologists, and woken them up to the poverty of their ideas regarding the antiquity of man. At a meeting at the Anthropological Institute in London last October he gave a final report on the jaw fragment, two skull fragments, and animal remains which were unearthed on two sites, Kanam and Kanjera, three miles apart. Eminent scientists such as Professor G. Elliot-Smith and Sir Arthur Smith Woodward were present, and agreed that in no important detail did these human remains differ from those of modern man. Yet the antiquity of these fragments, "modern" though they are, is somewhere in the region of a million years old. The conception of man in that remote period as an "ape-like" creature, with receding forehead, semi-canine teeth and small brain capacity, is proved a myth. Or rather the existence in the distant past of highly developed races in many parts of the world—England, Palestine, Africa, and India—is shown to have been a fact, even if alongside them there were also undeveloped or sub-normal types.

To realise that one has been "out" by a matter of a million years in one's notion of the antiquity of "modern"

man must be a humiliating thought for a scientist. These discoveries of Dr. Leakey will naturally give satisfaction to all who have maintained that man has a far earlier history than was allowed generally up to a quarter of a century ago. To students of Esoteric Philosophy in particular the new finds will be felt to confirm the predictions made in *The Secret Doctrine* in 1888 :—

... it is not impossible—nay, it is most likely—that further discoveries in geology and the finding of fossil remains of man will force science to confess that it is esoteric philosophy which is right after all, or, at any rate, nearer to the truth. (II, 711)

And the way is pointed to yet another prediction which, if confirmed, would astound the scientists yet more :—

... civilization dates still further back than the Miocene Atlanteans. "Secondary-period" man will be discovered, and with him his long forgotten civilization. (II, 266)

As Mr. J. Reid Moir, himself an archaeologist who has contributed important evidence on the early antiquity of man, put it in a letter to *The Times* last October, "the past history of the human race is unfolding itself in a truly majestic manner". He adds that its beginnings are still hid in the mists of remote antiquity—as to which a study of the occult sciences might enlighten him yet further.

London.

G. W. WHITEMAN

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“ ————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS.

“Other people’s views of life must be learnt and understood,” said Professor H. J. Fleure of Manchester University recently in addressing the annual meeting of the School Journey Association. But in order to do this “we must be able to look at ourselves from the outside”—and how few there are who can do so! Most men and women take their ideas *and* prejudices at second hand. As a result, we get the phenomena of mass emotion and mass mind. Ready-made feelings and thoughts are adopted by the generality of mankind—it saves trouble! The problems arising from the mass mind were discussed at the meeting of the Society for Research in Education, held at University College, London, in the beginning of the year. Mr. J. Howard Whitehouse, Warden of Bembridge, Isle of Wight, said:—

The mass mind has suddenly become a world problem. There is an amazing nationalist revival in almost every country, and we see a renewed belief in war and a renewed struggle in the competition for armaments which is really based on fear.

He instanced the case of Germany as a dreadful example of the power of the mass mind and cited a Christmas message from the Nazi Bishop in Germany. This prelate “in announcing that the message of Christmas was peace and good will among men, was careful to

point out that of course peace did not mean that there was to be an end of war.” But the Nazi Bishop’s “message” need not have so shocked Mr. Whitehouse, for there are many other people in the world who believe in peace only at their own price. The German Bishop would have doubtless lost his job had he spoken otherwise than he did. To what extent is Mr. Whitehouse himself caught in the toils of the anti-Nazi mass thought?

There is only one way by which people will learn to think for themselves, and that is by shaking off the shackles of priestly domination. Such domination is not confined to religion. If we do as the church priest says and think as he thinks, we are safe in the next world; if we do as the political priest says, we are prosperous in this one! There are priests of education who decide what we shall or shall not learn, and turn out robots of culture. There are priests of science who hypnotise us with their dogmas. There are priests of medicine who take charge of our physical health—it is true we may die under a “successful” operation, but no matter; it is only the body which dies! Under other priestly domination, however, our souls may be wounded unto death. All such priests are in reality traitors

to their respective professions. The important thing for such exploiters of humanity is that people should *not* think for themselves.

Only comparatively few persons have the courage to speak out and protest, but they are a growing number. To these the pages of THE ARYAN PATH are always open, for they are the salt of the earth.

Few will contest Mr. Whitehouse's statement that there has been a renewed belief in war and a renewed struggle in the competition for armaments which is really based on fear. But how is that fear engendered? An answer is provided in two remarkable pamphlets which have recently been published by the Union of Democratic Control, London — *Patriotism Ltd: An Exposure of the War Machine* and *The Secret International: Armament Firms at Work*. These may be described as a very detailed and exhaustive amplification of Lord Cecil's statement:—

There is a very sinister feature to all the disarmament discussions. I refer to the tremendous power wielded against all the proposals by armament firms. . . . It is no longer safe to keep in private hands the construction of these terrible instruments of death. We must aim at getting rid of this immense instrument in the maintenance of suspicion.

Mr. H. G. Wells, in characterizing the science of warfare as "a very active occupation," says:—

It is a sort of ugly and dwarfish twin sister of scientific research. The difference is that she tries to be secretive and her ends are murderous. She is perpetually seeking to seize and per-

vert scientific advances.

"Patriotism Ltd" is the name sarcastically given by the publishers to the collective body of the arms traffickers of the world who were charged by a League of Nations Commission in 1921 with playing on national animosities and fomenting war for their own profit; with bribing Government officials; with spreading false stories; with subsidizing newspapers to stimulate arms expenditure. A mass of the most weighty and conclusive evidence to show that these charges still remain true is collected in both the above mentioned pamphlets; they reveal in a telling manner some of the darkest aspects of the after-war world made safe for Democracy. "Profits have no fatherland. War, for Patriotism Ltd, is good business"—this is the grim conclusion of these pamphlets. As shareholders in such nefarious business all sorts of people make money but "oddly enough there is a noticeably high proportion of clergymen"! (*The Secret International*, p. 43.)

Though in most countries organized religions are weakening, in some outlying parts of the world creedal fanaticism flourishes; here is an instance. It seems that the Inquisition has returned, for the saving of souls by the whip is undertaken in the north-eastern part of the South American republic of Colombia. Here, in comparatively isolated villages, the Capuchins, a religious order of Saint Francis, are said to impose orthodox Catho-

licism through torture. Serious charges are made by the Marquis de Wavrin, in a recent article which appeared in a magazine, *Crapouillot*, published in France (Sept. 1933). The villagers are Catholics, but their religion is still mixed with pagan beliefs, and the Capuchins feel in duty bound to save the souls of these poor people. They have established orphan asylums next to their convents where, it is claimed, they imprison all children, whether orphans or not. They are said to organize raids in the nearby villages, capture all the children, and keep them there until adult and married. Since marriage is the only means of getting free from this prison, the youths are willing to marry anybody, often separating as soon as they have crossed the hated threshold. Sometimes, it is said, the captured Indian girls sacrifice their virtue to the emissaries of the Capuchins, hoping to buy their freedom.

Little is taught at the asylums beyond prayers and the catechism. A few are allowed to learn a trade and to practise it, but almost all the money that they earn goes to the mission, and for the tools given to them the monks demand so much that the workers are never free from debts. In spite of stren-

uous work in the fields, their food is very poor, a plate of maize once a day. The crops from the fields and the meat from the herds are kept for the monks and the nuns, and the surplus sold in the nearest cities.

We translate just one of the many incidents testified to by the villagers themselves!

Teodora Alfaro having wished to escape from the Asylum of San Sebastian was caught and tied, naked, face down on a table. A nun struck her with a whip until her whole back was bleeding. Then the wounds were rubbed with salt water. The woman was tied by "grillos" at ankles and wrists to the "cepo" for two days and two nights. Eight years after, the woman still bore the marks of these tortures.

We need not be surprised that these monks and nuns indulge in such cruelty; many of them enter the convent without any real devotion, so that the rules of peace and love mean little to them. Those who may have religious feeling are so fanatical that any means will justify the end of *saving souls*, as they call it. M. de Wavrin closes his article with an appeal to the government of Colombia which seems wilfully to ignore all this, and to the League of Nations, to stop the rule of these half-crazed monks and nuns who take a morbid pleasure in seeing the suffering of others.



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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FETTERS OF DESTINY

The following is the closing portion—taken from a stenographic report—of a lecture on "How Can Man Defeat His Destiny?"—delivered before the Sassoon Mechanics' Institute, Bombay:—

The seeds of destiny develop from within without, in the soil of our civilization. This implies country, race, family. The Soul with its seeds is not born into a particular family, country or race by accident or by chance. It is *attracted* to its own circumstances and surroundings. What we call obstacles arising from our circumstances are but the necessary resistances offered by the soil to the seeds of destiny. This teaching that our circumstances, our bodily and other limitations, are our own self-made destiny, has been wrongly applied and large numbers of people, in the name of contentment and resignation, sit down with folded arms and say: "Karma,

Kismet, Fate!" There is truth in the charge levelled against India, that its present fallen condition is largely due to the misunderstanding and the misapplication of this doctrine of Karma or destiny. Such an attitude is wrong because it overlooks the aspect of present exertion, self-choice and use of free will. And that brings us to the very important practical teaching—the central teaching of our subject: **DESTINY MANIFESTS ITSELF IN TERMS OF EXERTION.**

In our destiny we have good and bad aspects, strong and weak forces. These aspects and forces precipitate themselves in our lives through our present actions. It is possible to starve out the evil forces of destiny by abstaining from evil actions in the present. It is also possible to bring out the beneficent forces and aspects by the performance of righteous actions. Exertion and destiny are like positive and negative electric-

ity; exertion is positive, destiny is negative. At any given moment, in any particular situation, the descent of fate depends on what we choose to do now, and how we exert ourselves to fulfil that choice. Without present action past destiny cannot show itself. Hour by hour, in act after act, we make a canal for the good waters of destiny to flow into. Similarly, hour by hour, we can build a dam to prevent the dirty waters of destiny from drowning us. This philosophical principle is highly practical and on its understanding and correct application depends the answer to our question—How can a man defeat his destiny?

All men and women instinctively recognize that they must do righteous deeds—unselfish, and kindly and just; and yet they are not able to act thus. Selfishness, egotism, greed overpower us. The sins of omission and commission are numerous as well as varied. We saw that our destiny has two aspects, good and evil, and has three constituents, mind, character and body. Our present exertion must be in connection with these three things and also must have a dual aspect. We must commit good acts; we must omit evil ones; thus we make room for the good aspect of destiny to manifest, and prevent the expression of the evil aspect. But both these processes of commission and omission must be deliberate. We must deliberately eschew wrong; equally deliberately must we do right. And these two deliberate actions must be in reference to the three seeds of mind,

character and body.

This brings us to the exercise to be daily done; not spasmodically but regularly, with the purpose ever kept in view, the defeat of evil destiny. Three fetters have to be broken; three ornaments have to be secured. The fetters of mind, character and body are acts to be omitted; the ornaments are acts to be committed. The fetters are for the thieves of Nature, the ornaments for her Kings. Many are the thieves of Nature; people like ourselves are neither thieves nor Kings; we fear the robber and seek the royal company. What are these fetters and ornaments?

The fetter of the mind is its disposition to continue as a prisoner of Kāma—desires and passions. Our cravings and ambitions imprison our minds, nay more, exploit them. The ambition of the man of business imprisons and exploits his mind; our fears and hopes, our loves and hates, act as heavy chains on our mind, and disable its returning to the freedom of its own estate. The soul must instil into the mind courage to fight and defeat the enemy of passions and desires; for that purpose the mind must be made to recognize its abject slavery to desires and passions. We must present the mind with the shining jewels of divine ideas—noble, liberal and cosmic. Of these shining jewels of high thoughts a crown must be made, for our mind must be the crown of the Soul who is the King. Hence daily study, constant company of high thoughts and liberal ideas, association with holy and learned

men, are necessary.

The fetter of character is the sense of possession inherent in most people. Not only the wicked, are greedy and competitive; the good also are charged with that feeling of greed. The ornament of character is philanthropy. Fight and defeat your sense of possession by cultivating philanthropy. But do not misunderstand; it is not the giver of money only who is a philanthropist, often he is not! The real philanthropist begins with thoughtfulness and good will in small affairs. Personal attention to the woes and difficulties of others, personal help rendered, personal advice given—in such seemingly small acts of good will the true philanthropist is born. To write a cheque from our surplus funds is easy enough; to think and feel for our neighbour is very difficult. Philanthropy is the ornament of character. If mind is the crown of the Soul, philanthropy is the sceptre. The authority of the King is never in the rod of punishment, but in the wand of philanthropy. Without philanthropy we cannot be just, for then justice is robbed of mercy.

The fetter of the body is in its personal separative aspect, with which we identify ourselves. People say, "I am a man," "I am a woman"—we are not; we are Souls, human Souls; or "I am Hindu or Parsi, I am Indian or European," and so on—this it is that makes the fetter of the body, a hard iron chain very difficult to break. That is taking a personal

view of the body. How shall we defeat the destiny of the body? By cleansing it of all its personal separative tendencies; by clothing it in the royal robe of humanism. Our body is first and foremost a *human* body, not an animal rupa. To be human we must be humane. To don the robe of humanism, that is the third thing we must do.

And now we have answered the question—How can man defeat his own destiny? By fulfilling it.

Make of your body a human body; have philanthropy and good will as the basis of your character; fill your mind with great ideas which have ever moved men and masses of men to righteousness. Thus we defeat the evil destiny and fulfil our dharma—to be human, to be man.

Our heritage is royalty. Forgetting that, we have become exiles from our spiritual kingdom, we have become untouchables, eating the carrion of pride, living in the filth of selfishness, greed and fear. But, untouchables as we are, if we take courage, we see that there are the Royal Fathers of the Race, the Compassionate Sages who encourage us, inspire us, to walk out of our present degradation into the joy of knowledge, of altruism, of brotherhood. So let us all endeavour to defeat our destiny by fulfilling it. Let us never forget that in the midnight darkness of failure there is the herald of the dawn of success. Feel the power of Royalty within your heart and triumph will be yours.

PURE RACE VERSUS MIXED RACE

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT IT?

[R. L. Mégroz, who is one of our early contributors, writes this month on the thorny subject of mixed races. There are two broad methods of regarding the problem of races. The scientist relies entirely on physical characteristics when he determines race; that is the "outside" view. The Theosophist who holds that the physical body is but a tabernacle for the inner man, looks at the matter more from the point of view of the spiritual, mental and psychical development of that "inner man"—the thinker, the Ego that dwells in the body. Each race offers the means by which new powers may be developed. The degree and manner in which the spiritual, mental, and psychical aspects of Man are active on this, the physical plane, determines to what race he belongs. In *The Secret Doctrine* (II, 249), H. P. Blavatsky writes regarding racial divisions:—

"Strictly speaking, esoteric philosophy teaches a modified polygenesis. For, while it assigns to humanity a oneness of origin, in so far that its forefathers or 'Creators' were all divine beings—though of different classes or degrees of perfection in their hierarchy—men were nevertheless born on seven different centres of the continent of that period. Though all of one common origin, yet for reasons given their potentialities and mental capabilities, outward or physical forms, and future characteristics, were very different. Some superior, others inferior, *to suit the Karma* of the various reincarnating Monads which could not be all of the same degree of purity in their last births in other worlds. This accounts for the difference of races, the inferiority of the savage, and other human varieties."]

The problem of race in relation to the world's condition to-day rarely evokes any statement in print so suggestive and helpful as that which I read in *THE ARYAN PATH* for last January. In the course of a note replying to Dr. F. Otto Schrader about German nationalism, the Editors observed:

It would be manifestly unfair to arraign the German people for race prejudice, because, unfortunately, that feeling sways most people in the world either consciously or unrealised by themselves.

They then made a distinction between the deliberate adoption of race prejudice as a national policy and the common feeling of prejudice which is recognised only as something unworthy.

While it is true that nearly everybody feels racial prejudice (not least the Jews who complain so much of it in others), I do not think that the Germans are the only people who attempt to justify this irrational feeling. I shall have occasion to refer to the "Anglo-Saxon" racial egotism in the course of the argument that I wish to present now, but I am sure other peoples have their own forms of this egotism. What I have said already will not be taken amiss by readers of either German or Jewish race if they realise how strongly I am opposing this foolishness which is wrecking the world.

Here is the core of my argument. We have been told over and over by demagogues, by cardboard

"dictators," by shoddy historians and shoddy philosophers and economists, that the world's ills are fundamentally economic, and can be cured by this, that or some other nostrum. In so far as all this propaganda has encouraged a greater number of people to enquire into the meanings of the economic jargon, it is useful, for it will lead eventually to a return of enlightened common sense and a fresh application of the idea that the function of government is to bring the greatest good to the greatest number.

On the surface it appears that the almost universal tendency is towards intensified nationalism, but there are signs that the tide must now recede or else swamp what has not yet been destroyed of western civilisation. I have come to the conclusion also that the most urgent and most neglected problem of civilisation is not economic at all. Although economic experts notoriously differ in their diagnoses of a troubled world's malady, their concentration in the last few years upon vital material problems has perhaps already created that pool of instructed common sense in the publics of the world which is necessary to reconstruction.

All that is wanted, say both the "visionaries" and the "practical" people, is peaceful security; but this goal, fifteen, sixteen years after the "Great War," seems further off than ever. And why, if it is not because of the intrusion of deeper political passions that are racial rather than national?

There are signs in all parts of the world, literally "from China to Peru," that the subterranean activity of the volcano of racial antagonism is increasing and must threaten whatever international peace may be temporarily established on economic and national agreements. We are just beginning to realise the direful possibilities of confusing national with racial problems in India and Africa, and the present state of Europe; and conditions in the Far East, and in the Americas are not exactly reassuring.

If guidance is sought from any of the experts we find that there are no co-ordinated studies of the world's racial problems at all, but only isolated and frequently contradictory evidence from psychologists, ethnologists and the specialists in eugenics, who have seriously neglected the most urgent problems of race.

At the last British Association meeting I heard one scientist utter a warning that no white policy of "indirect government" (which has long been a fetish of western policy) in Africa, can be successful in the long run. The setting up of semi-autonomous barbarous states, he said, will in time reproduce the warring chaos of Europe since the middle ages, but on a more primitive level of savagery. Another expert amused his audience by debunking the genealogical trees of ancient families boasting "pure" race. This was published by many journals as a good piece of fun, but I did not notice that any of them saw the serious im-

plications. It is indeed not important whether anybody can trace direct descent from a tenth-century Dane or "Saxon" or an eleventh-century Norman. The undermining of such pretensions may annoy a few snobs but it does not seem to let in the light in adequate quantities.

More important than showing that racial "purity" is almost non-existent is to settle the pressing question whether it ought to be made an ideal. The moment you try to answer such a question you come up against our ignorance about racial values. Even if the question is confined to the limited sphere of the white races—sometimes grouped as Caucasians—there is very little evidence of a trustworthy nature as to the comparative value to civilisation of each of the races, and none as to the desirability or otherwise of mixing them. Whether desirable or not, from any point of view—biological, mental, spiritual—the mixing of the white races has gone on freely since they became settled communities. From the hey-day of the Roman Empire the mixing has become an almost inevitable consequence of material enrichment and increased inter-communication.

Perhaps the case in favour of some degree of racial admixture is sufficiently proved—notwithstanding the failure of science to find a verdict—by purely empirical data. If that vast melting-pot, the United States of America, has not been simmering long enough to yield other than isolated and inconclusive signs of the results of mixing

Mediterranean, Scandinavian, Germanic and Slav stocks, there must be fairly conclusive evidence awaiting examination in Europe. A writer who is himself Anglo French (but more English than many writers with English names) may be excused for remarking here that a not inconsiderable quantity of the finest human material in England and the Scottish Lowlands is the consequence of similar racial fusions.

An indication of the constant fusion going on since the Norman invasion is the fact that none of the English royal families has been purely English. Even the word "English" covers Celtic, Germanic and Scandinavian (the Normans were Scandinavian); but if those earlier mixtures are left out of account, we can still trace in available records since the Tudors the widespread results of French and Spanish admixtures. Since the accession of the Hanoverian dynasty in Britain there has been a large influx of Germans. Many of our famous *littérateurs* and scientists belong to families of Latin-Germanic or Latin-Celtic blood; and if one may hazard a guess based on a few instances, the families that were German in origin in modern times have tended to produce individuals of distinction in music and such branches of science as specially involve mathematics, like astronomy and physics. The French and Spanish strains are probably more notable in literature and the other arts, and in scientific crafts like engineering. These are guesses, I admit, although suggested by cer-

tain individuals, whom I do not name because the mention of only a few names would merely increase whatever wrong tendency there may be in my generalisations. The main point is that nobody else can do better, because sufficient evidence has not been collated.

In his provocative and tentative study, "British Genius," Mr. Havelock Ellis noted the probable results of Celtic infusion with the "English" strain, but it was outside his province to pay proper attention to the later important mixtures, and he is necessarily vague about the implication of "English". Some of his tables compiled to show the distribution of various kinds of talent are of highly conjectural character simply because he lacked enough information. And those later admixtures count for more than is generally realised, partly no doubt because many distinguished persons of mixed blood have acquired English surnames through the male line during the past hundred years or so.

But here is one fact, so important and suggestive that it may be considered worth an armoury of lesser facts. The writer was startled (having done a biography on this great man in entire ignorance of the fact) to be reliably told recently that the late Sir Ronald Ross, the poet-scientist who discovered the secret of malaria transmission by mosquitoes while working in India, was the grandson of an Indian Princess. We are so ignorant that we cannot say how much of his genius, or what special qual-

ity of it, he owed to this addition to an Anglo-Scottish inheritance. How many other distinguished Anglo-Indian families (the British in India) have what is vulgarly spoken of, in stupid contempt, as "native blood"? When we recall some instances of the more stupid and barbarous type of Anglo-Indian of the recent past, of apparently "pure" Anglo-Saxon descent, it seems desirable that many more such families should get "mixed" blood.

The reference above to German immigrants must have put many people in mind of the German Jews, who have probably almost equalled Germans as immigrants to this country. Modern Jewry resembles the rest of the world at least in respect of its confusion upon the racial issue. A very learned Jewish friend of mine has assured me that it is divided between the orthodox who jealously try to preserve their racial purity and the unorthodox who have adopted racial mixture as a policy. Their view—it is little realised outside Jewry—is not only that mixture with other races must undermine Anti-Semitism in Europe and the United States, but that it is also well justified eugenically. But again it is doubtful if any organised study of the results of Jew-Gentile marriages has ever been attempted or contemplated. And yet the proportion of well-known British families, both lords and commoners, who could supply interesting and valuable evidence, must be, to say the least, much greater than is at present realised.

The empirical argument in favour of some degree of racial ad-

mixture—that is among the Caucasian peoples,—has been employed here for want of the kind of evidence which it is the function of science to acquire.

There is another empirical argument, which leans heavily against the mixing of white and coloured races. It is however full of contradictions, even when it draws upon the big American problem of the Negro and the Whites. Many undesirable types are known to have resulted not only from such mixing in the United States, but from unions also between South African blacks and whites, Indian whites and browns, American whites and browns, and world-white mixtures of whites and yellows. Unfortunately we seem to hear much less about the undoubtedly numerous good types that have resulted from such unions, and the evidence about the bad types seems often to be tainted by the barbarous prejudice that is implicit in the very meaning of phrases like “half-breed,” “dago,” and even the innocent word “colour”. There are Anglo-Saxon backwoodsmen to this day who believe that all other races, including the inhabitants of Italy, France and Spain (who are “dagos” to them), are

just a sort of mistake of the Deity. It has not occurred to these fools that many native tribes in Africa can equal their contempt for other races, only the object of contempt is changed to the *lack* of pigmentation.

Barbarous prejudice depends upon ignorance. Science has not yet made coherent and enlightened thought about racial policies possible. But the problem cannot be evaded much longer without disaster. A visit to the slums of the chief British (and of course other European and American) ports will supply anybody with an object lesson on the dangers of racial mixture and the difficulty of preventing it. But it is necessary to remember that the majority of such mixed unions are outside the pale of social approval, and therefore generally between poor specimens of both the races involved. Thus the eugenic side of the argument remains obscure.

There is so much irrational feeling on this subject that I am sure few journals in Britain or the United States would print so candid an article as this, which is a symptom of the necessity for thoughtful publicity.

R. L. MÉGROZ

THE STIGMATA ENIGMA

[In this analysis of the phenomena associated with Teresa Neumann, the much-discussed stigmatist of Konnersreuth, **George Godwin** rightly repudiates the supernatural as an explanation, but gives, perhaps, too little credit to the possible superphysical causes. The reader's attention is invited to the note which follows the article.—Eds.]

The term stigmata is used in medicine, and also for the allegedly supernatural appearance of the wounds of Christ on certain individuals. I am concerned here only with this latter phenomenon.

The earliest example of the stigmata was that of St. Francis of Assisi. It is said that while in his cell on Mount Avernus a seraph appeared to him and produced upon his body the five wounds of the cross, one of which, it is said, bled occasionally. Pope Alexander IV declared that he had seen these marks, both before and after the saint's death, and he may have done so. Whatever the evidential value of old records of the appearance of stigmata, modern instances leave no possible doubt as to their occurrence. The issue resolves itself into the problem of causation.

The case of Teresa Neumann is remarkable in many ways. A poor peasant girl whose whole life has been lived in the tiny Bavarian village of Konnersreuth, Teresa, exhibits the stigmata; speaks in Aramaic—the language of Christ—while in ecstasy; describes accurately the topography of ancient Jerusalem and gives a circumstantial account of the Crucifixion that differs from the New Testament accounts. In addition to these mar-

vels, Teresa abstains from all food and drink, and is said to have done so for more than five years.

The issue is, then, obviously, one between faith and a rational explanation. For those who hold that the long years of misery and illness that have transformed this formerly healthy peasant girl into a chronic invalid are a sign of divine grace there is no more to be said. But for those who cannot accept that view, either on account of the interference with natural law involved, or because of the obstacles in the way of attributing to God so purposeless a manifestation of power, the scientific approach to the enigma is the only possible one.

Very briefly, I propose to examine the case of Teresa Neumann from this angle. During the War, when she was a child, Teresa Neumann had a bad accident at a time when she was suffering from the emotional strain of taking the place of her father, then a soldier. The injury left her paralysed for years. On Sunday, May 17th, 1925, she reported a vision, got out of bed and walked. Soon after this she began to exhibit the stigmata, wounds in hands, feet and side, with bleeding from the eyes. The phenomenon is permanent, but the bleeding takes place on every Friday of the

week only, when the stigmatist passes into a trance state and lives the Passion of Christ. It is in this state that Teresa has spoken in Aramaic, of which she could have had no possible knowledge by ordinary means. The abstention from food, claimed to have lasted for years, has been investigated for fourteen days, during which time the witnesses, two Catholic nurses, attest that the patient took nothing at all. During that period, however, Teresa gained somewhat in weight. To summarize, there were (*a*) an accident, with shock, and (*b*) emotional strain, as antecedent conditions. And these were followed by (*a*) paralysis, (*b*) sudden recovery of function, (*c*) visions or hallucinations, and (*d*) prolonged fasting.

The clinical picture of Teresa Neumann is that of a typical hysteric, this disease always affecting the whole nervous system without discoverable cause in organic disease. Its characteristics are an exaggerated self-consciousness, tumultuous emotion and a passion for sympathy and notoriety. Here, then, we can see, perhaps, the light; that is, so far as the type we are concerned with is involved. Teresa fits exactly the true pathological picture of the hysteric. Her subsequent symptoms carry us a step further, all her behaviour being that of an hysteric. Her fast—the typical anorexia nervosa (hatred of eating) of the hysteric—no doubt began with the motor disturbance, the “globus” or lump in the throat. She constantly complained that she could not eat because to do so

caused great pain. This condition is common in hysteria, but it is generally found that the patient takes food in secret, for hysterical symptoms manifest themselves always in the presence of others. It has been scientifically demonstrated that the human body cannot live fourteen days without food or drink. Yet it is claimed that Teresa has so lived for years. To accept that is to accept the miraculous indeed. Without any sort of reflection on the honesty of this stigmatist, it may therefore be put forward in explanation, and on scientific authority, that she probably eats in secret unknown to herself. Witness the very fact that while under observation—and one cannot withhold the suggestion that her watchers were sympathetic, being co-religionists — Teresa gained weight. The inference is overwhelming.

As to the miraculous recovery from paralysis, here, again, there is a simple medical explanation. It is that the disease was functional; *i. e.*, induced by abnormal mental disturbance, just as were that vast group of such cases known as shell shock.

We come now to the stigmata, the existence of which is not disputed, being far too well authenticated. Now in hysteria, accompanied by anorexia nervosa, the trophic or digestive derangement frequently leads to blue oedema. If either hands or feet are pressed, they puff up, the skin becomes stretched and glossy and a violet-red mark results. Skin in such a condition may easily be self-induc-

ed to bleed and any such wound, thus self-inflicted, may as easily be kept open. Is it stretching probability to suggest that Teresa Neumann is the author of the wounds she bears about her?

The so-called miraculous bleeding is as easily accounted for without resource to the supernatural. The mind has a vast power over the body and suggestion is amply sufficient to account for the periodical effusion of blood. It is interesting to note that this particular phenomenon synchronized with the cessation of another normal periodical function.

The ecstasy, or trance state, also fits in with medical science, and so we come to the enigmatic utterances to which Teresa has given voice in that state. It is one of the most interesting of all the Konnersreuth marvels. Since the claim is so astonishing, it may be as well to set down the evidence of its occurrence. It comes from a sceptic, Professor Wutz, an Aramaic scholar. He has gone on record to the effect that all attempts made by him to trick Teresa failed, and that she spoke idiomatically the language spoken by Christ. Space forbids a full survey of this interesting manifestation. But the first thing to be said about it is that it is not unique and has been known in cases where no question of hysteria arose. Professor Richet, who investigated several cases, formed the theory that the faculty results from a psychic state called by him Cosmic Consciousness. The case of Patience Worth, who addressed a Greek in his own

language without any knowledge of it, is perhaps the best known example of xenoglossy, or polyglot-mediumship. But there have been many others and it seems likely that the explanation will come eventually from the psychologist.

That the mind of Teresa Neumann in her abnormal state may have become free in Time and Space is a theory offering fewer objections than the orthodox Catholic view of the phenomenon. For, aside from the force of the medical view, one, in this case, supported by Professor Ewald, a noted psychologist, there remains the even weightier objection that is based on ethics and common sense. For, if we are to accept, as God-willed, the virtual destruction of a human creature, body and mind, for the production of a purposeless marvel, then we have to conceive of a deity who resorts to methods that would be despised by a necromancer.

It is obvious to common sense that no divine purpose is served by the suffering of Teresa Neumann, a girl of natural limited mental capacity. And this cursory examination of the enigma of Konnersreuth surely suggests that an alternative hypothesis exists into which the facts fit themselves. It is of course, that Teresa Neumann is an hysteric with mediumistic powers in a trance state. It is probable that her health, so long neglected, is past repair and that her sufferings are now a source of pleasure to her, fulfilling her craving for notoriety—that craving exhibited by every hysteric.

In this case, the enigma of the stigmata reveals a personal tragedy. Nor is it improbable that the whole history of the stigmatis, from St. Francis, Catherine

Benincases, better known as St. Catherine of Siena, down to Anna Katherina Emmerich and Louise Lateau, is but a record of unrecognised hysteria.

GEORGE GODWIN

A NOTE ON THE ABOVE

The powers and faculties of the inner man are still *terra incognita* for most of our scientists, including psychologists, and it is not surprising therefore that such a phenomenon as that of stigmata is not yet understood. Occult science, while rejecting the possibility of the supernatural and the miraculous, recognizes the power of thought on matter and explains its rationale. While agreeing with materialistic science in discarding the theories of "divine grace" and "God's will" as the cause of the peculiar ailment described in the article, it does not resort to the hypothesis that the girl is herself "the author of the wounds she bears about her," after the fashion of Mr. Godwin. Mr. Godwin diagnoses Teresa Neumann's disease as hysteria. Agreed. But what is hysteria? The greatest medical authorities to-day confess that though the symptoms are known, the disease itself remains a mystery, the cause of which has not been discovered. It is classed among nervous disturbances, yet actual physiological lesion can be observed. The theory that the ailment was caused by some trouble in the uterus (hence the name hysteria, from the Greek *hustera*) and that therefore only women could suffer

from it, has now been abandoned, since hysterical accidents have been observed in men. Occult science classifies hysteria among psychic mediumistic ailments producing peculiar trance conditions in which the conscious or unconscious potency of the mind over the body manifests itself to an abnormal degree. Without going into the technicalities we wish to point to a few well recognized phenomena of hysteria which clearly indicate the change brought about in *the physical body itself*. Take for example the change in the sensitiveness of body. A hysterical patient during a crisis may become absolutely immune to any outward touch. The body is in a complete state of anaesthesia, and the patient can be pricked all over the body without feeling it at all. A lethargic sleep is also a frequent symptom. The patient falls into a prolonged sleep and cannot be awakened. Cases are on record of patients who thus slept for weeks and even months at a stretch, during which no food or water was taken. When the patient wakes up, he does so without any apparent disorder and finds himself at once in the normal waking state. Stranger still is the well-known phenomenon of false or nervous pregnancy as it is

called. This is how modern medical science describes it: A woman intensely desirous of having a child may think she is pregnant, and goes through the early stages of pregnancy, only to find in the end that it was but an illusion. And yet all the symptoms are there, so that even the doctor cannot always know that it is not real until the fourth month. Menstruation stops, the breasts swell and are sensitive, the uterus expands, the patient suffers from morning sickness, etc., etc. Cases have been observed where even at the fourth month the patient thinks the quickening has taken place, and feels the movements of the foetus. Very frequently the breasts secrete a white liquid "that looks like milk," says the Medical Encyclopedia. And all these physical changes and symptoms are caused, we are told, by the combination of a passionate wish for a child and the woman's imagination. If a woman's desire can actually bring about such unmistakable physiological symptoms, why, we ask, cannot the desire of another human being produce stigmata? Do not all such phenomena, and those of hypnosis, demonstrate the action of mind upon matter? Nor are such occurrences only possible in the case of individuals psychically inclined. Any normal person under the stimulus of a very violent emotion can unconsciously exercise this same power. Intense fear has been known to turn white the hair of a young person over night. Is this action

of fear upon the colour of the hair not as extraordinary as the appearance of wounds? We quote another interesting case recorded in *Isis Unveiled* (I. 398):—

"Two young ladies, in Poland, were standing by an open window during a storm. A flash of lightning fell near them, and the gold necklace on the neck of one of them was melted. A perfect image of it was impressed upon the skin, and remained throughout life. The other girl, appalled by the accident to her companion, stood transfixed with horror for several minutes, and then fainted away. Little by little the same mark of a necklace as had been instantaneously imprinted upon her friend's body, appeared upon her own and remained there for several years, when it gradually disappeared."

Esoteric philosophy has detailed explanations of stigmatization which belongs to the same group of abnormal phenomena as birthmarks. The *modus operandi* of such manifestations cannot be fully explained or understood without a consideration of that which in Occult philosophy is termed the Astral Body. What H. P. Blavatsky wrote in another connection equally applies to stigmatization and kindred phenomena:—

The whole issue of the quarrel between the profane and the esoteric sciences depends upon the belief in, and demonstration of, the existence of an astral body within the physical, the former independent of the latter.
—*The Secret Doctrine*, II, 149.

A CROSS OF LIGHT

[**Geoffrey West** continues his biographical studies of European Occultists. In our previous numbers he wrote of Paracelsus ; here in four essays he examines the influence and activities of four extraordinary characters of the eighteenth century.

We are purposely grouping these together so as to enable the reader to note the similarity of aim and purpose each had at heart and the continuity of the teaching which shows itself in their actions.—Eds.]

I—THE COMTE DE SAINT-GERMAIN

In the sixteenth century—Paracelsus, the Seed ! Two hundred years later—the Flowering !

Europe in the eighteenth century was the credulous playground of wonder-workers. Scepticism breeds credulity ; he who begins by believing nothing may well end by believing everything. There were many charlatans, now mostly forgotten, though a few records, such as the cynical confessions of Casanova, survive to show how men and women might become the dupes of their religious hunger—and how there were always men and women waiting to take advantage of them. But certain other names remain, of individuals who *claimed* no more than the charlatans, yet perhaps *did* more. What more easy for a West which since then has rather systematised and deepened its scepticism than reduced it, to set the Saint-Germains, the Cagliostros and their like beside the Casanovas and *their* like? *What more easy, and yet . . .*

The Comte de Saint-Germain is, it must be confessed, less than any of his contemporaries a subject for the “sober” historian. He conforms to none of the rules ; he is neither here nor there. Not only are his beginning and his end hidden in mystery, but stories relating to both, and seemingly all of equal authenticity, are definitely contradictory. There can be no doubt of his existence, or of his movements about Europe over a period of approximately forty years, of his friendships in high places and of the general high regard in which he was held in many lands, but the fact remains that we possess scarcely any statement regarding him, whatever its degree of authority, that does not very quickly pass over into what most readers to-day will deem the realm of the fantastic.

His actual appearance and personality are in no dispute. Every account of him proclaims a single identity. He is a man of middle

age, but well-preserved, of medium height and build, simply and tastefully dressed, his only jewellery magnificent diamond buckles. His complexion is dark, he has black hair, wide-set fine eyes, white teeth. The chin is rounded almost feminine, but saved from weakness by the intellectual cast of the regular features, the intelligent expression of the mobile penetrating glance. His manners are of the most admirable; all accorded him charm, grace, courtliness, a true refinement. Though he has his enemies, all men respect him; he is received everywhere as a welcome guest, and even in the palaces of kings—at Versailles, at the court of Frederick the Great—he appears as no humble sycophant but as a man to whom all ranks are one. With Louis XV and Madame de Pompadour he is on terms of intimacy, spending hours at Versailles with the Royal Family. Among his personal friends are Prince Ferdinand Lobkowitz, first minister of the Austrian Emperor; the Comte de Belle-Isle, the French Minister of War; the Orlov brothers, officers and favourites of Catherine the Great; Prince Kaunitz; and Prince Charles of Hesse. For a while he and the great Duc de Choiseul are on visiting terms, though later political exigencies force the Duc to denounce him—in Louis's name!

Adventurer he has been called, but history gives no substance to the term, for it has to tell of gifts given by Saint-Germain, but of none received in return. It was a peculiarity of the Comte, often remark-

ed, that he neither ate nor drank in public; he was said not to eat meat or drink wine. When he attended his friends' dinner-parties it was not to eat but to talk, as he did brilliantly, with an effortless infinite variety.

A man of gifts, this!—reputed to speak not only German, French, Italian, English, Portuguese and Spanish "perfectly" (but some said his French betrayed a Piedmontese accent), but Greek and Latin in a manner to astound scholars, while his facility in Sanskrit, Chinese and Arabic gave weight to reports of his Eastern travels. He played many musical instruments: as a violinist he was compared to Paganini—or rather, Paganini to him! He painted "beautifully".

But these were his more ordinary accomplishments, for he was also credited with the ability to charm snakes and bees, with a knowledge of physics and chemistry that extended beyond such primary experiments as the production of imitation silk from flax to the perfecting of flawed gems and the transmutation of inferior metals into a substance indistinguishable from gold. Many testified to his powers of prophecy, of passing into trances wherein he saw distant places and events and held converse with spiritual beings. It was said that he held the secret of an elixir of perpetual youth, of which he himself had drunk.

Here we approach the most startling of all the allegations concerning him. We need not take too seriously the popular rumours of his personal acquaintance with

Jesus and the Apostles, and of his servant who had been with him "only" a few hundred years. But he was certainly commonly regarded by those who knew him well as of more than ordinary age. Both the Baron de Gleichen and Madame d'Adhemar (intimate of Marie Antoinette) testified to hearing others declare in their—and his—hearing that they had known him in Venice fifty years before, about 1710, and that he had seemed even then of the same apparent age. In 1760 an acquaintance wrote of him that he was said to be over a hundred and ten years of age though he looked no more than forty-five. The accounts however are bafflingly contradictory; twenty years later he told Prince Charles of Hesse that he was eighty-eight, while an eye-witness a little earlier judged him as between sixty and seventy.

Must we despair then of assigning him either birth-date or parentage? It seems so. Some writers have sought to prove the truth of his statement to Prince Charles that he was the third son of a Prince Ragoczy of Transylvania whose estates were confiscated about the beginning of the eighteenth century for his anti-Austrian conspiracies. He was married in 1694 and died in 1736, leaving legacies in the hands of the French Crown for his youngest son. Certainly this might help to account for Louis's friendliness towards Saint-Germain, as well as for the statement that in France the King alone knew his true identity—and we do know that he frequently used the titles of Prince

Ragoczy and Prince Tzarogy (the latter an anagram of the former). Yet if this be the truth, clearly we must discount many not only of his friends' but his own recorded statements!

We have in point of fact no certain knowledge of him till nearly the mid-century, when in 1745 he was arrested in London as a Jacobite spy, and instantly released. Evidently he had already a European reputation, but it is only possible to record without comment the reports of his five years at the Court of the Shah of Persia (1737-42) and of his presentation at Versailles almost immediately upon his return. In 1746 he is living in Vienna "as a prince," and here he seems to have met Belle-Isle. Ten years later he is with Clive in India—his second visit, it is said, and an occasion of initiation into yet deeper "secrets of nature" than his earlier Eastern pilgrimages had afforded him. In 1748, and more certainly in 1757, we find him in high favour at Versailles, and in 1758 taking up residence in a suite of rooms at the royal Chateau de Chambord assigned to him by the King himself, who, to those inquiring how he should be received, replied that he must have "all the consideration due to a man of his position," and be permitted to live in his own fashion. At Chambord he drew together a group of students in his laboratory, among them the Baron de Gleichen, the Marquise d'Urfe (Casanova's unhappy dupe), and the Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst, mother of Catherine the Great.

Followed the episode of the Hague. Louis XV, it is said, had used the Comte before as a diplomatic agent. Early in 1760 he sent him to Holland. The Seven Years War was at its height. France was in peril, all Europe distressed, longing for peace. The ghost of an empty treasury haunted Versailles. The Comte's mission was twofold: to approach the Dutch bankers, and to learn the English peace-terms. Louis, always fearful, had not informed his Foreign Minister, the Duc de Choiseul, for the latter upheld the Austrian Treaty which England and Prussia strongly opposed. When the news of Saint-Germain's negotiations came to the Duc he forced the King, in a dramatic scene, to denounce his agent as an impostor and adventurer. The move deceived none, for its why and wherefore were plain to all, and Saint-Germain's passport, signed by Louis himself, made mention of his mission, but he was forced to fly to England to evade arrest. More, the name stuck—adventurer, spy, the terms were to be applied to him again and again for no better reason than the false charges of 1745 and 1760, and . . . the want of any better label!

But his later career was not that of the exposed impostor. From London he travelled to St. Petersburg, where he was concerned in the conspiracy to set Catherine on the Russian throne. We hear of him in Berlin, Holland again, Italy, always honourably received. It may have been at this period that he visited the young Mesmer in

Vienna and had at least one long talk with him. As early as 1768 he was again at Versailles and on friendly terms with the King, and he was much in Paris between 1770 and 1774, the dates respectively of the fall from power of the Duc de Choiseul and the King's death. In the next few years he was at many German cities and courts, until towards 1780 he settled with Prince Charles of Hesse in Schleswig-Holstein. There, at Eckernförde, on February 27th 1784, the church register records his death.

And *again* we are plunged into contradiction. For a year later he is invited to a conference of Freemasons at Wilhelmsbad, and is said to have attended it! Madame d'Adhemar not only records his visit to her in 1788 or so, to warn the King (Louis XVI) of the coming Revolution, but mentions his being seen in Venice about the same time. A Rosicrucian student dates their "never-to-be-forgotten" meeting in the years 1788-90. The record of his subsequent tragic appearances to Madame d'Adhemar (up to 1822) in any case enters the realm of the supernormal, but even lacking that we have, at the end as at the beginning, a story which must transcend, or at least evade, the orthodox student's judgment. He is left simply with the spectacle of a mysterious, not unattractive figure, credited with the most remarkable gifts, haunting the Europe of the eighteenth century.

To what end? Again the historian must confess defeat. Simply, there are no documents. Saint-Germain left no writings, save one

"sonnet philosophique" only "attributed" to him. It is interesting if only as showing the sort of thing he might have been expected to write—a profoundly mystical declaration to be understood exactly in the degree of the reader's own illumination. All indications point to the mystical cast of Saint-Germain's mind and thought. His travels were not the mere wanderings of a man of leisure. Wherever he journeyed he was associated with Masonic bodies and students of occult knowledge. He is said to have been a Rosicrucian of high rank, though his interests took a wider sweep than that of any single organisation. The foundation of Freemasonry in Germany is set to his credit, and Cagliostro is named as one of his most eminent initiates—though this may be rather an addition to the Cagliostro *legend* than the Saint-Germain *fact*. But Mesmer

he seemingly did know, and Lavater sent him promising pupils, while his mission at least would appear to have been identical with Cagliostro's—the illumination of Western darkness with the knowledge of the Eastern seers. He was, some would say, supervisor of the Theosophical attempt to enlighten the Western world in the eighteenth century, and Madame Blavatsky declared him "certainly the greatest Oriental Adept Europe has seen during the last centuries. But Europe knew him not". There are many things, the Theosophist would say, that Europe does not know.

And certainly, regarding the extraordinary career of the Comte de Saint-Germain, the good European, bound within the narrow circle of his assured knowledge, cannot evade the impression that here indeed is something that he does *not* know.

II—CAGLIOSTRO

"A *famous* Adept, whose real name is claimed (by his enemies) to have been Joseph Balsamo. He was a native of Palermo, and studied under some mysterious foreigner of whom little has been ascertained. His accepted history is too well known to need repetition, and his real history has never been told."

Theosophical Glossary.

"Guiseppe Balsamo (for such was the "count's" real name). . . ."

Encyclopædia Britannica, 14th Ed.

Cagliostro ! Balsamo !—iostro-alsamo-ostro-amo. . . . The names reverberate down the years, seemingly inextricably intermingled. Yet are they really inseparable? The first identification of the famous Count Cagliostro, friend of princes and man of mysteries, with

the unimpressive Sicilian adventurer, was made *possibly* in 1777 by a rascally London attorney but more certainly in 1786, after the fiasco of the Diamond Necklace affair, by the blackmailing editor of a French paper published in London, apparently at the instiga-

tion of a government eager to discredit an innocent man just banished from its domains. The allegation was eagerly adopted five years later by the Inquisition authorities in Rome to defame the public figure who was then their prisoner, and thereafter passed into general currency, practically until the publication of Trowbridge's* vindication (to which all students of Cagliostro must be indebted) in 1910. It remains even to-day, stamped and sealed by the blind prejudice of Carlyle, the common version.

The confusion is complicated by the fact that occult writers, have found in the name Balsamo a cabalistic significance clearly attaching only to the larger figure, and have, moreover, accepted for Cagliostro the Sicilian origin born of the Balsamo story. Yet there is no real evidence for the identification. With the doubtful, and in any case dubious, exception of Aylett, the London attorney, Trowbridge says rightly that "nobody that had *known* Balsamo ever *saw* Cagliostro". The problem becomes finally one of psychological probability. We can solve it only by considering what is known of Cagliostro *as* Cagliostro, then looking backward to his own and the Balsamo versions of his earlier life, and using our judgment to declare which fits the better into the total conspectus. Even a glance may suffice for those who have eyes to perceive.

Count Cagliostro makes his first certain appearance as such in the

summer of 1776, blazes for less than ten years with an ever-increasing brilliance across the European skies, then swiftly recedes to vanish in the eclipse of obloquy and an Inquisition dungeon five years before his presumed death in 1795. He is, when he appears in London with his young and beautiful wife, not yet thirty years of age, a short, stoutish figure with round face and rather thick nose, full lips—not handsome, not especially attractive at a glance, yet with dark piercing eyes that compel attention and a pleasing manner of conversation. He has means, though little worldly wisdom to preserve them; in eighteen months in London a gang of scoundrels are able, largely by the involved processes of English law, to rob him of three thousand guineas. Yet a higher wisdom is his. It is said that in London he becomes a Freemason, yet his initiation must be merely formal (as he himself said), for a very few months later he is received by the Dutch lodges with high honours and is reported as discoursing to "enraptured thousands" upon "magic and Masonry," and soon is founding new lodges in Italy and Germany in accordance with that Egyptian Rite which is his own special teaching, and purifying other German lodges of "satanism". These are scarcely the usual activities of a novice!

Thereafter, at the order of a superior Fraternity he is pledged not to name, he travels eastward to establish the Egyptian Rite in

* *Cagliostro*.—By W. R. H. Trowbridge (Allen & Unwin. London.

Courland, Russia, and Poland. In Mittau and Warsaw he succeeds, winning flattering attention from the great; why he fails in St. Petersburg it is, in absence of evidence, impossible even to suggest. He returns, but wastes no time, for his triumphant public entry into Strasburg a few months later, in September 1780, proves an already wide fame as miraculous healer and man of knowledge. He is entering upon, from the worldly point of view, his most splendid period. He cures the sick, mostly among the poor but not turning the rich away, accepting reward from neither. More, he bestows princely gifts, but receives none in return. The powerful Cardinal de Rohan, Bishop of Strasburg, Grand Almoner of France, becomes his friend, carries him to Paris to save the life of the Prince de Soubise. His reputation grows. From Strasburg he journeys hither and thither, healing, prolific in charity, yet never forgetting his primary mission, the inculcation of the Egyptian Rite, the higher enlightenment of a misguided Masonry. Three years pass. Then, weary of the persecution of resentful doctors, he leaves Strasburg for ever. He goes to Naples, then for a year to Bordeaux, famous centre of mystical theurgy, where the followers of Mesmer and of Martin Pasqualis have prepared the ground for him but where also his success arouses envy and attack. So he comes to Lyons, to found the famous lodge of Triumphant Wisdom.

Would he had remained there, at least a little longer. But de Rohan

calls him to Paris. Thither he goes, where the web is already being woven for his downfall. The whole affair of the Diamond Necklace is no more than the scheme of an adventuress to possess herself of valuable gems by an imposture upon de Rohan in the Queen's name. Yet it will wreck lives and totter thrones. The charge of Cagliostro's complicity is but a bow drawn at a venture by a desperate woman. From February to August, while the plot deepens, he and his Countess become the latest sensation of a blindly pleasure-seeking aristocracy—necessarily, it would appear, by "phenomena" rather than wisdom—the toys of Greatness, received, if not by the Court itself, at any rate by the Court mistresses! The blow falls. De Rohan, Cagliostro, among others, are arrested. Only after nine months in the Bastille is Cagliostro acquitted, and simultaneously banished from France for ever. Calumniated, robbed by the police, exiled, he comes again to London, to take up his task once more. But his star is setting. The *Courier de l'Europe* publicly identifies him with Balsamo in a series of vicious articles. His fellow-Masons forsake him. A few years more he wanders about Europe, banished from this town, expelled from that, sinking with his wife into ever deeper poverty, until at last he is arrested in Rome, tried as a heretic by the Inquisition, sentenced to death and then, "by special grace and favour" (and, it is also said, following the appearance of a mysterious stranger within

the Vatican) "to perpetual imprisonment without any hope of pardon whatever". He survives but a few years, dying apparently in 1795 in the most miserable degradation. His unhappy Countess had already died, also in confinement. She is sometimes said to have been a Jesuit spy because she gave evidence against him at his trial. The suggestion is unnecessary. A rack is a persuasive argument, especially to a frail and lovely woman!

This is the man, and the career, to which we are asked to attach as prologue the rascalities of the humbly-born Balsamo, expelled as incorrigible by the religious brotherhood which educated him, known as thief, forger, swindler, prostituting his wife and making her a means of blackmail. Clairvoyant and "magic" powers are ascribed to him, but these were the common tricks of every adventurer of that day, and, moreover, his story has clearly been doctored by the addition of travestied episodes from Cagliostro's life to make the identification more plausible. Thus Balsamo is made to meet at Messina "the noble Althotas" whom Cagliostro had in court named as his tutor at Medina, where he claimed he was brought up under the name Acharat. *Althotas, he said, taught him many Eastern tongues and secrets. When he was twelve they went to Mecca, and presently on to Egypt, where the sanctuaries of pyramids and temples were opened to him. It was at Malta, in his eighteenth year, that he first adopt-*

ed European dress and the title of Count Cagliostro. There also Althotas died. For ten years he travelled about Europe, growing in wisdom, before his visit to London in 1776. He was married in 1770.

Now Cagliostro's account is as unauthenticated as his identification with Balsamo, yet which of these accounts bears the more likely relation to the Cagliostro of later life. Even the Inquisition biographer, regarding Balsamo, had to exclaim: "How could such a man without either physical or intellectual qualities, devoid of education, connections, or even the appearance of respectability . . . have succeeded as he did?" As Trowbridge says, How, indeed! And turning to Cagliostro's story, and the circumstances of its narration, must we not again echo Trowbridge in finding it "hard to believe that any man placed in so serious a situation as Cagliostro. . . would have ventured to *invent* a story calculated to increase the suspicion it was his object to allay".

Is not Cagliostro's version, with all its difficulties, infinitely the more consistent even with the purely exoteric figure of the man moving easily in circles both socially and intellectually exalted, a beneficent healer giving all and receiving nothing, one able to win the respectful attention of the most learned Masonic bodies of the day? Actually, of course, more may be read, has been read, into his life. He has been seen as agent of some of the libertarian secret societies of the time—the Illuminés and the like—which

worked, often in alliance with Masonry, for the overthrow of tyranny; here, it is said, lies the secret of his mysterious wealth. Well, their aims were not inconsistent with, if irrelevant to, true religion, but *his* highest aim was certainly religious, on a high plane of enlightenment transcending sectarian divisions. Even at the bar of the Inquisition he rebuked religious intolerance and maintained the equality of religions: "providing one believed in the existence of a Creator and the immortality of the soul, it mattered not whether one was Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, or Jew". The Egyptian Rite of Masonry, declared by his enemies to derive from a manuscript bought on a London bookstall, he himself ascribed to the ancient prophets Enoch and Elias. To himself, in Egypt and the East, the true teaching had been given, that he might restore the lost purity of Masonry, reveal anew the path of moral and physical regeneration to female equally with male initiates. The procedure of initiation still survives in rare records; but it was at best only the gateway to that secret teaching which caused the delegates of the French lodges to acclaim in him "a promise of truth which none of the great masters had so completely developed before".

He did not claim either name or title as his own, suggested them indeed as "rather a disguise not to appear what I am" than appellations of excessive honour. Others termed him the Wandering Jew, the Anti-Christ, gave him all the

common ascriptions of superstition. Yet is it merely superstition that sees in him one of those Nameless Ones who take to themselves many shapes and titles to impart throughout the ages a single ageless truth? We have little reliable record of his contacts with comparable contemporaries. Rumour tells of a meeting with the Comte de Saint-Germain; it may or may not be legend. The Martinists he must have known, if not Saint-Martin himself, and Mesmer he almost certainly did meet. But whatever their actual relations, their teachings were one, and they exercised, notably in their healing powers, the same "mesmeric" forces.

Yet if Cagliostro the charlatan fades away as the invention of calumny, the figure who replaces him is not reproachless. A man—whatever else—moving in the most worldly circles of the most worldly century modern European history records, he did not escape the taint of his environment. His sins were largely venial—vanity, love of applause, the desire to impress—but they led him to abuse his powers, to make a display of them, even to indulge in pretences. These things were sometimes noticed, and offended some of the best of those who sought in him the pure spirit. Perhaps we have here one reason why his influence was in general so short-lived—not merely the attacks of enemies, but a treachery within himself. He made a series of mistakes, and was, it is said, "recalled". Stories are told of his appearance upon earth many

years after his supposed death in the San Leo prison. Into these we cannot enter. The day of Cagliostro, as such, was really ended in

that fatal month of January 1785 when at de Rohan's call he left his work at Lyons to become the vogue of Paris!

III—LOUIS CLAUDE DE SAINT-MARTIN

As all sorts of men are needed to make a world, so no single teacher can suffice to instruct them all. For to every man knowledge must come, if at all, upon the level of understanding to which he has attained. Some gospels may be cried in the market-place; the more precious are better heard amid a small circle of attentive intimates, or dwelt upon in the quiet pages of some printed book. Truth hath everywhere her spies, and no man is safe from them though he barricade his heart and close the shutters of his intellect. The moment of danger is that when he becomes aware, in some aspect of existence hitherto disregarded or despised, of the presence of a Mystery profounder than all his previous knowledge. The true teacher is he who can create that state of troubled expectation, when the soul lies truly open, receptive, and can, also, impregnate it with potent seed. Amid the barren rationalism of eighteenth century France moved many exponents of a deeper illumination, each having his own methods and his own success—or failure. In one sphere the brilliant figures, the reported wonders of Cagliostro and Saint-Germain most effectively invaded the frontiers of scepticism; contemporary with them, and also frequenting distinguished social and intellectual

circles in pre-Revolutionary France, was the no less fascinating personality of Louis Claude de Saint-Martin, who steadfastly rejected the adventitious aids of "phenomena" and drew to himself the regard of his fellow men simply by the clear flame of his pure spirituality.

Of all the eighteenth-century mystics of theosophical acclaim, none perhaps commands the sympathy of the modern Western mind more than Saint-Martin. Even the superficial scepticism which would dismiss Cagliostro and some of his fellows as charlatans is compelled to discern in Saint-Martin's disregard of the pomps and vanities of his world a purity of essence which in comparison reveals their own aims and desires as gross and transitory things. Not that he was a hermit or anchorite. He accepted his world for what it was, lived in it, formed friendships, played his part in the state to which he was born, yet always without worldliness, without taint of greed or ambition. High as his rank was, he even accepted the Revolution, serving the new government loyally and seeking only to play his little part in counteracting its blind materialism. His best he gave to his books, yet claimed no credit for them; his name appeared in none of them in his own lifetime.

He was born in 1743, at Amboise, in Touraine, of noble parentage (though he was not, and never claimed the title of, a Marquis). His mother died almost at his birth, but he was happy in his home ; his father, if stern, was evidently attached to him, and he grew up in the loving attention of a devoted step-mother. He was educated, at home and college, in the strict Catholic faith, but a book on self-knowledge, read in youth, gave him an early leaning towards independent spiritual thought, and at eighteen he could say : " There is a God, I have a soul, and no more is wanted for wisdom." In essence, that was to be his teaching to the end !

He attended a college of jurisprudence, and actually qualified for a legal career, but he was not happy in the prospect, and immediately abandoned it, with his father's somewhat grudging consent, to become an officer in the army. The choice might seem even more incongruous for one whose mind was clearly centred upon the things of the spirit, yet it might be paralleled in our own day. And it was destiny, surely, which brought him to Bordeaux, where his regiment was stationed, in 1766. For thither also, in the following year, came the man whom to the end of his life he was to acknowledge as his master, Martines de Pasqually, a mysterious individual of uncertain antecedents but undoubted occult and spiritual attainments, who established there the headquarters of his own Order of Elect Priests, a body devoted to study of

the mysteries. Saint-Martin was initiated into the Order in 1768, and undoubtedly owed much to it and to Pasqually, but already his spiritual gaze was turned inward rather than outward, and though he could never doubt the success attained in the theurgic operations of the lodge, he was driven often to ask : " But, Master, is all this necessary to gain a knowledge of God ? " In 1771 he resigned his commission, to his father's anger, but though he lacked means he went his quiet way unswervingly. He visited Paris and Lyons, but Bordeaux remained his headquarters until some while after Pasqually went abroad in 1772 nevermore to return in the flesh. His first book, *Of Errors and of Truth*, was published in 1775 to achieve a wide success. Thenceforward, at least to the Revolution, he never lacked distinguished patrons (notably the Duchess of Bourbon) who delighted to set their homes at his disposal that he might carry on his studies and writing. He was sometimes in Paris, sometimes in Lyons ; he visited London, Italy, and—it is said—Russia. He lived in Strasbourg from 1788, the year of his discovery of Boehme, till 1791, when the illness of his father, who died two years later, recalled him to Amboise. During the critical years of the Revolution he was partly at Amboise, which " scarcely felt the storm," and partly in Paris, where the mob swept through the streets outside his very door. In 1794 the decree exiling all nobility from the city sent him

back to Amboise, but he soon returned as a pupil at the newly-established École Normale, which, however, was soon abolished. He continued to write and publish books mainly upon various aspects of the spiritual life until his peaceful death in 1803.

His own spiritual history is commonly divided into three periods, supposedly dominated by Pasqually, Swedenborg, and Boehme respectively, but Mr. A. E. Waite, in his profound study and exposition of Saint-Martin published in 1901, has shown clearly that despite his own somewhat effusive acknowledgments he owed comparatively little to Swedenborg or even Boehme, and that he was, "in the last analysis, *at all times sui generis*". That is certainly true in the sense that, from the age of eighteen forward, he sought God mainly in his own soul. His experience as initiate of the Order of Elect Priests led him to respect, but also to suspect, the practical usages of occultism, alchemy, mesmerism, and the like. He felt, as of numbers (though he held "numerical mysticism" in high regard), that they touched "merely the bark of things". One might find meanings in them which were not the true meanings; "physical communication" was possible not only with good but also with evil beings. Many of his friends were Masons, and he occasionally addressed Masonic and similar bodies on mystical subjects, but it was in the heart, not in the lodge, that he felt his wisdom assured. Truth lay in the microcosm, not the macrocosm; Divinity not in the visible

world but the invisible soul. Man, though the most ancient and highest of all the order of Nature, had come forth last from the Divine Centre to draw all being into unity again. By lapse of will he fell, and had dwelt ever since in "privation" of faculty and condition, supplanted in the scheme of things by the Active and Intelligent Cause, who as "the Repairer" (that is, the Christ) would show him the path of regeneration. Falling by failure of will, by will must men attain that spiritual re-birth which is the first gateway on the upward path. That Essential Divinity might, indeed *must*, be experienced directly by the individual was Saint-Martin's perpetual teaching. He went further:—

Be certain that no tradition or initiation of man can ever be sure of leading you to pure communications, because God alone gives them. Hold fast therefore where you are; seek only to strip yourself of all I-hood, of all self-hood; employ your faculties only to place them altogether in His hand who only seeks to rule them all, and *laissez faire*, be passive.

That was the only way, the only surety against self-deception, the only escape from the prison of subjectivity—a profound self-annihilation before God, a spiritual denuation, a trusting transcendence of all human hopes and fears.

Yet if he sought to limit the powers of tradition and initiation, he did not deny their importance; more, in his very first book he declared explicitly that he was the recipient of and voiced a tradition that had—

always been known to some among mankind from the prime beginning of

things, and that ... will never be withdrawn wholly from the earth while thinking beings exist thereon. . . . If I am accused of disseminating an unknown doctrine, at least I must not be suspected of being its inventor. . . . The principles here expounded are the true key to all the allegories and all the mysterious fables of every people, the primitive source of every kind of instruction, and actually the pattern of those laws which direct and govern the universe, constituting all beings. In other words, they serve as a foundation to all that exists and to all that operates, whether in man and by the hand of man, whether outside man and independently of his will. Hence, in the absence of these principles there can be no real science, and it is by reason of having forgotten these principles that the earth has been given over to errors. But although the light is intended for all eyes, it is certain that all eyes are not so constituted as to be able to behold it in its splendour. It is for this reason that the small number of men who are depositaries of the truths which I proclaim are pledged to prudence and discretion by the most formal engagements.

Knowledge, he seems to be saying, must be verified in the individual soul, before it becomes spiritually valid. His teachings—the whole tenor of his writings—were those of a pupil rather than an adept. His treatment of many essential points, as that of the origin of evil, is certainly unsatisfactory, though this may be partly due to the veiled terms he felt at times compelled to adopt. He had, after the death of Pasqually in 1774, little contact or apparent concern with his more famous contemporaries teaching doctrines akin to his own. With curious persistence he avoided naming, or passing a judgment upon, Cagliostro, even in response to point-blank questioning.

He pursued his quiet way without controversy, spreading wisdom as best he might in the way he had chosen. He has commonly been regarded as the founder of the French Society of Martinists, "a kind of occult Masonic Society, its members believing in the possibility of communicating with Planetary Spirits and minor Gods and genii". Frankly, it seems scarcely consonant with his views, and Mr. Waite presents no satisfactory evidence to make one accept the statement.

Outwardly he appears to have conformed all his life to the Catholic religion, though it is said that on his death-bed he refused priestly ministrations. Certainly he had long travelled far from orthodox acceptances; he knew the larger truth, that "all men who are instructed in fundamental truths speak the same language, for they are the inhabitants of the same country". He was little concerned with the after-life; his present concern was to live *this* life fittingly. At one time he seemed to deny belief in reincarnation, but he also declared that "death should be regarded only as a relay in our journey," and that "as our material existence is not life, so our material destruction is not death".

In life his admirable character was everywhere acknowledged; he made many friends and no enemies. To-day his beautiful spirit shines clearly out of the past, a taper flame of luminous perfection no gusty winds of sectarian or scientific doctrine can destroy. To impinge upon him at any point is to be drawn to him.

IV—MESMER

The Comte de Saint-Germain, in the cold light of the Age of Reason, walked the borders of wonderland. "Europe knew him not"—knows him not to this day. Franz (or Friedrich) Anton Mesmer it knew, and does know—after its own fashion. There is not in his case, as in the other, serious dispute concerning his birth, identity, life, death, or the stir, as such, which he created in medical and scientific circles, and even in the public mind, of his day.

His history is in fact quite straightforward. He was born in 1733 or 1734 beside the Lake of Constance. After a sound education he became a student of medicine at the University of Vienna, and took there his degree as doctor in 1766. If his progress was slow thus far, it was to be rapid thereafter! He is said to have announced as early as 1772 his discovery of a universal fluid which he declared to be "the immediate agent of all the phenomena of nature, in which life originates, and by which it is preserved". Certainly by 1776 he was already widely famous for his magnetic cures, and having had revealed to him his own inherent magnetism—some would say by a chance incident, others by a meeting with a Swiss priest who cured "by manipulation alone"—had gone beyond his original practice by discarding the metal magnets he had at first employed. Some of his many cures achieved a very wide notoriety, and drew upon him the resentment of the less capable

doctors. At their incitement more than one case was taken out of his hands while the attempted cure was still incomplete, and at length either his disgust or the interference of the police caused him to leave Vienna never to return.

This was about 1778. There followed, perhaps after a brief sojourn at Spa, the amazing years in Paris, where for a while he became, like Cagliostro after him, the very talk of the town, a centre of fashionable curiosity. He was at this time in the prime of life, physically attractive, intellectually imposing, and amiable and benevolent with all his natural gravity and firmness of will—and, clearly, personal magnetism. His reputation had come before him, and from the first he was besieged by patients in such numbers that he could no longer give them personal attention, but had recourse both to human assistants, to whom he gave instruction under a promise of secrecy, and to the mechanical device of the "baquet," a vessel filled with magnetized water from which projected iron rods which the patients applied to their own bodies. The success of both was remarkable, but it quickly appeared that the Parisian doctors too, the Medical Faculty of Paris, had their baquet, their rod in pickle, to combat Mesmer himself. A long struggle took place. He was asked to treat, as a test, a number of cases selected by the Royal Society of Medicine, and his alternative suggestion that he and the Society

should simultaneously treat an equal number of cases chosen by lot was not kindly received. When eventually he independently cured some very bad patients the Society would not acknowledge his success. Nevertheless he soon had sufficient supporters even among doctors to cause the Society to attempt to excommunicate any qualified practitioner adopting his methods. In particular, the eminent Dr. Deslon, Court physician, remained his friend, presenting to the Society Mesmer's "Twenty-Seven Propositions," and it may well have been on his advice, or at least with the consciousness of his interest, that Mesmer about 1780 wrote to Marie Antoinette, who had already paid some attention to his work, to ask the protection and support of the Government. The latter responded generously, then unexpectedly retracted, began to impose conditions, one of which amounted to a pronouncement by the doctors upon the value of his system. As he had previously left Vienna, so now he left Paris, in disgust, and again for Spa. But he soon returned to continue his labours in disregard of either patronage or calumny, making, it is true, a fortune from the rich, but freely treating the poor, and always seeking, with certain precautions, to propagate the ideas and methods which are generally regarded as his discovery. If the Government would not help him he had his wealthy friends in addition to his own resources and his wife's fortune, and from 1783 a circle of "Societies of Harmony,"

for the study and practice of magnetic healing, was established in some twenty French towns—notably at Bordeaux, then a centre of occult inquiry, where the popular preacher, Père Hervier, became, in the phrase of Mr. W. H. R. Trowbridge, "the noisiest and most ardent of his admirers".

It was impossible simply to disregard him, and at last, in 1784, a Royal Commission, composed largely of the doctors who had already rejected him but also including Benjamin Franklin, was established to enquire into the whole subject of this so-called Animal Magnetism. Mesmer seems not to have appeared before it at all, and, against his wishes and protests, most of the evidence was provided by Deslon, who, with all his excellent intentions, was no true "mesmerist" at all, for he denied his friend's "universal fluid" and—like the later Hypnotists—ascribed much of its effect to "suggestion" or "imagination". In the result the main reports of the Commission summed up against Mesmer's theory though they could not deny his practical success, compromising in the admission that—

man can act upon man at any time, and almost at will by striking his imagination; . . . and that the action of man upon the imagination may be reduced to an art, and conducted with method, upon subjects who have faith.

The rejection of Mesmer's ideas was a definite blow to his prestige, but he continued his work in Paris until the Revolution compelled him to fly to Switzerland, where, after a brief return to attempt to retrieve

his wrecked fortune, he finally settled in the neighbourhood of his birthplace. His French friends begged his presence with them, and in 1814 the King of Prussia invited him to Berlin to found a hospital and teach his system there; but, though he gave instruction to the King's physician sent to him at Meersburg, he protested that he was too old to begin anew. And since he was to die in the following year, one can understand his reluctance. His middle life had been strenuous and stormy, but his old age was peaceful.

His record was one which any man might envy—to make a great discovery, to use it consistently for humanity's good, to allay suffering and restore health, to progress despite all the attacks of inevitable enemies, and at last to die, peacefully, full of years and honour—honour which still stands, for the man and ultimately, one may believe, for his teachings.

The latter have had, since 1815, a somewhat chequered career. They were, to the day of his death, still under the shadow of the Report of the Commission of 1784. But the King of Prussia's invitation indicated a growing change of opinion, and by 1820 mesmeric methods were in use in many European hospitals. A second French Commission reported more favourably in 1831, and the succeeding years witnessed a rapid return of interest, alike in Europe, Britain, and America. It is true that for the most part that interest has been to this day more in the practice than the theory—for this Mesmer's own

disciples were not a little responsible—and that the popular development of Hypnotism did in fact almost totally deny the theory; but there is to-day, perhaps, an increasing realisation that "suggestion" cannot explain everything, and that the existence of some objective force, essentially magnetic, must be assumed if the observed phenomena are to be accounted for.

What was Mesmer's discovery, the principle underlying his teaching and practical methods? It is most succinctly stated in the "Twenty-seven Propositions," from which the following is quoted:—

There exists a reciprocal influence between the heavenly bodies, the earth, and animated bodies. A fluid universally diffused, and so continuous as not to admit of any vacuum, and the subtlety of which does not allow of any comparison, and which by its nature is capable of receiving, propagating, and communicating all impulses, is the vehicle of that influence. This reciprocal action is governed by mechanical laws, at present unknown. From this action there result alternative effects, which may be considered as a flux and reflux. . . . The properties of matter and of organised bodies depend upon this operation. . . . Properties similar to those of the magnet are found in the human body; different and opposite poles can be distinguished, which can be excited, changed, destroyed, or reinforced. . . . The action and virtue of (this) Animal Magnetism can be communicated to other bodies, both animate and inanimate.

This universal fluid, linking alike stars and earth and man in a perpetual flux and reflux, whose harmony in the individual is health, whose disequilibrium illness, to be set right therefore by control of the flow itself, so that "There is

only one disease, and one cure"—what is all this but the very key to the knowledge and teaching of Paracelsus, of the wise men before him, and what this fluid but the agent underlying the occult or magical phenomena of all ages, including the "miracles" of Jesus? Mesmer was in fact the very heir of Paracelsus, who himself was the heir of wisdoms older than any Western history. In point of fact, there can be little doubt that his very process of magnetic healing was known not only to Avicenna, Cornelius Agrippa, and those who came after Paracelsus, but also to Galen, Hippocrates, and to Plato and Aristotle. Mesmer's distinction was to be the first to rouse the wide interest of the West in this very ancient truth, and to excel in its practical exercise. Equally with Paracelsus he understood the moral causes of disease, and in his definition of magnetism as "the faculty of being susceptible to all the relations of things" he came very close to the older master's conception of "virtue"—a spiritual quality!

The "discovery" of Mesmer was, in short, no discovery; it was at most a rediscovery. Was it even that? Or did Mesmer, not as doctor but as initiate, draw it from some secret unnamed source? There is undoubtedly evidence to suggest so! At least the alchemical and astrological inclination of his early interests is clear in the subject he selected for his inaugural doctrinal dissertation, a study of the influence of the planets upon

the human body "through the medium of a subtle and mobile fluid, which pervades the universe, and associates all things together in mutual intercourse and harmony". Perhaps the fact that he had already come to *that* knowledge may suggest that his reported meeting with Saint-Germain in Vienna had taken place before 1766, and therewith, one suspects, his initiation into the mystic order of the *Fratres Lucis*, or Brothers of Light, of which Martin Pasqually, Saint-Martin, and Cagliostro were also reputed members. The founding of the Societies of Harmony has been noted; it has been said that these Societies expounded not only the practical principles of Animal Magnetism but also more recondite and more definitely occult mysteries.

Mesmer, one is bound to feel, did not stand alone. He had his associations with those of like knowledge to his own. He was but the temporary agent, one of several, of a wisdom known to others before and after him. It would be, though, a mistake to see him the lesser as such. Rather the greater, as a link in that long chain which stretches from the remotest past into the incognisable future. Like Paracelsus, he was a physician whose deep understanding found its completest expression in the act of healing. But, again as with Paracelsus, behind the figure of the physician shines the white light of a more than individual, perhaps an eternal, truth. . . .

GEOFFREY WEST

THE DOCTRINE OF THE BRAHMA SUTRAS

[Elsewhere we publish a short symposium on "Influence of Indian Thought" that seems, as it were, to have karmic affinities with the following article which concludes the critical series by **Dr. R. Naga Raja Sarma**. The message of this series may be thus summarised: Contemporary research in Sanskrit philosophical texts is characterized by an alien speculative sophistry which is greatly responsible for the un-Indian expositions of Hindu philosophy. If the West has begun to seek philosophical guidance from Eastern Thought, contemporary Indian thinkers have an increased measure of responsibility. They should concentrate more on the spirit of ancient Hindu Wisdom than cater for imitative and barren philosophisms.—EDS.]

According to Indian tradition, the Brahma Sutras, also known as the Vedanta-Sutras, were composed by Sri Vedavyasa—Badarayana, whom some regard as an incarnation of the Supreme Lord Himself. A final fixation of the doctrines of the Upanishads, the systematisation of their teachings, and a rational rallying of their truths and of the fruits of philosophical quest, constituted his metaphysical mission. Whatever the value of hair-splitting judgments of the chronologists, it is obvious that the demands of the philosophical situation at the time when he composed the Sutras must have been sufficiently urgent to have made him undertake the composition of the said Sutras to secure the systematization of the teachings of the Upanishads.

As the Vedanta Sutras (Apothegms) are devoted to an interpretation and systematization of the Upanishads, it would be perfectly natural to expect that the two great doctrines of Monism and Pluralism, Absolutism and Theism, would be embodied in them. That the Sutras advocate exclusively the cause of the Monistic Metaphysics is a dogmatic assertion that is devoid of traditional as well as ra-

tional sanction. The other dictum that Pluralistic Theism is the exclusive subject-matter of the Sutras is equally devoid of the said sanctions. The Sutras are divided into four chapters. The first is known as the "Samanvayadhyaya," a chapter devoted to a harmonization of the Upanishadic texts, with the object of demonstrating that the names of different deities, used therein, only apply to and glorify the nature of the Supreme Creator of the cosmos. The second chapter, known as the "Avirodhadhyaya," is devoted to a rational refutation of rival schools. The third, "Sadhanadhyaya," explains the nature and significance of the means that should be employed to gain the goal of philosophy. The fourth, "Phaladhyaya," elucidates the concept of final emancipation which is the fruit of philosophical quest.

According to Sankara's Monistic interpretation, the Sutras proclaim the relation of identity between the Finite and the Infinite. "Amso-nana-vya-padesat," (As in some texts souls are said to be many and different from Brahman, and as in others low class persons, and

gamblers are said to be Brahman, souls are to be regarded as *Sparks* of Brahman) (II, 3, 43); "Aa-bhasa-evacha," (The jiva or the Finite self is *only* a reflection or image of Brahman) (II, 3, 50)—these and other aphorisms of a like import are cited in support of the identity doctrine. The orthodox Monistic view is upheld that somehow the one Reality pluralises itself into or engenders the appearance of different, countless centres of life and activity which have only an illusional status. Sankara commences his classic commentary on the Sutras with an enunciation of the basic and foundational doctrine that the whole existence is "Adhyasta,"—error-ridden.

Championing the Dualistic tradition, Madhva has interpreted the Sutras in support of Pluralistic Theism. "Bhedavyapadesat-cha," As difference is proclaimed I, 1, 17; "Prithagupadesat," as the two are radically different (the supreme is *Mukta*—Free; the finite is *Baddha*—Bound in meshes of transmigration) (II, 3, 28)—these and other aphorisms are cited by Dualists in their support. The Sutras begin by emphasizing the duty or obligation of every aspirant to undertake philosophical quest after the Supreme Reality. In the next aphorism, the author defines Brahman as the Supreme Power that is responsible for the origin, evolution, preservation, and final destruction of the Universe. The finite beings stand helpless, aghast at the magnitude of the Universe. They can never be identical with the Infinite. The author of the Sutras

could have entertained no mental reservation to the effect that the Brahman defined by him is only of a lower degree of reality, and that the Finite and the Infinite are fundamentally identical, notwithstanding the obvious fact that the finite beings, even the most scientifically advanced, are not the authors of the universe. The difference in the matter of interpreting the Sutras is a real one and cannot be lightly brushed aside. The same difference that was noticed in interpreting the Upanishads, namely, the difference between the Monistic and Pluralistic traditions reappears in all attempts at interpreting the Sutras. The difference cannot be written off by any fiat of this or that critic.

II

The creation, preservation, and destruction of the universe are mentioned as the *differentia* of Brahman. Is Brahman just a magician projecting the world-show or does Brahman create a real world? The Monists have always held that the entire universe of organised and unorganised matter and spirit is only a show, an appearance. It is not a reality. Creation, in the Monistic view, is only the projection of an appearance, the colossal appearance of the universe or the cosmos. Vachaspati Misra felt that certain finishing metaphysical touches would be necessary before the picture of illusionistic creation could be made artistic and attractive. Though the Sutras do not explicitly make mention of the concepts of "Maya" and "Avidya"

in the sense in which they are used in later controversial treatises, Vachaspati Misra pressed them into service and explained that "the appearance of the universe is due to the material causality of Brahman with Avidya": "Evam-Avidya-sahita-Brahmopadanam-jagat . . ." (Bombay Nirnayasagar Edition, pp. 54-55).

Upholders of the Dualistic, Realistic tradition negated the illusionistic hypothesis, and argued that the definition of Brahman given by the author of the Sutas would commit one to the view that the universe must be regarded as real, perfectly and stubbornly real. Authorship of an illusionistic universe does only scant justice to the glory and majesty of the Supreme Lord. The Lord is not obliged to make a living by projecting shows of black magic. He has created a real environment, a real world which is a factory of soul-making and soul-transformation. It is the grand theatre in which is staged the eternal struggle between evil and good, between Ahriman and Ormuzd, with all of the existential and transmigratory paraphernalia. The reality of the environment not merely vindicates the glory of the Creator, but fully justifies moral effort and endeavour, secular activity and all dynamic nation-building and welfare programmes.

III

According to Sankara, realization of the Oneness of Being is the goal of existence. Moksha is final release from the error-riddenness

of existence. Moksha, in positive terms, is realization of the Oneness of Being; in negative terms, it is repudiation of the error-riddenness of existence. Vedantic investigation or quest is undertaken so that the goal of oneness of existence may be reached,—“Asya-anarthahe-toh-prahanaya-at-maikatvavidyapratipattaye-sarve-vedanta-aarabhyante.” (*Sankara-Commentary* on 1-1-1. Bombay Edition, N. S. Press, p. 26). That is the traditional Monistic conception of Moksha.

The traditional Dualistic, Pluralistic and Theistic interpretation of Moksha is freedom from the transmigratory career. A released soul is no longer caught in the eddying whirlpool of transmigration. “Nachapunaravarta-te,” (Does not return any longer to the transmigratory career) is the *Chandogya* text on which is based the concluding aphorism, “Anavrittih-sabdat-anavrittih-sabdat,” (Does not return on the authority of the Vedas: No further or no more returning to the transmigratory career—on the authority of the Śrutis). (Sacred Texts) (*Chandogya* VIII, 15,1, Sutra 4-4-22). Enjoyment of one's own inherent bliss, that is, unalloyed, is Moksha. The happiness enjoyed in life is hedonistically tinged. It is alloyed and mixed with unhappiness. Freedom from evil and pain, enjoyment of inherent bliss, and service of the Lord, and admiration of His Glory and Majesty in countless ways, about the nature of which not even the faintest envisagement is possible on this side of life or on the side of finitude at all, are the consti-

tuent elements of Moksha or final release according to Madhva and his commentators. These constituents are emphasized by Madhva in his *Anuvyakhyana*: “Dukkha-deemscha-parityajya-jagadvyapara-varjitah — bhunkte-bhogan-sadai-vocchan.” (Having shaken himself free from all traces of pain and suffering, the freed soul eternally enjoys superior types of Bliss, *without however, participating in the work of creation of the world*. Madhva, Vilas Edition Sarvamoola, Vol. I, p. 195).

There is an important point to note in the Vedantic account of final release. Released souls or free Spirits do not develop the power to create the universe. That power is the property of the Supreme Lord. If the free Spirits acquired this power, the harmony of the universe would be shattered owing to conflict of jurisdiction among a multitude of Omnipotent Beings. The Aphorism “Jagadvyapara-varjam” (Without or *minus* participation in the work of creation—4-4-17) makes this matter unequivocally clear and definite.

IV

When the author of *Indian Philosophy*, Sir S. Radhakrishnan, asserts that “Badarayana affirms a monistic view of the world” (Vol. II, p. 442), he discredits ancient Indian tradition. Whether the Sutras proclaim a Monistic world view or a Pluralistic one is, even to-day, a live, dynamic issue of Indian philosophy. Students of Indian thought do not require this issue to be decided for

them by either Max Müller or Thibaut, or by their modern imitators. They have to decide it for themselves. Even so, when Dr. Dasgupta, the author of *A History of Indian Philosophy*, remarks, “I am myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the Brahma Sutras were probably more faithful to the sutras than the interpretation of Sankara” (Vol. I, p. 421), he discards the well-known Indian tradition of the Monists. When the latter writer again observes that “It seems that Badarayana was probably more a theist than an absolutist like his commentator Sankara” (Vol. I, p. 442), he does violence to the Monistic tradition. That Sankara is faithful to the import of the Upanishads, while Ramanuja is faithful to that of the Sutras is an estimate, arrived at by Orientalists like Thibaut, which has no especial sanctity about it and which need not be binding on students of the Sutras and the Upanishads who can command the original Sanskrit texts.

I shall mention only one more instance of un-Indian exposition or interpretation of Indian philosophy. The author of *Indian Philosophy* writes: “The liberated in the fine phrase of the Talmud share with the Almighty in the work of creation” (Vol. I, p. 230). And again, “It feels that God is at work in the cosmic drama.... The liberated soul also plays in the same drama.” (Vol. I, p. 241). The fine phrase of the Talmud, and the equally fine phraseology employed by the author of *Indian*

Philosophy notwithstanding, the truth according to traditional interpretation of the Upanishads and the Sutras has to be told, that the liberated spirits decidedly *do not* participate with the Lord in the work of creation. Those who for whatever reasons state that the liberated spirits participate in the work of creation do violence to the letter and spirit of the apothegm:—"Jagad-vyapara-varjam." (4-4-17).

V

From the previous sections, it will be obvious that the Vedanta Sutras or the Brahma Sutras present in a systematic connected manner the doctrines contained in the Upanishads. Indian tradition itself has not attempted the impossible task of fixing the exact import of the Sutras. The Monistic and the Dualistic traditions have interpreted the aphorisms in their own way. Each interpretation is grounded on the well-known *six* canons of determining the exact and precise import of the texts: *Upakrama* (commencement of a context); *Upasamhara* (its termination or conclusion); *Abhyasa* (repetition with a view to making assurance doubly sure); *Apoorvata* (freshness or originality of the truth desired to be conveyed); *Phalam* (a specific or characteristic advantage); *Arthavada* (commendation or condemnation, respectively, with a view to impressing on a subject the desirability or undesirability of a course of activity); and *Upapatti* (adducing reasons). It is a serious error

to suppose that the Monistic interpretation alone is based on the six canons.

VI

Those who are anxious to interpret the thought and wisdom of the Vedanta to the West should state the doctrines as they are without giving them any alien orientation. The *Gita*, the *Upanishads*, and the *Brahma Sutras* are the textual totalities which form the *points d'appui* or points of departure for all philosophical investigation. They are known as the three "*Prasthanas*" (*Prasthanatraya*). They are shown to coalesce into an interpretational harmony or synthesis. One such harmony is the Monistic interpretation. The dualistic interpretation is another such. While European researchers have had access to the work of Ramanuja, their acquaintance with the system of Madhvacharya is too meagre and scanty to enable them to appreciate its place in Indian thought. Madhva has a place in the sun as the champion of the renaissance of Realism in Indian philosophy. He has been totally ignored by Indian and European writers alike.

VII

What is, after all, the truth of the matter? Is it the Monistic or the Dualistic world view? I think the problem has to be left in the hands of professional metaphysicians. Indian tradition has at particular epochs upheld the Monistic and the Dualistic world views. Let the metaphysicians have a long holiday. The problem for the prac-

tical man is to investigate which world view will best enable him to increase his spiritual stature. Sankara and Madhva, who differ radically in their interpretations of the *Gita*, the *Upanishads* and the *Brahma Sutras*, agree in maintaining that the values of this life will not afford abiding satisfaction of the spiritual needs of the thinking section of humanity. The author of the *Sarvadarsana-sangraha* puts the matter beautifully thus: "Sarvasya-samsarasya - dukkhatmakatvam-sarva-tirthakara-sammata," (All the Darsanas and Acharyas are unanimous in maintaining that the values of this life and existence,—feverish pursuit of which by all sorts and conditions of men is the goal of the activity of contemporary civilised society - lead only to pain, disappointment and disaster). And not to permanent bliss and abiding satisfaction. Yagnavalkya is emphatic that "the pursuit of the values of this life and existence is inconsistent with hopes of immortality." "Amritatvasya-tu-na-aasastivitteneti" (*Brihadaranyaka* 4-5-3). Family interests, interest in securing wealth, and other interests in the world and worldly affairs (Ishanas or Yeshanas-Putreshana, Vitteshana, Lokeshana—*Brihadaranyaka* 4-4-22)—determine the activities of man. These and allied interests must be transcended if freedom from recurring cycles of births and deaths is to be obtained. This is the message of the Vedanta, whether understood according to the Monistic or the Dualistic tradition, on which emphasis has to be laid

by those who are anxious to interpret the wisdom and thought of the East to the West. Trite as it may sound, where there is a will there is a way. Modern civilization and social structures, built on the *Yeshanas* or *Ishanas* (pathological or abnormal cravings for the values of this life and existence) are bound to crash sooner or later if the characteristic obliviousness to higher values continues to be the dominant dynamic power which now energises the builders and sustainers of contemporary civilization. Provided the will to subordinate these *Yeshanas* is cultivated, and provided such a disciplined and cultivated will finds an easy and natural outlet in beneficent constructive activity, modern civilization, grounded on science and scientific discoveries and on the joys made possible by those discoveries, may be saved. This is the message of the Vedanta, as I understand it after a careful study of the texts and traditions.

If this message of the Vedanta, which is essentially a message of freedom from the ills of existence, is correctly and faithfully interpreted and conveyed to mankind, and if at least a section, a rational, responsible section, of humanity will commence translating the message into action, peace and good-will will reign where conflict and ill-will are now stalking rampant. THE ARYAN PATH is a right royal road leading on direct to the realization of the inner bliss of the spirit.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

MY NOTE BOOK

*Blinds and Breathing—A Respectful Suggestion to Gandhiji—
Life, Nature and Art.—Western Materialism an Ancient School—
Leisure and Yoga—Kali-yuga and Man.*

[A. R. Orage, Editor of *The New English Weekly*, passes on a very helpful "tip" to the readers and students of old Indian texts. There are people who read the *Bhagavad-Gita* and *Yoga-Sutras* of Patanjali upside down, and there are those who read too literally. Much damage to mental balance and even to bodily health results. Breathing, or Pranayama, about which Mr. Orage writes, awakening of Kundalini and the development of Chakras, etc., are undertaken without even a proper comprehension, let alone competent personal guidance. Thus, we know of one person, among those who have practised meditation according to some verses in the sixth chapter of the *Gita*, who succeeded in becoming somewhat cross-eyed as a result of "the gaze directed to the tip of his nose without looking in any direction" (verse xiii), and then blamed the *Gita*! Carefully read, this description is but a picture of how the true contemplator seems to an outside observer—he is not gazing at the tip of his nose, he only appears as if he were. The same explanation holds good for verses 27-28 in the fifth chapter of the *Gita*. Instances can be multiplied.

"As above, so below," is a recognized fundamental of Esoteric Philosophy; from within without is ever the course of progress—cosmic and human. When this order is reversed in practice idolatry results; since the inner meaning of the symbol is not recognized the outer object is taken as real. Forgetting that man is made in the image of Deity, people conceive God in human form. A special feature of the men of this hard iron age, to which Mr. Orage also refers, is that they mistake beauty of form for Beauty of Soul, outer personal consciousness for the Inner Ego, and maya for Reality.—EDS.]

The appearance of a fourth edition of M. K. Gandhi's *Self-Restraint and Self-Indulgence*, while gratifying to all of us who realise Gandhi's greatness, is a little disturbing to those who would fain follow the high Aryan Path. It was many years ago that Mme. Blavatsky communicated to the present writer, via the late great Gnostic scholar, Mr. G. R. S. Mead, the clue—I might also say the tip—that the precise instructions laid down in many of the ancient Indian works were what she called a "blind"—that is to say, something to be read with particular care. In many such works, she said,

effects were substituted for causes, and for the subtle reason that the causes in question could not be communicated in words. Let us take a simple case. Every state of consciousness, it is well known, has its own characteristic form and rhythm of breathing. Anybody can observe this for himself. When we are excited our breathing is irregular and staccato. In states of peaceful reverie our breathing is correspondingly regular and smooth. And, similarly, every state of consciousness, up to the very highest, is accompanied by a form and rhythm of breathing which is peculiar, typical and characteristic.

But now let us suppose that a teacher wishes to induce in his pupil this or the other state of consciousness—how could he set about it? According to Mme. Blavatsky, he could set about it directly or indirectly; directly by personal contact when possible; but indirectly, when contact was not possible, by prescribing the effects for the causes; that is to say, by giving directions as to the form and rhythm of *breathing* in the anticipation that the special mode of breathing would induce the corresponding state of consciousness. The “blind” to which Mme. Blavatsky drew attention lay in precisely this fact; that the substitution of the effect for the cause was in lieu of something better, namely, personal instruction: and, secondly, that the cause when thus, so to say, artificially evoked, was not real, but, as she suggested, as moonlight is to sunlight.

* * *

I am reminded of this profoundly important warning of Mme. Blavatsky by M. K. Gandhi's present work. In his Preface to the Second Edition, he lays down in nine “commandments” the proper rule of life in respect of Sex. Most of his recommendations are of the order of Do or Don't. Do, for instance, seek the society of the good. Don't go to theatres and cinemas; and so on. What I would suggest, with all due respect, to M. K. Gandhi, is that these forms of behaviour are on a par with the modes of breathing already referred to. Their performance or avoidance, while perhaps appear-

ing to produce the state of continence, does, in fact, produce not the reality but only a bad imitation. In short, the prescription of rules of this kind is not what I conceive to be the high Aryan way. M. K. Gandhi himself, I think, is aware of this, since, in his last “commandment,” he urges that a man should remember that, as God's representative, he must express God's dignity and love. How much more “Aryan” this is—to be so intent on becoming God-conscious, that continence and the other virtues naturally follow. At the same time every teacher must realise the difficulty of inducing the effort to become God-conscious. And hence the temptation to prescribe effects as rules.

* * *

Modern astronomy appears to offer us small hope of any living company on the other planets; and, of course, still less hope of life on planets outside our Solar system—if any exist. The Moon, we are told, is certainly completely inorganic. Mars may have a little vegetation on it. But as for the rest of the planets, nothing of the nature of any life we know could possibly exist upon them. Even in respect of our own planet Earth, the disproportion between the inorganic and the organic is tremendous. Seen imaginatively from a distance, the Earth would appear to be an immense globe composed of minerals and gases, upon whose mere surface, like a very thin skin, all that we call life would be spread out—and even then over only about a fifth of its entire extent. What

a tiny fraction, even of our own planet, is the sum of what we proudly call the organic kingdom! Nevertheless I do not feel the oppression at the spectacle that other thinkers often appear to feel. In the first place, modern Science knows absolutely nothing of the possible relation between the inorganic and the organic processes. Life, in fact, may stand in the same relation to Matter, as, let us say, the brain-cortex to the human organism. And, secondly, we have an example of a similar disproportion in the comparison of Nature and Art. Taking the whole of the organic kingdom as Nature, and only very special works of Man as Art, it can truly be said that as the planet is to Nature, so Nature is to Art. In other words, there is nothing more terrifying in the disproportion between Matter and Life, than in the comparable disproportion between Life and Art. And just as certainly as it appears to be the human task to make all Life Art, so it appears probable that the divine task is to make all Nature Life.

* * *

In the "materialism" of the West I see nothing necessarily anti-spiritual, given a sufficient perspective. It has often been remarked that the greatest physicists have almost invariably been highly religious men. And the combination of the qualities is by no means inconsistent or paradoxical. The mind of Man desires certainty about Truth above everything else in the world. "There is no Religion higher than Truth". Certain-

ty, however, appeared to be unattainable by the ancient way of psychology; or, rather, the certainty attained by the individual appeared to be incommunicable and, therefore, unprovable. But the kind of certainty the human mind looks for is not merely private certainty, but public certainty; truth, that is to say, that can be both communicated and proved by demonstration. From this point of view, I regard Western materialism as, in a sense, merely one of the ancient Schools—the School devoted to the effort to establish certainty about Truth experimentally and communicably—the School devoted to demonstration. No doubt many of its pupils have been misled; many have forgotten, if they ever knew, their real object; and others are under the impression that no truth of any other kind than their own can conceivably exist. But not only, as I have said, have the greatest physicists always kept their spiritual objective in mind; but, happily for mankind, they have begun to discover that the same truths lie at the end of Matter as were discovered before by the more ancient Schools at the end of Mind. By whichever road the search for Truth is made, the end is the same; and it is now certain that in future there can be no quarrel between the masters of either School.

* * *

I have sometimes asked myself *why* India, the Aryan East, developed Schools of Contemplation, while the Aryan West has developed the Schools of demonstrable and

communicable Truth.

In an exceedingly able recent work entitled *The Heyapaksha of Yoga* (by P. V. Pattrak, of Bombay University), the answer, it appears, is given. Thanks to the fact that the ancient Vedic law enjoined upon the individual two distinct and separate duties—his duty to his caste, and his duty to himself—and, moreover, apportioned three-fourths of his life to the latter, “it was only natural that under such circumstances of leisure man should be given to reflections about the nature of the self,” and of his relation, not with Society so much as with the Universe. It is impossible to over-emphasize the importance of leisure to the spiritual development of Man. Not only is leisure the condition of time to contemplate, but it is the condition of the mood to contemplate. The discovery of practical truths useful to society is undoubtedly stimulated by the activity of work. Strangely enough, however, even this activity of work is justified by its promise of the provision of leisure. On the other hand, it is quite certain that, without leisure, even the discovery that Matter in the end is Spiritual will lead to no real change in Western thought; but the continued activity of work for three quarters of life will only leave the Western mind unsatisfied and at the same time helpless.

* * *

The question is very troubling whether, in terms of Yugas or great Ages, Man is developing or degenerating, evolving or involving. Indian tradition, as we know, affirms that in the Great Year of the life of Mankind we pass through successive declining stages, of which the present Age is the most involved of all. The greatest among us to-day must therefore be less great than the greatest of preceding ages; and there were not only great men before Agamemnon, but there were greater. Without daring to express an opinion upon this tremendous matter, I would merely note its bearing upon the question: What is the nature of Man? Assuming for the moment that, like the creature that begins life as an egg, passes through the stages of worm and chrysalis, and finally becomes a butterfly, the being “Man” passes *in reverse order* through stages, defined in time as Yugas, *what* is the definition we can give of the complete being? Those who saw him in his first phase must have had one definition; those who see him to-day must have another. But where is the mind that can “see” all the stages and, assembling them as merely phases of development, define the being whose nature they manifest? Again without venturing out of my depth, I merely record the doubt whether anybody knows what Man is.

A. R. ORAGE

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

INFLUENCE OF INDIAN THOUGHT

[J. D. Beresford and Max Plowman evince sympathy for Indian thought in reviewing books of three eminent Hindus. Mr. Beresford also comments upon the persecution of champions of oriental thought like Mr. C. E. M. Joad.—EDS.]

I

It will not be necessary for me to write here of the broad principles and beliefs taught by Radhakrishnan. They correspond so nearly to those expressed in these pages during the past four years that to state them would only be to repeat the truths of Theosophy. Radhakrishnan's teaching derives from the Ancient Wisdom, from the Vedas, the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and those other sacred books of the East which are the foundation of the one inclusive world-religion that will in time absorb all the minor sects that have seen one aspect of the truth and ecstatically acclaimed it as being the whole. By this I do not mean to imply that even the greatest adept can know the whole truth so long as any link holds him to material expression. While spirit and matter are still united by consciousness, the spirit must in some degree be restricted, debarred from its own complete realisation. But the truths of the Wisdom-religion are an inclusive *world-truth*, containing all that we can ever know while we are held in the bonds of this particular manifestation.

What does nearly concern readers of *THE ARYAN PATH*, however, is the means of translating some fraction of the generative truth into maxim and practice, and more especially in this connexion, the need for some means of enlightening the Western mind. Nevertheless, before dealing specifically with that subject, it may be as well to find a general direction from Radhakrishnan's own teaching, beginning with his statement on p. 49 of the book under review:—

It is a law of life that religions, like other things, take on the nature of the organisms which assimilate them.

By the side of that I would lay a further passage from p. 81, namely:—

There is no function or organ of the body which is beyond the influence of the mind or the soul. Man is one psyche, one whole, of which body, mind and spirit are aspects.

The second of these two statements is another version of the first, and by considering it, we may find a clearer understanding of the relation between the two units displayed. Thus the conversion of an individual will give us a figure

* *East and West in Religion*. By S. Radhakrishnan. (Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. 4s. 6d.)
Counter Attack from the East. By C. E. M. Joad. (Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

for the conversion of a body of thought.

The important principle at issue is the need for the realisation of the self as a unity, if only in imagination. The whole tendency of modern life in the West, and also of its religion, is to maintain the concept of the self as composed of two or more personalities. The truth is that in some relations this is apparently the fact. The various elements which make up the totality of the individual consciousness have taken on "the nature of the organisms" that act as their vehicle. For we must assume that every cell of the body is an agent of consciousness, and that it gathers force by the agreement or sympathy between the units from which it derives. The metaphor, being necessarily spatial and temporal, must ultimately fail, but it will serve the purpose of illustration.

Now the influence of such a reinforced element, forming a greater or smaller superconsciousness representing the common emotion of the units concerned, will from time to time "colour" the totality of consciousness to an extent that affects the mind and thought in various directions. And this effect as realised objectively by the intelligence is dramatised as presenting a distinct personality. The stimulation or depression of the bodily organism, for instance, so closely affects the nature of the consciousness "secreted" by a majority, it may be, of the cells, that the totality of consciousness becomes swayed in this or that

direction. (It is impossible to elaborate the metaphor within the space of this article, but it holds good in so many directions that as a working theory it explains most of the phenomena of abnormal psychology. Occultists will realise its adaptability to the concept of Kama and Manas.)

And this false notion of the self as a multiplicity, aggravated by our Western mode of thought, is perhaps the greatest barrier to the influence of Eastern teaching. The average man (or woman) in civilised Western life makes no effort towards the unification of the personality. He gives rein to one side of it in his business office, another in his home life, a third in his pleasures. And the religion of the churches, by its substitution of various ritual observances for the responsibility of unceasing personal effort, permits the assurance that a profession of faith in certain dogmas coupled with a reasonable conformance to a system of ethics is a sufficient guarantee of "salvation". Thus Western religion tends to divide its worshippers into two personalities, and in England, at least, one of them is usually in evidence for only one day out of the seven. Moreover the object of such religious observances is fundamentally selfish, whatever the profession of the Christian teachers; as the only powerful stimuli at their command are the promise of Heaven and the threat of Hell.

How then, we may ask, are such elements in the world consciousness to be brought into unison? At present we see them in perpet-

ual conflict among themselves, producing in the great body of civilisation just such ill humours and ailments as the conflict of personalities will produce within the physical body of the individual. Mr. Joad, towards the close of his admirable exposition of Radhakrishnan's philosophy, suggests:—

The ideal of a world commonwealth may be assisted, it may even be conditioned by that of a world religion. Just as rivalries of warring creeds have been a potent cause of war in the past, so their blending in an harmonious recognition of the spiritual reality of the world may be as potent a cause of peace. But, the fact is obvious, the claim to exclusiveness must be given up if the blend is to be achieved.

In confirmation of which he goes on to quote from Radhakrishnan's *Hindu View of Life*, p. 58 :—

When two or three different systems claim that they contain the revelation of the very core and centre of truth and the acceptance of it is the exclusive pathway to heaven, conflicts are inevitable. In such conflicts one religion will not allow others to steal a march over it, and no one can gain ascendancy until the world is reduced to dust and ashes. To obliterate every other religion than one's own is a sort of bolshevism in religion which we must try to prevent.

The implication of these quotations is the need for such a world-religion as will embrace and finally absorb all the warring creeds, each of which claims to be the one and only way to salvation. Such a world-religion is to be found in Theosophy, fulfilling as it does the "central dogma of all true religion" enunciated by Radhakrishnan as the belief in "the possible perfection of man, his inherent

divinity, and the invincible solidarity of all living beings with each other in the life of God". But just as in the life of the individual the reforming principle arises from the profound, inspiring wish for unity of spirit, so, also, must there be a single-hearted desire for reconciliation in the minds of all those who seek to aid the realisation of that supreme ambition "Universal Brotherhood".

That reconciliation is not to be achieved by criticism, nor by the power of the intellect. The dominance of the intelligence with its inevitable critical judgments will be an obstacle, sometimes an unconquerable obstacle, to the individual's search for wisdom. The world is not to be converted by logic, which is the instrument of the churches, founded upon the premises of its own dogma. Our teachers, of whom we must count Radhakrishnan as one, must appeal to the spirit as well as the minds of those they wish to help. And the only way known to us to do that, is by the power of love.

This may seem, at first, a simple remedy, but how many people are there living in the world to-day who have begun to know the truth as to the nature of love? Most people have "love and affection for their own kin and friends," writes the author of the pamphlet "The Light of Shekinah in Daily Living"; "and even then if that love is not responded to, disappointment, irritation and anger result. We do not love for the sake of love, but to get something in return." Or to take an-

other statement from Radhakrishnan :—

There is nothing nobler on the scene of space and time than where good men and true women, who renounce comforts, suffer as outcasts and walk the pavements of the world in want, scattering love without talking about it or feeling good or wanting anybody to know.

That, indeed, is the living spirit of "love for the sake of love".

It is, nevertheless, a spirit that is fully attainable only by the very few. We may find it, in its purity, as an attribute of those Lords of Compassion who refuse the enjoyment of the immortality they have won and return to earth to help the earnest pilgrims who would tread the same path. But even the true mystics of the West know but the fringe of that Divine Light which can be realised in its fullness only by those who have achieved the peace of unity. While to preach that gospel to the mass of the people who having eyes see not neither hear with their ears, is, indeed, a vain task.

Yet everyone who simply and earnestly desires the gift of love will find it in some measure, and everyone who finds it even in such small measure, adds his or her power to the world consciousness.

I might find a parable, as illustration, in the reception of Mr. Joad's book on Radhakrishnan. Mr. Joad is well known to the readers of THE ARYAN PATH as an honest philosopher, who, influenced by the sincerity of his own thought, has been moving from the materialist theses of such mechanistic explana-

tions of the universe as Behaviourism towards a definite Idealism. Something of the influence of his earlier training still remains. His championship of Radhakrishnan's philosophy has at times a too self-conscious air of defiance. But he has done good service by his lucid understanding and convincing exposition of Radhakrishnan's principles, and we owe him a real debt of gratitude for that work.

But the parable begins by my first advertisement of the book in question, in a long review printed by a serious and literary London periodical. The vulgarity of that notice makes me hesitate to quote it, so that I have a sense of vicarious shame in reporting that it was headed "Quack, Quack, or Having it Both Ways". But the tone of the whole notice may be inferred from that heading, and it will serve as representative of the kind of persecution that meets not only the teacher of such doctrines as these, but also those who are brave enough to expound them.

Personally, my hope lies in the belief that we have touched or are almost touching that nadir of inner conflict which is characteristic of Western psychology at the present time. Anger, hate, self-seeking, fear and sense-gratification are the ruling personalities in this European body of ours; and there is no dominating will to peace and understanding which can control these warring elements. In the human body such a condition leads to hysteria and madness and it can have no other effect upon the national or continental body. There,

fortunately, the analogy ceases, for the human body will be finally destroyed, but mankind as a whole is immortal. And when the dreadful climax towards which we are so rapidly moving is past, the work of re-creation will begin.

Meanwhile, those who hold fast

to the great uniting truths we profess, who live the ideal embodied in the thought of Universal Brotherhood, "the invincible solidarity of all living beings with each other in the life of God," are playing their part in the making of the new world.

J. D. BERESFORD

II *

The coincidence of these two books is interesting; both are concerned with the same subject, but they approach it from opposite poles. Mr. Chatterji's record of the travels of the wandering Brahmin ascetic Sivanarayan, which was first published in 1907, has been augmented by a collection of precepts upon spiritual and social questions, which have the simplicity and forthrightness of an oriental Whittman. Sivanarayan was a humble, uneducated seeker after spiritual perfection who applied his unquestioning faith in what he apostrophises as "the All-Comprehending Supreme Being, expressed as Light within and without, the Parent of all" to his own life and conduct with a courage and trust that removed mountains of sophistication and enabled him to take the place of a Mahatma without the assumption of any intellectual wisdom. Dr. Dasgupta, who is Principal of the Sanskrit College in Calcutta and possibly the wisest historian of Indian philosophy, has collected

and revised a series of Readership Lectures on the vast subject of Indian Idealism in which he explains in philosophic terms its beginnings in the ritualistic religion of the Vedas, its growth into mystical intensity in the Upanishads, and its subsequent intellectual and philosophic refinement in Buddhism and the Vedānta. Thus, *reality as spirit* is the common theme, approached on the one hand from pure personal intuition, and on the other from the profoundest free thought of the greatest perceptual thinkers.

In striking contrast the two books exemplify the approach to Truth by the ways of feeling and of thought. Anything simpler than Sivanarayan's vision can hardly be imagined. Anything more complex than the workings of a mind such as Nāgārjuna's, is, to me, inconceivable. From which it might be concluded that "most thought is mere folly" and that all that is required of us is simple faith entrenched in an intuition from which it never strays

* *Indian Idealism*. By Surendranath Dasgupta. (Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.)
Indian Spirituality : The Travels and Teachings of Sivanarayan. By Mohini Mohan Chatterji.
 (J. M. Dent, London. 5s.)

far into the forests of rationalisation.

Unfortunately for such a conclusion, faith is really dependent for its living maintenance and healthy growth upon its continuous effort to penetrate this forest. A faith that refuses this creative adventure and is content with the security of intuition is a weak and unproductive faith, however pure. Darkness is primordial, and the business of light is its overcoming. True rationalisation is only the unfolding into understanding of that which is perceived intuitively; and this unfolding is as necessary to Truth as the unfolding of its petals to a flower. Besides, the very purity of faith is dependent upon its being the expression of the whole man; so that he who slightes the testimony of his intelligence pollutes his faith and becomes a hypocrite, simply because he will not allow the truth to filtrate every particle of his experience. The poison of orthodoxy is that it preserves a portion of the mind from the access of *living* faith. And faith is not ascetic or reclusive. It is the soul's adventure, which the mind subserves, and the more active the mind in the service of the spirit, the greater the triumph of faith. Only when the intellect becomes dominant and makes the narrow circle of rational thought the limit of knowledge, closing the gateway of Infinity by disregarding the intuitions of spirit, does thought defeat itself and lay waste the territory of the spirit with mental abstractions.

And abstraction is the sin which

doth so easily beset both East and West. In the West it has taken the form of science. Materialism accepted as pure knowledge an analysis which is an abstract of actuality. This restricted conception of knowledge leads—as simply and as logically as any effect follows its cause—to the void of mathematical formulae. The scientific West now prostrates itself in adoration of an arithmetical equation, wondering by the by why it is in the toils of its own economics. Such is the nemesis of materialism. But in the East, abstraction took the form of metaphysical thought. In the pathetic endeavour to preserve the vision of truth in its purity and to extend the field of its comprehension to the widest limits, thought began to beget upon itself, trusting in its own self-sufficiency, until at last it too reached a void where, the Divine Vision forgotten, it looked nakedly upon nothing but its own spectral image.

How is the snare to be escaped?

For East and West the mystery of incarnation perpetually redeems from abstraction and stands as guide to the highest apprehension of truth. In the mystical experience, truth is seen as light. But this immediate perception is static and in itself unrelated to the world of existence. It cannot be maintained without the perversions of asceticism. The vision of being needs continual mediation, for that mediation is the process of life itself. The whole creation would wither and perish but for the mediation by which the light is transformed into the life. It is the

process of which human art is the symbol.

God Appears, & God is Light
To those poor Souls who dwell in Night,
But does a Human Form Display
To those who Dwell in Realms of Day.

In the Upanishads the founders of Indian philosophy perceived the Light with a purity of vision that has never been surpassed. But the subsequent history of Indian idealism reads as though men had gone blind in the effort to remain gazing nakedly upon the sun. Not thus does the sun itself behave.

Look on the rising sun ! there God does live,
And gives his light and gives his heat away.

And as the sun expresses itself by incarnating itself in the fruits of the earth, so man, having once perceived the Divine Vision, must himself become its incarnation. Thus only does the light become more light, and truth bear witness to itself. Not in vision, but in act, does India now need to realise herself. She has all and more than all the wisdom she requires. Her business is to translate this understanding into those human expressions of her faith which will be incarnations of her religious spirit.

And these, in whatever forms they take, are truly works of art.

Thus we conclude that Indian philosophy needs now the fructification of art in the widest sense even for the sake of that philosophy's own health. The comment may seem wide in its bearing upon Dr. Dasgupta's book, but it nevertheless has its reference. His historical exegesis is wonderfully exact and quite marvellously erudite ; but even in following his perfectly logical and often lucid exposition, the lay mind becomes conscious of contraction and a grim tightening of the mental nerves which is a sure sign of abstraction. "How charming is Divine philosophy," said Milton. It is true of that philosophy which is the contemplation of Divine reality ; but when, as too often in *Indian Idealism* (perhaps quite inevitably, considering the subject's past history) philosophy becomes the effort to sustain metaphysical thought upon the tight-rope of pure logic, then it is not charming, but barren, desiccated, and perilous to the soul.

MAX PLOWMAN

The Secret Commonwealth of Elves, Fauns and Fairies. By ROBERT KIRK, M. A., Minister of Aberfoyle, 1691. Comment by Andrew Lang, M.A. (reprinted from the 1893 edition). Introduction by R. B. Cunninghame Graham. (Eneas Mackay, Stirling. 7s. 6d.)

This strangely attractive book, reprinted by the enterprising firm of Eneas Mackay, of Stirling, Scotland, is not helped by the introduction contributed by R. B. Cunninghame Graham

Andrew Lang's history of the book is more serious and more appropriate. The original author, Mr. Robert Kirk, writing in 1691, does in many respects, in spite of his time and environment, treat his subject in a curiously cold "scientific" way, as Andrew Lang says. Mr. Kirk it is alleged, was himself spirited away by underground folk and never returned to human habitation, nor to an ordinary human death. Such a statement depends upon negative evidence and is impossible to substantiate

or to believe; nevertheless in Kirk's own book, written before this strange alleged departure, there is evidence of so much that is common to the seer of super- or sub-normal sights that his work should be read. Some one capable of modern research should carefully sift this and as many other ancient records as possible so that facts widely established may be crystallised out from the hazy nebula within which so much fraud has concealed itself.

There seem undoubtedly to be facts which could be verified and substantiated and on which such critical observation should concentrate itself. Influence of geographic locality on second sight is such a theme. The Highlanders and other members of the Gaelic races can afford even to-day verifiable instances of second sight and foreknowledge of events, and it ought not to be impossible to find out from men and women of that race whether they themselves are conscious of a difference in the intensity of their powers; whether perhaps they lose them altogether in various localities. The writer of this review is partly of Celtic blood and in her life has experienced a rich variety of incidents which are almost second sight and at any rate are supernormal, and some of them have been extremely useful. The only time she definitely and quite explicitly knew of the death of a person who was not known to her to be dying or even seriously ill was the day before that death took place, when she herself was in Edinburgh. On other occasions when those nearer and dearer and known to be ill were at the point of death, she being then in the south of England, no such foreknowledge or second sight was experienced.

One would anticipate that without too superhuman an amount of work an interesting map might be charted from individual experiences of those who are still alive and can be questioned, supplemented by carefully supported facts from such as are recorded in the

literature of the world. Such a map, it might be answered, would make the position only more complicated and inexplicable than before: that remains to be seen. The true scientific spirit is to collate facts, the answers themselves the facts will then yield.

John Kirk, whose manuscript dated 1691 is here reprinted, was a minister of religion and he says:—

As our Religion obliges us not to make a peremptory and curious Search into these Obtrusenesses, so that the Histories of all Ages give as many plain Examples of extraordinary Occurrences as make a modest Inquiry not contemptible.

Scattered through his manuscript are many points which may be held to be among the established facts of these regions of remote human faculty. He remarks, for instance:—

The men of that Second Sight do not discover strange Things when asked, but at Fits and Raptures, as if inspyred with some Genius at that Instant, which before did lurk in or about them.

His manuscript apparently lay unprinted until 1815 when the first edition of one hundred copies was printed. The second edition of five hundred copies was printed in 1893, and the present edition in 1933 is an indication of the vitality of his contribution: the dross of credulity mingled with the gold of truth.

ERICA FAY

[Miss Erica Fay who contributed to THE ARYAN PATH of February 1931 an article on "Fairies and Magicians," is the author of *A Road to Fairyland*. She has spent a considerable time in the East, and there came in touch with Lafcadio Hearn and his family. Her appreciation of the magic of words—first aroused by Hans Anderson who entranced her as a small child—was enhanced by hearing him and seeing the poetic beauty of his home in Japan. Miss Fay has travelled a great deal in many countries. She says that "Although I have some knowledge of science I have always felt that human truths deeper than can ever be presented by scientific methods can be expressed in fairy tales".

—EDS.]

Side Notes on the Bible. By HILDA PETRIE. (Search Publishing Co., Ltd., London. 3s. 6d.)

This book is aptly described by its title. It contains a series of disconnected notes elaborating, interpreting, or confirming extracts from the Old and the New Testaments; which notes are based on evidence gleaned from the dead and buried civilizations brought to light once more by the digging of Sir Flinders Petrie. It is a book that by its very sketchiness may irritate scholars; but then, it was obviously not written for them, but rather that the layman may read more in a sense of realism his Bible as a great historical document, and catch some of its contemporary effects. Short as these notes are, concealed in them lie the results of a careful and intelligent research which make them above contradiction.

Perhaps Lady Petrie's own words best describe her aim:—

A score of small pictures are gathered here, to throw light on some ancient things of the East, linked with the Bible narrative which they directly or indirectly illustrate.

I have put a few words to each—spun-out captions to give their meanings—and cannot find a title modest enough for these.

As to her method, we may take this for one example: she quotes the text,

"When Israel came out of Egypt," from Psalms, cxiv. 1, and shows us as the best portrait known of Mer-en-Ptah, who was the Pharaoh of the Exodus, the photograph of a sculpture found in a temple at Thebes. This she describes, together with other discoveries made at the same spot and dealing with the same subject.

Modest her book may be, and even if she may seem to direct her observations at a rather simple level, Lady Petrie is an admirable expositor. She knows how to arrange, how to select, and how to condense, and her attitude to her subject is primarily historical and human. In these pages is given an idea of the way a great literature came into being, while with her help we can glance at Government and private life, professions and trades, and the agriculture and architecture of a lost age. It is refreshing that Lady Petrie grinds no dogmatic or ecclesiastical axe, but, having given her illustrations and her "captions," she leaves the reader to do his own moralizing. The book will not fail to bring to him who reads it a new knowledge to understand the Bible and to realize that sometimes the spade is mightier in persuasion than the pen.

A. R. UBSDELL

The Avatars. By A. E. (Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London. 6s.)

This is written in the form of a symposium and in exquisite prose, and it is as instructive as it is delightful.

The evils of a civilisation dominated by machinery are powerfully depicted:

What was told of that mystic Babylon of the Apocalypse, the haunt of every unclean spirit, might have been spoken of the cities of the Iron Age dominated by the dark mechanic genius. . . . No song sounded over labour, for the machine chanted its iron dronings by day and by night, and the sorcery made men to forget the soul had once been as illuminated as nature. The heart was ever heavy, and few were those who could hold back the gloom by creating their own light. The imagination could no more conceive of lordly life, and multitudes fell blindly into a mould devised that society might have the precision of the machine.

The religions of the Iron Age were terrible and the state concerned itself with material well-being. Even the writers of that age could conceive only of the perfecting of mechanism and not of the perfecting of human nature.

To redeem men from this enslavement of spirit, to rouse them into a consciousness of their divine possibilities and the splendour and beauty of the universe around them, two Immortals incarnate themselves on earth as a peasant boy and a beautiful girl, and whoever came near them "had a quickening of the soul". For it was the peculiarity of the New Avatars, that unlike the Old in the ancient world, they preached no new doctrine but kindled a spiritual awakening in those among whom they passed. To

the poet came the vision of a living nature. The painter felt within him the stirring of the creative imagination which had become atrophied in the machine age. The sculptor experienced an exhilarating sense of freedom. To the musician life itself became musical. One who could lay no claim to any of these artistic gifts, still felt the "magic of the gay" for in the fleeting vision he had of the Avatars, it seemed to him that their being arose out of "a shoreless sea of joy". Lastly, to the philosopher, naturally, came the vision of the mystic unity of all things and he proclaimed the uselessness, nay, the mischievousness of formal systems of thought.

They left no wisdom for moralist or philosopher to dilate into systems which as they grew could only enslave us. They gave us no ethic, no commandment to do or forbear. Such things are not natural. They do violence to the soul, begetting exaltations followed by

despairs. No one can state a moral law which is sufficient for the infinite complexities of life. But as we grow nigher to deep own-being, our passions drop away from us. We act with tenderness to all for we enter the great unity of all-life.

This idea of the unity of all in the Divine Spirit is fundamental to A.E.'s philosophy of life. Connected with this is his belief—a belief for which, as he himself says in "Song and its Fountains," he relies on the intuition of the seers of the Upanishads—that all vision and high imagination come from a centre of consciousness behind the sphere of dream.

As the diver under deep water must
Rise to the air for life, so every night
The soul must rise and go unto its Father,
For a myriad instant breathing eternity.
And then, returning by the way it came,
It wakes here to renew its cyclic labours.

These two convictions pervade the poet's mysticism and colour all his great poetry.

N. NARASIMHA MOORTY

The Zohar (Vol. IV). Trans. by MAURICE SIMON and PAUL LEVERTOFF. (The Soncino Press, London. 21s.)

The Zohar, or "Book of Splendour," known as the "Bible of the Mystics," and written originally in Aramaic and Hebrew, is in form a commentary on the Pentateuch, but is actually a treatise on mystic theosophy, and is the chief text-book of Jewish Cabbalism. It is set forth as a series of discourses between the Rabbi Simeon ben Yohai, who lived in the second century, and his companions, but its actual authorship remains uncertain. It is obviously not the work of one individual, but contains material covering a period of many centuries and drawn from various mystical sources.

Volume IV, translated by Maurice Simon and Dr. Paul Levertoff, carries the commentary on from Exodus XXV to the end of Leviticus XI, but the discourses are also linked up with references to the Song of Songs and the Psalms; the Torah is regarded throughout as having a mystical mean-

ing, to be interpreted only by the "masters of esoteric lore".

Emphasis is laid on the Unity of the Unmanifested Godhead (En Sof, the Infinite); "there is one organic Whole, interrelated under One Principle, the most exalted of all—adorned as with a crown by the ineffableness of the En Sof." A deeply spiritual significance is given here to sex, for the Shekinah, the Glory of Israel, is the Matrona, the Supernal Mother, who comes to dwell "in the palace of the lower world, in order that all faces should be lit up there, and dispenses blessings and radiates light upon all things unto all creatures". She is Deity Immanent, the Divine Wisdom dwelling in this world and in the soul of man. "God and the Shekinah," says Rabbi Simeon, "are in one counsel, and rule according to the self-same plan," and, again, "The Divine King without the Matrona is no king".

The universe, including the human soul, is held to be the outward expression of the Divine Thought, and the souls of men, before they enter this

world, dwell in the Presence of God ; when the time comes for them to descend to this world, they are warned to remember the Torah, and to be devoted to the Holy One. So there is the closest link between the Divine and the human, and it rests with man to strengthen that bond, through his own power of will, for spirit rouses spirit, and the spirit of man, filled with yearning love, brings down the Divine Spirit. One of the Rabbis says :—

Assuredly whosoever is of a willing heart may draw unto himself the Shekinah, may bring Her down from on high, to reside with him, and when She comes, how many blessings and how much riches does She bring with Her.

And when the Shekinah dwells within them, the faces of the saints reflect the Beauty of the Lord.

So it is that the Divine Glory expands

The Diffusion of Culture. By G. ELLIOT SMITH, F. R. S., M. D. (Watts and Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

In his latest contribution to controversial ethnology, Dr. Elliot Smith attempts to prove the following main theses :—

1. That every important element of human culture was invented at a given time and place, and thence diffused throughout the world.

2. That the views of those ethnologists who, like E. B. Tylor, believe that such cultural elements may have originated independently at different epochs and in different places, are wrong.

3. That the pre-conquest civilisations of the American continent were not autochthonous, (nor, incidentally, Atlantean), in origin, but were imported from Indo-China, either directly, or indirectly via Polynesia, by voyagers who succeeded in crossing the Pacific at various times after about A. D. 800.

4. That, in his own words :—

The evidence which is now available justifies the inference that civilisation originated in Egypt, perhaps as early as 4000 B. C., but certainly before 3500 B. C., when men imitated the natural process which happened every year at the inundation of the Nile and cut channels

itself into spirit after spirit and soul after soul, until the time comes for the parts to be re-united in the Whole, the many varied lives with the Changeless Life, the separate with the One Inseparable, so that all is in all, and all is One.

The book is full of beautiful passages of profound mystical significance, which cannot be quoted here, and it will be read with deep appreciation, mingled with gratitude to those who have translated it so faithfully, by all who are interested in Mysticism, whether of East or West.

It is to be regretted that a book of this length and importance is not provided with an index, nor even a detailed table of contents, for the guidance of the reader.

MARGARET SMITH

to extend the flooded area. In this way agriculture was first invented and with it a settled mode of life in villages. It became essential to make pots to hold grain, granaries to store it. Houses were then invented for the people themselves. Circumstances compelled them to make cemeteries. . . . [the result of burial in the hot, dessicating sand] seems to have suggested or strengthened their belief in existence after death [and led to] the devising of chambers of brick, pottery and rough stone slabs to protect the corpse, and, as soon as copper tools were invented, of wood and carved stone coffins made by carpenters and stone-masons. They also used the flax growing in their barley fields to make linen. . . . All this time they were studying the river and their irrigation basins, devising arithmetic and calendars, and geometry to measure their fields. . . . The value of timber, gold and copper had been created by these events in Egypt. . . .

It is curious that Dr. Elliot Smith, who frequently finds occasion to chide his fellow ethnologists for their tendency to unwarranted theorising, should in this passage prove himself a past master in the same art. What he calls justifiable inferences, will be regarded by many of his readers as merely speculative hypotheses, piled up with generous disregard of all the canons of probability. If the primitive Egyptians could really create in a few beggarly centuries all the sciences and

arts which differentiate the magnificent civilisation of the Fourth Dynasty from the crude mode of life of the scattered hunting tribes of the Upper Palæolithic; if they could in so brief a time invent agriculture and irrigation, the loom, the mining and smelting of metals, carpentry, masonwork, ship-building and navigation, pottery, to say nothing of geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and the art of writing, then there must have been more genius among them than the world has ever seen before or since! It used to be said in a certain medical school that a physiological theory lasted on an average for two years. We wonder how long this attempt to derive the foundations of all human achievement from the reaction of the Nile floods on the minds of the palæolithic savages of 4000 B. C. will find acceptance among even the most credulous of archæologists and ethnologists.

In its most general form the Diffusion theory does account for many of the facts of ethnology. Many of the most important culture discoveries were doubtless spread from single centres; but this does not exclude the possibility that some of them may have been independently invented, or re-invented, in different times and places. The particular problem, around which this controversy has raged fiercely for centuries, is that of the origin of the ancient civilisations of the American continent. To prove his theory of their comparatively recent East-Asiatic origin, Dr. Elliot Smith cites a number of facts, notably the elephants' heads

sculptured on Maya ruins and depicted in Maya manuscripts, and other symbols and art forms which display a striking resemblance to Hindu models. But he passes over in silence the whole cycle of facts, collected by Donnelly, Lewis Spence and other writers, which point to an Atlantic origin, not the least pertinent of which are widespread traditions to that effect of some of the American races. The use of the same symbols in different parts of the world may, as H. P. Blavatsky and others have suggested, be due to the natural appropriateness of those symbols to express certain ideas; but to Dr. Elliot Smith and some of his confrères symbols are merely arbitrary signs, which, being arbitrary and without any inherent significance, must, when found among different peoples, be taken as proofs of cultural contact. At best Dr. Elliot Smith's theory leaves more puzzles than it solves. Why, for instance, should the hypothetical voyagers from Indo-China have brought to Peru a few religious symbols but not the art of writing, the loom but not the wheel, the shipbuilder's craft but not the use of animals for draught or burden.

To illustrate his theories, Dr. Elliot Smith has collected—or perhaps we should say *selected*—a large number of extremely interesting facts about early civilisations; and some of the matter in his book, especially his account of the effect of the founding and propagation of Islam on the cultures of the Old World, is really illuminating.

R. A. V. M.

The Twelve Healers and the Four Helpers. By EDWARD BACH, M.B., B.S., D.P.H. (C. W. Daniel Co., London. 1s.)

The theory of disease and its cure expounded in this little book is simple to the point of *naïveté*. The author prescribes herbal remedies for faulty states of mind or emotion, to which he ascribes physical disease. Our suspicion of the arbitrary method of choice of these specifics is confirmed by finding

Impatiens prescribed for impatience. This seems almost too ingenuous to be meant seriously, but the author's simple earnestness disarms suspicion. *Clematis* for indifference, *scleranthus* for indecision, *vervain* for overbearing enthusiasm—how alluring it all sounds! But what for Hatred, Lust and Wrath? How easy were the conquest of perfection if moral blemishes could be so easily removed!

E. H.

Reincarnation in the Light of Thought, Religion, and Ethics. By FRIEDRICH RITTELMAYER, D. Phil., Lic. Theol. Trans. by M. L. Mitchell. (The Christian Community Bookshop, 1001 Finchley Road, London. 3s. 6d.)

Dr. Rittelmeyer is the leader in Germany of the Christian Community founded in 1922 as a "free work of religious renewal" inspired by the teachings of Rudolf Steiner. His earlier life was spent as a Liberal Protestant Pastor; he is well known on the Continent as preacher and writer. The special aim of his new book is to discuss reincarnation, usually regarded as an Eastern doctrine, in relation to Western thought and Western religious tradition. Through Christianity, Dr. Rittelmeyer believes, the idea of reincarnation has acquired a new meaning and a new value for the whole world.

Following the teachings of Rudolf Steiner, Dr. Rittelmeyer holds that the incarnation of the Christ Spirit in Jesus of Nazareth gave a new impulse to human evolution. Initiates had always known Christ, finding Him after death in the spiritual world and during life through the Mysteries, not always as a Being who had to be sought in lofty spiritual realms, away from the earth. Hence reincarnation seemed to mean a recurrent coming away from Christ; it was often felt as a burden. But since Golgotha Christ has dwelt in the earth's sphere, men are not re-born into exile, and the spiritual evolution of humanity becomes inseparable from the spiritual evolution of the earth itself. Even the metals must be raised up into the likeness of the precious stones of the Apocalypse.

I think that in the future men will demand increasingly a religion which relates itself to the earth in some such way as this; no other religion can unite truly with science or with sociology. But how far is reincarnation, as interpreted by Dr. Rittelmeyer, essential to religious development along these lines? What is important is that every human ego should be bound up

through past karma and future endeavour with earthly history. There are other esoteric teachings, which establish this link by conceiving that one ego may participate in the experiences of other egos, born before him and after him, towards whom he stands as spiritual child and spiritual parent. Something like reincarnation may also occur; but it is easy, perhaps, to form too crude a picture of what the process involves.

I wish that Dr. Rittelmeyer had told us more of the inner experiences from which his own belief in reincarnation is mainly derived—that he had made his book more of a personal record and less of a polemic. Although he rightly emphasises that reincarnation is not to be accepted by anyone simply because Rudolf Steiner taught it, references to Rudolf Steiner's work are very frequent; and the general reader may feel that this aspect of the book limits its appeal.

But this need be felt only if the book is treated as an argument. Its essential value, I think, is as a stimulus to thought and meditation. Dr. Rittelmeyer's writing is most agreeably free from sensationalism and false sentiment. He is well aware that thoughts of reincarnation may be a dangerous source of egotism, callousness, and vanity—"one may say candidly that if hostile powers wished to destroy men, they could lay hold of them at this point." In his discussion of how such danger may be avoided, and how a belief in reincarnation should be expressed in personal and social conduct, there are many wise remarks reflecting a long pastoral experience and a deeply sympathetic insight into human nature. Whether or not we are inclined to believe in reincarnation, we must feel that it is united here with an exalted morality; and that to reflect upon it, under Dr. Rittelmeyer's guidance, not only gives us a clearer grasp of present-day religious needs but brings us close to far-reaching spiritual issues.

Human Livestock. By EDMUND B. D'AUVERGNE. (Grayson & Grayson, London. 10s. 6d.)

Mr. Edmund D'Auvergne has presented his timely book to the public in the centenary year of one of the greatest acts of liberation in history, for it was in August, 1833, that Great Britain decided to wash her hands completely of any complicity in slave trading and slave owning by setting free all the known slaves in the British Empire on August 1st, 1834.

Human Livestock covers in readable form the whole story of slavery under British and Foreign flags whether in the West Indies or the Southern States of America, or other islands of the sea. The author tells a terrible story, but then, slavery is a terrible story.

It is estimated that for the two hundred and fifty years from 1600 to 1854, the slave traffic involved the original capture of 12,000,000 of human beings, of whom only about 6,000,000 ever reached the plantations. Mr. D'Auvergne tells us that in one intensive period from 1780 to 1786 over 2,000,000 slaves were shipped into the British American Colonies.

He also tells something of the demoralization with which slavery was accompanied. There was first the practice of breeding slaves, and he quotes one planter who in making his report expressed satisfaction that the report

included "52 wenches who were pregnant"! He mentions also the well-known fact that there was the freest licence in the matter of women. In another part of the book he plainly illustrates a well-known practice which is seldom committed to print, namely, that of gelding, and quotes the following record of a woman who was paid to carry this out: "Ten guineas paid to Alice Mills (*sic*) for castrating forty-two negroes according to sentence of commissioners for trying rebellious negroes."

But Mr. D'Auvergne does not limit himself to the horrible side of *Human Livestock*. He tells very finely indeed, almost better than it has ever been done before, the story of the historic work of Granville Sharp. The picture which he draws of this clerk in the Ordnance Department who resigned his position to make history in bringing about Abolition, will be an inspiration to any reader. One other interesting and little known feature is the part which Canada played in assisting the work of liberating the slaves of the Southern States of America, and he produces some of the most thrilling stories connected with the efforts the Canadians made to rescue slaves who were making their escape from the south to the free country of Canada.

Human Livestock is a story extremely well told.

JOHN HARRIS

Son of Heaven: A Biography of Li Shih-Min, Founder of the T'ang Dynasty. By C. P. FITZGERALD. (Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.)

This interesting and scholarly history of the founder of the T'ang Dynasty, during which dynasty China flowered into one of her fairest eras of culture, is an outstanding work of original research. Yet it is so pleasing, and so vividly written, that the ordinary reader will find himself greatly attracted by this picture of one who might be called the Charlemagne or the Akbar of the Far East. Li Shih-Min, who is more universally recogni-

zed under his dynastic name, T'ai Tsung, was not the first of the line, but it was his impetus, military genius and force of character which placed his weak good-natured father on the throne at a time when China was divided under twelve warring satraps. Since the Hans, China had become more and more disintegrated, and indeed was still not to become the size of nation as we know it to-day, although Li Shih-Min drew in Fukien and some of the South-western provinces before he died, worn out at forty-nine. But his unification of China was to last, with modifications, till the present age; and

when one considers that enormous achievement, one perceives why he has become a national hero.

He was but fifteen when he was sent to fight the Tatar hosts. Constantly throughout the book, China's borders are harried by these horsemen, skilled with bows and arrows, vulnerable only in their inter-tribal dissensions and their dependence upon their herds and flocks and water-wells. Indeed Mr. Fitzgerald compares the problem to that facing British India to-day on her North-west Frontier. By the close of his reign, Li Shih-Min had put China in the position of being on the offensive, if she so desired, rather than the defensive. His war with Korea was not so successful perhaps as to arms, but he certainly set an example in clemency which is worth noting in that cruel period: for, out of his private resources, he ransomed the families of

the captured and set them on farms, so touched was he by their sad condition. With similar magnanimity he made Wei Cheng, the adviser of a fallen foe, his chief minister, and he paid attention to his candid and frequent criticisms.

It is not surprising that the Chinese look upon this Emperor, who not only unified but settled the administration of the provinces and restored the examinations for the civil service, as almost the ideal of Confucius's Perfect Prince. Foreign nations, moreover, may well respect him, for it was he who welcomed the Nestorian Christians to his capital at Ch'ang-an (or Hsian-fu, as known now), and permitted the Mohammedans to build a mosque in Canton. Tolerance truly admirable even to-day, as well as in the seventh century A. D.!

DOROTHEA HOSIE

Mixed Pasture. By EVELYN UNDERHILL. (Methuen & Co., Ltd., London. 5s.)

Once more we have a book from Miss Underhill on her special subject. She is perfectly correct when she says:—

Philosophy has not only to make room for the intellectual experiences of a Plato, a Descartes, a Kant, a Hegel. It must also make room for the contemplative experiences of a St. Paul, a Plotinus, a Francis, a Teresa.

This divergence between intellectual and spiritual experiences has been the source of the division between Religion and Philosophy. Spiritual experiences offer unique material for thought, and a complete philosophy is not possible if the most striking and important experiences of life are neglected. Indian philosophy has shown deeper insight in building up systems of thought not only on normal but also on super-normal experiences.

This book opens with "The Philosophy of Contemplation," defined as "the art whereby we have communion with that ultimate reality". The author points out the importance of

the mystic quest for "that mysterious Something Other, the Holy and Unchanging which gives meaning to life".

Mysticism opens a new vista of experience, "a wonderfully full, new, and intimate sense of contact with the real life of things". The touch with real life can be felt here, and the soul pours forth melodies of creation in all departments of life, social, artistic, philosophic and contemplative. The discovery of this eternal life makes our temporal life here richer and fuller by the reflection of its light upon it. The temporal is the shadow of the spiritual; and, therefore, the "will of the voice" is understood and obeyed. Social actions become easy and spontaneous; love, charity and service become full of meaning and joy.

The Oxford Movement, discussed in another essay, evokes the true sense of the church as the Divine Fold, by impressing the significance of sacramental worship as helping the nourishment of mind and spirit in finer instincts and illumined impulses, and as giving a disciplined life and holiness. "The pro-

motion of holiness—this alone can guarantee any institution's spiritual worth."

In the last part of the book the author describes the spirituality of St. Francis, Richard the Hermit and Walter Hilton, and summarises the philosophy of Baron Von Hügel. The Baron conceived of a thin barrier

between our poor finite relativity, and the engulfing infinite Absolute, a barrier which is absolutely necessary for us, for though God was and could ever be without us, God is no more

God for us, if we cease to be relatively distinct from Him . . . Our spirit clothes and expresses His, His spirit first creates and then sustains and stimulates our own.

The author emphasises the dynamic side of Mysticism, which shows life in exuberance, life in all aspects of prayer, love, charity and service—life which touches the finger tips of the Eternal as well as raises the fallen humanity to enliven it, transform it and lead it Heavenward.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

Christian Myth and Ritual: A Historical Study. By E. O. JAMES, D. Litt., Professor of the Philosophy and History of Religion in the University of Leeds. (John Murray, London. 12s.)

Professor James begins by telling us that Christianity, as an institutional and historical religion is synonymous with the worship of Jesus as the Eternal Son of God and the centre of a sacramental ritual. For weal or woe, from the beginning of the second century, the main strands of the culture pattern, which in the East became known as Orthodoxy and in the West Catholicism, took shape, and grew in complexity during the subsequent ages . . .

How these "strands" of the Christian "culture pattern" may be traced back to the religious rituals and practices of the oldest known races is the theme of the present work, in which the author demonstrates that an enormous number and variety of the ceremonies, formulae and ritual objects, used in the Catholic rites of ordination, baptism, the Eucharist, etc., have descended from pre-Christian times, and have been preserved and, as it were, mummified by the conservatism of the Church.

Professor James has much to say about the cycle of primitive ideas centring round the kingly office—so fully described by Sir James Frazer in *The Golden Bough*—ideas which became interwoven with the Christian conception of Jesus as the king who was sacrificed for the welfare of his people.

Primitive conceptions of the kingship have survived, not only in connection with the central dogma of Christianity, but in such Christian rites as the English coronation service, which is a veritable museum of relics of ancient rituals. But it was—

in the papacy that the ancient conception of the royal priesthood survived in fullest degree . . . The Roman Pontiff, therefore, came to represent the unity of the Church, and the concentration of all ecclesiastical power in the same sense that the divine king was ruler of the community by virtue of his supernatural status . . .

In illustration and support of his thesis, Dr. James has collected and arranged with discriminative skill a vast amount of deeply interesting information about the popular religious beliefs and practices of antiquity.

It must not be forgotten, however, in connection with this and similar works, that, contemporary with the folk who believed and practised these doctrines and rites, which were usually superstitious and often obscene or cruel, there were philosophers, poets, saints, and cultured men and women, whose creeds were rational and ethical standards unexceptionable. No doubt such people were in a minority then; but are they otherwise now? Superstition, cruelty and obscenity were no monopoly of the ancients; nor are their antithetical virtues peculiar to ourselves.

R. A. V. M.

THE LAST QUARTER OF 1933 IN THE U. S. A.

Events which are Symptoms—The Coming of an Ordered Society—Spiritual Values of the New Deal—Precepts and Examples of Emerson and Thoreau—Poetry returns to the Stage—Study of Religion at Columbia.

[**Professor Irwin Edman** is one of the more independent and idealistic of the younger group of American thinkers. He keeps a sensitive finger on the American pulse. His fitness for the task of observing spiritual trends of Far Western thought and recording them once a quarter for **THE ARYAN PATH** will be apparent from the following extract from his personal credo, contributed a few years ago to the volume entitled *Living Philosophies* :—

There seem to me, without benefit of religion or of clergy, to be the possibilities of worship and of adoration. There are altitudes of the spirit revealed to us in the traditions of philosophy, literature, music, and art that remind me still that divinity was not a human invention but a human discovery. I believe those heights in art or in life may be reached again, and I know the works of contemporaries and the lives of contemporaries that seem to me to bring a renewed faith in the possibilities of life even to a disillusioned and weary generation.

That powerful current of magnetism that emanates from ideas influences men to a greater extent than most realise. It explains the phenomenon of consensus of mass opinion on countless points, but no less it offers hope for the raising of the level of the race mind, as spiritual ideas are held and spread. Ideas know no geographical boundaries, and the trend of thought in America is of immediate practical interest to us all.—EDS.]

The spirit bloweth, of course, where it listeth, and it most assuredly bloweth not at stated intervals such as a week, a month or a quarter. In the profoundest sense, it must be said that life in so far as it is spiritual, has no geography, no calendar, no local confines or provincial home. In the face of these facts perhaps a word of apology is in order for this enterprise of a quarterly letter on the more significant intellectual and spiritual happenings during a given period as seen from the perspective of the skyline of New York. While spiritual events cannot be dated with the exactness of a political election, or a war, or a revolution, the spirit too has its seasons. And no one can have followed the deeper moral and intellectual changes in American life in the last decade or

two without being aware how even in three months there comes to be a variation in the climate of opinion and in the imaginative weather. There comes to be a new turn in what the informed and sensitive are talking about, the books on the stalls show a new direction, there are flourishings and declines in one or another of the arts. A mood of hope or of fear, of despair or tranquillity comes to animate the general scene.

Then, too, as to geography, which it was said above is in essence irrelevant to the life of the spirit. That, too, should be said with reservation. The United States is singularly susceptible to gusts of opinion. There are movements and accents of thought here that are to be explained not least by the kind of economic and political scene and

history in which they appear. And even European and Oriental thought, which constitute no small part of our moral and intellectual nutriment, come to have both a different taste and a different effect when imported here than they have upon their native shores.

There is one special difficulty about a periodic report on the movement of things of the spirit. One cannot so much report events as report symptoms, or more strictly put, it will be the purpose of this chronicle to treat events only in so far as they are symptoms, signs of the times in the domain of the timeless. And such indications may come from the most diverse quarters. A book, a cinema, a political address may be, to the alert, an index of something more than a fact. Facts even, or particularly, the most external and political ones, may be freighted with moral significance. Your correspondent proposes to try scrupulously to select only such facts as are or seem to him spiritually symptomatic and representative.

So much by way of preface. The observations in the above paragraph may be illustrated by the circumstance that even in circles devoted to the more generous interests of the human spirit, economic and political matters have come to occupy unusual attention. This seems to be true all over Western Europe, but there is, I think, a special reason why it is true in this country at the present time. The present Government under the imaginative leadership of President

Roosevelt is not simply trying experiments, political, social, and fiscal, of the most adventurous character, but all these experiments, judging by the utterances of the President and his closest official advisers, are marked by an obviously consistent and general intention and a pervading unity of vision. The New Deal, a phrase that has become at once a popular and a technical term throughout the country, refers to that extraordinary group of experiments in economic and social control, which have as their goal a planned society in which domination by the profit motive, it is hoped, will be succeeded by the ideals and motivating forces of a more generous and co-operative commonwealth in which individual lives may come more finely to fruition. It is not within the scope of this communication nor within the competence of this writer to examine or even enumerate all the technical economic and political devices which the New Deal of the Roosevelt Government involves. What is pertinent to this chronicle is the fact that scarcely a single signal pronouncement of the leaders of the present administration in this country has failed to be marked by some specific and obviously sincere reference to the deeper aims of an ordered society. It is beyond all peradventure that an element of idealism, at once incisive and profound, has entered American life in a way conspicuously absent from it since the tragic frustration and death of President Wilson. Whatever criticisms—and there are many from many

quarters—may be made against specific enterprises of the current regime in the United States, even its critics have acknowledged the generosity of motive, the high sense of a more generous life, that have marked the cardinal statements of the President himself and his official family. From the time of his ringing utterance on the day of his inauguration that the money changers must be driven from the temple, he has consistently suggested to capital and labour alike that recovery meant something more or rather something different than the restoration of material profits to the few. It meant and could mean a life for all, in which with material security re-established and the grosser inequalities removed life might find its true flowering in more and other than material ways. Nobody has quite sounded such a note in American political life since Wilson, gaunt and weary, pleaded before a great audience in New York in 1919 for a commonwealth of mankind "lest the great heart of the world should break". It is this new note that Roosevelt has imported into political life that explains why many who had in America considered political life the enemy of the spirit have begun to believe that politics and industry may yet in this country be made the instrument, as they were at the hands of Abraham Lincoln, of nobler aims. The "politics of time," in the language of A. E. (many of us in this country are beginning to believe) may be made allies of the "politics of eternity". It is a hopeful sign when even

practical statesmen insist that the instruments of life are not its ends. In an address recently at the Foreign Policy Association, which meets fortnightly to discuss current issues, Professor A. A. Berle, one of the so-called Brain Trust, was one of four speakers to address a highly representative audience on "Which Way Out?" (of course, out of the economic depression). Mr. Berle emphasized not the economics, but the spiritual values of the New Deal. The latter were, to his mind, an attempt through devices however new and however social, to promote that spiritual flowering of the individual, which was the distinctive hope of American life as pleaded for and illustrated long ago by Emerson and Thoreau.

It is said among the economic experts that freight car loadings are an index to general economic conditions. In the same way, one of the ways in which the general temper of mind and feeling may be studied is by the outstanding events in the world of theatres, books and music. One notable characteristic of the present season in the theatre in New York is what one may define as the renaissance of both poetry and moral integrity. The most loudly acclaimed, both by the intellectual and the larger public, is a play called "Mary of Scotland" by Maxwell Anderson, known here as both poet and playwright. The important fact about this play for our purposes is that it has brought poetry, both as to language and as to grandeur of intention, back to

the theatre, and that the grand manner and the singing lyric splendour of the lines have awakened a warm response. It was only last year that some of the critics were complaining, or at least asserting, that the day of poetry in the theatre was over. One other outstanding success, both artistically and financially, is a play called "Ah, Wilderness" ("Ah Wilderness were Paradise enow") by Eugene O'Neill, generally acknowledged to be America's most distinguished playwright. His more recent works had been sombre and morbid pieces of psychiatric analysis. In this play he studies with the most simple and with the same imaginative insight the longings and aspirations of a normal adolescent boy in a naïve and wholesome family in a small town in Connecticut of the now pastoral seeming days of 1906. The play is a triumph of tenderness, realism and lyricism combined. And it constitutes a tribute to the finer reachings of that human nature which O'Neill had previously made his audiences feel was a vessel of corruption. It is no small symptom that the public has taken this new play of his to its heart.

Among the notable books that have attracted attention the same unwonted reaching may be discerned. There is Ralph Roeder's beautiful study, "The Man of the Renaissance," marked at once by its elevation of style and of theme. It

is the lyric rendering of the spirit of an age consumed by the fire of beauty. The most popular book of poetry among that growing body of readers in America who read poetry is Yeats's "Collected Poems," than which there could be no more ardent instance in our age of a poet "obedient at once to his five senses" and to the deeper meanings and storms and calms those five senses echo or evoke. And in philosophy, the themes of art and religion, which had seemed to yield in recent years to those of social philosophy almost completely, are coming back to their own.

At my own (Columbia) university, a professorship of religion, where spiritual interests may be studied free of any specific theological commitments, was some years ago established. And by this autumn the most ambitious secular programme for the study of religion in any American university is in full swing. America, too, is discovering that men cannot live by bread alone. Thousands of them crowded a concert hall one autumn evening to hear Artur Schnabel play—and play nothing but Beethoven sonatas. America is becoming—who knows?—in a new and more auspicious sense an "outpost of civilization". New York during the musical season seems almost the centre of it.

IRWIN EDMAN

*New York,
December 27th, 1933.*

CORRESPONDENCE

THE SWASTIKA

[**S. V. Viswanatha** is the author of *Racial Synthesis in Hindu Culture* which was published in Trübner's Oriental Series. We really wonder whether a historical locus in the ordinary sense can be fixed for immortal symbols. A hint, however, as to the occult genesis of the Swastika is given by Madame Blavatsky in her *Secret Doctrine* (II, pp. 99-100).

Born in the mystical conceptions of the early Aryans, and by them placed at the very threshold of eternity, on the head of the serpent of Ananta, it found its spiritual death in the scholastic interpretations of medieval Anthropomorphists.]

Concerning the observations made by Dr. F. O. Schrader on p. 61 of the January ARYAN PATH that "the Swastika is pre-Aryan, and nobody can tell where it originated," but "it was known in Germany since pre-historic times," and means "the rise of a benign power or lucky time," and that "it is not by itself an anti-Semitic symbol," nor "a peculiarly Indian symbol,"—it may be of interest to mention one or two things about the Swastika, which might point to its origin and peculiar import.

The Swastika is generally accepted to be a symbol of "well-being," of "prosperity"; and this meaning is given to it by its derivation from Sanskrit (*Su+asti+ka*). It appears in two forms with its hands pointing clockwise or counter-clockwise (卐, 卐). Though the origin of the symbol may have lain elsewhere, it owes its popularity as a sacred sign, no doubt, to the Hindus and Buddhists with whom it was an invariable practice to prefix "Svasti" at the time any auspicious act was commenced.

Like many other religious usages and features appearing elsewhere at a later age, it would appear the Swastika also can be related to Egyptian mythology. In Egyptian hieroglyphics the symbol for "created life" is seen to have taken the form 𐀓 or 𐀔. If we ignore in these figures the "circle" at the top, standing perhaps for the "egg," i.e., life in creation, we get a cross which in all probability was the original for the later varieties of the "Christian Cross". In hieroglyphics again, the symbol 𐀓 stands for "Div-

inity". Putting the two concepts together, we should have a Swastika with only one hand 卐 to represent "Divine Creation". With four arms 卐 it may mean the symbol for Divine Creation of life *viewed from any of the four points*. It is possible that the symbol and what it stood for migrated also from Egypt to Italy, where it is met with in some old Etruscan tombs. Schliemann observes in his *Troy* that the symbol was found among the Greek ruins, and the left-handed Swastika is interpreted by him as a "mark of the sinister sex". Without the arms, it is the Greek "Cross" of later times, in which both the vertical and horizontal lines are of equal length.

It remains an open question yet as to when the meaning "Rise of a benign power or lucky time," that Germany attaches to the symbol, was given to it, and whether it may have been received direct from Egypt or only through India. It is worth while to learn from what age in "pre-historic times" it was familiar in Germany and known to have this meaning. It may, however, be observed here that the sense "Rise of a Benign Power" may have been borrowed from Egypt from the idea of "Divine Creation"; while the meaning "lucky time" seems rather to have been the result of a borrowing from "Sanskritic India". It must, in any event, be conceded that the name given to the symbol would show that it had a peculiar relation to, and influence on, Indian religious thought.

Palghat

S. V. VISWANATHA

CHRISTIANITY AND HUMANITARIANISM

The centenary of Wilberforce's death last year gave an opportunity to clergymen and others still devoted to the Churches to make the altogether unfounded claim that the abolition of slavery was a triumph for the Churches. Students of history know that the Churches' claim has no foundation in fact, and it was therefore well that THE ARYAN PATH reproduced in its February "Ends and Sayings" some extracts from an article by Sir A. G. Cardew on the subject. But in referring to the indefatigable work of Wilberforce, Buxton and others, he wrote:—"The Protestant Churches in England had at last generally awakened to the iniquity of slavery." I respectfully venture to point out that this statement is erroneous, and that the Protestant Churches did nothing of any substantial kind to abolish slavery.

It should be borne in mind that Wilberforce himself, writing in 1832, admitted that "the Church clergy have been shamefully lukewarm in the cause of slavery abolition." In the now famous Lunn-Joad correspondence on "Is Christianity True?", Mr. Joad quotes this statement and points out that "the clergy of the Established Church either actively opposed or were completely indifferent to the abolition of the slave trade".

Sir John Harris, in *A Century of Emancipation*, says:—

In America Abolitionists were formally denied Church membership, as Joseph Sturge discovered when he went there in 1841. In England it would be fair to say the Churches had not awakened to the criminal nature of slavery, and that clergy and ministers had not grasped the fact that the practice of slavery broke every law of the decalogue.

The father of W. E. Gladstone was a devout member of the Anglican Church, but he owned extensive plantations and was therefore keenly opposed to the abolition of slavery. When asked whether he wanted slavery to be interminable, he replied:—

I humbly conceive that it is not for me to attempt to say when a system should terminate

which Almighty God in the Divine Wisdom of His overruling Providence has seen fit to permit in certain climates since the origin and formation of Society in this world.

Sir John Harris also points out that leading families in the Christian Churches were so closely connected with the slave trade that the average Churchgoer's attitude was pretty accurately reflected by old Mr. Gladstone. He further shows that one of the Abolitionists drew public attention—and suffered for it—to the fact that the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel drew part of its revenue from the slave-cultivated Codrington Estates in the West Indies.

Of course there must have been many abolitionists in the Christian Churches but it may be said that the Churches *qua* Churches did not contribute to the abolition of slavery.

While Wilberforce was carrying on his great fight, there existed in England itself slavery in another form, namely, slavery of the labouring classes—particularly children—engaged in factories. What was the Church's contribution towards the investigation of the horrors of labour conditions? Absolutely none. By a curious irony Wilberforce himself recommended a *laissez-faire* policy with regard to labour conditions, and he wrote of the poorest and most miserable classes in England "that their more lowly path had been allotted to them by the hand of God, that it is their part faithfully to discharge its duties and contentedly to bear its inconveniences".

It is due to Lord Shaftesbury pre-eminently, that the national conscience was at last aroused against the different forms of virtual slavery that existed in England. The Church was a mere looker-on, despite the contention of Canon Barry of Westminster who wrote of the victims of the mines and factories that "the Church did hear their cry and delivered them—in the person of Lord Shaftesbury".

ENDS AND SAYINGS

- ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS.

Lieut.-Col. R. H. Elliot, Chairman of the Occult Committee of the Magic Circle, the most influential body of conjurers in the Empire, writes in *The Spectator* of January 15th, that after fifteen years' continuous investigation by that body, it has not been possible to "point to a single observation in favour of Spiritualism". His conclusion is that it is all fraud and trickery on the part of the mediums; and in proof of this he stresses the low intellectual level of several communications purporting to come from the spirits of distinguished dead persons.

Mr. C. E. M. Joad, in the next issue of *The Spectator*, agrees with much of what Lieut.-Col. Elliot writes. "Spirit messages, the fact is, alas, too obvious, are not remarkable for their intellectual content." Mr. Joad, however, points out that in his experience certain phenomena have occurred which cannot be explained away as mere trickery and which demand "investigation by scientific methods in a spirit of scientific detachment". But the Psychical Research Society, which has always consisted of some of the most distinguished men of science, may be supposed to have carried on their investigations in such a spirit, and yet the fact remains that such investigations have lacked solid results. In an interesting article on psychical research

in *The Manchester Guardian*, Dr. Robert H. Thouless writes on the failure of that Society in its fifty years of existence to settle "the problems of the reality and nature of such apparently supernormal occurrences as telepathic communication, clairvoyance, spirit-rappings, table-turning etc." He candidly admits that "the vast majority of the problems about which there was doubt at that time [*i.e.*, at the time of the establishment of the Society] are still doubtful".

It has been repeatedly suggested in these pages that what are called psychic phenomena can never be properly understood without definite knowledge about the different principles making up the constitution of man. That knowledge has been available for ages in the East, but Western savants blunder on, "investigating" phenomena, and sternly ignoring the record of the findings of their great predecessors in the Orient. The ancient eastern psychology has a thoroughly rational explanation of the phenomenon of telepathy, for example, but Dr. Thouless remarks:—"Telepathy, if it be a fact, fits in with nothing that we know of mind or brain, and casts no new light on what we already know of human psychology." Is not this statement tantamount to an admission of the inadequacy of present western knowledge regarding brain and

mind, and of present western psychology? Again, the relation between mind and matter, which Mr. Joad calls "that most puzzling of all relations," is not an insoluble mystery to the student of the psychology of the ancient East.

For the reasons indicated above, we are left cold by the announcement that a new International Institute for Psychical Research has been formed to investigate psychic phenomena on strictly scientific lines. The known materialistic bias of its President, Prof. G. Elliot Smith, does not encourage hope that the new Institute will fare much better than the older Society whose failure is now generally admitted. There probably will be the same stubborn refusal of the clues offered in the authentic texts of ancient Eastern psychology, which Madame H. P. Blavatsky synthesized and made readily available. Such theories alone can guide the Western psychologists to the proofs they seek, without grave risk of injury to helpless mediums, the tools on which they depend for their investigations. It is not in the séance room that the great Sages of the East have acquired the mastery of occult arts and sciences and probed the deepest mysteries of nature.

Sir Ernest Wallis Budge, perhaps the greatest living authority on Old Egypt and Chaldea, and formerly keeper of the mummies in the British Museum, has stated in an interview (*Daily Express*, January 17th) that he believes he holds the secrets of the "Death

Ray," of self-levitation, of television, of wireless without the aid of machinery, and of communion with the dead. He is reported to have said:—

All powers were in the safe keeping of the "masters" who passed them on to those initiates who had a vocation for their development and the necessary judgment for their proper use.

When Madame Blavatsky wrote about certain secrets in the possession of Eastern Sages which could not be made public, she was scoffed at as a charlatan. We wonder what will be said now of the statement of such an eminent authority as Sir Ernest Wallis Budge, who, when requested to enumerate the psychic powers of which he knew said, "No; because then I would be locked up." Again, he spoke of knowing "an African and an Indian who could vanish into air as you spoke to them, touched them," and said, "I doubt whether any Englishman could dissolve from view even if he were told how to. These arts need practice." Whatever the basis for his claims to knowledge of the Occult and its present custodians, his interview should provide the new Psychical Research Institute with ample matter for inquiry. Will it be free from the weaknesses from which the older Society for Psychical Research has suffered and suffers? Through ignorance, obstinacy and arrogance the Society for Psychical Research of 1884 lost the splendid opportunity to learn, which H. P. Blavatsky and her Masters offered. From then to now what has it learnt? Nothing.

AUAS

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

THE ARYAN PATH

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TORCHBEARERS OF TRUTH

At this present moment of time and space the human intellect as we know it may possibly not be the highest type of intellect in existence. Higher intelligences may exist in other places or may appear in other epochs. And the intellectual level of these beings may be as much above ours as ours is above the protozoa. Then it may well happen that before the penetrating eye of such intelligences even the most fleeting moment of mortal thought, as well as the most delicate vibration in the ganglia of the human brain, could be followed in each case, and that the creative work of our mortal geniuses could be proved by such an intelligence to be subject to unalterable laws, just as the telescope of the astronomer traces the links of the manifold movement of the spheres.

—MAX PLANCK

This is a remarkable passage coming as it does from the pen of so eminent a scientist. It reminds us of a similar pronouncement of the great Huxley who in one of his essays suggested that there might be beings in the universe whose intelligence is as much beyond ours as ours exceeds that of the black beetle. Theoretically this view is generally accepted. But such Supermen do not mingle among men and so their existence is doubted. In the East and especially in India such Beings of Light, Mahatmas and Rishis, are believed in; but it is also held that in this Kali Yuga,

Dark Age, they cannot be found, cannot be known.

H. P. Blavatsky startled the western world by asserting that she herself knew such Superior Men who possessed superhuman knowledge and who controlled forces of nature unknown to science. There she was ridiculed and derided for this. In India her statement was accepted, but exaggerated notions prevailed as to their powers and the possibilities of their interference in ordinary affairs of life.

In our pages Mr. Geoffrey West has been writing about some

European Occultists who, like Madame Blavatsky were possessors of extraordinary knowledge and of extraordinary faculties. Having examined the life activities of Paracelsus, St. Germain, Cagliostro, St. Martin and Mesmer, in the following article he writes about H. P. Blavatsky, the anniversary of whose death her students and admirers will be celebrating on the 8th of May.

The policy of this journal has ever been to insist on the examination of the *teachings* of Madame Blavatsky. In them, if nowhere else, can be found the proof that such Elder Brothers exist; for she claimed that such Living Men were her Teachers—the inspiration of all her work, the source of all her knowledge. But if Madame Blavatsky's own word is doubted, then it inevitably follows that she in her own person will have to be given the credit of having "invented" all that she wrote, and what she wrote is one of the grandest and most beneficent philosophies once it is properly understood. No sincere student of her works can help admitting the vastness of her intellect and marvelling at the enormous range of her vision.

For our part we are content to take her word as to the source of her teachings; from the very beginning she claimed "a somewhat intimate acquaintance with Eastern adepts" and she offered very convincing arguments in logic and in fact about their existence and the knowledge they possess.

Is it of no importance to the world to learn that such Wise Men

live? Would it be altogether useless to ascertain the conditions under which their priceless knowledge is available? Is it not possible for some men to fulfil those conditions and study so that they may teach?

There are numerous methods by which those interested have set out to find these Wise Men: there are those who seek them personally, trying to trace them to their high retreats by physical travel or superphysical claptrap. Mme. Blavatsky and others, however few, who have known them and their Occult World have spoken of the one and only sure way, the study of their philosophy which reveals who these Living Men are, what their place in human evolution is, why they continue to labour for the race, and how they work. Their teachings open the gate of gold through which the learner passes to the Teachers for more intimate study so that he may serve his fellow men more worthily and by a method which has so stood the test of time that it may be called infallible. The aim of this Journal is to help its readers to find the Aryan Path, treading which they will find for themselves these Superior Men whom Mme. Blavatsky described as the Sages of the Orient. One of these Living Men has said:—"If you want to know us, study our philosophy; if you want to serve us serve our humanity." Another of Them has promised: "Every step made by one in our direction will force us to make one toward him."

THE OCCULTIST OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

I—H. P. BLAVATSKY

[**Geoffrey West** completes this month his studies of European Occultists. In our February and March issues he dealt with the life of Paracelsus, and in April he wrote of those four heroic characters who formed a Cross of Occult Light in the eighteenth century sky—Saint-Germain, Cagliostro, Saint-Martin and Mesmer. And now he writes of the latest link in the ever-lengthening chain of the Torchbearers of Truth to a darkened humanity—H. P. Blavatsky.—EDS.]

To attempt a biography, or even a portrait, of H. P. Blavatsky in a few hundred, or thousand, words would be not only absurd but something of an impertinence, in these present pages at least. Many books and countless articles have been written about her, and the end is not yet. For those able to hear, a certain knowledge may be presumed—and who shall speak to the deaf?

What should be stressed here are certain similarities in her career and accomplishments and those of some of her forerunners already portrayed. Her remarkable psychic gifts, her mysterious wanderings, the seeming dubiety of some of her actions in the eyes of the world, the charges brought against her, her steadiness of aim, her dominating personality, and yet, with all the general air of doubt colouring the wider view of her, the persistence of respect, and a respect that grows—all these things might be paralleled over and over in the biographies of Paracelsus and even of Saint-Germain. Her life was as strange as any, even in its best-certified events, right from her premature birth and unfortunate baptism in South Russia in 1831—by way of her self-willed childhood, her

early reputation for supernatural powers, her somnambulism, her mannish airs, her passionate tempers, her brief marriage at seventeen to the man she never lived with but whose name she made famous, her twenty-five years of wandering over Europe, America and Asia, her recorded meetings with beings (not supernatural but supernormal) into whose hands she gave the direction of her life, her dramatic episode as a soldier under Garibaldi, her abortive attempt at Cairo in 1871 to found a society for the enlightened study of spiritualism, her new visit to America in 1873 and the spiritualistic controversies which followed, her foundation of the Theosophical Society in 1875 and subsequent work for it in India and Europe, her displays of “phenomena” and the attacks and “exposures” entailed thereby, her persistence in the face of all attempts to destroy the work by discrediting the woman, her miraculous recoveries from seemingly fatal illness during the writing of *The Secret Doctrine*—and so right to her rather sudden death in 1891.

With some at least of these forerunners she was one in her ruthless breaking of all personal domestic ties to serve her real end, in the

tireless nature of her odyssey, in her turning of her great gifts to others' good above her own—and also, in a degree, in what some students cannot conceive but as the misuse, sometimes, with whatever good intentions, of those gifts. She may have ranked as high as any—or even higher—but few approaching her for the first time, or perhaps on further study, can easily regard her as in all things the perfect embodiment of all she stood for. Her character was compounded of contradiction. In some directions profoundly perceptive, in others she seemed almost wilfully blind. She could be charming, tempestuous, childish, child-like, impish, abusive, generous, impatient, penetrative, illogical, wilful, impersonal, egotistic, scornful, laughing, reverent—and hardly so much by turns as all at once. She totally lacked ordinary discretion! Faced by either superior scepticism or open-mouthed gullibility she would “pull the legs” of her audience mercilessly, quite careless of the charges of fraud she might sometimes thereby invite. She defied convention, and laughed at if she did not ignore the gossip she provoked. Thus she laid herself open at times to the gravest suspicions, and yet, with them all, *one turns from a study of her life with the final impression of a fundamentally honest, a deeply serious and sincere personality, possessed of, at once, courage, will, and purpose.*

Always the will and courage held the purpose foremost. That it was not her own purpose, that she regarded herself rather as an instru-

ment, a vehicle, serving others, is evident from the attitude constantly expressed in her letters of having a work to do which she accepted yet could find irksome:—

I feel I am dying . . . I am sure I will drop some day on my writing and be a corpse before the T. S. says *boo*. Well, I don't care. And why the deuce should I? Nothing left for me here.

That with all her gifts she was less than a perfect instrument the references in the published *Mahatma Letters to A. P. Sinnett* would alone suffice to make clear. “She has once more proved inaccurate and led you into error . . . she forgets and mixes up things more than usual.” On several occasions her competency in explanation of fine points was called into question; she was said to lack concentration, to be “unable to write with anything like system and calmness, or to remember that the general public needs all the lucid explanations that to her may seem superfluous,” to be by nature “too passionately affectionate” for “a true adept,” to possess a but partial if increasing knowledge, to write at times in a manner “foolish, childish, and silly,” and to be (and progressively) indiscreet in her excess of zeal. She was, in fact, “far from perfect in some respects, quite the opposite,” and yet with all her “strong personal defects” she had also “most exceptional and wonderful endowments,” so that “just as she was, there was no second to her living fit for this work”. Despite, indeed, her “habitual incoherence” and “strange ways,” the truth was that “after nearly a cen-

tury of fruitless search, our chiefs had to avail themselves of the only opportunity to send out a *European body* upon European soil to serve as a connecting link between that country and our own." She wasted valuable psychic force upon trivialities, and herself admitted the "crime" of revealing in her enthusiasm unpermitted occult secrets, but with it all she *was* "the only opportunity," and whatever her sometimes jocular comments on the Masters she did in her heart deeply venerate them and serve them loyally.

Did she fail? Clearly not, for her work still stands, but it is permissible to hold that she faltered. Her troubles, her sufferings, declared the Master M. in 1882, were "effect from causes which *cannot* be *undone*—occultism in theosophy." And here at last we are coming very close home to the heart of the problem of the general Western attitude towards Theosophy. Her work was not confined to the West. If her Eastern Wisdom was especially needed by the West, the East needed it only less, and her work in India from 1879 to 1885, with many of her direct statements, make clear that her aim was not alone to bring about an understanding of East by West, but *vice versa* also, so that one body, one humanity with common hopes and ideals might thereby arise. But in so far as she did address herself to a Western audience, she could not wholly escape the fate of such as Cagliostro and Saint-Germain, both, even more than she, given to purely "magical" performances, and both,

in consequence, rather notorious than respected in the Western world at large. That the Masters themselves knew that this would be, at least for her, the probable if not inevitable effect is quite clear from their printed letters. The "most astounding phenomena," K. H. told Sinnett in his first communication, would never convince a sceptical world.

The ignorant—unable to grapple with the invisible operators—might some day vent their rage on the visible agents at work; the higher and educated classes would go on disbelieving as ever . . . The world's prejudices have to be conquered step by step, not at a rush.

Eighteen months later Sinnett was warned by M. against that universal failing of occult students, "the hankering after phenomena," M. adding: "If you cannot be happy without phenomena you will never learn our philosophy . . . If our philosophy is wrong a *wonder* will not set it right." Madame Blavatsky had of course her reasons, that "wonders" would excite curiosity and so "enquiry into the nature and the laws of those forces, unknown to science, but perfectly known to occultism". But events proved her wrong, and she had ultimately to accept the order "to abandon phenomena and let the ideas of Theosophy stand on their own intrinsic merits". Yet even so, the ill that resulted for her and for those associated with her, appears not only in the common attitude of incredulity but in all too much of the subsequent history of the Theosophical Society, whose "hankering after pheno-

mena" has been at all times all too plain.

Most seriously in Madame Blavatsky's case, these often trivial, essentially inconsequent phenomena obscured the value of her real work, her writings, wherein, in how much greater degree, "the ideas of Theosophy" *do* "stand on their own intrinsic merits," and to turn to which from the phenomena is, as Mr. G. B. Butt has said, "equivalent to a transition from the sensational to the sublime". There is neither space in the present article nor competence in the present writer adequately to assess her books as a whole. One can only declare the degree of imaginative and spiritual insight apparent in all her works, and how in reading *Isis Unveiled* and still more—much more—*The Secret Doctrine* one is constantly aware of contact with a mind of great power and knowledge, and with marked if variable analytic and synthetic gifts. One may feel at times that here is perhaps the work of one who, as Mr. Middleton Murry has said in these pages, "had not yet truly made up her mind," achieved a final clarification either within or without, but these are *not*, and only blindness can mistake them for, a charlatan's handiwork!

(One persistent charge perhaps needs to be briefly dealt with—that, never stilled, of plagiarism. Quite recently we have had Mr. Bechofer Roberts's statement that *Isis Unveiled* "clearly derives" from *Isis Revelata*, a work published in 1837. In fact Mr. Roberts has been misled by a title; the earlier work covers but a very

minute portion of the ground of the later, and none of its most fundamental theses. To this day the charges of W. E. Coleman in his appendix to Solovyeff's *A Modern Priestess of Isis* remain the only ones bearing even the appearance of substantiality. Coleman achieved the maximum air with the minimum actuality of precision; his enumeration of "plagiarised passages" means little without either his definition of what constitutes plagiarism, or a guarantee of his good faith. It is more than interesting, it is important, to note that he himself had had this identical charge of plagiarism brought against him a dozen years before his attack upon Madame Blavatsky, and apparently on good grounds. Does not a guilty conscience tend too easily to see its fault in others? Actually when one takes a fairly definite charge at random—as that that "nearly the whole" of pp. 599-603 of Vol. II of *The Secret Doctrine* "was copied from Oliver's *Pythagorean Triangle*, while only a few lines were credited to that work"—a parallel examination soon makes all but nonsense of the suggestion. Incidentally, it is clear that to maintain the view of Madame Blavatsky as a systematic plagiarist is necessarily to make liars of all who testified as to the way in which her books were written!)

William Kingsland has said of Madame Blavatsky that she "must be judged by her literary record and not by her personality". And rightly so! But it is interesting in this connection to consider her own attitude to her principal books. It was in general one of a real personal humility combined with a vast—to the sceptic, a fantastic—claim for her writings. Perhaps one should hardly term them even that, for she openly declared them to be not of her own conception, but set down clairvoyantly, recorded, she being copyist rather than

author. She freely recognised the faults of her transcription—notably in the case of *Isis Unveiled*, which she said “contained useless repetitions, most irritating digressions, and . . . many apparent contradictions,” besides being extremely confused in its arrangement. Nevertheless “I maintain that *Isis Unveiled* contains a mass of original and hitherto never divulged information on occult subjects.” She added :—

Prepared to take upon myself . . . the sins of all the external, purely literary defects of the work, I defend the ideas and teachings in it, with no fear of being charged with conceit, since *neither ideas nor teachings are mine*.

The Secret Doctrine was clearly a work of identical nature, in both conception and writing. Originally it was intended of course as not much more than a rewriting of the earlier book, at least in her mind, but it proved as all know to be very much more than that. It is, beyond all question, the greatest work from her pen . . . whatever its source.

Now the problem arises : Supposing one does accept the higher, or anyway less definable, origin for such a book as *The Secret Doctrine*, then *in what sense* is it to be understood ? The question is neither easy nor unimportant. The book is large in scope and various in detail. Exposition of the spiritual nature of the total universe jostles exact and elaborate human history ; religious insight and scientific controversy appear side by side ; cosmology, philosophy, archæology, anthropology, physics, myth-

ology, symbolism—all these and as many more departments of knowledge have their ordered places. In the field of science the book was at its appearance seen as running counter to many basic and long-established dogmas. To-day, in 1933, it may still appear to do so. But those who would see what Jericho walls have already fallen should read such an essay as *The Secret Doctrine and Modern Science*, by B. A. Tomes, where it is shown as having forestalled, or according with, not a few of the declarations of Einstein, Eddington, Lloyd-Morgan and others. In the field of history, however, or what is better called pre-history, it offers the most definite possible accounts of declared events which the average Western reader must find wholly fantastic. Must we accept them, literally, as part of the essence of Theosophy ?

Some Theosophists, perhaps, will say yes. Others, we think wiser, will say : Only to the point of one's ability, one's true inner acquiescence. One thing is certain—that Madame Blavatsky made no such demand. *The Secret Doctrine* was no last word ; it was, in her own phrase in its own pages, “but the pioneer of many more such books”. It states truth perhaps but certainly not the whole or the *pure* truth. For one thing, “since . . . this work withholds far more than it gives out, the student is invited to use his own intuitions”. As Kingsland has said :—

All these “theosophical” classifications—“principles,” “globes,” “chains,” “rounds” and “rings,” etc.,—necessarily

belong to the perceptions of the lower rational mind, which cannot transcend the categories of time and space.

He adds: "There is a very great deal in *The Secret Doctrine* which must not be taken too literally." Perhaps it is overmuch to say of her account of the planetary "rounds and rings"—as she of Sinnett's—that it is "only at best allegorical," but at least it is clear that it can only be understood in the degree of our more than literal understanding. There is a plane of thought upon which all statement, even the most plainly scientific, must be realised as metaphorical (a plane upon which the literal, simply, does not exist), and it is here, on this plane, that such a work of cosmic exposition as *The Secret Doctrine* must be approached—regarded, that is, intuitively rather than intellectually. All perception, save the purely intuitive, and all formulation must involve distortion in some degree—from that only the Absolute is exempt. In one of the *Mahatma Letters to Sinnett*, we find K. H. himself acknowledging: "I must have sorely failed to convey the right meaning, and have to confess my inability to describe the—*indēscribable*." That is the rock upon which every religion is sunk if it beware not—the taking of the symbol for the truth, the description for the indescribable, that essence which intuition alone can seize. One authority may be better than another, but *none* is absolute save that which speaks in a man's own heart. We are forced to say of Theosophy's as of every

religion's cosmology, that whatever its claim to be the truest it is still at best less than the True!

That is, I would hold, an at once genuinely Theosophical and essentially Western attitude. And one, moreover, which bridges, or helps to bridge, the gulf already noted earlier in this series of articles between the average Westerner and the teachers of Theosophy in the West. It is not *merely* that they—the latter—are strange. Let us admit that we have to enlarge the scope of Western knowledge, transcend its preconceptions, accept not only the possibility but the *fact* of many things we do at present all too readily deny. Presume all this achieved, and still (one feels to-day) some gulf would remain. For the path of the West is a path not merely of blindness, but of a real, if one-sided, development. It is a path of open individual self-realisation, of interior discovery rather than exterior instruction (though the two, of course, can never be wholly separated); one essentially out of sympathy, as Mr. Murry has put it, "with Madame Blavatsky's tendency to make a mundane mystery of things that are mysterious only because they are spiritual".

Such comment may be far from fair to Madame Blavatsky and her fellows, and one can appreciate reasons for secrecy where knowledge gives power for both good and evil, but the fact of the feeling remains and is a potent force to be reckoned with. Perhaps, one thinks, the presentation of these figures has been wrong—they

have never been drawn full-length for a Western public in Western terms by a biographer at once of the West and yet possessing the necessary wider perceptions and knowledge. The task would require both profound understanding and great literary skill, and these requirements have never been wholly fulfilled, even in perhaps the best of all, Mr. A. E. Waite's study of Saint-Martin, who is clearly the most acceptable of all, turning his gaze inward rather than outward, feeling occultism and alchemy to touch only "the bark of things," finding his wisdom not in the lodge but in the heart, not in the world but in the soul, accepting the traditional knowledge but discovering it valid only as he verified it in his own being, seeking primarily to live *this* life fittingly in *this* world. We cannot but feel that Saint-Martin—and next to him Paracelsus or Mesmer, who achieved their "wonders" as physicians in the service of the sick—is *the* type of the Western Theosophical mystic and teacher, and that whatever reason may be found for occult practice, wonder-working, these beings would have come more easily home to our bosoms lacking its display; would have seemed the spiritually purer and more satisfying. It is not that we doubt its actuality, but only, as revealed, its spiritual significance; too often it but seems that triviality has been imposed upon greatness, and greatness trivialised thereby. Cagliostro, it has been suggested, was lured by vanity to

use his powers for sheer display, and thereby were those offended who sought in him the pure spirit of understanding. We may hardly lay the charge in the same degree to Saint-Germain, or to H. P. Blavatsky, but the tendency appears, and always to Western eyes regrettably. The Mahatma letters become the more, not the less, impressive when we can forget the phenomenal methods of their delivery, and concentrate attention upon their contents. *Teaching not phenomena, understanding not worship—these are the essence and the requirement of Theosophy.*

These five men, this one woman, they went their various ways, achieved their various wonders, but their knowledge was one; and while the wonders pass the knowledge remains, a true and sublime knowledge when truly understood in that ultimate realisation that Truth itself must always be beyond definition, that every defining statement must be in its nature a metaphorical rather than a "precise" account, that every religion is but one partial and angular embodiment of Truth, and that Theosophy itself, with all its deeper insight, is finally no more exempt from this, no more *absolutely* exact, than the various religions it so profoundly illuminates. The wonders pass, the knowledge remains. . . . "If you cannot be happy without phenomena you will never learn our philosophy. . . . If our philosophy is wrong a *wonder* will not set it right."

GEOFFREY WEST

II—H. P. B.

[Reviewing in *The Sunday Referee* of January 7th the second volume of *The Complete Works of H. P. Blavatsky*, whom he described as "an overwhelming and essentially noble personality," **Victor B. Neuburg** wrote:—

This appreciation may seem exaggerated, emanating from one who is not and has never been connected with the T. S. ; but it is now due to suggest that possibly, when the true history of the period she covered comes to be recorded, with all its effects and ramifications, H. P. B. may be hailed as the greatest figure of her age.

In response to a request for a more detailed consideration of his judgment, Mr. Neuburg has sent us the following article.—EDS.]

The publication of H. P. B.'s *Opera Omnia* erects a monument to her achievements more enduring than brass; for it is a monument of pure gold; as it is likely that the Sun will outlast her daughter-planets.

Every great life—a life that is "outstanding"—has the quality of uniqueness; the higher we arise in the evolutionary scale, the more our individuality shows itself; for the more "individual," or undividable, do we become. Through intense differentiation we arise towards unity.

The many resemble each other, more or less, in their personalities; the few individualities are alike only in their uniqueness; in their characteristics, their lives, they differ infinitely.

It is these differences, these infinite mutabilities of personality, that cause what we call genius, which is simply an aspect of race-embodiment in an individual. There is a fierce controversy always and inevitably about the merits or demerits, qualifications or lacks, of the Great Ones; for they "strike" all those whom they contact at a different angle of personality; again, a characteristic of greatness.

By this test, H. P. B. may be considered profitably by the impartial student and historian. Everything possible to be said about anyone has been said about her. There is no need here to give the names, even, of her detractors and panegyrists; they run into scores; no two are alike. From the unveiled hostility of J. N. Maskelyne and G. W. Foote to the appreciation of G. R. S. Mead and the Countess Wachtmeister, H. P. B. has been criticised in every conceivable way.

It is only great souls who cause this infinite variety of reactions. There is a crystallization of race-experiences that brings the gift of seeming, and of being, all things to all men. Here is the mark of Attainment; the price to be paid is nearly always, humanly speaking, that of Attainder. Attainder and Attainment together sum up the relationship between the Adept and his fellowmen; this is provable from all our records. And by this standard H. P. B. being adjudged, she is proven indubitably of the Blood Royal of the Masters.

The ordinary human of to-day possesses more facts, probably, than were ever available before in the planet's history. Wisdom remains as rare as ever. The street-

man is "better informed" than Pythagoras or Archimedes; that is, he is better supplied with facts. But mere facts are to wisdom as pigments to the creative artist. In mere facts there is no science; it is in the weaving and blending and harmonising and correlating of facts that wisdom consists. It matters very little to us, if it matters at all, that Herodotus and Paracelsus were "incorrect" in detail; in Mind man moulds facts; facts never mould man; and so, in their separate ways and degrees, Herodotus and Paracelsus "stand" for wisdom—the wisdom of their age—as against mere knowledge. These men were, in to-day's speech, Adepts or Masters. Knowledge is not wisdom, as a polished stone is very rarely a diamond.

H. P. B.'s works give all the clues needed to an understanding of her life and being. For the task wherewith she was entrusted it would be impossible to imagine a more unlikely past than was hers; it was doubtful, shadowy, mysterious, compromised. Accused of fraud and spying; at one time a "spiritualist medium," with innumerable shady contacts with life and humans, it can be asserted with complete accuracy that, of all the conscious beings upon this planet of paradox and romance incredible, H. P. B. was the last to be entrusted with the custody of the Pearl of Wisdom that is the product of human tears and laughter; that Pearl that had been maturing for æons in the Great Sea of thought. Yet the unexpected and impossible happened; paradox

again transcended platitude; the choice of the devas made the prejudices and the predilections of unenlightenment look small and mean, and pitifully inadequate. The "senders" saw from a different angle; that is all. The difference in view-point between man and deva is ultimately a mere matter of focus.

The age into which H. P. B. plunged—that is really the most appropriate word—was an age in which, in the general break-up of creed-crusts that were unable to withstand the acid tests of science, there was a real danger to western humanity that that outer crust would be mistaken for the core or *cor* itself.

Had that happened, the race (this is a magic word) of Humanity would have been retarded for an æon; for the western tradition of civilization would have lost sight entirely of the Human Goal. This nearly happened in the mid-nineteenth century; and the knowledge that this was so, and that she personally had to restore the vision of the Goal, will be found to explain much that is otherwise inexplicable in the life and labours of H. P. B.

H. P. B.'s passions, prejudices, controversies, impatience, irritabilities, abnormalities of custom and habit, are all understandable with this key. To the truth, as she held it, she subordinated everything; her own life, work, happiness and reputation included. She was a Master; no more to be judged by human standards only than were Paracelsus or Cagliostro.

It is fatally easy to criticise the Masters; it is nearly always impossible to fathom their motives. It is they whose vision, reflected in the minds of men, leads humanity onwards. That vision sometimes, by its brilliance, blinds the visionary to the ordinary affairs of life, so easy to the average human. So, from the conventional angle, the Great Ones "act askew". They remain Great Ones, nevertheless. And a man's real spiritual worth is to be measured by his view of them.

Had sight of the Human Goal been completely lost, even for a moment, the temporary death of the Western Ideal would have ensued; this was the spiritual objective of the Dark Ones. It is not yet guessed how nearly they succeeded.

From behind the veil emerged H. P. B. with the Torch; that those who had earned the Sight might see ideas in their true relationship to Reality.

As a result of the conflict behind, what was happening in the western world? Specialised scientists on one side of the house, and religious fanatics on the other, were brawling with the Truth between them, unperceived by either army, and being pummelled and crushed to death in the conflict. H. P. B. intervened to rescue Truth ere Truth got battered beyond recognition. She succeeded. Such is her achievement.

Between religionists and scientists H. P. B. herself was all but crucified, An embodied Force,

she assailed, on the one hand, those whose evolutionary scheme stopped short at humanity, refusing to rise above it; and, on the other hand, those who mistook symbols for concrete things, events and facts. In a phrase, she was a spiritual protagonist with the opposed legions of materialism assailing her on either side.

The opposing armies had but one point in common; hatred of H. P. B., whose interest was centred in Truth Herself, and not in any partial and distorted presentation of Her. This was at the time when Truth and Her interests were almost completely subordinated to partisanship.

There is a tradition—a tradition not without considerable confirmation in history—that during the last quarter of each century a Messenger shall be sent to the West; a Messenger who shall bring light to that section of western humanity that is ready for an inner illumination. An intensified campaign occurs in the last century of a millennium. This is part of what is loosely called the Hermetic Doctrine. H. P. B. was the Light-Bearer of the nineteenth century to the western world.

A day or two ago I met the Editor of one of London's most famous weeklies; a man who is a philosopher, an "independent," a man of enormous, although specialised, erudition. He compared H. P. B. to Mrs. Eddy . . .

Those who hold this view would be less certain if they would glance at a little book—one of H. P. B.'s

minor works—called *Nightmare Tales*. The first tale has for title "A Bewitched Life". There is no particular distinction in the style; but there is so much distinction in the idea, and in the way in which the writer works it out, that it is an unassailable statement that the writer's knowledge was first-hand. No mere amateur or dabbler, no ordinary deriver, in Occultism could have written this tale, which bears the mark of the fountain-head.

I have heard a fool declare that *Zanoni* was the work of a madman. It does not occur to the fool that there may be realms of mind and being beyond his own gaze and reach. That is why he is a fool—the Fool of the Taro. The uninstructed criticism of H.P.B. is just as foolish. Your orthodox religionist, in the Victorian Age, used to declare, in the abundance of his ignorance, that Evolution was not true because a man was not a monkey. He thought that that statement disposed finally of Darwin. Yet many of H. P. B.'s critics, many of whom were students of science and Darwinians, criticised, or, rather, abused H. P. B. with the same complacent ignorance wherewith the religious bigots of the period assailed Darwin. Darwin's defenders were many and influential; H. P. B.'s few and, with an exception or two, obscure.

The obscurantist children of the Dark did their damndest to "dowse" the Lucifer of their age. By reason of a long and complicated miracle they failed. The long

and complicated miracle was H. P. B.'s charmed life.

* * *

To-day the highest and clearest thought-atmosphere is enhued by the incalculably potent tinge brought to the western mind by H. P. B. and her circle. Before the advent of the modern Theosophical Idea, Reason, in the large, karmic sense wherein it is used by Éliphas Lévi, had been forgotten. That Reason, an all-embracing Reason including within itself the twin doctrines of Rebirth and Fate, was restored to the West.

For centuries Europe had blundered on at the theological mercy—which is mercilessness—of rival superstitions that vented their mutual bigotries in torturings, burnings, mutilations, ostracisms. In the mid-nineteenth century these superstitions were to be vanquished by a new religion called Science, which replaced superstition by denying that there was any truth worth the title that was not scientifically provable, "scientifically" being understood strictly in a nineteenth-century, that is, religious, sense.

H. P. B. hated religion—as popularly understood—herself; and she assailed this new religion calling itself Science; partly because it *was* a new religion; partly because it denied the possibility of what—to her—was the only reality that counted; the Path that leads from amœba to deva. She denied the Evolutionary scheme of her century because it stopped short at men; not because it "went too far,"

as the religionists asserted; but because it did not go far enough.

H. P. B. transcended her age; just as Socrates, Bruno, Confucius, Asoka, Pythagoras, Lucretius, transcended their ages. An age grows towards the Teacher; usually after the Teacher has passed beyond the hope of earthly reward. It is the Paradox again.

Looking around Europe and Asia to-day we may find scores of societies, groups, cults, periodicals; all influenced, consciously, by the heritage of idea—the agelong wisdom—that H. P. B. restored to the West. The White Group that is said to hold the destinies of Europe in its “gift” chose the most improbable instrument conceivable because it was to prove the most efficient. Once again, it is all a question of focus; and the Intelligences that

despatched H. P. B. as Messenger to her Age did not err. Her mission has been accomplished. She changed the current of European thought, directing it towards the sun.

Between two fires of idea the modern world is scorched; two tyrannies, both seeking as prey and prize the soul of man, beset us. Our Youth, in despair, knows not to which—if to either—to turn for aid. There is the hope that it will not turn. Before it lies the path that stretches from the beginnings of life to beyond a divinity incarnate—into Samadhi, and, it may be, beyond. No man, possibly no god, knows. But the very existence of the Path was forgotten in Europe until H. P. B. re-discovered it for herself, and announced her re-discovery to the West.

VICTOR B. NEUBURG

Travellers have met these adepts on the shores of the sacred Ganges, brushed against them in the silent ruins of Thebes, and in the mysterious deserted chambers of Luxor. Within the halls upon whose blue and golden vaults the weird signs attract attention, but whose secret meaning is never penetrated by the idle gazers, they have been seen but seldom recognized. Historical memoirs have recorded their presence in the brilliantly illuminated salons of European aristocracy. They have been encountered again on the arid and desolate plains of the Great Sahara, as in the caves of Elephanta. They may be found everywhere, but make themselves known only to those who have devoted their lives to unselfish study, and are not likely to turn back.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. I, p. 17.

WHAT IS THERE WORTH SAVING IN EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION?

[**Count Carlo Sforza**, a direct descendant from the famous ruling family of Milan, has served his country Italy at different times as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and as Ambassador to France. From the very first he found himself in opposition to the Fascist regime, and though still a member of the Italian Senate, he is unable to express his views freely in his own country, so he has devoted himself of late years to lecturing in American Universities on the responsibilities of the World War and other political problems. He is the author of *Makers of Modern Europe* and other books, and is a contributor to leading journals and periodicals both in England and America. M. Jean Guéhenno, a Frenchman, gave in our January issue his answer to the problem, What is worth saving in European Civilization? Now we have the view of a Liberal Italian. It would be interesting to hear the point of view of a follower of Mussolini, Stalin, or Hitler. Every school of political opinion must have some contribution to make on such a subject, and from their united views it might be possible that some satisfactory answer to the problem might be deduced.—EDS.]

What is there worth saving in European civilization?

The question looks terrible.

In reality one simply needs sincerity to answer it; because it cannot mean more than this—what our deepest feelings tell us about the present state of the world. A psychological confession; nothing more.

To make my answer easier I shall begin by stating what seems to me worst in Europe—from a moral point of view.

In my opinion Europe is still paying the penalty of that monstrous crime—the war. We, who fought during the war, we, who are the survivors, too often forget that beside us fell—during four terrible years—the most generous, the most ardent, of all our comrades. For my part, when I am thinking again of the war I recall at once certain pure Italian friends of mine, about whom I had always thought that they were a marvel-

lous promise for the moral and intellectual Europe of to-morrow.

Now this loss seems forgotten; *les morts vont vite*, as the French proverb says.

What seems even more forgotten is that during four years of war all the Europeans were taught that blind obedience was a national virtue—even in the field of the spirit; that military discipline was to be applied even to the most stupid theories prevailing, under different forms, in all the belligerent countries.

Truly, all Europeans have gone during the war and the after-war through an intellectual degradation, which explains how Fascism came to be possible in Italy and Nazism in Germany. Like pustules on a sick body, these political phenomena are nothing else than external manifestations of an even more general disease; and if they appeared in Italy and in Germany rather than in France or Great

Britain, it so happened simply because the material sufferings of the Italian masses had been more severe during the war than those of the French ; and because Germany, contrary to Great Britain, had already, spread through her own veins, the old poison of pompous and crude Bismarckian dictatorship.

The recovery of Europe's moral health will be very slow. To rule and to be ruled by fear degrades ruler and ruled alike. The mental prostration under dogmas, formulae and men (exalted to-day by order, forgotten to-morrow by order, as happens all the time in Germany, Italy and Russia) is, in the long run, morally lowering. And it ends by creating habits of thought so deep-rooted as to remain after the causes have gone.

The very experiment of Dictatorships has already proved that Liberalism and Democracy are the only ideas still worth saving in European civilization. Their work during the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth has been only the initial prologue of human liberation. Liberalism and Democracy are still to be, with changed methods, the instruments of human freedom—political and moral.

What, in fact, ails Europe to-day? That her bounds are too strait for her economic and intellectual potentialities. In the midst of so

much hatred and so much lack of comprehension, this assertion may appear Panglossian. And yet, has not the big change come about under our very eyes? Thirty years ago one could be English, French or Italian. . . Nowadays one cannot. Those very writers who furnish the gospels of nationalistic hatreds would be desperate if their books were not read, translated, commented on beyond their frontiers. Our needs, intellectual and economic, run over our frontiers ; German problems, Italian problems, become at once European problems.

Before this novel fact one has a right to wonder whether agitations for formulae of hatred which can be catalogued according to the colour of the shirts are not like unto the growing violence of bombardments on a front several miles long during the war—the terrifying but glad announcement of an imminent retreat of the enemy.

It may be, perhaps, that the crisis will be too long for our lives to witness the end of it. And it will be certain that this crisis is going to leave long marks of degradation, moral and intellectual. . . But our lives do not matter. For those of us who have neither ambitions nor hatreds it is joy enough to feel that the future will vindicate our loyalty to the ideals without which nothing would be worth saving in European civilization.

CARLO SFORZA

THE PRESENT CRISIS IN WESTERN CULTURE

[Dr. F. S. C. Northrop is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. Since he occupies such an important position in the world of learning, it is scarcely necessary to say that he is the possessor of many academic distinctions. He has studied in Germany and England as well as in his own country. He is the Secretary-Treasurer of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division), Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Member of the American Physical Society, etc., etc. He is author of *Science and First Principles* and contributes to numerous journals, among which is our own, for he wrote in THE ARYAN PATH of June 1932 on "The Philosophical Foundations of World Understanding". The following article shows how the trend of events in one civilization is the outcome of the thoughts and ideas of the philosophers and sages of former eras. The noumena of one age become the phenomena of a succeeding age.—Eds.]

Western civilization is facing a crisis. This fact requires no emphasis. It is evident on every hand. However, profound insight, born of an understanding of the metaphysical foundations of culture, is required to appreciate its deep-rooted significance.

In a previous issue of this journal,* and more fully elsewhere,† the writer considered the history of Western Civilization in the light of the fundamental metaphysical issue of the relation between matter and forms. If the characteristics and differences between the Middle Ages, the Scholastic Period (1450-1600) and the Modern World are to be understood, the three philosophical systems, Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Democritean materialism, to which the problem of matter and form gives rise, must be kept clearly in mind.

Nevertheless, there is another metaphysical issue, equally profound and fundamental, which is more illuminating with reference

to the present crisis. I refer to the metaphysical problem of the one and the many. This issue raises the question whether reality is one thing or many things, whether continuity or discontinuity, geometry or arithmetic, organized autocratic theism, or skeptical, sophistic, democratic humanism, is the more fundamental.

This metaphysical issue is inadequate as a basis for distinguishing between the three major periods of Western culture after the Greek Era, since it draws only a dyadic distinction. Hence, according to it the Middle Ages and the Scholastic Period fall together, since Medieval Platonism and Aristotelian Scholasticism are both monistic; from the point of view of the problem of the one and the many, Plato's Idea of the Good, as historically interpreted, and Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, are practically equivalent: Both provide intellectual foundations for unity. But this very fact puts the pre-Modern World into

* Vol. III, 368-376.

† *Science and First Principles*, 1931, New York and Cambridge.

direct and sharp contrast with the Modern World, and thereby simplifies the issue involved in the intense social, spiritual, and intellectual crisis through which the Western soul is now passing.

The definiteness of this contrast appears if we examine any sphere of human thought or any social institution. Consider the purely intellectual phase of human experience. In the Medieval and Scholastic periods all educated men were dominated by Plato's Idea of the Good, as made explicit in Augustine's City of God, and as actualized on earth in Western Latin Europe in the One Catholic Church Roman, and in Eastern Europe in the Orthodox Church Greek; or they were taught Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. This meant that every informed intelligent person took it for granted that rational unity is intrinsic in the very nature of things. Thus the intellectual foundations for the unity, necessary to build civilization, were at hand. It is this single scientific and religious concept of unity, born out of the empirical investigations of Egyptian, Babylonian and Greek scientists, and crystallized and made applicable to every phase of thought and experience, human, social and divine, by the great Greek scientific philosophers, that makes Western Europe the home of a civilization rather than the mere stamping ground of a lot of fighting tribes. Without this basic intelligible, divine principle of unity, this principle of the rational one, demonstrated as eternal and primary for Western mankind by

Greek mathematics and astronomy and made explicit and articulate in the very depths of man's being by Plato and Aristotle, Western Culture as we know it, would not exist; there would be no Saint Augustine with the Church Invisible, no Holy Fathers and Popes with their Church Visible, no Saint Thomas with his *Summa Theologiae*, or Dante with the *Divina Commedia*, nor any Greek orthodox Church, or European Russia with its Caesars and Patriarchs. All these, and countless other factors, representing the very soul and substance of Western Civilization in the Medieval and Scholastic Periods, are the fruition of the thoughts and actions of men who were dominated by the binding, organizing, overpowering and soul-sustaining concept of unity.

And precisely for this reason all these beliefs and institutions are, even when present, utterly alien and foreign to the Modern World. It is utterly impossible to imagine a Nicene Council made up of Newton, Descartes, Voltaire, and Hume. A single authoritative Catholic Church arising spontaneously out of the soil of the seventeenth and eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is unthinkable. Such doctrines and such institutions require, as the barest essentials for their existence, intellectual foundations for unity, and such foundations do not exist after 1600.

The opening of the Modern World makes this clear. Galilei's reflections and experiments founded, what he most aptly termed,

the new science of local motion. Even Moderns have failed to sense the full significance of this. Galilei's word "local" is the key to the story. Local masses and locally measurable forces were revealed as the basic causes of the orbits of astronomy and the order of nature. Given these *many* masses and their *many* motions and gravitational effects, the orbits of the heavenly bodies can be deduced, Newton demonstrated. Also given a disintegration of the stellar masses, the orbits could change or disappear. With one stroke, the empirically-grounded, supposedly eternal orbits of Greek astronomy, the cosmologically verified rational unity of Greek and Medieval thought, were smashed. When Newton and Laplace derived Kepler's laws for planetary motion, and the irregularities in the Moon's orbit, from the mere compounding of inertial and accelerative forces, the rational one was revealed as a mere effect of the physical many, the Western World's intellectual foundations for unity were destroyed, and the whole structure of Medieval and Scholastic civilization came tumbling down. The Church Visible remained, but the soul of and rational ground for its being, the Church Invisible, was gone. The materialistic pluralism of Democritus replaced the rationalistic monism of Plato and Aristotle, and a civilization reared on dualism in epistemology and the principle of plurality in metaphysics was in the making.

What happened first in astronomy and physics with Galilei and

Newton was repeated later in mathematics with Dedekind and Cantor. Irrational numbers and fractions were defined in terms of classes of natural numbers, the geometrical, and the number, continuum were reduced to arithmetic, and the principle of the many again triumphed. Two steps further, made by Frege and Russell, and the principle of the many applied to logic, also, the very elements of thought itself; logical atomism was the result; instead of the one idea of the Good, thought found itself with nothing but the many motion of "such that," "and," and "or," etc.

Education followed. The Scholastic Method with its Trivium and Quadrivium, its planned education, with logic, rhetoric, medicine, mathematics, etc., each in its place, and all culminating in the metaphysical theology of a Saint Thomas, went into disrepute. In its place came the unorganized specialization of the sciences, the degeneration of philosophy into a special restricted subject such as ethics or epistemology, the departmentalization of the universities, culminating in its fruits, in the widely educated masses for whom the psychology of advertising is as profound a subject as physics or metaphysics, and to whom all concepts are of equivalent importance and none clearly defined.

This transition from the principle of unity to the principle of plurality grips politics also. First there was the Holy Roman Empire, meaningless and impossible for an age without intellectual founda-

tions for unity. It is true that the movement toward nationalism began before the Modern Era opened. But even so, in the Scholastic Period, it was holding fast to unity. Then, there was no nationalism of democracies. There could be many states but in each state the principle of unity was supreme; for there must be a King. Moreover, even the many Kings must recognize the still remaining primacy of unity: hence the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, and the necessity of Royal intermarriages in order to possess this Divine Right. It is not until the physics of the seventeenth century has inspired the political philosophy and economic theory of the eighteenth century that the government of the many, the rule of the masses, begins to become a reality. Even as late as 1690, the English philosopher Locke had to attack my namesake Filmer who defended the Divine Right of Kings. It is not necessary to trace the transition further. The rule of the many in politics, and in business has been upon us. We know what a culture reared upon the many individuals who recognize no restricting, justice-producing sanction of unity, means. Those who lived in the United States in the years 1932 and 1933 will never forget it.

The transition from unity to plurality in religious thought is equally interesting, and if anything more tragic. We have noted how Plato's Idea of the Good and Aristotle's Unmoved Mover provided intellectual foundations for

unity in Western Culture. It is to be remembered how Plato's naturalistic rational idealism provided the bridge by which Augustine passed from Manicheanism to Christianity, and how he, having made this journey of the mind and spirit, outlined the City of God and made explicit the Church Invisible. This Platonic Augustinian Christianity with its phenomenalistic theory of matter and the attendant otherworldliness, provided intellectual foundations for the rationality, unity and authority of the Earthly Catholic Church Visible, and dominated, in its doctrine, and its inevitable ascetic consequences, the course of civilization up to the tenth and twelfth centuries. Then came the Arabs to Spain with the real texts and materials of Greek knowledge, and their frank Aristotelianism. It is to be noted that the transition toward the pluralism of Protestantism from the unity of Catholicism began in the Scholastic Period.

However, an examination of the philosophical foundations of the Scholastic Period will show that Luther's move in no way violated the primacy of the principle of unity, nor was the Reformation ever a mere historical incident. The metaphysical foundations of the Scholastic Period are Aristotelian. It is an essential point in the Aristotelian metaphysics that matter is present as well as form. Moreover, one of the functions of matter is to introduce the individualizing principle. The importance of this becomes evident when one remembers that there is only

one instance of a pure form. It is matter which permits the one pure form to participate or appear in a large number of instances. The relevance of this for Catholicism is most evident. It draws a sharp distinction between the one Church Invisible, the Form of which has but one instance, and the earthly material Roman Church Visible which, on Aristotelian principles, need be but one of many instances of the single Church Invisible. Up to the coming of the Arabs to Spain this Aristotelianism would not make itself felt in Western Europe but after their coming it did. Dante was one of the first to take up the distinction. The moral character of the Popes during the Italian Renaissance did not help matters. Luther, attacking the corruption in the Church Visible, took up Dante's theme. The point to be noted is that the authority of the Visible Church at Rome could be repudiated safely by Luther in 1517 without destroying religion and the foundations for unity in Western Culture, because the authority of the Church Invisible still remained; the metaphysical monism of Plato and Aristotle was still valid.

But Luther and the Reformation did not reckon with the coming of Galilei and Newton. With the new physics, the authority of the Church Invisible was also destroyed: the cosmological argument for the existence of God was no longer valid. Protestantism having repudiated the authority of the Visible Church, and Newtonian physics having destroyed the eternal

rational order of the astronomical universe, which was the basis for the Invisible Church, the Modern World faced the necessity of losing its religion.

What was true of religion was equally true of politics and the State. The pluralistic foundations of modern culture meant that the source of political as well as religious authority was to be shifted from the one representative of God, the King or Pope, to the many consciences of the many individuals. As Plato saw long ago, when he wrote the Republic, this means skepticism in religion and knowledge, relativity in ethics, and chaos in the State. For the shifting of the source of religious belief and political principle from the one God to the many men, meant that no measure existed for man, and that man was made the measure of things. This means neither faith nor knowledge, but mere opinion and sophistry. Man had freedom of belief but nothing in which to believe. The many had freedom of political action but no unifying justice-producing principle to prevent them from destroying each other by the clash of their many interests. To perceive that the Modern World has attempted to rear culture on nothing but pluralism, is to realize the meaning of the present crisis in Western Civilization: The Modern World has at last attained the consequences of its own premises.

Such is the tragic meaning of contemporary events in the Western World. But the present crisis has a deeper and more hopeful

meaning. This *reductio ad absurdum* of the modern principle of the many has affected not merely religion and politics, but physics and mathematics also. This means that the traditional modern assumptions that reality is merely a many, can no longer be assumed as final. In short, intellectual foundations for unity are again a possibility.

Space permits but brief reference to the scientific considerations necessary to justify this conclusion: In traditional modern physics, the universe was conceived as a mere aggregate of microscopic particles moving in an absolute space. Nature as a whole had no structural constancy and no causal unity. No basis for a unity, either formal or physical, existed. In order to keep this theory in accord with new evidence, it was necessary to introduce an absolute time series, and an absolute electromagnetic field, or ether. All these additions represented structural continuous factors. In 1905 and 1916, Einstein showed that none of these absolutes exists as an entity independent of matter, but that the structural constancy and continuity of space and the ether is the structure and continuity of matter itself. More recently the wave, as well as the atomic, character of matter has been experimentally demonstrated. In short, physical nature seems to be both one and many.

In mathematics Cantor's reduction of the continuum to the many natural numbers has been demonstrated to lead to contradictions. The final solution of this difficulty

is not a topic upon which mathematicians agree. It has been admitted, however, by those who have worked the hardest to retain the modern theory of mathematics (*e.g.*, Ramsey), that its exclusive pluralism is inadequate. Also two of the most profound students of the problem (Brouwer and Weyl) have frankly accepted the continuum as primary and would derive the many from it by abstraction and the constructive activity of the thinker.

These two developments in contemporary physics and mathematics are sufficient to show that the Modern World has come to its end. They are sufficient to show also that the crucial problem facing us in physics, in the issue between field theories and atomic theories, and in mathematics, in the issue between the logical atomism of Russell and the intuitively-given continuum of Weyl, is the old metaphysical problem of the one and the many, which we have used from the outset as the key to our analysis.

What direction will the solution of this problem take? The final answer which our day gives to this question will determine the character of Western Culture in the coming Post-Modern Era. There are signs, in fact decisive considerations, which indicate that new intellectual foundations for unity are to be found. The danger is that we revert back to pure monism and lose the lesson which all the travail of the Modern World has taught us. This would be a mistake. The Modern World was

not born of error, but of one-half of the truth: there is a real many and there are the temporal forms which only the motion of a real many can provide. This is the Modern World's permanent contribution to Western Culture. But also there is the one, a primary principle of unity. This is the truth enshrined in Medieval culture which we find we cannot do without. In short, there is both a real one and a real many. But to get these two together without contradiction is the crucial problem. There are many systems of philosophy which provide one without the other; but none, to my knowledge, in the Western World at least, which consistently retains both. Stated in metaphysical terms, this means that the principle of unity of Platonism and Aristotelianism must be combined with the principle of pluralism of the philosophy of Democritus and the physics of Newton. The metaphysical significance of the macroscopic atomic theory, proposed elsewhere* by the present author, consists in the fact that it

attempts to do precisely this.

If it succeeds, or if some other equivalent reconciliation of the one with the many arises out of the apparent confusions and contradictions of our present experience, then we can say that the present crisis in Western Culture has even a deeper meaning: It signifies that the West, finding truth in the unity enshrined in the Medieval World, as well as in the plurality discovered in the Modern World, is ceasing to be divided against itself, and is passing, by means of its Medieval thesis and Modern anti-thesis, into a true synthesis which is the fulfilment, and, let us hope, the more peaceful realization, of its own full being.

It is to be emphasized, however, that this fulfilment of its own real potentialities will be actualized in the West only when, in addition to the union of matter and form, and the one and the many, it adds *quale* or the psychical. When this is done it should be possible, as my earlier article† in this journal suggested, for East and West to understand each other.

F. S. C. NORTHROP

* *Science and First Principles*, 1931, New York and Cambridge.

† Vol. III, 368-374.

KINDLING THE FIRE

[B. M. is an old-world man living by his old-world methods in our era. We are fortunate in having secured a few reports of his talks to his intimate friends. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is the book he has mastered through long years of study and meditation; but further, having lived according to its tenets more successfully than is generally possible, his thoughts breathe a peculiar fragrance. The papers have been translated from the vernacular: it should be understood that they are not literal translations, and the translator has adhered more to ideas and principles than to words. Although B. M. knows English, his inspiration becomes impeded in employing that medium of expression and so he prefers not to use it.—Eds.]

He who, unattached to the fruit of his actions, performeth such actions as should be done is both a renouncer of action (Sannyasi) and a devotee of right action (Yogi); not he who liveth without kindling sacrificial fire and without ceremonies.

—*Bhagavad-Gita*, VI. 1.

We must have an historical setting for this verse. Its definitions are contrary to those to be found in the ancient record of Shruti, left behind by Sages and Seers. Also in the Smriti, the Persistent Tradition rooted in memory-experience, and in Yoga-Shastras, actual Instructions to aspirants for Sannyasa and Yoga. Literally speaking, the Great Master goes contrary to established accepted definitions. Why?

The first third of the *Gita* is devoted to an examination of the then existing schools of thought, every one of which suffered from accretions and misinterpretations. The great art of Sannyasa and Yoga had also been corrupted. The synthesis which like a Sutratma connects all points of view (Darshanas) was broken. The first six chapters of the *Gita* restore the synthesis, and in doing this they naturally point out the errors, by

emphasizing the true points of view. These chapters are neither an attack on the false, nor a defence of the true, but a restoration of the lines of thought, at every deflection.

The position taken up by so-called Sannyasis and Yogis, 5,000 years ago, must have been something like that of our free-thinkers, who are only nominally free from the bondage of bias and fanaticism. In reality proud rationalists argue without any basis of reason and knowledge; their minds are fast bound by desires and fancy. They proceed by the negative route: we are not this, we are not that, we do not believe, we do not accept—not, not, not. The moment they begin to define what they are, and formulate their principles of ethics and of philosophy according to which they view life they become confounded. In the days when Shri Krishna taught, the Sannyasis and

Yogis were taking this negative route: their proud boast was that they performed no rites and ceremonies, they kindled no fire, and so on. Yet a hundred deeds bound them fast to their pride, and much talk kindled the fire by friction, producing disunity and confusion all round. These nominal Yogis took the path of irresponsibility and indolence: they readily accepted what they should *not* do, but as readily rejected what they must do. They assumed virtues of omission but not of commission, and so the former became deadly sins.

On the other hand this verse has been exploited by the orthodox who make out that the *Gita* recommends performance of religious rites. It does not. And yet it does. It certainly does not support the view of religious orthodoxy. How can it? Synthesis of philosophies rises above and goes beyond any and every caste and race, creed and religion. Unless we look upon the *Gita* as Instruction for the human soul we are bound to be confused, now by one verse, now by another. Therefore if the *Gita* recommends performance of any ceremony it can only be such as is performed by the human Soul.

This is the first lesson of the verse.

Secondly, it tells the aspirant to righteous living and soul-freedom what should be done. Not only does the *Gita* expose what is false, but it also expounds what is true. It does not only say what a man ought not to do, but is positive and practical and says what ought to be practised. Actions must be done;

fruits of action must not be allowed to interfere with that performance. What must not be done are deeds which are not duties; and duties must be done with an eye to present duties not to their future results. Thus a man is to be known not by what he does not do, but by what he actually does. Apply that to our present-day Sannyasis: do not judge by what they abjure in the name of their discipline, but by what they do and practise.

This is the second lesson of the verse.

The aspirant to Righteous Life, called upon to do duties and to renounce fruits of actions, sorely needs some basic principle for this exercise. This the verse offers—indirectly and by implication. The nature of the actor, the doer of duties, has to be understood. Action is like energy—prana; its result is a form—rupa or body; but it is the actor who alone determines, like the Soul, actions and their results. Most men act unconsciously, that is, without any reference to or without any knowledge of the nature of the actor. If active doing brought peace and illumination our active civilization would be highly enlightened and calm. No—there are too many actions without a cognisance of the actor, with the result that the world is afire and burning up with bad deeds and good deeds, but all thoughtless deeds. Fire is necessary, but not knowing the art of kindling it we are suffering from actions; the reaction will be towards non-action like those of the Sannyasis we mentioned.

This verse contains, most appropriately, the secret of kindling the fire; this instruction forms the heart of the verse; because it is hidden it is very often missed. This particular Instruction of the *Gita* is named Dhyana-Yoga; it is knowledge about meditation of a particular kind; in verse 46 it is shown that by this Dhyana the man attains to the superior position of a Dhyani. He is superior to the man of penances and austerities; superior also to the man of learning and even to the doer of noble deeds. He who becomes a member of this Order belongs to the Heart of the spiritual world. It is the most mysterious and secret Order whose father-head is Marichi, according to some texts. These Dhyanis are also known as Vairajas, whom fire cannot consume, because their bodies are composed of the highest essences of Fire. They are men's real friends, guides and teachers, for They are the makers of Geniuses and Instructors. They kindle the latent Soul-fire in the Race and feed it, from time to time, lest it go out. They feed that Soul-fire in each of us by pointing out where the fuel of knowledge is and how it can be used.

The human Soul is born of Fire and is of the nature of fire (agni-jata); his body is the fire-censer (agni-dhana); his foremost duty is preserving and nourishing that fire (agni-rakshana). If we do not

want to go wrong we must make that fire the eternal witness of all our deeds. In the marriage rite fire is the symbol of faith and love, which consume every impurity, and of creative wisdom. But that rite itself is the representative of the higher marriage between ourselves and the divinities of our Higher Selves, and it is that union which enables the Spirit-Soul to create Soul-children of radiant fiery-form (agni-rupa); this is what the true Gurus do, for Their chelas are Their children.

In the old rite of Agni-Shtoma the mystery of this Order of Dhyanis was revealed.* In our verse of the *Gita* the real Sannyasi and Yogi is one who knows how to preserve the Soul-fire in himself; also how to kindle it in others. He is a constant performer of ceremonies, without a thought of reward; these acts are tongues of fire and proceed from within the heart where that fire ever burns. These sacrificial acts or tongues of Soul-fire ascend towards Tapo-loka, the world of Those Dhyanis and they receive the grains of incense thrown for the blessing of our world by the Great Lords. Thus also it is not the chela, but the chela's good sacrifices and noble acts of Soul, which attract the help and the blessing of the Guru. Actions bind the actor, not to actions but to the Great Actors when we perform deeds without caring for their fruits and rewards.

B. M.

* It is the ceremony or sacrifice performed at Spring time and it extends over several days; its symbology refers to the birth of self-consciousness caused by the higher pitris according to Hinduism, to the fall of angels according to Christianity, which process is fully discussed by H. P. Blavatsky in the second volume of *The Secret Doctrine*.—Eds.

THE FREE MAN ACCORDING TO MARXIAN PHILOSOPHY

[John Middleton Murry gives us his interpretation of Karl Marx's ideal of the free man. It is doubtful, however, whether most communists or socialists would accept even in theory that "the freedom of a truly free man was the knowledge and acceptance of his own determination". The "knowing" aspect of our determination should necessarily involve something more than the merely materialistic interpretation of life and the historical process.—EDS.]

The great maxim of Marxian philosophy concerning Free-Will is taken bodily from Hegel: "Freedom is knowledge of Necessity." That, to many, seems a barren paradox; to some, indeed, almost a bad joke. To others it is a word of deliverance. In which of these two opposed classes we are to be reckoned depends primarily, I think, upon the side from which we approach the maxim: whether from the inside or the outside. Inside and outside, in such a connection, are manifest metaphors. To approach a gnomic and mysterious statement from the inside means chiefly to have shared the experience which underlies the statement, and of which the statement is the crystallisation: whereas to approach it from the outside means that one has no such clue in one's own experience. "We read fine things," said Keats, "but we only understand them when we have gone the same steps as the author." To read the "fine thing" before one has gone the same steps as the author—that is to approach wisdom from the outside; to read it after those steps have been trodden—this is to approach it from the inside.

Now, the statement: "Freedom is knowledge of Necessity" has

deep and obvious affinities with other mysterious sayings. A close parallel to it could be found in the secret wisdom of all high religions: and I have no doubt at all that the experience which underlies that statement is essentially 'religious'. To me, it is the bare and austere modern form of an identical realization which has been expressed in other times and places in a different idiom. But, for the moment at any rate, we will confine ourselves to seeking affinities in the relatively modern wisdom of the West. Hegel, from whom Marx took the word, was deeply influenced by Spinoza, and in Spinoza we find a doctrine essentially the same. Let us note first what Marx, following Hegel, actually says. He does not say, as many of the "outside approach" appear to imagine, that "Freedom is Necessity"; he says that "Freedom is *knowledge* of Necessity." The Freedom consists in the knowledge. If a man is ignorant (as most men are) of the Necessity which he unwittingly obeys, he is not free. What I am seeking to emphasise is that Marx does not deny Freedom; he is asserting true Freedom against false Freedom—the reality of Freedom against the appearance of Freedom:

and he is asserting that the reality of Freedom is achieved when a man becomes conscious, fully aware, of Necessity.

The doctrine of Spinoza is that, in the 'natural' state, a man is the mere vehicle of "passion": that is to say, he is the mere passive subject of experience. The necessary, salutary and crucial change takes place in him when "passion" is transmuted into "act". This transmutation is achieved by the Reason (which has, of course, nothing to do with the mechanical intelligence). When a man, by the operation of Reason, becomes aware of his own fundamental "passivity," then his "passions" are transmuted into "act". Put into a form parallel to that of the Marxian-Hegelian statement, Spinoza's doctrine is that "Activity is knowledge of passivity". The statements are, in reality, identical.

In other words, conscious adult Man is the point at which the Necessity which governs the Universe becomes conscious of itself. And this all-pervading Necessity is not in the least mechanical. On the contrary, it is dynamic. It is a Necessity of the same order which prevails in the growth of a tree, or any other living thing. When a man becomes conscious that he also is completely subject to this dynamic Necessity, his consciousness ceases to be at odds with his instincts; he is re-integrated into the process or life of the whole. He is liberated—to use the terms of William Blake—from his Selfhood

and enters into his Identity.* Whereas, when he refused to acknowledge his "passivity," he was distraught and weakened by internal conflict, claiming for himself a status in the Universe which his actual behaviour belied, now, when he accepts his true status, the conflict is resolved, and he becomes a pure Instrument of the Life-process, which many men have called God. This condition of pure instrumentality—which is the same as the condition of "perfect service" in Christian idiom—is the condition of pure "activity". The ethical corollary is that no pure "activity" can have its source in the Selfhood. Only when the Selfhood is in abeyance, or "annihilated," as Blake said, is pure activity possible. And this is the profound truth which is expressed in the great prayer of Jesus of Nazareth: "Nevertheless not as I will, but as Thou wilt."

This religious and ethical wisdom has, inevitably, undergone re-statement after re-statement during the advance of the intellectual consciousness in the West. That advance has been marked by an effort to achieve an ever-deepening and more comprehensive idea of Nature. This has gone hand in hand with a steady diminution of the province of Super-nature, or the cosmological God. At the moment when Nature could be conceived, or more truly "imagined," as one all-inclusive living process, the need of Super-nature, or cosmological God,

* Much the same distinction is expressed by others as the distinction between the Ego and the true Self.

began in the finest minds to disappear. The first clear statement of this non-supernatural religion appeared in the opening of Book III of Spinoza's *Ethics*, where he shows himself fully aware of the breach he was making in traditional religious thought.

Now the 'religious' potentiality of this re-integration of Man into Nature depends directly upon the depth of the idea of Nature. For Spinoza Nature was absolutely non-mechanical. Spatiality and thought were modes of the all-comprehending, all-pervading "substance," or "God". That meant that he did not subordinate human nature to non-human nature, as the "materialists" or "determinists" vainly do. The character and laws of Nature were revealed no less in specifically human nature than in the non-human. All that was required in order that the process of Nature should work freely in man was that, by the birth of Reason in himself, he should know himself as subject to that process: by that act of submission the nature of the process could declare itself in and through him. Under the mode of thought the law of the process was discovered to culminate in the *amor intellectualis Dei*: or, as Spinoza boldly declared, the experience of God loving Himself through Man.

This may seem remote from the Marxian realization; but, in fact, the relation between them is intimate indeed. Marx did not develop for himself a complete philosophical-religious position as Spinoza did. A religious philosophy exists

in Marx's work in the state of implication merely. The conditions of the age in which he lived enforced upon him a complete devotion to "revolutionary" activity. But the crucial point to be realised is that this life of activity to which Marx dedicated himself was the consummation of the religious-philosophical resolution which he had inherited from Spinoza through Hegel. Philosophically and historically, the great achievement in which Marx justly took pride, of standing Hegel's philosophy "on its feet again," whereas before it had been standing on its head, was a re-assertion of Spinozism from the perversions to which Hegel had submitted it. What Marx took from Hegel was then reduced to his adoption of the "dialectic," or the appropriate logic for the description of living process. It is therefore within the Spinozist "frame of reference," rather than the Hegelian, that the philosophic contribution of Marx can be most clearly apprehended. Marx more fully explored the nature of the "passivity" of man than was possible for Spinoza, in days when the science of history was embryonic. He demonstrated the historic modality under which the blind *vis existendi* of Spinoza had been compelled to operate—the compulsive influence of the technique of production on the structure of society and thence on the transitory legal conceptions which appeared as absolute to the unliberated mind. Thus we may fairly say that Marx developed Spinozism on the historical side, or that he dotted the i's and crossed

the t's of the Spinozist affirmation that "Activity is knowledge of passivity".

I fancy that the deep affinity between these two great modern thinkers is not unconnected with the fact that both were Jews; and I believe that the great function of the Jewish genius has been to mediate between the speculative genius of the East and the practical genius of the West. Hence it is that Europe owes to Jewry the essence of its own religion: indeed, the Western idea of religion consists, I should say, precisely in this synthesis of the Eastern speculative and the Western practical which has come to it through Jewry. Hence, again, the simple fact, (generally unnoticed) that the eleventh of Marx's crucial "Theses on Feuerbach"—"Philosophers have merely given different interpretations of the world; the task is now to change it"—is, substantially, a revindication of religion from both philosophy and theology. For the effort of religion in the Western sense has always been "to change the world". And Marx was perfectly aware of the "religious" affinity of his own effort. Not merely is the famous essay "On Hegel's Philosophy of Law," which begins with the declaration that understanding of religion is the pre-condition of all understanding, one of the most profoundly religious criticisms of religion that have ever been made, but the evidence of the statement in the 8th Thesis on Feuerbach is peremptory.

All life in society is essentially practical. All mysteries, which divert

speculation into mysticism, find their rational solution in human activity and the understanding of this activity.

That is to say, the mysticism of speculation is the phase which passes into, and is transcended by, complete human activity. This complete human activity Marx calls "revolutionary, i. e., practical-critical". The phrase seems clumsy; but that is because Marx was striving to express a new realization. "Practical-critical" is precisely the synthesis of 'speculative' and 'active'. And this synthesis is achieved when the knowledge of passivity, or Necessity, is complete in any individual at any given moment in human history. Such a synthesis produces now a Jesus, now a Spinoza, now a Marx. That their objective problems were different goes without saying: that is the meaning of Marx's own pregnant statement that Humanity never sets itself problems but those which it is able to solve. But on the subjective side the essential wisdom is the same. "Freedom is knowledge of necessity."

What changes there are in the practical consequences of this "Freedom" depend upon changes in the extent and character of the knowledge. With every century changes, major or minor, take place within the realm of Necessity, and the faculty of knowledge develops to recognise them. Marx emerged at the critical moment when the social morality of competitive individualism—itsself a new development since the feudal era in the West—was blindly confront-

ing the new technical phenomenon of machine-production. Marx ruled out, instinctively as a Westerner, the possibility of "scrapping the machine". He saw that a conflict between the "bourgeois" habit of competitive individualism and the economic necessities engendered by machine-production was inevitable; and he saw that this conflict was taking and would take the form of a struggle of the working-class to make their human rights prevail against the inexorable degradation with which the competitive use of machine-production must threaten them. In other words, since the machine could not be scrapped, human beings would be. Eventually, these human beings would rebel against their degradation, and would overthrow "bourgeois" society. But they would have to understand the cause of their degradation—the necessity in which they were enmeshed. To the task of educating them into "the freedom which is knowledge of necessity" Marx devoted his life.

Why did Marx do it? He was not a member of the class threatened with degradation. In the "Communist Manifesto" he describes his own case.

Finally, in times when the class-struggle is nearing the decisive points, the process of disintegration in the ruling-class becomes so violent, that a small portion of the ruling-class separates from it and joins the revolutionary class—the class which holds the future in its hands. Just as formerly a portion of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, now a portion of the bourgeoisie

goes over to the proletariat—in particular a number of bourgeois thinkers who have raised themselves to the level of a theoretical understanding of the whole historical process.

But why, one may still ask, does a theoretical understanding of the dynamic movement of history produce this effect in men to whom, as to Marx, it can bring no advantage whatever, but only a life of contumely and suffering? And no rational answer is possible. One can say that understanding of this kind is possible only by a great effort of self-detachment: that it is a form, in the West the authentic contemporary form, of self-annihilation. Or one can appeal to the great maxim itself: "Freedom is knowledge of Necessity." But if one had asked Marx: Was he, in taking this crucial decision to devote his whole life to the proletarian cause, 'free' or was he 'determined'? I am sure he would have smiled, because he knew that the freedom of a truly free man was the knowledge and acceptance of his own determination. Then he might have appealed to the Hegelian dialectic, and pointed out that "Free-Will" and "Determinism" are thesis and antithesis: their synthesis was what chiefly mattered—*worauf es ankommt*. Such a synthesis he experienced and was: for the conflict between Free-Will and Determinism was one, and perhaps the chief, of the mysteries whose solution by Reason was found in creative and therefore 'revolutionary' activity: to which the life of Marx was given.

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

PRALAYA IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENCE

[Our readers will remember the very instructive series of articles that Dr. Ivor B. Hart, O. B. E., contributed last year on "Modern Science and The Secret Doctrine," wherein he compared the latest scientific teachings on Space, Time and Motion with what Mme. Blavatsky had written nearly fifty years ago in her monumental work, *The Secret Doctrine*. This month he treats of the Doctrine of Pralaya as it is being interpreted by science to-day. Dr. Hart is the author of *Makers of Science*, *The Mechanical Investigations of Leonardo da Vinci*, *The Great Physicists* and numerous text-books on Physics. Some time ago he was an honorary Research Assistant in the department of the History of Medicine, University College, and an Extension Lecturer at the University of London.—EDS.]

Students of *The Secret Doctrine* are no doubt familiar with the correlated conceptions of Manvantara and Pralaya. These are discussed, apart from several incidental references, in Chapter VII of Part II of Book I of Madame Blavatsky's great work. They are Periods, or Kalpas, of activity and of rest—of the ordered development of the Universe in the case of Manvantara (*Manvantara*, or between the Manus), and the periods of dissolution (Pralaya) which succeed them. There are degrees of Manvantara and Pralaya, minor and major. A quick summary, given in a footnote to p. 172 of Book I of *The Secret Doctrine*, reads thus:—

Occultism divides the periods of Rest (Pralaya) into several kinds: there is the *individual* pralaya of each Globe, as humanity and life pass on to the next; seven minor Pralayas in each Round; the *Planetary* Pralaya, when seven *Rounds* are completed; the *Solar* Pralaya, when the whole system is at an end; and finally the Universal Maha—or Brahmā—Pralaya at the close of the "Age of Brahmā." These are the three chief *pralayas* or "destruction periods."

There is no room in this short

article for any elaboration of this important fundamental of esoteric philosophy. Readers who look for a detailed account of the processes of Manvantara and Pralaya cannot do better than study the exposition of it by Madame Blavatsky in the main reference given above. Our chief purpose here is to discuss the counterpart of Pralaya in modern Western Science. Before proceeding to this, however, we may well add one more quotation from *The Secret Doctrine* to help us to visualise the Eastern standpoint:—

The appearance and disappearance of the Universe are pictured as an out-breathing and inbreathing of "the Great Breath," which is eternal, and which, being Motion, is one of the three aspects of the Absolute—Abstract Space and Duration being the other two. When the "Great Breath" is projected, it is called the Divine Breath, and is regarded as the breathing of the Unknowable Deity—the One Existence—which breathes out a thought, as it were, which becomes the Kosmos. So also is it when the Divine Breath is inspired again the Universe disappears into the bosom of "the Great Mother," who then sleeps "wrapped in her invisible robes." (I. 43).

What, we now ask, has modern

Western Science to show us in substantiation of the conception of Pralaya? What we may refer to as minor Pralayas are both numerous and obvious—the alternations of light and darkness in day and night, of growth and decay, in the alternations of the Seasons, of the span of human consciousness in the ordinary sense of life and death, and so on. Of planetary pralayas we may cite the example of the moon, once, almost certainly, in the course of its evolution, possessed of both air and water, and therefore presumably capable of supporting life as we know it; but now almost entirely bereft of both, and therefore lifeless. It is a well-known consequence of the now generally accepted kinetic theory of gases that when molecular velocities exceed a certain critical value (easily calculated for each individual planet) in an upwards direction, the molecule in question escapes beyond the gravitational bounds of the planet. It is the continual operation of this factor that gradually thins out a planetary atmosphere in the course of time, and also gradually denudes its evaporated waters. Another principle, that of tidal evolution, has meanwhile also been operating, having as its effect the gradual and inexorable slowing down of the period of the moon's rotation on its axis from what was once but a few hours to the present period of 28 days—in what is referred to as a condition of dynamic equilibrium with the lunar period of revolution about its Mother Earth in the same period of time.

And so the planetary pralaya of the moon is virtually complete.

Nor is it necessary to enter upon the time-honoured controversy of whether or no there is life on the planet Mars to remind the reader that here, too, with its much attenuated atmosphere and the dearth of waters apart from its polar concentrations, we have an intermediate stage of a planetary pralaya in a less advanced form of completion.

But what of the Pralaya Maha—the dissolution of the Universe itself? Has modern Science nothing to show in support of this? Most assuredly it has. Of all laws or principles which modern physics has produced, we may say unhesitatingly that the most unshakable and positive is that which is known as the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The Doctrine of Energy nowadays dominates the whole field of modern physics. Energy has many forms—mechanical, chemical, electrical, heat—and these are all mutually convertible. What is known as the Law of the Conservation of Energy tells us that the sum total of the energy of the Universe is a constant, so that when a given quantity of one form of energy disappears, its exact equivalent in another form appears in its place, the process being one of conversion and not of destruction. It is upon the consequences of this Law that man has improved his power of control to provide, by the agency of suitable machinery, such amenities of life as mechanical transport, electric light and power, and so forth. It is significant, how-

ever, that in all such cases of human control, the basic factor is *fuel*—heat energy derived from chemical energy in one form or another. And yet, of all forms of energy, heat is itself the least useful, and ultimately the most inevitable! All operations of energy conversion are accompanied by a “wastage” or “seepage” of heat energy that becomes dissipated beyond human control. If we carry a current along a wire, some of the electrical energy is wasted in the heating of the wire. In every mechanism of any kind, the working is always accompanied by the production of heat, but for which an equivalent amount of energy would have been available for carrying on the work for which the mechanism was intended. This much energy is therefore “lost” by radiation uselessly into Space. Every known form of energy “pays its toll” in this way. Even when we try to convert heat energy into more useful forms we cannot wholly succeed. Only a small portion of the fuel, for example, that is put into the fire box under a boiler is actually utilised in working the steam engine—the greater portion is lost up the flue and out into space. The Second Law of Thermodynamics tells us that there is only one heat-flow natural to the Universe—that from the higher temperatures to the lower. This process is irreversible. There can never be a flow from the cooler to the hotter. The measure of this flow is known as Entropy.

We see, therefore, that not only are all forms of energy gradually

being permanently converted into heat, but also that the general tendency in the Universe is for the establishing of a uniform temperature throughout. Such irreversible processes as conduction, radiation, friction, etc., are constantly functioning to make the hotter portions of the universe cooler and the colder portions warmer. Gradually the limits of maximum and minimum temperatures are narrowing down, and with this tendency there is less and less heat energy available for “useful conversion”. While the total energy of the Universe remains constant, more and more of it is being dissipated into Space as unavailable heat, and gradually the entropy of the Universe is on the increase. So we get the Pralaya Maha—the gradual stagnation of the Universe to a condition of a uniform and a useless heat distribution in a lifeless and a motionless ocean of Space.

Physical research of the last few years has, of course, removed us considerably from the complete simplicity of the “one-way” traffic scheme of heat energy, and while bringing in many respects a clearer picture of its processes, has also brought fresh and for the moment bewildering problems. The problem, for instance, of the mechanism of re-birth following upon the ultimate stagnation which we have indicated is one upon which the modern physicist is silent. Moreover, the newer ideas regarding the electronic structure of the atom have introduced a complication of detail in the process of dissipation to

which we can but make a passing reference. Careful study of stellar evolution shows clearly, for instance, that there must now also be reckoned a radiation of *mass* as well as of heat, since we now know that energy has mass. Moreover, the existence of what have been referred to as "cosmic rays," completely absorbed in the lower

atmospheres, and the subject of contemporary investigation in the great elevations reached recently by Professor Picard and others, may help us to build up a truer picture of the process of the Pralaya Maha in the near future. But at least the Pralaya Maha may now be accepted as a truism of modern cosmical physics.

IVOR B. HART

What we desire to prove is, that underlying every ancient popular religion was the same ancient wisdom-doctrine, one and identical, professed and practised by the initiates of every country, who alone were aware of its existence and importance. To ascertain its origin, and the precise age in which it was matured, is now beyond human possibility. A single glance, however, is enough to assure one that it could not have attained the marvellous perfection in which we find it pictured to us in the relics of the various esoteric systems, except after a succession of ages. A philosophy so profound, a moral code so ennobling, and practical results so conclusive and so uniformly demonstrable is not the growth of a generation, or even a single epoch. Fact must have been piled upon fact, deduction upon deduction, science have begotten science, and myriads of the brightest human intellects have reflected upon the laws of nature, before this ancient doctrine had taken concrete shape. The proofs of this identity of fundamental doctrine in the old religions are found in the prevalence of a system of initiation ; in the secret sacerdotal castes who had the guardianship of mystical words of power, and a public display of a phenomenal control over natural forces, indicating association with preterhuman beings. Every approach to the Mysteries of all these nations was guarded with the same jealous care, and in all, the penalty of death was inflicted upon initiates of any degree who divulged the secrets entrusted to them. We have seen that such was the case in the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries, among the Chaldean Magi, and the Egyptian hierophants ; while with the Hindus, from whom they were all derived, the same rule has prevailed from time immemorial.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. II, p. 99.

THE ORIENTALISM OF WHITTIER

[**Arthur Christy** actively engages himself in investigating the extent of oriental influence on American Men of Letters. In *THE ARYAN PATH* for June 1933, he wrote on "Whittier and the Brahmo-Samaj" and in September of that year on "Emerson's Oriental Reading". Now he returns to a consideration of Whittier and more generally surveys that poet's spiritual connection with the Orient.—EDS.]

In Romain Rolland's *Prophets of the New India* appear these words:—

It would be a matter of deep interest to know exactly how far the American spirit had been impregnated, directly or indirectly, by the infiltration of Hindu thought during the XIXth century, for there can be no doubt that it has contributed to the strange moral and religious mentality of the modern United States. . . . I do not know whether any historian will be found to occupy himself seriously with the question. It is nevertheless a psychological problem of the first order, intimately connected with the history of our civilization.

It is in elaboration of the problem Romain Rolland has suggested that I propose to discuss some of the interesting phases of the Orientalism of Whittier. Obviously, there are so many aspects to the study of the rise of Orientalism in America that many weighty tomes must be written before we can hope to see the subject whole. But we can make a beginning, and I know no better way than to examine the works of the poets of the people for evidences of the waning hostility to Orientalism because it was "heathenish". It may be platitudinous, but it is true, that where the poets lead the people follow.

The history of the intellectual and religious contacts of the Orient and America, which still remains

to be written, cannot ignore the Orientalism which appeared in the work of the American literati. It is indeed profitable to study the organized cults and their swami founders, as Wendell Thomas has done in his *Hinduism Invades America*, but these cults are only the culmination of the long process in which the American religious soil has been prepared for Oriental thought. The harrowing was done, I am convinced, largely by poets and travellers through whose pages and tales the public was unconsciously weaned away from the traditional Calvinistic exclusiveness. Consider the assertion in George Willis Cooke's *Unitarianism in America* that it may be accepted as a very interesting fact that "the two potent influences shaping the ancient Puritanism of Salem into Unitarianism were foreign commerce and contact with the Oriental religions". To these we must add the translations of Oriental books which slowly found their way into the new nation, books which in time contributed both figures of speech and essential Oriental thought to some of the classic pages of American literature.

The leavening process was the more effective because it was not

always deliberate. Men often resist organized propaganda, but they are usually in a hospitable mood as they browse through the pages of their favourite poets. When the poet in particular happens to be so devout a soul as Whittier, one realizes that the new Orientalism possessed formidable allies in the writers who were engaged with the eternal verities and read the Eastern scriptures to ascertain the conclusions of the ancients who had wrestled with the same problems. In illustration of a subtle interweaving of Christian and Buddhist morality, consider Whittier's poem "Disarmament" which commences with Christ's command "Put up the sword!" and concludes with echoes of a Buddhist birth-story and the moral injunctions of the *Dhammapada*. After a discussion of the futility and ghastliness of war, Whittier writes of the story told in Eastern tents among Mongol shepherds as they sat around their fires, a story of how

Once, on the errands of his mercy bent,
Buddha, the holy and benevolent,
Met a fell monster, huge and fierce of look
Whose awful voice the hills and forests shook.
"O son of peace!" the giant cried, "thy fate
Is sealed at last, and love shall yield to hate."

Now here was assuredly a new note in the conservative religious poetry of America. Buddha, the founder of a heathen religion, was labelled "holy" and "benevolent," and addressed as a "son of peace". Furthermore, Whittier goes on to inform the reader that

The unarmed Buddha, looking with no trace
Of fear or anger in the monster's face,
In pity said, "Poor fiend, even thee I love."

At these words the sky-tall
monster shrank into the form of a

dove and hovered, singing over the Buddha,

"Hate hath no harm for love," so ran the song;
"And peace unweaponed conquers every
wrong."

A poem such as Whittier's "Disarmament" is decidedly not in the same *genre* as Hunt's "Abou Ben Adhem" or Browning's "Rabbi Ben Ezra" or Matthew Arnold's "Sohrab and Rustum". In this type will be found either a perfectly good Occidental moral which for the sake of ornateness has been put into a pseudo-Oriental form or an interest in the Persian epic form—in this instance the *Shah Nameh*—because of its rhetorical similarities to the epics of Greece. Some of Whittier's poems on the other hand made use of the Oriental scriptures, paraphrasing unique passages and with persuasiveness teaching some of the very lessons which Krishna taught to Arjuna in the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Whittier did write poems of the Hunt and Browning type, as witness "The Khan's Devil," "Rabbi Ishmael," "The Two Rabbins," and "Requital". But we may with justice say that these were written in a well-established, conventional form that was not of any particular significance.

Not so, however, such a passage as that which appears in "The Preacher," a long poem written in celebration of George Whitefield, the celebrated religious reformer.

In exposition of the Vedantic doctrine of identity, Whittier writes:—

In the Indian fable Arjoon hears
The scorn of a god rebuke his fears:
"Spare thy pity," Krishna saith;

"Not in thy sword is the power of death!
 All is illusion,—loss but seems;
 Pleasure and pain are only dreams;
 Who deems he slayeth doth not kill;
 Who counts as slain is living still.
 Strike, nor fear thy blow is crime;
 Nothing dies but the cheats of time;
 Slain or slayer, small the odds
 To each, immortal as Indra's gods."

No readers acquainted with the *Bhagavad-Gita* will fail to recognize in these lines an excellent paraphrase of a passage in the second canto.

But a poem even more interesting because of its Orientalism is "Miriam". Here we find such lines as:—

Those yellow Lamas who at Meerut pray
 By wind and water power, and love to say:
 "He who forgiveth not shall, unforgiven,
 Fail of the rest of Buddha," and who even
 Spare the black gnat that stings them. . . .

And there are lines in the conclusion of the poem which are even more significant, for they obviously contain Whittier's paraphrase of the typical conclusions of representative cantos of the *Gita*. The words are placed in the mouth of an ancient holy man who

Knew Manu's laws, and through his close-
 shut eyes
 Saw things far off, and as an open book
 Into the thoughts of other men could look,
 Began, half chant, half howling, to rehearse
 The fragment of a holy Vedic verse;
 And thus it ran: "He who all things
 forgives
 Conquers himself and all things else, and
 lives

Above the reach of wrong or hate or fear,
 Calm as the gods, to whom he is most
 dear."

Assuredly here is not a presentation of Oriental teaching in a manner designed to estrange the Christian reader. Here we have an echo of the best of the *Gita* with fitness woven into a poem on a very Christian theme. The reason Whittier wrote as he did is simply explained. He believed firmly that there were truths in the ancient scriptures of all races which

The wiser world hath not outgrown,
 And the All-Father is our own!

I do not have at my disposal the space that would permit reference to all instances in which Whittier made use of the Oriental scriptures or alluded to doctrines and events. Nor can I attempt to distinguish between the Brahman, Mohammedan and Confucian echoes in his works. What I have offered will be sufficient if it leads to a fresh perusal of Whittier's pages with an eye to discerning the catholicity of his sympathies and the variety of his interests. His pages offer a rich suggestion of the slow processes of intellectual and spiritual osmosis through which Orientalism has permeated the American temper.

ARTHUR CHRISTY

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE SELF OF MATTER AND THE SELF OF SPIRIT*

[C. E. M. Joad reviews two volumes of philosophical studies by Indian scholars and although he disagrees with their conclusions, he admires the powerful reasoning by which they are supported.—Eds.]

Mr. Kaveeshwar has written a scholarly study of Berkeley's Metaphysics. The exposition is clear, the treatment sympathetic, the criticisms acute, and the general thesis, that Berkeley, while arriving on the whole at the right conclusions, namely, those of Spiritual Idealism, tends to defend them with unsound arguments, is one that will commend itself to Indian philosophers. Two points may be selected for comment. First, why did Mr. Kaveeshwar choose Berkeley for his subject? Because, primarily, he was struck by the similarity of many of his doctrines to those of the Vidnyanavadin Bauddhas; and struck further by the similarity between some of the criticisms levelled against Berkeley's doctrines, in so far as they assert a purely subjective Mentalism by the later objective Idealists in Europe and the criticisms brought against the Vidnyanavadin Bauddhas by Shankaracharya. One of the merits of the book is, indeed, the frequent parallels which the author draws between the doctrines of metaphysicians belonging to different civilizations separated in space by half the globe and in time by centuries.

Secondly, Mr. Kaveeshwar devotes considerable attention to

Berkeley's doctrine of the immortality of the soul. He expresses himself as being in general agreement with the common criticism of this doctrine that the soul or self, as ordinarily conceived, is so closely interlocked with the body that it is difficult to see in what sense it could, if disembodied, be considered to be the *same* self. He quotes, for example, with apparent approval, Professor Taylor's criticism "unless the soul continued to live for aims and interests teleologically continuous with those of its earthly life, there would be no genuine extension of our selfhood beyond the grave". Berkeley's mistake, he thinks, arises from his failure to distinguish between the empirical self of our ordinary experience and our real self, the Atman, which underlies it. The second is immortal, the first is not. But if in ordinary experience I am not aware of my Atman—and Mr. Kaveeshwar seems to suggest that I am not—it is a little difficult to see how the doctrine of *my* immortality is supported. It may, of course, be a fact that some self other than the self of which I am empirically aware survives; but it is not clear why the fact, if it is a fact, should interest me.

* *The Metaphysics of Berkeley*. By G. W. Kaveeshwar. Published by Mrs. Kaveeshwar. 5s. 6d. *Ajñāna*. By G. R. Malkani, R. Das, and T. R. V. Murti. (Luzac and Co., London.)

The concept of the dual self may serve as a link between the *Metaphysics of Berkeley* and *Ajñāna*. The latter is a treatise on the nature of ignorance, or, as we in the West would call it, error, by three profound and subtle thinkers, who are apparently on the staff of the Indian Institute of Philosophy. Although each contribution is independent of the others, the three form in fact a series of parallel statements of what is essentially the same position, that of the Advaita Vedanta. Let me say at once that *Ajñāna* is of the highest philosophical interest and that the three contributors exhibit a philosophical acumen and dialectical skill which, if they are at all representatives of modern Indian philosophical writings, only increase the Western reader's surprise on reading Mr. Kaveeshwar's complaint that "it is very easily possible for an Indian student to qualify himself for the M. A. degree in the subject of philosophy . . . from an Indian university, without having any considerable—and in some cases even the least—knowledge of *Indian philosophy*." It is not merely the fact that Indian philosophy is in certain respects unique; it is also the manifestly high attainments of some modern Indian philosophers which raise this surprise to the point of something like astonishment.

What is the problem of error? I will begin briefly stating it in my own way. Either the mind in knowing discovers objects existing independently of itself, or it creates

them for itself, or it partly does one and partly the other. If the first, then error is impossible, since we can only know what is; if the second, we never know anything that anybody else knows, and we are forced back upon Berkeley's subjectivism, since our minds are shut up each within the closed circle of its own ideas; if the third, how are we to distinguish the one activity that of discovery from the other that of creation? How, in fact, can we ever be sure that we are knowing anything which is independent of us and is not merely the projected fancy of our own minds? The writers of *Ajñāna*, if pressed, would no doubt choose the second of these three alternatives, yet would so define the mind, or rather the self, as to rob it of its subjectivist implications.

Mr. Malkani states the problem somewhat differently. Reality, he holds, is a single, non-temporal, non-substantial spiritual unity; it is an Absolute, "eternally accomplished," eternally existing. The individual is himself in his inmost being this Absolute. Now the world, as it appears, is a collection of temporal, material objects, extended in space and of apparently individual minds which perceive them; this appearance must, if reality is a spiritual unity, be illusory. Hence the concept of Avidya (apparently used synonymously with *Ajñāna*) denoting the misperception of things, the perception of them, that is to say, not as they are, but as they are not! Avidya, then, is a form of knowing, not the

world of appearance which is known. (This, at least, is Mr. Malkani's rendering of the meaning of the term; Mr. Das seems to take a different view, defining Ajñāna as "the material cause, the stuff of which illusions are made," which suggests the illusory world of appearance rather than the misperception of it by the mind.) Mr. Malkani is anxious to disclaim the view that Avidya creates the illusory appearance it perceives. Rather it implies and is implied by it—"the being of Avidya and the being of the world are mutually implied and partake of the same sort of reality."

Mr. Malkani's argument proceeds along the familiar lines of Idealist philosophy. Reasons are first adduced for supposing that matter cannot be real; it is full of contradictions. Nor, he holds, does the modern realist's theory that the contents of the external world are not substantial physical objects but sense data, patches of colour, raps of sound, and so forth, avail to meet the objections urged against substantial matter. What follows? First, "we misperceive the real when we perceive it as something extended in space and time and as determined by the law of causality." Secondly, if it has no reality in its own right, matter must be either a creation of spirit, or it must be spirit misperceived or misapprehended. The second alternative, which Mr. Malkani adopts, brings us back to the problem of the soul or self. There are, he holds, at least two souls or selves—the empirical self known to

us in consciousness and the Atman which is behind and beyond consciousness. "There is nothing" behind or beyond the true self "that can know it or make it an object. It is therefore not related to objects at all; it is, in fact, pure subject." In short, and not to put too fine a point on it, it is the spiritual Absolute which is the sole real. What, then, of Ajñāna, of Avidya? It is an activity of the empirical self only and as such it is not truly real. In reality itself there is no error. In the "Absolute Reality which is our true Self, the whole realm of the objective, and also that ignorance which may in a sense be said to be the cause of the appearance of the latter are cancelled."

My inability to subscribe to any of these conclusions does not detract from my admiration of the exceedingly powerful reasoning by which they are supported. Nor, because space has prevented me from dealing with the contributions of Mr. Das and Mr. Murti, should it be inferred that their interest is inferior to that of Mr. Malkani. All three, indeed, are models of what Idealist philosophical writing should be. But, although it permits me to admire, my disagreement obliges me to protest. A proper protest would take a volume; but, since error is the ostensible object of enquiry, let me enter a caveat against the notion that, if Monism is to be preserved, error can, as Mr. Malkani contends, be unreal. For consider; I certainly believe the world to be a plurality of many things. If the world is,

as these writers maintain, a spiritual unity, my belief must be erroneous. Is the error I make in so misconceiving the world a real error or not? If it is real, then error belongs to reality, and the universe cannot be a unity through and through, unless, indeed, it be one single, coherent error. If it is

unreal, then it is not really a mistake to hold that the world is a plurality of many things. But if it is not, then Idealist Monism which maintains that it is, must be false. In a word I do not see how, if Idealist Monism is to be maintained, error can be unreal.

C. E. M. JOAD

DEVELOPMENT OF BUDDHIST THOUGHT*

[Dr. S. K. Belvalkar, M.A., Ph. D., is a Sanskrit Scholar of distinction and Secretary of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. He has contributed to the Harvard Oriental Series, a critical edition of *Rama's Later History* (Uttara-Rama-Charita) an ancient Sanskrit drama by Bhavabhuti, and has also to his credit numerous other volumes. In collaboration with Professor R. D. Ranade, he is working on a *History of Indian Philosophy*, of which the seventh volume was reviewed by Hugh l'A. Fausset in our issue of November, 1933.—EDS.]

The present publication belongs to the "The History of Civilisation" Series, in which is included *The Life of Buddha as Legend and History* by the same author, published in 1927, of which the volume under review is a continuation and a complement. Since, however, each of the two volumes is designed to be more or less self-sufficient, there has been some inevitable repetition and overlapping. This book deals more fully with the philosophical and religious aspects of Buddhism, while the earlier one stressed the legendary, biographical and historical aspects. Both the volumes contain illustrations, a detailed account of the Buddhist Scriptures (by way of an Appendix), a serviceable Bibliography, and a full Index.

There can be no question that Dr. Thomas is perfectly at home with his subject. He has used most of his sources in the original, and on any point of consequence such as the birth or the death of the Buddha, his Temptations, his First Sermon, his views on Nirvāṇa, or the interpretation of

the so-called Chain of Twelve Causes, the author is able to cite almost exhaustively a mass of authorities ancient and modern, Indian as well as European, with a facility truly remarkable. The result has been somewhat unfortunate to the general reader, who, if he comes to these volumes with any clear-cut ideas about the biography and personality of the Buddha or with any specific views on his teaching, is sure, after a perusal of these volumes, to get his ideas blurred and his earlier beliefs rather unceremoniously shaken; and this, in our opinion, constitutes at once the strength as well as the weakness of our author. In other words, these volumes deserve to become standard works of reference for scholars who may wish to find out the documentary evidence and the critical literature bearing upon a particular topic relating to Buddhism, but may repel the beginners who may wish to win light and inspiration from a study of the Founder of one of the greatest of World Religions.

As Buddhism arose in a region and

* *The History of Buddhist Thought*. By EDWARD J. THOMAS, M.A., D. Litt. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 15s.)

amongst a people not directly under the influence of Brahmanic culture, religion and philosophy, we are not surprised to find misrepresentations of these in Buddhist works, as when they talk in season and out of season of Brahmā (masculine) "the Creator" and remain unaccountably silent about Brahman (neuter) and all that the Upanishadic philosophy of the Absolute implies. We can perhaps understand and allow this in the case of the Founder, but were not the later exegetes and compilers of the Canon expected to know better? And if, nevertheless, they allowed the words and arguments to remain as we find them to-day, should not this indicate on their part a greater measure of fidelity to the original tradition than the author seems generally to concede to these later compilations? The compilers may and do differ amongst themselves on other points where questions of immediate doctrinal importance were involved. These differences the author has fully emphasised. But it is worth while emphasising their agreements also, as there we can feel as though we are treading on surer ground.

Dr. Thomas has done well in bringing prominently to the fore the "Ascetic Ideal" implied in Buddhism and the consequent part that "Yogic" practices played in shaping the course of conduct and the conception of the Nirvāṇic goal promulgated by it. And as there was an equal emphasis placed by the Founder upon moral discipline and self-culture as the necessary propaedeutic to it, both for the lay disciple and the avowed monk, Buddhism is saved, as the author correctly points out, from the charge of being a mere "vulgar magic and thaumaturgy coupled with hypnotic practices". Nevertheless the actual contribution made by Early Buddhism to Ontology or Metaphysics seems to be disappointingly meagre. When cornered, "The Enlightened One" gives non-committal answers and withal resents being dub-

bed Agnostic or Nihilist. The position thus taken does not seem to us to differ in any essential respects from the position of Yājñavalkya in the Brhadāraṇyaka: "When, however, for him everything has become just the Self, with what means—and what—could he see?"—a position which is even more logically contained in *Guros tu maunam vyākhyānam*. The frankly agnostic attitude of Sañjaya, Bellatthi-putta, which the Jain doctrine of the Syādvāda sought to invest with an apparently positive aspect, falls quite in a line with the above attitudes, and one is naturally led to ask whether these more or less cognate attitudes to Reality could not have been the inevitable reactions against the disturbing "Sophistic" dialectics of the great "Heretic" teachers preceding both Jainism and Buddhism. That the so-called Akriyā-vāda, Svabhāva-vāda, Bhūta-vāda, and the other view-points of this heretical philosophy were actually held and preached in the Post-Upanishadic and Pre-Buddhistic period may well be believed in. Not only the Jain and Buddhist sources, but even Brahmanic sources—the Upanishads and the Mahābhārata—vouch for their existence. Dr. Thomas seems to us to be unnecessarily sceptical on this point. Compare Dr. F. Otto Schrader's *Ueber den Stand der Indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvira's und Buddha's*, Strassburg, 1902.

We confess to a few other minor differences of opinion—mainly of emphasis—with the author. But the sterling merit of the work remains unquestioned. To books on Buddhism there is no end. But we must frankly admit that we have not so far come across any other book of this compass, packed full of reliable information and calculated to afford a clear perspective of the origin and evolution of Buddhist thought in all its aspects. We congratulate Dr. Thomas on his achievement and unhesitatingly recommend the book to every serious student of Indian Philosophy.

S. K. BELVALKAR

A MODERN YOGA*

[Sri Krishnaprem comes from a cultured and well-to-do English family. His original name was Ronald Nixon. He took his tripos at Cambridge in Mental and Moral Sciences. A brilliant and deep student of philosophy, it was with him a case of love at first sight with the Vedanta which made him adopt India as his spiritual home. He came first as a Professor of English at the Lucknow University, but gave up this very highly-paid and much-coveted post for a Professorship at the Hindu University on a small salary, because Benares attracted him deeply. Later he gave up that post also, and gave away all his savings and belongings, to resort to Almora, a poor Vaishnava. He is now at a small Asram in the Himalayas under the guruship of Sri Mataji, a Brahmana lady who retired from the active duties of life and who is a devotee of Sri Krishna. It was there that Ronald Nixon changed his name.—Eds.]

A new work from the pen of Sri Aurobindo is an event. The present volume is a collection of writings dealing with problems and difficulties raised for the most part by some of those who are aspiring to lead the spiritual life under his guidance and consequently has for sādhakas an even greater interest than works addressed primarily to an outside public.

To avoid possible misunderstandings it is perhaps as well to say that the yoga treated in this book has nothing in common with the so-called "yoga" which, I am told, is having quite a vogue in the sillier circles of the West and which concerns itself with such things as standing on one's head and breathing rhythmically, psychic trivialities or ridiculous "concentration" on health, wealth and happiness. It deals with the high spiritual quest that even so long ago as the time of Yājñavalkya, was *anuh panthā vitatah puranō*—"the ancient narrow Path that stretches far away."

There is perhaps no one writing in India whose words on this subject will be listened to with more respect than Sri Aurobindo, and that for two very good reasons: first, his powerful and keen intellect, and secondly his prolonged and arduous *sādhana*, a *sādhana* which, I understand, he is still pursuing. This book, moreover, is clearly based on the author's own experience.

It may be briefly stated that the

central method of this yoga is an integral and comprehensive offering of the whole nature to the Divine Reality. The technical methods of the classic yogas are not rejected but are all subordinated to this central "*samarpan*" which is, as it were, their soul and must include our whole being, physical, emotional, mental and spiritual. There is to be no ascetic dualism but an ascent which springs from the whole nature. Rejecting the selfish desire to "live one's own life," the aspirant bends all his powers, purified by the discipline of yoga, to a winged ascent to the one Divine Reality and to a poised waiting at the feet of that Reality.

At this point, the point at which many mystics stop, the second movement of this yoga commences. The sādha, emptied of self but filled with the Light and Power of the Divine according to the level to which he has been able to rise, now seeks to retrace his steps and to descend again to the lower world bringing down with him as much as he can hold of the Light and Power with which he has been filled, thus transforming his lower nature and ultimately making of it a centre in this lower world through which can take place the manifestation of a diviner reality than has heretofore been possible. Thus there is a twofold movement; an ascent *to* the Divine and a descent *with* the Divine; an ascent to the "kingdom of Heaven" and a

* *The Riddle of this World* by SRI AUROBINDO (Arya Publishing House, Calcutta. Rs. 2. Obtainable at the Shama's Bookshop, Medows Street, Fort, Bombay.)

building of that kingdom of Heaven here on this earth; no mere shaking off of the dust of this world in "a flight of the Alone to the Alone," but an attempt to transmute, to divinise life here by providing channels and centres of manifestation for that spiritual Reality which is, even now, the very basis of this and all other worlds but is hampered and clogged in expression by the "*tamasic*" inertness of the world of matter and the inharmonious self-seeking of the world of mind.

This, and nothing less than this, is the aim of this yoga. Soul, mind and body, all must be transmuted. The soul must no longer remain a pale starved shadow but must become a vivid and radiant existence, a centre pulsating with Divine Light and energy, dominating and using the mind and body. The mind, too, must no longer remain a mere analytic machine, revelling in its proud independence. Instead it must realise its subordination to the soul and assume its proper function, that of the formative power, that which impresses with form, not merely the raw material of the world but also the formless (in the sense of transcending form) truth of the soul. Even the body, the "despised and rejected" of so many mystics, must become a harmonious vehicle of the Divine Life in the same way that a block of marble from being a lump of dead matter becomes a radiant expression of the sculptor's idea. It is no narrow or unworthy ideal, no mere salvation-seeking, but a noble attempt to "remould things nearer to—not the heart's—but the Divine desire," and it is one which should commend itself to the attention of all whose eyes are not utterly blinded by the follies of materialism.

Nor need the so-called "intellectual" turn up his nose in scorn. Here is no pseudo-science, no obsolete psychology, no fantastic cosmology. Though I, at least, am in no way prepared to admit that the old systems represent merely "the childish lisplings of humanity" or whatever the silly phrase was, yet it must be admitted that they have long

ceased to be understood by the majority, including many of their orthodox commentators who manage sometimes to shed more darkness upon light than light upon darkness. In this system a new terminology has been forged, which is more easily intelligible to the mind trained in modern ways of thought. It might be suggested that the value of a second edition would be greatly enhanced if an appendix were added giving explanatory accounts of some of the more important technical terms such as "vital," "psychic," "super-mind" and others which are all used in a highly technical sense which has to be gathered from somewhat inadequate data as the book proceeds.

One outstanding feature of the book is its clear differentiation between the spiritual experience of yoga and the merely intellectual concepts of idealistic philosophy or the emotional intuitions of poetry. The intuitions of the poet, shot through as they sometimes are with spiritual light, are too vague and evanescent to be of practical use. They are like the delicate plants that branch out in beautiful shapes beneath the surface of a lake but which collapse into a sloppy shapeless mass when you take them out of the water for examination.

It is characteristic of this age of popular education that many people suppose that anything can be learnt by a patient study of books. But there are some things which can never be learnt in this manner, and yoga (in any form) is one of them. Yoga is the art of the soul and it can never be learnt without the living contact with a master. All attempts to practise yoga without a Guru, and a real Guru at that, end either in disappointed failure, trivial psychism, ill-health or madness. The present writer has seen with his own eyes cases of all the above occurring to uninstructed or ill-instructed would-be yogis.

Some of the dangers and difficulties on the path are discussed in the chapter on "The Intermediate Zone". Its perusal will enable the reader to under-

stand how it is that there are so many "*Avatars*" and "*Jivanmuktas*" roaming about the world nowadays and so many prophets with "divine inspiration" seeking to save our souls though their own seem to the outer eye as much in need of salvation as ours. The prevalence of such people, by no means *all* charlatans, is often a ground of scepticism to the superficial, but it is, in reality, an inevitable phenomenon, always liable to occur to those who essay the mystic path without adequate guidance. In this sphere, as in others, Sri Aurobindo gives us advice which is clear and definite, that is to say, as definite as could be expected in a realm which he well describes as one of "half-lights and tempting, but often mixed and misleading experiences".

In fact, all through, the book is characterised by the clear definiteness of thought that real experience gives. Many have got into the way of supposing that the word "mystical" is synonymous with the word "vague," and that all spiritual writings will have an elusive dreamy texture, a sort of Celtic twilight which conceals more than it reveals, and, though rich in the suggestion of infinite possibilities, is apt to be poor in definite content and disappointing in realisation. Such readers will find that the life of the spirit can be written about with a concrete clarity which will surprise them, a clarity of thought and expression which, while it too often crystallises into sterile dogmas at the hands of subsequent generations, is yet clearly visible in the writings of many of the great mystics.

The concluding section of the book contains a gallant attempt to give some explanation of the origin of the cosmos which, if it cannot be the whole truth, will yet serve as some sort of a prop to those whose minds cannot stand alone but demand some answer at least to the great question as to why this cosmic process with all its misery emerged from out the blissful splendour which lies beyond the flaming ramparts of the world.

Let us, however, turn away from the

contemplation of the ultimate insolubility back to the yoga which, with its double movement, stands before us like a challenge. Are we going to remain in our own selfish littlenesses, forever chasing the tail of our own desires, or are we going to lose our selves that we may find them again in selfless co-operation with the one Divine Reality which rules us all, mystic and materialist alike?

A great and sympathetic Western writer has described Sri Aurobindo as believing that "humanity is going to enlarge its domain by the acquisition of a new knowledge, new powers, new capacities which will lead to as great a revolution in human life as did the physical science in the nineteenth century". Now this seems to me a misrepresentation of the true yoga, as dangerous as it is slight. Yoga is not something to increase the vital well-being and cultural development of humanity as such, something like eugenics or the wireless. Any view that places the emphasis on a mere humanity is then clearly wrong, for it is the service of the Divine Reality and its manifestation in humanity and elsewhere that is the heart of the yoga and this difference, slight or purely verbal as it may seem to humanist moderns, is yet of profound significance and makes all the difference between the high spiritual endeavour of the ancient East and the ephemeral humanist progress of the modern West. Not that such "progress" is in any way to be deprecated in itself, but it is a phenomenon belonging to a far lower level than this or any other yoga.

I have one slight criticism, that Sri Aurobindo does something less than justice to Buddhist yoga. It appears to be considered that Buddhism taught world-negation and escape into a transcendental region beyond the cosmic process. No doubt this is true of certain Buddhist schools, but it is by no means true of all. The extremely influential *Mahayāna* schools, or some at least of them, taught the nobler *Bodhisattva* doctrine and, rejecting what they termed "the *Nirvāṇa* of the *Arhata*" held that supreme enlighten-

ment consisted in the realisation that *Nirvāṇa* and *Samsāra* are one and the same reality which they termed "bhuta tathata". Ashvaghosha, perhaps the greatest of all Buddhist philosophers, expressly teaches that enlightenment has two aspects which he terms "prajñā" and "achintya karma". The first may be regarded as the centripetal force leading to realisation of the Unity and the latter a centrifugal force working for the spiritual welfare of all beings. I do not propose to discuss here the question as to how far this doctrine is equivalent to the "double movement" of Sri Aurobindo's yoga but it must, I think, certainly be admitted that the escape from the cosmic process by no means constituted the sole message of Buddhism.

To return to the yoga, it may be of interest to enumerate the qualifications which are necessary for one who aspires to tread this path. From a study of the book it becomes clear that they do not differ essentially from those demanded by the masters of old. "A central sincerity," "a fundamental humility," the ability to do all work in "a spirit of acceptance, discipline and surrender, not with personal demands and conditions but with a vigilant conscious submission to control and guidance," a calm equanimity and a faith that "in spite of our errors and weaknesses and in spite of any immediate appearance of failure, the Divine Will is leading us, through every circumstance, towards the final Realisation". Above all, transmuting all by its constant presence, must be a burning aspiration towards the Divine and a desire to offer oneself and all that one has for the Divine service quite irrespective of what part one may be called upon to play in the Divine LILA.

Clearly, the yoga is no passing amusement for those in search of a new sensation. It is the age-old spiritual path, the "Great Work" of the alchemists, the transmutation of the whole character, and this can never be an easy task, for although the actual transmutation is and can only be accomplished by the Divine Grace, yet the preliminary drudgery, the preparing of the vessel for that Grace must be accomplished by one's own efforts.

Perhaps there will be some whose first question will be whether this yoga is a *jñāna yoga*, a *bhakti yoga* or a *karma yoga*. I will leave such lovers of classification to find out the answer from the book itself or from the following few remarks. Here is knowledge, the knowledge that there is nothing but the One Divine Reality, the "sarvam khalvidam Brahma," of the Upanishads: here is *bhakti* for it sets forth the necessity for unchanging love of and self-surrender to the Lord, the *atmanivedana* which is the culminating stage of the nine-fold *bhakti* of the *Srimad Bhāgavat*: and here is *karma* for it expounds the unattached skill in action, the "*karmasu kaushalam*" of the *Gita*.

Beyond all classifications stands the One, the Supreme, the Stainless Eternal, changeless amidst His own eternal change, effulgent amidst His own dark shadows. All paths are His paths and this book stands as one more testimony that, even in this age of dark materialism, the ancient, razor-edged Path is open for those who have the courage to walk therein: "tena dheera apiyanti Brahmavidah swargam lokamita urdhvam vimuktah"—"Thereby the calm wise who know the Brahman, released, come unto the high Heaven world beyond."

SRI KRISHNAPREM

WAR*

[**Henry Pratt Fairchild** is the Professor of Sociology in New York University; here he analyses the different programmes offered for war-prevention, and finds them wanting.—EDS.]

The title of this book was apparently chosen more for its popular appeal than because of its applicability to the nature and subject matter of the treatise itself. A more apt title would have been "The Political Expert's Analysis of the Present Obstacles to Peace". If the reviewer is justified in his assumption that the "intelligent man" referred to is just the ordinary layman with an average I. Q., who can be reasonably identified with himself, then he is forced to say bluntly that, except for the last chapter—Harold Laski's contribution,—he finds very little in this volume in the way of suggestion, as to what he can do, or what he can urge others to do, that will really be effective in preventing future wars.

To begin with, the book is much too long for such a layman, too detailed, too crowded with minute historical data and abstract analyses of technical factors, forces, and relationships. All that the average intelligent man is able to grasp, or needs to know, about these matters could have been condensed into a quarter of the total number of pages (564). On the other hand, there are enormous gaps and deficiencies with respect to fundamental matters about which the intelligent man needs and craves information and understanding—but more of this later.

Except for the aforementioned last chapter, the book is essentially a brief for the League of Nations as the one outstanding hope for the elimination of the international anarchy that Norman Angell so well portrays in his first chapter. Coming at a time when the League has recently suffered several severe body blows with a resulting decline in prestige, this elaborate defence, with its suggestions for improvement, is salutary and welcome. Cer-

tainly nothing else has yet been offered that could take the place of the League, with all its weaknesses and deficiencies. But the treatment of the subject in this book is too largely re-threshing of old straw to give the intelligent man much inspiration or enlightenment. Gilbert Murray's demonstration that the Treaty of Versailles is not the towering obstacle to peace that many liberals think it is, is interesting and useful. But to take eighty-seven pages in proving that a certain treaty is not seriously impeding peace is a distinctly negative way of helping the intelligent man to know what to do to prevent a war that is actually impending. If we can't stop war by revising the Treaty, what can we do?

Much the same can be said of C. M. Lloyd's chapter on the "Problem of Russia" and Charles Roden Buxton's on "Inter-Continental Peace". There is much that is anachronistic, in particular, in the discussion of Russia in the light of recent events. Viscount Cecil's discussion of "The League as a Road to Peace" is the kind of a closely reasoned, well-informed, comprehensive production that one would expect from that source. But the pallidness of its tone may be judged by the closing paragraph:—

Finally it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the Prevention of War is not simply a negative business, a repressive action to be taken in a crisis. The best and surest of all "sanctions" against war lies in making the ties of peace too strong to break. We can all help to do that. When the advantages of peaceful co-operation are seen to be so great that no State will dare to throw them away, and when the individual citizens, the unofficial organisations, and the Governments are firmly resolved to withhold those advantages from a violator of the minimum code of peace, then the prevention of war will be assured.

What is the intelligent man to do

* *The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War*. Edited by LEONARD WOOLF. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 5s.)

War. Edited by LEONARD WOOLF. (Victor

about all that ? Of the same general character is W. Arnold Foster's long chapter on "Arbitration, Security, Disarmament".

What this book lacks is fresh viewpoints, original approaches, searching analyses of factors seldom recognized, and practical suggestions as to what the lay individual can actually do. The reviewer does not claim to have read every word of the volume, and consequently he is under some restraint in specifying matters that it does not contain. But certainly there are enormous deficiencies. When practically all students who approach international relations from the sociological point of view agree that overpopulation is one of the greatest causes of international war, if not actually the dominating one, why is not an extensive treatment of this subject included in this book ? True, Norman Angell touches upon the theme very briefly (page 485), but dismisses it with the apparent assumption that better co-operation is all that is needed to correct overpopulation—a most disheartening finger-snapping at the established body of population theory.

And how much the book would have gained by a really searching inquiry into the nature of group loyalty, the essence of nationality, the derivation of the actual forces that drive peoples into armed conflict with each other ! The probing into the causes of war scarcely scratches the surface, and how can the intelligent man know what to do about war if he does not understand the real causes ? And why, oh why, is there no really objective, vigorous, discussion of the future of the League, and the changes that might be made in it which would add to its strength and effectiveness ? For example, Norman Angell points out the discrepancy between the order of the individual state that possesses a police force and the anarchy of the international association that has no such agency. But instead of following the argument to its logical conclusion, and looking the need of an inter-

national police force squarely in the face, he shies off and says:—

This must not be taken as an implied argument in favour of a centrally organized police force for the world, an international army. (p. 47).

Why not ? What reason is there to suppose that sixty-odd nations, with widely divergent languages, traditions, standards, and modes can devise a basis for permanent peace without the use of an instrument which every separate nation on earth, however homogeneous it may be, has found indispensable ? To say that the very diversity makes it difficult is no answer. The intelligent man is interested in knowing what is the logical and the effective thing to do. If the necessary thing is made impossible by various contributory factors, then there is nothing to do but to resign himself to recurrent wars until the nations have been brought to the point of facing the inevitable. Dismissing necessity because of difficulty gets one nowhere.

There remains, then, Harold Laski's plea for the abandonment of individualistic capitalism, and the establishment of a communalized form of social organization all over the civilized globe. This is courageous, reasonable, inspiring, and convincing. This is something that would bring many desirable results, aside from the prevention of war. It is doubtful if it would prevent war, as long as nationalism, group feeling, and ethnic egoism persist. The assumption that all international war is the result of capitalistic activity is by no means proved. Commercial rivalry may be one important cause of war, but it is by no means the only one. And in many respects, Laski's treatment is quite inconsistent with the rest of the book, which assumes that the League of Nations is to continue to be as association of capitalist states (p. 195).

And so the intelligent man is left still groping in the dark, with no discernible pathway leading to the shining haven of peace.

HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

Coleridge: Select Poetry and Prose. Edited by STEPHEN POTTER. (Nonesuch Press, London. 8s. 6d.)

Like Ruskin, Coleridge would at intervals write a volume consisting of the titles of works he was about to write. He was fond of referring to "his system"—the great philosophical work he never produced. He never found a suitable Form in which to present all his priceless talents to the world. Yet after a hundred years that Form has been found. Mr. Stephen Potter has taken the fragments from all their different nooks, from the *Biographia Literaria*, the *Aids to Reflection*, the *Notebooks*, the *Table Talk*, the *Theological and Metaphysical Discussions*, the *Political Journalism*, gathered them together selectively into one splendid volume—and, suddenly! Coleridge emerges in a *perfect form*. The element of surprise, of joy, as we come unexpectedly upon gems of wisdom, eloquence, and mysticism, as we miraculously pluck the pearls from their hiding place, could not be achieved in any other form. It strikes me as a noble piece of work.

Mr. Potter's selection from the poetry is also happy. Coleridge excelled in Fancy when he wanted to excel in Imagination. But the famous poem "Kubla Khan" belongs to no category. Does this dream-poem mean anything? On the face of it, nothing. And yet its very phraseology invites the assistance of Freud. Mme. Blavatsky draws attention to the possibilities in an *Essay on Dreams*, and we wish that she had followed it up.

I could quote from this volume sixty paragraphs of immediate relevance to readers of THE ARYAN PATH—for Coleridge belongs to *our* era. I choose two:—

(1) I have known some who have been *rationaly* educated, as it is styled. They were marked by a microscopic acuteness, but when they looked at great things, all became blank, and they saw nothing, and denied (very illogically) that anything could be seen, and uni-

formly put the negation of a power for the possession of a power, and called the want of Imagination judgment, and the never being moved to rapture philosophy!

(2) What is it that I employ my metaphysics on? To perplex our clearest notions and living moral instincts? To extinguish the light of love and conscience, to make myself and others *worthless, soulless, godless*? No, to expose the folly and legerdemain of those who have thus abused the blessed organ of language, to support all old and venerable truths, to support, to kindle, to project, to make the reason spread light over our feelings, to make our feelings suffuse vital warmth through our reason—these are my objects and these my subjects.

Those two quotations are sufficient to show why it was that Coleridge wished to make it his chief task to establish the distinction between Reason and Understanding, with their relatives Imagination and Fancy. Such a distinction is by no means as difficult for us as it was a hundred years ago. It is the now familiar distinction between unintellectual and intellectual knowledge, between cerebration and intuition, between arguing and seeing, between reflecting and contemplating. Wordsworth called Imagination "Reason in her most exalted mood." Whether we use the term Reason or Imagination we mean an inward beholding, a direct aspect of truth. Fancy, on the other hand, the decorative play of the Understanding, is but the clothing of faery-like imaginings with reality instead of quickening our sight of the Real with the powers of the imagination. If we grasp these distinctions we shall easily understand Coleridge's worship of Wordsworth. For Wordsworth possessed the natural faculty for demonstrating in poetry this function of Reason and Imagination, while Coleridge himself, by some strange irony, possessed a natural faculty for employing Fancy, with the result that this superb philosopher and metaphysician is chiefly known as the author of *The Ancient Mariner* and *Christabel*!

J. S. COLLIS

The Christian Renaissance. By G. WILSON KNIGHT. (Macmillan & Co., London. 12s. 6d.)

This is a book of deep interest. It is tributary to that strong current which now is carrying away the mind of thoughtful men from the abstract and mechanical towards the concrete and the vital. As Dr. Whitehead calls for a New Reformation, so Professor Knight announces a New Renaissance in harmony with the dynamic truth of the New Testament. He wishes to see a Christianity which can live in union with Renaissance science (that he believes is already without difficulty) and in union also with the *life-consciousness* of the Renaissance, that delightful sense of a great expansion of heart and mind and action which is seen in Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe and others of the Renaissance poets. His key-thought is of the creative marriage between soul and body, heaven and earth. Nature with its love and joy and beauty can and must be given its true place in religion. Christianity has too often been dark and threatening. "We are still afraid of Jehovah, forgetting the Christ." But to Dante, whatever mediæval glooms beset his poetry, Paradise meant love and joy and beauty and dance and banquet and laughter. So Jesus "would have us blend our life with the life around us, incarnate our instincts along the creative rhythms of nature". He would have us live our metaphors, as in that Incarnation whereby the divine Logos is married to humanity.

Professor Knight tells us that his vision of the Christian Renaissance arose from his experience in the interpretation of Shakespeare. By studying the Bible or Shakespeare or Dante or Goethe "we raise our understanding beyond the complexities of history and literature . . . to Life itself". Poetry and vision have been failing us for a long time. Fact and value, nature and spirit have fallen apart. But we may look for a "richer integration" than anything in the past, "childlike but not childish, incorporating in some

way the purest poetry with a keen critical and historical faculty".

Space does not allow us to follow the author in his enthusiastic appreciation of Jesus as the greatest of poets, a poet supreme in word—and in life: or of Paul as he writes of the new Life that has come to birth. The New Testament he describes as brimming over with life, a life victorious over death. Here if anywhere poetry has been put to the high use of bringing light and joy to men, of creating a new life-consciousness in harmony with the divine. Paul, for example, does not set out to write poetry, but he writes it. His conscious aim is to convince and convert and to organise the new life-forces, but his faith in the living Christ drives him to write "from an imaginative, not from an intellectual centre".

The author, earnest in his ethical sincerity, seeks, as the mere moralist never seeks, to lift us above morality to the love and life which is the source of true morality. He finds the poets one with him there. "Consider how our Renaissance poets stress union and love and an awakened life: a death-conquest, a freedom from evil: all this is close to Christian doctrine," and indeed "many of our great and so-called pagan poets became specifically Christian in their latest work". The Renaissance, that splendid re-birth, "failed to integrate the new poetry with Christianity. That integration awaits us to-day."

G. E. NEWSOM

[Very likely the above review was the very last piece of writing that the Rev. G. E. NEWSOM, Master of Selwyn College, Cambridge did. We regret to chronicle his death which occurred on February 15th. He was the author of *The New Morality*, which was reviewed in the pages of our April 1933 number. His last letter to us, enclosing his notice of *The Christian Renaissance* was dated February 2nd, and, as always, was friendly and full of good will towards the work of THE ARYAN PATH. Though his mould of thought was very different to ours, he was ever ready to respond to our requests for co-operation. When sending the review of Gandhiji's *Self-Restraint versus Self-Indulgence* (THE ARYAN PATH,

February), he wrote us: "I am not at all theosophical, and it is only by a kind of accident and almost a whim that I have contributed to 'The Aryan Path'." About this month's review he wrote: "I am ashamed to see how long it is that I have kept you waiting for the review on 'The Christian Renaissance'. Now that vacation has come I hope to get that through. As a matter of fact it is a book which has led me to a great deal of thought, and I am very grateful to you for having sent me such a book." At the very outset he offered free co-operation and expressed the hope that "the Editors will not

think me either rich or proud, but I do not wish to receive a fee for what I have done". In his last letter he said: "I think you might well put a note to say that Professor Knight of Trinity College, Toronto is endeavouring to found a new school of Shakesperian scholarship, showing a world of imaginative significance in Shakespeare which has not received due attention. His books such as 'Myth and Miracle' and 'The Shakespearian Tempest,' have received high praise from the critics." We are of course sorry to lose the co-operation of such an able and esteemed friend.

—Eds.]

Kettle Drums. By N. RAMABHADHAN, B. A. (Basel Mission Press, Bangalore. Re. 1).

The title of this book is a little misleading, for the strict definition of kettle drum is an instrument tuned to a definite note. It suggests the repetition of a sound that is apt to become wearisome. Mr. N. Ramabhadran's *Kettle Drums* is anything but monotonous. It is exceedingly varied, for it contains "Dhuradasa and Ramanuja" and "Krishna's Plan" in which moral precepts are lightly and humorously stressed, sketches of an old Indian Police Station and studies of such village worthies as schoolmaster, landlord, headman and accountant, recorded whimsically, sympathetically, and occasionally with gentle irony. There is an ambitious, but hardly successful, short story, "The Black Ointment," a letter or two, "Home Truths from the Epics," essays on chess and cruelty to animals, and finally two excellent sketches a little reminiscent of Mark Twain's *Innocents Abroad*. When we add apt quotations, generally from English classics, and a glossary, it will be realised that the author has not provided us with the nerve-racking tap, tap of a percussion instrument but rather with full orchestral effects that suggest wisdom, a kindly understanding of human nature, and not a

little laughter.

Mr. N. Ramabhadran is a modest man. "I do not claim," he writes, "any literary or artistic achievements." That is nearer the truth than Mr. R. S. Sarma's Foreword in which he expresses wonder that a member of the Indian Police Force should not renounce that "thankless service" and make "a little fortune in the literary world". The trouble is that Mr. N. Ramabhadran is not sufficiently critical. Every turn in his variety entertainment is not good. His "Cruelty to Animals" would be better if he had confined his subject to India. He spreads his net too wide and catches a very odd fish indeed: a Frenchman who "will eat anything from a rat to an elephant with gusto". Surely that is dealing with cruelty to human beings. If I cannot honestly say with Mr. N. Ramabhadran's servant, "Salaam—Swami," to all his literary efforts, I can warmly and gratefully praise his keen sense of humour and his pleasant observation of human character. There his touch is sure and delightful. Let him carve upon a cherry stone some closely observed Indian scene, let him laugh at himself, as he does so happily in "A Tramp in the Metropolis," and we may yet hear of a good Indian policeman becoming a still better writer.

Caste and Democracy. By K. M. PANIKKAR. (Hogarth Press, London. 1s. 6d.)

This is a most useful and instructive little pamphlet. I use those much-hackneyed words advisedly, because they happen to provide the best description of it. *Caste and Democracy* is useful to those who are directly interested in Indian affairs, where "Hindu society is now facing a crisis unparalleled in Indian history," because it provides an epitome of the fundamental issues, stripped of the mass of detail which may be so misleading. And to those whose acquaintance with the crisis is little more than a vague knowledge that Mahatma Gandhi is leading a campaign against untouchability, the pamphlet is instructive without being dull.

Mr. Panikkar has divided his thesis into three parts. In the first he outlines the origins and principles of caste, laying stress—quite rightly—on its religious basis. He is, perhaps, rather too annoyed with the practice to admit the points in favour of the theory. That, in fact, it has been employed by selfish sacerdotalism to conserve exclusive benefits by the propagation of superstitious tabus merely emphasises the gap between theory and practice. It does not, in reality, invalidate the theory.

In the second part, the author sets forth the ideals and methods of demo-

cracy, showing how the idea of equality has permeated contemporary thought; and in the third, entitled "The Future of Caste in India," he makes, lucidly, his point that the criminal law of the Hindus, based on caste, has been totally displaced by the British system of penal law, based on egalitarian considerations. It is, primarily, this conflict in the sphere of everyday administration of justice, which has a very practical bearing on daily life, that has provoked the widespread revolt against the caste system.

If there is a criticism to be levelled against this admirably lucid essay, it is that the author gives insufficient weight to the *religious* basis of democracy. He tends to represent the clash as between Hindu faith (or "superstition," if you like) and Western political theory. But political theory, however reasonable, would have no chance against a religious faith, however unreasonable. The real motive power of the democratic ideal derives from the fundamental implications of Catholic Christianity. These issues are too wide to be entered into in a short review, but the universal struggle that they imply may be hinted at by suggesting that Calvinistic Protestantism conforms to the Hindu caste system by attributing unthinkable consequences to an accident of birth.

HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON

Anthony Adverse. By HERVEY ALLEN (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d., and Farrar & Rinehart, New York. \$ 3.)

Once upon a time—in the days of the silent film—there occasionally appeared a much-heralded "super" production which claimed to present an historical epoch with absolute fidelity. An army of experts certified that every detail relating to buildings, costumes, manners, and customs was accurate. Hollywood's latest triumph was upon us. We rushed to get seats.

Then we sat in plush darkness and watched this mammoth production.

We gazed at scene after scene, thought it was very well done—and no doubt quite accurate—and agreed that Hollywood deserved a pat on the back. But—we only watched. Never, for an instant, were we compelled to identify ourselves with it imaginatively. The experiences it presented remained outside us.

Anthony Adverse is rather like that.

It is a romance of Napoleonic times. There are over 1200 closely-printed pages. It concerns a young man whose father was not his mother's husband and who, in consequence, is handed

over to a convent. Eventually he is adopted by his own grandfather (a remarkable coincidence!) and, later, is sent on business to Havana. Thence he goes to Africa, Paris, London, America, Mexico. And there's no saying where else he would not have gone if he had not killed himself by trying to cut down a tree with a stone in it.

There is no justification for the inordinate length of the book. Catalogues and inventories make for length, but not breadth—or depth. Consequently the monotony of *tempo* becomes almost unbearable. It is impossible not to skip. How we long for a stark unforgettable phrase, instead of one mountainous paragraph after another! A phrase which, by isolating a significant detail, makes a scene or a character flash into life.

As a façade, the book is an achievement. It is weakest in its characterisation and dialogue. Certain characters could be removed without substantial loss, and whole pages could be scrapped with positive benefit. These are the book's defects. Also, a vulgarity which on occasions jars badly. "The fountain giggled." "... a twinkling

garter of mountains." And, referring to the builders of Burgos cathedral, "They had left the record of their ecstasy in a divine orgasm of stone."

In the front of his book Mr. Allen quotes these sentences from Sir Thomas Browne. "*There is something in us that can be without us, and will be after us, though indeed it hath no history of what it was before us, and cannot tell how it entered into us.*" Mr. Allen, therefore, has challenged himself. And he has given his critics the right to seek a relation between his book and the quotation which is its text.

Only half a dozen novels could survive this ordeal, and *Anthony Adverse* is not among them. Nevertheless, here and there, are paragraphs and sentences which possess spiritual kinship with the quotation from Sir Thomas Browne.

What Mr. Allen lacks is a deep feeling for period. He gives us a façade, somewhat in the Hollywood manner. But this book is outstanding in contemporary fiction, and it does suggest that its author will probably write a much better one. But, if so, it will have a modern background.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

The Message of Krishna. By A. S. WADIA, M. A. (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London. 3s. 6d.)

This volume vindicates Hinduism against the erroneous interpretations and false charge of foreigners like Katherine Mayo and of Christian missionaries, like Whitehead. The author discusses some of the cardinal tenets of Hinduism and shows that they are in conformity with the most advanced philosophic and scientific thought of the West. For instance, the much misunderstood and misrepresented doctrines of Karma and Reincarnation, in his opinion, not only are the foundational beliefs of Hinduism and Buddhism but they also exist in undeveloped form in Christianity, Islam and Judaism. He cites many prominent ancient and

modern thinkers as upholders of this doctrine.

Mr. Wadia predicts a future for Hinduism even greater than her glorious past, and believes with Lion Feuchtwanger and Sir S. Radhakrishnan that the future of mankind will be under the influence of Asiatic and particularly of Indian culture. Just as the ancient culture of Greece and Rome awakened Europe to new life in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries so the ancient culture of Asia, of which Indian culture is the soul, will awaken the whole world to a new life.

We heartily commend the author for his sympathetic appreciation and proper exposition of Hinduism, which is so uncommon among non-Hindus.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

The Message of Asia. By PAUL COHEN-PORTHEIM, trans. by ALAN HARRIS. (Duckworth, London. 8s. 6d.)

India intuitively discovered the truths that European science is now about to place on a rational basis. The things which in a great many (though by no means all) cases were expressed symbolically by the Indians and were therefore dismissed as nonsense and superstition or at the most as "poetic fancy"—i. e., as scientifically worthless—by a superficial rationalism, are now being proclaimed once more by the most progressive European savants in modern scientific terminology.

That the present materialistic civilization of the West has proved a failure and is on the way to an utter collapse is now generally admitted. Many of the writers who have diagnosed the causes of this failure have rightly come to the conclusion that the salvation of Western nations lies in the adoption of the philosophy of life taught by the ancient Eastern sages. Mr. Cohen-Porthheim belongs to this increasing group of writers, and thus his faith in Eastern philosophy does not arise from mere whim or fancy but is based on the latest scientific researches.

Our author points out that after a hard fight with ecclesiastical orthodoxy, science itself became intolerant, denying the existence of everything that reason could not explain:—

The supersensual, the metaphysical, the "miraculous" it has dismissed as an old wives' tale Philosophy had established the limited nature of our knowledge as far back as the eighteenth century, but what did natural science need to bother about that? It remained as infallible as any Pope

Science remained in this arrogant dogmatic position till about the 'eighties of the last century when, in our author's words, it "began to pay serious attention to psychic phenomena".

Spiritualism and occultism in its theosophical form—the foundation of the Theosophical Society by Madame Blavatsky falls within this period—directed general attention to transcendental problems once more, and Charcot and his school applied themselves to the study of hypnotism and magnetism.

Blow after blow was dealt to purely

materialistic science by the discoveries and researches of the scientists themselves. Of such discoveries a common feature, in Mr. Porthheim's opinion, is "the recognition of a hitherto unknown psychic region which is definitely not identical with consciousness and not intelligible to reason alone" (p. 157). Again, Reichenbach's researches into "od" and the theories of animal magnetism, the discoveries of Röntgen and the Curies, the investigation of hitherto unknown rays and of radium, and the hypothesis of the all-pervading ether are mentioned in the book as helping to prove the falseness of the purely materialistic science. But more important than all these discoveries and their effects on the materialistic science is the moral which the author draws from them:—

What strikes me particularly about all of them is the way in which they agree with or approximate to ancient Indian ideas. . . . The upshot of them is that only a small fraction of the vibrations of light, sound and ether are perceptible to man; that is to say, his senses are absolutely untrustworthy. "Utterly deceived by the senses he walks through the world" and "Waking, sleeping, walking, the wise man remembers that the senses abide in the things of sense" is how the *Bhagavad Gita* puts it.

Our author is convinced that science is moving in the direction of ancient Eastern thought and will reveal to the Western world "what was confined to the initiated in India". He pays high homage to the esoteric philosophy of the East. Unfortunately his knowledge of true Yoga is imperfect; otherwise he would not recommend for spiritual unfoldment such practices as the fixing of the eyes on a shining object, crystal gazing, or gazing at a metal mirror, ink or water, or resorting to the action of a monotonous sound on the ear or a stupefying scent on the nostrils (pp. 190-191).

Himself an artist, our author's comments on Art are subtle and illuminating. His conclusions are worth noting:

Dancing, simple music without orchestral elaborations, classical architecture, architect-

ural sculpture and a formal, linear sort of painting—such is going to be the art of the immediate future Our age is looking for something more than a European harmony : the next classical period will be based on the spiritual equilibrium of Europe and Asia. It will be—after a preliminary period the length of which it is impossible to estimate—the first great age of world art.

Immensely interesting are the author's comments on the sex-question which is looming so large in our day. It is a real pleasure to find a Western writer expressing views which will be endorsed by every true occultist and which in our day have been so courageously advocated by Mr. Gandhi. Says Mr. Cohen-Portheim :—

A relatively small amount of libido is suf-

ficient for physical propagation ; all the emotion that is left over when that purpose is served goes to the creation of spiritual and mental life, of true human progress.

It is doubtful whether any other Western writer has so cogently shown the necessity for "the diversion of the libido from sexual intercourse in order to make it available for higher purposes" (p. 167). The author's handling of this question is very sound.

On the whole this book is admirable, inculcates lofty teachings, and conveys a message of such inestimable value to the West, that in spite of certain defects, it is well worth reading and pondering over.

J. P. W.

Babylonian Nights' Entertainments : A Selection of Narratives from the Text of Certain Undiscovered Cuneiform Tablets. By JESSIE DOUGLAS KERRUISH. (Denis Archer, London. 7s. 6d.)

Nebuchadnezzar, that mighty king, could not sleep; and as insomnia can play havoc equally with a king as with a subject, something had to be done about it. In vain did the Physicians and the Astrologers hold council, the Seers and the Necromancers practise their arts; for still his woe afflicted that great Majesty. At last, the Chief Queen, "the wife of the King's blithe youth she was," conceived the plan that search should be made throughout all Babylon for "owners of stories able to bear away the hearer's thoughts from under the load of common life to the refreshing freedom of Other Lands, Other Times, and What Never Was". So, out of all countries from Egypt to India were story-tellers collected, and night after night did they vie with each other in weaving spells against the King's distress; and here in this book are some of them re-set by Miss Kerruish.

Twelve tales she has given us, and

much entertainment salted with a sly humour and served up with an Eastern leisureliness. Particularly to be recommended is "She Who was late for her Funeral," a story of the death and burial rites of Patesi Abargi, King of Ur; of those who went down with him to the Pit; and of why Ellatbau was not of them.

The stories in this collection may be trifles but they have in them spirit and life: they may be mere ghosts of "The Thousand and One Nights," yet somehow they have captured the atmosphere of the ancient East, as if a museum piece (rather a waggish one, if a museum piece can be waggish) were suddenly aroused from centuries of silence to talk to us. Evidently they were thought worthy of record, these pillows kneaded for a King's repose, these scatterings of poppy and mandragora; and Miss Kerruish is to be congratulated not only on her happy transcription of them, but also on the care obviously taken by her in making so judicious a selection from cuneiform tablets which have remained, and still remain—undiscovered by man.

A. R. UBSDELL

Science Hammers at the Church Door. By M. ELIZABETH MILLARD, M. A. (Rider & Co., London. 2s. 6d.)

This has now become a well-worn theme, and one wonders how many more writers are going to flog the dead horse of orthodox doctrinal Christianity. The merit of the book lies in the easy and lively manner in which the writer deals some hard blows to certain of the more glaring absurdities of the Christian position.

It is unfortunate that Miss Millard, while avoiding the Scylla of orthodox Christianity, should fall into the Charybdis of modern Spiritualism and Psychism; she expresses the view that the phenomena of séances have established survival after death. Sir James

Jeans has said: "Speaking as a scientist, I find the alleged proofs totally unconvincing; speaking as a human being, I find most of them ridiculous as well." This is the only conclusion to which an intelligent study of the subject should lead us. Fortunately the fact of soul-survival does not rest upon such slender evidence or lack of evidence as the séance room affords. If Miss Millard would wisely divert her attention to the study of *true* Spiritualism and Occultism as taught by ancient Eastern Sages and popularised in our day by Madame Blavatsky she would see why the phenomena of the séances should be shunned as morally and spiritually unclean, besides being insulting to human intelligence.

J. P. W.

Arya: The Call of the Future. By GRAHAM SETON HUTCHISON, D.S.O., M.C. (Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., London. 5s.)

The interest of this book on the problem of India's future lies neither in its political diagnosis, which is superficial, nor in the proposed solution, which, whatever its merits, sets at naught the premises on which it purports to rest. Its value lies rather in its sturdy defence of spiritual realities and the validity of the Aryan tradition. Col. Hutchison views India as historically the cultural centre of the world, and holds that not only have the various Indian philosophical systems a common origin in the Aryan ideology but even Christianity rests upon a Vedic foundation. He bravely states his conviction that

The Hindu philosophy is vested in the knowledge, not belief or speculation, that there have been men in the past who by direct experience of metaphysical truth have known the whole truth of man's nature and existence as well as that of the Universe as a whole. The men were the "perfected Seers," known as the Rishis, and from direct experiences the Rishis have taught metaphysical truth to the Hindus through the Vedas.

Col. Hutchison is right that no lasting solution of the Indian problem can rest solely on material considerations.

The ancient philosophies which under

Aryan rule dominated all material considerations are as valuable to-day in the governance of human organization and as expressing the happiness of mankind as they were in the epic age of the Aryan rulers.

Unfortunately his theory that the unrest in India is a revolt against an alien ideal and, specifically, against materialism, will not hold water. The Westernized young Indian is no whit less materialistic than his European contemporary. Let none read into Gandhi's political prestige the consecration of his followers to his spiritual ideals. If he withdrew from the scene to-morrow, all too quickly young India, in its present temper, would go the way of modern Japan.

In his carefully built-up premises, Col. Hutchison insists upon the divinity of man as the essence of the teaching of all the great Sages, "Thyself, the Inward Ruler, the Deathless". He enunciates the true aristocratic ideal of the guidance and leadership of men inspired by that faith. It is a far cry from that ideal to his proposed solution of the political problem of India—a monarchical federal system with rulers of new states appointed by the Paramount Power from among the "lesser Rulers and Leaders of Indian political thought".

PH. D.

The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. By SIR MOHAMMAD IQBAL. (Oxford University. 10s. 6d.)

In this book, Sir Mohammad Iqbal seeks to reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy with due regard to the philosophical traditions of Islam and the more recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge. He feels that the day is not far off when Religion and Science may discover hitherto unsuspected mutual harmonies.

The author deals first with the relation between knowledge and religious experience, pointing out that the Qur'ān attaches equal importance to all regions of thought as yielding knowledge of the ultimate Reality, which reveals its symbols both within and without. He maintains that religious experience is essentially a state of feeling with a cognitive aspect, the content of which cannot be communicated to others except in the form of a judgment, which may be tested intellectually and practically. The intellectual test leads to the conclusion that the ultimate Reality is a rationally directed, creative Life, an organising Principle of Unity. Religion seeks a close contact with this Reality, a living experience and intimacy, which is achieved by the attitude of mind called Prayer, resulting in a spiritual illumination, for "all search for knowledge is essentially a form of Prayer". While in thought the mind observes and follows the working of Reality, in the act of prayer it rises above thought to capture Reality itself, in order to become a conscious participant in its life.

The author then considers the freedom and immortality of the human soul, and shews that the Qur'ān emphasises the individuality and uniqueness of man, and makes it clear that he is the trustee of a free personality which he accepted at his peril; man therefore shares in the life and freedom of the Ultimate Ego. Destiny is not an unrelenting fact working from

without, but it is "the inward reach" of a thing, its realisable possibilities, which lie within the depths of its nature. This view of Destiny is one way in which the unitive experience expresses itself, that union which the mystics of Islam teach is not the finite effacing its own identity by absorption into the infinite, but rather the infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite.

Personal immortality, the author holds, is to be achieved by personal effort, and physical death leads to *Barzakh*, a state in which the soul catches a glimpse of fresh aspects of Reality and in which it is prepared to adapt itself to these aspects. Life is, then, one and continuous.

Dealing with the history of Muslim culture, the writer claims that in the realms both of pure intellect and of mysticism (Sūfism), the ideal revealed is the possession and enjoyment of the Infinite. This culture is based on the idea of the unity of human origin, --for all human life is spiritual in its origin ---and on the concept of life as a continuous movement in time, for Islām, as a cultural movement, rejects the old static view of the universe and reaches a dynamic view. Humanity needs three things to-day—a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis. Sir Mohammad Iqbal believes that it would be possible for Islām to reach a development that would meet these needs.

This is a closely reasoned book, full of arresting and suggestive lines of thought, and it will repay the most careful study on the part of all interested in the relation of the life of the spirit to the life of to-day. The book is well-produced and indexed, but includes a few misprints which need correction; "Mammonides" for "Maimonides" (p. 64), "Schopenhauere" for "Schopenhauer" (p. 77) and "Balvatsky" for "Blavatsky" (p. 8).

MARGARET SMITH

What Can We Believe? A Study of the New Protestantism. By JAMES GORDON GILKEY, M. A., D. D. (The Macmillan Company, New York.)

In the Foreword to his account of the New (Modernist) Protestantism, Dr. Gilkey distinguishes three main periods in the past history of Christianity: the primitive or apostolic period, which lasted about 150 years; the period of early Catholicism from the second to the beginning of the sixteenth century; and the period of early Protestantism from 1517 until the end of the nineteenth century. He might have added, however, that, in the third period, the later Catholicism of the Council of Trent and the Jesuits has played at least as large and characteristic a part as Protestantism. Christianity has now, Dr. Gilkey contends, entered on a fourth period in its evolution, namely, that of the New Protestantism; and the present group of liberal Protestant churches are the matrix within which this with its "new beliefs and new objectives" is taking shape.

The New Protestantism frankly rejects every form of authority as its basis. It is equally set against founding its beliefs on intuition; but seeks to build itself upon "logical inductions drawn from facts provided by reason and experience". Having defined his method of discovering religious truth, Dr. Gilkey proceeds to apply it, and very quickly proves to his own satisfaction the verity of theism with a number of corollaries thereof. He appears to think that his method is a new one; but as a matter of fact it is as old as human thought. In Christendom, for example, the Roman Catholic Church has long held it as a dogma that the existence of God and the truths of "natural religion" can be demonstrated by reason alone without the aid of revelation. By the same method non-Christian religions and philosophies reach quite different con-

clusions. A Buddhist would aver that "logical inductions drawn from the facts of reason and experience" went to show that there is no God in the theist sense; and a Materialist would on the same grounds deny the existence of God in any sense. The trouble is that the method is valid only if *all* the pertinent facts are taken into account; but nearly all men are apt to select as material for their logical inductions only such facts as appear to be consonant with their predilections; and it is a common-place that one can prove or disprove anything from selected facts.

The New Protestants were Christians before they began to select their facts and make their inductions. Their beliefs, at least in outline, were firmly established in advance of their search. In other words, they went looking, not for truth, but for satisfactory reasons for believing what they already regarded as truth. In doing this, they were in no way remarkable, for most men, who are enlightened enough to reject authority, do the same thing; and an entirely open-minded man is much rarer than the proverbial black swan.

To the crucial question: "What is man?", the New Protestantism gives us the old orthodox Christian reply. "Human personalities," writes Dr. Gilkey, "are independent entities, created by God and enjoying a literally endless existence"—a statement which would scarcely pass the test of his own canon of judgment.

But, though its theorising may be open to criticism, the practical aims of the New Protestantism, as outlined in Dr. Gilkey's final chapter, will have the sympathy of all liberal thinkers; for their stress is on the application to life of the ethical teaching of Jesus; and the ethics of Jesus are the ethics of all the great spiritual leaders of the race.

The Kalyana-Kalpataru (Gorakhpur)

We have received the first issue of a new journal, *The Kalyana-Kalpataru*, which is described on the cover as "A monthly for the propagation of spiritual ideas and love of God". The object with which the journal is started must commend itself to all right-thinking men, provided the organisers take scrupulous care to see that no crude, wrong or superstitious notions about God find expression therein—such notions as a great Spiritual Teacher of India once condemned thus:—

It is belief in God and Gods that makes two-thirds of humanity the slaves of a handful of those who deceive them under the false pretence of saving them. Is not man ever ready to commit any kind of evil if told that his God or Gods demand the crime?; voluntary victim of an illusionary God, the abject slave of his crafty ministers.

Happily the first number of *The Kalyana-Kalpataru* shows that wrong notions about such "an illusionary God" will have no place in its pages, and we trust subsequent issues will maintain this attitude.

This issue contains over sixty articles and necessarily they are of unequal merit. The distinguished Indian philosopher, Sir S. Radhakrishnan, writes on "The Hindu Idea of God" (reproduced from *The Heart of Hindustan*). He rightly points out that the great Indian Rishis of ancient times were "the pioneer spirits, the first researchers in the realm of spirit," and that

The truths announced by the Rishis are evolved not as the result of logical reasoning or systematic philosophy, but are the products of spiritual intuition, *drishti*, vision. The Rishis are not so much the authors of the truths registered in the Vedas as the seers who were able to discern the eternal truths by raising their life-spirit to the plane of the universal spirit.

These great Rishis taught the true principles of Yoga whereby each individual can in this or some subsequent life on this earth attain the same high

spiritual level. In such a philosophy the absurd idea of a personal God as taught by orthodox Christian priests can have no place, and Sir S. Radhakrishnan in the course of his remarks on the words "personal God" as used in Hindu philosophy rightly reminds his readers that "Personality is a symbol, and, if we ignore its symbolic character, it shuts us out from the truth." Perhaps the whole teaching is stated more explicitly by H. P. Blavatsky:—

A man can have no god that is not bounded by his own human conceptions. The wider the sweep of his spiritual vision, the mightier will be his deity. But where can we find a better demonstration of Him than in man himself, in the spiritual and divine powers lying dormant in every human being? (*Isis Unveiled*, Vol. II, p. 567).

Pandit Bhawani Shankerji's contribution "Unity of Godhead" is a very learned disquisition in which he points out that the Hindu scriptures postulate only one Absolute Brahma or Mahesvara (Logos) called एकमेवाद्वितीयम् (one without a second), and that the Trinity—Brahma, Vishnu, Siva—are but different aspects of the one Brahman, are never separate from, or independent of, It. His exposition of the Hindu Trinity is most thought-provoking, and well worth an attentive study.

The article on "The God of Theosophy," concisely expounds the teachings of Madame Blavatsky, and points out that the Path of Realization, "to be consciously and cautiously walked," as described in *The Voice of the Silence* is in entire conformity with the teachings of the *Gita*.

Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, one of the greatest figures in modern India and a most devout Hindu, has an interesting article, "God and Sanatana Dharma," in which he expounds the high and lofty ideals which should govern the life of the true Hindu.

There are clear indications that many people will find *The Kalyana-Kalpataru* very helpful in their studies.

J. P. W.

A LETTER FROM LONDON

The general tendency of biological theory at the present day is in the direction indicated by Shaw in his Preface to "Back to Methuselah". There is, indeed, reasonably good evidence to support the argument that physical evolution did not proceed uniformly by slow and regular degrees, but that as a result of various causes of which we have no certain knowledge, there were periods during which evolution advanced very quickly and the emergence of a new species was accomplished within what must be counted from a geological point of view as very brief periods of time. Shaw further suggests, as an explanation of this contention, that the sudden quickening of the evolutionary process was due to an urgency that came from within, and manifested in the conscious desire felt by members of the species itself for change and development.

I have opened with this illustration because it may be used as some kind of touchstone to test social and religious conditions in Europe at the present day. Let us begin, however, by a brief consideration of historical precedents. In the past there have been the same comparatively rapid emergences among nations that have produced their own civilizations and with them their appropriate philosophies and religions. China, India, Egypt, Greece, to come down no further than the Christian era, each advanced very rapidly in the earlier stages of its develop-

ment. Some great inspiration came to the race, and within a century or two it began to evolve a high degree of intelligence and learning. And in each case, although with dissimilar effects, some climax was reached and thereafter the influence of the new civilization suffered a decline. Sometimes there was a barbarian influx that in destroying the dominant nation's temporal power, checked, also, its intellectual and spiritual growth. But in those instances, such as China, in which the civilization as such survived invasion, no advance was made beyond what might be described as the critical point. We see, in every case, that the great mass of the people were incapable of being raised to the level of its teachers.

Now there are indications that at the present time European civilization as a whole is nearing one of these critical points, and in this letter I propose to examine some of the symptoms that appear to me most representative of the prevailing condition. I will begin by taking the instance of my own country, confining myself in this connection to the witness of its religious movements.

Two such movements are most in evidence. One of them tends in the direction of breaking away from the old religious concepts; the other maintains its established premises but is seeking a restatement. The first finds expression

in a denial of general orthodoxy. There are innumerable societies and alliances, in which I might include the Unitarians, that have broken away from their allegiance to the rule of the Churches, Anglican, Roman Catholic or Non-conformist. For the most part such societies accept the figure of Jesus as an inspired Teacher and the perfect exemplar, but shoulder the burden of individual responsibility by denying the principle of vicarious sacrifice. For these, faith cannot be depended upon as a soul-saving resource at the eleventh hour.

The second movement can be typified by the remarkable activities of the "Oxford Group," generally known as Buchmanism. The principles of this group are not mainly fundamentalist, which is to say that they were not primarily reactionary. Their ideal is to bring religion, by which is intended the body of Christian teaching, into everyday life and to practise it openly. The most noticeable of their methods as a means to this object, is by the "sharing" of religious experience. The members seek as far as possible to "pool" their beliefs, emotions, and aspirations, thereby reinforcing their ideals and creating, within limits, a group consciousness. The tendency, so far as it can be foreseen, will be in the direction of mass suggestion, to which subject I shall return when I come to consider certain European symptoms.

Another aspect of the broad religious movement may be found in the increasing latitudinarianism of

the Established Church, even among its very highest dignitaries. This represents a marked inclination away from fundamentalism, but not in the direction of the dogma and ritual of the Anglo-Catholics. The principle of vicarious sacrifice remains, and belief in the Trinity, though it may be more loosely interpreted, but the Bible, as a whole, is regarded as a historical document and not as being literally inspired to the minutest details by the word of God. The general effect and object seems to be a reconciliation of Christianity with the teachings of modern science; and the movement is being slowly forced upon the Church by the attitude of the more thoughtful representatives of the young generation.

In Germany the situation is more critical. Dr. Karl Barth, the champion of the German Reformed Church, is in some particulars more nearly fundamentalist in his principles than Buchman, more academic and less imaginative. The vital issue, however, the independence of the Protestant Church in its relation to the State, is splitting the Church into two parties not upon doctrinal but upon political grounds. In this, Dr. Barth stands for religious independence. He demands that ministers of religion must put their "whole trust in the authority of God's Word," and says that while "it is no disgrace to be a Church politician under no circumstances should we, as theologians, forsake our theological existence and exchange our rights as 'first-

born' for 'a mess of pottage'."* In other words he deprecates the regimentation of the Church for political aims.

This issue will inevitably have to be fought out in the near future, but already Adolf Hitler, following a Bolshevik precedent, is getting to work on the nation's youth. Such Evangelistic youth associations as "The Christian Pathfinders," "Girls' and Boys' Friendly Societies," "Bible Unions" and so on, are now prohibited from holding conventions and holiday camps. All of them are to be incorporated in the Hitler Jugend, and must obey the orders of their "group leaders". Finally, any boy or girl refusing to join the Jugend, will run the risk of being suspected as an enemy of the National ideals held by the Nazi Government.

This is the German form of that mass-suggestion which I indicated as being the informing principle of the Oxford Group in England. In Italy the same principle has not involved any antagonism to the Church. In Russia, it has ousted, or is ousting, the Church altogether. Should France go the same way, it seems probable that she will follow Russia's political rather than her religious ideals.

And that France will go the same way becomes every month more probable. I received a letter only two days ago from a personal friend, a professor in Toulouse University, and the author of

several books,† in which he writes :

Il se passe en ce moment en France de très curieux événements. Il y a un complet divorce d'opinion et de mentalité entre Paris et la Province. J'ai l'impression que nous nous acheminons insensiblement vers la fin du régime capitaliste et que les puissances d'argent font un effort désespéré pour empêcher la socialisation du pays ; d'où les dernières émeutes à tendances fascistes, auxquelles ont répondu avec beaucoup de dignité les manifestations ouvrières.

Nevertheless, should some kind of revolution come about in France (all that is needed is a leader of sufficient force and personality), it is probable that no religious element will be involved. France is still mainly a Roman Catholic country, and in the south more particularly religion has a strong hold on the people. Moreover, as witness the instance of Italy, the Roman Catholic religion is one that lends itself to political leadership, since it is so easily divorcible from political practice. No other form of Christianity at the present day is so completely self-sufficient, so logically consistent, and, as a consequence, so incapable of growth.

Now what inferences, we may well ask, are to be drawn from the tendencies indicated by these examples? We see a general inclination on the part of the people to submit willingly to regimentation, to submit the individual will and power of choice to some leader who represents for them some common emotion or ideal. Fascism and Socialism are but two different

* *Theological Existence To-day* by Karl Barth. (Hodder & Stoughton)

† More particularly in this connection *L'Angleterre Nation Continentale* (Editions Tallandier), a study of recent social and political movements in England.

methods of encompassing the same object. Politically they are regarded as representing two extremes. Psychologically they present precisely the same phenomenon,—a direction of group-consciousness by mass-suggestion. And the precedents of history all go to prove that this condition either leads to decay or precedes a great change. When a nation such as the Inca civilization of Peru is left undisturbed to enjoy a system approximating to the ideals of state-socialism, it declines in vigour and originality. But this is not possible in a continent made up of such units as Germany, France, Italy, Russia and Great Britain, because these units have no common purpose. Nor is it conceivable that any one of these units, nor any majority combination of them, could impose their leadership upon the remainder.

It has been suggested that there are two forces which might become dominant in the future. These are Russia and Japan, mutually antagonistic, but both of them representing the vital urgency of a young people comparatively new to civilization. Both are, also, fundamentally irreligious. But it is obvious that no threat of the dominance of Europe by either Russia or Japan is imminent at the present time. And Russia, at least, must pass through a difficult stage of growth before she will be

capable of any form of leadership. At the present moment, her rulers are making the fatal mistake of deceiving Russian youth,—in order to elevate the ideals of Bolshevism,—by giving them false information with regard to the social and cultural conditions obtaining in Western Europe and America.* And since these fictions cannot be maintained indefinitely, some powerful reaction must inevitably follow the release of those bonds that at present are isolating the U.S.S.R. from the rest of Europe.

We have then come to a point at which we are confronted by a deadlock of antagonistic aims and ideals that holds no possibility of the emergence of any single directive purpose. And I believe that sooner or later this condition of unstable equilibrium must inevitably end in catastrophe. In the past it was possible to maintain some kind of varying balance by the instrument of segregation. Nations were divided one from another, and were able, within limits, to preserve their own identities. But modern applied science is steadily breaking down those artificial barriers; and already a movement towards a process of unification is beginning. It cannot, however, produce any valuable results unless it is informed by a true spiritual force, strong enough to overcome all the antagonisms of the peoples concerned.

J. D. BERESFORD

* See *Modern Russia* by Cicely Hamilton (Dent), a recently published work that gives a very interesting and unprejudiced account of Bolshevik conditions and methods in 1933.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE INDUS VALLEY CIVILIZATION

I must admit that Professor S. V. Venkateswara's theories leave me quite unconvinced. Even if we concede the autochthonous origin of the Vedic Aryans, my hypothesis stands. The discoveries of Sir Aurel Stein, Langdon and Frankfort show clearly the intimate connection of the Indus Valley culture with the great civilization of the Tigris-Euphrates delta. That the people of Mohenjo Daro were Semites is shown by the steatite portrait-statuettes of a priest, with his thick lips, high cheek-bones, full, fleshy nose and almond-shaped eyes. Anything more un-Aryan I cannot imagine. The Indus Valley seals contain neither the Cow or the Horse, both of which must have appeared, especially the Cow, if they were Aryans. The fall of Mohenjo Daro by the edge of the sword is clearly and unmistakably proved by the skeletons. The Vedas speak of the Dasyus, the enemies of their race, as "noseless" (*anāsāh*), and "phallus-worshippers" (*Śisnadevatāh*). The snub-noses of the statuettes may not be absolutely convincing, but what about the enormous stone phalli, found in such numbers? The syllogism is simple: the Indus valley people were phallus-worshippers. Phallus-worship is un-Aryan, and condemned in the Vedas as barbarous. Therefore, the Indus Valley people were not Aryans. Lastly, will Professor Venkateswara enlighten us on these three conundrums? (i) If Mohenjo Daro was not overthrown by the invading Aryans, by whom was it overthrown? (ii) If the walled cities (*purāḥ*) of the Dasyus, mentioned in the Vedas as having been overthrown, are not Mohenjo Daro and Harappa, where are they? Surely, if they existed, archæologists would have traced them. (iii) Who were the Dasyus?

I believe that if Pargiter were alive still, he would have found, in the Indus Valley people, the clue for which he was looking. But this is another story, and too long a one to inflict upon you at this juncture.

London

H. G. RAWLINSON

TWO FRENCH VOLUMES*

According to some, the present crisis is a crisis of the Machine; for it has changed man from a merely eating and drinking and procreating animal into a more capable, more ambitious, more individual person. But when capacity becomes trickery, ambition becomes greed, and the individual instead of looking to the equitable satisfaction of his various needs, loses himself in the very means to that satisfaction; life is starved, and the being revolts and asserts itself in cynicism and perversion. Excitement becomes his need, and fatigue his repose. You have only to ask the ordinary man in the street from what he is suffering. From want of money, of course—of money that could allow him to have his cinemas, his rides, his wireless, his drinks or his dances. In fact, he suffers from being alone—being left to himself, to have nothing to escape to. If life has no hope, his escape is suicide. If not, there is the street, and that immense, sinuous solitude across the phantasmic chatter of man. Is there anything more dreadful than to be alone—among men?

"There are," says Duhamel in his last book, *L'Humaniste et L'Automate*, "two aspects of solitude. According to Socrates, solitude is the best of riches and the worst of misfortunes. Food of the healthy souls, solitude is the poison of the suffering ones. I have, during the two last years of the War, realised that the supreme peril of Mechanism is to kill sympathy,

* *L'Humaniste et L'Automate*—By Georges Duhamel.
Pour une Société des Esprits—By Paul Valéry.

and raise around human beings a wall of solitude."

That is significant of Duhamel. Nobody has fought against the onslaught of the machine, as he has done—so fervently and so humanly. Sensitive and generous, M. Duhamel cannot bear the idea that one day the machine will turn us into such indifferent automata, as to make us lose the very virtue of our being—human sympathy. He takes the example of medicine—for he has been a doctor, and he knows where it has led to. There is a patient; he has to be consecutively examined by the Radiologist, the Cystologist, the Chemist, the Occulist, the Oto-rhinolaryngologist, the Neurologist; and the Doctor, sitting in his consulting-room, looks at the results of the examinations before him, and dictates to the stenographer his diagnosis, without so much as looking at the patient. If it should be an operation, a number of very capable surgeons get together, and apply their learned minds in handling very delicate and infinitely varied instruments. That is very good, he says. It may be more precise, more perfect, more scientific, but medicine has lost that magic touch of the family doctor, that sympathy, comprehension and attentive, loving care. Of what use is all your knowledge if you have lost the very capacity to be human!

And the human is the eternal. We are living in a world, he says, where the sense of eternity is "in decadence". We have lost the capacity to feel beauty itself—beauty that reminds us of all that is great and unchangeable. Look at the lovely Dutch tulip, he asks us. It may be dead to-morrow. But it is beautiful. And once we have looked at it, we carry in us, something deep and permanent. "If we do not hope any more for the eternity of our soul," he adds, "we cannot at least renounce the feeling of the eternity of our work."

M. Duhamel, like most of his race, has not a metaphysical mind, and in his essay he very easily mixes up the eternal and the human—much to the

dismay of an Oriental. But one cannot help feeling that he is struggling to express how we are losing the intimate and continuing contact of our being with what is the most profound, and *eternal* in us. The danger of the machine is to kill this—or blind this—and make us react rather than respond, sense rather than feel, see rather than comprehend; in fine, make us intellectual machines.

This is the other danger of Europe—if not the sole danger. For let us not forget, the machine is the work of the intellect, and consciously or unconsciously shaped after it. And once the machine began to occupy a more familiar, indispensable place in our lives, our consciousness itself underwent a change, and our intellects became as gigantic, precise, insensitive and supreme. It created a new centre in us, dominating the other centres, of instinct and spontaneous response. All action had to be referred by the instinct and intuition to the intellect, which it sorted, weighed, calculated and judged, with an accuracy never before seen in man, and at the same time with results, never so incomplete, so chaotic, so grotesque. And yet drunk with its power, it became more imperious, more tyrannical, cold in its cruelty, and sadic in its satisfactions. But the body would not bear it,—revolted and became a bundle of nerves. Never before has man been less himself—and yet never so conscious of his existence. Standing on his own ruins, he knows not what deity to invoke.

M. Paul Valéry has chosen his deity—it is "L'Esprit". But in spite of his elegant and classical diction, and in spite of the legendary perfection of his intellectual machinery, he does not seem the less confusing. He often uses the word intelligence for "Spirit," and "Spirit" for brain. Nevertheless, this is how he defines it:—

"I mean by 'Spirit,' a *certain power of transformation* which intervenes, (more or less successfully) to solve, or to try to solve, all the problems which arise before man, and which his organ-

ic automatism does not or cannot deliver him from. . . . It is therefore natural," he continues, "in the presence of a generalised disorder, of insufficiency of known expedients, of the newness of the situation, which has nothing to compare with it in history, to seek that power of the spirit, more energetically, more rigorously and to postulate this: that if we had more 'spirit' and if we gave the 'spirit' more place and veritable power in the things of the world, this world would have more chances to recover, and more promptly. I am certain that the defect of intelligence and the restriction of its authority, are the most real and the most fearful vices of our condition. George Meredith, in a well-known poem, asked that a woman should have a little more of brain. 'More brain, O Lord,' he said... Let us pray, Europeans will obtain that. They have plunged into a prodigious adventure, which consists in modifying the initial, natural, conditions of life, no longer (as they did a few centuries ago) to satisfy certain definite needs and the limited necessities of the same life—but as though inspired to create a form of existence, completely artificial, a type of being whose means of understanding and action always increased, leading them deliberately, and systematically, to make all that they know and all they think, act on what they are

"One cannot escape the impression of a *factitious fatality*, which leads humanity in the path of conflicts without issue; and without any other result than the destruction of all kinds that they lead to It will then appear, by the way, that this letting loose of men implies a total and desperate renunciation of the 'spirit' I come back thus to the beginning, which was an invocation to the intelligence of man—and I repeat: 'More brain, O Lord'"

"One would feel like answering back, 'More heart, O Lord, more heart' For, apart from the machine, if the present disorder has one real cause it

is that man has had but too much of the brain—and little of that humanising and integrating co-operation of the heart. It is only this which can temper, soften and sublimate, and as it were lead back the brain-chips into the primal centre from which everything flows out as wisdom.

Soissons, France.

RAJA RAO

INDIAN MISREPRESENTATIONS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

May I say a word regarding the articles, "The Truth about the Gita," and "The Philosophy of the Upanishads" appearing in the February and March issues of THE ARYAN PATH? Dr. Sarma in his first article in January said that he would show later that the traditional Indian Orientation was absent from the works of Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Dr. Dasgupta on Indian Philosophy. In the two succeeding articles, however, what he has done is to give his own interpretation of the *Gita* and the Upanishads in the light of Absolute Monism and Pluralism.

To show that such orientation is lacking in an author's work, one has to show, by *taking the fundamental concepts* of the philosophy treated of, (1) that none of the three or four traditional interpretations (based on the different systems) are present in it; or (2) that though such interpretations are given, they are not properly appreciated in a spirit of sympathetic understanding, but are cantankerously criticised or cavilled at; or, finally, (3) that, apart from literal adherence to the traditions, not even the *spirit* of Indian thought is to be found in them. Now Dr. Sarma is not able to show in his articles that Dr. Radhakrishnan is guilty of any one of these charges. All that Dr. Sarma has done (in the article on the *Gita*, for example) is to quote a few stray sentences and phrases here and there, taken out of their context, and exhibit them as inconsistencies, or (to a dualist) unpalatable statements, or as criticisms passed by the author against Sankara and others. If there

be inconsistencies, such are almost bound to occur in an extensive work like that of Dr. Radhakrishnan. Is it not, however, gross injustice to the author of *Indian Philosophy* to argue, as Dr. Sarma does, that because there are two or three inconsistent statements in that work, therefore the traditional orientation is entirely absent from it? Are we then to understand that a blind and unthinking exposition of an ancient author, shutting one's eyes to any defect or *lacunae* in him, is the mark of the presence of true Indian orientation?

In the article on "The Philosophy of the Upanishads" Dr. Sarma still pursues the same logic. Here his sense of Indian orientation first tells him—up to now unknown to us—that the Upanishads, *by themselves*, propound "a set theory of philosophy" or "a dogmatic scheme of theology": if this be so why should so many schools, differing from one another and yet all equally "hallowed by tradition," have sprung out of them? In the same para, however, (THE ARYAN PATH, March, p. 73), it is strongly suggested that the Upanishadic seers were distinctly aware of the contradiction between Advaita and Vishishtadvaita. Were Samkara, Ramanuja and Madhwa then devoid of Indian orientation because they have all taken sides and equated the *Gita* and Upanishad teaching *either* with monism *or* with pluralism etc., ignoring the other possibilities? Dr. Dasgupta has been weighed in the balances (in about twenty lines) by Dr. Sarma and found wanting in Indian orientation because like Samkara and a host of illustrious names after him, he has declared the sum and substance of Upanishadic teaching to consist in the identification of *Atman* with *Brahman*.

The general impression that I have gathered is that "Indian orientation" is equivalent to an unhistorical, uncritical reproduction of everything that has been said in ancient works, without having any definite standpoint of one's own and, above all, without making any statements unpalatable to Dualists and

Pluralists.

Dr. Radhakrishnan and Dr. Dasgupta have told the western world of the existence not only of two forms of traditional interpretation of Indian thought, Monistic and Pluralistic, but of many others. This, however, need not preclude such philosophic expounders of the Upanishads from adopting either a critical historical attitude towards them or a definite interpretation.

Every Indian agrees, of course, that no true expounder of Indian philosophy should allow himself to be unduly influenced by western standards of judgment. But the point here is that no genuine attempt has been made by Dr. Sarma in his articles to show how the two historians of Indian philosophy of whom he writes have been so influenced.

Mysore

K. R. SRINIVASINGAR

AN ANSWER TO DR. SCHRADER

"When a word, phrase, or symbol, having been once used for the purpose of suggesting an idea new to the mind or minds being operated on, is insisted upon irrespective of the said idea, it becomes a dead letter dogma and LOSES ITS VITALISING POWER, and serves rather AS AN OBSTRUCTION TO, than as a vehicle of the spirit." (Capitals mine)

I daily remember this teaching of H. P. Blavatsky when I see the most beautiful words, the most moving sentences, the most solemn promises, used as a screen to hide evil designs, to cover corruption, to mask hypocrisy. I naturally thought of this teaching when I read, in your January number, the letter of Dr. F. Otto Schrader on the Swastika.

Every student of Wisdom knows that in this dark age there are no pure races, that "castes have been mingled" in Germany as elsewhere, but caste exists always and forever in each man. It is individually that we must judge men in order to decide to which caste he belongs. But wisdom exhorts us not to judge unless it is for the purpose of helping. It follows,

then, that the duty of a nation is to try to *raise* the level of its members and not to sacrifice a part of them, no matter on what pretext. It may be useful to add that one cannot claim to be an Aryan or of the noble caste, if one is not tolerant and is not working for Universal Brotherhood. This holds true for individuals as well as for nations.

Does Dr. Schrader know the words of a German whom the whole world honours, Goethe ?

I do not hate the Jews. The aversion which I might have had for them in my youth was rather apprehension. Later, when I met among them many men of noble mind and refined feelings, my respect became mingled with admiration.

And how about the words of Chancellor Bismarck, a man of quite a different calibre to Hitler :—

The Jews have many things which we lack : spontaneous feelings and actions which, without them, would not be so much a part of us. The Jews bring to the mixture of various Germanic peoples a certain "froth" that we must not underestimate.

Has Dr. Schrader tried to think impartially of the number of Jews who have helped to make Germany famous before the rest of the world ?

The Hitlerites do not only hold a grudge against the Jews, but they persecute all those who dare to think differently without distinction of race or faith. How many true Germans, Catholics or Protestants, have had to flee from their country or now fill the concentration camps ? Men of different colour are also banned by the Nazis. It is for all these victims, to whatsoever

religion they belong, be they white, yellow or black, that we cry out and protest.

Economic nationalism has led the world into an awful crisis, admirably described centuries ago in the eighteenth chapter of the Revelation of St. John :—

The merchants of the earth shall weep and mourn . . . for no man buyeth their merchandise any more.

If spiritual democracy is rejected everywhere and if Nazism spreads like a spot of oil throughout the world, the rest of the prophecy will also come true, and the awful wars which will follow will rapidly destroy the modern Babylon and its so-called civilisation.

I am far from being an admirer of the Treaty of Versailles, nor did I have the slightest sympathy for the first treaty of that name which ended the War of 1870. I see that most of the governments called democratic are corrupt. I admit that some of the social reforms vaunted by the Fascists seem just and desirable. But what I consider disastrous is the reign of terror inaugurated by Hitler, the suppression of free thought, the smothering of souls, the hatred of race which he is striving to build up.

All this is vile. But that on top of it all, impudence should go as far as using the Swastika, the designation "Aryan," and the *Gita* to justify a policy diametrically opposed to every injunction of the Great Master—that is the last straw.

Paris.

SAM AÉLION

ENDS AND SAYINGS

- ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Dickinson in his article on "What is Amiss with the League?" in the March *Contemporary Review* says :—

Men still talk of the brotherhood of man and the federation of the world; but we are in reality further away from that ideal than we were twenty years ago. We have assumed too rashly that when once a League of Nations was set up human nature would change of its own accord. It has not done so yet, and those who labour for a League that is truly international have still a long and heavy task before them.

Contemporary events and particularly the sordid history of the Disarmament Conferences go to show that there is considerable truth in this statement. The Great War and its bitter legacy united some of the Western nations temporarily and inspired them with lofty ideals, but, in a short while, all their new-born enthusiasm evaporated before the onrush of their old cravings for material gains and self-aggrandisement. How is this innate selfishness to be eradicated? This is another way of asking how is human nature to be changed?

There are signs that an increasing number of men and women look to the Eastern Wisdom for a satisfactory solution of the present-day problems and we venture to predict that in this direction alone will be found the safe way out of the existing chaos. The

Eastern Wisdom teaches that One Spirit animates the whole universe and all mankind. A recognition of this truth and of the Law of Karma leads to active conviction of Universal Brotherhood. When these great teachings are assimilated by individual men and women, a mighty social revolution will have been wrought, and the purpose for which the League of Nations has been established will be automatically achieved. Remedies not based on sound ethics and philosophy can only prove ineffective.

That interest in religion is fast reviving in England is the view expressed by Mr. R. Francis Foster in the New Year number (1934) of *To-day and To-morrow*. His reason is :—

Science nowadays has swung right round in its views and repudiates the idea of a materialistic universe... This generation may not be able to grasp with full intelligence what science is telling it, but it is filled with the spirit that has emancipated it completely from the despair of materialism.

Mr. Foster deals with some of the latest developments in science and emphasises what is now commonly admitted, that the discoveries of science itself have dealt a death-blow to the materialism of the nineteenth century. All this is perfectly true, but can it be logically

inferred then that religion is reviving?

That even thoughtful writers fail to grasp the significance of the present religious crisis in England and other Western countries is shown by Mr. Osbert Burdett, in an article in *The English Review*. This writer seems to think that since it was the materialistic science of the last century that dealt a blow to orthodox Christianity, now the turn has come for Christianity to reassert itself. After hurling anathemas against materialism Mr. Burdett goes on to say :—

Whenever a policy, a book, a scientific argument, a picture, a building, a piece of sculpture, a bill, a verdict, an article in a newspaper, or a sermon confesses, or implies, the fatal philosophy, its animating spirit should be exposed. The target is gigantic. It is, therefore, less for the Church than for its separate members to pot at it. The tactics of sharp-shooting, a horde of separate snipers are required. The hour has passed for Christianity to remain on the fence, or the defensive. Persecution might help. It must start a counter-attack, for only by taking up the challenge, from which it has shrunk too long and too timidly will it renew its inspiration, its belief in itself.

Mr. Burdett's fancy has outrun the limits of common sense; not only are the churches not in a position to "pot," but themselves offer a fine wide target for others to shoot at. Because a death-blow has been dealt to scientific materialism it certainly does not follow that moribund organized religion will revive. Will up-to-date science support the claims and doctrines

of the Church? Of course not. Can any philosophically trained mind which examines those claims and doctrines give them support? Of course not. If the Church wants to live it must die in its present form—give up its claim to be the only spokesman of Deity, revise its teachings about God, the Mother of God, the unique work of Jesus and such other tenets. It must take its place as one of the numerous creeds, some of which excel it in philosophy and are equal, if not superior, to it in ethics. No, the day of organized religions, not only Christianity, but all organized creeds, is done. Now men need a rational Religion which satisfies at once the keen mind and the aspiring heart of man.

But the difficulty in the way of a true Religion at once rational and inspiring does not lie entirely either in the materialism of science or in the dogmatism of an orthodox faith. Neither of these would be strong enough to stop the emergence of this new Religion. Its chief opponent in the twentieth century is a false religion which has already arisen and overpowered the mass-mind to a considerable degree. It is political nationalism.

Very aptly Mr. Aldous Huxley writes about it thus in *Time and Tide* (3rd March 1934) :—

Most people desire certainties, feel the need of a faith. Modern education makes religious faith difficult, but has done nothing to undermine political faith. Masses of men and women think themselves too intelligent and well-informed to believe in miracles or the divinity of Jesus; but find not the

smallest difficulty in accepting the infallibility of a Leader. The worship of God is an intellectual impossibility for thousands to whom the worship of a divine being, called the Nation, seems the most natural thing in the world. The old tendencies have not been abolished (they never are); they have merely taken new and, on the whole, less desirable channels. Fascism digs these new channels for worship and provides, in its cult of the divine Nation, a kind of lightning-conductor, upon which thousands of reluctant infidels can discharge the accumulations of their will to believe.

Blind belief is hydra-headed. Destroyed in one shape it assumes another. As Disraeli said on a famous occasion "man is a being born to believe; he "will find altars and idols in his own heart, in his own imagination". As he predicted, even the scientific modus has proven unsuccessful, for to-day people who refuse to believe—and rightly—in miracles in the physical world are illogical enough to accept miracles *i. e.*, lawlessness in reference to the moral order of the universe. The remedy lies in philosophy—not in the cold speculations of logicians and verbose abstractions of metaphysicians, but in the ethical philosophy now corrupted and degraded into the many religious creeds. Real philosophy like that expounded in the *Gita* or the Gnostic Lore, by the Buddha or Shankara, has both its metaphysics which purify and satisfy the mind and its ethics which elevate and inspire the

heart. This is being recognized more and more.

In the latest issue of *The Personalist*, published by the School of Philosophy of the University of Southern California, the Editorial is entitled "Can We Rethink Our World?"—and is a reasoned piece of work admirably done. It says:—

The danger will arise out of the effort still to live by ideals that in the common range of thinking have passed away, but whose passing we will not admit. Their justification no longer has a hold upon the common mind.

Now we are entering a new order, which bears in it the greatest possibilities of human success or of human disaster.

There is nothing so important as that the world should once more set itself to thinking, and there is little time. We must think quickly and more broadly than has been our wont. Our thinking must include the whole world, for if any element of the world order is left out it will be fatal to all the rest.

This living world can be achieved only as an organism looking toward ends, and it demands that every individual must accept the role of looking toward the common interests of society. None of us can claim exemption from the common duty, as each may claim profit, safety, and care from the common sacrifice. The problem of this hour is whether the leaders of men and the masses of our population can think of themselves and of society organically. Can we re-think our world?



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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INTEGRATING ACTION

Karma may be considered as the union of Spirit, Mind and Matter *in action*. Being filled with earthly ideas, full of erroneous conceptions derived from modern science, religion and philosophy, we do not realize the power that lies within ourselves; so we think of Karma as an external thing. Karma is a synthetic word which means the progress of a being. There is no action without an intelligence; no intelligence without a consciousness; no consciousness except as a centre of energy in the One Life.

"As a man thinketh, he acts." If we think we are derived from forms, then our sense of Self is contingent upon a given form, and when the form is dissolved, where is our sense of Self? It dissolves with the form. If our sense of Self is contingent upon this or some other idea of mind, then upon the dissolution of that mind our sense of Self is dissolved; we survive but

we have no sense of Self. But if our sense of Self is identified with the One Life, the One Spirit, the One Consciousness, which is the eternal, infinite, boundless, immutable container, pervader of all, then how can that sense of Self ever be destroyed? Once this idea is grasped, a new cycle begins to manifest immediately in the sphere of intelligence, because the processes of correct cognition are three: the *perception* we have of the One Self and our identity with It; *inference* from within, without, instead of from without, within; and *living* what we have seen and inferred.

When we start acting from the basis of the One Self, we begin to practise Brotherhood, to treat other men through the body as spirits, as souls, as the One Self. We deal with forms as forms, with ideas as ideas; but whenever we are touching a form, we know that invisible within that form is intelligence, and that when we strike the

body, we bruise the intelligence. Within that intelligence is soul, identical with our Self, and when we bruise the intelligence we bruise the soul, which in reality is the same as our Self; just as a tidal wave, the bruise comes back to us; that is *testimony*. Every man's body is a visible testimony of how he understands matter and how he treats it and how he makes use of it. It is a visible reflection of his so-far acquired intelligence by experience in and through forms of this kind. His treatment of his own body and the bodies of others, his treatment of his own mind and the minds of others is the visible and standing witness of how far the Christ-processes, the genesis, the conception, the antenatal preparation of the spiritual being have gone on in him.

We see three lines of evolution everywhere in nature, but highest of the three, because all-inclusive, is spiritual evolution—the perception of Self as Self apart from body or form, apart from mind or intelligence, apart from beings of any kind—the sense of Self. When we set our mental house in order so as to conform to that idea

we shall see how this triple cycle, the spiritual, the intellectual and the physical, conjoined in one, operates to illumine us within. In our minds there are faint fires lighted here and there by isolated true ideas, fraternal actions, longings and aspirations for a better life, to know better, to do better, to understand better. When in that inner world, which is our mind, a sun bursts into endless luminosity we have the state of a Christ, of a Buddha, of a Krishna. These fundamental ideas have over and over again been shed on the world by men who before us passed from the human to the supreme, from the intellectual to the spiritual consciousness, from physical knowledge, psychic knowledge, intellectual knowledge, into the full blaze of Wisdom. When the most ordinary man seizes hold on them, he will work that very evolution in himself which is in truth a revolution, because it will transform him into a new order of being. Then, instead of dwelling amidst the funeral tapers of time, he dwells in the shadowless light of the eternal illumination.

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM IN EUROPE AND THE WAY OUT

[**Julien Benda** is one of the leading French critics. Most of his writing is in support of the Intellectuals as against such writers as Bergson, Barrès, and Romain Rolland, who are not detached from sentiment. In one place he has written that what Bergson calls "Intuition," is really intelligence as distinguished from a species of bureaucratic functioning of the mind. M. Benda's latest work is *Discours à la Nation Européenne*, and deals with the part that pure intellect should play in the rebuilding of a European nation.

Only in October last year an effort was made in France, under the chairmanship of M. Paul Valéry, to gather together in a conference the intellectuals of Europe. Mr. Langdon Mitchell, writing in *The Saturday Review of Literature*, (New York, March 10th) gives a translation of a letter written to him by Count Hermann Keyserling, who was the only German to answer this call of culture, to which England, Norway, Spain, Holland, Italy and Hungary contributed each its quota. M. Benda was one of the distinguished Frenchmen who took part in the Conference. Count Keyserling writes:—"Accordingly we decided to form an association independent of all politics or any other empirical aims, under the neutral title of 'Société d'Études Européennes,' to have as its aim the cultivation of relations between persons of distinguished intellect, through the furthering of such inspiring contacts as were the custom in Goethe's time, and the recognition of the radiating character of all living intellect and its natural resistance to organization." This is one practical method of attempting to revive the civilization that once existed in Europe and of which M. Benda here writes.—Eds.]

In order to discover what can save European civilization, the first thing to be done is to decide what has doomed it, and what is corrupting it more and more each day. In the first place, has a European civilization existed in the past?

Yes, a European civilization definitely has existed. But despite the opinions of certain doctors, more apostolic than veracious, and inclined to assertions more charitable than true, a European *nation* has not existed nor has there existed a European political community; but there has existed a *moral* European community—Christendom. Charlemagne was proclaimed Emperor of Christian "Europe". Above all, there has existed an intellectual European

community; it was due to this that all those who devoted themselves to the things of the mind, from the Pyrenees to the Vistula, felt they belonged, not to this nation or to that, but to Europe, an undivided Europe. A tangible symbol of this intellectual Europeanism was the University life of the Middle Ages. In the precincts of these Universities, students from all nations jostled one another and manifestly felt in greater sympathy with each other, despite differences of nationality, than with those of their compatriots not interested in intellectual life. As for their masters, their degree gave them the right to teach "throughout Christendom" (*jus ubique docendi*), and this Europeanism was accepted unreservedly by all the intellectual

youth of the continent. It never occurred to a student from Paris to wonder why he should have the German Albert the Great, or the Italian Thomas Aquinas or the Englishman Alexander of Hales as mentor, nor to a "bachelor" from Vienna to consider it unwise to entrust the formation of his mind to the Frenchman Jean Gerson. This intellectual cosmopolitanism was obviously favoured by the fact that all such men wrote their works in one language, Latin. One may say that the small consideration given by learned men to the ethnical *désinence* of the mind was maintained by the majority until the end of the eighteenth century, despite the fact that they had abandoned Latin for their national tongues. Prior to this date, we find very few thinkers beyond the Rhine pointing out that Luther and Eckhart possessed essentially Germanic minds, and even less do we see French doctors proving that Descartes or Racine could only have been born on this side of the Vosges. Voltaire was able to write in 1767: "An immense republic of cultured minds exists in Europe." Again, obviously referring to such cultured people, J. J. Rousseau observed shortly before the Revolution:—

To-day there are no longer Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards nor even Englishmen; there are only Europeans. The same tastes, the same passions, and the same habits are common to all, *because none of them has had to accept a national mode of thought from any isolated institution.*

The historian who quotes this opinion, and who obviously agrees

with it (Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, Vol. I, p. 257) accounts for it by the fact that all men had their minds formed by the same masters—the Jesuits—who were a cosmopolitan order.

* * *

This European civilization, which was due to the existence of a moral unity and fellowship among the intellectuals, transcending national divisions, has been destroyed, as a European civilization, by the action of the intellectuals themselves. One may say that, from the seventeenth century onwards, a movement contrary to that which I have just described makes its appearance, a movement in which the intellectuals make common cause with national sentiment awakening in certain countries and are eager to nationalise their minds. It seems that we must admit that the movement began in Germany, with such men as Thomasius who considered it shameful that one could not be thought cultured unless one had had a Græco-Roman education; and even with Leibniz who, in his *Pensées sur la Pratique de la langue Allemande*, not only did not content himself with exhorting his fellow-countrymen to become more conscious of their individuality, but was already inciting them to become so in opposition to French thought, to which influence, he said, they had too long submitted. The movement was greatly strengthened, a hundred years later, by the Lessings and Schlegels, and by the *Dramaturgie de Hamburg*, the sole

aim of which was to save Germany from following in the mephitic wake of the literature which produced Racine and Voltaire; by Herder whose intellectual cosmopolitanism was transformed into a most uncompromising nationalism and whose example demonstrates, according to a specialist in the intellectual history of Germany (Lévy Brühl, *L'Allemagne depuis Leibniz*, page 154) the secret continuity which, notwithstanding the improbability of such a supposition, connects without a break that nineteenth-century Germany which we call realist and that eighteenth-century Germany with which we generally contrast it, terming it idealist*; by Fichte, whose *Discours à la Nation Allemande* are nothing less than a summons to his compatriots to break with all non-German culture and to plunge into the dark and unique embrace of the Germanic soul; by Niebuhr, whose works, as he says himself, strive to bury the German soul in the depths of its own particular individual sources.

Until the war of 1870, the work of the destruction of the intellectual unity of Europe had affected scarcely any but the Germans; on the morrow of this war, with the Mommsens, the Treitschkes and all the Pangermanists (see Ch. Andler: *Le Pangermanisme philosophique*), it takes on, for the first time, a consciousness of itself and

a technique not seen before; moreover, it invades the Latin world; in France with Jules Lemaitre (*vide*, his violent articles against the influence of Ibsen and Tolstoi), and with Barrès, we see the formal desire, until then unmarked among the French, to have a culture which would be completely unsullied by external influence; henceforth, one only speaks of *French* science or of *German* science; authors attempt (especially in Germany) not to cite the names of foreign savants in their works; in 1904 the Rumanians were invited to the Petrarchan celebrations, because they were a Latin race, but not the compatriots of Goethe or of Shakespeare! And then there are the conceptions of Justice and Truth which must cease being universal and become "national"; Barrès writes that he wishes to learn only "Lorraine truth and French truth,"† to which Langbehn replies that he only desires German truth.

Since the war of 1914, it has been even more violent. Here are several examples: Some months ago a professor in a great German University, Dr. Haupt, declared amidst the applause of several thousand listeners, that Europe must learn that Germany, from that day, *had definitely abandoned the path of Western civilization*. (Quoted in *Le Temps*, September 11th, 1933.) Only a few years before, the Italian

* The whole passage should be read: "The antithesis is false," says M. Lévy-Brühl (*i.e.*, the antithesis between the idealist Germany of the eighteenth century and the realist Germany of the nineteenth century); "there are not 'two Germanies'; there is only an evolution, sometimes favoured, sometimes thwarted by the intervention of the neighbouring nations and whose different phases appear more closely linked together as history surveys them from further away."

† See my *Trahison des Clercs*, p. 120.

Minister for Public Instruction and Fine Arts had delivered an official speech in which he said :—

Our artists must prepare themselves for the new imperialist function which our art is to fulfil. To this end a principle of "Italianity" must definitely be established. Whoever draws his inspiration from foreign art is guilty of "*lèse-patrie*," as a spy who admits the enemy by a secret door.*

Behold the state of open hostility between the national cultures, the will capable of stirring up this hostility and of glorifying it ! Behold the catastrophe into which European civilisation is collapsing day by day before our very eyes !

* * *

How are we to save this European civilization? How can we recover it?

By restoring, notably amongst the younger generation, amongst the students, the feeling of this universalism of intellectual function and of cosmopolitanism of mind. For that, it is especially necessary, as I have pointed out in my *Discours à la Nation Européenne*, to raise the product of the intellect above that of the feelings, the works of science and philosophy above those of pure literature; because the intellect is universalistic while the feelings are much less so; because the value of a scientific work exists, or for the most part tends to exist, independently of individual genius and of the *language* in which it is written, whereas the work of the man of letters is, so to speak, indissolubly linked to this vehicle; because the work of the intellect is translatable

whereas that of the man of letters is not, or is at any rate very far from being so to the same extent. We must restore to credit such phrases as Renan's: "All those things which make up literary taste, charm, poetry, amusement, may be clothed in local form; *but science, like the mind, is unique.*" This return to the honouring of the mind in so far as it is universal, overlooking any particularities which it may offer, will be difficult, if I am to judge by the fact that the best brains, those apparently most eager to rebuild European civilization, appear to be refractory, even unconsciously refractory, so deeply have they absorbed the doctrine of the nationalisation of mind. A little while ago, I was reading some pages of a French savant, whom I had believed completely exempt from this influence, the lamented Charles Pfister, Dean of the Faculty of Strasbourg. This professor, having just indicated the excellent works which the German savants had recently produced on the history of Alsace, considered it his duty to express the hope that France would not allow her neighbours "to monopolise" the study of this subject, and declared it to be "the duty" of the French University of Strasbourg and of the learned societies of the city "to mount guard on the Rhine". But what, I ask, is this idea of "monopolising" doing here? And the "guard on the Rhine"? The learned societies, whether French or German, have the duty of *mounting guard*

* Quoted in my *Trahison des Clercs* (p. 52) together with other examples.

on the mind and, from the moment that good works are composed on the history of Alsace, a true priest of science need not worry whether they be the work of Frenchmen or Germans. In the same way, while on a lecture tour in Scotland a year ago, I heard a professor of the University of Edinburgh, during a banquet celebrating the memory of the great poet Dunbar, make his compatriots feel ashamed because the best editions of Dunbar are made by Germans. As if the important thing for this minister of the intellect ought not to be that good editions of Dunbar exist, not that they are not the work of his compatriots! Such nationalism of mind must be absolutely removed if we wish to return to a conception of the intellectual universalism which, once again, is for me the primordial condition for the resurrection of European civilization.

Some may object: You surely do not claim, however, to destroy the national characteristics of the mind, those which distinguish—so delightfully—the ways of thinking of a Frenchman, an Englishman and an Italian, even about the same subject. I do not claim to destroy them at all, but I beg these

different intellects to honour the essential part of the mechanism of thought, that essential part, in which, *precisely because it is essential*, these differences in the manner of thinking disappear. I have given in my *Discours à la Nation Européenne* (Chap. V.) a striking example of the differences in the Anglo-French ways of thinking (the Frenchman is H. Poincaré and the Englishman the physicist Maxwell), and I have shown how, as soon as they reached the essentials of the intellectual functions, they agreed.

The teaching of history could also do much. Instead of devoting ourselves almost entirely to setting forth to children the history of the nations of Europe independently of each other, we ought to tell them the history of that *undivided* Europe which has existed, as I said in the beginning of this article, in the moral and intellectual planes. And I return to this conclusion: You will only save European civilization by calling upon Europeans to honour moral and especially intellectual values, the only ones which have realized in former times, and which are capable of doing so again to-day, the unity of Europe.

JULIEN BENDA

THE LEISURED WORLD

[Miss Cicely Hamilton, novelist, playwright and actress, is a traveller who observes changing Europe from her own vantage ground. She has recorded the results in *Modern Germanies*, *Modern France*, *Modern Italy* and *Modern Russia*.

Some still hope that widespread unemployment is passing. Others look upon it as the permanent mark of an era dominated by the machine: as the invention of more and more efficient machines is progressing, unemployment is bound to increase, producing in its turn the problem of leisure. It is perhaps the most pressing problem of to-day, on the solution of which the very existence of civilization depends. But leisure does not spell inactivity. The *Gita* says: "No one ever resteth a moment inactive. Every man is involuntarily urged to act by the qualities which spring from nature." Miss Hamilton truly envisages a leisured world in terms of the mode of life of the leisured class of to-day: when men have leisure they will do what the aristocrats do—behave charmingly, converse brilliantly, hunt and gamble. Western humanity is fast inheriting vast wealth earned by science; as it does not possess the moral capacity to use it, there is likely to be a ghastly squandering of the inheritance. The unhappy divorce of knowledge and virtue constitutes the problem of leisure, and it is more a moral than an economic problem.—EDS.]

One of the results of industrial depression, long drawn out, is a realization of our problem of increasing leisure; a problem inevitable in a mechanized world, and one which civilization must tackle, and speedily, if it is to live at peace with itself. Fundamentally the Luddites, the breakers of looms, were right in regarding the machine as a rival; their own age treated them as criminals and fools but time has justified their views. In calling after calling the machine has ousted the handworker; human thew and sinew, human craft and intelligence are year by year becoming less needful for provision of our sustenance and comfort. And the end is not yet, is not even in sight; it may be that, before many decades have passed, all our daily wants and daily amusements will be supplied by the obedient machine. When that happens we shall have attain-

ed to the real Simple Life; where the movement of a lever, the pressure of a button, will have superseded all the complicated processes whereby our ancestors provided themselves with their heat, light, food and amusement.

That a world fully mechanized will be a world largely leisured is a fact that needs little demonstration; the less need of hand and brain in the ordinary labour-market, —in the work of the factory, the office and the house—the more time we shall have to ourselves. But increase of leisure will not be the most important effect of the supersession of Man by his creature, the Machine; the change—the alteration of values—will have a moral and ethical significance. Man—western Man, at any rate—deprived of his work, will have to discover some new justification for existence. What that justification will be I do not pretend to

forecast ; but I am sure that we cannot live without it.

Hitherto the majority of mankind has justified its existence, in its own eyes and those of its neighbours, by capacity for some kind of work ; by production of food, by production of fuel, by production of clothing and ornament ; by building, by soldiering, by fetching and carrying ; by the exercise of arts and professions. For centuries after history emerged from the forgotten, Man catered for his wants with no other help than that afforded by domestic animals and a few simple hand-wielded, hand-made tools. Until the advent of the Machine and its consequence, the Industrial age, the world was run on the activities of men and women, whose trades and callings could be started with a minimum of capital ; in the pre-machine era a man possessed of the weaver's skill might make his own loom and set it up at home, and so start as a cloth manufacturer. And think of the cost of equipping a modern gunner with his weapon, compared to the cost of equipping an archer with his bow ! Capital counted for less in production, labour for infinitely more ; and any section of the community that did not justify itself by some form of labour activity eventually fell into contempt. When Beaumarchais could jeer at a French aristocracy that it had "given itself the trouble to be born," that French aristocracy was within a few years of its downfall.

It may well be, however, that in the near future Beaumarchais' gibe

will have lost its point ; and civilized humanity all the world over, will only "give itself the trouble to be born"—living thereafter, like the lilies of the field, toiled for and spun for by machinery. Already in large sections of the community the old relation between the worker and his tool has been reversed ; the "worker" has become but an adjunct of his tool, an attendant on its needs and activities. Primarily, no doubt, the machine is the servant of man ; but not for the first time in the history of the world the servant now dominates his master. Dominates and likewise humiliates ; makes his skill of small value, his strength of small account ; and in a good many instances, needing no help from him, casts him on the labour scrapheap.

When we are no longer workers, how shall we estimate our value ? That, it seems to me, is the essence—the crux—of our problem of mechanized leisure. In times past peasants and artisans, oppressed by those in power, when they rose against their tyrants were spurred by the thought that they, the oppressed, were the workers, the makers, by whose toil and ingenuity the world obtained its daily needs. In all ages, and all the world over, the claim of the oppressed has been the claim of the worker to benefit more fairly and fully from the fruits of his labour. Nowadays that claim is less valid than of yore ; because the loom or the engine—some form of machine—has taken over most of the work. While in the future it may have no

shadow of validity—capital, in the shape of the ubiquitous machine, having become the sole agent in production—that fact, of course, will not invalidate the claim of a human being for an equitable distribution of the goods he no longer produces; but the claim must be advanced on other grounds than a personal labour which has ceased to have any value.

So far in the history of the human race a leisured class, with no need to work, and no spur to its activities, has usually shewn symptoms of deterioration; and if the same symptoms are not to make themselves manifest in our mechanized world, some substitute for labour will have to be brought into our lives. What that substitute shall be, is our problem; and upon our success in discovering the substitute and applying it to our needs may depend the future of mankind.

We describe our present economic perplexities as a breakdown of the Capitalist System; but it would be a good deal more correct to describe it as a breakdown of the Labour System. It is Labour that is going, not Capital,—which every day, in the form of the Machine, increases its hold upon the world. With every day we are less and less workers, more and more capitalists; since, whether as plutocrats or whether as paupers, we live more and more by machine-made goods and services—that is to say, by the capital that science and invention have bestowed on us.

* * *

When one studies the develop-

ment of manner and custom, it becomes abundantly clear that the leisured classes, in every age and country, have felt the need of a substitute for work. To this day they are hunters, for the sake not of food but of activity; while another persistent characteristic of such classes is their insistence on rules of behaviour. It is fairly true to say of them that the less productive they are in actual work, the stricter their discipline of etiquette. The training required by any youngster intended for some form of useful hand-labour, such as bricklaying or carpentering, is easy of acquirement when compared to the training of a member of the old French nobility in the manners and graces of his caste. These people who thought it beneath them to soil their hands with spade or plough were subjected to a discipline of speech and behaviour amazingly rigid and complicated. Their lives were regulated by little rules of courteous etiquette; they were drilled to correctness of poise and of movement; and, if they were to hold their own with their fellows, a high standard was demanded of them in the difficult art of conversation. All leisured classes have evolved their codes of disciplined behaviour; but it was the idle, court-haunting section of the French *noblesse* whose code was the strictest test and most disciplined If the past is any guide, it would seem not unlikely that the leisured world upon which we are entering will evolve its stringent customs and codes of manners—as a measure of pre-

caution against slackness of body and mind.

And there is another fact to remember in this connection; that one of the characteristics of a leisured class—at any rate of a Western leisured class—has, so far, been a combative spirit. If proof were needed that strife is not always of economic origin, that proof could be discovered in the records of the “idle rich”; the one calling that has never been beneath the dignity of the “idle rich” is the calling that involves the shedding of blood—a Western aristocracy has always put its sons into the army. Something of the “leisured” inclination for the arts of war may be due to old feudal tradition, not even yet wholly extinct; but that a leisured class inclines to blood and quarrel is proved by the fact that it was among aristocracies that the practice of duelling flourished. The classes whose energies have been employed in agriculture or industry—in the earning of a living by some form of regular work—have never made a practice of the duel; in such classes, quarrel and the shedding of blood is the result of personal grievance and enmity; whereas in the duelling classes of society it has always been recognized that blood may be shed—must be shed, in fact—for a point of honour or etiquette. (The same tendency to be sudden and quick

in quarrel is said to prevail in the *apache* section of society, which is also, to a great extent, “leisured”; that is to say, its “work” is intermittent and irregular.)

There is another undesirable characteristic of leisure with which we may have to reckon in our mechanized society: the gambling habit. When a class has been sufficiently prosperous to feel itself secure, its members have often been addicted to high play—willing to risk their secure prosperity on a card or the throw of a dicebox. The fact is interesting and may have its significance for a special system which permits of leisure and security for all. Mechanized production, properly controlled, should mean economic security for the race in general: the human being—so, at least, we hope—will be able to live without fear of destitution; whatever may befall him in the way of ill-luck, or bodily misfortune, the machine will provide for his necessities. But if the average human being is of the same flesh and blood as the leisured classes of to-day and yesterday, then the same need of risk and excitement may stir in him, demand its outlet and find that outlet in gambling The average human being will still remain human, even in a world where he is not justified by work.

CICELY HAMILTON

EGOTISM AND IMPERSONALITY

[John Cowper Powys is well known both as a novelist and an essayist. In October 1933 he wrote for us on "The Magic of Detachment," and this month he is concerned with the ever-present opposites—Egotism and Impersonality. Most men and women, especially in the West, lead personal lives, and it is because of this that spirituality is so rarely able to flower there.

Impersonality is not the annihilation of the human intelligence which is self-consciousness but an attitude of that intelligence—a mode of its vision; the impersonal attitude grows as that intelligence acquires a knowledge of cosmic ultimates. In Indian philosophy *Vyakti* is the finite personality, while *Purusha* is the Immortal Person who possessing real values of conditioned existence is not affected by its *Maya* or unreal values.—EDS.]

That great and mysterious pulse of ultimate life—that planetary rhythmic beat—that balance of the unseen tides—forward, backward—advancing, retreating—of the systole and diastole of the world—how can it be named? And the moments of magical harmony that it brings to our total being, to our body, soul and spirit subsumed in an unspeakable unity, how can they be named? These feelings are far more than pleasure, far more than joy, far more than delight. To call them by the tranquil word "Peace" would give to many minds too negative an implication. To call them by the exciting name "Ecstasy" would imply something too disturbing, too—what shall I say?—too violent. In my present discussion I will confine myself therefore, after the cautious traditions of the countryside, to the most simple and primitive word in our language, and I will call this mysterious feeling by the plain name of *happiness*.

Happiness of this rare and precious kind is, I have recently come to think, the real purpose, the real nature-inspired elixir of life—though so often obscured and confused and beguiled and betrayed—of all organic, and perhaps of all super-organic, entities! It has often come into my mind to think that there has been some mis-translation, some misinterpretation undergone, in those translated versions of the ancient books of wisdom such as I have been able to get hold of, where indifference is spoken of as if it were "indifference" to *happiness* equally with "indifference" to the grosser forms of pleasure and pain.* How could what is called by our Western Saints "the Beatific Vision" be beatific at all, if a person "only saw, *not felt*," as Coleridge says of his magical light in the sky, how "beautiful it was"? What, I mean, would such a vision be, if it were merely something *recognized*† by the lonely intellectual power,

* Not quite. In Hindu philosophy the *Deity* has three aspects, *Sat*, *Chit*, *Ananda*; the last of these is *Bliss*. Supreme joy is therefore also one of the triple aspects of the Spirit in man. In Buddhistic philosophy *Nirvana*, the highest spiritual state, is one of peace and bliss actively experienced; it is not empty passivity, much less annihilation.—EDS.

† In yoga-philosophy it is not only recognition, but realization, *i.e.*, intimate experience in which the Highest is not only seen and felt but also known.—EDS.

rather than something in the attainment of which all that we are, our body, our soul, our spirit, found ultimate fulfilment ?

As Heraclitus maintained, and in this point was followed by Hegel, it is out of the clash of opposites, out of the transcending of contradictions, that the balance-point between warring forces which we call "the Truth" emerges, becomes, exists, establishes itself.

And this law of the transcending, or if you will of the subsuming of opposites, applies to the psychological equally with the physical, to the spiritual equally with the psychological.

What we call *egotism* is that excessive, unbalanced, disordered discordant self-assertion which more than anything else causes the unhappiness of our Western World to-day. It is this "egotism" of a number of unbalanced individuals, which when it flows together, in the evil itch to assert oneself at the expense of someone else, in the evil itch to gloat over the discomfiture of someone else, in the evil itch to triumph over the weakness or over the strength of someone else, becomes so formidable, that I have got into the habit of calling "crowd-consciousness." This "crowd-consciousness" I have come to regard as one of the most objectionable of all the evil psychic phenomena that we are oppressed by to-day. And it is very powerful; for it is the inverted, the evil side of that transporting power of widespread human feeling that can work miracles.

My own instinct tells me how-ever, though in this I speak humbly and tentatively, that *even at its best*, even when it works miracles, this crowd-consciousness is not a holy thing. We all know how quickly, at a touch, at a breath, at the wink of an eyelid, this miracle-working power can *turn into its opposite*, and commit the most abominable and shameless crimes !

No ! If I am not mistaken, it is never the noblest human emotions that are projected, externalized, hypostasized, in the feelings of the crowd.

And now, having shown, as well as I can, that what I mean by "egotism" is a foolish, ungracious, greedy itch to assert our crudest and least considerate desires at the expense of anyone who comes near us, let me indicate, as far as I am able, what, in this particular essay, I mean by "impersonality".

From the cautious and tentative experiments in human nature—principally in my own—which I have so far been able to make, and I am an extravagant, and perhaps even an heretical, believer in the magical power of what we call the will to change our character completely, I have arrived at a shrewd inkling, I trust under the suggestion of good rather than of evil, that *impersonality*, as its extremest implication comes to be emphasized, over against the extremest implication of *egotism*, is not, any more than its opposite, a desirable thing.

It is the *Tao*, it is the mysterious way of all balances, that I am fumblingly and gropingly seeking ; and

I seem to hear the voice of Kwang Tze, that most whimsical and poetical disciple of the great Laotze, whispering to me, on the long-drawn wind of this northern twilight, that the Tao must not be called the Impersonal any more than it must be called the Personal ! It is, in fact—at least so I seem to learn from studying the writings of Kwang Tze—some indescribable Nameless that transcends both personal *and* impersonal.

Words are, however, in their living suppleness and in their organic complexity so slippery, so tricky, so treacherous, so much like phosphorescent water-snakes, that a person, catching at one faint clue and then at another, to these Eleusinian Mysteries, is forced to use each word as if it had a margin, a penumbra, a thin curve of the unrevealed portion of its lunar circumference, that extended a good deal further than the word's ordinary significance.

Putting the matter clumsily and crudely, and without that subtle, scarcely-discernible lunar penumbra, in which, at least to my Celtic mind, the truth can alone be found, where the word "impersonality" conveys something quite as different from the nameless Tao as the word "egotism" itself, is in what I might perhaps be allowed to call its *scientific* content. Scientific knowledge always claims—though its claim is often an extremely questionable one—to be "impersonal," that is to say, to be free from all those distorting, perverting, and deluding subjectivities, with which human passion pros-

titutes the virgin purity of objective truth. Mathematics is certainly, I fully admit, impersonal; "but so much the worse," thus in my Faustian nature I am tempted to cry out, "for impersonality !" Impersonality as the supreme clue to a cosmos, whose motive-force seems so essentially a *living*, and hence, of necessity, since mathematics is the science of the dead, so essentially a non-mathematical force, appears to my mythological mind especially unsatisfactory.

Is it not the "impersonality" of the materialist-determinist view of the system of things that lays its cruel icy finger, like John Keats' cold-hearted philosopher in "Lamia," upon the creative and living impulses which even the most idolatrous of our mythologies somehow manage to suggest ?

I regard therefore this psychological antinomy, "egotism"—"impersonality," not as a cosmic struggle between good (impersonality) on the one side, and evil (egotism) on the other, but as an Hegelian contradiction. I regard the opposition of these two things as resembling the opposition of "Being" and "Not-Being," which, while in themselves they are less than nothing and are indeed totally unreal, find their reality in the concept "Becoming". In the same way I regard egotism and impersonality as a contradiction of two extremes that in themselves are meaningless abstractions but that find their "truth" in a third concept, corresponding to this Hegelian "Becoming".

And what, thus stated, is the

ideal that subsumes or transcends the opposition of egotism and impersonality? It must be, it seems to me, like "Becoming," an essentially *imperfect* concept; for a perfect concept must of necessity lift the whole issue into the region of the Absolute and thus, at a stroke, clean out of the sphere of our intelligible verbal categories. What the philosopher Croce so well says about *Imperfect Virtue* applies here. He says that the very essence of Virtue lies in its imperfection, in other words, in the condition of its *living growth*, and that Perfect Virtue, *ipso facto*, would cease to be Virtue at all! What we must look for, therefore, in the relativity of our present human state, is some ideal that, while transcending both "egotism" and "impersonality," retains the living principle of growth in both these extremes. Let us see what can be made of this. Is not the living principle, distorted and depraved in "egotism," the nobler concept of *egohood*; and is not the living principle, frozen and petrified in "impersonality," nothing less than *sympathy*, the feeling with, the rejoicing and the suffering with, other entities?

Our two words now are the word *egohood* with its centripetal implication, and the word *sympathy*, with its centrifugal implication; and our philosophical problem is to find some single word that will bring these two, with all their mysteriously wavering under-life and over-life, into one comprehensive ideal.

Such a word is, unfortunately for me, not to be discovered in the English language. Shall I be misunderstood if I make use of the phrase, "the Larger Self"?* We are all in the habit of talking rather loosely about our "lower" and our "higher" self. Now what I mean to imply by my expression "the Larger Self" is obviously not the same as either of these. "Larger" carries with it a somewhat different connotation from either "lower" or "higher".

Now if we return to our original words egotism and impersonality, whose hopeless and irreconcilable characteristics we are striving to overcome, it will, I think, be clear that what is wrong with both these extremes is their deadness. They are both, in their opposite ways, when you carry them to their logical limit, descriptions of the state of death. And in their death-truth, like our metaphysical Hegelian parallels, they turn out to be identical. Nothing is more egotistic than a corpse. It sympathizes with no one. It gives nothing to anyone. It makes way for no one. It is a ghastly and pitiful burden upon the hands of all. But nothing, also, is more impersonal than a corpse. This we feel unhappily enough, when, under the murderous logic of a deterministic materialism, the vast mysterious life of great Creative Nature Herself becomes one appalling "Golgotha and Mill of Death".

But "egotism" contains some-

* Why not the Sanskrit word Mahatma-- the Great Soul, i.e., that human soul which has experienced the Motion of the Great Breath, the Universal Spirit or Deity.—Eds.

where within it the quickening principle of a legitimate "egohood," and "impersonality" can be interpreted in two very different ways. It can be interpreted according to that fantastic and entirely false conception of the Inanimate which the old-fashioned and let us hope totally discredited materialistic theories upheld. This is the lower view of "impersonality". But "impersonality" can also be interpreted in a deeper and more spiritual way, as something not lower, but higher, than what we commonly know as "personality".

We are thus in possession, if there is any cogency in my present line of argument, of two residual concepts, which we have arrived at by eliminating the logical death-extreme from both "egotism" and "impersonality". We are in possession of the living principle of "egohood," and we are in possession of a mysterious Something, that, though different from "personality," is richer and fuller than what we vulgarly mean by this word. But I cannot help being led on to the conclusion that in what I have called, for want of a single word, "the Larger Self" both these residual essences find their realization and truth.

We have all heard the story of

Plato's having visited the Orient, and may it not be that that blending of erotic egohood with ideal impersonality which is so striking a peculiarity of his habits of thought represents a *rapprochement* between East and West? Certainly in all the tantalizingly obscure and hopelessly scattered myths of my own Welsh ancestors, particularly in connection with the Legend of the Grail, a hesitant and tentative "third way" does almost seem to present itself to me, a way less "impersonal" than the way of the East, and less "egotistic" than the way of the West.

Would not one of the results of even the most childish glimpse of our mortal affairs from an extra-mundane view-point be a negation of the silly Western notion that progress in science implies progress in wisdom? And might not such a glance—none the worse perhaps for being childish—help us to recognize, as the Greeks and the Welsh seem to have recognized long ago in their kindred mythologies, that there is a way by which the Self can get the good both of Nature and Sex and yet not relinquish its ultimate awareness of belonging to a level of Being and of Life outside the whole turbulent arena?

JOHN COWPER POWYS

PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA

[Below we print two articles: the first is a sketch of the work of the Indian Philosophical Congress written by **Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri**, one of the Secretaries of the Congress, which aims "to take philosophy out of the school-room and the cloister and make its appeal wider." The other, by **P. T. Raju, M.A., Sastri**, lecturer in Philosophy at the Andhra University, pleads for a reorientation of Indian metaphysics because "our very social life demands new developments in thought".

The baneful effects of the divorce between philosophy and life are being recognized more and more. The urge for a re-expression of philosophical principles and to bring their light into the lives of the people is also felt by philosophers abroad. In California through *The Personalist* a group of philosophically minded men are earnestly seeking to determine if some fresh influence of philosophy cannot be invoked in the reconstruction of the social order. Its April issue not only contains the first of the posthumous papers of the late H. Wildon Carr, but the editor continues his reflections begun in the last issue—"Can we rethink our world?" And now comes the April *Philosophy*, Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy, in which its editor publishes a letter from Sir Herbert Samuel under the heading, "The Present Need of a Philosophy". Sir Herbert says:—

The old ontology, the old ethics and the old social order, based upon systems of theology that were generally accepted, are crumbling under the influence of new ideas inspired by the discoveries of science. Urgent practical questions of personal and social morality, of economic organization, of international relationship—press upon the peoples, but the leaders of thought give little guidance for their solution. This generation is dissatisfied, anxious, apprehensive. It feels itself as in a ship, launched on an unknown sea, without navigator, chart, or compass. Since the old theologies cannot meet the new problems, and since science cannot claim to deal with the larger issues, men are asking what philosophy has to say to the present age.

Next month we will print "Philosophy and Life," by C. E. M. Joad, which will be a further contribution to this problem of world-wide interest.—Eds.]

I.—THE NINTH PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

The first session of the Indian Philosophical Congress was held in 1925 under the auspices of the University of Calcutta. A band of enthusiastic Calcutta scholars under the leadership of Sir S. Radhakrishnan was responsible for its inauguration, and Calcutta has contributed in a great measure to its continued success, the next great contributor being the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner. The papers in succeeding sessions have varied in number and quality; the attendance has at times been none too good; but throughout it has been possible to rely on

Amalner for a good quota of papers and contingent of delegates.

From the first it has been our ambition to take philosophy out of the schoolroom and the cloister and make its appeal wider. The choice of the first President, Rabindranath Tagore, was significant of this aim. And though in the nature of things it was not possible to repeat such a choice in subsequent years, we have had other opportunities of linking philosophy with the national life. The second session of the Congress was opened by the Maharaja of Benares, the third by the

Maharajah Gaekwad of Baroda, (who sent a learned address though he could not attend in person), the fourth by Sir Rama Varma, an ex-Raja of Cochin, widely respected as a man and a philosopher; after a period of three years, filled up by men of affairs,—the Ministers of Education in the Punjab, Eastern Bengal and Behar,—the eighth session was opened by the Maharaja of Mysore and the ninth by the Raja Saheb of Sangli. Those who watched or read the proceedings know that these opening addresses were anything but nominal; in every case sound knowledge was displayed of one or more systems of philosophy, besides a keen desire for the furtherance of philosophical studies and pursuits, in view of their importance to all nations in the conduct of affairs of this world, to say nothing of the hereafter. The culmination, in a sense, of this line of thought found fine utterance in the speech of the Rajah Saheb of Sangli, who, in the light of his own philosophic studies, wondered whether the pursuit of perfection as an ideal in the place of expansion may not be a cure for all our present ills. It is a source of no small gratification to those who have been continuously associated with the Congress to know that it has succeeded so greatly in interesting and enthusing such high personages, who, by virtue of their position as rulers and the good example they set in the matter of a pure selfless life, are so eminently calculated to be the leaders of all thinking India.

The appeal of philosophy to men and women is that they should save themselves from the endless restlessness of modern life with its dissipation of energies and consequent despair, by betaking themselves seriously to the endeavour to see things as a whole, to obtain a synoptic vision, to break through the walls erected by custom under the sanction of reason, to cease to rely solely on the intellect, and to seek the intuition which underlies the intellect and is also its crown. Such was the message of Radhakrishnan as President of the eighth session at Mysore; the same message was repeated to a Poona audience in one of the public lectures organized in connection with the ninth session. The other lecture in this same connection was delivered by Madame S. Wadia who made an eloquent plea for Buddhi-yoga which is in effect the "intuition" of Radhakrishnan. Such presidential addresses and lectures are representative of the activities of the Congress in so far as it seeks to lift Philosophy from mere scholarship and link it with the life of the people to-day. To another type belongs the presidential address of Prof. A. R. Wadia who made a philosophical analysis of the life and teachings of the most interesting public figure in the country—Mahatma Gandhi. There have been other types of addresses too, like that of Principal Dhruva, which made a survey of recent philosophical literature and that of Principal W. S. Urquhart, which concerned itself with the present status of philosophical studies.

The address of Rai Bahadur K. C. Bhattacharya at the last session is a fine example of yet another type, pure and rigorous philosophic speculation. Philosophers do not all tread a beaten path; nor do they lose themselves in the sands of the desert.

The papers contributed are many and varied. There are at present four sections—Indian Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics, Ethics and Religion, and Psychology. It is somewhat of an anomaly that in India Indian Philosophy should be treated as a separate section. It would be more proper to include these papers in one or other of the remaining sections, according as they are metaphysical, ethical or psychological. But quite a good number of papers on Indian Philosophy concern themselves mainly with questions of the history of doctrines, and these require a section to themselves; there may come a time when such papers find a more suitable home in the Philosophy section of the Oriental Conference. One of the symposium subjects for the eighth session was the Possibility of Universal salvation (Sarvamukti); one of the subjects for the next session is the place of God in Advaita. It is in the discussion of such subjects that the Indian Philosophy section becomes most lively. The section of Logic and Metaphysics vies with that of Indian Philosophy in getting the largest number of papers; and in both sections, the bulk of contributions comes from Amalner.

This is a section exclusively for the serious. The section of Ethics and Religion provides some good papers. In the past it provided at least one controversial subject for a symposium—the possibility of a new ethic. Two interesting papers were contributed last year on “Mystical Experience” and on “Freudianism and Swadharma”. Our Psychology section has not been as popular as it ought to be. This has been in part due to the failure to know the province of this section in relation to the Psychology section of the Science Congress. Dr. Purushottam’s clear and eloquent presidential address at Poona on the philosophical implications of modern biological and psychological discoveries has no doubt served to clear the ground and given some indication of the type of papers that will find the most suitable home in the Philosophical Congress. The discussion of the symposium on “Idealism and the Physical world” was very lively.

The interest of both members and outsiders has been steadily increasing and it is not too much to hope that the Philosophical Congress has come to be a permanent feature of Indian academic life. Philosophy can never claim spectacular results, but there is reason to believe that its grip is none the less sure and steady. And not the least of the signs of hope for the future is the request of THE ARYAN PATH for an article on the Congress.

S. S. SURYANARAYANAN

II—THE NEED FOR REORIENTATION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

India has passed through many a political crisis. With every change in its political situation, new factors have been introduced into its civilization. It has had to face, either to incorporate or oppose, new ways of thought, new standards of morality, and new forms of administration. The remarkable plasticity and elasticity of the Indian mind have evinced themselves in the various ways in which it has tried to treat the novel factors. Whenever a new religious creed appeared, it was shown to be a part of the old creed itself, and the supersession of the latter by the former was prevented. Thus Buddhism, which once spread from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, was rooted out by the absorption of most of its fundamental tenets. Moral and political discussions were divorced from the philosophical.* What Manu or Parāśara said was the settled law. None was allowed to tamper with it. It had nothing to do with a philosophical principle, even though it be the central principle on which the conception of the world was based. Similarly political theories were in no way affected by philosophy. It was enough if our politics and morality did not conflict with the ultimate aim of life, *viz.*, the realisation of the Supreme Brahman.

This indifference to ethics, poli-

tics, and other social sciences is the vulnerable point in Indian philosophy. A philosophy, if it is to satisfy fully the demands of human life, should not only provide us with a principle on which we can base our conception of the world, but also attempt to develop from it the sciences that are incident to social life. True, a synoptic view of the universe, an intellectual construction of it, should not be the sole aim of philosophy. It is in the ability to rise above such an attitude that most of the western systems are lacking. Their dominant attitude is one rather of intellectual curiosity than of a serious search after the solution of life's problems. On the other hand, we should not fail to notice that life's problems include the ethical and the political. They should be related to the same principle which is to explain the nature of the world. It is very often said that the outlook of Indian philosophy is practical, that philosophy, for the Indian, is not a way of thought, but a process of life. But philosophy, if it is to be a process of life, should be a process not of blind, but of conscious life, a life that thinks. Studies like ethics, politics and social philosophy, form part of our conscious life. Our life cannot avoid thinking about them. Nor can it sunder itself into discrete

* Some may say that the institutes of our ancient law-givers, like Manu, have a philosophical basis. But such a basis is rather religious than philosophical. No particular metaphysical system seems to be implied by them. Unlike Hegel and Plato, Manu has no metaphysics of his own. Dr. Bhagavan Das's interpretation of Manu in his *Laws of Manu* does not advert to any such system. Manu's code is accepted by pluralists like the Naiyayikas, monists like Ramanuja, and non-dualists like Sankara, alike.

and unrelated parts, and treat social sciences as having nothing to do with its theory of the world. Life is a whole, a unity, and its various phases cannot be left in isolation.

The work of philosophy, says Dewey, is—

the ever new undertaking of adjusting that body of traditions which constitute the actual mind of man to scientific tendencies and political aspirations which are novel and incompatible with received authorities. Philosophers are parts of history, caught in its movement; creators perhaps in some measure of its future, but also assuredly creatures of the past.”*

But our philosophies of the past have nothing to say about political aspirations, and we have no new philosophies now. We are therefore obliged through sheer necessity to import and adopt foreign views. We find some of our leaders following Rousseau, some Marx or Russell, some Hegel, others Croce or Gentile. But their views, necessitated and developed under dissimilar circumstances in foreign lands, may not well suit our purpose. One element here and another there may seem adoptable. But the danger of importing such isolated elements from a system is too great to be encouraged. We have our own world conception. And the imported views, if they do not agree with it, will work havoc on our lives by disintegrating them. It is necessary that our own individuality should react to the new problems that face it, discover its own solutions.

It is this absolute separation of our metaphysics from our social sciences by our ancient philosophers that is mostly responsible for the growing apathy towards them. *Our philosophers are now studied mostly in the spirit of antiquarian research, and not with a view to find a solution for the problems that face present-day society. One feels as if our philosophy has nothing to do with life, it is not living but dead. One cannot help doubting whether one is not clinging to a body from which the life has escaped. It may be admitted that our philosophy satisfied the needs of our ancestors centuries ago, when India was not in close contact with the rest of the world. But now the conditions have changed. That our philosophy is not able to cope with the complexity of the present situation is shown by the indifference with which it is treated by men in public life.* A Tilak or a Mahatma Gandhi may give the *Bhagavad-Gita* a new interpretation. A Radhakrishnan may infuse life into our fossilised philosophical ideas by viewing them in a new light. But every such attempt is resented by the orthodox Indian as a misinterpretation which he would regard as something not to be seriously taken. It is not of serious concern for his life. He can take active interest in it only if it is shown to be a necessary development of his own views. He is now faced by new problems, and any solution which the philosopher wishes to offer him should be demonstrated as the logical outcome

* *Philosophy and Civilisation*, p. 4.

of his own theories. Only thus can our philosophy be now brought to bear on life.

It is high time that philosophers should enter upon such a task. For a number of decades the work of translation, interpretation, and exposition, has been carried on. Besides the vast amount of work accomplished by western scholarship, Indian scholars have been recently very active in that direction. To mention a few, Dr. Gangadhara Jha has seen that no important work on Indian philosophy remains to be translated; Dr. Radhakrishnan's work from the standpoint of comparative philosophy leaves little to be desired; throughout all his works are scattered hints for new developments, and he himself has given a new synthesis in his *Idealist View of Life*; Dr. Dasgupta, besides the two massive volumes he has already presented to the world, promises to bring out four more such; and the attempts at an encyclopaedic survey of Indian Philosophy by the Academy of Philosophy and Religion (Poona) will, we may expect, leave little to be done any further in the field of interpretation and exposition. Already, there are signs of lagging enthusiasm for such work.

Not only the conditions in the present philosophical circles, but also our very social life demands new developments in thought. It is as if the current of our old traditions has met the opposite current of the new ways of life and the progress

of either has been checked. We have to find a new synthesis which would open the way for further progress. We should not allow the traditional and modern modes of thought and life to play into each other's hands for the downfall of our philosophy and consequently of our civilisation. Hegel said that a civilisation without metaphysics would be like a temple, "in all other respects richly ornamented, but lacking its Holy of Holies".* And ours would be no exception to his view. The duty of the philosopher now is "to effect a junction at some point in the new and the old, of deepest sunk customs and unconscious dispositions, that are brought to the light of attention by some conflict with the newly emerging directions of activity".

"Philosophies which emerge at distinctive periods define the larger patterns of continuity which are woven in effecting the enduring junctions of a stubborn past and an insistent future".† Only by performing this function can Indian philosophy still maintain itself and our civilisation. It can be performed only by attempts at new syntheses. Thus the philosopher would be serving his society by supplying new patterns for future thought and action.

Ideals to guide society in its different branches of activity cannot be framed unless the world-conception is brought to bear on the social problems. This requires a reorientation of our philosophy. In spite of our great ancient

* *Science of Logic*. Tr. by Johnston and Struthers, p. 34.

† Dewey: *Philosophy and Civilisation*, p. 7.

systems, we cannot boast of any organisation of our philosophical sciences. Our systems contain discussions mostly on religion, metaphysics, logic, psychology, and certain rules of life which are rather religious than ethical. Even they are promiscuously mixed up, not distinguished and systematised. They have all to be organised. We have to import from the West the spirit of organisation. We have been politically conquered for want of it, and our philosophy may lose its interest for the same reason. Though systematisation of our various branches of experience should not be the sole aim of philosophy, it should be an essential part of it. Our metaphysics should be made the foundation of our logic, ethics, and social and political philosophies. With this aim it has to be reorganised. It should be made to yield logical principles which would guide our social and political thought. Then only will it be living, and touch our very lives. What great efforts have not been made by Plato to adopt his metaphysical theories to his conceptions of state and society! Similarly, the part played by Hegel's conception of the Absolute in the organization of the states of Central

Europe is not little. We need not follow any of these philosophers blindly in their methods. Yet that there is the need of relating all branches of Human knowledge cannot be gainsaid.

In advocating this plea, it is not meant that the work of interpretation and exposition should be stopped now. What is pleaded for is the need for a reorientation of our metaphysics, which has not yet been seriously undertaken. Nor is it implied that there should be only one philosophy in the future for India. If a nation professes only one philosophy, we may say that it is intellectually dishonest or inactive. No particular system can dominate, and satisfy the aspirations of, every mind. At every point of history there can be found diverse currents of thought. Each can be developed into a separate system. But what is required of every system is an organised and connected treatment of all human sciences. Such a treatment is possible only after a special formulation of the metaphysical theory. As our Indian philosophy is wanting in this respect, a reorientation of it is needed.

P. T. RAJU

THE NOVEL: ITS INFLUENCE IN PROPAGANDA

[“The novel with a purpose, the novel with a thesis, triumphs,” wrote Lion Feuchtwanger. In this essay **Gerald Gould**, author of *The English Novel of To-day*, shows why the novel makes an excellent propagandist. We append to this article some pertinent remarks by **H. P. Blavatsky** written over forty years ago, bearing on this subject. The extract is taken from the Editorial article of *Lucifer*, November 1889.—Eds.]

The question of the place and value of the novel as a means of propaganda for national and humanitarian causes falls naturally into two parts. The novel, after all, is only the particular form, which for various reasons has at the present time superseded most others in popular favour, of the thing which has delighted all ages of mankind—namely, the story. We cannot, in the first stage of our enquiry, put the novel in opposition, for instance, to poetry, because, in poetry and in prose narrative alike, the actual story element has always been a predominating one. We have to remember that hundreds, and even thousands, of years before the novel, as we know it to-day, began to develop, poetry, and specifically narrative poetry, was in high favour. Whether in its epic or in its dramatic form, it filled the place in the life of the ancient Greeks which the novel fills in ours. When Aristotle said that poetry was “more philosophical” than history, he did so for the specific reason that the poet could shape conclusions to establish a moral point, whereas history was bound down to external facts. The phrase which we still so commonly use, “poetic justice,” was a legacy of this Aristotelian theory.

It must not be supposed that Aristotle was asking for any sort of crude and convincing adaptation of fact to theory: such, for instance, as we get in the sentimental Victorian tales which reward the good boy with wealth and punish the bad boy with poverty. Aristotle, in common with all the great Greek writers, had grasped, more clearly, perhaps, than it is grasped by most people to-day, the fact that it is impossible to chop up experience, into artificial sections, putting fortune on the one side and character on the other. Character and circumstances play into each other's hands, and help to shape each other in real life, and consequently must do so in fiction, if the fiction is to be convincing.

Sir Philip Sidney, the first English critic to write on literary questions with a profound understanding of general principles, praised narrative poetry for its power to capture and hold the attention; but already, in Sir Philip Sidney's time, there existed, as a result of the Renaissance, some of those early prose tales in Italian out of which it may be said that the modern novel directly developed. Not, of course, that we could not go even further back, if we wanted to, for origins. There were imaginative prose tales in both

Greek and Latin, long before the Italian *novella* appeared, and it is only for convenience sake that the modern novel is dated from one point rather than another. But the point to establish is that, in all periods of man's development, the story, as such, has had a tremendous appeal.

I have mentioned outstanding instances in the development of Western civilisation: indubitably the same truth holds of the older civilisations of the East. From childhood to old age, both in the life of the individual and in the life of the nation or race, everybody wants to be told stories, of one kind or another; and it is therefore not hard to see why so many people have chosen the story medium as a means of propaganda.

We come now, however, to the second part of our enquiry. Why is it that the old love of poetry has so largely given way to the popularity of prose fiction? I can speak only of my own country and my own time, but certainly nowadays in Great Britain one is both surprised and delighted if one finds anybody with a keen and sustained appreciation of poetry. Many people go through a youthful stage of poetry reading, but in maturer years put aside this interest as if it were one of the idle whims of adolescence. To find a mature person, of ordinary interests and accomplishments, who keeps up an active and vivid interest in poetry to the extent of looking out for new poets, and re-reading the established classics, is extremely rare, even among the most

highly educated classes; whereas it may be roughly said that the whole adult population reads novels, and that their popularity increases yearly.

The change from verse to prose, like so many other things in the changes of civilisation, is largely due to an external and mechanical discovery: in this case, the printing press. So long as stories depended upon human memory, and were handed on from one generation to another by word of mouth, the rhythm of verse had definite "survival value": it enabled stories to be remembered easily, and therefore preserved. There is no doubt that the activities of the printing press have gone far to destroy the necessity, and therefore the use, and even the existence, of human memory.

More and more, then, in spite of the competing claims of the wireless, the talking pictures, and so forth, people rely for entertainment and distraction upon the novel. The foregoing historical outline can be summarised in two assertions—the human being, as such, loves a story: the convenient form for the modern human being to indulge this taste is the novel. It may be added that, in Great Britain alone, roughly four thousand new novels are published every year, besides vast numbers of reprints.

The propagandist, then, is faced with this situation—he wants to get his message accepted by the largest possible number of people: how is he to get at his audience? The old simile of the pill and the

jam can scarcely be avoided here. The reader may be unwilling to swallow the pill of moral or political reform unless it is disguised for him with a sweet-tasting story to help it down. Even the advertisement writers have long learnt this lesson. When recommending a particular brand of goods, they no longer consider it sufficient merely to assert that the brand is good, or even that it is the best of its kind. The up-to-date advertisement begins at some distance from its actual subject, or, rather, object; it beguiles us with an anecdote or something of the kind, and only when our interest is already roused do we find that we have been led up to appreciation of somebody's patent medicine, or tailoring, or cosmetics.

There is surely no reason to pursue by psychological investigation the natural and universal love of a story. It is so primitive and basic that it can scarcely be explained by anything simpler than itself. Yet, if we need an explanation, it can easily be found in the common desire of the human being to dramatise himself, and to see himself in a nobler posture than he can take up in everyday life, or in circumstances more exciting than his own. The child who is told a fairy tale dreams of being a fairy prince: the boy who reads an exciting adventure story dreams of going on like adventures himself; and this tendency by no means disappears, though it may grow less crude and obvious, with increasing age.

The propagandist, then, will

naturally make use of this tendency. When song and dance were the natural communal means of expressing emotion, the preacher of a popular cause would strike his harp-strings and sing what he wanted people to believe. Now, he finds it easier and more expedient to appeal through the written and printed word.

But, it may be said, though all human beings like stories, they like other things as well. Their psychological equipment includes not merely imagination, but reason. Why should the propagandist not go straight to his purpose, and tell us what he wants us to accept through exposition and argument? Of course, in many cases, he does so. Political campaigns are still mostly conducted by direct propaganda, though the political speaker who knows his job by no means neglects the aid of apposite anecdote. But, broadly speaking, we may say that the human reason is not anywhere near so highly developed as the human imagination, and that therefore the appeal of mere bare argument is apt to meet with little response. There have been, it is true, in the history of the world, purely philosophical or sociological documents which have had an enormous influence on historical development. It is commonly said, and with as much truth as such an unqualified statement can be expected to possess, that Rousseau's "Social Contract" sowed the seeds of the French Revolution. Similarly, Burke's essay on that Revolution had great influence on British political thought; and

so, later on, had John Stuart Mill's essays on "Liberty" and "The Subjection of Women". But the influence of these propagandist and didactic works is almost wholly indirect. Of every million citizens who have been indirectly influenced by Rousseau's "Social Contract," it would be pretty safe to say that only a few thousand, at the utmost, had ever read the book. Possibly the majority have never even heard of the book. Its influence has been exercised through the acts and words of people who had read other books which took their inspiration, often unintentionally, from the original argument.

How different is the challenge of a work of fancy or imagination! It can become immediately popular. It can pass directly into the hands and minds of the millions. It may be read for the sake of enjoyment; whereas, at the present state of our mental development, most people regard the tackling of an abstract case as a task, and even a hardship. There are those who *do* enjoy political or ethical debate, but they are still in a minority. To make a cause popular, something more colourful must be used.

The outstanding historical example of effective propaganda through fiction is, of course, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. The average man or woman, at the time when this work appeared, would no doubt have admitted vaguely that slavery was a moral wrong, and that the slave trade could not be carried on without the violation of elementary rights, to say nothing of individual cruelties; but the average man or

woman, while admitting this, did not get wrought up about it. Then came along an author who presented the wrongs and cruelties in a concrete and dramatic form, a series of human pictures which moved human feeling. It was no longer a question of slavery in general: it was a question of a particular suffering fellow creature—a mother wickedly parted from her child, or a man brutally flogged to death. Those pictures had a direct effect, as they were meant to have, upon emotion; and emotion is a much stronger force than logic.

It would be impossible to discuss the use of fiction for propaganda in the world of to-day without going into questions which are still controversial, and therefore outside the immediate scope of this essay, which pretends to deal with no more than the bare question of why and how propaganda is best embodied in the story form. I venture to think that even this bare essay may, to a certain extent, prove its point by illustration as well as argument. Readers may have wondered why I began with Aristotle. It is true that he is the earliest, and remains the greatest, of literary critics in the whole of Western civilisation, and that most of our theories on æsthetic points get their ultimate inspiration from his speculations. That might be a good enough reason in itself, but it was not the main one. By beginning more than two thousand years ago, I was enabled, in a sense, to tell a story—to trace through the centuries the history of fiction.

That is of necessity a much less thrilling *kind* of story than one in which the protagonist is a human being like ourselves; but, even so, it is surely more persuasive than a dogmatic statement of contemporary fact. There is magic in the formula, "Once upon a time . . .,"

with which the old fairy tales begin; and, because we live by action, our first instinct, when we read, is to want a tale of action.

This is why fiction is so good, and indeed so necessary, a means of propaganda.

GERALD GOULD

A NOTE ON THE ABOVE

A new era has begun in literature, this is certain. New thoughts and new interests have created new intellectual needs; hence a new race of authors is springing up. And this new species will gradually and imperceptibly shut out the old one, those fogies of yore who, though they still reign nominally, are allowed to do so rather by force of habit than predilection. . . . It is finally those who, amidst the present wholesale dominion of matter, material interests and SELFISHNESS, will have bravely fought for human rights and *man's divine nature*, who will become, if they only win, the teachers of the masses in the coming century, and so their benefactors. But woe to the XXth century if the now reigning school of thought prevails, for Spirit would once more be made captive and silenced till the end of the now coming age. . . .

Take advantage of, and profit by, the "tidal wave" which is now happily overpowering half of Humanity. Speak to the awakening Spirit of Humanity, to the human Spirit and the Spirit in man,

these three in One and the One in All. . . . What the European world now needs is a dozen writers such as Dostoevsky, the Russian author, whose works, though *terra incognita* for most, are still well known on the Continent, as also in England and America among the cultured classes. And what the Russian novelist has done is this:—he spoke boldly and fearlessly the most unwelcome truths to the higher and *even to the official classes*—the latter a far more dangerous proceeding than the former. And yet, behold, most of the administrative reforms during the last twenty years are due to the silent and *unwelcome* influence of his pen. . . .

It is writers of this kind that are needed in our day of reawakening; not authors writing for wealth or fame, but fearless apostles of the living Word of Truth, moral healers of the pustulous sores of our century. . . .

To write novels with a moral sense in them deep enough to stir Society, requires a great literary talent and a *born* theosophist as was Dostoevsky.

H. P. BLAVATSKY

THE COMMON SOUL OF ALL RELIGIONS

[**Hugh McCurdy Woodward** is Professor of Philosophy of Education at Brigham Young University in Utah, and on several occasions he has been visiting Professor of Education at the University of Washington. He is the author of *Humanity's Greatest Need*, a review of which appeared in our pages of August 1933. The *raison d'être* of this book is seen in its dedication "to the increase of tolerance, to a better understanding between peoples and races and to the rising tide of World Unity". In the following article Dr. Woodward demonstrates that all religions have a common soul, and because of this the idea of monopoly (all too common among orthodox religionists) should give way to a tolerant and sympathetic attitude. We should emulate surely the broadminded man as described by Confucius, who sees the truth in different religions, the common heritage of their divine origin.—Eps.]

In every clime, in every time, and among all peoples, religion is man's most common expression. In creeds, cults, and churches, animists, Mohammedans, Christians, Buddhists, and Hindoos worship by the millions. In religions, ancient and modern; with ceremony, emotional and rational; through rituals, varied and numerous, men respond to images, symbols, personality, and to principles. In his struggle to understand the mighty forces and the glorious beauties about him, the individual strives to respond knowingly and effectively to that great mosaic of expressions in Reality which science calls Nature and religion calls God.

Confucius, the master moralist of China, once said:—

Religions are many and different but reason is one. The broad-minded see the truth in different religions. The narrow minded see only the differences.

It is wholesome practice to occasionally separate one's self, at least theoretically, from all localisms, creeds, and cults, to watch the millions of human souls from the

savage to the highest philosopher, and, in all forms of religious worship, to struggle for self-realization and self-expression. In such an attempt to view the whole of religious response, the differences in doctrine and in ritual are minimized and there merges gradually the *Common Soul of All Religions*. This Common Soul is as evident in the worship of the savage as in the great master. It is the striving of the ego for a fuller realization of self, a fuller realization of the Great Universal Intelligence out of which all things come; a fuller realization of the relations which exist between the self and the not-self; and a constant struggle to maintain the most satisfactory adjustment possible.

Man, the most complex of all nature's creations, is of many types and many tendencies. In every place and in every age he differs greatly but no discussion of him is complete without the recognition that before everything else he is incurably religious. Religion does not represent a mere stage in the development of man out of which

he emerges into a more perfect state. It is a process and a phenomenon of man's growth forever present in every stage of his evolution.

Man is not religious because of the social habit of his ancestors. He is not religious because of some habit which has been forced upon him. He is not even religious because of his own choice. He is religious because of certain fundamental characteristics which make him man and without these characteristics he would not be man. As long as he is man, he is therefore necessarily religious.

The Common Soul of all Religions grows out of man's universal tendency to solve certain great unavoidable problems. These problems were once mentioned by that eminent scholar and teacher, Lyman Abbott. They come as a natural result of man's intellectual gifts. These gifts of nature represent those peculiar characteristics which differentiate him from the animal and from the lower orders of life.

It is in man that the awareness of self or self-consciousness first makes its appearance. This consciousness of self is not so pronounced in the lower types of the race but grows progressively with developed man. It finds its clearest statement among the great philosophers in the profound question, "What is Man?" It appears early in all religious literature. The declaration of the Hebrew prophet is a fair example. "What is man that thou art mindful of him? And the son of man that thou visiteth him?"

The struggle to sense the inner nature of self has been the sign-board which has pointed the way through the ages to greater and greater philosophical researches. It is the basis of much of the religious urge and the central problem of psychology.

As the mind becomes aware of the nature of self it becomes aware of its relations to the not-self, or the forces by which it is influenced and with which it must reckon. In the midst of these perplexing forces the second great problem arises: "What is the nature of the forces among which I find myself?" In the primitive forms of this problem it is much less definite. The object of study is less unified, nature presents itself as chaotic forces, but the same phenomenon of the self trying to understand the not-self is present. At first the world appears to be capricious, uncertain and unorganized. Gradually its forces become more unified into groups of pagan gods and finally merge into the unity of one Great God. Then the question: "What is God?" becomes the central problem of philosophy.

As man becomes more and more aware of his own nature, he finds that certain adjustments to the not-self produce satisfaction, and certain adjustments produce pain. Different paths are open to his conduct. Independent choice becomes inevitable. Reason concerning results that certain modes of conduct will have on his welfare plays an ever-increasing part in his life. Out of this condition

comes the third unavoidable religious problem: "What is the right relation between man and God?" The various answers which man gives to these three questions constitute the philosophy of every sect and every creed.

As he becomes aware of his power to make an independent choice between the different possible ways of acting, man becomes conscious of his responsibility to make the right adjustment. At this point a fourth question emerges in his religious development. "How can the proper relationship between God and man be brought about?" From this question, either implied or stated, grows every organized ritual and sacrament of the various groups.

The ritual or sacrament is organized according to the best intelligence of the group and represents what is thought to be the most efficient method of doing honour to and receiving desired help from the controlling forces in nature.

Man cannot help asking these questions. He is endowed by nature with self-consciousness, reason, independent choice, and the will to act in the most effective way. Out of the exercise of these gifts of nature arise all of his metaphysics, ethics, and doctrinal interpretations as well as his numerous rituals and types of organized religions. Since there seems to be no limit to his power to develop along these characteristics, he instinctively feels something of his unlimited possibilities for self-realization and pictures

himself a child of God. This feeling of kinship to the Great Universal Intelligence is the very soul of worship in all its forms. The most undeveloped savage is not without it and the wisest philosopher cannot escape it.

The answers man gives to these great questions are necessarily incomplete. His guesses are many and different, which naturally leads to great variation in his religious philosophy, ritual and organizations. If one tries to understand religion by a study of its differences, he is soon lost in confusion and chaos. He will find it much more profitable to study its common elements. The differences are due to different degrees of understanding and to mistaken judgments, while the soul of religion grows out of the fundamental nature of man and God.

In the lower forms of religion, such as animism, the world is very chaotic. Man reads his own nature into every object. The trees, mountains, rivers, and animals are all endowed with individual spirits. The unity of nature has not yet become evident. Extended observation soon recognizes order in many of the forces, and the millions of individual, capricious spirits are reduced to a lesser number of pagan gods and goddesses. Representing as they do different forces and phenomena, these gods are yet very individualistic and are liable to all the passions and weaknesses of man. Continued observation shows the weakness of some of the hostilities between the gods and in turn reveals a larger unity throughout

the whole of nature making possible the conception of one Humanity, one Truth, and one God. Thus man travels in his religious life from chaos to cosmos. From satisfactions of his selfish desires, to the quest for truth and humanity. From his varied schemes to escape the avenging wrath of his many gods, to a desire to be at one in purpose and action with the purpose and will of the one just and living God.

To sense *The Soul of All Religions* is to see every religious system, every creed, every religious device in its functional relations. God talks to his children in many different languages. The institutions must be very different to meet the different degrees of development. The individual who adjusts to animism as a rule, is unable to adjust to the religions of unity. A man who lives largely in his stomach and sex organs is unable to respond to a higher spiritual philosophy. One group must not judge another without knowing how efficient are the ideals of that particular group in accomplishing the ends for which they are developed. With this point of view, we can honestly ask the question of all religions, all

creeds, and all cults, "How efficient is your system in bringing about a constructive growth in the people you are trying to serve?"

It becomes our business, to sense the great inevitable drive in all religions and to search out the good and give credit for the same. The idea of monopoly must give way to a tolerant and sympathetic attitude. Favouritism on the part of God cannot be a part of a modern adjustment. *The Common Soul of All Religions* grows out of man's urge for self-realization, for self-expression, and for his constant desire for secure happiness. His particular type of religion is always a result of the way he answers the great problems: "What am I? What is God? What is the right relation between God and myself? How can this right relation be brought about?" Gradually we realize that we see only in part at any given time, become less dogmatic, and more appreciative of the efforts of others. Not until we have reached this attitude are we prepared to do justice to the many religions and do our best to aid them in the particular work they are prepared to accomplish.

HUGH M. WOODWARD

SPIRITUAL EARTHQUAKES

[**Pramathanath Mukhopadhyaya** is already known to our readers. In this article two questions are raised : Will modern science sufficiently expand to include religious science? Will new discoveries, archaeological and anthropological, compel the modern savant to bow with reverence before his ancient peer for possessing a profounder wisdom? The formidable difficulty is the corrupted and deformed condition of religions. Esoteric Science, to which our author refers, is an exact science, but little is known of its real tenets. Without the key which that Esoteric Science offers, the modern investigator will not be able to decipher the real meaning of his excavations and finds, and so will not succeed in valuing the Wisdom of the ancients. That Esoteric Science formed the very foundations of what was once the Universal Religion. In every age, under every condition of civilization and knowledge, the educated classes of every nation made themselves the more or less faithful echoes of one identical system and its fundamental traditions. What was this system, this source? If coming events are said to cast their shadows before, past events cannot fail to leave their impress behind them. It is, then, by those shadows of the hoary past and their fantastic silhouettes on the external screen of every religion and philosophy, that we can, by checking them as we go along, and comparing them, trace out finally the body that produced them.—EDS.]

Even careful scholars have sometimes permitted themselves to be led away by hasty conclusions in matters in which conclusions are to be expected only at the end of the enquirers' journey.

The cement of facts collected should be allowed to set, before any top-heavy theory structures are sought to be built upon them. The universe of knowledge, like our Earth herself, has an uncanny knack of readjusting itself by earthquakes which not only crack, but pull down, structures not firmly built on the granite bedrock of truth. These spiritual earthquakes may have their epicentres in the realm of new findings or in that of new conceptions. We shall illustrate this by two examples.

The complex of ideas, beliefs and practices which we call Hinduism is, admittedly, an amalgam of several factors. It may also be that the incidence and coherence of these factors have not been a homogeneous occurrence with reference to what in mathematical language we call the co-ordinates of Space and Time. They may have been diverse in their space and time "origins". Nevertheless the Hindu concept has, on the whole, been an organic unity in spite of some parasitic growths now and then, and exotic graftings here and there. Scholars have been wont to divide its evolution broadly into three stages—Pre-Vedic, Vedic and Post-Vedic. Historically, such divisions may stand the

strain of future earthquakes. But it has to be remembered that the order of regional distribution and of historical sequence of vital and spiritual events is but a superficial and tentative scheme, conventional and convenient, but not deep and dependable. The geologist is not deceived by what meets his eye on the surface strata of the earth. He knows that there are bends and faults of the rocks concealing deeper links and affinities of formations. So also must the historian of spiritual history take stock of the deep, dynamic, vital links and affinities which underlie what but meets his eye on the surface screen of space and time. He should take deep borings before asserting that such and such spiritual entities had or had not existed in the Vedic or Post-Vedic Age, or in this region or that. There may be a live, dynamic background of affiliation and co-ordination beneath and behind all superficial diversities of regional and historical cultures. On that background perhaps the Pre-Vedic, Vedic and Post-Vedic all stood, met and co-operated. The "orthodox" historian may miss that background of *élan vital*, and notice only the isolated, spasmodic origins and endings of spiritual entities, the forced robbings and borrowings of spiritual values. He only knows that a particular idea or institution was borrowed or "grabbed" by this country or by that. But to those seers to whom the dynamic background itself is revealed, great creative ideas are never born, and are never borrowed or robbed, but

subsist, and can only be embodied and vehicled suitably to the competency of a given age or assemblage of men. It is the conditions of their latency or patency which vary in different ages and types of culture. The seers will see and discern where the blind will not. Some apparatus may be delicate enough for all lengths of the spiritual wireless waves. Others will respond only within limits. The common historical testimony as to how and when and where great creative ideas and institutions originated and spread should therefore be admitted with the door not bolted and locked but left ajar or even wide open.

That the above is not merely a "mystic" precaution has been proved again and again by many a sharp rap and many a rude knock. Where that rap or knock has not been answered soon, the door has been burst open, and the new apparition or vision of fact has spelled confusion to those who have bolted themselves in. Events in recent history have been many. Nineteenth-century science had bolted herself in with the "billiard ball" atom and a universe caught and secured by the net of Newtonian Dynamics. But towards the close of the last century she began to hear the strange rap on her door. She has now come out in the open. The universe is no longer a prisoner. It is now on parole. The atom is no longer an atom, but has proved a universe in its turn. The old bars and fetters have fallen away and no new ones have yet been forged. It seems as though

Science might after all sign their release order. And with that she will sign her own death warrant also as an opponent of Religion and Mysticism. The opponent dead shall then be the living exponent and helpful component of Spiritual Experience.

But let us come to archaeology for an illustration. We all know how the wonderful cave-paintings and bone-engravings of the pre-historic cave dwellers of Spain and France have proved a riddle. In the face of such findings, we are called upon to substitute an altogether new set of values for those that so far have been in vogue in the appraisalment of the pre-historic man and his "lower cultures". Some have seriously thought of a lost continent to reconstruct the logical chain of the genealogy of this finely artistic "savage".

Another illustration we shall take from the realm of modern physical theory. In the ancient lore of different countries (including India) the material universe has been likened to a vast sphere. In India, the Scriptures describe it as *Brahmānda*—the Cosmic Egg or Sphere. The Indian Book of Genesis commonly begins with a Primordial, Undifferentiated Cosmic Stuff which it calls *Ap* or *Apsu*. In that Stuff, the Creator casts the "Seed" of creation. The Seed grows and expands to become the Great Egg or Sphere or Universe. The underlying idea is threefold. First, the physical universe, though immense in dimensions, is still a bounded system,

which, however, does not mean that there may not be myriads of other universes beyond the universe of our ken. Secondly, the "boundedness" of the physical universe implies that it may be possible for an appropriate agent—say, the light ray—to go round it. Thirdly, that this universe grows and expands—also perhaps contracts and oscillates—with reference to a possible nucleus. These are the clear implications of that ancient idea of *Brahmānda*.

For long this idea has been regarded as queer and childish. The immature primitive mind thought of the universe around it after the pattern of the "egg," and it was prompted in this by the sight of the blue dome of sky or of the luminous belt of the Milky Way round the starry firmament. The analogy of the egg has no application to the material universe as a whole. Space is limitless in all directions, and the universe is unbounded. That it grows and expands (one of the root meanings of the word *Brahman* in *Brahmānda*) is a fantastic idea. That has been the orthodox cosmology of Science. But this, too, has been shaken by a recent earthquake. Relativity ideas have proved the curvature of space and, with it, the boundedness of the physical universe. The universe has become an immense sphere again. Not only so. Both mathematical theory and astronomical observation require this universe to be an expanding (and, possibly also, contracting and oscillating) universe. To sum up, it has become the old *Brahmānda*

again in all essential features. New Astrophysics may not yet be thinking in terms of the "egg". That is perhaps because its thought of the physical universe is still abstract mechanistic thinking, and not vital, spiritual thinking which is concrete and complete thinking. It is, however, thinking of the universe in terms of the soap-bubble blown by a child. The bubble expands and, possibly, bursts at last. Bursts into what? That is more than one can say. Is this idea too—backed as it is by formidable mathematical reasoning and accurate observation—childish? If so, the ancient seer and the modern savant have both been playing in short clothes.

But let us come nearer home and somewhat nearer our own times. Yoga, Mysticism, the Cults of Shaivism, Shaktism, and so forth, form, and have for many centuries formed, an integral part of the Hindu complex. They pertain to the core, the nucleus of that complex. The tendency of modern scholarship has been to regard all this as primarily Post-Vedic. There have been some vague references to Pre-Vedic sources, Dravidian or otherwise, in the case of some minor features. But, generally speaking, Yoga and the rest are believed to be both alien and subsequent to the culture of the Vedic Aryans. These formed no part of the "simple animism" of the Vedic hymnners. They were exotic. Now, as regards the first point (that they were alien and

exotic), we shall not say anything here beyond this: that we do not certainly miss them in the background and spirit of Vedic culture; that there always existed an esoteric side to that culture; that the *Āranyakas*, including the *Upanishads*—note that both the terms meant रहस्य,—hidden, mystical—co-existed with the ritualistic side as its counterpart and the culmination of Secret, Esoteric Doctrine, not necessarily in their present forms and linguistic garbs, but in spirit and substance; and, finally, that even the *Purana* which is, or appears to be, historically the latest, was, in its fundamental form as the tradition of Ancient Wisdom, the earliest axis of that *Vidya* or Culture.

As regards the second point—that Yoga, Shaivism, and so forth, are subsequent graftings on the Vedic Cult—the unearthed findings of what now is called the Indus Valley Civilisation have proved a very unsettling earthquake. Yoga, Mysticism, Shaivism, Shaktism, and the rest *did* exist in that Pre-Vedic Age. Not only so; they formed part of an ancient culture which was not confined to the bounds of India, but stretched far and wide. In fact, the Indus Valley findings appear to have closed the circuit with the dynamic background, the *élan vital* of human spiritual experience, to which we referred. So Yoga is not something quite new. History ought to be more careful and less assertive now.

PRAMATHANATH MUKHOFADHYAYA

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE PORTRAIT OF AN EGOTIST*

[**John Gould Fletcher**, whose acute analysis of Amiel we publish this month, is known on both sides of the Atlantic. Perhaps by reason of his ancestry and environment (for he has Scottish, Irish and German blood in his veins, and was born in the United States), his interests are very wide and include music, painting, metaphysics, mysticism and oriental art. With regard to religion, he believes in a fusion of Buddhism and Christianity. His publications include both poetry and prose, and he is a contributor of critical articles to several periodicals. Mr. Fletcher is one of our early contributors, having written in the September number of our first volume on "Blake's Affinities with Oriental Thought".—Eds.]

The reputation of Henri-Frédéric Amiel has suffered a great eclipse in the present-day world of European political dictators, Bolshevik experiments, civil wars in China, militarism in the far East, non-co-operation in India. And it is no wonder. The reader of the modern age is generally too hurried and too harried a person to read through a *Journal Intime* which records, with painstaking and minute analysis, every detail of the life-long failure of an obscure Swiss professor to attain either worldly success or inner happiness. It is enough for us to know that Amiel was highly praised by the most prominent Victorians, notably Matthew Arnold, for us to ignore him. For the Victorians, with their universal faith in mechanical "progress," their lofty lip-service to Puritanism, and their gnawing doubts and distrusts whether, after all, God *was* in his heaven and all *was* right with the world, are more remote to us to-day than the men of the thirteenth century. Neither the modern mystic or the modern

materialist are ever again likely to pay any attention to them.

Nor do I think that, in Amiel's case, this publication of further extracts from his *Journal* is likely to bring him back to favour. The new extracts tell us something more about the man, but nothing new about the writer. Here are the same heart-searchings, the same details of dilatoriness and procrastination, the same desire to be fundamentally virtuous, without being able to distinguish between real virtue (which is always heroic, never a matter of rules) and the conventions of society; and the same useless and futile self-reproaches, as in the larger *Journal*. The new extracts only reveal that into Amiel's life, when he was thirty-nine, and sexually virgin, there came a young widow with a six-year old son who offered to him not only marriage, but who would have gladly consented to become his mistress, if he could have agreed to take her. He dallied, parried, discussed the possibility of another match with a man she did

* *H. F. Amiel: Philine*, with an Introduction by D. L. MURRAY (Constable and Co. Ltd. London. 5s.)

not love, and in the end yielded, when past forty, only to recall another woman, whom he named Egeria, whom he had kept waiting for him for nine years. Philine—for so he named the young widow—was grateful to him for his somewhat pedantic protectiveness, devoted to him as a slave, and would have gladly married him, but he felt that marriage would have implied emigration from Geneva, where he had already vegetated for twenty years, and was doomed to vegetate for the rest of his life. (Why he should have wanted to emigrate, unless he was afraid of some scandal with Egeria, it is impossible for us to say.) But as with his still-born literary ambitions, again here he dallied, idled, refused to assert himself, leaving in the end both Egeria and Philine desolate, and angry at each other (for of course he had told each of the other's existence). Such is the unheroic, tragic, absurd, preposterous story that these pages unfold.

If this revelation of masculine perverseness—carefully suppressed from the pages of the original Journal as published by Scherer, Amiel's intimate friend,—is not enough to disgust the world with Amiel, then I do not know what will. Unfortunately, he was presented to the gaping Victorian audience by Matthew Arnold, as a man too tender-hearted, too conscientious, to profit by experience at another's expense. But here is final proof that this indecisive character made two women suffer, and the introduction to these pages

mentions two others who also loved him, and suffered: Fanny Mercier, who helped to edit the original Journal, and Celestine Benoit who likewise pursued with him a long Platonic flirtation that ended only with his death. If not to make others miserable is in itself a virtue then we can truly say of Amiel that he did not possess it in any degree. He possessed it, indeed, to a much lesser extent than the rake, Casanova, about whom Havelock Ellis has truly said that he seems to have left no woman either heart-broken or resentful. Nor can we say of Amiel that the sufferings he caused were due to mystical scruples, to a feeling that he was dedicated to some higher service to God than that of the flesh. The opening pages of this Journal are in themselves proof to the contrary. There we find him cultivating voluptuous thoughts by reading all the outspoken pagan authors: men like Martial, Ovid, Parny, Byron. His "purity," which misled Matthew Arnold into admiring him, was neither a natural inclination, or forced on him by anything more than the conventions of the provincial town where he lived. It was the mask of an imagination which revelled in ideas of impurity, which it did not dare to carry into practice.

What sort of man, then, was Amiel? A careful reading of the Journal, or of this supplement to it, will supply the answer. He was, fundamentally, an egotist. Equipped from youth with an interest in speculative thought, and the apt pupil of the great meta-

physical leaders who were, at the time, recreating German philosophy, he returns to Geneva to assume a minor post as teacher, and remains there apparently without ambition for the rest of his life. Meanwhile, he is writing his Journal, which reveals how torturing his ambition really is. It is the sort of ambition that can never make decisions for itself, never listen to the voice of instinct which says to man what, for him, is the right path—it is an ambition which forever falters and hesitates, wishes forever to be assured from without as to the course to follow, and finds no moral support in itself—is in fact continually swayed by others. It is just because it is incapable of following any course of action out to its logical end, without hesitation or remorse, that Amiel's character becomes thus enmeshed in himself. He analyses, picks himself to pieces, puts himself together again, lets events carry him along, shrinks from any decision. He himself says of himself that his character was "feminine". Never was a diagnosis more profoundly mistaken. To live as Amiel lived is neither to be feminine, nor masculine, but neutral—and to be neutral is to be egotist: it is to lack either sympathy enough or hatred enough with whatever the world has to offer of good or evil, to be able to make up one's mind in regard to it.

It is for this reason that I, personally, am unable to agree with Mr. D. L. Murray, who says in the introduction to this volume, that it "is an unrivalled exhibition of

what Mr. Hugh P'Anson Fausset has brilliantly diagnosed as 'the disease of dualism'. It exhibits the sufferings and failure of the divided consciousness with a clearness and poignancy not easily to be matched in modern literature." What seems to me to be rather more characteristic of Amiel, is his intense limited self-consciousness. He can literally not feel what Philine felt, nor Egeria, nor any of these other people, because he lacks the imagination to put himself in their place. He has neither the mysticism nor the practicality to see anything beyond himself. And just for that reason he is profoundly unable not only to meet life, but do anything more than deny it. As he writes, in a lucid moment:—

I should be happy to be either the author or the critic. Both have arrived, have done something, and made names for themselves, while for a long time I have taken the road that leads nowhere, and have, as it were, wantonly and in a sombre frenzy, torn up my flowers, destroyed my seeds, wasted or killed my gifts, sterilized my life, squandered my savings and my memories, conspired against myself, against my success, against my race and my name. I have, so to speak, pursued and sought out with a diabolical instinct the means to annul myself, to make myself barren, powerless, useless, and have almost succeeded. Actually I am despoiled of character, of individuality, of memory; I have no object, no intellectual capital; I have neither wife, nor children, nor home, nor any longer youth, no credit, no influence, no self-confidence, no smiling future. My frenzy is spent. And whence did it spring? From the shame of having a desire and from the fear of not being able to satisfy it.

Distrust of fate and weakness of will, that is what has made me entirely negative, what has driven me into indifference and inaction. So as not to be refused by fate, I have asked nothing of it. So as not to be humiliated, I have wished for nothing. So as not to be conquered, I have not fought. So as not to be mistaken, I have affirmed nothing and made no choice. So as to remain independent, I have forsworn all ambition, and renounced all power—Zweifel, Verzweiflung, Diabolus.

That the will-to-power, suppressed and negated, only rankled all the more in this man may be proven by the above passage, no less than by every page he wrote. What could have cured so deep-rooted an egotism? Only, I think, the study of some of the great mystic utterances of the past. The single sentence from the *Bhagavad-Gita*, "Perform action without attachment to action" makes the entire *Journal* unnecessary. That the mystic solution also demands renuncia-

tion and sacrifice is obvious—but they are real renunciations, real sacrifices, where what has been sacrificed and renounced is also fully valued and known. Amiel suffered from the Puritan element implicit in Christianity, which wrongly classifies the sins of the flesh as being more evil than those of the spirit, and supposes that anyone can be pure without being able to distinguish clearly between purity and impurity. The mystic discipline, on the other hand, sets before man a higher goal: to "put off holiness and put on intellect". From the dark night of the senses, or of the soul, to the light of full intelligence that goes through both unscathed—such must be the aim of the mystic. But such a solution would have shocked Amiel; just as the solution offered by Jesus, was, as St. Paul says, "to the Greeks foolishness".

JOHN GOULD FLETCHER

LIFE BEFORE AND AFTER DEATH

[Modern and ancient views are to be found in two recent publications reviewed below. The former takes no cognizance of the doctrine of Reincarnation; the second deals with it from the standpoint of Buddhism. Next month we will publish an article on "Reincarnation" by Clifford Bax and also a study entitled "The Mind-Body Problem in relation to Human Survival," by Prof. K. R. Srinivasiengar.—Eds.]

I'

The moment is opportune for taking such a cross-section of current thought on the question of soul survival as is represented by this symposium, which originally appeared as a series in *The Spectator*. Within our generation, the defenders of Materialism have struck their colours

en masse; only a few invincibles, like Prof. G. Elliot Smith, still battle on against overwhelming odds. It is noteworthy that he alone of the seven contributors is as whole-hearted in his conviction that soul survival is a myth as Mr. Christopher Dawson is that the equally untenable after-death teachings

* *After Death?* A Symposium. Ed. by Dr. Edwyn Bevan. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London. 1s.)

Dr. Edwyn Bevan. (Methuen & Co. Ltd.,

of the Roman Church represent truth and fact. Surprisingly, these two base their respective attack and defence less upon soul survival than upon the resurrection of the body, a long-closed issue among thoughtful men.

All seven, however, exhibit, in varying degrees, the curiously circumscribed vision so characteristic of Western thought. They almost completely ignore the results of millenia of profound philosophic thought in the East. Otherwise, in the series we should find, surely, more than a single passing reference to reincarnation, which more to-day believe in than deny, and which is at least as philosophically tenable as the views here expressed. For the contemporary Western mind, what lies beyond the Caucasus deserves in truth the name of "undiscover'd country".

The next most striking feature of several of these views pro and con is the assumption that belief or disbelief is but hypothesis—in Dr. Bevan's phrase, "a personal conviction of which no cogent logical demonstration can be given". Implicit in this argument, and doubtless unsuspected by those who advance it, is arrogance. Between the lines is written: "We do not know;

we do not see how it is possible to know; therefore it is not possible to know; therefore none know." The validity of this syllogism rests on the omniscience of the writer, which none of these, we think, would claim.

Prof. J. Y. Simpson believes that it would be "supreme unwisdom" to deny on the basis of our incomplete and rapidly growing knowledge, and the President of the Society for Psychical Research points to the amply demonstrated, if occasional, power of the mind to "gain access to all sorts of knowledge beyond its conscious range. We are beginning to understand that each one of us is greater than he knows, that we are composite beings only feebly represented by our bodies." The Hon. Mrs. Alfred Lyttelton points also to—

the testimony of so many religions and great religious teachers . . . as evidence at least of the intuitions of mankind. Join these to the discoveries of psychology and psychical research and the cumulative effect on many minds seems irresistible.

Dr. L. P. Jacks has one end of the thread that would lead out of the maze of speculation in his conviction that the roots of belief in a future life lie "in the depths of the life-force which actuates us all".

PH. D.

II¹

Not in any way interested in "eschatology" which term she detests as "absurd" (p. 17), Mrs. Rhys Davids is interested only in "anchistology," in the next step that is to be taken. In a delightful booklet, she has summed up the message of Gautama Buddha embodied in the earliest Pali Texts: life is a splendid opportunity to follow the path of Dharma with a view to the realization of the MORE in man. It affords, according to her, perhaps the most convincing and satisfactory answers to the eternal interrogations of earnest inquirers—Whence came we?

Whither go we? What ought we to do? Buddha's answer indicates "the life of the man as preceding this life on earth; this life as a moment, an opportunity to ensure a better next life"... (p. 87) She complains that this message of the Founder was completely lost in the monastic encrustations that had collected in the subsequent works and treatises. She claims that early Buddhism "had a distinctly New Mandate, a mandate eagerly welcomed when first given, but subsequently worsened and then virtually dropped" (p. 9).

If Mrs. Rhys Davids had confined

* *Indian Religion and Survival*—A Study. By Mrs. Rhys Davids, D.Litt., M.A., President Pali Text Society. (Allen and Unwin, London. 3s. 6d.)

herself to a reasoned demonstration of the normal excellence of an ancient Buddhistic Mandate that this life is to be viewed as an opportunity for the realization of the MORE in man and that the task of realization, incomplete in any given existence, indicates survival with the indispensable concomitant of "adjudication" and "awarding" (p. 18), she would have been entitled to unstinted gratitude. She however, accuses the Upanishads of silence about the "adjudication," "awarding," and of absence of "consistent theoretical unity" (p. 17). She accuses Dr. Radhakrishnan of having tripped in his treatment of Buddhism, and I may add of the Upanishads, the Gita, and the Brahma-Sutras as well ; but has she not herself taken a false step ?

An inaccurate citation from Dr. Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* (I, 115) and an examination of stray Upanishadic texts divorced from their contexts would hardly justify her arraignment. According to Indian tradition the Vedas relate to ritualistic programmes (कर्म कांड), and the Upanishads to metaphysical quest (ज्ञान कांड ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा). If Mrs. Rhys Davids desires to view the Vedantic tradition from the correct perspective, she should regard the Upanishads, the Gita, and the Brahma-Sutras forming a textual *tout ensemble*. She will find the elements of "adjudication" and "awarding" of man by man in the *tout ensemble*. If Mrs. Rhys Davids should seek to argue that, in the structure of Vedantic literature, a survival is a direct or indirect borrowing either from the early Buddhistic Pali Texts or from Zoroastrianism, it would be a matter of opinion which the students of the Vedanta are under no obligation to endorse. Borrowing or no borrowing, chronology or no chronology, the mandate contained in the "Dharma-Sutras" like that of Gautama, and in the "Mokshadharma Parva" of the Mahabharata shines forth with a splendour in no way inferior to that of the mandate embodied in the ancient Pali Texts. "Karma" as a consis-

tent doctrine is found in the *Brihad-aranyaka* :—

पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति । पापः पापेन ।

(By holy work verily a person becomes holy, unholy by unholy. III, 2, 13.)

Man's responsibility to fellowmen is indicated in the same Upanishad :—

यन्मनुष्यान्वासयते यदेभ्योऽन्नं ददाति ।

(He houses men and feeds them, etc.)

No doubt life is a splendid opportunity to realize the MORE and enable our fellowmen to realize the MORE likewise. But it is unintelligible why Mrs. Rhys Davids fights shy of the view that the values of life are to be transcended as misery-ridden. Every life, every existence, has in it the element of misery. Even the last birth in which atomic residue of the Karma-complex is finally shattered has the element of misery. The monastic ramification of later Buddhism must be right in its emphasis on the element of misery and on Nirvana as escape from it. The Upanishads have gone one step further. If man enjoys his birthright and right of way "in the worlds" (p. 89), disillusionment would surely dawn as these worlds are evanescent and perishing :—

तद्यथेह कर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयत एवमेवासुत्र पुण्यजितो लोकः क्षीयते.

(Just as in this world, the world obtained by means of actions perishes so also does perish the next world acquired by virtuous deeds.—*Chhandogya* VIII, 1,6).

The Upanishads indicate the goal of "freedom from transmigratory career" (अपुनरावृत्तिः).

My comments notwithstanding, I feel sure Mrs. Rhys Davids has earned the undying gratitude of students of Indian thought for the powerful vindication of the glory of the gospel of Buddha to whom, she rightly contends, a position of inferiority was assigned by W. Lutoslawski, though I for one cannot accept her view that the last word on the subject has been uttered by early Buddhism.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

MONADS OF LEIBNIZ

Leibniz (1643-1714) was a man of penetrating mind. His interests were as wide as they were certainly profound. He made his influence felt in many spheres, and in the varied roles of politician, historian, theologian, mathematician, physicist and philosopher his contributions have been of the highest importance. It is fair judgment to say that, with the possible exception of his invention of the calculus as an instrument of mathematical enquiry, it is in the field of philosophy that his influence has most largely endured. As subsequently systematised by Christian Wolf, his teachings not only dominated German philosophical thought for over a century, but also considerably influenced the subsequent trend both of the critical philosophy which followed it, and of the new ideas as to the fundamentals of such physical concepts as force and energy in the realms of pure science.

There is at the present time a very ambitious scheme, undertaken by the "Akademie der Wissenschaften" of Berlin, for the publication of a complete edition—in no less than forty volumes—of the works and papers of Leibniz. The plan, with but five volumes thus far issued, is still in its infancy. Until it is available, C. J. Gerhardt's edition in German remains the most comprehensive, and indeed supplies the main sources for Mary Morris's excellent translation now under review. It is pertinent to remark, however, that the main English commentators of recent years on Leibniz's philosophical writings are Bertrand Russell, in his *Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (1900), and Professor H. Wildon Carr's more recent *Leibniz* (1929). At the modest price of the Standard Everyman Edition, however, Mary Morris has now made available to all students familiar with the English tongue a compact and authoritative volume, every page of which

breathes care and discrimination in selection. The "meat" is there, and the reader need have no fear as to the omissions. The work is arranged in three Parts—the first giving in complete form the three essays ("The Monadology," "Principles of Nature and Grace," and "On the Ultimate Origination of Things") that best embrace the formal exposition of Leibniz's Philosophical System; Part II, gives, in the form mainly of various extracts from letters, the bulk of the amplifying evidence for Part I; and Part III is mainly of interest as giving us valuable glimpses of the man Leibniz behind the philosopher. To all this is prefaced a most able introduction, running to ten thousand words, by C. R. Morris, M.A.,—a well balanced and critical survey of the Leibnizian tenets of philosophy as set out in the translations that follow.

A quick word as to the personal setting of Leibniz is here advisable. He lived in the philosophical stream of the Cartesian School founded by Descartes (who had died when Leibniz was but seven years old), and he was contemporary with Spinoza and Locke. His philosophical duels were, in greater or lesser degree, fought with all these. Descartes, discussing the problem of doubt, came to the bedrock certainty of his own existence. "Cogito, ergo sum"—"I think, therefore I am," since to doubt he must think, and to think he must exist. But this existence was positive not in the bodily, but in the mental sense—the same difference as is implied between the statements "As sure as I stand here," and "As sure as I am now thinking". The certainty of Descartes was, however, in respect of a consciousness of self, limited, finite and imperfect, and therefore involving by implication also an idea of something unlimited, infinite and perfect.

Descartes essentially attempted his explanation of physical nature on a

* *The Philosophical Writings of Leibniz*. Selected and translated by MARY MORRIS. ("Everyman's Library," J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 2s.)

mathematical and mechanical basis. Natural, perhaps, that he should do so, having regard to the times in which he lived. (Galileo, for example, was a noted contemporary.) With Descartes there was a clear demarcation between mind and matter. Both to him were "substances" in that they existed on their own account, and could each be conceived only independent of the other. But for him "matter" was that which was extended (arising from a clear and distinct idea of extension apart from thinking), whilst "mind" was that which was conscious (arising from the idea of thinking apart from extension). It was the problem of the union of mind and matter in our own persons, therefore, that gave the Cartesian philosophers some trouble. This problem was worked out in terms of a mutual independence of each other, but of a common continual dependence upon God as the source of all existence. It was in fact the problem of "individuality," tackled on bolder lines by Spinoza, in one direction, and by Leibniz in another. Spinoza, however, continued to think in the tradition of the world of Galileo and Newton—the world of mechanics and physics. Distinctions between organisms and individuals find no place in the physicist's world. For him the truths of mathematics and mechanics are final and complete in themselves. The results are common property and the mere heritage of the historian of facts. But, and readers of THE ARYAN PATH will well appreciate the point, for the poet and the artist and the moralist this will not do. For him the utterances of the physicist or of anybody else cannot be divorced from the personality of the individual.

It was thus the problem of individuality that occupied Leibniz's mind. Definitely he could not see it in the physical atom, which, although physically indivisible, yet by virtue of its extension in space must have parts. And the same must apply in their turn to the "parts" also. Therefore real individuality, which for Leibniz demanded

a necessary real indivisible unity, cannot be found in the thing itself, but only in souls which have no extension in space. So Leibniz teaches that these "unities," or "monads," as he calls them, are the only realities, and that what is material or extended is but a phenomenon. There are monads which may *appear* to be things, because they *appear* to be extended. Actually they have the same kind of unity a soul has; and if they are not conscious of themselves, neither, after all, is a soul. If Descartes says, "I think, therefore I exist," Leibniz adds, "but when I am not thinking, as in sleep, my soul does not cease to exist". According to Leibniz, "little perceptions are going on in the soul even when we are not conscious"—(note here the forerunner of the modern doctrine of the "sub-conscious" in the science of psychology). So, therefore, the monads which make up the universe are not only, for instance, what our souls would be if we never reasoned, but also what our souls would be if we always slept, either with dreams or without. Similarly there are monads, or individualities, corresponding to the bodies of plants and animals, and even of bodies not ordinarily regarded as "living". All are of the same nature as, but differing in capacity from, the human soul. Further, no interaction is possible as between monad and monad, since each is a perfectly independent individuality and unity. Happenings are for each monad the outcome of its own nature. As Leibniz put it, "there are no windows by which anything can come in or go out." Yet if there is no interaction there is an interrelation—a "pre-established harmony" which produces an appearance of interaction which does not in fact exist. In man, for example, there is pre-established harmony between the highly developed "monad" which is his soul, and the many less highly developed monads which make up the body. Pre-established harmony leads therefore to the universal order chosen by God—the Supreme Monad—to give "the best possible of all worlds"

out of an infinite number of possibilities. This conclusion is reached by what Leibniz calls the "principle of sufficient reason"—a principle over and above the principles of mere logic and mathematics.

Such, all too briefly, is a summary of Leibniz's doctrine of the "Monad". Space unfortunately prevents a reference to the other aspects of Leibniz's philosophy and of its repercussions on modern physics and mechanics as brought out in this excellent little volume. But we would in conclusion direct the reader to a section of *The Secret Doctrine* (Vol. I, Part III, Chapter 15) by H. P. Blavatsky, entitled 'Gods, Monads and Atoms' which traverses the field of "Monadology" from the special viewpoint of Theo-philosophy. The link with Leibniz is at once apparent from the following (p. 614) :—

Neither esoteric philosophy, nor Kant, nor Leibniz would ever admit that extension can be

composed of simple or unextended parts. But theologian-philosophers will not grasp this.

And if Madame Blavatsky was not prepared to admit of Leibniz's teachings that they were wholly right, she at least goes more generously near to it than she does for any other Western philosopher. So she says (pp. 619, 620) :—

It is well known that Leibnitz came several times very near the truth, but defined monadic evolution incorrectly, which is not to be wondered at, since he was not an INITIATE, nor even a Mystic, only a very intuitional philosopher. Yet no psycho-physicist ever came nearer than he has to the esoteric general outline of evolution.

How near or how far the reader can decide for himself by first reading through Mary Morris's excellent little book, and then turning to the chapter from *The Secret Doctrine* here indicated, in which Leibniz is given a very fair and a very thorough consideration.

IVOR B. HART

Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind. By CHARLES WILLIAMS. (Oxford University Press. 6s.)

There is a memorable line of Milton's to which Mr. Charles Williams returns more than once in the course of his exploration of that schism in the soul of man which religion in the West has named "the Fall," but which he studies here in the expressive record of English poetry. It is the line in which Satan speaks of

Warring in heaven against heaven's match-
less king.

The tragic paradox of man's rebellion against a Divine Will which can never be defeated is condensed into these seven words. Satan, to quote Mr. Williams, "has rebelled, in the name of freedom, against the central nature of freedom". He knows the futility of his act, knows that unless he can reconcile himself with heaven, there is nothing for him but an ever-deepening hell. But to be reconciled with heaven requires an acceptance of the nature of Love, and that

cannot be without a complete self-abandonment. But Satan is self. He has asserted his partial identity with such splendid daring against the pure identity of God. Is he to surrender, not merely his pride and ambition, but his rational independence and self-respect? His egoism cannot tolerate the thought. He will stand upon his rights. He will have his private freedom, but God who, as Love, is perfect freedom, must be subject to his conditions. And so all that he can do is to go on madly warring with heaven's matchless king. Hate which destroys itself must maintain its feud against the Love which can never be destroyed.

Thus in "the pitiless imagination of Milton," as Mr. Williams calls it, we see figured in its ultimate starkness the irrationality of man's rational disobedience. But there are many stages in that futile but necessary rebellion of a rational selfhood against the true Reason of our being. And in this book Mr. Williams delicately defines some of them as they are revealed by various

poets whether explicitly in actual dicta about poetry or implicitly in the very texture of their style.

A poet himself, he regards every true poem as a complete whole, and as a creation which has, in a real sense, a consciousness of its own which the reader must intimately experience. Consequently the pure nature of the poetry he studies does work on him immediately and what he discovers for us in it is, we feel, its essential meaning, passed through the analysing lens of his mind. There are times, perhaps, when he is superfluously subtle, but the depth and fineness of his insight is a constant satisfaction and the more so because he carries even into the abyss of reality a certain high gaiety of spirit.

He begins with Wordsworth's description of poetry as expressing passion, which itself "is highest reason in a soul sublime". And then, after a short chapter on the inexpressible quality of Beauty as Marlowe conceived it, he shows how, in Pope, Reason split up into discursive and intuitive reason, how Spenser sought to combine Reason and Beauty, but with too conscious and external a contriving, so that the truth which he allegorized into loveliness faded beneath the loveliness; how, in a different way, Keats, too, in his Odes to the Nightingale and Grecian Urn sought to leave the "dull brain" behind in order to be free to assert that beauty was truth, truth beauty, but how his genius in its integrity compelled him to recognise that he had evaded reality in a fancied luxury of death that was no death. And so to Milton and Shakespeare, in whom the dread schism of reason and desire, the awful reality of the disintegration of beauty and truth by which the one becomes a temptation, the other an intellectual lie, was expressed with a power and penetration unequalled elsewhere in

English poetry. In them Mr. Williams finds the complementary hemispheres of imagination. Milton has imagined a sublime Reason, which is both Truth and Beauty and also absolute Power, in control of the Universe and in relation to the contending and contradicting states of divided souls. Shakespeare has abandoned this supernal Reason and traced the conflict deeper and deeper until in some sense he has "imagined earth, under the influence of the operation of falsehood, ravening upon itself". Over "Paradise Lost" the Creative Reason sits enthroned, in its uncreated purity. In "Lear" Unreason, violating the very sanctities of Nature, carries us into the abyss of destruction. The antithesis cannot be pushed too far. For there are Shakespeare's last plays to be considered. And Mr. Williams writes of the atonement which he expressed in them with sensitive understanding. It may be that "some new Augustan coolness," to quote his own words, "may have to rebuke the romantic heat" with which he explores the complex meaning of Shakespeare's tragedies. But he has read in him or into him, as he has, even more lucidly, in Milton's great epic, a spiritual drama of the highest significance. For here we are shown in and through the testimony of great poetry the reality of man's separation from the living universe, the loss of identity which goes with it and the devastation of reason as well as sensation, to which it ultimately leads. But Mr. Williams does not, like so many of his contemporaries, dethrone Reason because reason has usurped its place. For him Reason in its eternal purity is the chief faculty of the Soul and the poet fails to reconcile Beauty and Truth in his art, as we all do in our lives in the measure that we deny our real perceptions and "choose to know otherwise than in the duty and delight of love".

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

The Will to Fuller Life. By J. H. BADLEY. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London. 10s. 6d.)

This book is written by a headmaster for the benefit of boys and girls in their last year at school. It arose out of discussions with the pupils, and is a continuation of the author's previous book, *The Will to Live*. It has all the merits and limitations of a text-book for young people. But the pedagogic weaknesses of dwelling too long on the commonplace and the obvious, of repeating the same thing in several different ways and of dividing and sub-dividing and numbering the points to be driven home are more than redeemed by clear exposition, cogent reasoning, apt illustrations and above all by the serious and sane outlook on life throughout the discussion. The evident and acknowledged source of the teacher's inspiration is the emergent evolution of Professors Alexander and Lloyd Morgan.

From that point of view the creative urge that is responsible for the production of matter, life and mind is also responsible, at a higher level of being, for the so-called spiritual values of truth, beauty and goodness. The fullest manifestation of the will to live is the struggle towards a diviner life, of which these values are a foreshadowing and a pledge. They grow as man grows. They are different at different stages of the history of the race as well as of the individual. Mr. Badley has discussed in very simple language all the implications of truth, beauty and goodness as well as their origin, development and purpose. He has written a very persuasive book on a subject which vitally concerns us all.

The spiritual values of truth, beauty and moral goodness which have emerged at a certain level in the psychological evolution of man are not entirely unconnected with his animal instincts. It is not fanciful, says Mr. Badley, to regard the three kinds of spiritual good as being directly connected with

the three groups of human instincts—those of self-maintenance, of reproduction and of herd-life.

Thus the love of truth seems to be in direct connection with the first group of instincts; with that one in particular, curiosity, which impels us to learn all we can about our surroundings in order the better to deal with the situations in which we find ourselves. The love of beauty is no less closely connected with the reproductive instincts to which so much of the actual beauty of living things is due, and which have to do with creativity in all its forms. And if it be allowed that the 'ought' of moral activity is the outcome of social experience, the connection between moral good and the group-instinct is no less evident.

Fortunately this trend of thought proves no snare to us in the twentieth century, as it did to some nineteenth-century philosophers in England, who persisted in judging a tree by its roots and not by its fruits. We are not likely to be misled into thinking that evolution is working to merely biological ends and not spiritual ends. Love of truth, love of beauty and love of goodness may have had their origin in a biological necessity, but they attain their fullest development only when they are wholly dissociated from self-interest. Not only that. The hard and fast lines that we draw between them begin to fade away when the self is left behind. The highest values meet at the other end, interpenetrate one another and pass into the Great Unknown, of which all that we can say, according to the Hindu sage Yagna-*valkya*, is *neti, neti*—"not this, not this," not truth as we know it here, not beauty as we know it here and not righteousness as we know it here.

Thus all paths lead to religion, as all values inhere in God. Therefore the teaching on the Will to fuller life cannot be complete without a chapter on religion. But the author says that this subject has been left for separate treatment. We hope his future book on religion will be as cogent and convincing as the present one on the implications of science, art and morality.

Theological Existence To-day! By KARL BARTH, trans. by R. BIRCH HOYLE. (Hodder and Stoughton, London. 2s.)

Christ Himself was eclipsed, in the West, when the Western Church herself distorted the image of Christ, changing herself from a Church into a Roman State, and again incarnating the State in the form of the Papacy. Yes, in the West, Christianity and the Church truly exist no longer, though there are still many Christians, nor will they ever disappear. Catholicism is truly Christianity no longer; it degenerates into idolatry, and Protestantism with giant strides runs down the steep into Atheism.

Dostoevsky wrote those sentences a year or two before he died in 1881. Could he see Europe to-day, he would be forced to believe that the State has swallowed the remains of the Church—and that therefore we have reached the end-term of Lutherism. Everything in this book, which reveals the degradation of the German Church, compels that belief—except the courage and integrity of its author.

The present régime in Germany has been defined as a "sergeant-major civilization". The State is absolute. That is, temporal power—and only temporal power—is worshipped. As an inevitable consequence, the German Church has become the slave of the German State. It is necessary to cite only a few of the facts given by Dr. Barth in order to show the extent of that servitude.

Army-Chaplain Mueller is *Reichs*-bishop, and is therefore the spiritual leader of Germany. He was appointed despite Church protest, and von Hindenburg's expression of sympathy with that protest. He is Hitler's nominee, and has the support of the "German Christians". As these latter also control the Central Church Press Bureau in Berlin, their doctrines are dominant in Germany to-day.

Summarized, these doctrines are as follow:—

1. The Church has to prove herself to be the Church for the German people.

2. She must help the people to understand and fulfil the vocation entrusted

to her by God, as this is the ultimate purpose of the present government.

3. The acknowledgment of the majesty of the National Socialist Government is not only a matter of citizenship, but also a matter of religious belief.

4. The Gospel in future must be preached as the Gospel of the Third Reich.

5. The Credal confession must be expanded in the sense of a fierce attack against Mammonism, Bolshevism, and anti-Christian Pacifism.

6. The *Reichs*-bishop is the spiritual leader who is personally responsible for the ruling decisions.

Now, all of that comes to this:—Render unto Cæsar the things that are God's. Any attempt to attain Christ's stature is abandoned. Christ is to be reduced to the level of men. He is to doff his seamless coat and don a Brown Shirt. Well, that is "war-time christianity"—and we in England have known it, and the horror of it.

Those are the doctrines of the "German Christians". Dr. Krause—recently elected to the Synod Council at a meeting of the Brandenburg Synod of the Evangelical Church—is more explicit. Recently, he stated:—

It is an impossible idea that one can acknowledge the Third Reich and yet obey God more than man. We must return to a native scheme of values, retaining as much of Christianity as will stand this new test.

And Dr. Barth's answer to all this? His answer is—No! It is a magnificent and a courageous answer. The reasons for his refusal to accept "German Christian" doctrines are given on pages 50 to 53. It is essential, however, to quote in full one of those reasons here.

The fellowship of those belonging to the Church is not determined by blood, therefore not by race, but by the Holy Spirit and Baptism. If the German Evangelical Church excludes Jewish-Christians, or treats them as of a lower grade, she ceases to be a Christian Church.

But Dr. Barth's book—which must be read from cover to cover by those who wish to know the present position

of the Church in Germany—raises by implication a question greater than any actually discussed in its pages. It is this. What inner failure has made this degradation of the Church possible? It is not persecution. Persecution does not degrade a living Church any more than danger paralyses a living nation. Greatness is always greatly opposed—and grows greater as a result of opposition. What, then, is that inner surrender which (in an institution as in an individual) is the forerunner of degradation? Dr. Barth holds that "Where the Church is a Church, she is already delivered". And, if she is a Church no longer, what has deserted her that she stands defenceless?

A living Church represents man's belief that he has a supernatural environment as well as a natural one. The Church exists to minister to his eternal welfare; the State to his tempo-

ral. To the former, man is a soul. To the latter, he is a citizen.

In fact, the institutions of Church and State—the compromises and the conflicts between them—are projections on a mighty stage of the individual's response to the claims of his dual environment. Where the supernatural, the eternal is venerated—the Church is mighty. Where the natural, the temporary, is worshipped—the State is mighty.

Once a Church ceases to be the temple and the symbol of man's belief in the eternal, she is no longer a Church. She is a ruin, misty with memories. And so soon as man believes that temporal power is the one reality, the State becomes absolute. Life is no longer conceived as a pilgrimage, but as a battle.

Men get the Church, and the Government, that they desire—and therefore deserve.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

The Indian Theatre. By R. K. YAJNIK M. A., PH. D. (Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 10s.)

Dr. Yajnik has written an excellent survey of the Indian drama from the golden age of Kalidasa to its decline after the Mohammedan conquest and its revival under British influence. He deals with the classical period and the medieval popular stage, not with the idea of writing exhaustively on these phases of dramaturgy but rather as a background to what followed in 1756 when India had her first British theatre in Calcutta. The writer is singularly qualified to deal with the Indian drama to-day, for he obtained first-hand knowledge after a long tour of important theatres in India, a tour which included the study of MS. copies of various plays and the perusal of the diary of an eminent producer. Dr. Yajnik seems to think that "it is as great a reward of scholarship to appreciate the deep unity in apparent diversity, as it is to enjoy the subtle distinctions between the arts and literatures of diverse nationalities at

various stages of their evolution". In no carping spirit I venture to think that the author stresses unity in Indian and European drama a little too readily. The differences are quite as marked. It is true Shakespeare deeply impressed India. No less than twenty-nine of his plays were translated and adapted, though not all staged in that country. It was not Shakespeare in modern clothes, as we had him in London, but Shakespeare made to fit into the rich heritage of the Indian stage. Dr. Yajnik realises the unfortunate influence of the cinema in India, and is aware of the popular craving for scenic effect on the stage. Crude imitation has naturally failed. What is wanted is "a thoroughly Indian Ibsen or Shaw who would tackle contemporary problems with the earnestness and artistic appeal of those writers". Although Dr. Yajnik sees in the Indian theatre to-day "a state of utter confusion," he is also aware of signs of hope, an approach to a period of "self-unfolding".

HADLAND DAVIS

John Galsworthy: By HERMON OULD. (Chapman and Hall Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

William Morris. By PAUL BLOOMFIELD BARKER (Arthur Barker Ltd., London. 10s.)

"There are not enough lovers of beauty among men. It all comes back to that." Thus wrote John Galsworthy in *The Burning Spear* just after the War. There are not enough lovers of beauty in the world. It all comes back to that—is a sentiment which William Morris, whose name is more closely associated with the word Beauty than that of any other Englishman, would *not* have uttered. He imagined that love of beauty is innate in all men, and he gave his life in the endeavour so to change the social scene that all men would enjoy beauty and produce it. The illusion that men are better than they are is what made Morris a great force. The knowledge of what men are made Galsworthy a great novelist.

Mr. Hermon Ould has performed a very friendly and self-effacing task in writing this book. It amounts to a general cracking up of all Galsworthy, providing a sort of anthology of his work, mercifully unburdened by quotation marks and dots. It puts us in a position to look at Galsworthy as if we were in the auditorium of a cinema being shown in rapid succession all the facets of his work. The author takes exception to the prevalent idea that Galsworthy was the typical Englishman, on the ground that he attacked the foundations of society. I do not follow him. One of the chief English traits is that of self-criticism. Galsworthy was typically English—never more so than in his innate decency, charity, stiffness, tightness, uprightness, pity for animals, sedate shyness, love of fair play, ignorance of philosophy, and blindness to the meaning of religion as opposed to creeds. On a subject such as Immortality we can only expect from him absolute clichés about "merging" and indirect digs at "those Yogi chaps in India". But he could go deep when not realis-

ing it, far deeper than Morris was capable of. In "The Inn of Tranquillity" we read:—

... Suddenly I was visited by a sensation only to be described as a sort of smiling certainty, emanating from, and, as it were, still tingling with every nerve of myself, but vibrating harmoniously with the world around. It was as if I had suddenly seen what was the truth of things, not perhaps to anybody else, but at all events to me . . . "Yes," I thought, "he and I and those olive-trees, and this spider on my hand, and everything in the Universe which has an individual shape, are all fit expressions of the separate moods of a great underlying Mood or Principle, which must be perfectly adjusted, revolving and revolving on itself. For if It did not volve and revolve on itself, It would peter out at one end or the other, and the image of this petering out no man with his mental apparatus can conceive."

Galsworthy was too typically English to suspect that this was philosophy—and the *only* philosophy. But he uttered it. William Morris was no seer. Mr. Paul Bloomfield has written a very likeable account of this many-sided man. He has obviously got a lot out of Morris and is so fond of him that he is inclined to think him always in the right. However, the reader is given ample opportunity to draw his own conclusions. Morris was not supreme in any one form of expression. He was supreme as an all-round man—and that is as good an achievement as excelling in one thing. He was poet, prose-writer, decorator, architect, painter, printer, lecturer, sociologist. There is no use pretending that he was a good poet, for he only wrote easy verse, or a remarkable prose writer, for in that form he lacked muscle to the extent of making his *Tales* unreadable, though in *The Dream of John Ball* and in *News From Nowhere* he does reach at times the beauty of expression which only his style could attain. And as he refused to countenance the new birth, industrialism, in any degree whatever, his decorative work, the furniture, stained glass, tapestries, wall-papers, carpets modelled on an old birth, were out of touch with the historic moment and hence only of museum value. All this

escapes Mr. Bloomfield who calls him a great *wise* man. William Morris was not wise. There are not two or three ways of being wise: there is only one—that of facing reality. A man with Morris's immense force of life might have changed the course of industrialism before it was too late. But he preferred to talk of reviving the Middle Ages, which somehow does not sound quite so ridiculous as attempting to revive Athenian or Roman life, but belongs nevertheless to the same order of thought. Morris was idealistic about Beauty: Mr. Bloomfield does not see that, but what he does see from the beginning of his book to the end, is that Morris was absolutely realistic about ugliness. He knew that life was made ugly for most people, and this hurt him so much that he gave a moral force to the Socialist movement that is still felt. He gave a lot of material help to the cause in financing it, in acting as editor, newspaper boy, lecturer, song-writer; but it was his moral weight that still tells. He said that fellowship is heaven and that lack of fellowship is hell. I have suggested that he was not supreme in anything. But in that active fellowship which is heavenly he was supreme, and in the supreme decency of this

great man we may hope to see the most typical English trait. Once at a public meeting a professional heckler asked him—

"Does Comrade Morris accept Karl Marx's theory of value?" Comrade Morris answered: "I am asked if I believe in Marx's theory of value. To speak quite frankly, I do not know what Marx's theory of value is, and I'm damned if I want to know."

Nor do we know what that theory is. But we do know what the facts are; and it is to the English Morris rather than to Marx that we must look for the moral force to overcome them.

But as regards final English typicality let us remember that Morris was prepared to make a spectacle of himself in the street selling pamphlets and getting moved on by policemen. And let us remember that Galsworthy spent his life in showing up the injustice of the rich towards the poor, and in pouring upon the latter an ocean of pity; but the only political action he was ever known to take was when he came up from the country in 1931 especially to vote for the Prime Minister who was exchanging the cloak of socialism for that of conservatism. A reviewer is not called upon to decide whether the action of Morris or of Galsworthy is representative of the English genius.

J. S. COLLIS

The Transformation of Nature in Art. By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY. (Harvard University Press. \$3.00. Humphrey Milford, London. 12s. 6d.)

This book, besides being an invaluable study of Oriental æsthetic theory, offers a basis "for a general theory of art co-ordinating Eastern and Western points of view". Until the Renaissance the Christian art of the West corresponded in essentials with the art of India and China; and an illuminating exposition of the dicta of Meister Eckhart is given in support of this. The Asiatic response to art is described as being predominantly intellectual, "a delight of the reason," the work of art itself being "the stimulus to the release

of the spirit from all inhibitions of vision," or what Eckhart called "the vision of the world-picture as God sees it . . . intellectually and not merely sensibly". Again, the deeper implication of this æsthetic theory—namely, that "life itself—the different ways in which the difficult problems of human association have been solved—represents the ultimate and chief of the arts of Asia"—is echoed by Eckhart in so far as he regarded the artist "not as a special kind of man, but every man as a special kind of artist"—that is, faced with his own particular problem of human association.

Unfortunately, however, the fact that both Asiatic and Christian art are

conformist, conservative and rigidly orthodox is likely to alienate even the most sympathetic Westerner to-day—who could not be reassured by Mr. Coomaraswamy's rather enigmatic assertion that "orthodoxy, for the East, is determined by what a man does, and not by his beliefs," when the whole purport of the book is an uncompromising rejection of the empiricism which that one isolated sentence would seem to imply. For the Westerner, the strength of virtually all post-Renaissance European art lies in its empirical nature. The Renaissance itself was an emphatic declaration that man could no longer abide by prescribed theories: a widening divergence was apparent between the intellectual apprehension of God and the manifestation of his being in man's nature. Man could no longer conform to a pattern of which he did not feel himself to be an organic part; it became necessary for him to "prove life upon his pulses"; and if all life was good, if "God's idiosyncrasy was being," then it was incumbent upon man to explore his own unplumbed potentialities that he might know God as a reality rather than as a hypothesis. And it is impossible for the modern Westerner to go back upon that gesture of the Renaissance; his humanism may have led him into some queer paradoxes, but fundamentally he knows that the way of truth is always hard, a continual process of trial and error; he knows, too, that in the realm of art to repudiate the religious fervour of a Beethoven or the passionate quest of a

Keats—whose life was like a steadfast flame in which the dross of falsehood was consumed, leaving only the Real, the True and the Beautiful in their inevitable unity—would indeed be to sell his birthright.

Nevertheless, we feel that an understanding between East and West is already much nearer than Mr. Coomaraswamy would imagine. For, once we have accepted that first racial difference wherein the nature of Eastern genius might be said to be abstract and that of the Western concrete, there remain many points of contact. The more responsible kind of Western criticism to-day very definitely asserts that naturalism is not art, that substance and form must be interdependent and indivisible; while realism is relegated to the category of mere inartistic *fact*, simply because it is a mode of expression in which Nature is not transformed, by the artist's subtle and individual craftsmanship, into a revelation of artistic *truth*, or ultimate reality. Surely, then, the implications of such an attitude are concomitant with Mr. Coomaraswamy's description of a work of art (that is, "a stimulus to the release of the spirit from all inhibitions of vision"); and is it not true that, while the Eastern artist works in the freedom of a formal tradition and the Westerner in the tyranny of a freedom in which he must perforce be his own arbiter, the goal of each is identical—namely, that universal spiritual truth which alone, in the last resort, can traverse the barriers of race and creed?

J. P. HOGAN

Clerambault, or One Against All. By ROMAIN ROLLAND. Trans. from the French. (Jackson, Wylie and Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

Man is a product of the social and economic conditions under which he lives. Like every other animal, he owes his character to his environment: he does not spring fully-armed from the mind of Jove with power to bestride the earth like a Colossus. He is

dependent upon his surroundings, human as well as physical. His whole nature is deeply dyed to the colour of the life obtaining in that part of the world to which he belongs by birth and tradition. He is a gregarious animal whose individuality is a product of his social relations. He is, in fact, part of the social organism, and until he recognises himself as such he cannot see himself for egotism.

This being so, the theoretical problem of pacifism, with which this novel deals, is far more difficult and complex than they can understand who lay claim to a childish individualism. To the child, peace or war is rightly a matter of personal inclination since he can have little or no objective appreciation of society; but the case is far other with a grown person. In order to be an intelligent pacifist a man must first be an intelligent nationalist. What that implies is a bone of great contention; but since it is indisputable that we are as purposefully born into nations as we are born into families, we cannot claim to be citizens of the world merely by espousing the sentiment of formless internationalism. A beggar might as plausibly lay claim to all wealth. Willy-nilly each one of us draws his life's blood from the body of his own national organism, and if the blood of that organism is enfeebled or becomes infected, in vain does the individual disown the infection. Therefore the individual pacifist who prides himself upon his pacifism is merely one who does not understand his place in the body corporate—one who meanly propounds the question "Who is my neighbour?" Merely to disclaim the inherited vices of the community to which we belong does not free us from them. So when the individual pacifist claims his pacifism as a virtue, the claim is specious. It is a claim to isolation from the life of the community, a claim to privilege, and virtue based on privilege is merely parasitic.

Hence the unbearable conflict which went on in the mind of every intelligent man who was required to bear arms in the late war. Society and tradition enforced that which humanity and religion forbade. The dilemma presented itself finally in some such form as this: Am I to outrage those susceptibilities which distinguish me from the beast because I realise that I am part of the organism whose activities in the last issue involve this outrage; or, am I, in the name of humanity, illogically to disown the corporate life to which I

belong, and to inhibit in myself an activity now manifestly become destructive? And to the question thus presented I confess that I, personally, could find no answer that offered a true dialectical resolution. Yet an answer had to be found; the necessity for action demanded it.

As always in such dilemmas the only valid appeal was from theory to practice, from the question to the questioner; for it is in himself as an organism, and not merely as an intellect, that the true answer lies. Therefore in my experience, when I appealed from the complexity of thought to the simplicity of action, it was to enquire: Are you *in your totality* able to do those things which war requires of you? And to that there was but one reply: a final and irrevocable no, which dispelled all questions of choice.

Yet this absolute conclusion was at once personally humiliating and spiritually enfranchising. To be incapable of solving the matter intellectually and thus to be driven back upon the simple fiat of consciousness was victory in defeat. I was humiliated to find myself a "Defeatist," a "Conscientious Objector". To break faith with the past was death to personal pride. But the casting away of arms amid the ruins of one's own making brought with it the sense of resurrection to unity with the emergent purpose of life. Self-concern ceased. Whatever the issue, it lay with that life which only required one's obedience.

I have stated the case for complexity at this perhaps inordinate length precisely because I feel that Romain Rolland's novel does it scant justice and that his advocacy of pacifism upon the basis of entirely virtuous individualism, however eloquent, plays straight into the hands of opposing counsel. "One against all" is far too simple; for if the individual is to be set over against "the mob" in everlasting opposition, then the redemption of the world is a fond daydream of self-indulgent superiority. In *Clerambault* the individual is set over against society in the

terms of vice against virtue. Clerambault himself is described as "a good idealist," "on the whole a good poet and good man, intelligent and somewhat foolish, pure in heart and feeble in character," a description which really denies him the right to the prophetic mantle with which he is disguised. He is awakened from his complacent dream of peace to the "engulfment of the individual soul in the abyss of the multitude soul," and the contrast between these impossible antitheses is maintained as a fundamental law of human ethics. One can only remember, in mitigation of this false simplicity, that the book was written while the War was actually in progress, when an emotional rather than a philosophic treatment of the subject was natural.

Here it has been productive of a sentiment and rhetoric quite unworthy of its famous author. Moreover the anonymous translator has done almost his worst, ignoring the English idiom and constantly perpetrating such sentences as this :—

They were proud of him [*i.e.*, Clerambault] as if he had been their work. What one admires is somewhat as if one had created it. And when, in addition, one is part of the being admired, when one is of the same blood, one no longer distinguishes very well up to what point one comes from him, or if it is he who comes from you.

So that, on the whole, it seems to have been hardly worth while making an English translation of a work, completed seventeen years ago, which was, when it was written, little more than a humanitarian gesture.

MAX PLOWMAN

The Horizons of Thought: A Study in the Dualities of Thinking. By G. P. CONGER, Ph. D. (Princeton University Press. \$ 5.).

This is a companion volume to the author's earlier book *A World of Epitomizations*. It sets forth the epistemological presuppositions of the latter, namely, that perception and thinking are implicitly dual :—

When we think of the universe or any of its parts, our thinking.....proceeds as perception does, by selection and at the same time by a correlative neglect.

What we select, we are said to treat denotatively or connotatively, *i. e.*, either by mere designation or by characterisation. What we neglect forms the background of what we select. This neglected field transcends our actual knowledge. It is what we are necessarily ignorant about, and have to leave indeterminate. Our treatment of it is designated by the author as enotation and innotation to correspond respectively to the two forms of actual knowledge. The author thinks that—many difficulties in classical and contemporary philosophy are due to mistaken attempts to treat neglected...backgrounds, which are beyond the horizons of our thinking, as if they were, or in any ultimate sense could be made, parts of its selected....content.

The author examines in Part I some dualities, nine in all, involved in perception and thinking. He then enters into a study of most of the current problems in logic, mathematics, ontology and cosmology and freedom and values, and considers each problem under five heads. Under A, he defines his subject. He considers, under B, what he calls inadequate and questionable treatments which approach the traditional problems by way of certain psychological and epistemological theories, such as skepticism, realism-idealism, intuitionism, etc. Under C, he considers those treatments of problems which are in terms of other problems without seeing, as he thinks, "that the answer in terms of the second topic really involves the same formal principles and horizons, in short the same problems of duality, under another name". The third class of mistaken ways of dealing with the problems involving dualities, is dealt with under D. Here he examines certain unwarranted descriptive statements, affirmative, negative, alternative (either-or), antinomial (but-and), and nihilistic (neither-nor), which according to him point beyond the horizons but do not point to anything definitely descriptive there.

The mistake is like running a football out

of bounds and expecting to continue the game.

Lastly, he considers, under E, the nine dualities as they are applicable to every problem within his six realms of logic, number, geometry-kinematics, matter, life and mind, which according to him "are in transitive relationships of inclusion, or 'container and contained'."

His conclusion is :—

The cosmos which we are able to apprehend in perception and comprehend in thought is an island, and all around it is an ocean of the unknown.....Our island or continent of the cosmos invites exploration, cultivation, and perhaps even *settlement*. Traditionally we have looked too much to the enotative, the transcendent, for our grounds and sanctions. The task of metaphysics is to explore our island-continent; the task of philosophy, of religion and of ethics is to show what are the conditions of our settling down and being at home in it.

There will be general sympathy, if not whole-hearted agreement, with the author's view that all our knowledge at whatever level implies an indeterminate field of which we remain necessarily ignorant. The existence of the indeterminate in some sense is forced upon our thought. To think is to prescribe limits, and everything beyond these limits is perforce to be left undefined. But evidently, once we have admitted this necessary limitation of our knowledge, we cannot leave it there. It is just where metaphysics ought to begin and not, as the author thinks, to stop. It is the business of the sciences to explore the field of our actual knowledge, the island-continent as our author calls it. It is the business of metaphysics to venture out into the transcendent and to try to take a whole view of things. This it can only succeed in doing when it ceases to put too much reliance upon ordinary logic, and evolves a new logic that will be hand-maid to those intuitions of reality that, in the words of William James, "come from a deeper level of our nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits". The author is shy about put-

ting "reliance upon intuition as a way of synthesizing and reconciling the oppositions of thinking". But either these oppositions are reconcilable or they are not. If they are, we must somehow rise above thought, and endorse Hocking, for whom—

the ultimate evidence for the selfhood of the whole is not primarily the evidence of argument, nor of analogy, but immediate experience interpreted by dialectic.

If they are not, metaphysics is not possible, and there is little mental satisfaction in the study of—

some principles according to which thinking is limited to various horizons, and some principles whereby intuitions afford us a formal confidence and resolute grasp when we try to carry our connotative knowledge into the enotative future.

The author shows wide acquaintance with the present day writers on logical, scientific and philosophical subjects. His references to them are very copious. But unfortunately his treatment of the different topics, which comprise a very wide range, is not very satisfactory. It is scrappy and disconnected; there is no consistent working out of any topic from a single point of view. This entails much distraction on the part of the reader who has to pass in rather rapid review all possible forms under which a subject may be approached or talked about. The book contains much information and many useful suggestions, but no solutions of philosophical problems. If anything, the author's conclusion would seem to be wholly negative. He does not give us a new method of tackling problems of philosophy, but simply shows the limitations of all possible knowledge with the implication that we must have the transcendent alone and remain satisfied with the connotatively known finite universe. But the truth is that the finite cannot be properly understood without reference to the Infinite. The Infinite alone is the true Reality, knowing which, as the Upanishads say, "all else is known".

Encyclopædia of Psychic Science. By NANDOR FODOR LL.D., with Preface by Sir Oliver Lodge, O. M. (Arthurs Press Ltd., London.)

Psychic Science, as defined by Dr. Fodor in his Introduction, "embraces both psychical research and spiritualism" which are "purely empirical and merge into orthodox science". Within the limits of this definition Dr. Fodor has collected, summarised, and arranged a vast amount of information. His book contains no less than 832 closely printed columns, and the Index shows that about 900 different subjects are dealt with. Most of the more important topics in psychical research and spiritualism receive full and generally satisfactory treatment; the leading authorities on each are quoted or referred to, and bibliographies are appended. Among the other subject-headings appear the names of writers, experimenters, mediums, societies, and periodicals. One gathers that the author himself is inclined to the spiritualist point of view but in most cases, where either the reality or the explanation of the phenomena is disputed, he adopts a judicial attitude and quotes from both sides.

Dr. Fodor dismisses "occultism," "theosophy," and "mysticism" all in some twenty-five lines, and thereby—some of us will think—makes his work much less useful than it might otherwise have been. The explanations of psychic phenomena, put forward by H. P. Blavatsky in the 1870's and 1880's, are sufficiently weighty to deserve mention in an encyclopædia of the subject. What she said, for example, about the part played by the astral body of the medium in materialisations and other séance room phenomena has been confirmed by the recent re-discovery of ectoplasm; but the still more significant theory of "shells" has been studiously ignored by psychical researchers and spiritualists alike, although it supplies a consistent and logical *via media* between the conflicting theories of those who attribute all the phenomena to "spirits" and those who deny that ex-carnate agencies have anything to

do with them. Dr. Fodor's article on Madame Blavatsky is almost entirely taken from hostile sources, notably Dr. Richard Hodgson's report to the Society for Psychical Research; and although he includes Mr. W. Kingsland's overwhelming criticism of Hodgson in his bibliography, Dr. Fodor shows no sign of having read it nor indeed any other statement of Madame Blavatsky's side of the case. In fact his interest in her is limited to the psychic phenomena, with which she was associated, and these he condemns merely because they were condemned by Hodgson who, it must always be remembered, did not himself see nor investigate any single one of them, but based his verdict on the tainted evidence of people who received money from the Madras missionaries for their testimony against Madame Blavatsky. We trust that Dr. Fodor, who does not usually display bias, will revise this very one-sided and unfair article when preparing the second edition of his book.

It is probably inevitable in a work covering so wide a field that some subjects should be given too much space and others too little. For example under *Spheres* we are given a long summary of the statements of various mediums the value of which may be gauged from Dr. Fodor's remark that "every trance information asserts something different". While, on the other hand, the enormously important subject of *Time* receives only the briefest of treatment. Mr. J. W. Dunne's deeply interesting book, *An Experiment with Time* is casually referred to under the heading "Dreams," but is not mentioned at all under "Time" nor under the author's name.

But, while the *Encyclopædia of Psychic Science* is open to criticism in some of its details, the work as a whole has been excellently constructed, and promises to be most valuable to all students of abnormal psychology, spiritualism, psychical research, and occult phenomena.

R. A. V. M.

The Eclipse of Christianity in Asia.
By LAWRENCE E. BROWNE, B. D. (Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.)

The author of this interesting book has set himself to trace the history of Christianity in Western Asia during the first eight centuries of Islamic domination. By confining his view strictly to Asia, he has excluded from his survey Constantinople which, for the largest community of Asiatic Christians, was the sun and centre of the universe throughout the period. The Armenian and Georgian national Churches, though of great historical importance, come in only incidentally, while many interesting local sects—*e. g.*, the Maronites—receive no mention; so that it is the history of the Nestorian and Jacobite (Syrian) Churches which he is really tracing, and with these he would appear to have some modern personal acquaintance, though he does not say so. From first to last the attention of the reader is focused upon Mesopotamia, which was in fact the heart of Asia in those days. The work is the result of study in an unfrequented field, and also of much thought. If Dr. Browne lets off the Christians at the time of the Islamic Conquest lightly in his judgment, he does not hide the virtues of the Muslim conquerors; he makes it clear that Muslim intolerance of Christians was very largely the result of the Crusades and, though his information on Islam has largely been derived from definitely hostile sources, he repeats no calumnies, and has one pair of scales alike for Christians and for Muslims.

For all who care to know something of the history, conduct and ways of thought of those Churches, anathematised by the Orthodox of East and West as heretical, which were "preserved within the structure of the Muslim Empire as toads have been preserved alive in rock" (the simile is more striking than accurate as Dr. Browne's readers will learn), this book provides a wealth of information not to be attained elsewhere without profound research; and also a civilised general view of

a period of history which has been the subject of much controversy. Particularly interesting are the chapters entitled "Polemic" and "Christianity under the Mongols," each of which I hope the author will expand some day into a volume. Comparatively few people know that the Christians of Mesopotamia enjoyed a brief spell of triumph after Hulaku had taken Baghdad and, as has always happened in the history of the Eastern Churches, they abused their triumph with disastrous consequences to themselves.

The author seems to have a prejudice against the Turks, for on p. 139 we read "Mahmud of Ghazna, *Turk though he was* (my italics), was a great patron of learning." The historical truth is that, wherever Turks have risen to imperial power, whether at Ghazna, Delhi or Constantinople, they have been among the greatest patrons of learning, art and genius that the world has known. Even the little Seljûq sultanates of Asia Minor were renowned for such patronage. Dr. Browne ascribes the ultimate conversion of the Mongol Emperors to Islam instead of Christianity entirely to a materialistic view of the uses of religion, and he may be right in this particular instance. But he seems to us to take it a little too calmly for granted that the triumph of Islam was always due to people's awe of overwhelming military power and never to an appeal of the religion to men's hearts and minds. One feels that, as an ardent Trinitarian, he is always at a loss to imagine how anyone can prefer Unitarianism, and is apt to look upon the Unitarian as a person of inferior intellectual (or it may be spiritual) status and defective mental outfit, which seems not quite fair. In both communities are to be found those who take a materialistic or political view of their religion and also those whose faith is based on spiritual experience, and the experience which Dr. Browne would call "conversion" is quite as common among Muslims as among Christians; nor do the metaphysical and the ethic of the two religions

appear to me to differ half so radically as he thinks. On p. 181 he has written :—

Perhaps it may sound premature to speak of the fall of Islam when there are still many millions of Muslims in the world, but culturally Islam was a spent force by the fifteenth century.

I would rather say that culturally the predominances of East and West have alternated pretty regularly for the last three thousand years, and are likely to go on alternating. The present power of Christendom (if one may still apply the term to something which is anything but Christian) seems to have reached its zenith and to be threatened with destruction from within; while the culture of Christendom, in which Islam has no small share, is reinvigorating the East without absorbing it. It

seems to us that these phenomena differ not at all from those which marked the day of triumph of Islam. The cause of the decline and fall of Islamic world-power was a strangling growth of scholasticism comparable to the ecclesiasticism which kept Christendom backward in the old days which Dr. Browne so well describes. The Muslims now are casting off that yoke; and, if our author's theory with regard to its propagation in the old days is correct, Islam has never before had such an opportunity of proving its worth as a religion as it has to-day.

The author's personal views are as interesting as the fruits of his ripe scholarship though in a different way. The book is furnished with a bibliography and an index.

MARMADUKE PICKTHALL

Hypnosis and Suggestion. By WILLIAM F. LOVATT, C.S.M.M., G.B.P.A. (Rider and Co., London. 2s. 6d.)

The author studied on and off for six years before attempting any practical work of healing, and, in his Foreword says: "I feel thankful for this God-sent gift and to know that I can be of some service to humanity". But sound motive, unfortunately, does not necessarily imply sound knowledge. He states that the various conflicting theories of hypnotism lead nowhere—which is true—but he rashly goes on to imply that the practice can be safely undertaken, irrespective of the theory held. This fallacy probably accounts for his faulty propositions about the innocuous character of hypnotism, propositions that are contradicted by the very cases he records. To take only one obvious example, compare these two extracts :—

(1) The subject can only be put to sleep and suggestions given as long as he is willing to do so. (p. 29).

(2) ... I was giving a demonstration. One of the spectators declared that no one would

ever be able to have any influence over him, etc. ... I said nothing to him for the time being, but after he had seen two other subjects quickly put to sleep, I suddenly turned to him and gave him a command to close his eyes. He did so at once. "Now you can't open them," I suggested firmly. He couldn't in spite of trying hard.....To day he is a very good and willing subject. (pp. 21-2).

What the author cites as an argument in favour of the process, namely, that many subjects respond to suggestion without needing to be put to sleep, merely proves that many people have so far lost their human birth-right of conscious free-will that they are ordinarily in a semi-hypnotic condition. The man in the street does well to beware, even though mesmerism is potent for good as for evil. For those who have studied the subject thoroughly from the inner point of view, hold that its practice and instruction should be most stringently restricted, since there are very few people who are inherently fitted, intellectually and morally, to use that power with true discrimination.

W. E. W.

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

[A. E. Waite is well-known for his many valuable books—veritable flames of old knowledge which are worth an exchange with more than one modern bulb. Every quarter he will give to our readers the benefit of his researches and reading of the many periodicals containing matter of interest.—Eds.]

It is now some time since Sir Oliver Lodge spoke over the wireless, in one of a series of talks on the importance of Psychical Research, and gave his considered answer to an allotted question: Do We Survive? Under any circumstances, that answer would call for notice in looking back on the psychical events of the last three months; but it is especially important to see how we stand regarding it, because at least one spiritist periodical has termed it in bold headlines a "clear and convincing answer to an age-old question".* It was not put forward as such and does not correspond to the description, except in the unchallengeable sense that it bears unfailing testimony to the speaker's utter sincerity. Knowing Lodge as we all do, respecting and loving him as we must, it would be impertinent to insist hereon. The discourse is otherwise, in all simplicity, an explanation and defence of a personal faith, as the following summary shews. A study of the evidence for some fifty years has assured Sir Oliver Lodge (1) that we are not "limited to the physical body," or to the brief tenure of our earthly life; (2) that we have a larger and more permanent existence; (3) that the spiritual world is a great reality and that there are many man-

sions in the Father's House; (4) that this life is "only the beginning of our pilgrimage"; (5) that there is "scope for talent and enterprise" on the other side; (6) that "our friends come to welcome us when we cross the barrier"; (7) that the veil between the two worlds is "wearing thin"; and (8) that it is possible to communicate with those whom we call dead, "given the right conditions". The beginning of Lodge's conviction on these subjects was derived from trance utterances of Mrs. Piper in 1889, when communications were received from deceased members of his own family, "which unmistakably shewed that they were just as living and active as ever". So far on the personal side, outside which "the last and most crucial evidence has been given since the death of F. W. H. Myers in 1901," an allusion to the results of "an ingenious and elaborate system of cross-correspondences," the records of which will be found in *Proceedings* of the S. P. R. Between the testimonies thus formulated and the grounds on which they stand, we obtain in this manner an adequate and lucid synopsis of a brilliant scientist's mature judgment on the alleged "age-old problem". But those who are in search of authentic certitude on their own part

must realise that behind it lies the whole question of Mrs. Piper's mediumship and the memorials of Myers' *post-mortem* contributions to the enigmatic subject of spirit identity.

The long-outstanding debate on the "Margery" Mediumship has moved one stage further at least in the publication by the American S. P. R. of its continually deferred Report on the charges brought against Mrs. Crandon in respect of the "Walter finger-prints". It is comprised in a large octavo volume of 224 pages, extensive preliminaries, bibliographical appendix and page-plates not included.* Obviously therefore it is impossible to do more than indicate the conclusions reached by Mr. B. K. Thorogood, who has compiled the whole undertaking and is to be congratulated assuredly on the completion of an arduous work, whatever may be the verdict on his findings. It is not to be thought, however, that he stands alone therein: a remarkable preface—which is not that of Mr. Thorogood—speaks by implication with no uncertain voice in the name of the Society at large. The conclusions are: (1) that "there is no evidence of fraud, trickery or the use of any normal mechanism in connection with the séance production of the

Walter finger-print phenomena"; (2) that these are "definitely proved by the evidence to be supernatural"; and (3) that "neither of the Walter hands, as a whole nor as to any of the component parts, is identical with that of any known person or persons". These conclusions are underscored, outside the volume itself, by the Chairman of the A. S. P. R., Mr. W. H. Button, writing in the Society's *Journal*.† This is how the question stands at the present stage of its development: a word only can be added on certain ventures of criticism which have appeared so far in England. Mr. Stanley de Brath, who has devoted many years to psychical and spiritistic research, has produced at considerable length his individual reasons for accepting the Thorogood Report "as final and conclusive".‡ Mr. H. F. Prevost Battersby, who is also known among us, hopes that the "thumb-print controversy" will be buried once and for all in Mr. Thorogood's "competent and conscientious volume".§ We need not take too seriously the epistolary objections of the Rev. Herbert Thurston, S. J.,¶ and may rest content if Mr. E. J. Dingwall continues "to sit on the fence";§ but all persons concerned from all standpoints must be dissuaded from thinking that we have done with

* *Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research*, Vol. XXII, being third volume on the Margery Mediumship. The sub-title is: "The Walter Hands, a Study of their Dermatoglyphics," by Brackett K. Thorogood, New York, 1934. Dr. Crandon announced in London on Dec. 19th last that the work would extend to 500 pp. and 104 plates. The actual plates are 119 and pages as shewn above.

† See issue for January, 1934, pp. 9-13.

§ *Ib.*, February 2nd, pp. 65, 66.

§ *Ib.*, March 2nd, p. 135 and March 9th, p. 150.

‡ *Light*, March 2nd, 1934, pp. 137, 138.

¶ *Ib.*, February 16th and March 2nd.

the Walter prints, any more than with the Margery mediumship. The Boston S. P. R., which first gave space to the charges in its own official organ, may put in a last word or a new "Proceedings". We must wait and see.

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The story of life on this planet, from the standpoint of scientific materialism and subsequently from another standpoint at issue therewith, is contemplated by Mr. Cyril E. M. Joad,* who is known in Psychical Research. He reminds us that, according to Sir James Jeans, "one tiny corner at least" in the mighty universe of atoms has (1) "chanced to become conscious for a time," but (2) "was designed in the end," and this under "the action of blind mechanical forces, to be frozen out," leaving the alleged corner in its precedent state, "a lifeless world". The hypothesis is in a pretty pickle as the wording stands, seeing that the chance came about in connection with a "designed" end concerning it, the undemonstrated designing THAT using available energies to achieve its plan. If this does not postulate conscious intelligence engaged in purposed work, the sooner Sir James Jeans re-edits his theme, the better for a world of readers which may be athirst to understand his drift. But if it does, we are offered the picture of conscious being at the back of the universe setting cosmic machinery at work to destroy the conscious; and this seems intolerable, even

for the foremost files of scientific material thought. On the horns of such a dilemma we must be content to leave the proposition and proceed to that which follows, as unfolded in the contrast before us. If material science is right, life is not only a product of material conditions but "a product of rotting matter preying like a fungoid growth upon the planet on whose surface it crawls". The explanation is that once upon a time our earth was "too hot and too moist to maintain life"; that an external crust formed as it began to cool; that the earth grew colder yet and the crust decayed; that "the evil humours of its corruption bred life, much as a rotting cheese will breed maggots". Hereof is the beginning, and as to the final end, life is "a chance passenger across a fundamentally alien and hostile environment"; and when conditions are no longer suitable that passenger "will finish his pointless journey with as little noise and significance as, in the person of the amoeba, he began it".

We know that story, almost from of old, and called it the Gospel of Slime; but it persists in certain circles and is less or more brought up-to-date. There is also Sir Arthur Keith, who has likened the "soul" or life to the "flame of a candle which goes out when the candle is burned". Mr. Joad says truly enough that the simile begs the question. If we must have "material images to illustrate the immaterial," he would think of the

* *The Contemporary Review*, February, 1934, pp. 177-183, s. v. "The Future and Prospects of Life."

body as a portable wireless set which receives wireless waves; and then at once it would be absurd to argue that if the set ceases to record, the waves have ceased to be. As to the counter-hypothesis which he places over against that of material science, it depicts life as an "immaterial force or stream, of which, in common with all other living creatures we are temporary individual expressions". It uses and directs the physical body, much as the fingers of a skilled pianist play upon his instrument. The picture again is familiar; but Mr. Joad adds that, on such assumption, the brain is like a telephone exchange and "transmits messages which it does not originate". Life in this case is "an activity other than matter" and directs it to its own purposes, much as the Jeans *ignotum quid* is said to apply the "blind mechanical forces". It can act on matter only at a given stage, there being only "certain kinds of chemical combinations which will take the current of life," even as some metals and not others will take that of electricity.

So far we are confronted by rival hypotheses, and predilection only can guide our choice between them. But there is something behind the contrast which places the alternatives in distinct positions. The affirmation that matter produces life is an appeal to a point of alleged fact within the world of physics, and if evidence fails here-on the dogmatic contention lapses. Now, science has sought long and earnestly, but in vain, to produce life

from anything except antecedent life. Bio-chemical research has reached a stage when it can manufacture "many of the organic compounds found in living organisms,"—urea, sugar and starch included. It infers herefrom that if this manufacture could be prolonged till protoplasm itself was obtained, then the "suitable treatment of such protoplasm" might and perhaps would exhibit the phenomena of organic life. Not alone, however, does this desired end remain unattained, but Mr. Joad indicates that its achievement could prove nothing, for that which would be manufactured by chemists would not be life, "but only the material that is capable of receiving it". He adds acutely that the identification of "synthetic protoplasm, which began to behave like a living creature, with the creation of life would be like saying that the builder who constructed a house had created the tenants who proceeded to occupy it." It follows that after all the speculations, all dogmatic findings, and with or notwithstanding all the galaxies of scientific discovery, it is still possible to hold with Mr. Joad, as he holds evidently, that "life is an independent activity which makes use of matter" and that the destruction of this planet would by no means involve that of life itself. It follows also that we can maintain unchallenged the poet's doctrine of the soul coming from afar and the deep things behind it, to which East and West gave witness of experience long ages before biological chemistry made its first experi-

ment. That witness still remains: it is not dead but living; and those who have willing ears in days to come may hear its voice, when our manifold schemes of research have reached their final term.

We ourselves meanwhile can listen to other voices which sound about us in immediate vicinities, and can note how each of them, after its own manner, says unto us *Consolamini, consolamini*, from many zones of thought. All recently, Mr. J. Scott Lidgett has proclaimed that the "Purposiveness of man is aligned with, emerges from, and confirms the suggestion of the Purposiveness of the Universe." Count Sforza reminds us how Francis of Assisi committed the salvation of Christendom to the inner man.[†] He is talking in reality about a supposed "Legend of Italian Scepticism"; but a spark falls from elsewhere and finds expression, since find it must; and it is taken into our hearts, as we take perhaps

that old Hermetic Axiom which pillories those who look without for a *secretum secretissimum et occlusum* that is only found within. Mr. J. C. Crowther recalls us to the "present unsurpassed activity in scientific research";[‡] but he leaves us contemplating "indescribably vast stretches of empty space"; and we wonder—indeed we wonder—whether a higher science will find that void a *plenum*. May it not be about or near the time desired by Mr. J. C. Stamp, when moralists and others will have learned, in the words of Canon Streeter,[§] that "science is the great cleanser: it renders possible no religion but the highest". Does not Dr. G. I. Wade, talking of Thomas Traherne as "Divine Philosopher," sketch the groundwork of this religion in his closing words on Traherne's "exquisite perception of the interrelations between all things in the Universe"?[¶] And the rock of this groundwork lies in the "Unity of life" realised.

A. E. WAITE

The Contemporary Review, March, 1934, p. 314, s. v. "The Phenomenal and Reality".
Ibid., April, 1934, p. 438.

The Nineteenth Century, February, 1934, pp. 208, 219, s. v., "New Particles".

The Hibbert Journal, April 1934, p. 399, s. v., "Must Science Ruin Economic Progress".
Ibid., p. 408.

FRENCH NOTES

"For the last month, the scandal, born of a few individual weaknesses..." (*Le Matin*, February 7th, 1934). An indignant clamour greeted the first words of the speech which M. Deladier read to the French Chamber of Deputies. Individual weaknesses are but a slight aspect of what the Stavisky scandal has revealed. It has unmasked deep-rooted corruption in every branch of the government. France is not, however; the only country to suffer from moral degradation. We see similar dishonesty and corruption in every country; the whole world in its struggle for power, for money, for personal glory, has opened welcoming doors to racketeers, gangsters, thieves, swindlers and blackmailers. They pose as honest citizens, respectable men in fashionable dinner jackets. We have only to cite as examples the Tammany scandals in New York, and the recent bank investigations in Washington, D. C. ! In France such crimes once brought to the attention of the public could not be accepted peacefully, be it due to the more fiery Latin temperament or to a deeper sense of justice and of the rights of man. Confronted with political and financial failures here, all parties, all men, demanded a thorough cleaning of the governmental machinery. They not only demanded this, but fought for it. This manifestation would show that the public still has sufficient moral sense to want justice and honesty, although the immediate evil has not yet been eradicated in spite of the Doumergue Cabinet.

But what shall we say of those who allowed themselves to be used and exploited by Stavisky and his cohorts? M. Mounier writes (*Esprit*, March 1, 1934) on myths,—not the poetic legends, not the fabulous narratives of gods and goddesses, but the stupid, prosaic tales which politicians and financiers present to the average individual, who swallows them with evident relish. Lies, empty words, "the honour

of the party," "the integrity of the leader," fanning ardent faith into a blaze by a shallow appearance of nobility. "The masses, weary of being free, of facing their responsibilities, rush headlong into the ease of myth-believing." M. Mounier exhorts us to lead a revolution against these myths: struggle against the power of the financiers; pave the way for spiritual upliftment and regeneration; and in immediate crisis keep clear of political parties and their intrigues.

And we have other denouncers of evil. Books and especially the theatre have been means to that end; the old comedies of Athens, the great satires of Horace, Persius, and Juvenal; the comedies of Molière where evil was ridiculed and the tragedies of Corneille where honour and virtue were exalted. This use of literature for preaching has yielded many good results but we have had too many realists and naturalists who do not want to paint evil to encourage good, but rather who take pleasure in describing evil for its own sake. It is a sordid pleasure at best; still it seems to attract many. Francis de Miomandre calls this "le crime naturaliste" (*Les Nouvelles Littéraires*, January 20th, 1934) and Robert de Traz denounces the latest fashion in literature which tints most books with a certain vulgarity. (*Ibid.*, Dec. 30th, 1933)

And how easy it is to slip from denunciation of evil to preaching, promulgation of a new doctrine! Here again books and the theatre, and now more especially the cinema, play an important part. We should make a scandal of this too and fight for cleaner and saner productions. Many juvenile crimes can be laid directly at the door of some gripping detective story or some thrilling cinema. Bernard Champigneulle wrote an excellent article on the subject which we cannot resist quoting at length:

The danger is one of importance; so many make of the cinema their bread and meat, their indispensable drink, often their only spiritual food... An illusionary reflection of a distant universe, decked with the prestige of the unknown. To the humble inhabitants of the small towns, after these thrilling and sumptuous pictures, their lives appear too mediocre. ...The young country girl, the young provincial, is tempted to compare her life of work and peace with the marvellous activities of the heroines who flash before her enchanted eyes... They are all more or less consciously influenced... Those who leave home, the ancestral trade, to find adventure in a big city, to seek at least the semblance of independence, of brilliancy; all those whom we know, whom we meet every day, who have thrown aside their apron and their tools to clothe themselves in artificial silk, paint their finger nails and curve their eyebrows à la Greta Garbo! (*Mercur de France*, February 1st, 1934, pp. 554-576).

It may seem a paradox and yet it is true that the screen, for all its influence, is really but a faithful mirror reflecting the trend of our society, its desires, habits and inclinations. One acts upon the other; another vicious circle.

We can even now find some hopeful souls who refuse to believe that we are as bad as we seem. The fundamental principles of our society are still good; democracy is yet in the order of things: it is not facing a crisis. Some, like Rodolphe Laun, say that it is just as healthy as ever and that it is not preparing to meet its last phase. ("La democracie—essai sociologique-juridique et de politique moral." Delgrane). As for capitalism M. Gaëton Piron explains in his recent book ("*La crise du capitalisme*"), that nothing points to an immediate change. He feels that the social system in France to-morrow will be but a continuation of the present mixed and composite elements. For the most part we, the common masses, feel that change is coming and in a way we are eager for it.

Les Nouvelles Littéraires featured a very clever cartoon by Carlo Rim not long ago (February 24th, 1934): "The Carnival of 1934 or the Dilemma of M. Virgule." M. Virgule is confronted at the fancy dress store with the costumes of Peace, War, Fascism, Radicalism,

Revolution, Communism, Hitlerism. Which to choose? M. Virgule comes out of the shop with an elegant costume; a combination of the cap of Revolution, the black shirt of Fascism, the swastika of Hitlerism, the boots and trousers of Communism, the umbrella of Radicalism and the mask and bayonet of War crowned with the olive branch of Peace! Does not this not only represent the state of mind of the Occidental at present but also indicate that his real problem is his weak will and his befogged mind? Why cannot he determine his own mode of life and thus the mode of a new social order? The politician of to-day is like the priest of yesterday—an exploiter of the holy feelings of manhood. The man in the street will not energize himself to enquire, nor induce himself to decide, nor devise his own ways and means to a better life. Does he not get what he deserves?

Before we leave the political field we must call attention to a series of articles appearing in the *Mercur de France* on Germany and disarmament. France's "bête noire," even in the midst of internal turmoil, is still the armament activities of Germany. For France the internal struggle at the advent of the next war will be terrific. Many of course will rise to arms for the sake of the country: patriotism will be the national cry. But there are a great number of men, both among the last war generation and among the younger set, who sincerely desire peace and will refuse to fight. In 1914 some had enough strength to stand up for their great ideal. We heard of well-known men like Romain Rolland. Of the others more humble, we heard but little; they were quietly dealt with. This time there will be many more and the problem will be more difficult to cope with. A mere handful can be coerced or imprisoned, but if the number increases, what is to be done? This is a very serious question and one which is even now puzzling the militarists of France, although they are

counting a great deal on mass influence and group psychology.

One other problem should also be ranked among the most important of the present moment, but which unfortunately has not yet left its rather vague and shadowy background: the colonies. France has always been proud of her way of dealing with the colonies. She is convinced that she is playing the rôle of a kind, considerate stepmother—sometimes a little severe, overzealous to do the best for the foster-child. Her reputation thus taken for granted, other affairs have claimed her attention and she has left the immediate governing of her colonies in very incompetent hands. Several horrifying articles and books have come to light during the past months which reveal the true condition of the natives, the abuses of officers and officials—dishonesty, cruelty, torture. Andrée Viollis set forth facts on Indo-China; Marcel Homet reports on French Equatorial Africa. ("La Vérité sur l'Afrique Equatoriale Française," *Esprit*, March 1st, 1934). There is no intention of throwing discredit on any of the colonies, or upon the colonial regime as a whole. It is merely a question of putting before the public in an objective manner, the true situation, and awakening the interest of those who are sufficiently powerful and sufficiently humane to try to remedy it. We have, of course, had some excellent men at the head of our colonies, such as the Governor General Pierre Pasquier, who died tragically at the beginning of this year in the accident to the "Emeraude". But for one man like him, there are any number who fail miserably in their task. Driven by a desire for personal gain, perhaps by an inborn desire to inflict punish-

ments, these men become absolutely heartless in their treatment of the natives. Sanitary conditions, prisons, hospitals are in a lamentable state. Torture has reached a most refined and ingenious degree. However, in spite of many monthly journals on the economic, social and political conditions of the colonies, on their relations with the Motherland and with foreign countries, it is only through daring people—Andrée Viollis and others—that we are able to learn the truth. If it is given enough publicity, perhaps a new era for the colonies will dawn.

To turn to a more encouraging realm, that of philosophy, we find a masterly account of French contemporary philosophy in M. Benrubi's book: *Les sources et les courants de la philosophie contemporaine en France*. (2 vols. Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine, Paris, Alcan 1933). An excellent review of these two bulky volumes was published in *Revue Philosophique* (March-April 1934). M. Benrubi recognises three distinct currents: one, positive, scientific, a struggle against metaphysics and religion; the second, a critical idealism rising in opposition to the first, fighting against the dogmatism of science, laying down its boundaries and limitations; the third, "a metaphysical and spiritual positivism" inspired by a touch of mysticism. This last is the greatest and highest current, the most fitted "to enlarge the spiritual patrimony of humanity," and is therefore the most important. It is hopeful to note that it is also strong in numbers, having among its ranks many influential and well-known scholars. So in spite of our woes and cares there are still some who are struggling towards spirituality.

M. D. C.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE TRAINING OF YOUTH

[The two following contributions deal with the training of youth, and both curiously typify the prevailing biases in the present-day East and West. **Dr. Bharatan Kumarappa** outlines a course of religious training for the Hindu child, which, despite its ideal of tolerance, is tinged with sectarianism. He expresses himself unequivocally in favour of the Sunday School system obtaining in the U. S. A., but we question very much whether the present religious state of that country is any recommendation for the adoption of such a system for India. **Mr. Leslie A. Paul**, whose novel *Periwake* has recently been published by Denis Archer, is founder and leader of the Woodcraft Folk. Here he presents his educational aims. Both programmes are partial, but the latter has the sounder basis. The Grith Fyrd camps for unemployed youths are the logical outgrowth of its ideals; their aim is the reorientation of man to his natural and human environment through "the inner or spiritual experience of the shared life" under conditions as close to nature as can be achieved. Mr. Paul does not believe in teaching religion, whether it be "the local and particularised expressions of the religious spirit" or "the devotion of man to something greater and finer than himself". Of the latter he says: "We do not teach that either, we live it". Living the life, in free contact with nature, as do Mr. Paul's people, is no doubt excellent, but surely there is something of the spiritual life *that can be taught*, else the Sages have lived in vain. Dr. Kumarappa tends too much towards sectarianism, but Mr. Paul, in his escape from such a pitfall, is apt to err in the opposite direction. There are simple truths which can be taught to the young, by which they can guide their lives. These truths lie beyond creeds and also beyond the lessons that physical nature can teach us.—EDS.]

I.—THE RELIGIOUS TRAINING OF THE HINDU CHILD

In every realm of human thought and action—science, art, morality, industry, social and economic organisation, politics, education—there is dissatisfaction with the old and a wistful search for the new. More especially is this true in a country like India, which after centuries of civilisation of its own has recently been brought into contact with a civilisation differing very widely from it and extremely vocal and aggressive. Whatever the contact has meant for the foreigner, it has certainly shaken us, and thoughtful Indians here and there are applying themselves to the work of reconstruction. At the moment the work of this kind absorbing the greatest attention is being carried on in the realm of politics; but more silently it is also being carried on in other realms such as

art, literature, industry, agriculture, and more especially in the form of legal and social reform. There is no doubt that religion which supplies one of the main springs of culture has also not remained unaffected. The numerous religious societies which have sprung up during the last century within Hinduism, with which alone we are concerned here, are witnesses to this fact. But there is one form of religious reconstruction (and that the most important, for it is the most effective, and one that has unfortunately not yet been attempted within the fold of Hinduism), to which I wish to direct special attention. It is the religious training of the Hindu child.

In times past the child—at least, the boy of highest caste—was sent to lead the life of a Brahmachari under the

supervision and guidance of a teacher. Here he learnt among other things the Vedas, Upanishads, and the vital truths of religion, and that not in a merely academic way but in such a way that the boy practised in everyday life the religion that he was taught. The guru was not a mere schoolmaster as now understood. He was often a philosopher and a saint, of noble life and character, and the boy would learn from him not the religious superstitions, practised at the time by the masses, but a religion tested by thought and conduct in the life of the guru himself. In this way the religion taught was one that had grown out of the personal life and experience of the teacher, and the religion imparted was, we may conjecture, from the ethical and philosophical points of view, about the best that the age could produce. The method employed at this time appears also to have been very sound. The pupil was not given learned lectures on religion for him to digest as best he might, but judging from the few records (for example, in the Upanishads) that have come down to us, he was led by stages to discover the truths of religion for himself, the teacher merely aiding and directing. The teaching was generally in the form of a dialogue and came in answer to a felt need. Thus we are told, for example, that Upakosala dwelt as a Brahmachari in the house of Satyakama Jabala for twelve years without tuition regarding Brahman, at the end of which period he became so eager to learn regarding Brahman that he was not even able to eat his food, so much so that the fires which he tended took pity on him and taught him. That is to say, the pupil arrived at his conclusions independently of the teacher. It was only after the pupil himself had thus struggled for knowledge that Satyakama Jabala proceeded to instruct him regarding Brahman (*Chhandogya Upanishad* IV, 10-15). We thus see that both in content and in method the religious instruction given to boys within the Brahmanic community at this early

age was of a high order.

What happened in the past, however, is of little practical interest if it does not teach us lessons for the present. Since our ancestors had evolved such an effective system of religious instruction in their day, we should turn to the present and ask ourselves what organisations we have produced in our day. The answer, one grieves to state, is that we have produced absolutely none. The boys and girls in an average Hindu home grow up with no systematic religious instruction. They may, without understanding, partake in the ritualistic worship conducted daily in the home or in the temple. They may recite Sanskrit slokas without knowing their meaning, and they may listen to the stories of gods and heroes as depicted in the Epics and in the Puranas. But with such meagre training what can they know of their religion at its best? Can we be surprised then if young men to-day with a little education have little or no use for their religion and regard religion as superstition? Unless religion is re-interpreted from age to age, and taught in a manner to be intelligible to men living in an ever-moving, changing world, it can have little influence on their lives and like all things which have failed to fulfil their function, must die a natural death.

It is therefore especially necessary that Hinduism should be re-interpreted and expounded in the light of modern knowledge. It is no use, on the one hand, falling back upon the old traditional religion, for traditionism is the worst enemy of genuine religion. Nor is it much use, on the other hand, merely re-interpreting Hinduism in a learned academic way. Our object should be to disseminate our knowledge in simple form among children and among peasants—even more among children than among peasants, for the mind of the child is open and capable of being moulded in a way in which the adult mind is not.

In this connection we may learn from the West, notably from the Uni-

ted States, where religious instruction is given chiefly in Sunday Schools attached to churches; in them the work of educating the youth of the community, ranging in age from four to twenty-five or beyond, in religion is very systematically undertaken. Text books are published on the books of the Bible, Christian doctrine, the sacraments of the Church, etc.; systematic graded curricula are gone through to suit the age of the pupil. Sunday School work has advanced to such an extent that it has been found impossible to carry it on at all effectively without the employment of teachers specially trained for it. Special Sunday School teacher-training institutions have thus grown up, and College men and women qualify themselves for the work just as they qualify themselves for any other profession. It is not necessary to go into the details, but basing ourselves upon the results achieved there we might make some definite suggestions regarding how we may attempt to educate our children in Hinduism.

The child's life centres round the home, the school and the temple, and these are the institutions through which religious instruction may be attempted.

1. *The Home*: The place in which the life and activity of the child first find their expression is the home, and it is here that all religious education must take its start. The child who has had no religious education given to him in his home suffers always under a serious handicap. It is in early childhood that the mind is most impressionable and what the child learns at this age forms a part of him and is woven into the very fibre of his being. Hence it is all important to teach the child nothing at this stage that he will have to unlearn.

The child should be taught to begin with a little prayer. The mother or the father should pray with the child in simple language that it can understand. Two or three sentences voicing the little one's gratitude to the Divine

Being for protection, and expressing its desire for the welfare of all beings will suffice. Similarly when the child retires to bed at night another such simple prayer should be made. The child should be encouraged with the help of its parents to compose its own prayers as soon as it is able. If the father is accustomed to perform the domestic rites before the family shrine, he must have his children with him and must explain to them the significance of what he is doing. He should read a passage out of a devotional book, explaining it if necessary, and spend a brief period of prayer and meditation with them. When the child is old enough to read it should be presented with a book of devotion suited to its age, and this book it should be taught to read on rising in the morning and on going to bed, this period of devotion ending always with a prayer whereby the child learns of its own accord to commune with its Maker. This is a rough sketch of what might be undertaken in the home in the way of religious education. Individuals may add to, or subtract, from it. But it must always be remembered not to make religion a burden to the child by making religious discourses or prayers too long. Besides, the child should be encouraged to cultivate its own individual form of worship.

2. *The School*: Experience in the West seems to show that it is best not to attempt religious education to any very great extent in secular schools. But that is only because in the West the Sunday School attached to the church is so well organized that religious education may be left safely in its hands. Secular schools are attended by children belonging to various denominations, and it is not possible to give the pupils instruction suitable to their own particular denominations. Sunday Schools, on the other hand, are run by denominational churches and so can give the children such instruction. This has been found to be the most satisfactory arrangement, and hence is followed widely in the West. But not

all secular schools leave the work of religious education of their pupils to the Sunday school. There are, especially in Britain, what are known as Church schools. These are somewhat similar to the missionary schools in India in that they give secular education but they devote a part of their curriculum to definite religious instruction along the lines of their particular denomination.

We in India should probably find it best to follow the example of the United States in restricting the ordinary school to secular education, for children in India not only belong to different sects within Hinduism, but also to quite different religions. The religious institutions to which the children belong must, therefore, as in the United States, undertake the responsibility of instructing their young in the fundamentals of their faith. Nevertheless, the ordinary schools may begin their day's work with a short period of worship, when a passage may be read from one of the Scriptures or from the sayings of the saints of any religion, and a short hymn be sung or prayer recited. It is necessary that such hymn or prayer be one in which children of diverse creeds or sects may all equally join.

3. *The Temple*: If the ordinary schools are to give little or no religious instruction, the main work of religious education must as in the West be undertaken by religious bodies. The temple must run a school within its precincts for this purpose. But if the temple authorities, owing to conservatism or to disagreement with the broad type of religious education that is to be given, are unwilling to house the school within the temple precincts, a place outside could easily be secured for the purpose. The school might meet once a week, for about an hour. The worship would begin with all the children assembling together for scripture reading, hymn and prayer, after which they would disperse to their several classrooms. The classes should be according to age. For example,

for children of four to six years old, the kindergarten class; six to nine, elementary; nine to fourteen junior; fourteen to eighteen intermediate; and eighteen upwards, senior. The work of the kindergarten would be chiefly religious story-telling with the aid of pictures, and if possible models, songs and memorizing of little verses or prayers suited to children of that age. The work of the other departments would have to be graded, and take the child through a regular course in selections from the Hindu scriptures, and readings in the history of Hinduism and Hindu religious literature:- if a denominational colouring is desired the history of the particular sect to which the children belong, beliefs and practices of sects within Hinduism, comparative religion giving a sympathetic account of religions such as Buddhism, Jainism, Islam and Christianity (there should be opportunities here of inculcating religious toleration and bridging the wide gulf that now exists, for example, between Islam and Hinduism), lives of the great religious leaders of Hinduism, the significance of the more important Hindu rites, and an account of Hindu religious festivals and their significance. The senior department may consist chiefly of study and discussion groups.

In all this work of instructing the young, the main objective of religious education should never be forgotten, and that is not to inform the understanding merely, but to cultivate in the rising generation the spirit of true religion, which is to love God and to love our fellowmen. It must be made clear that this is all that matters, the external form of religion, whether it be details of creed or ritual, being of little account.

It is obvious that work such as this cannot be undertaken without text-books. At the moment there is hardly anything in the way of suitable text books. I use the word "text-books" in a broad sense to include hymn books, prayer books and books of devotion written for the benefit of the

young. Books of various kinds would have to be written,—books for family worship containing scriptural readings, meditations and prayers; little hymns, prayers and religious stories written specially for very young children; hints to parents as to how to teach their children regarding God, books of religious passages and prayers suitable for use in secular schools; and books on all the topics mentioned above in connection with the religious education of the temple. Each topic must be dealt with in a graded fashion, leading the child on as it grows from year to year into fuller and fuller knowledge.

Besides all these, text books will have to be written for the use of tea-

chers. Training centres will have to be established where teachers can obtain instruction in the subjects outlined above, besides instruction in the principles and practice of teaching, child psychology, story telling and such like.

It is obvious that there is a whole field here waiting to be opened up, carefully mapped out and cultivated. The work is one that is of vital importance, and yet one that has not yet been so much as thought about. If a group of earnest minded men of ability met together over the matter, much might be done in obtaining the necessary literature and organizing the necessary institutions.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

II.—THE EDUCATIONAL BASIS OF THE WOODCRAFT FOLK

Readers of *THE ARYAN PATH* who have read that Neptunian sermon to humankind, the novel *Last Men in London*, by W. Olaf Stapledon, will remember how creatively the author reconstructed the struggle between man's better and worse natures, between his human and simian characteristics, between his dawning sense of loyalty to the human spirit and his self-engrossment, and between that loyalty and his feeling of impotence beneath the overwhelming grandeur of fate. Despite the school teacher mannerisms of the author, they may have been as moved by it as I was, and have felt that it was a remarkable effort to put down clearly what many of us have been thinking for a long time.

There is a struggle between the animal and human aspects of man's character—how far inevitable none of us know—and between his personal struggle for life and his loyalty to the human spirit. This is not new, I know. What is new, perhaps, is the depth of human perception of it.

Man is tugged this way by personal, and that by public, interests; here by bodily urgencies, there by intellectual interests. All the real attempts at

education (and by "real" I mean those which start from contact with life and not from an academic and pedantic tradition) have, whether they are aware of it or not, a deep impulse to reconcile the conflicting interests of man and out of such a reconciliation to germinate a new, harmonious flowering of humanity. Educationists, aghast at the mauling which the young and lovely human spirit receives in childhood, and intuitively aware of thwarted human potentialities, exclaim "*There!* There is man's crime. Give us the children and we can remake man."

Human dislocations, the terrible attrition of human delicacy and fineness through sexual maladjustments, the oppressing of human life through economic, imperial and political perversity and exploitation, these, we say, have their spring in the pitifully timid education of the masses. Give us a different system of education, we say, and we will give you a new mankind. It is not so simple as that, of course. Before we can recast education we must recast human society. But a start can be made in a small way to break the vicious circle.

It was in this spirit that the Wood-

craft Folk commenced their educational work some eight years ago and have since expanded it continually despite hardships and world crises which cripple our resources.

The impulse which drove us to work was precisely this. Mankind hovers on the verge of a new world. His economic power has so far advanced, his mechanical grip on resources and production is so extensive and complete that now—at this moment!—granted the will, a form of society could be established in which man, freed from poverty, could go from adventure to adventure of the human spirit. We felt that man's history was only just beginning, that before he had been sub-human. That was the vision. The bitter reality was that children were not given freedom to grow; that new worlds might grow and old worlds die, uncomprehended by their stunted intelligences; that before they reached the age at which they could be of use to society they were already spiritually warped, their ideas on human sexual relationships tainted, their curiosities in all but this destroyed, their imaginations deadened and their bodies, more often than not, prematurely sapped of joy and will.

Out of the conflict between the vision and the reality was borne upon us the need to undertake educational work among children. We did not discriminate between classes, but we concentrated on workers' children. They would inherit the earth.

Our first task was to give the children a breath of something less mechanical and artificial than they found in towns. So we became an open air movement. We wanted children to grow physically so that their minds would flower in sound bodies. In the open they were initiated into a freer yet simple life—sun, air, water, growing things, campfires. Life was at once more primitive and more exacting. Food had to be prepared before it could be cooked, cooked before it could be eaten. Fires had to be lit before it could be prepared. Wood had

to be collected before fires could be lit. Cause and effect.

Co-operation between all members of the group was necessary at camp or nobody could enjoy anything. In fact, what we created for them in the open was a more primitive type of human society, one whose demands and achievements immature minds could readily appreciate.

This co-operative principle was underlined by the co-educational nature of our work and the complete absence of any military tradition and procedure. A few simple ceremonies (cf. "The Folk Trail") and the group tradition took the place of the old "do-as-you-are-told-and-ask questions afterwards-if-you-dare" attitude to children.

Group-activity and group-responsibility have a far-reaching democratic significance. The real democracy must be a democracy of work. The real check upon leaders by the led can only take place through small groups whose members know each other well. The small group gives the widest basis of individual participation in common activities. And upon the effective participation of the masses in the work of the world the future society must base itself.

Important as these things are, our work does not end there. We want children to flower individually. We gave them the opportunity to be freer of their bodies—to swim, to run about as near to nakedness as the law permits, to sun bathe, so that the evils of bodily repression would be eliminated in the generation we were teaching. After battles with outsiders who affirmed that children in bathing slips were immoral, we established a freedom in this which has since been adopted by other bodies.

To over-emphasise freedom from taboos can be as dangerous as the taboos themselves. So we worked this side fanaticism.

We were anxious that children should train their brains through their hands as well as their heads. So we taught them woodcraft—cooking, light-

ing fires, pitching tents, tracking, nature lore and simple camp handicrafts. This learning-by-doing principle we carried further by training in handicrafts at indoor meetings. Children of the Woodcraft Folk make their own belts and costumes, totem poles and banners etc., decorate their belongings and bring as much colour into the movement by their own work as they can. Colour we regard as a release from the drabness and ugliness of modern life. Self-expression is also encouraged through songs, dancing, dramatic work and pageantry.

To summarise—we brought children into the open and gave them room to grow. We taught them to use their hands and their hearts and to grow unafraid of life.

Our work did not cease there. The flowering, the observable flowering of young life under these conditions was a fine thing, but not fine enough. At camp they were in a world of their own. What of the world which would reach out for them when they were fourteen and clamp them to a desk or a bench for many hours a day, most days of the year? It had little use for flowering personalities, unless they happened to be rich. Flowering personalities were a nuisance, they rebelled, they dodged discipline, they had a contempt for the glittering prizes. They were suppressed.

It was all very well for children to grow fit and lovely in the open. But if we were to leave them in ignorance of what the world might do to them we should be committing the same crime as older generations.

What would the world do to them? Unemployment. War. Exploitation. Poverty. The tale is long and sorry. What had we got to say about it?

Two things. First, that human society had crawled out of pitiful depths to its present power. It had achieved magnificent things as well as despicable things in the process of crawling, but there was something fine in the spectacle. We wanted children to get the human struggle in perspective. And

so we gave them elementary instruction in biology and world history.

The second thing—unemployment, war, exploitation, belong to a past stage in human society. A new world can be built in which these things have no part. The dying old world lingers on, torn to pieces by its internal dissensions. A new society must be built if the waste of human life is not to go on. We taught that children would be the builders or the inheritors of that new world and that they had to look upon their lives as lives which are pledged to the service of their fellowmen in the cause of the human spirit. Co-operation? Socialism? Bolshevism? Call it what you will. It has to be taught to the young or we are betraying them.

And so I am back where I began. Human society is only just beginning. The Folk, too, feel that they will be in the forefront of human venture. For they live for the flowering-out of the human spirit.

I shall be asked whether we teach religion, or what I mean by the human spirit. If by religion is meant sectarian creed, or obeisance to a particular ritual or set of dogmas, or even the belief in the immortality of the human soul—well, no, we do not teach it. I, for one, have no use for the local and particularised expressions of the religious spirit. But for the religious spirit itself, by which I mean the devotion of man to something greater and finer than himself, then we do not teach that either, we live it.

I do not propose to define the human spirit. Those who would like to do so are at liberty to identify it with the soul. To me it is something more subtle and less divorced from body. Something which goes on through humanity though bodies are born and die.

Finally—is there anything new or peculiar about our organization? No, nothing particularly new, unless it be, in this dispirited age, a health of mind and body and faith and enthusiasm for the new world we shall help to build.

London.

LESLIE A. PAUL

INDIAN MISREPRESENTATION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

I

We sincerely congratulate Dr. Naga Raja Sarma for bringing up for public discussion the tenets of Dvaita-Vedanta by contributing to THE ARYAN PATH a series of four learned articles from January to April, 1934.

Dr. Sarma is known to Indian readers as a scathing critic. His criticism an eminent editor of an Indian philosophical journal described to me as "judicial criticism" in contrast to "inductive criticism". Like a magistrate he passes judgment on others' views. Dr. Dasgupta has presented Indian philosophy according to current Indian tradition and method, whereas Dr. Radhakrishnan has done so in the light of modern thought. Though Dr. Sarma admits that "both the authors have done splendid service in the cause of Indian philosophy, their scholarship is widely recognised and admired. They have an international status as philosophers,"—his articles contain small trace of appreciation but only unfavourable criticism.

Dr. Sarma's suggestion that Indian thought must not be interpreted in the light of Western concepts proves his outlook clouded by orthodoxy. This is an age of international understanding. Insularity and indifference on the part of a thought-system mean death to it. Ancient methodology must give place to the modern scientific one; otherwise philosophy is doomed. That is why some modern thinkers say that India has no philosophy except an antiquated theological system. For this Dr. Sarma and others who want to represent Indian philosophy *as it is* are seriously to blame. Drs. Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta are mainly responsible for the present day world-wide appreciation of and interest in Indian philosophy. Their attempts may not be free from defects but that does not mean that they have misrepresented Indian philosophy. Moreover, human thought is going beyond its natural limits in evolving a world

philosophy, and in that Indian philosophy has a very great contribution to make. Dr. Sarma himself admits that ancient Indian philosophy has a message universal in appeal.

Dr. Sarma's main contention is that the two doctors have not devoted much attention in their works to Dvaita-Vedanta. He asserts that Dvaitism is as hallowed a tradition in Indian philosophy as Advaitism. Prof. M. Hiriyanna of Mysore University, one of the profoundest living authorities on Vedanta, has omitted the Dvaitavada from his *Outline of Philosophy* as having made no marked contribution to the philosophical world. The West is tired of hearing about Dualism. They have enough of Dualistic philosophy and religion. Anything of the same nature from India simply repels them. It was the Hindu metaphysics of Advaita-Vedanta which influenced Hegel, Schopenhauer, Max Müller, Deussen, Royce, James, etc.

Theology is a matter of faith, and it differs with peoples, nay, from man to man. Dr. Carpenter in his *Comparative Religion* said that theologies are many but Religion is one. And in India religion and philosophy are not separate as in the West. Still, it is surprising that Dr. Sarma, setting out to expound philosophy, should place so much emphasis on faith. Philosophy is not so much concerned with faith as with reason. Dr. Chakravarty of Madras Presidency College in reply to Dr. Sarma recently called faith the most wicked thing. He is right in a sense. Another writer claims that the unseen accompaniment of faith is bloodshed, wars, the Inquisition etc. That is why philosophy stresses exercise of reason.

Dr. Sarma opines that if the West can understand and admire the Monism of Kant and Spinoza it should find no difficulty in understanding and admiring the Monistic edifice of Sankara. The West, with its scientific intellect,

can no doubt comprehend Vedanta, but Vedanta in which form? Is it in the form of translation of Sanskrit texts, as Dr. Sarma wants to present it, unalloyed by Western thought, or in its modern interpretation? Certainly not the former; otherwise long before the publication of the books of Drs. Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta the West would have understood them. Many of the Vedantic Sanskrit texts were translated long ago, but Westerners never cared to look at them. Indian philosophy in its Indian form is naturally unintelligible to the West and so till recently it drew little or no attention from Western thinkers. Hence the urgent necessity of modern interpretation.

Dr. Sarma concludes that as the *Gita* does not state explicitly the theory of Adhyasa the import of the *Gita* is not Advaita. The primary concern of Advaitavada is to establish Brahman or the ultimate Reality or Truth, devoid of Desha, Kala and Nimitta or, in Kantian terminology, Space, Time and Causation. Mayavada is an explanation of the theory of Advaita and hence it is secondary. Mayavada wants to prove the theory of nescience which obstructs the Brahman consciousness of man. Dr. P. D. Shastri, formerly of Calcutta Presidency College, a most orthodox Vedanta scholar of wide repute, shows in his *Doctrine of Maya* that not only in the *Gita*, but in the Upanishads and the Vedas as well, the theory of Maya exists in more or less developed form.

Dr. Sarma points out that there are passages in the Upanishads with Dvaita signification. Nobody denies that. But does that mean that the philosophy of the Upanishads is Dvaitavada? Then how can the passages with Advaita import be explained away? Here he has given the age-old stock arguments to support Dvaitavada. But we challenge Dr. Sarma to find in the ten principal Upanishads with Sankara's commentary one single passage where Dvaita is extolled. Emphatically nowhere. Everywhere *Ekam eva Advitiyam*—One without a second—has been glorified.

It is a pity that Dr. Sarma confounds Monism with Non-dualism. His rendering of Visistadvaita as Qualified Monism or rather Pluralism, and not as Qualified Non-Dualism is palpably wrong. Visistadvaita is not Visista + Dvaita, but Visista + Advaita. Dvaita means Dualism and necessarily Advaita means etymologically Non-dualism. How can it then be Pluralism? Monism is the theory of the one. The knowledge of the One implies the knowledge of the many, for, as every student of logic and epistemology knows, that knowledge is possible only by comparison and contrast. Hence Advaita is Non-dualism and not Monism. The Upanishadic phrase Advitiya—not two—is most correct, as what Brahman is essentially, is beyond the reach of all concepts. With Madhva he holds that the external world is as stubbornly real as the supreme Brahman. If matter has a degree of reality equal to that of spirit, then what is the definition of reality in his opinion? What is the criterion of Truth? If God changes as does matter, then that God is no better than a phantom. Change signifies imperfection. But an imperfect God is no God. We see matter changing constantly before our eyes. The whole of modern science, particularly the new physics, has not yet been able to find out the ultimate nature of matter. All modern scientists are of one opinion—that matter is indefinable—just as the Advaitists say that it is *anirvachaniyam*. How, then, can matter be ultimately real? But at the same time nobody denies the pragmatic or concessional reality or the *Vyavaharika Satta* of matter.

Dr. Radhakrishnan tries to reconcile the Dvaita, Visistadvaita and Advaita passages of the Upanishads. As the Upanishads contain three kinds of passages there can be three kinds of interpretations of the Upanishadic philosophy, as expounded by the commentaries of Sankara, Ramanuja and Madhva. So why does Dr. Sarma try to depreciate one at the expense of the other? Dr. Radha-

krishnan has doubtless displayed remarkable originality and philosophical acumen in his attempt to harmonise the three schools; they are not at all contradictory but supplementary to each other. They are true from different standpoints. In the *Rig Veda* itself it is said, "*Ekam Sat vipra bahudha vadanti*"—"Truth is one though the sages call it variously". Max Müller agreed with Vignana-Bhikshu, Madhusudhan Saraswati and others in the view that behind the different schools of Indian philosophy there is a common philosophy of which these systems are but aspects.

From different mental angles the philosophers have propounded the theories of Dualism, Qualified Non-dualism and Non-dualism, as Hanuman said to Sri Ramachandra, "As body I am your servant, as Mind I am your part, and as spirit I am thou". Thus from the planes of body, mind and spirit, Brahman is realised as the personal, the impersonal, and the Absolute. Accordingly, in our Indian philosophy there are three kinds of cosmology—Arambhavada, Parinamavada and Vivartavada. As long as body idea persists God is seen with form as an extra-cosmic being and the world appears as real. That is the position of Madhva and the Dualists. But that is not the ultimate goal. If the aspirant pushes further he sees God as immanent in the Universe. He perceives that the Creator and the creation are unified. Man sees himself as part and parcel of God. That is the

standpoint taken by Ramanuja and his followers. Then comes the experience of *Tat Twam Asi*—"That thou art." Man realises that he is God spiritually and the world appears as a mirage. So physically man is Dvaitist, mentally he is Visistadvaitist and spiritually he is Advaitist. This is in essence the message of the Upanishads.

In conclusion, we wish to show that Dr. Sarma's exposition of the *Gita* does not contain the traditional orientation. Repudiating Dr. Radhakrishnan, he says that the *Gita* is a systematic philosophical construction or a code of morality. What are the definitions of philosophy given by all modern philosophers? If the *Gita* is a system of philosophy, then what may the philosophies of Kant, Hegel and Spinoza be called? Nor is the *Gita* only a code of morality. On that theory can Dr. Sarma account for the different kinds of Yoga, such as Dhyana Yoga, Karma Yoga, Gnana Yoga etc.? At the end of every chapter Sri Krishna says that the *Gita* is Yoga Sastra.

In general, it may be said that Dr. Sarma's criticism emphasises insignificant points: in these studies he has played the role more of a philologist than of a philosopher. Modern Indian scholars show ingenious skill in hair-splitting arguments and textual interpretations. The Indian Pandits can reproduce voluminous books, but they cannot understand underlying ideas in relation to the whole.

Mysore. SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

II

While I had readily anticipated that the series of articles contributed by me to THE ARYAN PATH under the above-mentioned general title would be greeted with sharp criticism and opposition by the admirers of the authors of *Indian Philosophy* and *A History of Indian Philosophy*, I had not expected that Mr. K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar, would confine his remarks to one or

two disparaging references to Dualists and Pluralists or that Swami Jagadiswarananda would embark on a vindication of Monism or Absolutism, arranging Dvaita, Vishishtadvaita, and Advaita, in an ascending order of superiority based on spiritual experiences. The Swamiji has attacked Dvaita, and attempted a vindication of Advaita. By way of reply to Mr. Iyengar and

Swamiji, I would like to emphasize the following facts every one of which could be argued out, if space permitted.

(1) There is room for difference of opinion as to the best and the most effective manner in which the absence of traditional Indian orientation from the works of the two distinguished Indian philosophers may be demonstrated. In the course of contributions appearing in journals, only specimen sentences can be cited, and those cited by me, whether they are divorced from or dovetailed into their contexts, stand typical of the un-Indian exposition of Indian philosophy. Mr. Iyengar queries—"Were Sankara, Ramanuja, and Madhva then devoid of Indian orientation because they have all taken sides and equated the *Gita* and Upanishad teaching either with Monism or with Pluralism . . . etc.?" No one would venture to accuse the Acharyas at all, as they have all very rightly and legitimately taken sides, but since modern Indian philosophers have condemned Sankara for his Absolutism and applauded him for his courage in the same breath, and as they proclaim they are fascinated by the Monistic edifice, but feel nervous lest it may collapse before they enter and so forth, they have to be viewed guilty of lack of loyalty to Indian tradition. The two authors have attacked Sankara and his Absolutism. Yet, they somehow feel that the equation between Atman and Brahman is the ultimate truth. This, I maintain, is an attitude that does violence to Indian tradition.

I am not so philosophically uncivilised as to attempt any denial of freedom to the two philosophers of their own interpretation. I shall take a crucial instance. Neither the author of *Indian Philosophy* nor the author of *A History* could agree with Sankara regarding the supreme problem of "Adhyasa," to an interpretation of which they have administered their own orientations. Attacking this or that Acharya piecemeal is a childish game. "I reject Sankara's interpretation of the *Gita*—I cannot accept his

version of Maya and Adhyasa. His account is the same as that of Mahayana Buddhism—and yet Madhva is a religionist. His is not a philosophy at all." Modern interpreters of Indian thought to the West who proclaim the jargon noted in the previous sentence cannot but be condemned or classified as *untraditional*. The authors of both *Indian Philosophy* and *A History*, are convinced that Sankara's Advaita does not differ in essentials from Mahayana Buddhism. This is resented and repudiated by the custodians of Indian tradition. If the modern interpreters repudiate tradition, they find themselves in the company of Madhvacharya whose Dualism and Pluralism are to them anathema. What is the Indian thought they interpret to the West? Is it Sankara's? No. They disagree with his main thesis of Illusionism. Is it Madhva's? No. They reject his Dualism and Pluralism. I do not know anything about Dr. Dasgupta's attitude to Madhva because his volume on the works of that Acharya is yet to appear. But Dr. Radhakrishnan has plainly stated that Madhva's work does not belong to Indian Philosophy proper. Such philosophical misstatements should be repudiated and exposed then and there. If Mr. Iyengar desires to make sure what I mean by "traditional Indian orientation," let him read or re-read the discussion of the relation between Buddhism and Advaita in the works of the two philosophers.

(2) Swami Jagadiswarananda may be told that for the benefits of a very doubtful international understanding—benefits largely economic and political in character—philosophical truths grounded on age-long traditions should not be repudiated or thrown overboard. It is absolutely immaterial to me whether this or that writer devotes any portion of his work to Madhvacharya or not. But my complaint has been that the interpretation of the philosophy of Sankara attempted by the two philosophic moulders of international opinion and understanding has been *untraditional*,

though I have not failed to emphasize that sufficient justice has not been done to the work of Madhvacharya. When even an avowed opponent of Dvaita like Appaya Dikshita has admitted the undoubted excellence of the Dvaita Vedanta it is astonishing that Swamiji should seek to reject Dvaita root and branch, for the reason that Mr. Hiri-yanna has omitted Dvaita from his book. I must say the philosophical prestige and integrity of the Dvaita do not depend on the futile and flimsy reason of its having been omitted by this or that author from his book.

The West may be tired of Dualism and Pluralism. Yet the philosophical worth of Dualism and Pluralism may not suffer at all. When the Advaita Vedanta has not moulded the practical life of philosophers in India itself, it is idle to contend that writers like Deussen and thinkers like Schopenhauer were influenced by Advaita to any considerable degree. That interest in Indian philosophy was kindled only after the publication of *Indian Philosophy* and *A History* is an *ipse dixit* which I am not bound to accept.

I gladly accept the Swamiji's challenge. "Dvasuparna-Sayuja" and passages of similar import support the Dvaita. Nay, I claim more, as this claim has been elaborately substantiated. Even the passage "Tatvamasi" supports Dvaita, because, Madhva has argued that the Upanishadic text should be split up into "A-tat-tvamasi"—Thou art not-That.

Swamiji attributes to me a rendering of Vishishtadvaita which is not mine. Let there be no quibbling. Monism is and must be the same as Non-Dualism. My complaint was that Drs. Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta had uncritically adopted the wrong rendering of Vishisht-

advaita into. "Qualified Non-Dualism or Qualified Monism". Vishishtadvaita is *not* Monism at all, but, emphatically *Pluralism*. Three fundamental entities endowed with the same degree of reality, namely, Chit, Achit, and Isvara are admitted by Vishishtadvaita. I have made this clear along with the traditional import of the term in the course of the footnote published towards the end of the opening article of my series.

If the author of *Indian Philosophy* has tried as observed by the Swamiji to reconcile Dvaita, Advaita, and Vishishtadvaita passages in the Upanishads, he has attempted the impossible. One may as well attempt a reconciliation of the Spinozistic Monism and Leibnitzean Pluralism. There is no sacrosanctity about the order adopted by the Swamiji. For instance, one may say—Physically all are Advaitins—for, dust are all and to dust all return. Mentally one may be a Vishishtadvaitin, and spiritually a Dvaiti as he realizes the Overlordship of God. Let Dvaita stand or fall on its own merits. The destinies of Dvaita whatever they be do not surely depend on Mr. Hiri-yanna and his work.

I have summed up in my own words Sankara's interpretation of the message of the *Gita*, and Madhva's interpretation of it as well. Between a system of philosophy and a code of morality there is absolutely no antagonism or incompatibility whatever, and the Swamiji has raised no relevant objection at all to my description of the *Gita* as containing a system of philosophy and as proclaiming a code of morality. The different yogas, the concomitant spiritual practices and the goal to be reached come under the latter, while the metaphysical system falls under the former.

Kumbakonam R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

The Hitler dictatorship of the mind is Heinrich Mann's theme in *Foreign Affairs* for April. The intellectuals who have remained in Germany have had to submit to the system of controlled thought imposed by the Nationalist Socialist Party, of whom the exile writes:—

Thought becomes materialized in their hands and is simply a mechanism conveniently placed at the disposal of the strongest. Only official truths are admitted, and only such creative work as happens to serve the purpose of the authorities. Everything in the arts and sciences which contradicts or goes beyond the National Socialist doctrine is looked upon as non-existent, simply by reason of the fact that the artists and thinkers concerned have left Germany. Having eliminated all opposition, the government is far from regretting the loss of eminent personalities which added to the permanent glory of the country. It is delighted to have to deal only with minds which are timid, with talents so mediocre that they can easily be directed. The method of selection is to ask all artists and writers to reply in writing to the two essential questions: Are you Aryan? Do you undertake to support the national government with all your strength? Anyone who refuses to sign immediately loses his public; there is no longer any audience in Germany to which he can address himself. The irreconcilables have been eliminated in advance; there remain only the weak and the mediocre to be dealt with, not to mention the shrewd who, after having made their way in a free regime are quite prepared to profit from the methods of a dictatorship.

Such "complete control over the whole intellectual and spiritual life of the nation" is a moral calamity the effects of which inevitably spread beyond the borders of Germany and the confines of this century. Freedom of thought is indispensable to growth to full intellectual and moral stature. If the western civilization is to be saved it must complete its education, and that soon.

For many years the "rising standard of living" (read, increasing complexity of demands) has been a matter for pride in the West and skilfully fanned by advertising and the urge to keep up with the neighbours. Production has been speeded up accordingly, and now the West is suffering from a plethora of goods and productive power far in excess of effective demand. Mr. K. K. Kawakami makes out a good case in April *Foreign Affairs* for a difference in living standard not meaning that one is superior and the other inferior:—

The question is simply one of difference. Transplant a Japanese mill hand to Lancashire, give him an iron bed with a soft mattress, put him on a ration of bread and butter, beefsteak, coffee and cream, and he will go on a strike, demanding Japanese bedding spread on a matted floor, and a ration of fish, rice and vegetables which, to him, are more palatable and wholesome. It is the misfortune of the British or

American that his standard calls for higher-priced materials than the Japanese, that is all. Despite the advent in their midst of Western culture, which Norman Douglas characterizes as "frowsy and fidgety," the Japanese still cling to the simple life, and are satisfied with fewer worldly things than are coveted by their Occidental brothers.

The question would, therefore, seem to be not one of "high" or "low" standard of living, but rather one of taste. The solution, then, should lie in the cultivation of adaptability and resourcefulness in dealing with the given set of circumstances. But real adaptability and resourcefulness (not the counterfeit that so often passes in this age for these virtues) are rare, for they are the outcome of a spiritual outlook on life.

In *The Bookman* (April) Mr. Hugh Ross Williamson writes in his "Random Notes" of a sentence which occurs in *Reading and Discrimination*, by Denys Thompson. It runs thus :—

The reading of literature is the best means now of improving one's capacity for living.

This Mr. Williamson regards as "utter and unforgivable nonsense," and adds later, "on second thoughts I am sure that Mr. Thompson cannot have meant it !" But why not? We have not read Mr. Thompson's book and therefore do not know in what connection this particular sentence was written. Mr. Williamson further states :—

It is almost incredible that anyone should contend that, in this amazing age, when life has become so swift and exciting that another Renaissance charged with all the wonder of undreamt-of discovery is upon us, "the reading of literature is the *best* means of improving one's capacity for living". The continual strifes and the warring creeds, which are the growing pains of a new world-order, leave very little time for reading at all. And as only a hypochondriac will ponder over his health, so surely only the half-dead will be obsessed with their "capacity for living". One lives.

But even in this chaotic civilisation there are *ways* of living. We can live wisely or live foolishly. In the midst of excitement we cannot reflect; therefore if we take Mr. Williamson's advice and only live, we shall have little time for thought as well as for reading and the reflection that good reading demands. There are the great Scriptures of the world, and the works of the great poets and philosophers available to all. For the man of to-day as well as of yesterday, there are few better means, if any, of "improving one's capacity for living" than the reading of such literature; and if one does not give some attention to this capacity for living—Mr. Williamson's parallel of a hypochondriac is quite inadmissible, but we are sure "he cannot have meant it !"—how can one help either oneself or others effectively? If Mr. Williamson can only spare the time, we think he would do well to re-read his *Bhagavad-Gita* on the subject of Action.



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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THE BLIGHT OF CONFORMITY

There has been a great hue and cry over the restrictions on freedom of thought in lands under dictatorships to-day. In fact, however, nowhere in our modern world are the thinking classes free. Intellectual conformity has most of them as helpless in its coils as the serpents had Laocoon and his hapless sons. Our intelligentsia flatter themselves on their liberal outlook, their emancipation from superstition, their cosmopolitanism. As a matter of fact, with very few exceptions, they are absurdly provincial mental robots. They look back with pitying contempt at the circumscribed vision of a few centuries ago, when men believed at the dictates of the church; they view with mixed amusement and disdain the more recent recrudescence of militant religious orthodoxy in the backwoods of Tennessee. Nevertheless, truly free-thinking men and women are as rare in our great centres of civilization and

culture as in the Dark Ages or in remote small towns to-day.

Mediocrities with one or several degrees have dominated Western culture these many years. The universities turn them out by the thousand, stamped ineffaceably, like coins from the mint, with the pattern of orthodox mental attitude. The university's proper function is to broaden all the minds it trains. In practice, like Procrustes, it tries to make all comers fit its bed, amputating as ruthlessly as it stretches, according to the mental stature of each comer. The university imparts information, but it clips the wings of thought. The very ideal of culture it presents is a fixed pattern, the mental attitudes it imposes as stereotyped as the formal gestures of some Indian dances. In some countries, the various fraternal organizations and women's clubs take up the task of moulding thought where the university leaves off. The price

of intellectual leadership of one's group to-day is willingness to browse in the plains with the flock, satisfied with the herbage they munch, perhaps a few feet in advance of the rest—not more. The gregarious instinct is strong and the heights, whither the flock would not or could not follow, beckon to but few. The blight of orthodoxy affects not sciolists alone and such small fry. Some of the greatest names in science to-day belong to men who have indulged in bold free thought within their own domain, but who, outside it, are not ashamed to wear the drab habit of conformity.

The extent to which mental discipline is imposed by modern culture is obscured by the existence of a limited outlying area in which the mind may lay aside its uniform and move about in mufti. Absolute conformity with orthodox doctrines was never demanded. A certain laxity around the edges always has given the illusion of intellectual freedom and saved self-esteem. Even in medieval Europe one was free to hold what views he liked on non-essentials, such as the seriously debated question how many angels simultaneously could occupy a needle's point. In our day there has been a great relaxation in standards of conduct, a scouting of long-established social sanctions, a weakening of moral fibre, perhaps most marked among many of the intellectuals themselves, the natural leaders of the throng. This liberty, run into licence, glammers its votaries with the illusion of freedom absolute,

and such have but added the chains of sense and lust to those of intellect.

Let none imagine that the dominance of intellectual orthodoxy is less tyrannical to-day because more tenuous! Poison gas which he cannot see can choke a man quite as effectively as can a visible rope. True, modern learning has formulated no definite creed, but certain of its assumptions have all the weight of dogma. Perhaps there has never been less real tolerance. The iron hand wears a velvet glove to-day, but let a man defy the force of the views of his group and he soon feels its weight. The heretic courts martyrdom. The rack and thumb-screw of the modern Inquisition are the epithets applied to dissenters—reactionary! visionary! fanatic! Its stake is the amused tolerance or undisguised contempt of friends and kin. "Scientific freedom," for instance, is a Shibboleth which even the humane feel they must echo or lose caste, and so most resolutely turn their thoughts away from the barbarities and tortures practised in its name. Let a man raise his voice to condemn vivisection and champion its helpless victims—straightway he is dubbed "a hysterical sentimentalist". If he dares challenge the current medical superstition of serums and vaccines, he is "a dangerous crank". And let a man oppose birth control by artificial means as an abomination; let him affirm his faith that education and practice in self-control offer the only legitimate cure for the over-population evil, and he

is denounced as an enemy to society. A man may be guilty of one of these heresies and, if he keeps reasonably quiet about it, his friends may indulgently call him "unpractical," and let it go at that. But let him entertain heterodox views on several of these points—he is "quite mad, poor chap!" If his convictions go so deep that he feels constrained to urge his views on others to effect reform, he finds the utmost difficulty in gaining a hearing. The orthodox press is closed to his "vapourings"; his letters are not published, his articles, whatever their literary merit, are refused.

There are more basic concepts which self-respect, as a modern intellectual, demands that each accepts,—such, for example, as the truth of the Darwinian theory in broad outline, the inferiority of ancient views and cultures to our own, the evolution of religions from worship of natural powers and fetishes to monotheism. Some in the West find implied tacitly in the last the ultimate superiority of Christianity over other faiths; others, in East and West alike, interpret it that there is nothing sacrosanct in any faith.

The provincialism of the educated Western man is nowhere more apparent than in his bland and quite complacent ignorance about the great religions and philosophies of the East. Men who consider themselves broadly cultured feel no embarrassment in admitting that they have never heard of the *Bhagavad-Gita* or the *Zend-Avesta*. Sometimes their tendency is to be-

little them therefore, as if to imply that what they do not know is not worth knowing. Commonly the study of comparative religions is under sectarian or agnostic auspices and because it is undertaken from a great height of fancied superiority, perspective is quite lost and only the fantastic and irrelevant stand out. The ashes of dogma and superstition have hidden the fire that smoulders underneath, and those who stir contemptuously the cooling embers most often miss the gleam of living truth, common to all faiths, that once gave them life.

On the moot point of soul-survival it might seem at first blush that a wide latitude is tolerated. Some of the intelligentsia hold it probable that consciousness survives the death of the body; some, a smaller number perhaps, hold that it probably does not; a few find reincarnation an interesting hypothesis. All can exchange their views with relatively little heat. The possibility of knowledge on the point would be proclaimed absurd by one and all. If one allows a shade too much conviction to creep into his tone, someone is sure to remark, comfortably, "After all, no one knows!" And all the group are amicably upon common ground, pleased with their detachment and contemptuous of the host of simple folk outside of their agnostic circle who have the bad taste to believe or to deny. We venture to predict that even Mr. Bax's reasoned view on reincarnation appearing in this issue will be looked at askance by

many who regard conviction on anything they cannot see and touch as just a bit quixotic. To deny without a basis of knowledge is equally illogical, but this is less apparent to the modern mind, which never heard the words of Narada :—

Never utter these words ; “I do not know this—therefore it is false.” One must study to know, know to understand, understand to judge.

How many, without pretence of investigation or thought on what reincarnation means, snatch at the distorted idea of transmigration into animal forms and dismiss with a witticism the possibility of many lives on earth ! It is surprising, too, how many, bored and disillusioned with their lives, deny the possibility because, forsooth, they do not want to live again on earth. “ But I don’t want to come back ! ” If reincarnation be a law of nature, as many hold, do these poor modern Canutes think that the tide will heed their interdicts ?

Part of the unwritten Credo of Western thought is that belief in superphysical powers and forces is unworthy of serious minds. The average educated man would as soon confess to a belief in Santa

Claus, the Christmas sprite, prancing reindeer, chimney descent and all, as to belief that there might be anything in Magic but fraud or jugglery. He would think himself fit subject for a lunacy commission if he admitted any power in man not properly accredited by modern science. One step in that direction and he might find, oh, horror ! that he had opened wide the door to belief in so-called superstitions he had thought were safely bottled up like the djinn of old and sunk to the bottom of the sea.

They have been so sure of their strength, these modern minds, that they have let themselves be lulled to sleep by the blandishments of pride, as Samson yielded to Delilah’s wiles. Like him, they lie securely bound ; the Philistines of narrowness and of delusions manifold are upon them. Individuals can arise in their strength and strike the shackles from their minds, but they must recognize first that they are bound. All honour to the few who brave the crowd ! Thrice fortunate they who can break through the vicious circle of modern influence and come up above the vapours !

WHITHER GOETH THE SOUL

[Below we print two articles, both dealing with the immortal nature of the Soul. The first is by the well-known biographer and playwright, **Clifford Bax**, who accepts Reincarnation because of his own intuitive perception. The other is by **K. R. Srinivasengar** of Mysore University, who examines the theories of modern psychophilosophy in the light of ancient doctrines.—Eds.]

I.—MY VIEW OF REINCARNATION

Reincarnation is an idea which a vast majority of Western persons are not disposed to consider seriously, and the objections which people bring against it are almost innumerable. It has never taken root in the West, and perhaps it never will. Our forefathers, believing that the Bible was dictated by the Master of the Universe, naturally ignored the reincarnation-idea because, had it been true, God would presumably have mentioned it. I am aware, of course, that some theosophical writers attempted to show that the New Testament* refers to the theory twice: firstly when the disciples reported that "some say that He is Elias," and secondly when they asked whether the man, blind from birth, was suffering on account of his own sins or these of his parents; but it is said that those passages do not imply a belief in reincarnation as it is generally understood and, in view of his answers, no one could claim that Jesus maintained the idea.

In these days not many people disregard a belief because it is not sanctioned by the Bible. In these

days, on the other hand, most people reject the reincarnation-idea simply because they do not believe that there is anything which could reincarnate. Now, since I want at the present moment to explain my attitude toward this ancient idea, it is obvious that if I had first to explain why I think that the soul exists, I should never come to my theme at all. I must therefore take for granted that, in one way or another, we do survive death; and I ought to add that I speak about reincarnation with no authority and shall give merely my own view of the matter.

II

First, then, let us see why it is that a good many persons are instantly attracted by the theory. Well, there are people, foolish but sometimes also charming, who respond to it because they immediately use it to fan their self-importance. How many Cleopatras, how many Napoleons, are walking among us, unrecognised! Once, too, I met a man, well-known in the newspaper world, who confided to me that he was "Shakespeare,—

* In the U. L. T. Pamphlet No. 8—*Reincarnation in Western Religions*—three papers are reprinted—"Reincarnation in Judaism and the Bible," "Reincarnation in the Bible" and "Christian Fathers on Reincarnation". All of them are by W. Q. Judge.—Eds.

resting". It is much less often that we come across anyone like a certain other man, a more modest creature, who informed me that he had been eaten to death by rats during the French Revolution: to which, I regret to say, he added that I had been responsible for his gruesome end but that he had long since forgiven me. The reincarnation-idea, as we all know, is a forcing-house for fantasies, and the absurdity of our Cleopatras and Napoleons does much to bring it into disrepute.

Some people, again, conclude that reincarnation is a fact because they have had a vision or a dream—I have had such a dream, myself,—which carried with it all the feeling of a vivid recollection: or it may be that they have known the experience which Rossetti recorded in the lines:—

I have been here before,
But when or how I cannot tell:
I know the grass beyond the door,
The keen sweet smell,
The sighing sound, the lights around the
shore.

An experience of this kind may be impressive enough to make us feel morally certain that we must have been to some place, or have encountered some person, in a previous life: but it will probably not be long before a wiseacre assures us that we get this peculiar sensation of "knowing it all" simply because there are times when one lobe of the brain functions a little bit later than the other lobe. There is, so far as I am aware, not the slightest evidence for this assertion but, having a scientific flavour, it satisfies many people. At least we

find here a first warning that almost any experience may be interpreted in a dozen ways.

There are, too, other persons, of more exacting intellect, who adopt the reincarnation-idea because, taken together with the twin idea of karma, it seems, better than any other doctrine, to render the crossword puzzle of life almost intelligible. And lastly, there are people who recognise that the idea is true as soon as they hear of it, and who are unable not to believe it. Occasionally, even, children will discover it for themselves.

III

Leaving aside all those who "do not believe in the soul" and who therefore cannot take any interest in the reincarnation-idea, what are the most usual objections which people advance against it? There are many—most of them based upon misconceptions of the theory—and I can instance only a few. One man may feel that it is absurd to conceive that the entire personality of George Brown or Nancy Green will persist indefinitely. Another may declare that nobody has really recollected a past life, and that if all of us have lived many times, then humanity as a whole would not be unconscious of the fact. A spiritualist might contend that if reincarnation were true, then the spirits and controls who speak through mediums would triumphantly announce the truth. And finally, a great many people assume that the idea must be only an oriental dream because it was put forward so long ago and

in pre-scientific times. They feel that all sound knowledge began with Darwin, that pre-Darwinian thinkers were necessarily playing only with day-dreams and guess-work, and that no modern person need pay much attention to the ideas of anyone who could never have heard of evolution, psycho-analysis or the ductless glands.

IV

Even if it is true, reincarnation would of necessity be almost impossible to prove intellectually. Supposing, for example, that a child (as seems to have happened in India) were to recall events in the family-life which occurred before his birth? Even such evidence can be explained in various ways. I know a school-girl, born during an air-raid, who is obsessed by a terror of war and by a dread of being poisoned. This looks like a memory, but it would convince no critic. I know another school-girl who, when she was about seven or eight, used to tell her father (a distinguished man) that she had been in the great war. She went so far as to describe some of the cities in the French war-zone. Her father, who was once as good a sceptic as anyone could wish for, received a planchette-message that his daughter had been an officer in one of the Yorkshire regiments and had been killed in action. The father then asked the little girl what kind of clothes she wore when she was in France; and, after describing a khaki uniform, she said "There was a funny thing, just here. It was like this." She

next began to scribble and suddenly, while she was doing so, she exclaimed "I know! It was a Tudor rose." Here again a careful or obstinate critic would suggest that telepathy between the father and the daughter might account for the whole incident. And it might, but that does not prove that telepathy is the true explanation.

It is, in fact, only if we conceive that an entire personality passes intact through the major operation of death and back again into life that we shall expect much evidence of this kind: and from the little that we can learn or surmise concerning the after-death adventures of the soul, it seems clear that when it enters a new set of conditions it loses more and more of its terrene characteristics. Our minds are made very largely by our circumstances: and another "world" would change us more thoroughly than any mere sojourn, however long, in another part of the familiar earth. Indeed, the best advocates of the reincarnation-idea suggest that, between one life and another, the soul (or whatsoever we choose to call the persisting principle) gradually sheds more and more of its earth-won knowledge, memories and peculiarities until, finally, it succeeds in extracting an essence, as it were, from its experience of life. The idea in its best form, then, does not imply that Virgil, for example, would return to this world as a perfect replica of the Roman poet, but rather that the mind which was once Virgil would return with the

same essential tendencies. In this connection, too, we shall do well to consider the bold idea which figures in Geraldine Cummins's automatically-written book, *The Road to Immortality*. In this book we find a statement that the souls of people are not sharply separated, as their bodies are; that every person is a part of a group-soul, somewhat as a number of cells make up a physical organism; and that after death each soul becomes slowly reabsorbed into the group-soul with which it has an affinity. Leonardo da Vinci, therefore, may have been only the most effective representative of a group-soul which includes, let us say, a thousand persons. If this were true, it would be seldom that any one soul would recollect the details of any particular life in the past.

The only other way in which we could prove that reincarnation is a fact would be to see it in action, and this, manifestly, would be an achievement of the utmost difficulty. Theosophical writers used to declare that, as a rule, there is an interval of about fifteen hundred years between one life and another. Buddhists, I understand, maintain that there need be hardly any interval at all: and indeed, under different time-conditions, a soul after death might well pass through a thousand experiences in what we can only call a moment. Everyone knows how much may be experienced in a moment of mere sleep. Whether the interval is long or brief, a very high state of vision must be necessary before anyone can actually

perceive the operation of a law which extends from life to life and across the abyss of death. And here we dispose of the spiritualist's objection: for we have no ground for supposing that death makes anyone more capable than he was during life of detecting so profound and intricate a process.

For most of us, therefore, reincarnation must remain a philosophical idea. We cannot prove it, as a physicist can prove the law of gravity, because we lack the necessary equipment: but gravity was at work in the world a very long time before men apprehended it intellectually, and reincarnation may have affected millions of people who were quite unaware of it. Why, then, would some of us, having so little evidence (if indeed we have any), be willing to say that we believe reincarnation to be a truth? Well, perhaps it is only a physical fact which can be demonstrated to the contentment of every sane person. I think that there are some ideas which ring true upon the mind. I think it more than probable that many truths about ourselves and the universe around us can be apprehended only by intuition or that sense of truth which, in my judgment, we possess. I would no more attempt to satisfy another man's intellect that we continually go to and fro between death and life than that, if he were more sensitive, he would understand why some people derive deep happiness from fine poetry. Reincarnation is an

idea which seems either true or unthinkable. In addition to this feeling of its truth, we have, for what they are worth in argument, our sense of familiarity with certain historical periods or even with certain places which still exist. And lastly, if we are satisfied that the soul will survive death, we may wonder how it fares on the further side of that change, and ask ourselves whence came the souls that are for ever trooping through the archway of birth, and come to the conclusion that nothing could be

more in keeping with the processes of nature than that the souls of the newly-born should come from the world of the dead,—even as the soul, when its body is broken or outworn, passes, in our belief, from this world into another where it digests the experience of life, smoothes out the many creases of memory, becomes for an instant something mightier than any single personality, and then, recreated by this purging, returns to pursue its everlasting purpose of apprehending truth and of manifesting love.

CLIFFORD BAX

II.—THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM IN RELATION TO HUMAN SURVIVAL

Various theories have been held regarding the nature of mind and its relation to the body. Neo-Realists of all types generally accept *emergent evolution* as the *modus operandi* of Nature. This is fast becoming a favourite dogma in contemporary thought. It declares that on a basic framework of matter (Lloyd Morgan) or space-time (S. Alexander) higher and yet higher entities, not predictable before, “emerge” from a new and effective form of relatedness of the elements of the previous stage, *e.g.*, space-time, electronic charges, atoms, molecules, biocules, life, mind, reflective thought. Morgan, however, explicitly states that though there is emergence *in mind* of higher and yet higher levels of perception and consciousness, there

is no emergence *of mind* from that which is no wise mental.* At every level of the pyramid of evolution, there are psychical correlates to the physical emergents, and it is out of such rudimentary “other than physical” factors that mind as we know it emerges at last at the stage of vital relatedness.†

In Alexander’s theory of mind, which is also Neo-Realistic, space-time is the matrix of the whole gamut of evolution, and even at this basal level time is spoken of as the “mind of space.‡” This means merely that “alike in the matrix of finite things and in all finite things there is something of which, on the highest level we know of finite existents, mind is the counterpart or correspondent” and which performs “to them the

* *Mind at the Cross-ways*, pp. 172, 26-28.

† *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 38.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

office of consciousness to our brains.”* And in the organism in which mind has fully emerged, although the mental and the physical processes are identical, “mental process is . . . something new, a fresh creation,”† a new quality acquired by a neural process of a certain level of development.

It has always seemed to me a matter for some surprise that in the West philosophers in general, unlike Eastern thinkers, should have founded their conclusions solely on facts of normal life and waking experience (*jāgrat*) and ignored dream-life (*swapna*), deep sleep (*sushupti*), and supernormal phenomena generally (*turiya*). It is only recently that two eminent thinkers, one a psychologist, Dr. McDougall,‡ and the other a philosopher of Cambridge, Dr. C. D. Broad, have thought psychical and supernormal phenomena worthy of serious discussion in scientific and philosophical works. Dr. Broad, after a prolonged study of mediumistic phenomena, observed both in personal experience and in the recorded evidence of eminent and unimpeachable authorities, concludes that something which possesses *some* of the attributes of mentality survives the death of the body and is able to relate itself to the mind of a living person, *i. e.*, to possess the body of the medium.

Mind as such, however, does not survive.§

This something Dr. Broad calls “the psychic factor”. It possesses only some of the attributes of mind and persists only for a certain period after the dissolution of mind and body.¶ Mind as we know it is an emergent upon a combination of this psychic factor and a bodily factor. This is what Dr. Broad calls the “Compound Theory” of mind which is a modification of the theory known as “Emergent Materialism” (that mind emerges purely from a physical basis). On this theory all that we need suppose is simply that the persisting “psychic factor” combines with the material organism of the medium to form “a little temporary mind or ‘mindkin,’”** or that it combines with a series of organisms to form a successive series of minds (in the case of metempsychosis ††).

The recognition of a “psychic factor” which persists after death and which is able to unite with a living organism is, it will be admitted, a very great step taken by contemporary thought in the direction of unravelling the mystery of mind. But why does not Dr. Broad pursue further this persisting “psychic factor” and discover its necessary implications and conditions?

* *Space, Time and Deity*, p. 44.

† *Ibid.*, p. 7.

‡ *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*, Chapter IV. McDougall, a severe critic of Watsonian behaviourism, concludes, on a survey of the facts of memory and psychical research, that mind has a non-spatial, *i. e.*, immaterial, organisation and though it may manifest itself through the medium of a material organism, it is not in its own nature bound down to any such organism.

§ *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, Chapter xii. ¶ *Ibid.*, pp. 540-541. ** *Ibid.*, p. 540.

†† *Ibid.*, p. 551.

Mr. C. E. M. Joad has pointed out that if mind is supposed to be emergent upon a combination of a psychical and a bodily factor, it cannot escape traces of the materiality which has gone to its making. This means that it would then be impossible "to maintain the sharp distinction between mind and brain, that is, between mind and body, upon which as vitalists we must insist."* And since Dr. Broad maintains this distinction,† his theory of mind's emergence would result in a fundamental self-contradiction.

Further, if the "psychic factor" in Broad's theory is the residuum left behind after the dissolution of mind and body, it cannot exist prior to the mind (and Dr. Broad does not say that it does); but in that case with what does the bodily factor combine in order to produce mind? The same difficulty arises in connection with the bodily factor.

Again, the "psychic factor," *ex hypothesi*, is not material for Dr. Broad. If what we know as mind can according to him exist only in conjunction with a body, how can something which is less than mind "persist" even "for a time" or "at intermediate times"; without it? What becomes of it finally? If it is destroyed, what is meant by saying that an immaterial entity is destroyed? If it continues to exist, how does it exist, what kind of life does it lead? And how is an immaterial something able to unite with the material body of the

medium?

If only Dr. Broad had studied authentic Theosophical works like Madame Blavatsky's *The Secret Doctrine*, I feel sure he would then have perceived that the "psychic factor" which is said to persist for a time after the death of the body is really what is called in Theosophy the Astral Body, *Linga Sharira*, Design Body. He is right in thinking that it is not a mind but that "it may carry modifications due to experiences which happened"‡ to the individual while alive. But then it is not entirely different from matter, for it consists "of matter of very fine texture as compared with the visible body, and has a great tensile strength" and possesses an "elasticity permitting its extension to a considerable distance. It is flexible, plastic, extensible, and strong. The matter of which it is composed is electrical and magnetic in its essence."[§]

And yet since "sub-conscious perception and latent memory" are located in it, "it retains all the memories of the life lived by the man, and thus reflexly and automatically can repeat what the dead man knew, said, thought and saw".** As, however, it is devoid of mind and conscience and spirit, it has no independent knowledge of its own real state or surroundings to impart, and this explains Broad's observation that the dead men, alleged to communicate with the living, are singularly reticent about their present life, occupations, etc. After the death of the physical

* *Matter, Life and Value*, pp. 162-163. † *Op. cit.*, pp. 438-439. ‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 540-541.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 540. ¶ W. Q. Judge, *The Occan of Theosophy*, p. 39. ** *Ibid.*, p. 42.

body, this "Astral Body" is released and "becomes the shell of the once living man and requires time to dissipate".*

If then the "Astral Body" is not mind or the basis of mind, what is? It seems to me that a synthesis of the elements of truth in Alexander, Morgan and American Neo-Realism is necessary in order to arrive at the Eastern view of mind. If the "neutral stuff" of American Neo-Realists is interpreted as the space-time of Alexander, then this same space-time is the Ultimate Reality for Esotericism as well (but in a higher sense than Alexander's†). But the emergence of mind (Madame Blavatsky employs the phrase, "the emergence of consciousness"‡) is to be interpreted not in Alexander's or Broad's sense as the emergence of an *absolutely new* quality, but in Morgan's sense as the emergence of higher levels of consciousness from rudimentary psychical factors. And it must once for all be understood that in Esoteric as well as in Indian philosophy generally, there is no radical distinction between mind and matter, life and non-life, like that usually held in Western thought. This, however, requires a qualification, lest it should be interpreted behaviouristically to mean that thought is a form of brain secretion. Says Madame Blavatsky :—

Spirit (or Consciousness) and Matter

are, however, to be regarded, not as independent realities, but as the two facets or aspects of the Absolute (Parabrahm), which constitute the basis of conditioned Being whether subjective or objective.§

I am not sure whether Occultism would accept the psycho-physical parallelism of Spinoza, or the similar doctrine of universal concomitance of Lloyd Morgan, or "the panpsychism" of J. A. Thomson.¶ In one place at least Madame Blavatsky writes that "every physical point is but the phenomenal expression of the noumenal, metaphysical point."** This is, however, more a Leibnizian tenet and the following extracts probably may reveal the heart of Esotericism much better on this question of the relation between mind and matter.

It may be correctly stated that were Leibnitz' and Spinoza's systems reconciled, the essence and Spirit of esoteric philosophy would be made to appear. From the shock of the two...emerge the truths of the Archaic doctrine. Both opposed the metaphysics of Descartes. His idea of the contrast of two substances—Extension and Thought—radically differing from each other and mutually irreducible, was too arbitrary and too unphilosophical for them. Thus Leibnitz made of the two Cartesian substances two attributes of one universal unity, in which he saw God. Spinoza recognised but one universal indivisible substance, and absolute ALL, like Parabrahmam. . . There was but ONE for Spinoza; for Leibnitz an infinitude of Beings, *from, and in, the One*. Hence, though

* *Ibid.*, p. 42. For further details regarding this body and its part in séances, *vid*, *Ocean of Theosophy*, Chapters v, vi, xvi and xvii.

† *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, pp. 35, 37.

‡ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 15.

§ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 15.

¶ "That all the objects of our experience have two aspects . . . mental as well as material, physical as well as psychical." (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 325.)

** *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 630.

both admitted but *one real Entity*, while Spinoza made it impersonal and indivisible, Leibnitz divided his *personal* Deity into a number of divine and semi-divine Beings...

Now, if these two teachings were blended together and each corrected by the other,—and foremost of all the One Reality weeded of its personality—there would remain as sum total a true spirit of esoteric philosophy in them. (S. D., I, pp. 628-629).

This sum total she analyses into "the impersonal, attributeless, absolute divine essence" on the one hand, and "the as invisible, yet comprehensible Presence (*Mulapra-kriti*) . . . from which evolve the numberless hierarchies of intelligent *Egos*, of conscious as of semi-conscious . . . Beings, whose essence is spiritual Force, whose Substance is the Elements and whose Bodies (when needed) are the *atoms*."

Mind then exists throughout Nature and this accords well with Morgan's conception.* Says Madame Blavatsky :—

Descartes denied soul to the animal, Leibnitz endowed, as the Occultists do, "the whole creation with mental life, this being, according to him, capable of infinite gradations." (S. D., I, p. 627).

"And this," she continues, quoting from J. T. Mertz's *Leibnitz*, "at once widened the realm of mental life, destroying the contrast of *animate and inanimate matter*; it did yet more—it reacted on the conception of matter, of the extended substance" (I, p. 628), showing that matter is in its essence nothing but mind.

Mind then does survive the death both of the physical and of the Astral Body or Linga Sharira. If materiality "persists" why should not mentality "survive"? For according to Esotericism, mind (*Manas*) is connected with two immortal principles, discernment (*Buddhi*) and Spirit (*Atma*) forming the Immortal Triad in man. Hitherto, of course, psychic research has not been able to reveal the existence of anything higher than the persisting Astral Body; but I am convinced that it is only through the study and development of the higher psychic powers of man that the true nature of man can be realised, and not through the study of what passes for scientific psychology in our modern universities.

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR

* *Mind at the Cross-ways*, p. 26.

CONFUCIUS AND THE MODERN STATE

[**E. Dora Edwards, D. Litt.**, of the School of Oriental Studies in London, was Reader in Chinese at the University of London in 1931. She writes of China from intimate experience, having lived for six months in Peiping and for over six years in Manchuria.

World conditions to-day resemble the state of China when Confucius began his lasting work of reform. Then as now the world was in a hopelessly chaotic condition, and many thought the end had come. But Confucius arose and a new cycle opened in China. His motive for action is well revealed in the following :—

“ One day Confucius lost his way in the country. Seeing two farmers working in the field, he sent one of his disciples to inquire the road. The two farmers, who were hermits, insulted the disciple and criticized Confucius for being so restless in his endeavour to get into office and to improve existing political conditions. One of them said : ‘ Disorder, like a swelling flood, spread over the whole empire, and who is he that will change the State for you ? ’ Then the farmers continued to work, paying no further attention to the questions put to them. When the disappointed disciple related to Confucius what had transpired, Confucius remarked sorrowfully : ‘ I cannot associate with birds and beasts. If I associate not with my fellow-beings, with whom shall I associate ? If peace and order were prevailing in the empire, I would not care to change it. ’ ”

And the method ? He “ searched the Scriptures ” and harking back to his illustrious predecessors transmitted the Wisdom of the Ages. “ I only hand on : I cannot create new things,” he said. “ I believe in the ancients and therefore I love them.”—EDS.]

At the end of the last century the pressure of Japan and the West compelled China to recognise the existence of a great and different world beyond the limits of the Middle Kingdom. So long as she had slept, secure in the rightness of the old tradition and incredulous of anything better, the old order continued in spite of internal dissensions and dynastic changes. But as the events of the nineteenth century more and more disturbed her security, a number of her leaders became convinced of the need for reform. Even before 1900 Chang Chih-tung had pointed out the importance of the study of international law and political science ; military reforms were undertaken about the same time ;

and, when the revolution of 1911 occurred, bodies of well-trained troops were found on both sides. Similarly educational and juridical reforms were inaugurated, largely through the influence of K'ang Yu-wei ; but the most sweeping change was the official promulgation in 1905 of a projected new form of government. This envisaged the representation of the people after a preparatory period which would come to an end in 1917. But the situation developed rapidly. Growing knowledge of the mechanised, scientific west, of new and various political systems, of modes of thought entirely strange, spread dissatisfaction with the tardiness of the proposed changes, and the Manchu house, unable to enter the

promised land, gave place to the republic in 1911.

When revolution broke out, it was neither a popular movement nor the direct consequence of agitation. From 1895 Sun Yat-sen had worked steadily to bring about a rising, but his attempts and those of other reformers failed. Popular support was lacking, and, when rebellion came, it flared up as the result of the injustice of the government towards certain railway shareholders in the distant province of Ssü-ch'uan. The proposed reforms, which had been first of all political, economic and social, had neither interested nor touched the vast rural population, which indeed even to-day remains politically inert. Old bottles cannot contain new wine, as the leaders of the reform movement came to realise, and they therefore began to plan the psychological reconstruction of the nation.

But the revolution did not really place China in the hands of the reformers: she swiftly fell under the power of the war-lords, with whom the welfare of the country was second to their own interests. Unrest was still further increased by the numerous parties and factions which formed a confused and ever-changing political background to a succession of civil wars. Out of this welter of dissension emerged one party which was to prove itself stronger than the rest. As soon as the republic had been set up, the revolutionary group which had supported Sun Yat-sen's efforts to overthrow the Manchus resolved

itself into the People's, or Nationalist, Party (Kuo min tang). As the largest and most influential group in the parliament of 1912, it inspired the drafting of a constitution, and was the bitterest opponent of Yüan Shih-k'ai's presidential policy though Sun had been responsible for his appointment. Part at least of the strength of the Nationalists appears to have lain in the fact that from the beginning they have had a definite constructive policy. Externally they seek full recognition of China's equality with other nations; while so far as the internal situation is concerned their declared programme is the overthrow of militarism and the betterment of the masses. The introduction into China of the communism which has marked the left wing since about 1923 when Sun Yat-sen fell under the influence of Soviet Russia, forms no part of the official party programme; and the death of Sun in 1925 may well have relieved the Nationalist leaders of a burden. But even the most strenuous opponents of the living politician did not fear to place in the hands of the whole Chinese people as a sacred book the full text of the lectures in which Sun, whose death was followed by his immediate apotheosis, elaborated his three principles of national liberty, political equality and economic brotherhood. These he explained as amounting to "government of the people, by the people, for the people," the meaning of which is, he said, "that the nation is the common property of all the people, that the government is administered in common by

all the people, that the profits are enjoyed by all the people in common." He added :—

According to that theory not only will the people be communistic in regard to the state, but everything else will be in common. When the people have everything in common in regard to the state they will truly have attained to the "great commonwealth" so ardently wished for by Confucius.*

Of these three principles only one was entirely strange to Chinese thought. Theoretically, at least, the Confucian ideal included the principle that the people is the state, and governing meant acting for the benefit of the people. But, while Sun Yat-sen advocated equal political rights for a people stirred to national consciousness, neither Confucius nor his school envisaged a state other than one in which the masses were kept ignorant of the art of governing. What Confucius desired to see was an educated class governing not by means of punishment but by the force of example, and a people trained to follow the example thus set. It is not possible, as some writers attempt to do, to reconstruct the ancient Chinese system of government in terms of modern political thought. On the other hand there is no doubt that the Confucian concept is that of the modern idealist, who looks upon the state not only as a legal but also as an ethical and moral institution. Confucius conceived the state in its political, social and ethical aspects as an organic whole,

and advanced theories always in accordance with this view. The earliest, purely family stage of government was breaking down, and a new stage was gradually being evolved out of the chaotic conditions of the time. This new stage represented what has been called "an autocracy superimposed on a democracy". Until the end of the Manchu dynasty the family remained the unit in the social and economic structure of the empire, while politically a highly centralised administrative system was developed. The function of government was largely protective. It maintained an army; it administered criminal law through its various grades of magistrates; and in return it levied and collected taxes. For the rest, control was vested in heads of families and in village headmen or groups of village elders, while economic authority rested with the guilds, through which commercial law was largely administered.

As has been pointed out by one Chinese writer,† Confucius did not formulate any ideal system of government. Forms are outgrown as society develops, and are never universally satisfactory, but in so far as the purpose of government is to adjust the relations between society and the individual, certain principles may be laid down which are universal and permanent. Confucius was no revolutionary, but neither was he as conservative as Lao Tzū. He recognised the inevitability of the change that was

* D'Elia, S. J., *The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen*, p. 476.

† Liang Ch'i-ch'ao *Political Principles of Confucianism*, p. 83.

taking place and knew that "inaction" and "non-interference" were words no longer effective. Yet it was to save the old ideals from extinction that he travelled from state to state, making himself unpopular by his efforts to persuade the princes that the new "autocracy" should, and could, be built up on the same fundamental principles as had actuated the rulers of China's "golden age". This was the "great commonwealth" so ardently wished for by him—an economic and ethical Utopia and not a political democracy.* The theory advanced in relation to ancient India† that the state existed to uphold *Dharma*, that is, to maintain the moral order and the social equilibrium, and that all must accept their place in the scheme of things in order to improve that place at each rebirth, has only a limited counterpart in Chinese thought. The religious aspect is entirely absent, and the end is the present good of the state (the people as a whole) and not that of the individual hereafter. But the careful adjustment of human relationships by means of that untranslatable quality "*Jen*" which is in effect social virtue (*man's humanity to man*) and "*li*," the outward and visible sign of this inward grace, are at the root of the Confucian concept of the state. Those fitted to rule are those in and by whom these two qualities are most clearly displayed; and it is the duty of the king as the re-

presentative of the state to discover such men and promote them to office. Thus the state is not an external force, driving each to do his part in achieving social harmony, but is itself the harmonising element. "The king is the wind and the people the grass; when the wind blows over it the grass must bend," may have more than one interpretation.

In the view of Confucius, harmony, or social solidarity, could no longer be induced by non-interference. New conditions demanded new methods, and social harmony was possible only when the five relationships were correctly adjusted. And these, he held, had not only ceased to be self-adjusting, they were no longer even understood. "What is needed is to rectify names!" he exclaimed. We speak of the five relationships of prince and subject, father and son, husband and wife, brother and brother, friend and friend, but now, though the terms are still used, their true connotation has departed; when a man has killed his prince we still speak of prince and subject, though one or the other, according to the justice of the deed, must have forfeited the name; similarly, even when father and son are lost to the relationship which should exist between them, we still speak of father and son; and so it is with the essentials of the whole social structure; we say what we do not mean and

* The text upon which Sun based this appeal to tradition has long been questioned by Chinese critics, even if the communistic interpretation given to it by him were not entirely unfounded. See D'Elia, *op. cit.* 233, n.

† R. Pratapagiri, "Nature and Sphere of the Ancient Indian State," *Journal of the University of Bombay*, July 1932.)

have "the name without the reality"; the first requirement for the restoration of the state to its former excellence is to rectify names,—such was his argument, and indeed there can be no true reconstruction upon a foundation of confused thinking.

The special emphasis which Confucius laid upon man in his relation to man left small place for individualism. This may explain in part the rapid spread and the extraordinary influence of Buddhism in the centuries following the official adoption of what came to be known as the Confucian system of government. Western ideas concerning the rights of the individual, particularly as interpreted by Sun Yat-sen, have had much to do with the veneration in which the revolutionary leader is held and the wide influence which his teachings have gained in China. "In no sense a great man, he was undeniably a great force,"—words applied to Sun on the day after his death,* that might, with equal truth, be spoken

of Confucius. Sincerely convinced of the special nature of his mission, and undaunted by the impossibility of his self-imposed task, each sought in his own way the welfare of his people. It is as yet too early to form any adequate judgment of Sun for it is not possible to foretell what will be the effect of western socialistic and communistic theories superimposed on Chinese ideals and modes of thought. One thing is certain; the introduction of revolutionary principles is not in itself sufficient to change the fibre of the Chinese mind, and Sun himself, in spite of his western training and the radical difference of his doctrines from those of China before the revolution, must ever remain an example of the influence of the thought of the past upon the present. Education may do much to prepare the ground, but a nationalism built entirely upon other than Chinese foundations, if not foredoomed to failure, must seriously retard the progress which China so ardently desires.

E. D. EDWARDS

* *North China Daily News*, 13th March, 1925.

THE SYMBOL

[In our February number was published "The First Abyss: A Chapter in Autobiography," by **Theophilus** who now writes the following sympathetic character study. It attempts an interpretation of the value of a symbol to the human heart and indirectly brings in an instance of the working of a well-known occult law.—EDS.]

Whatever reality things possess must be looked for in them before or after they have passed like a flash through the material world ; but we cannot cognise any such existence directly, so long as we have sense-instruments which bring only material existence into the field of our consciousness.

—THE SECRET DOCTRINE, I, 39-40.

She had no fear, but her pride leapt into a great flame of resentment and anger. She could find no fault in herself that might justify this stroke as a sign of judgment. It was not judgment. There was no eternal mind, no deliberation, no purpose in the universe. There was nothing but a fortuitous concurrence of atoms that in obedience to some vast indifferent law, combined and recombined into an infinity of meaningless patterns, no one of which was of greater or less importance than any other. In the beginning had been chaos and to chaos all things would in time return. And between chaos and chaos came these patterns of heterogeneity ; the accidental products of differentiation ; nebulae and incredibly great stars ; the white mass of the sun, the gross solidity of the cooling earth, the brief proliferation of a million life forms presenting, in the fugitive moments

that intervened between excessive heat and that ultimate cold of death in which all movement ceased, the delusive appearance of order and reason.

That had been her father's explanation of the Kosmos and now for the first time she saw that he had been right. Until this senseless blow had fallen upon her, she had believed in an inherent justice and mercy that endowed the universe with love and beauty.

Her life had steadily confirmed her in that belief. She had her mother's love and if she could not love her father, she greatly admired the sturdy force of his fine intellect, the pride of his magnificent assurance. He had been honoured by the world and his death had been spoken of as a great loss to mankind.

Yet she and her mother had not greatly missed him when he died. He had been a man apart from the

warm intimacies of life, courteous and kind but lost among the deep abstractions of thought into which they could not follow him. And so soon after his death, life had suddenly flowered for her into a very ecstasy of love and beauty.

She had wisely refrained from any boast, she guessed so truly the tolerant, condescending smile that would have replied to it, but she knew that the love between Andrae and herself had been of a quality different from that of her acquaintances, different from any that she had ever known. She had been aware of a curious stillness at their first meeting. When he spoke to her, his voice had seemed to come out of a great silence. She had heard nothing but his voice; had been suddenly deaf to all the multitudinous sounds of the bustling world around her. Their conversation at that first meeting had been brief and insignificant, but for her it had had an effect of unique privacy. During those uncounted moments, the remainder of the world had ceased to exist for her.

She had had a quiet certainty that they would meet again, and had waited, content and faithful, for his return. He, however, had had no such calm assurance of hope. He had been fretfully anxious to find her again, chafing at the temporary barrier that parted them. Yet when he had surmounted it, he had approached her diffidently as if unsure that she would welcome him. It was not until after they had met many times that she was able to inspire him with her own deep certainty that the rest of

their lives would unquestionably be spent together in the strength begotten of quiet and confidence.

The rest of their lives! How strange it was that she who had known so much and so truly, had never doubted that the years ahead of them would be many. Andrae had sometimes allowed fear to come into his mind, had said that such happiness as theirs was too great to last, made references to the traditional jealousy of the gods. But she had always been able to still his anxiety, giving to him out of the abundance of peace and calm in her own spirit. She had had no fear. She had believed that she was strong enough to command happiness.

And when the fatal stroke had been delivered, when, before the sacred offspring of their union had yet stirred in her womb, they had come to tell her that he had fallen, none knew how, on to the rocks and been found there with a broken neck, all her being had flared into revolt. She had not wept, nor lamented, nor stormed at fate; but all the peace of her soul had turned to anger. In an instant her faith had gone from her, and open-eyed and in a deep silent wrath she had realised the vast indifference of a meaningless universe, in which there was no eternal mind or spirit, no purpose, no power for good or for evil. Life was no more to her henceforth than an unintelligible pageant, "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury signifying nothing". Shakespeare had known it. Her own father had known it. And now the blasting

truth had come to her, also.

For her there could be no more hope. She and the child she bore in her body were but casual aggregations of atoms among the illimitable host of atoms that clashed and warred together in one all-enclosing fantastic device. They might survive to what we know as old-age or they might be destroyed at any moment by a casual stroke of the shifting pattern. And whether they or any other human being lived or died was of no account here or for ever.

Her mother's love and pleading, the challenge to live for her child had no meaning for her. She was alone in the vacant wilderness beyond which lay nothing but the horror of Medusa's empty glare, and upon that she would gaze until her heart was turned to stone.

As the year ripened and the child began to stir within her, she sat often on the cliff from which Andrae had fallen, and watched the play of the sea. She was never tempted to kill herself. She was too proud to strike her colours, too brave to surrender before whatever indifferently brutal attack might be offered by the crass nonentity of chance. She sat very still and heaped the fires of her inward hate and anger.

She had been sitting there on the cliff for many hours when the evening came that brought her vision. No cloud had flawed the great arc of the sky since early morning. Beneath her the slow weight of the incoming tide slipped landwards in succeeding ripples so faint that the delicate music of

their sibilant advance was no louder than the midnight whisper of a restless poplar. The sun that had changed from scoured brass to ruddy gold as it drew obliquely down from the open depths of the sky, glowed at last blood-red as it touched the steel-hard line of the horizon, and the track of its reflection on the waters fell straight towards her as the stem of a gigantic letter T crowned by that glowing circle of fire.

And with the transient writing of that symbol on sea and sky, some deep, mysterious memory moved within her, some age-old association with the figure of Life. For an instant it seemed that the whispering of the sea changed to the faint melancholy music of a remote singing. But even as she watched, held motionless in a straining effort to recover that lost knowledge, the symbol changed. The sun was half-hidden now, but her imagination completed the circle and she saw it crossed by that single tense line of the sea's edge. But although that pattern, too, held some vague meaning for her, she would have rejected it in her desire to recover the earlier illusion, had not the second symbol persisted, even when the sun was hidden. For then she saw the vast enclosing arc of the sky crossed by that single horizontal line, as if the whole great universe were intent on manifesting this single sign of wonder.

Yet the hate and anger that burnt within her rejected that symbol as no more than another work of the ruling nonentity. That

effect of memory and the warm emotion that had accompanied it, were attributable, she declared, to sentiment and superstition. But as one who boasting the solidity of the material world may be startled by the tremors of an earthquake, so she who had been so steadfast in unbelief had now to fight for the recovery of her footing. And when an hour later she turned towards home and saw the full circle of the rising moon crossed by the outflung branch of a withered pine, she threw up her arm before her face as if she would hide her eyes from the messenger of God.

But in the days to come she could not forget that symbol which had been presented to her. She saw it perpetually in chance combinations of the common effects of life, in the face of the clock when the two hands were in line, in an ash-tray crossed by the stick of a match, in the plate on which she laid her knife, but most clearly of all burning in white fire against the darkness when she closed her eyes at night.

In those days she became steadily more and more aware of her own duality. On one side were ranged the forces of her intellectual scepticism, bringing with them, as she began to realise, the destroying emotions of fear, anger and hate. On the other side there was this strange, unanalysable resistance typified by a dream symbol. And presently she was asking herself why, if that symbol brought a sense of peace and quietude, she should so wilfully oppose it? Why, indeed, if the universe were no more than

a fortuitous concourse of atoms, should she deliberately choose conflict? The answer came to her intuitively. The intellectual pride inherited from her father, preferred conflict to humiliation. But of what use was that pride, she asked herself, if its only purpose was to bring division and torture?

And after that the yeast of the Spirit began to work more rapidly within her. By degrees she ceased her opposition to it, and began to open her mind to the suggestions that sprang from the great inner source of wisdom, acquired, though she did not as yet know it, through long ages of old experience. Sometimes she would sit motionless for hours at a time, plunged in contemplation, held by an intuition that she was on the verge of discovery, that if she continued to hold herself very still, knowledge would come to her, knowledge of some great eternal mystery for ever beyond the reach of the physical senses. And although that knowledge was still just beyond her reach, her quietness and confidence increased, calming her intellectual revolt and bringing the promise of a new unity.

She had lived ascetically for many months before her son was born, and her confinement was quick and natural. Afterwards when her son had been taken from her, she lay outstretched with a feeling of vast relaxation, emptiness, exhaustion. For a moment it seemed to her that she was falling into a great darkness, and then that she saw with the eyes of the Spirit, already separated from

her body and looking down upon it.

And in that instant the wisdom she had sought came to her. She saw the outstretched form on the bed, as one of innumerable vehicles that had served her as a temporary means of expression. She knew also that her partial recognition of the symbol that had haunted her had come from the fount of her ancient knowledge. Once that symbol had been familiar to her, the horizontal line had represented the "divine immaculate Mother Nature," the appearance, within the vast all-embracing circle of Infinitude, of what we know as "matter," the fecund developing instrument used by the informing ever-present Spirit for its own divine purpose. Matter was only a shadow that she had mistaken for reality

She opened her eyes and came back to a consciousness of the well-known room in which she lay. And then like the last leap of an expiring flame, the thought came to her that she had been asleep and had dreamt a meaningless dream. She clenched her hands and welcomed the reassurance of the familiar flesh. She had been

safely delivered of a son, and henceforth she decided he should be her one reality. To him, she could devote herself with a great singleness of mind, forsaking all perplexities as to her origin and destiny. He should become for her the living witness of present reality

But when they brought him to her, she saw upon his breast a birth-mark impressed by her own power of thought,—a thin red circle crossed by a single horizontal line. It was the writing of her own spirit, to be for all her life to come a perpetual witness of the truth of her vision, a reminder that reality must be sought in the self and not in the illusions of the physical senses.

For these signs have been manifest from the beginning of the world, foolishness to those whose thought cannot reach beyond the ever-present illusions of matter but a pregnant symbol to the Spirits that in the will to conquer are rising to the threshold of immortality. To them it is given to read the universal script that has neither meaning nor message for those who are pre-occupied by their consideration of worldly life.

THEOPHILUS

THE TRIUNE TEACHING OF DIVINE WISDOM

[S. V. Viswanatha, author of *Racial Synthesis in Hindu Culture* (Trübner's Oriental Series) gives here some interesting fruits of his study of the *Bhagavad-Gita* with regard to the threefold process in the imparting of Divine Wisdom. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is one of those rare books of Esoteric Wisdom, the reading of which entails the deciphering of a profound cipher. This cipher-language is said to have been "used systematically by the adepts in life and knowledge, who, seemingly giving out their deepest wisdom, hide in the very words which frame it its actual mystery". Our author attempts an explanation, using a particular correspondence which is interesting.—EDS.]

The *Bhagavad-Gītā* lends itself to classification and interpretation of different sorts; and, viewed from one standpoint, a close study of the "Song Celestial" discloses to the reader three distinct courses through which Śrī Kṛṣṇa takes Arjuna while imparting to him the Divine Wisdom:—(1) Simple Conversation (*samvādam*), (2) Divine Vision (*viśvarūpa darśana*), and (3) Personal Communion. The second appears to be an advance upon that which precedes it and a preparation for that which follows. This becomes evident, first, from the gradual change effected in the course of the teaching, in the mental equipment and attitude of the pupil. Early in the discourse (ii. 7) he is shrouded in doubt as to his duty, and waits innocent and child-like, to take the instructor's decision. In the sixth chapter (39) he admits that none besides his Teacher can dispel his delusions and doubts. As the teaching progresses, (xi. 1) and the Lord's Light is breaking in on his mind, his delusive fears vanish with the words of divine consolation spoken by the Master. At the end (xviii. 73), he characteristically exclaims that,

after the full attainment of Spiritual Knowledge (*Smṛiti*), he feels steadied and certain; ignorance and illusion linger in him no longer.

This threefold process in the imparting of Divine Wisdom is revealed in the aim and purpose of the teaching, the method adopted and the result achieved.

I

The essence of the instruction is pithily put in one verse as the preparation of the postulant to perceive, realise and enter the Eternal Light, which is impossible save by earnest and whole-hearted devotion to the Lord. "One can know, see and reach Me only by unremitting devotion to Me" (xi. 54). The first chapters of the *Gītā* are intended, no doubt, to inculcate knowledge that is "secret" (*guhya*) but of a general nature and pertaining to the physical senses (*jñātam*); and here only glimmerings of Divinity are beginning to be perceived by the pupil. In the middle portion, it is realisation of Superior Wisdom (*guhya-tara-vijñāna*) taught by the revelation of the Divine Form (*drashṭum*). In the last chapters is seen to emerge the Knowl-

edge of Self (*ātma-jñāna*, xiii, 11) which is styled the only Perfect Knowledge (*guhyatama*, xv, 20, xviii, 65f), the disciple thereafter becoming one with the Master, to enter His Abode and dwell with Him in Immortality (*praveshtum*).

In the last three verses of the last chapter, Sañjaya, summing up the efficacy of the Teaching, refers first to the Wonderful Dialogue (*samvādam*), next to the Marvelous Form revealed by the Lord (*rūpa*), to behold which with the vision that is faultless, the pupil is endowed with the *Divya chakshus* (xi,8) and, lastly, to the Eternal and Permanent Abode (*sthāna*) where the Master and Disciple stay united (*yatra . . . tatra*). Arjuna displays a lecturing spirit in the earlier chapters, being under the influence of a false philosophy of conduct (*prajñāvāda*), tending gradually, as a result of the teaching, to become attentive and quiet. Treating the whole *Gītā* as a dialogue between Master and disciple, it will be seen that, of the questions asked by Arjuna, about half have been exhausted by the close of the first six chapters, few of them being vital, while only a few are met with in chapters xiii to xviii. Strictly speaking, therefore, only the first third of the text can be called *Samvādam*, the succeeding divisions devoted to the other two aspects, *Rūpa* and *Sthāna*, containing more of the Master's disquisition and only a little of interrogation by the disciple.

The three-fold path—*Karma*, *Bhakti* and *Jñāna*—appears also in conformity with the principle of

division attempted here. First, Arjuna is instructed in the sacred necessity for doing his duty, without the thought of personal ends, thinking nought of gain or loss to himself. Verses 16 ff. of the fourth chapter are devoted to the nature of man's activities and duties. It is stated here that even the wise are bewildered by the multitude of opinions as regards *Karma* (right action), *Vikarma* (wrong-doing) and *Akarma* (inaction). Mysterious is the Path of Duty. Hence, the first six chapters are devoted by the Teacher to summing up his precepts on *Karma*. Next, by a course of instruction, the pupil is enabled gradually to see the Master as He really is, being gifted with the superphysical sense, and becomes devoted and obedient to Him (xii). Thereafter, he is ready to follow Him with humility, wherever he is led. Therefore, the Master unfolds to him at the end the essence of the Esoteric Knowledge (*guhyāt guhyataram* and *guhyatamam*), even superior to that beyond which it was stated in chapter vii, there is nothing greater to learn (vii, 2). Thus the *Gītā* teaching progresses from the physical to the metaphysical plane.

II

The method adopted and the qualities demanded of the student at each of the three stages appear to be different and suited to the nature of the instruction imparted. In the first chapters Śrī Krishna follows the method of simple instruction, as if to an untaught child. He exhorts Arjuna on the necessi-

ty for doing his duty, unmindful of the results. Here he drafts into service analogies and parables, with a view to bringing home to the pupil the essence and efficacy of His teaching. With the pupil who had been endowed with the eye to perceive the Truth there was not much need for the Teacher to draw such examples from outside; hence the reader meets with only a few instances of metaphorical language in the second part of the *Gītā*. In the concluding chapters, Arjuna has become a discerning disciple, and the direct language used by the Master does indeed have a telling effect.

As regards the qualities required of the student:—Earnestness, unremitting service and steady application (*śūsṛūṣhā*, *abhyāsa*) are called for in the first stage; strength of will, concentration and detachment in the second (*tapas*, *vairāgya*); while contrition of heart, serenity of temper, and selfless love are the special marks demanded in the third stage (*samyatātmā-bhakti*) (vi, 35; xviii, 67). These qualities are peculiar respectively to *Indriya* (senses), *Mana* (faculty of attention) and *Buddhi* (intellectual faculty); and iii, 42 says, the *Indriyas* are indeed powerful, more powerful than these is the *Mana*, and dominating both is *Buddhi*.

III

As to the effect of the teaching, after the first stage, the darkness

(*tamas*) that had enveloped the mind of Arjuna is gradually dispelled by the gradual glow of glimmering Light. Thenceforth is in evidence what may be described as a quality of *rājasa* in the temperament of the pupil which gets fired by the Teacher's mention even in chapter vii of a few of the characteristics of His *Vibhūti* (Cosmic Glory). Arjuna yearns now for a fuller knowledge of the might and mercy of the Master; and hence, a fairly complete description of the *Vibhūti* of the Lord is given in Chapter x. This *rājasa* of Arjuna is later tempered by the dazzle of the Eternal Light and the Power of His Majesty. At the end of the teaching he attains purity (*sattva*), peace (*śānti*) and patience (*śraddhā*), the white light of the Divine having penetrated every sense (xiv, 11).

Thus are we led to the three stages through which, according to the Hindu religious belief, the postulant passes on the Holy Highway of the Divine. These are, in order, proximity, the pupil sitting at the feet of the Instructor; the opening of his Eye to the Light; his admission to the Bliss of Immortality; and the Master and Disciple becoming one. They correspond respectively to "*Sāṃpyā*" "*Sālokya*" "*Sarūpya*" and "*Sāyujya*," which are treated as being in ascending order of Merit.

PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE

[The place and influence of philosophy in the everyday life of the people is being discussed from different points of view, as we remarked in our last issue in publishing two articles on "Philosophy in India". C. E. M. Joad makes this interesting contribution to the discussion, indicating that the influence of philosophy on the mind of the populace is indirect. His article presses home the fact that it is time that the nature of philosophy and the function of philosophers be given fresh consideration and redefined.—Eds.]

Philosophy has, I am convinced, an important effect upon life. Nevertheless it is difficult to say in what this effect consists and how it is brought about. It is not, for instance, a direct effect resulting from an attempt to carry into practice a particular philosophical doctrine. Philosophy unlike religion does not exhort us to live a particular kind of life; it has no specific message.

We have only to look at philosophers as they can be currently observed in the West to see that this is so. The political philosopher is no better either as a citizen or as a statesman than his neighbours. The metaphysician cannot provide an agreed and demonstrably correct answer to the questions, how the universe started, whether it works mechanically, whether there is a God, or whether there is such a thing as matter. The morals of the ethical philosopher are not noticeably superior to those of the plain man. In particular he is not necessarily remarkable for what is known as the "philosophic temperament". He is no more serene, and he is not better tempered than the man in the street. A knowledge of all the ethical systems that have been propounded since man began to moralise will not make the

philosopher a good man, and thinking will certainly not make him a happy one. It is even possible that happiness and knowledge may be in some ways incompatible, so that we are still to-day faced with the choice, which the Greeks propounded long ago, between being a happy pig or an unhappy Socrates. This fact need not, however, cause distress, since the question whether happiness is the only thing which is desirable is itself a philosophical question, capable of being answered in many different ways.

One of the reasons for this apparent absence of any practical effect by philosophy either upon the individual or the world, is, it is commonly said, its failure to reach results, that is to say, results which are definite and agreed. If "results" mean a complete set of answers to all the questions that have puzzled mankind since speculation began, it must be admitted that philosophy has nothing of the kind to show. The philosopher, instead of building upon the foundations laid by his predecessor, spends most of his energy in destroying the work of those who have gone before, disputing their hypotheses and throwing doubt on their conclusions. There is no one philosophy to which all philos-

ophers will agree, as there is, for example, one multiplication table to which all mathematicians agree. Many of the disputes of philosophers are, moreover, disputes about what exactly it is that they are disputing about. Hence arises the gibe that a philosopher is like a blind man looking in a dark room for a black cat that isn't there.

Yet this charge, although in a sense it is true, is also extremely unfair. All the sciences, it must be remembered, started life as philosophy. Astronomy, mathematics, biology and physics were branches of philosophy in the time of the Greeks, and, for so long as they were purely speculative in character, philosophy they remained. So soon, however, as anything definite began to be known about them, they seceded from philosophy and became separate sciences in their own right. Philosophy is thus in the unfortunate position of a schoolmaster who must inevitably lose his pupils directly they show promise. Definite knowledge has no place in philosophy, and it is in this superb aloofness from brute fact that men have found much of its charm.

This mention of aloofness brings me to a consideration of its practical influence. This influence is exerted in several ways. Philosophy will take a common object and show us that we know much less about it than we expected. A chair, for example, which appears to common sense to be four wooden legs surmounted by a square wooden seat, can be shewn by philosophical reflection to be an

idea in the mind of God, a colony of souls, a collection of sense data, a piece of our own psychology, or a modification of the Absolute. Philosophy can give very good reasons for supposing that the chair is each and all of these things, and, although it cannot definitely prove which of them it is, it at least makes it quite certain that it is not just a chair. From this point of view the value of philosophy lies largely in its uncertainty. The man who has no acquaintance with philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices, the preferences and the habitual beliefs derived from the society in which he happens to have been born, and the period in which he lives. If he is born in Persia he thinks it right to have four wives; if in England, only one. If he is born in 300 B. C., he thinks the sun goes round the earth; if in A. D. 1900, he takes the contrary view. None of the views which he holds are the result of independent thought; all are the product of convictions which, having grown up without the consent of his reason, are merely the reflections of the conventions and prejudices of his age. To such a man the world tends to become dull and obvious. Common objects provoke no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. Philosophy, which raises doubts about what has hitherto been taken for granted, keeps alive the sense of wonder and restores mystery to the world. By diminishing our certainty as to what is, it enormously increases the possibil-

ity of what may be. Thus it makes life more interesting, not because of the answers it provides to the questions it raises, but because, by the mere process of raising such questions, it liberates us from the dominance of the actual and sets us on the threshold of the reign of emancipating thought.

It is here that we come within sight of the real function of philosophy, a function which philosophy can alone fulfil, and which constitutes its ultimate justification. We can exhibit it in the clearest light by drawing attention to the fundamental difference between philosophy and science.

Now philosophy may be defined as the effort to comprehend the universe as a whole; not, like physics or biology, a special department of it, but the whole mass of data to which the moral intuitions of the ordinary man, the religious consciousness of the saint, the æsthetic enjoyment of the artist and the history of the human race, no less than the discoveries of the physicist and the biologist, contribute. To look for certain fixed and definite knowledge in regard to a subject-matter of so all-embracing a character is unreasonable.

In the first place, the subject-matter is itself in a state of continual flux. It is not philosophy alone that is changing and self-contradictory; the record of science is strewn with the debris of discarded theories, and the scientific laws and formulae of one age are superseded in the next. At the moment the physicists are

presenting us with new theories about the constitution of the material universe at about the rate of one every ten years, while biology is in a perpetual state of controversy about the cause and character of the evolution of life. But more important than differences in the data about which the philosopher speculates are the differences in the minds of philosophers. Philosophy is not content to catalogue the facts; it enquires into their meaning. Pooling the experiences of the scientist, the saint, the artist, and the common man it asks what must be the nature of the universe in which such experiences are possible. It is interested, in other words, not so much in the facts as in their significance. Thus it establishes principles of selection and rejection whereby some of the facts are shewn to be important, while others are rejected as trivial or condemned as illusory; it assigns values, too, and assesses the universe in respect of its beauty or its goodness.

Now, this search for meaning and significance, this task of assessment and valuation, involves considerations of a highly personal character. We shall select according to what we think important; we shall group and arrange according to likenesses which we think significant; we shall assign values to what we recognise as beautiful or good. What we think important or significant or beautiful will depend very largely upon the sort of minds we possess, and not only upon our minds, but also upon our characters and temperaments. One

man will detect common elements where another observes only a chaos of differences; some will recognise the hand of God in what others insist to be a haphazard collection of fortuitous events. Thus, while the facts are the same for all, the conclusions which we base upon them will be different. Nor need this difference be deplored; just as it takes all sorts of men to make a world, so does it take all sorts of minds to make the truth about the world, and philosophy is no more to be dismissed because each philosopher has a different system, than morality is to be invalidated by the fact of differing moral judgments, or religion proclaimed to be nonsense because there are innumerable variations of religious belief.

The conclusions of philosophy are, therefore, uncertain because they depend not upon facts but upon the interpretation of facts; and, once we go beyond the facts and attempt to give them a meaning, we have to reckon with the element of personality. Given the same facts you and I will take different views of what they mean, simply because we are different people. Hence the uncertainty of philosophy comes partly from the largeness of the questions which it studies and partly from the temperamental considerations which must necessarily affect our attitude to these questions.

But the all-embracing character of philosophical problems, while it makes for uncertainty in the answers, is not without its effect upon the mind that studies them.

Taking the whole realm of knowledge for its sphere, philosophy deals with those ultimate problems which have troubled men in all ages since thought began. For equipment to grapple with these problems, philosophy arms herself with the most up-to-date information, including of course the conclusions reached by modern science. But the philosopher is not content with these conclusions; they are for him merely a stimulus to speculation, diving boards from which he may plunge into the sea of the unknown. His work begins, in short, where that of the scientist leaves off. In the light of the facts recorded by scientific research, he proceeds to a renewed consideration of the time-honoured problems of the ages.

Philosophy seeks to study these questions impartially, not desiring to arrive at results which are comfortable or flattering to human conceit, nor to construct a universe which is conformable with human wishes. On the contrary, it endeavours to maintain a modest attitude towards objective fact, and to discover truth without fear or favour.

Those who give time to the study of such impersonal questions are bound to preserve something of the same impartiality and freedom in the world of action and emotion. Since a consideration of fundamental questions shows us how little is certainly known, the philosopher is ready to grant the possibility of contrary views having as much or as little truth as his own. Thus philosophy generates

an attitude of tolerance which refuses to make the distinction between right and wrong, good and evil, truth and falsehood, identical with that between the things done and the views held by the self and the contrary actions and thought of others.

Finally, the fact that no agreed answer has yet been discovered to the most fundamental questions cannot but suggest to the honest thinker that all systems hitherto constructed are in some degree false. Those who have no tincture of philosophy are inclined on all questions not susceptible of proof to supply the place of knowledge by converting other people's conjectures into dogmas. The philosopher, on the other hand, will admit that even his so-called knowledge is conjectural, and regard fanaticism, bigotry and dogmatism not only as an offence

against manners, but as a betrayal of the truth.

It is, therefore, for the sake of the questions themselves which philosophy studies, and of the methods with which it pursues them, rather than for any set of answers that it propounds, that philosophy is to be valued. Through the greatness of the universe which it contemplates, the mind itself achieves greatness. It escapes from the circle of petty aims and desires which for most of us constitute the prison of everyday life, and, forgetting the nervous little clod of wants and ailments which is the self, is elevated into communion with that which is greater than the self. On the practical side this greatness of the mind generates qualities of tolerance, justice and understanding, in the growth of which lies the chief hope of the world to-day.

C. E. M. JOAD

JEWISH MYSTICISM

[Dr. Margaret Smith has written numerous essays in this journal on Sufi teachers and their doctrines. Besides being the author of *Rabbi the Mystic*, she has also to her credit *Studies in Early Mysticism*.

Judaism as an exoteric creed is the most corrupted, and in it phallicism has developed. Hebrew esotericism is identical with Eastern esotericism, but those teachings are little known and less practised. This article, however, shows that the roots of numerous spiritual facts and truths are to be found in Hebrew texts. The restoration of the pure mystic element to Judaism will also effect an improvement in Christian outlook which is permeated through and through with tenets based on Jewish beliefs and tradition.—EDS.]

Although Judaism, with its insistence on the transcendence of God, its adherence to legalism and formal ritual, and its tendency to a narrow exclusiveness, might seem at first sight to offer little encouragement for the growth and development of mysticism, yet from a very early period we find mystical ideas at work within the Jewish faith.

Such ideas are to be found in the Pentateuch, and in the writings of the Psalmists and the Prophets, especially in those of Ezekiel and the Apocalyptic writers. It was upon this earlier teaching that the Rabbinic or Talmudic Midrashic school of Jewish mysticism, which had its rise in Palestine, and later developed into the mediæval Qabbālā, based its doctrines. But these doctrines, in their most developed form, as we find them in the *Sefer Yetsira* and the *Zohar* have embodied, in addition, elements which are to be found also in Zoroastrianism in Neo-Platonism and in Gnosticism.

The *Sēfer Yetsira* (Book of Creation) is the oldest philosophical work in the Hebrew language, though its date and origin are still

obscure. It has been ascribed to as early a date as the second century A.D., but this could only apply to certain parts of it, while others point to a much later date. It represents a mystic philosophy based upon the forms and values of the Hebrew alphabet, and while this teaching is to be found also in the Talmud, there is much in the book which is obviously due to Egyptian, Babylonian and Mandaean sources. According to its teaching, the production of the cosmos is the result of the action of the Divine Wisdom in the combination and manipulation of the twenty-two letters of the Hebrew alphabet, symbolically conceived, and the universe is thus an expression of the Divine Intelligence. Outside of the cosmos, yet dwelling within it, is One Being, the Infinite.

The *Sēfer Yetsira* includes a fully developed doctrine of emanation, all existence being regarded as an outflowing of the Infinite, who is therefore immanent in all existing things. He comprehends all things within Himself, and all apparent multiplicity is but an emanation from the One, a manifestation of the Godhead, whence all came, and

whither all must return; for all are ultimately one with the One, as the flame is one with the candle which gives it forth.

In connection with its teaching on emanation, the *Sefer Yetsira* deals with the *Ten Sefirot*, here regarded as spiritual agents or emanations from God, and they are described as being like the fingers of the hand, ten in number, but in the midst of them is the "knot of the Unity".* The first of the ten is the Divine Spirit, from which are derived the three primal elements, air, water and fire, and the remaining six are the dimensions of space, *i. e.*, the four points of the compass, and height and depth. As all, from two to ten, are derived from the unit, so also is the multiplicity and variety in the universe but a manifestation of the Unity of God. The *Sefer Yetsira* therefore teaches that all Being is one, and that God is both transcendent and immanent; but while it is mainly concerned with the relation between God and the Universe, the development of Jewish mysticism which we find in the *Zohar* is concerned rather with the nature of God, His relation to the soul, and the means by which man can realise that relationship.

The *Zohar* (Book of Illumination), while it represents only a part of a much larger mystical literature, is much the most important and valuable work we possess, dealing with mediæval Jewish mysticism. It is written partly in Aramaic, partly in Hebrew, and it purports to be a commentary on

the Pentateuch, while actually it is a treatise of mystic theosophy, which aims at establishing a synthesis between the revealed Law and the mysteries hidden within it. It is attributed to Rabbi Simeon ben Yoḥai, who lived in the second century A. D., and consists of discourses between this Master and his fellow-mystics, but it is obviously of later date. It was made known to the public by a thirteenth century Quabbalistic writer, Moses de Leon, of Granada in Spain, and some have regarded him as the author; but the book is plainly not the work of a single writer or of one period only, but rather a compilation of material of great scope and variety, derived from both Jewish and non-Jewish sources, and woven into a mystical doctrine, containing a system of theosophy and cosmogony, which has been affected not only by the influences already mentioned, but also shews many points of contact with both Christian and Muslim mysticism (Sūfism).

The *Zohar* teaches an esoteric doctrine; each word of the Torah contains an exalted meaning and a sublime "mystery, a soul within a soul, which the earnest seeker should strive to penetrate, but revelation is granted only to the elect, and even these do not all receive it in the same degree. Those who taught the Zoharistic doctrines first tested the capacities of their pupils and revealed the mysteries only to a chosen few. In this they followed the example of Rabbi Simeon, the Master,

* *Sefer Yetsira* I. 3

who entrusted his doctrines only to his disciples, and warned them against betraying the word confided to them, saying that the fate of the world depended on these mysteries. Man, he said, cannot understand the revelation of mysteries with his ordinary understanding; they can be revealed only to the Masters, who are fitted to receive such teaching, because they have been initiated. So the *Zohar* states that God is known to each one according to his receptive capacity—

for each man can attach himself to the Spirit of Wisdom only in so far as the breadth of his own spirit permits. And every man must try to deepen his own knowledge of God, in so far as his own understanding allows him to do so. But the Divine Essence must ever remain a profound mystery.

In its teaching on the nature of God, the *Zohar* upholds the view that everything emanates from the *En Sof*—the Infinite, who is the great Unknowable, the Supreme Incomprehensible, the Ancient of Days, the most Hidden of all Mysteries. God is all and all is God. He creates and continues to exist in all things, both what is hidden and what is revealed, in the seen and the unseen worlds, in what is animate and what is inanimate, that is, the universal Substance is one with God. So that the *Zoharistic* teaching is predominantly pantheistic; though God is infinite and transcendent, yet the universe and the soul of man reveal His power and His love; this world is a reflection of the Divine world, and there is a continuous and cons-

cious relation between that which is "above" and that which is "below".

The transcendent and infinite Godhead becomes immanent in the universe by means of successive emanations, representing the Thought and Action of the Infinite; there can be no creation out of non-existence, nor, consequently, can there be any return to nothingness. Of the creation the *Zohar* states:—

God created this lower world on the pattern of the world above; here is found the likeness of what is there; for all is a Unity . . . Before the creation of the world and before any form existed, God was alone, without form, resembling naught. Who could comprehend God as He was, before existence began to be? . . . Then He made Himself known as Jehovah, and manifested Himself according to His attributes. For if God had not manifested Himself under different attributes, how could He have ruled the world? If he had not shed His light upon His creatures, how could they know Him, and how also should be fulfilled the words of Scripture, "All the earth is filled with His Glory?"*

The *Zohar* teaches, then, with regard to creation, that it is the result of the thought, carried into action, of the Divine Being: to create means to think and to manifest, by means of the production of endless forms, all that exists being a part of the Divine Wisdom, before it appears in concrete form. So the Master, ben Yohai, tells his disciples:—

All things are in Him and He is in all things. He is established, since He upholds everything and at the same time He is not established, for we can find Him nowhere. He is the Light of

all Lights, we can find only the light which He irradiates and which appears and disappears. This light is called by many Holy Names. But all the Holy Names stand for but one thing.*

This divine life-giving Spirit is never at any time withdrawn from the world which it animates. As God is the Light of Lights, so also He is Perfect Beauty. "Beauty," said the Master, "is like the sun, giving its light and warmth to all without exception or distinction. Beauty emanates from both Wisdom and Grace. It is the highest expression of life and of moral perfection. And Beauty, in its most sublime expression, is the Supreme King."†

The transcendent Infinite (*En Sof*), in becoming immanent, gives rise to four universes, the world of Emanation, the world of Creative Ideas, the world of Creative Formation, and the world of Creative Matter. The first two are filled with the Holy Light of the Godhead and there God is all and all is God, considered as Absolute and Transcendent; in the latter two the light of the Divine Essence has been lessened in order to allow of the existence of the souls of men, of the celestial beings and the inferior worlds. The divine Essence thus diffused is called the *Shekina*, the Mother of all, *i. e.*, God immanent. The manifestation of the Divine Will is to be found in all these, hence Evil is outside of them, it is but an outward appearance, an illusion, non-existent.

The conception of the *Ten Sefirot* appears again in the *Zohar*, as the

One manifesting Himself in plurality, and they represent the Attributes of God by which He is known to man. The first of these, in the *Zohar*, is called the *Crown*, representing pure, undifferentiated Being. The next two are Wisdom and Intelligence, considered as male and female principles, whose offspring is Reason (not counted as a *Sefira*), and this triad hold and unite in themselves all that which has been, which is and which will be, and in their turn are united to the first *Sefira* the *Crown*. The fourth and fifth *Sefirot* are Mercy and Justice, and from the union of these two result Beauty, the sixth *Sefira*. The seventh and eighth are Victory and Glory, giving rise by their union to the ninth, Foundation, representing stability. The last of the *Sefirot* is Royalty, summing up the qualities of the Supreme King, who is shewn by His attributes to be the force immanent in the world in respect of thought, morality and power. So it comes about that God is known to men as the Infinite, the All-Wise, the Compassionate, the All-Just, Supreme Beauty, the Victorious, the All-Glorious, the King and Foundation of All.

With regard to the Soul, the *Zohar* emphasises its pre-existence, before it was attached to the body, its relation to which is that of God to the world.

When God willed to create the world, He created beforehand all the souls destined for the bodies of all to come. When the time comes for a soul to des-

* *Zohar Idra Zutta*.

† *Zohar Idra Rabba*

cend into the world God calls it and says: "Go forth into such a country and inhabit such a body," and the souls of those who will never arrive at perfection cry, "Lord of the Universe; we are contented here; grant that we may remain and not descend thither." But He replies, "Ye were destined from the day that I created you, to descend into that world, and it was to that end ye were created," and hearing these words, the souls unwillingly descend into this world."*

The soul, according to the *Zohar*, includes the rational element,—which links it to the Divine,—the moral, and the physical, which drags it downward, and this conception suggests a Platonic origin. The reality of man consists in the higher soul, by which he was created in the Divine image, and he is regarded as a microcosm including all mysteries; he is the central point round which all creation revolves, a Divine Presence on earth.†

But when the soul has begun its course upon earth, its purity becomes affected by the weakness inherent in matter, and it is dragged down by the lower self. It must therefore strive to obtain an absolute mastery over the body and not to become its slave, and it is through trials and tribulations that man must win the joy of those who are re-united with their Source. The Divine within him enables man to raise himself, and the Divine Law guides him on his upward path. While predestination is not excluded, for nothing happens which has not been pre-ordained, yet man has free-will and

is master over his own actions, and each man is provided with an opportunity for good actions by which to escape punishment in a future world. The *Zohar* teaches the doctrine of re-incarnation, partly that the soul may have the opportunity of achieving its own purification, and partly to serve the justice of God, since the sinner expiates his sins here and so wins entrance to Heaven. This is made possible by re-incarnation, wherein the soul consciously realises the bitterness of punishment and the grief of being unable to ascend on high and return to its original home in God. The Master, ben Yohai, when at the point of death, bade his disciples note that the soul was immortal and could feel no joy until it re-entered the heavenly sphere and continued there to learn the meaning of the Divine mysteries. But the soul that found no entrance there knew that it was not to enter heaven at once, but only after being purified, and so long as there is any desire for repentance, the soul will be given another opportunity. If the soul placed here in the world fails to take root, it is withdrawn again and again, and transplanted again on earth, until it has taken root. Transmigration is inflicted as a punishment on the soul, varying in accordance with the nature of the sins it has committed, and every sinning soul must return to earth until it is perfected. Says the *Zohar* :—

All souls must undergo re-incarna-

* *Zohar* II. fol. 96b.

† Cf. the Sufi conception of the Perfect Man, as set forth by Ibn 'Arabi and al-Jili.

tion, but men do not know the ways of God, they do not know how the Divine Justice is maintained, nor do they realise that men are judged in heaven each day and each hour, and that the souls of men undergo judgment before coming into this world and after they return thence. Many are the re-incarnations through which souls must pass, and many are the vicissitudes to be undergone by the numberless souls and spirits, who go astray in this world below, and cannot find entrance into the Palace of the King. Many are the disturbances caused in this world by the transmigrations of souls; but all that escapes the sight of men who do not know that the souls are tossed about like a stone from a sling.*

Only the Righteous, those who "have emanated from the *Shekina*," are not subjected to re-incarnation.

But when the erring soul, having passed through many bodies, and experienced many existences here on earth, in each one making further progress than the last, is perfected, then it can attain to that union with the Divine for which it yearns unceasingly. This consummation of joy can be attained only through Love, that perfect love which remains steadfast in affliction and prosperity alike, and when such love has taken possession of a man, he flees all earthly joys. Love it is that draws the lower to the higher for in love lies the secret of Oneness. In the heavenly Palace of Love takes place the marriage of the soul with God and in that mystic marriage is consummated the soul's longing for the Divine, when by the Kiss of God (by which Moses died), the soul dies to itself, and is drawn up into the Presence

of God, even as the spark is drawn into the flame. Yet this is not annihilation, but only eternal realisation of its oneness with the Infinite.

It is to be noted that the mysticism of the *Zohar* was no narrow individualistic seeking after salvation. Vision was to be followed by action; the love which drew the mystic into union with the Divine, here and now, was to influence his attitude and all his actions in relation to his fellow men. The life of the universe is bound up with the life of each man, and each must live in the consciousness that it depends upon him whether others are left to continue to suffer and consume themselves in desire, or are helped to find peace and joy in attaining their pre-destined end. The perfected soul "has himself become a creator—a companion artist with God in His creations". From the mystic's attainment, good will flow towards himself, towards his fellow men, enemies as well as friends, towards the universe around him, even towards God Himself. The soul which has entered into union with the Supreme Being can help all creatures to share in the infinite mercy and love of God, and such a one will be loved, and feared, by all creatures.

The *Zohar* has had, and still has, a far-reaching influence. By its teachings, like those of other mystical doctrines, it sought to uplift humanity by showing man the way to the Path of God, and the life of union with Him. Its

influence was naturally greatest upon those among whom it had its rise; by means of the *Zohar* the Jews were led to find a new mystical force in their faith and to seek for the spirit behind the letter: Through its teaching, they learned to know the true meaning of love, to understand the hidden message of the Divine Spirit underlying all the problems of life, to bear all their sufferings and persecutions without being embittered by them, and to look upon all the vicissitudes of life in this world as but transitory, from which they might pass to eternal light and joy. The Zoharistic teachings were incorporated into the Hebrew Liturgy, and affected

mediaeval religious poetry outside the synagogue, and therefore had an influence upon Judaism in general, while they were the chief inspiration of the schools of mysticism which developed in Palestine and are represented to-day by the *Hassidim*. But the influence of the *Zohar* upon poetical, philosophical and mystical works during the last six centuries has not been limited to those of Jewish writers; it proved to be very attractive also to Christian scholars, who have been the means of making its teachings known and appreciated among those to whom "all ways lead but to the One".

MARGARET SMITH

Cf. W. W. Westcott *Sefer Yezirah* (London, 1893) Knorr von Rosenroth *Kabbala Denudata* (Hebrew text and Latin commentary 1677--1684); *Sepher ha-Zohar.*, tr. J. de Pauly (Paris 1909); *The Zohar I.* tr., H. Sperling and M. Simon (London 1931); *The Zohar in Moslem and Christian Spain.* A. Bension (London 1932); A. Frank, *La Kabbale* (Paris 1892).

ALCHEMY IN MOROCCO

[Dr. E. J. Holmyard is a well-known and recognised authority on the subject of Alchemy, and has communicated useful information through his numerous articles in these pages. He wrote in our second number a very interesting article on "Alchemy" in which he stated that "in spite of all the patient investigation that has been carried out, we still know little of the beginnings of alchemy except that, far back as we may go, the art appears to be yet older". In our second volume Dr. Holmyard contributed a series on the lives of some important alchemists and in subsequent volumes wrote about Islamic and Chinese Alchemy. —Eds.]

Leo Africanus, the Berber traveler of the fifteenth century, relates that at Fez he discovered "a most stupid set of men, who contaminated themselves with sulphur and other horrible smells". Fez was indeed, for a very lengthy period, one of the principle centres of alchemy, and though the casual visitor of the present day may wander through its tortuous alleys but find no single adept among its pallid, yellow-slipped throngs, the conclusion that alchemy is no longer practised in that ancient city would be entirely false. By the orthodox of Islam, however, alchemy has long been frowned upon. It is true that the Prophet himself was credited with full initiation, and that the Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib pronounced the celebrated "Sermon of Revelation" upon the Art; but the fact that many of the principal alchemists were Shi'ites and Persians helped to make the much more numerous Sunni faction treat alchemy with suspicion and contempt. In the popular literature, the alchemist was always a scoundrel and almost always a Persian.

Yet though alchemy has been largely driven underground in the

majority of Muslim countries, it continues to lead a flourishing, if subterranean, existence. Among the townsmen of Arabia, Syria and Persia there are many who devote their lives and substance to the mediæval form of the Art, thumbing the pages of Jabir ibn Hayyan, Ibn Arfa Ra's and Al-Jildaki with hands stained by the operations of the laboratory. Sulphur and mercury, marcasite and sandarach, realgar and kuhl, are still made to undergo the complex and interminable calcinations, fixations, cerations, albifications and rubefactions so familiar to the student of alchemical literature. In Fez, however, it would be easy to spend months in a vain search for a professed member of the People (*Qom*); the native bookshops may be ransacked without the discovery of a single alchemical manuscript; and even well-educated citizens will profess a suave ignorance of the very names of the great Masters.

It is not until they are completely convinced of the sincerity of one's motives, and assured of one's lack of the almost universal scepticism with which Europeans regard the tenets of alchemy, that the Fazi adepts will begin to throw off the

cloak of secrecy. Then, however, though still with caution, the admission may be made that "a certain *shaikh* is believed to practise alchemy in the Holy City of Moulay Idriss," or that such-and-such a Hajji brought back an alchemical treatise from Damascus. Finally, one may be led—from behind closed doors and shutters—down a flight of stone stairs, past a water wheel driven by one of the underground rivulets of Fez, and through a narrow passage into a cellar which is at once the study and the laboratory of a contemporary follower of an age-old science.

There is little doubt that, could a European scholar sufficiently ingratiate himself with Fazi alchemists, and could he spare the time for such an exasperatingly slow negotiation, rich treasures of alchemical literature would be brought to light. The chief authorities, Jabir, Rhazes, Avicenna and the like, are of course universal in popularity, but the North African adepts are still too little known, and much awaits the patient investigator in these fields. It is all the more desirable that this work should be undertaken inasmuch as the introduction of alchemy into Europe took place mainly in Moorish Spain, which in turn was principally influenced by Western (Moghreby) Islamic thought. Though the main lines of transmission are reasonably clear, details are sadly lacking, and until the Arabic manuscripts of Fez and Spain have been thoroughly studied, our knowledge of the flow and evolution of alchemical thought must remain far too conjec-

tural.

One of the principal alchemists of Morocco was Abu'l-Hasan Ali ibn Musa, generally known as Ibn Arfa Ra's, who died at Fez at an advanced age in 1197 A. D. Among his fellow-countrymen in Morocco and Spain, he attained a reputation second only to that of Jabir, mainly on account of his celebrated alchemical poem entitled *Shudhūr al-Dhahab* ("Particles of Gold"). This work, though it has been published at Bombay in a lithographed edition, has not yet found a European translator or editor and is consequently little known. Written for the most part in the stately metre called *tawil*, it presents a masterly exposition of twelfth-century alchemical philosophy in concise and polished verse. The economy of phrase that characterizes it is, indeed, so great that the author himself consented to write a commentary upon it, to elucidate the more difficult passages. This commentary, which was redacted by Ibn Arfa Ra's's pupil and personal friend, Abu'l-Quasim al-Ansari, is fortunately still extant, as is also a second commentary made by the indefatigable student of alchemical literature, Aidamir al-Jildaki (fourteenth century).

A later Moroccan alchemist was Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Hasani, who lived at Tlemsen and there wrote his great book, *A Complete Account of the Perfect Preparation*. So far as is known, only one copy of this work exists—a manuscript in the Royal Library of His Majesty the King

of Egypt. The author tells us that he composed the treatise in response to the requests of his brethren in God, after having studied the science in Egypt and in Mecca and Medina. Returning from Medina to Egypt, he had a vision of the Prophet, whom he asked concerning the Most Noble Stone. The Prophet having replied that the Stone was thus and thus, Al-Hasani besought the Prophet for power to understand the esoteric meanings of alchemical books, and God bestowed this favour upon him. His book, while of very considerable interest, is by no means easy to understand; but the general philosophical background is such as is already familiar to students of alchemy from the writings of Jabir and Avicenna.

The fundamental conception of Al-Hasani and his fellows is that of the unity of matter, and its permeation by the Divine essence. Exoterically, it was believed by Muslim chemists that (to use the Aristotelian notation) the *Prime Matter* of the universe, before it can become a definite substance, must be united with *Specific Form*; and according to the specific form which it receives, the prime matter gives rise to all the various substances of which the world is composed. The most simple kinds of specific form are those which, impressed upon the prime matter, give rise to Fire, Air, Water and Earth, the "Four Elements" of Greek and Muslim philosophy. As to metals, they are all one in species; that is, they are composed of the prime matter united with

the same specific form. The existence of various metals was accounted for by supposing that accidental qualities had become intermingled with the pure metallic species, except in gold. Gold represented the state of metallic perfection, a state which no other metal had succeeded in reaching. Accidental qualities, however, might be removed by appropriate treatment, and thus a theoretical justification of physical alchemy was established.

The base metals differed from gold, it was considered, by excess or deficiency of certain constituents. The problem then was to find an agent that would remove the excess, or make up the deficiency, and this agent was called the Elixir (*Al-Iksir*) or the Philosopher's Stone. It was usually thought that no one substance would be sufficient: there must be two Elixirs, a red one to convert silver into gold and a white one to convert the remaining metals into silver.

Beyond or behind this "physical" theory, however, there was a secret doctrine of which an adequate idea is difficult to convey. It is hinted at, partially revealed, and obscured again, in practically every Muslim alchemical treatise, and nowhere more than in the pages of Al-Hasani. The close connection with Sufi-ism which many alchemists maintained, and the very clear traces of Gnostic and Manichee doctrine which thread Muslim alchemical literature, show unmistakably that while physical transmutation was doubtless an impor-

tant side-issue of the adepts, only the vulgar among them would regard it as an end in itself. Islamic alchemy, particularly in its Western form, was of a two-fold nature, and if one aspect of it gave rise in due course to the science of chemistry as we now know it, the other preserved and strengthened the mystical lore which apparently arose in the beginnings of human culture and has never lost its perennial vitality.

With the expulsion of the Moors from Spain towards the close of the fifteenth century, Moroccan al-

chemy—which had doubtless drawn support from the Andalusian adepts—begins to deteriorate. We have seen that, to Leo Africanus, the alchemists of Fez were “base fellows” mightily addicted to “a vain practice,” and with the lapse of years the Art fell more and more into disrepute. The last Moroccan adept of any fame was Muhammad ibn Muhammad Maghush al-Maghribi, who died in 1540 A.D., after composing a treatise on alchemy at the request of the Sultan Sulaiman of Turkey.

E. J. HOLMYARD

No doubt that there is such a thing in nature as transmutation of the baser metals into the nobler, or gold. But this is only one aspect of alchemy, the terrestrial or purely material, for we sense logically the same process, taking place in the bowels of the earth. Yet, besides and beyond this interpretation, there is in alchemy a symbolical meaning, purely psychic and spiritual. While the Kabalist-Alchemist seeks for the realization of the former, the Occultist-Alchemist, spurning the gold of the mines, gives all his attention and directs his efforts only towards the transmutation of the baser *quaternary* into the divine upper *trinity* of man, which when finally blended are one. The spiritual, mental, psychic, and physical planes of human existence are in alchemy compared to the four elements, fire, air, water and earth, and are each capable of a threefold constitution, *i. e.*, fixed, mutable and volatile. Little or nothing is known by the word concerning the origin of this archaic branch of philosophy.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Glossary*

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

WAS MARX A MYSTIC ?*

[**John Middleton Murry's** interest in Karl Marx is not merely academic. He is a practical revolutionist who is working through the Independent Labour Party of Great Britain to usher in a new social order. His views of Marxian Socialism are very different from those of ordinary socialists; we refer our readers to his article in our May number.—EDS.]

Mr. Carr quotes, at the end of his life of Marx, a picture of the man as he appeared in his old age to H. M. Hyndman :—

He combined in his own person and nature, with his commanding forehead and overhanging brow, his fierce glittering eyes, broad sensitive nose and mobile mouth, all surrounded by a setting of untrimmed hair and beard, the righteous fury of the great seers of his race with the cold analytical power of Spinoza and the Jewish doctors. It was an extraordinary combination of qualities, the like of which I have known in no other man.

That description, which I have never read before, corresponds with a surprising exactness to my own mental picture of Karl Marx, formed from a reading of his works. Marx, ever since I came under his spell, has always appeared to me as the last in the great succession of Jewish prophets.

"Marx was a prophet," declares Mr. Carr; and since Marx's latest biographer is no "Marxist" but, in the main, vigorously critical of his doctrines and his conduct, his tribute is the more impressive for its unexpectedness. "Marx," says

Mr. Carr again, "was one of the few—perhaps the first since Luther—whose life has constituted a turning-point in human thought".

Oddly enough, Mr. Carr makes very little attempt to explain the nature of this revolution of human thought; and perhaps he himself does not understand it clearly. But he is conscious that it is there. He writes in his final paragraph :—

Few men have, on the whole, proved more far-seeing in their prophecies than Marx. But any one who is unable to accept either the Marxist hypothesis of the millennium, or the non-Marxist hypothesis of the approaching end of civilization, must necessarily anticipate a new, though probably not an imminent revolution in human thought.

Those words are, in themselves, a curious confirmation of a parallel which continually haunts my mind, between Marxism and early Christianity. When Jesus of Nazareth appeared with his message, there was precisely the same opposition between a doctrine of the approaching end of civilization, and a doctrine of an imminent millennium, which Mr. Carr indicates as existing to-day. The eschatolog-

* *Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism.* By E. H. Carr (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)
What Marx Really Meant. By G. D. H. Cole (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London. 5s.)

ical belief of the Jews of Jesus' time was a belief in a millennium through catastrophe. And there seems to me no doubt that Marx himself was tinged with this deeply-rooted Jewish belief. It re-emerged in him, in a new form. But it is to simplify and falsify the true position of Marx to credit him with the naïve "Marxist" belief in the millennium. Indubitably, he did believe that the world, now unified materially by the advent of industrial capitalism, was destined to enter on a new epoch: as he put it, "pre-history would end and History begin". That would be, in one sense, a millennium; but it would be a very relative millennium. And a millennium which is relative is not a millennium.

To the true proletarian, the completely disinherited member of modern industrial society, *to be secure of food, and clothing and shelter must seem like heaven on earth; but the security is no defence against the subtler pains of human life*. Nor is there the faintest reason for supposing that Marx imagined it would be. He had more than his fair share of intimate misery; he knew what it was to suffer, as even Mr. Carr has to admit. What the social revolution would do was to bring "the life of the soul" within the reach of every man. No longer would the greater part of mankind be immersed in the mere struggle for animal existence: the joys and sorrows of true human life would be open to all. True history—human

history as distinct from animal history—would begin.

If that is what is meant by the "millennium," then certainly Marx believed in it, and believed that it was ultimately inevitable. But he was under no illusions as to the price humanity might have to pay to enter it. He thought that it could only be won by a political victory of the working-class; and again he was probably right. But what he did not foresee was the immense inertia of the working-class itself. Marx was not a member of the working-class: he was a highly educated German intellectual, who had, without a moment's hesitation, sacrificed a brilliant career and a life of ease for a painful existence as a prophet and leader of the proletariat. Probably at the beginning he took for granted a similar imaginative heroism in the working-class itself.

That is only to say that Marx was a prophet and not a politician. Nor have I any doubt that he was sustained by a prophet's insight, and by the sense of being "a man of destiny". He was the most completely conscious human being of his age. And that, I think, is the right designation for him. To call him a mystic would be to use that ambiguous word in a new and unfamiliar sense. But if we separate out as the characteristic "notes" of mysticism, first, a sense of complete integration into the universe, and, second, a supreme degree of detachment from one's own "animal" existence; then it

must be admitted that Marx manifested them both in a high degree. He felt that the dynamic process of human history had become conscious in himself: in him, humanity had reached a new phase of self-awareness. And this new self-awareness of mankind, of which he was the vehicle, was necessarily manifest in him as a complete detachment from his own personal vicissitudes. He had the objective ruthlessness and the domestic tenderness of the man inspired with a true creative mission.

What that mission actually was, it is too early to pronounce. So far Marx has been the inspiration of one immense political revolution. Considered merely as the seed which has grown into Soviet Russia his influence on the modern world has already been greater than that of any other single man of his age. But *the relation of Soviet Russia to Marx is not altogether unlike the relation of the Catholic Church to Jesus*: and the simple fact that Russia was in Marx's view the last possible country in Europe where a Marxist revolution could take place and the Russians the last possible people to achieve it is an indication of the discrepancy. Marx believed that the social revolution must be achieved by a democratic revolution. That has not occurred. In Russia we have had a social revolution without a democratic revolution; and in Germany we have had its opposite, a democratic revolution without a social revolution. To the Russians, Marx has been a Christ; to the Germans, an anti-Christ. The real

step into that future in which Marx believed—"the classless society"—still remains to be taken.

Mr. Cole's book *What Marx Really Meant*, has for its main purpose an attempt to explore the possibilities of an authentic Marxist—that is, democratic *and* social—revolution in Great Britain. Since that was the country from which the facts of Marx's theory were drawn, and the country with whose political destinies he was most deeply concerned, the title of Mr. Cole's book is amply justified. If we wish to know what, in actual practice to-day, is the exoteric meaning of Marxist doctrine, we cannot do better than to consult Mr. Cole's book. But we shall seek in vain in it for the secret of the Marxian dynamic. That is of two kinds. First, there is the popular dynamic which is indubitably operative in Russia to-day. That is a primitive religious dynamic of precisely the same order as that of primitive Christianity: the belief of a slave-class (for Russian workers and peasants before the revolution were no more) in a real, and not a relative, millennium. The second is the dynamic of the Marxism of Marx himself—that vision which enabled him to live a life of heroic self-devotion to a cause which never came and which he knew would never come remotely near to triumphing during his life-time. It may be an intellectual or religious bias in myself which leads one to regard this as ultimately by far the more important of the two. At any rate, I am convinced that this Marxian

dynamic, and the peculiar self-awareness on which it depends, is the natural and necessary ally of any genuine spiritual realization in the world-to-day. And, paradoxically, I believe that that awareness will prove to be necessary if an authentic Marxist social revolution is ever to be achieved. So that, in my view, although *the practical effects of Marx, by thesis in Russia and by anti-thesis in Germany, have*

been prodigious, they are essentially a degradation of the Marxist dynamic. This, I believe, will be genuinely operative only in the country where that dynamic is strong enough to inspire democracy to advance of its own accord to the classless society. To such a political and social movement Marx will be neither Christ nor anti-Christ, but one of the greatest of modern Teachers.

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

THE KEY TO BLAKE

[Max Plowman, the author of *An Introduction to the Study of Blake*, has written much on that Mystic and Poet.—EDS.]

"Blake," said a reviewer the other day, "was primarily an artist, and an artist is a man whose gift it is to communicate the light of his being." Then, referring to Mr. Murry's new book,* he added naïvely: "If Blake had that gift in superlative degree, why should it be necessary for another man to come forward a hundred years after his death and tell us what the light was?"

A question so simple hardly calls for reply, but since it suggests many reasons why Blake is still little understood, we will answer it directly.

One reason is to be found in the modern habit of superficial reading. The habit has increased enormously in the past hundred years and it is one that vitiates mental energy. Only too often the modern reader faced with matter of any profundity

finds that the muscles of his mind are stiff, and there is strain where there should be satisfaction, and apathy instead of apprehension.

Another reason might be found in the consideration that the light which comes from the most distant star now visible has taken an unbelievably long time to reach us. Yet another and more apposite answer is to be found in Blake's couplet:—

We are led to believe a lie
When we see with, not through the eye.

For these words have an historical as well as a personal bearing. For a century, western man has concentrated his whole energy upon seeing *with* the eye: the very virtue of the scientific eye lies in the purity of its objective reflection; and in this fact is to be found a very simple reason why an artist who declared that his work could

* *William Blake*. By John Middleton Murry. (Jonathan Cape Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

only be understood by *another order of seeing* should have remained for that period uncomprehended. When "the light shineth in darkness," it is not the way of wisdom to question the light if "the darkness comprehended it not".

In the first of his *Engraved Designs to the Book of Job* Blake wrote: "The Letter Killeth. The Spirit giveth Life. It is Spiritually discerned"—which, being particularly interpreted, means: He who looks at these designs merely *with* the eye will see nothing. In another place he declared: "Allegory addressed to the Intellectual powers, which is altogether hidden from the Corporeal Understanding, is my definition of the Most Sublime Poetry." If we can discover exactly what he meant by these phrases we shall perhaps see clearly why he is unintelligible apart from spiritual discernment.

What are these "Intellectual powers"? They are, I think, the powers of recognition—literal recognition—the powers by which we attain to a vital knowing in place of mere cognizance. Blake in early days gave this explanation of the character of all his writing:

As the true method of knowledge is experiment, the true faculty of knowing must be the faculty which experiences. This faculty I treat of.

So it appears that the intellectual powers are the powers which make experience intelligible.

That is a description of consciousness. Consciousness is something very wonderful. It is the intelligent experience of something that is not ourselves. It func-

tions by means of the imagination, through which we are able to enter into the life of an object alien to our own physical body. It is distinguished from cognition by experience. Therefore, according to the argument, knowledge which is *not* an explanation of experience—knowledge divorced from consciousness—is not "true knowledge". If it is not true knowledge, what is it? Blake describes it as Corporeal Understanding. And his terminology is apt; for this knowledge is, as it were, the mere percussion of fact against our own physical body: it is the awareness of an object in its disharmony to ourselves: it is cognition, but not recognition: it is the hearing of a report without experiencing the event: it is the admission of a seed of truth into the mind without any consequent germination: it is the retention of tidings in an outer chamber of the mind where they remain isolated, untouched by the imagination and therefore incapable of passing into the experiencing consciousness.

Now this experiencing consciousness is synonymous with what is called spirit. Thus we see whatever the mind, by the act of recognition, passes through the experiencing consciousness is spiritually discerned.

Blake appealed exclusively to this experiencing consciousness. His distinction among English poets is this exclusiveness. Whereas poets in general are concerned to keep touch with rational thought and from its apex reach the imaginative consciousness, Blake discards the rational process and

makes a direct appeal. What makes him strange is the quintessential nature of his demand that poetry shall speak directly to consciousness, and not suffer the distortion or interpolation of matter that is not essentially imaginative. Imagination, he believed, was the language of the spirit; he therefore endeavoured to speak entirely in that tongue. And since language itself is created by imagination, poetry cannot be confined to the mercantile use of words as tokens of limited exchange value. The verbal function of imagination is to heighten and extend the meaning of words continually, and ultimately so to pack them with imaginative content that they become symbolic.

The reader of Blake must be prepared for this extended use of language. But above all, since Blake's utterance is from an experiencing consciousness, he must bring to it a corresponding experiencing consciousness: he must, in fact, read Blake and the book of his own experience at the same time. Then he will see, in epic form, visions of the events that transpire within his own soul, and he will see them in the revealing light of one who was ruthless in his own self-examination. And he will find that Blake, because he was an artist, was a true surrogate and not a psycho-analyst.

But Blake as profound psychologist is only half the story. Why was it that he discarded the trappings of Elizabethan poetic usage that he had worn so finely in the *Poetical Sketches*? Why, too, did he

reject the whole mechanism of logical thought after having given proof that he could use it as well as any man? What led him to take Dr. Isaac Watts and Milton for his models after copying Spenser and Shakespeare so admirably? How came he to make of his verse anything so nebulous to common sense as "visions of Eternity"?

Mr. Murry knows: knows by experience. And that experience is the true and only key to Blake. Mr. Murry applies the key quite simply to all the doors of the so-called prophetic books that from the corridor of approach appear so dark, but within are full of light. The same key fits all the doors. Without it, Blake is a dungeon: with it, he is a dome of many-coloured glass.

Blake experienced the Divine Vision. In a moment of time he became an inhabitant of Eternity. He saw that which no man can see without passing from existence into the realm of being. He saw in vision the Reality that lies behind actuality. He saw "the Infinite in all things". He saw that which, in the moment, killed, annihilated, and utterly obliterated his own ego. He saw that which lies open to everyone whose sincerity in suffering is for a moment absolute.

It happened to Blake, without doubt, at the death of his brother Robert. Through his own broken heart Blake saw the Divine Vision; for at that moment he experienced physical death in the imagination, and in consequence saw through it. Thereafter, as a perfectly natural

result, the appearance of things ceased for ever to be of importance to him; it was with the life and death of what is beyond sensation that he was concerned.

But when once I did descry
The Immortal Man that cannot die

is his description of the moment. The veil was lifted, the doors of perception were cleansed, and *he saw the immortal spirit, not as a cause of which the body was an effect, but as the reality of which the body was an appearance.* Did he thereupon deny the senses? On the contrary, only then did he understand their mediatory use, and hence their vast importance. But because he had looked through death and clearly seen it to be only a physical appearance, he could not be detained by appearances and give to them his regard: he had perceived an Infinite and Eternal Reality of which they were but temporal expressions. It was, in a sense, merely a matter of natural and spiritual values; but once Blake had discovered spiritual value he counted everything else but dross.

So Blake became a mystic. His course as such Mr. Murry has followed with a zest and perception worthy of their object. His book is the first adequate interpretation of Blake that has ever been made. Never before has the inner chronological development been understood. Never before has anyone divined the changing nature of Blake's symbolic figures, nor understood the imperative necessity of their changes. Here, for the first time, the inner significance of

The French Revolution is perceived. Here, for the first time, we discover why there is a falling away in the later Lambeth books, and realise what a crucial struggle is enacted in *The Four Zoas*. Nothing hitherto written about Blake's *Milton* can compare with Mr. Murry's simple and profound exposition. Never before have Blake's dark sayings on Art and Artists been so fully comprehended. The book is a rare example of what creative literary criticism really is.

Yet without detraction it must be said that Blake is wider, freer, and above all, far more joyous than he appears in this portrait. Blake's vision was essentially cosmic: Mr. Murry's is essentially microcosmic. There is a lark and a wide-ranging eagle in Blake: Mr. Murry's Blake is a good deal of the hermit crab. Blake derives from the Christian tradition, and religious ecstasy is never far from him: Mr. Murry derives from Natural Evolution, and materialistic determinism hides round his corners. If ever there was a triumphant supernaturalist in the strict sense of the word, it was Blake. Mr. Murry is frightened by the word supernatural: it means for him contrary to nature; so the supernatural in Blake is glosed or denied. Indeed Mr. Murry's subjective method involves some trimming of the borders of Blake's singing robes in order to make them conform to the pattern of Mr. Murry's understanding: a fact for which he is not in the least to be blamed. On the contrary, this self-projection is the only honest way of showing both the

limitations and the extent of individual understanding. Criticism does not really begin until this imaginative re-entry into experience has been made. So it is that in the *quality* of what Mr. Murry perceives he is magnificent—perfect. Yet he needs to open another eye to see all there manifestly is in Blake. That eye is the eye of faith. Mr. Murry is habitually inclined to mistrust these intimations of consciousness which he cannot verify with his intellect. But it is precisely these which the poet trusts. Faith is the act of trust in that which the intellect cannot reach. To the intellect this trust seems to be trust in nothing; but to the imagination it is *the way*, the only deed that can follow upon self-annihilation, the impelled adventure of the enfranchised soul,

the birthplace of true art. It is freedom from self in action. And there is no joy without it. Joy is man's spiritual goal, and the sign that Blake knew life to be a divine comedy is the fact that his work is full of joy. Mr. Murry stops short of all this. The joy in Blake fascinates him, but it is foreign to his thought. I wonder why. Is it because he will not accept in all its fullness the meaning of resurrection? The resurrected body, which is the identity that has experienced self-annihilation, is to his eye rather a worn and ghostly figure, still cumbered by its grave-clothes. For Blake, "It is raised a spiritual body". He knew the meaning of joyous ascension—of the heavens opening—of New Jerusalem coming out of the opened heavens.

MAX PLOWMAN

Outlines of Buddhism: A Historical Sketch. By MRS. RHYS DAVIDS. D. Litt. (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London. 5s.)

In this essay, for in size it is little more, a famous authority on the Pali Canon continues her attack on orthodox Buddhism. Her arguments are so intensely interesting and so well backed with references that one almost forgets the curiously involved style and uncouth terminology which make her works such difficult reading. Her challenge, however, is clear enough, that were a disciple of the Buddha to appear to-day he would scarcely recognise in "Buddhism" his Master's teaching. All that we have left, she argues, is a negative and fruitless parody of the sublime message which crowned the immemorial wisdom of India.

The author argues that while Indian philosophy at the time of the Buddha

had reached a conception of the Absolute as the ultimate Ideal and, at the other end of the scale, had realised the immanence of this Ideal in every human heart, it lacked a positive, constructive declaration of the process by which the part becomes the whole, an explanation of that ceaseless becoming from the potential to the actual whereby the Man-as-More, to use the author's words, becomes in time the Most. As corollaries to this new knowledge, the Buddha made clear the relationship of spiritual brotherhood implicit in this doctrine of immanence, and the fact, not then appreciated to the full, that this Way of Becoming was a way of self-development in which each unit must, while helping all others, work out its own salvation, with diligence. In the opinion of the author, in this joyful creative message which lies in the word "become," the Buddha proclaimed a

positive, dynamic will to progress, using the symbol of a Way with each man as a wayfarer, in order to stress the need of unceasing self-development towards a goal he had himself attained. All too early, as expert examination of the Pali Canon reveals, this mighty message was smothered by monastic influence, and replaced by a number of dogmatic formulae, such as the Signs of Being and the Four Noble Truths, which can be shown to be of later origin. In the same way, in the place of the sublime morality of which but fragments remain in the recorded Scriptures, there was evolved the cold, monastic sterility of the negatively formulated *Pansil*, while with the ascendance of monkish influence came the insistence on a semi-mechanical causation, with "becoming" as a mere link in the chain to be broken as soon as possible, and this as a substitute for that living reality of self-becoming in which the meaning of *Karma* and sister truths were only comprehensible as the flower of living experience. So long as monasteries were principally rest houses for monks between periods of missionary endeavour, the dynamic message of the Master, long needed by India, burned like a brilliant flame; but with the decay of the Sangha into a place of escape from life as distinct from a place wherein it might be more vividly realised, the original teaching of Man as More was swiftly degraded into a static condition of the Man as Less, until the negative doctrines of *Dukkha* and *Anatta*, useful as correctives to a misunderstanding of the nature of worldly life, became elevated into the very Message of the Master, and proclaimed as his unique contribution to Indian thought.

This emasculation of the Buddha's teaching is clearly shown, the author contends, by the rejection at the

Council held in the time of Asoka of those who held these, as she claims, original views; and in her opinion it was the spiritual descendants of these rejected Gnostics, travelling later to China, who there built up the dynamic Mahayana, or Greater Way, as distinct from the Hinayana or lesser, because static and negative Way of the Southern or Thera Vada School.

Such is the author's theme. Whether she is right in regarding most of what is now taught in the latter School as Buddhism as "decadent elaborations" on the Master's message is for individual opinion to decide. Her views are sufficiently well reasoned and documented to merit most careful attention, and if they in some ways overshoot the truth, this is an inevitable defect of every effort to remould public opinion. From the point of view of the ancient Wisdom we call Theosophy, her views are biased by her failure to appreciate that the Buddha was not a mere philosopher, but *Buddha*, the Enlightened One. And it must not be forgotten that to a certain type of mind the negative expression of doctrine is a better corrective to certain typical faults than the complementary message which all too easily loses itself in unproductive exuberance. Adequate criticism, however, in the space permitted is impossible, but no criticism can drown the voice which proclaims to Thera Vada Buddhists that the Master they attempt to follow never would have advocated the sterile dogmas found in every Buddhist textbook as the basis of His Teaching, though they play a most useful part as an incentive to the "will-to-become" which lies at the heart of Wisdom, and for the achievement of which the Blessed One proclaimed the Middle Way.

After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy. The Page-Barbour Lectures at the University of Virginia. By T. S. ELIOT. (Faber and Faber, London. 3s. 6d.)

This is the second-fruit of Mr. Eliot's recent visit to America. At Virginia he ascended the platform, to quote his own words, "only in the role of a moralist," although the subject to which he was concerned to apply his moral principles or to persuade others to do so was modern literature, and particularly the work of certain modern writers, such as Hardy, Ezra Pound, and D. H. Lawrence, which illustrated his thesis. But the demoralisation which he deplored in the particular province of literature is a disease of modern life, and implicit in these three lectures is that larger reference. They are meant to encourage men in what Mr. Eliot calls "the struggle of our time to concentrate, not to dissipate; to renew our association with traditional wisdom; to re-establish a vital connexion between the individual and the race; the struggle, in a word, against Liberalism."

He does not define Liberalism but lumps it with "Progress and Modern Civilisation" as something to which we cannot and ought not to reconcile ourselves. And there is of course a sense in which all these things are false and must be reconceived. They are false because they are the expression of a one-sided individualism carried to destructive extremes. Modern life has become demoralised through the same agency which Mr. Eliot discerns in modern art, "the *unregenerate* personality, partly self-deceived and partly irresponsible, and because of its freedom, terribly *limited* by prejudice and self-conceit, capable of much good or great mischief according to the natural goodness or impurity of the man."

Granted. But how then is the sick personality, which is the cause of it

all, to be regenerated? Here, as usual, Mr. Eliot's prescription seems to me quite inadequate. And it is inadequate because he fears the unregenerate self too much to surrender it. Instead he would merely control, educate and cultivate it. Inevitably, therefore, to him the "Inner Light" is "the most untrustworthy and deceitful guide that ever offered itself to wandering humanity".

To which one can only reply that such a deceitful guide is in no true sense the "Inner Light". But Mr. Eliot cannot see beyond the old precarious balance of rebellious will and external restraint, whether it be of tradition or institution. He cannot admit the necessity, because apparently he questions the possibility, of a man becoming through interior, disciplined growth a centre of that true Light, "which lighteth every man that cometh into the world". While, therefore, one may agree with almost all he says of the crippling effect of growing up without the support of a living and central tradition, I cannot believe that any real regeneration can be effected by such doses of "tradition, perpetually criticised and brought up to date under the supervision of orthodoxy," as he recommends. For it is only within a new and vital order that what is true in past cultures can be creatively re-affirmed. Consequently the break-down of the old forms and restraints is not in fact the unmitigated disaster which Mr. Eliot conceives it to be. For falsity was in them as well as truth and from their dissolution new forms may be born which will express, not an anxious orthodoxy, but a fearless integrity. Because he does not conceive the need of such an integrity Mr. Eliot can only oppose a disdainfully critical mind to the disorder of the modern world. And there is no real inspiration and curiously little relevance to-day in the kind of order he would reimpose.

HUGH P.A. FAUSSET

I was a Pagan. By V. C. KITCHEN. (Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd. London 5s.)

The "Oxford Group" is a widespread and influential revival movement in Protestant Christianity. Despite its comparatively recent foundation, its adherents are already, we are told, to be found in forty countries, and some of its gatherings—curiously called "house-parties"—have been attended by no less than 5000 people. It differs from other movements of the same kind, such as Methodism and the Salvation Army, in that its stress is rather on conduct and inner attitude than on mere faith. Like its predecessors, the Oxford Group accepts Jesus as a still-living, personal, saviour-god; but it seems to regard him, not so much as a scape-goat sacrificed for the sins of mankind, as an active fount of inspiration, to be contacted and experienced inwardly. There seems to be evidence that the activities of the Oxford Group have been the means of giving new life to a moribund religion; and it has certainly turned numbers of slack or nominal Christians into Christians who, with more or less success, are attempting to frame their lives upon the ethical precepts of Jesus.

In *I was a Pagan*, Mr. V. C. Kitchen tells the story of his conversion and its effect on his life. The book is a blend of autobiography and propaganda for the Oxford Group and, as such, emphasises the sinfulness that preceded, and the reformation that followed the author's conversion. Very many of the principles, which Mr. Kitchen endeavours to "sell" us with all the persuasive skill he learned as a New York advertising expert, are eminently good and wise. When, for example, he urges over and over again that no preaching to others can be effective unless the preacher re-orders his own life and practises his own precepts, he is uttering a vital truth which sadly needs attention in these days of elaborate paper schemes for turning the world into Utopia by means of political or economic changes.

The peculiar methods adopted by the Oxford Group for influencing men to lead better lives have been extravagantly praised and as keenly condemned. The truth about them seems to be that some are spiritually wholesome and conducive to ethical improvement, while others are of doubtful value or even dangerous.

When Mr. Kitchen insists that all our relations with our fellows should be based on brotherly love, honesty, and moral purity, he is defining the indispensable conditions for all individual and collective reforms. His emphasis on the need of complete surrender to God brings his teaching into line with what the mystics of East and West have said about resignation and the renunciation of all selfish personal desires and interests as being the first step in the spiritual path.

There is a very close resemblance in many respects between the religion of the Oxford Group and Indian Bhakti; and much of Mr. Kitchen's writing is reminiscent of *The Gospel of Ramakrishna*.

But, despite the undoubted fervour, devotion and sincerity of the Oxford Group, the system, like most Bhakti systems, is fatally weak on the intellectual side. It is not unfair to say that it simply takes the outline theology of Protestant Christianity for granted and has no philosophy otherwise. Its adherents, once converted, seem to rely entirely on what they call "guidance," i.e., on inner promptings, which they believe come from God; but they appear to have no criterion by which to distinguish impulses that come from above from those otherwise derived. Mr. Kitchen is convinced that he receives divine guidance in planning the detailed events of his daily life. God tells him what clients to call on and what to say to them. Now, while the general tenor and orientation of our lives should be determined by the promptings of the divine Higher Self, yet that Inner God does not concern itself with material details, which are the business of the ratiocinative mind.

The God sets the course : we have to do the steering and see to the efficiency of the ship. That Mr. Kitchen attributes so many of his impulses to divine guidance suggests inevitably that he does not distinguish between the divine and the human in himself ; and herein lies the great danger of his method. He himself is obviously a sincere and high principled man ; but many or most people, who come to

rely on " guidance " in the Oxford Group sense, would be apt to fall into the way of accepting every urge that wells up into consciousness as coming from God, with dire results to mental and moral health.

On its own merits and for the light it throws on a remarkable movement in contemporary religion, *I was a Pagan* deserves the attention of readers of THE ARYAN PATH.

R. A. V. M.

Science and God. By BERNHARD BAVINK. Trans. by H. Stafford Hatfield. (George Bell and Sons, Ltd., London 5s.)

Limitations of Science. By J. W. N. SULLIVAN. (Chatto and Windus, London)

The scientists of the seventeenth century, who are really the founders of modern thought, evolved a mechanistic picture of the world in terms of classical mechanics. These founders of science were men of great piety and had no intention to oppose the traditional Christianity. Subsequent developments during a period of three hundred years have turned European culture away from belief in God and all that goes with such faith, and have finally resulted in " simple unconcealed atheism and materialism which is to-day the official philosophy of Bolshevik Russia ".

Bernhard Bavink adds his testimony to the growing mass of evidence that a mere mechanistic view of matter is untenable. The modern physicist has learned that his " atoms or electrons or what not, are no longer to be regarded as rigid lumps of reality from which no path can be found into the mental and spiritual sphere ; he sees, on the contrary, that all those structures are forms in perpetual flux which are only of interest to him as regards their form ". With this view every variety of materialism is superseded.

Any candid enquiry into the why and wherefore of observed phenomena leads every scientist, be he physicist or biologist, to something inexplicable, something mysterious. This horizon, which limits our scientific vision may be growing more distant, but we must confess that the beyond passes human understanding. Dr. Bavink, theologian as well as scientist, holds that it is within the " ken " and is the " action " of some superhuman being which we call God, but this is speculation, not science. The fact remains, however, that the scientist has made hardly any progress in solving several vital problems of great moment. The relation between the body and mind, the physical and psychical, the origin of life, the great gap between life and death in spite of the identity of substance—these and many other issues have remained unexplained.

This thesis is admirably developed by Dr. Sullivan, who regards science not as formulation of truth but as the constant pursuit of truth ; dynamic rather than static. *Limitations of Science* presents the history of science as a record of the painstaking but never-ending endeavour of man to solve the riddles of nature, a history of knowledge ever growing but never complete. Generally speaking, while our curiosities about inanimate matter are to some extent satisfied by scientific enquiries, our knowledge concerning life is still far from satisfactory. It may be that our interest in phenom-

ena connected with inanimate matter is limited, but it can be said without hesitation that in every department of enquiry we are confronted with unsolved or unsatisfactorily solved problems. Our attempts at the formulation of the laws of probability stand out as confessions of our limitations.

The chapter on scientific philosophy is most appealing to the Oriental mind. When the enquiring mind attempts to probe into the significance of facts as perceived by the sciences, to sift out the important facts suitable for scientific formulation from others which are either trivial or illusory and to comprehend Nature as a whole and not as a special department of it, the limiting features of our existing knowledge confront us at every stage. The

search for significance and the assessment and valuation of facts involve considerations of a highly personal character, subjective and not objective, and thus constitute a fresh limitation of science.

Has Sir S. Radhakrishnan suggested the solution? He has said :—

Man's never ceasing effort to read the riddle of the Sphinx and raise himself above the level of the beast to a moral and spiritual height finds a striking illustration in India. The problem of Indian Philosophy to-day is whether it is to be reduced to a cult restricted in scope and with no application to the present facts or whether it is to be made alive and real so as to become what it should be, one of the great formative elements in human progress by relating the immensely increased knowledge of modern science to the ancient ideals of Indian Philosophy.

B. N. SASTRI

Stories of Second Sight in a Highland Regiment. BY WILLIAM KIRK. (Eneas Mackay, Stirling, Scotland. 2s. 6d..)

These stories are not records of cases of second sight in a Highland Regiment, but short tales and poems written for the war-time gazette of a Highland Regiment. Not all of them deal with "queer" things, but those that do were founded on fact—the author's own experiences and those of his fellow-soldiers.

There is to-day a definite demand for tales of "ghaisties and ghoulies" and an oncoming curiosity about abnormal faculties. Whether such literature is wholesome diet is another matter. When put out merely as hair-raising thrillers, such fiction accustoms people's minds to the idea of an inner psychic world, and thereby helps to force their own psychic development and to bring them, through the magnetic attraction of their interest in the

subject, into a condition where they are more easily affected by psychic forces. Scepticism is a measure of protection, and when it vanishes, leaving only ignorance behind, the last state is worse than the first.

Since Mr. Kirk has recognized empirically such faculties as clairvoyance and second sight he has some basis for the theoretical study that must precede practical investigation, if the latter is to be carried on in safety. Madame Blavatsky gave many a warning about the coming development of psychism with all its allurements and dangers, and the vital need for proper knowledge and control of such powers. We can see to-day how even fiction writers have a responsibility in the matter. Are their stories helping to arouse interest in psychism without giving at the same time any means of dealing with the difficulties that will arise from that interest?

WINIFRED WHITEMAN

The Word to Peter. By J. A. HEATON. (Elliot Stock, London. 3s.)

The author, in this account of Peter's training and preaching, attempts to show along what lines a real religion of living, individual and collective, may be formulated. He believes there are "pieces of truth in many sects," but that the full glory of Christianity will be revealed when the sects are dissolved in the Christ-Homo. And that alone can regenerate the present Satan-Homo of the modern world. He rightly opines that truth has largely outgrown the age of creeds and that their bonds are superseded. He pleads for creedlessness and non-sectarianism in the faiths of the future which he sees as Christianity stripped of Churchianity.

He pleads, too, for the removal of Bibliolatry that has impeded the growth of Christianity. Very truly he says that the Bible has been misunderstood.

This misunderstanding is the cause of non-progress and decay; but the wider interpretation of the Bible which alone can save Christianity from its oncoming doom, is possible only by the aid of Western science and Eastern wisdom. This has been done remarkably in our opinion by Madame Blavatsky, and every Christian should peruse her writings.

We cannot, however, agree with the author that Christianity alone can fuse the nations into one. No single religion can do so. The Secret Doctrine of all religions—the Universal religion of which all religions are partial expressions—which yet is latent in each, can alone unite the world. The book betrays the author's ignorance of other religions. Such narrow views will be outgrown if he makes a comparative study of Indian Religions.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

The Book of Scientific Discovery. BY D. M. TURNER, PH. D. (George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

In this volume an attempt has been made to show how some of our present scientific knowledge has grown. The treatment is historical, with a narration of conditions in which some of the pioneers in the field of scientific discovery had to work. The theodolite has been set to work out only a general topography of a vast and varied field. Yet it presents a view of scientific tradition and evolution which is broad, plain, varied and compact.

Whilst there is no question as to the value and interest of a book of this kind, there are some postulates and conclusions as to the nature and value of modern scientific knowledge which may be open to question. Modern science may appropriately be said to have begun with Roger Bacon, Leonardo, Kepler, Galileo, Harvey, and others. Its method has been as remarkable as its discoveries. But it would be hardly just to claim that these are quite "new," and the past had no idea of

them. The past sought the one indivisible Truth through its own approaches while modern science has been seeking it through others. The spirit and method and range of ancient science may have been different from those of modern science, and its results may have been recorded in a language which we do not quite understand and which even the middle ages did not quite understand. But this does not mean that it was all nonsense or superstition. The "New Outlook" in Modern Science is showing that there is a background of truth in some ancient "superstitions" (e.g., alchemy) which had long been supposed definitely exploded.

As to the question how Science has aided human welfare, the concluding chapter of the book presents a fairly just balance sheet of the real assets and liabilities of our current scientific business; still the position "that as a body of knowledge, science is perfectly neutral" would appear to be maintainable only in a morally and spiritually perfected world.

PRAMATHANATH MUKHOPADHYAYA

History and the Self. By HILDA D. OAKELEY, M. A., D. LITT. (Williams & Norgate, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

In this new work, the author widens the thesis of her *Study in the Philosophy of Personality*, and at the same time directs thought to the primal sources of history. In that she is not original. Carlyle said "In a certain sense all men are historians," and on another occasion "History is the essence of innumerable Biographies," thereby succinctly adumbrating the argument here so capably and so modernly discussed, which by its trenchency supplies an irrefutable answer to Joseph Butler's question in his essay "Upon Human Nature,"—"Why should we be concerned with anything out of and beyond ourselves?"

It is therefore all to the good that these young explorers into cause and effect, that these dissecting surgeons of the pen, should remove shibboleths of which precise thought is well rid.

The place of personality in history is undoubted, and history has its action upon the individual. The Cecils never forget their forebears, and this historical memory has definite effect upon their movements to-day. This thought the author advances (p. 147) in speaking of India:—

A Rajput chief would introduce himself by naming clan and branch, family and lineage, going back to an eponymous ancestor. The question of the state to which he belonged would be a far less important matter. Here the historical thread is all-in-all.....the relation of the self to historic development, the value of the higher experience is potentially present wherever there are selves conscious of each other as selves. Here there is the capacity for free and self-originating activity.

In contrast to Cicero's dictum (*De Oratore*) that "history is the light of truth," the author asserts (p. 89) "It has been admitted that the ideal of truth in history cannot be realized," following this, as if remembering Carlyle's "innumerable biographies," with "but there is a great range of knowledge which is historical in a secondary

sense taking the form of a panorama of persons and events," which "the individual subject contemplating history interprets on the basis and by means of the forms and qualities of his own experience". Thus is explained the assertion in the introduction that "Historic reality is in the primary field of human experience," and it is further developed in the domain of ethics by---

It would appear to be of the first importance that we should approach the problems of the practical life with its values that are universal in all forms of experience from the historical standpoint. By this it is meant that the good for the individual is his good as member of the long historical process. The nature of his ideal, therefore, as well as the true significance of his activities, their scope and limitations, will not be understood without realization of the nature of his relation to events, the tendencies of his development in history, the problem of changes in values from age to age and its bearing upon that principle of absolute value of which the greatest moral teachers seem to have been conscious.

It has indeed been held that in view of the brevity of life and the enormous burden which is laid upon each individual by the past out of whose influences he can with difficulty raise himself, as also the ever repeated failures of past struggles for permanently nobler forms of existence, the best hope of new creative movement in ethics lies in an ignoring of the past so far as possible... History cannot be forgotten since the self, its activities, the question whether they can achieve any real change or creative action, are all bound up with the actuality of history, which is only actual for selves. If we deny the significance of history we deny the significance of selves. (pp. 157-8)

To this is added.—

History exists for us because the men and women of the past, like ourselves, have continually worked in events under some particular idea of what is good, though they may not have been aware of this meaning in their actions, and though their springs of action may often seem to us contrary to the good. (p. 158)

The thoughtful will find in this work much to contemplate in regard to the power of the self in the forming of what is popularly known as "history". Increasingly the individual is becoming significant: Roosevelt, Mussolini, Hitler, Gandhi. Therefore this work is both timely and salutary.

WILLIAM H. STEER

The World's Great Sermons. Selected with an Introduction, by SIDNEY DARK. (Arthur Barker Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

Mr. Dark has chosen a misleading title for this book. It may be that he confuses the World with Christendom, or else that he does not consider any sermon of Pagan origin worthy of being called a great sermon, but the fact remains that this volume is not what it declares itself to be. A more correct title would have been *The Great Sermons of Christendom*, for since it contains none of the discourses of Socrates (some of which might well be classed as sermons), the Buddha or Sri Krishna, it has little claim to represent the great preachers of the world. But as a collection of Christian sermons it is in many ways an admirable book, covering as it does so many shades of belief, ranging from St. Leo the Great to Charles Spurgeon, the eminent Baptist preacher of the last century. As a symposium of the many forms of Christian doctrine it is a work of considerable value, and it only fails in so far as Christianity as a whole fails to give a satisfactory answer to the problems of life. However, since the aim of this book is to affirm the common goal of Christian endeavour, and since the compiler might have taken for his motto the saying which appears on its cover, that we are right in what we affirm and wrong in what we deny, it would seem better to dwell rather upon its spiritual achievements than on the shortcomings of Christianity as a whole.

One of the most important sermons that Mr. Dark has chosen is that of St. Clement of Alexandria on "The Rich Man's Salvation," which might be regarded as a perfect answer to the accusation of Nietzsche that Christianity is a religion solely for weak spirits, paupers and outcasts. St. Clement

declares that Christ's precept to be rid of one's possessions—

does not refer to the visible act...but to something else greater...which is signified through this; namely, to strip the soul itself and the will of their lurking passions and utterly to root out and cast away all alien thoughts from the mind....The men of former days, indeed, in their contempt for outward things, parted with and sacrificed their possessions, but as for the passions of the soul, I think they even intensified them...He who has cast away his worldly abundance can still be rich in passions.

Such sayings will find answering chords in many of the Eastern scriptures.

If this collection is a little marred by the insistence of Spurgeon and Pusey on Hell and Damnation, its blemishes are cast into the shadows by many sermons of vital beauty, among which may be numbered Phillips Brooks's discourse on the text, "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord". "Man must be something that he may be nothing. The something which he must be must consist in simple fitness to utter the divine life which is the only original power in universe." Again there is Lacordaire's remarkable study of the character of Jesus, St. John Chrysostom's moving account of the "Dread Tribunal" at Antioch, and Newman's exhortation to be rid of argument and disputation, to work while there is day, "to advance and sanctify the inward man". For these and several others—Luther, Donne, Fénelon and Chalmers—this book is well worth the study of those who would know what Christianity is as conceived by some of the greatest minds in European history, and there need be no hesitation in saying that those whose experience of Christianity has been solely a barren "Churchianity," which so often passes for the teaching of Christ, will turn from this book with a far higher opinion of their religion.

THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1934 IN THE U. S. A.

Eternal Issues and a Civilized Minority—Music in New York—American Philosophical Association—Liberalism, Communism and Classical Religion—Scholars and Comparative Study of Religions.

[**Professor Irwin Edman** in his quarterly survey remarks (1) that American philosophers are recognizing that political and social problems and events have a spiritual dimension and (2) that American youths are seeking some coherent sense of ultimate standards of conduct and the place of values in Nature. Next month we will publish "Spiritual Values of Contemporary America," by C. E. M. Joad, who visited the States in the same period of which Professor Edman writes.—EDS.]

Discussion continues, of course, to centre upon the economic crisis, even in quarters where a few years ago a "planned society" and the gold standard would have been unknown terms. The threat to peace in Europe and the intransigence of both left and right wing movements all over the world continue, on the surface, to usurp the attention of all thinking men. Issues, moreover, quite removed from any surface political aspect, are increasingly being discussed in politico-economic terms. Even the spirit wavers when confronted with the picture of twelve million unemployed, and the peace and solitude requisite to mysticism or meditation are not easy in a nation undergoing social changes both obvious and profound.

Yet the eternal issues that lie deeper than machinery of government and that will outlast any economic order, continue to preoccupy and win the attention of the civilized minority, an ever-growing one, in this metropolis of the western world. One seems never to have noted more signs in more directions of the interest of a

larger number of people in the life of imagination and thought. One reason for this is, as a matter of fact, the consequence of the so-called New Deal in American Politics. Under the provisions of the codes for Industry established by the National Industrial Recovery Act, the shorter work day has provided, and promises to provide in the future, even more leisure. Educators and leaders of civic life have been concerned with the use of the new leisure thus created. Adult education, a recent development in America, has assumed large proportions. And there is one group in New York, consisting largely of working people who come every Wednesday of the winter to discuss Aristotle's logic with a university professor. This in 1934 near a railway terminal in downtown New York. These are attended not merely by those with extra leisure but those unemployed. And it is striking that it is not only courses in economics and politics that are attended, nor books on those subjects that are in demand in the libraries. The New York Public, I am informed by one of its educa-

tional directors, has an increasing demand largely by young people for books that will give them some coherent sense of ultimate standards of conduct, their place in life, and the place of values in Nature. And it is not without significance that two months before publication there has been a demand, unprecedented in the history of American publishing, for Dickens's only recently released simple and touching story of Jesus written originally for his children under the title *The Life of Our Lord*.

Since my last letter I have nothing to report of any special distinction in the theatre in the way of new dimensions or enlarged themes. One continues to be struck by the wide devotion of an always increasing and increasingly discriminating public to music of the first order. The connection of the life of the spirit with its mechanical and material conditions cannot more admirably be illustrated than by the broadcasting of the concerts of the New York Philharmonic Symphony Concerts under Arturo Toscanini from coast to coast and over the whole Canadian network. It has been estimated that one Sunday afternoon recently, there must have been over ten million people listening to a meticulous and dedicated performance of Beethoven's "Missa Solennis". The actual performance, at which this correspondent was present, was a marvel of minute care and wide understanding on the part of the distinguished maestro and of all con-

cerned. The music has very seldom been heard in New York. The explanation is, I think, to be found in the music itself. It is not the best of Beethoven by a good deal, on purely musical grounds, for all the tenderness and clear beauty of the Agnus Dei. In point of spontaneous religious passion and altitude of feeling it compares very poorly with the Bach Mass in B Minor which had its annual New York performance by the Schola Cantorum before an audience larger than ever, who listened with something more than a mere concert goer's interest to that towering work of religious art given faithfully in its completeness.

If references to music occur frequently in these quarterly letters, it is because there is probably not a city in the world, and one might say, with the education by radio broadcasts, not a country in the world, where there is a larger and more discriminating musical public. And it is clear, from the response from all over the country to the Philharmonic-Symphony Orchestra's campaign for public support, that in a period where the spirit finds few avenues for solace, liberation or escape, the ministration and moral therapy of music has come to be regarded as one of the minimal necessities of American life, depression or no depression.

A good place to detect current winds of doctrine is at the annual meetings of the American Philosophical Association which take place directly after Christmas at one or another of the leading colleges

or universities, this year at Amherst, a hill-surrounded New England town, that is most famous as the home of the great American mystical poet, Emily Dickinson. A large part of the programme is inevitably devoted to technical issues in philosophy, and too often regrettably for their own technical sake. But there are always some hints and intimations of deeper and more genuinely serious things. The Presidential Address by Professor C.I. Lewis, the well known Harvard logician, was a critique of that philosophical cult, begun by the Viennese, Wittgenstein, which tries to reduce philosophy to a series of definitions, postulates, logical relations. He indicated with neatness the limitations of so purely an abstracted and abstractional philosophy. There was a charming and extremely illuminating paper, by Dr. Demos, also of Harvard, on the conception of Eros and the Psyche in Plato. Eros was Plato's way of speaking of, illustrating and defining the mortal creature passionately seeking and indirectly moving toward the ideal good, and love itself a way of describing the movement of matter to its goal in God or the motionless Good. Dr. Demos's paper will doubtless appear in print shortly, and will be of special interest to Platonists all over the world, especially to those who forget how much movement there is in Plato's conception of matter, and how the doctrine of love links the world of material change with the

immortal and unchanging world of ideal essence or idea.

Earlier in this letter, it was remarked how even issues not generally connected with politics or economics in the minds of those concerned with them have of late taken on the vocabulary of the pre-occupations of these troubled times. There has just been published a book by a well-known contemporary theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr of Union Theological Seminary, entitled *Reflections on the End of an Era*. Mr. Niebuhr, like all the rest of us, is genuinely perturbed by what he sees as the end of the relative security and clarities of the traditional bourgeois economy of the Western World. Politically, he has moved very far to the left. He regards liberalism as completely bankrupt both in its easy optimism about the future and its refusal to recognize the incorrigible greeds, lusts and corruptions of human nature. Communism, too, he insists, depends too much on a materialistic logic of history and a naïve faith in the ability of man to conquer the chaos of events and the conflicts of the self. He turns, therefore, where "classical" religion has always turned in the past, to the assurance of grace from the realm of God, the eternal and the absolute, in which all the defeats and frustrations of human nature are reconciled. This book* is not itself distinguished either in style or in

* A review of this volume by John Middleton Murry will appear in the next number of THE ARYAN PATH.—EDS.

profundity of thought. It makes too easy an attempt to reconcile the right wing in theology with the left wing in politics. It is provincial in its identification of "classical religion" with Christianity. There is, as readers of THE ARYAN PATH, especially those in India, scarcely need to be reminded, a classicism in religion that antedated and in the opinion of many transcends the "classicism of Christianity". But there is genuine significance in Professor Niebuhr's book. It makes it clear that current *theologians and philosophers in America are recognizing that political and social problems have a spiritual dimension, that in the long run it is the good life that matters, and that considerations of the good life lead us inevitably to those ultimate grapplings with ultimate things which we call philosophy and religion.*

In the last quarterly letter from this part of the world, it was intimated that there is at Columbia University a very extensive project in the scholarly study of religion from a non-partisan and non-theological standpoint. The general programme is under the direction of Professor Herbert W. Schneider, Professor of Religion. It includes courses and research projects in the philosophy, ethnology and psychology of religion, and involves the development

of a Museum and Library of Religion out of a large special fund, and the editing of a series of studies in "religion and culture," amongst which must be counted Salo Baron's monumental study of the history of the Jews soon to appear, *Religions in Various Cultures* by Friess and Schneider already published, a study of St. Paul by your correspondent, in preparation, and a study of Indian Buddhism by Professor G. Griswold. Most of these projects are furthered through the resources of the Schermerhorn Fund, a large special fund expressly bequeathed for the study of religion at the University. The Department of Religion has an active programme also of undergraduate and graduate courses and several research seminars.

The "Oxford" Movement (Buchmanism), with its evangelical enthusiasm, has come back from England to this country where some years ago it originated. It is attracting considerable comment, pro and con. There are those who are disdainful of its mixture of spirituality and sensationalism; others who find in it a revival of a genuine and living piety. A book called *I was a Pagan** by a well known advertising man, V. Kitchen, now an enthusiastic convert, has provoked such typical mingled comment.

IRWIN EDMAN

ENDS AND SAYINGS

- ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

Magic, and especially black magic, formed a subject of discussion in the London papers because of a case brought into the English Courts of Law. Most of the numerous contributors showed ignorance or prejudice or both. Mr. E. F. Benson is an exception; his short article in *The Spectator* of 20th April deserves attention. We agree with him that magic is not the art by which miracles are performed (for there is no such thing as a miracle), and that with the increase of knowledge the universe expands. We welcome his words that "the dim tracts of the unknown which hold the key to the ultimate mysteries of human life are so vast that science has as yet explored only the narrowest margin". We also agree with Mr. Benson that superstition about magic-rites prevails—and not only among illiterate orientalists as is generally believed; it also flourishes in fashionable drawing-rooms of "cultured" London, Paris and New York. The anglicized Indian who turns up his nose at the "dirty sadhu" and calls the genuine faquir a faker, and believes he has freed himself from such abject humbugs and charlatans often accepts with avidity "suggestions" of some occidental necromancer. We have known Indians who laughed at the Brahmana Jyotshi in India but who had their

horoscopes cast by European astrologers charging high fees! Again, they pooh-pooh the art of the street *jadoo-wallah*, but pay a heavy price to some European hypnotist whose power and performance compare unfavourably with those of the *jadugar*!

But for all that we cannot accept Mr. Benson's theory and trace magic, both white and black, to the ignorance and superstition of early humanity. The root of the very words magic and magician tells a different tale. Magic was considered a divine science which led to a participation in the attributes of Divinity itself. "Magic consists of and is acquired by the worship of the Gods," says Plato. "It unveils the operations of nature," says Philo Judæus, "and leads to the contemplation of celestial powers." Again, Proclus the Platonist ably puts it:—

Ancient priests, when they considered that there is a certain alliance and sympathy in natural things to each other, and of things manifest to occult powers, and discovered that all things subsist in all, fabricated a sacred science from the mutual sympathy and similarity—and applied for occult purposes, both celestial and terrene natures, by means of which through a certain similitude, they deduced divine virtues into this inferior abode.

We can multiply quotations from Greek and Roman philos-

ophers more learned in the magical lore than the modern psychical researchers. We can also quote from Chinese, Egyptian and Indian texts to prove that magic was a Science, with its theoretical and applied branches. To call it all the result of ignorance and superstition is sheer folly.

The modern scholar suffers from a twisted historical sense—it may be described as the straight line theory of history. He cannot give up the supposition that human evolution started in savagery ; nor can he conceive that earlier civilizations could be superior to the modern, if not in all at least in many respects , nor that the ancients could possess knowledge on subjects about which the modern universities have nought to say. When the modern schoolman studies ancient lore he evaluates the old-world wisdom with a conviction that he is fully capable of passing judgment on it. Thus modern philologists rate ancient philosophies ; modern scientists shrug their shoulders at ancient alchemy, ancient astrology and other branches of magic ; modern historians smile at ancient chronology. Modern scholars accept Plato when it suits them, but wink a doubtful eye when they come across in the *Timæus* the statement that “ the transactions of this our city of Sais, are recorded in our sacred writings during a period of 8000 years ”. They call Herodotus the father of history but refuse to consider his information that “ the Egyptians assert

that from the reign of Heracles to that of Amasis, 17,000 years elapsed ”. The labours of archæologists are tarnished by the obsessing influence of Archbishop Usher’s chronology, even though they no longer believe in the creation of the world in 4004 B. C. It is as absurd to hold that human evolution began with the single couple Adam and Eve, as to believe that savagery, and savagery alone, was the starting point of the human kingdom.

If men like Mr. E. F. Benson who believe in Magic but look upon it as rooted in superstition and ignorance were to adopt, at least as a working hypothesis, the view that sages and savages existed ever, that dynasties of Divine Rulers of child humanity are not a poetical fancy, that the rise and fall of civilizations betoken a cyclic progression, then they would also see the truth and the validity of the following propositions of oriental psycho-philosophy :—

Magic, as a science, is the knowledge of the way by which the omniscience and omnipotence of the spirit and its control over nature’s forces may be acquired by the individual while still in the body. Magic, as an art, is the application of this knowledge in practice.

Arcane knowledge misapplied is sorcery ; beneficently used, true Magic or Wisdom.

Races of men differ in spiritual gifts as in colour, stature, or any other external quality ; among some peoples seership naturally prevails, among others mediumship. Some races are addicted to sorcery, and transmit its secret rules of practice from generation to generation.



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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GOD AND MODERN DEMOCRACY

In proportion to the love existing among men, so will be the community of property and power. Among true and real friends, all is common; and, were ignorance and every superstition banished from the world, all mankind would be friends. The only perfect and genuine republic is that which comprehends every living being Once make the feelings of confidence and affection universal, and the distinction of property and power will vanish.—SHELLEY.

Of all teachings that which presents a far distant God is the nearest to absurdity. Either there is none, or he is nearer to every one of us than our nearest consciousness of self. An unapproachable divinity is the veriest of monsters, the most horrible of human imaginations.—GEORGE MACDONALD.

The immanence of God and the omnipresence of Deity are generally accepted by religionists, and nowadays by many a scientist also. Yet an examination shows that the concept of omnipresence is understood differently. Thus, the God of the Christian is not present everywhere but only in Christendom; nor is He the very self in man, for the Christian is saved by his faith in the Saviour who died for him some 2,000 years ago. Similarly, Allah is the inspirer of the splendid feeling of brotherliness among the Muslims, but among

them only—for, outside the community all are infidels. Neither an orthodox Christian nor a Muslim would deny that good men and true are to be found in other folds, but he considers himself a chosen one somehow, and he is safe because saved. The Jew too makes a similar claim, as also the modern follower of Zoroaster, very tolerant indeed of other creeds but withal with a smug belief that his is the best and most superior religion.

Shelley who is quoted above was called an Atheist: and verily he was one in a sense, for he was

philosophically logical and showed the moral courage to express his own disbelief in the Personal God of the churches, whom George Macdonald describes as an absurd invention of horrible human fancy. But Shelley was truly a more religious man than many a prelate, and George Macdonald who left the pulpit for the broader profession of letters served the community better thereby.

Purposely we put together the two extracts. If there is any one single belief which hampers the cause of friendship among all peoples it is that in a Personal God. This false notion is mainly responsible for the havoc prevailing in Chistendom and elsewhere. The character of the individual is weakened by a belief in a Personal God and a Prophet-Saviour. A state composed mainly of such believers cannot possibly rise to the status of a true Democracy; nor can it help in cosmopolitanizing the world. On the other hand, a rejection of Deity and the embracing of a thoroughgoing materialism as in modern Russia also must fail in democratizing the international world. Both Fascism and Bolshevism are enslavers of human will and thought, though the former is an ally of religion and the latter rejects it as an opiate. Even the Republics of France and the U.S.A. have not escaped the influence of these two autocracies—that of atheistic materialism aided by science, and that of the Personal God of the priest-ridden religions.

But the day of the orthodox religion is done. Everywhere its place

is being taken by Nationalism which is mainly guided by the economist, the scientist and the sociologist. Even this powerful combination will not succeed in making all mankind friends as Shelley desires, though it may dethrone the monster invented by human folly and priestly fancy. The modern reformer badly needs the study and acceptance of the great fundamental of Indian philosophy—the Immanence of God and *therefore* the solidarity of Man. The fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of Man must go together; one without the other is a half-truth more dangerous than a lie. Acceptance of the truly philosophical concept of Deity as the very self of man to which George Macdonald refers produces that feeling of love which, according to Shelley, would make all mankind friends. But that God must be really omnipresent, if *universal* Brotherhood is to prevail.

The League of Nations at Geneva has a very useful department of intellectual co-operation which labours for unifying the world of thought with a hope of precipitating co-operative action. Remote and abstract as the subject of God may seem, it is one which has a practical bearing on the affairs of mankind, and therefore, it is worthy of attention by practical reformers whose task is the reconstruction of a shattered world and who aim at establishing peace everywhere. Give people a true knowledge of their own divine nature and the ideal of universal brotherhood is on its way to realization.

A NOTE UPON REINCARNATION

[L. A. G. Strong is three parts Irish and one part West Country English—a fact which will enable the reader to appreciate his article in which reason counters the intuition about Reincarnation. For twelve years he was in the teaching profession but since 1930 he has devoted himself to writing. He has to his credit verse, short stories, three books of criticism, and five novels, of which the most recent is *Sea Wall*.—EDS.]

When, a couple of years ago, a newspaper asked what was my favourite quotation, I gave without hesitating the final three lines of Sir Herbert Warren's Inscription for a Sun-dial.

Thynges diurnalle
Bin a shade
Of eternalle.

These lines have for many years been in the forefront of my mind because they epitomise my outlook upon the universe. To me, the material universe is simply the representation, in terms perceptible to our limited senses, of ideas, facts, and relationships in the infinite. It is a dramatisation of these ultimate facts etc., in terms of three dimensions (or four, if we regard time as a fourth dimension). The objects of which it is composed are not in themselves reality, but the interpretation put by our senses upon that reality: as much coloured by our limitations as human beings, as are the interpretations put by sleepers in their dreams upon noises which they hear without awaking. In the words of the Platonist, Peter Sterry:—

The Creation of the World was a Vail cast upon the Face of God, with a figure of the Godhead wrought upon this Vail, and God himself seen through it by a dim transparency; as the Sun

in a morning, or Mist, is seen by a refracted Light through the thick medium of earthly Vapours.

The philosopher Berkeley once said that physical objects were a sort of universal language in terms of which we apprehended the universe. What we see is not the Thing in itself, but, in this sense, the word for the Thing—with the qualification that it is not detachable, but is our only way of apprehending the Thing in the conditions under which we live. In human language, the word for a thing may become obsolete without affecting our perception of the thing, which we may find in an attic long after the word for it has passed out of use. But a physical object is a "word" in a more fundamental sense. It is not separable: it does not only connote, but *manifests*, what it stands for. The "word" for John Jones, *i.e.*, the physical organism through which John Jones manifests himself to us, is all we can know about him here; and when it becomes obsolete, *i.e.*, when John Jones dies, nothing is left which represents John Jones.

If, then, the objects of the physical world are a representation or a manifestation of reality in certain limited terms, it probably

follows that the space and time by which we are accustomed to measure these objects are likewise not a part of reality, but only conditions under which we apprehend it. In other words, they have no necessary validity outside the special conditions of the physical universe. Here, then, is the first difficulty I encounter in considering the theory of reincarnation. It is a time theory. It seems to presuppose that time outside the physical universe is of the same nature as time inside it. If, that is to say, a given soul is supposed to undergo reincarnation at intervals of a hundred and fifty or two hundred years,* we must assume, if the argument is to have any weight, that the time into which it regresses between those incarnations coincides with or runs parallel to earthly time. This, or so it seems to me, is a great deal more than we have any right to assume. The immediate hostility of the Roman Catholic Church to the theories of Einstein is probably due to the fact that their philosophers have seen that, if time is relative (that is to say, if time measurements as we understand them are valid for this particular part of the universe only), then we have no right to say that a life not subject to these physical conditions (in heaven, hell, purgatory, or wherever it may be supposed to be) comes "after" a life here; and this to

the popular mind would seem to sweep away at once all idea of an "after" life being a reward or a punishment for this one. The same difficulty applies to the theory of reincarnation.

This may seem a far-fetched objection to a theory towards which, at some time or another, every thinking man must feel drawn. I have always wanted to hold the doctrine of reincarnation, because it seems as reasonable to believe in the evolution of the spirit as in the evolution of its material envelope. If the tendency of physical life is to develop in an upward direction, and to become more and more highly specialised in order to cope with its environment, why, considering the economy of nature, should one suppose the spirit to work upon different lines? But the doctrine is in its essence a time theory. Not until quite recently, except in the more or less unregarded *obiter dicta* of a philosopher here and there, has the human conception of time differed or been seriously questioned. Time and space were part of the universe. It is only in the last forty years that there has been any general disposition to regard them as conditions only. The new physics is making it necessary to restate our views upon all psychic matters, and it seems that the time factor will become more important the more deeply these are studied.

* The teaching of the Esoteric Philosophy is that the average time is from 1,000 to 1,500 years; but it depends on the degree of spirituality and the merit or demerit of the last incarnation. But we must not overlook that the condition of the soul after death is entirely *subjective* and therefore it has no knowledge of the passage of time, just as the sleeper is unaware of the passage of time and even in dream-state his conception of time is entirely different, *c. g.*, in a moment of objective time human consciousness experiences events lasting hours and days.—EDS.

Personally, I feel that I want to know more about time before I can examine to my own satisfaction this theory to which I have always been attracted.

Another reason, if not for suspecting the theory of reincarnation, at any rate for approaching it with caution, is its extreme human plausibility. We must in duty bound look with care upon any theory of divine order which seems like wish-fulfilment. It has been observed that immortality is a mask drawn by man over the ugly face of death. In the same way, reincarnation may be a mask drawn over the ugly face of accident. Why should one man be born to luxury and another to rags? Why should one child inherit disease and another perfect health? Obviously the best way out of these tangles, the best explanation with which to justify the ways of God to man, would be to suggest that the soul had a taste of every kind of life. If each of us must run the whole gamut of human fortunes, then, in the last reckoning, it will be impossible to say that one has been favoured above another. I am, of course, stating the theory in its crudest form, if only because the space allotted to me will allow me to go no deeper. My point is that the whole theory of reincarnation has a suspiciously human ring, and, whatever my private feelings may be about it, on rational grounds I should not feel justified—yet—in urging it upon anyone else.

Nor is the so-called evidence in favour of reincarnation very

strong. Most of it, even the most impressive instances, lies open to other explanations. I have even a small hint in my own experience, which I mention only to show how easily it may be explained, if indeed any explanation is thought necessary. From earliest childhood I used to have a recurring nightmare. I would be walking along a road close to Plymouth, with railings on either side, a road of which I had actual daily experience. Presently a vague terror would become crystallised, and I would hear a tremendous rumbling behind me. Looking over my shoulder, I would see that I was being pursued by a succession of enormous wheels, of a kind which I had never seen, except in these dreams. I would try to run away, but be hardly able to move. The rumbling would become louder, the shadow of the foremost wheel would be thrown in front of me, and, just when I was about to be crushed, I would wake up. When I was seven years old, I was taken to stay at a place in the country where there was a water-mill. Seeing the wheel, I recoiled in terror, for it was a miniature version of the wheels that pursued me in my dream. I had never before seen such a wheel, nor any picture of such a wheel, and there was no possible explanation for my dream until I discovered, some years afterwards, that my West Country ancestors on my father's side had, up till a hundred and fifty years previously, owned a water-mill. This instance is too slight really to require any explanation at all, but

I can find three or four perfectly sensible ones which do not involve any necessity for my previous existence.

A really striking incident, quoted by some as an instance of reincarnation, was told me some years ago by Mr. W. B. Yeats—whom, incidentally, it did not impress. A young Hindu girl, when she came of marriageable age, to her parents' consternation refused to consider the question, declaring that she was already married. Her parents thought she must be mad, but she declared with the utmost conviction the name of the man to whom she was married, said where he lived, and described his house in the greatest detail. The place she mentioned was some distance away, but finally her parents, in order to show her that the idea was a delusion, took her there. They found the place, and the house, and an old man bearing the name which the girl had given. The old man did not know the girl at all, but he told them that his wife had died many years ago. The girl, however, persisted in her assertions, described her clothes, ran upstairs to the chest in which they lay, brought them down, and was indignant to discover, from a mark on one of the dresses, that another woman had worn it. She went on to recall any number of incidents, which the old man in growing bewilderment confirmed. Finally she demanded to be left with the old man; but he had now become a Mahommedan, and the Hindu girl who claimed to be his bride was led weeping away.

Such an instance as this lies open to the same criticisms that can be brought against most so-called instances of communication from the dead. It is, first of all, very difficult to exclude the possibility of communication between the girl's mind and a living mind. Yet even this is not necessary. There is a type of phenomenon known as psychometry, whereby a medium can reconstruct, from a physical object which has been in contact with someone whom the medium has never seen, not only a description of that person, but of incidents in that person's past. The only reasonable explanation for this faculty seems to lie in the theory that some sort of chemical record clings to the object in question. We are familiar enough with the belief that "Thoughts are things". The theosophist who sees and reads an aura, and the chemist who is endeavouring to photograph the chemical discharge or effervescence which, as the late Sir Frederick Mott suggested, is given off by thought and emotion, may possibly be confronted by the same phenomenon. I myself, sleeping in a bed for the first time, have been awakened in a violent mental reconstruction of something entirely unknown to me which once took place upon it. There is strong evidence that on such occasions a definite physical or chemical record clings like an odour to various objects, and, under suitable conditions, in contact with a sufficiently sensitive mechanism, repeats itself, calling up, on the analogy of a gramo-

phone record, the ghost of that which caused it. If this is so, (and the evidence for it is very strong), we have yet another possible explanation for such apparent feats of memory as that of the Hindu girl. She need not even be in contact with another mind. Even though no living brain contained the information which she was receiving, she might yet be deriving it from purely earthly sources.

The more one is inclined to believe a theory, the closer and more dispassionate should be one's scrutiny of it. By temperament and circumstances I have personally often been brought near to what, for want of a better term, we call the unseen world. I have strong private reasons for believing in many things which I do not, and dare not, profess publicly, because one's own beliefs, unless supported by rational and unassailable evidence, are no argument. If I tell a man, on unsupported personal testimony, of some thing in which he cannot believe, I do the thing no good, and merely put him in the

embarrassing position of having to decide that I am either a liar or a lunatic. Thus, though, for example, I privately believe that we survive death, I cannot assert that this is so, nor ask anyone else to believe it, because none of the evidence which I have yet seen seems to me conclusive. I agree that, in many of the instances put forward, survival seems a more natural and simpler explanation than any other. But, where any explanation is possible in terms of knowledge we already possess, we have no right to posit knowledge which we cannot yet claim to possess on the same terms. The doctrine of reincarnation, humanly reasonable though it is, and satisfying to our ideas of human justice, seems to me at present to lie open to grave objections, and to be bound up with a possibly obsolete view of the nature of the universe. Whatever my private beliefs, then, I feel in duty bound to state these objections, and regard the theory as not proven.

L. A. G. STRONG

MENACING BARBARIANS OF TO-DAY*

[Leo Chestov, the Russian philosopher, now living in exile, is the author of *In Job's Balances*, *La Nuit de Gethsémani*, *La Philosophie de la Tragédie Dostoievski et Nietzsche*, and other works.

Jean Guéhenno wrote in our issue of last January: "There is, I think, nothing greater in the European consciousness than a certain sense of human dignity. . . . Christianity is dying. Let it die, for it has ceased to nourish our souls."

Count Carlo Sforza wrote in our May number: "The very experiment of Dictatorships has already proved that Liberalism and Democracy are the only ideas still worth saving in European civilization."

Julien Benda, in the June ARYAN PATH, said: "Behold the state of open hostility between the national cultures. . . . European civilization is collapsing day by day before our very eyes! . . . How can we recover it? By restoring . . . the feeling of this universalism of intellectual function and of cosmopolitanism of mind; . . . by calling upon Europeans to honour moral and especially intellectual values."

And now Leo Chestov finds a Tartar under most European skins and adds: "The barbarians who are menacing modern European civilization come from within. . . . The Tartar regards freedom as his undying and most formidable enemy and he devotes all his strength to its suppression. . . . We must save Liberty." But how? "Plotinus was irresistibly impelled towards liberty and independence of mind . . . Plotinus had eradicated the 'Tartar' within himself; . . . his gaze was directed towards Asia as the source of spiritual light."—EDS.]

The nineteenth century was the happiest and most tranquil period in the history of the human race. After the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, until the Great War of 1914-1918, life flowed in a steady current but confined to a channel which seemed to have been dug once for all. There was nothing to foreshadow the dire events we have witnessed during the last two decades. No doubt there were wars and revolutions between 1815 and 1914, but they were soon over and were speedily forgotten. True, also, that all over the world, and especially in Europe and the Americas, an intense social struggle was in progress. We may say without exaggeration that

the social problem was a child of the nineteenth century. Although Karl Marx founded his teachings on the principle that (under capitalism) there was an irreconcilable conflict between the classes, many believed that the unprecedented and marvellous development of industrial technique would serve as a harmonising factor. Many economists, historians, sociologists, and legal experts, as well as statesmen and political theoreticians, were optimistic enough to believe firmly that our institutions were endowed with an assured stability. They believed that the Rights of Man and the Citizen were secure for countless centuries to come. Almost everyone was ready

* Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul from Leo Chestov's original Russian article especially prepared for THE ARYAN PATH.

to hold as axiomatic that the extant social order was safeguarded, not by force (which cannot be trusted, since brute force has no regard for one order or institution more than for another, and the apostles of force do not care whether peace reigns on earth or not), but by man's profound faith in the sanctity and inviolability of the loftiest moral and legal principles. Those who spoke of civilization and its advantages were thinking of the triumph of spirit over force, of mind over matter. There is a saying in the West, "Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar." This implies that there is a profound distinction between a Western European and a Russian; that there is no Tartar, no semi-barbarian, hidden beneath the Westerner's skin; that, in the West, civilization has become second nature.

But the Great War burst upon us none the less. Thereafter, one of the first notable utterances of a European* was Bethmann-Hollweg's, when the German Chancellor declared: "A treaty is nothing but a scrap of paper!" This signified that, in his view, morality and law were trifles invented by the simple-minded, and that really force rules the world. Bethmann-Hollweg, though a mediocrity, showed himself to be a prophet. Much that has happened since this "justification" for the Germans' disregard of the neutrality of Belgium has gone to show that

extremely second-rate persons can be prophets. Indeed, for certain kinds of prophecy, the prophet must perforce be narrow-minded. The true significance of the Chancellor's words was, "Scratch me, and you will find the Tartar." A man of subtler and keener intelligence would have avoided "giving the show away". But the remark about "scraps of paper" has become proverbial, like the saying about "Russians and Tartars," and will make Bethmann-Hollweg's name live in history longer than his other words and deeds would seem to warrant.

The Imperial Chancellor set the ball rolling, and since then no one has blushed to proclaim himself a Tartar. Many boast of it. Some even say with pride: "Scratch me as deep as you like, and you will find in me nothing of the European; I am Tartar through and through; Tartar I wish to remain, for thus I shall conquer, which is the chief purpose in life." Such was the spirit of the ancient Romans, who coined the phrase, "Vae Victis". We can easily read the same signification in Hegel's famous dictum, "What is real is rational". Bethmann-Hollweg was not thinking of Hegel when he talked of "scraps of paper," but he might well have quoted the distinguished German philosopher. There was a Tartar beneath Hegel's skin. The Hegelians of the Left, the Marxians, do not hesitate to make their acknowledgments to Hegel, and

* Although *geographically* Russia is part of the European continent, in current parlance Russians distinguish between "Europeans" and themselves. For a Russian, Europe begins at the western frontier of Muscovy.—Translators' Note.

in the preface to the second edition of *Capital* Marx declared himself "a disciple of that great thinker". But the Hegelians of the Right, no less, valued above all in their master his cult of reality, that is to say his genuflection before visible and tangible brute force. Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit was but a fig leaf to hide the non-spiritual lusts of Europeans. When life was running a normally tranquil course, the fig leaf was worn in accordance with the conventions. But as soon as troublous times began, Europeans stripped off this last vestige of clothing, for even the fig leaf had become oppressive.

In very different circumstances, across the Atlantic, kindred phenomena have been discernible. When the Prohibitionists tried to deprive the citizens of the United States of alcoholic drinks, the country rallied like one man to the defence. "At all costs we will keep our whisky!" Within a marvellously short space of time a formidable army of bandits ("boot-leggers") was organised to supply the demand for prohibited drinks, and the Government was soon compelled to beat a retreat. It was plain to the whole world that unless the "dry laws" were abolished, the nation would become enslaved to the bandits. Anything, anything, rather than give up whisky.

However paradoxical it may seem, there is an intimate connection between the ideology of Bethmann-Hollweg, which made him describe treaties as "scraps of

paper," and the revolt of the Americans against Prohibition. Neither in Europeans nor in Americans has civilization been able to extirpate the vestige of the primal beast. Man will fight like a tiger for his whisky, but will show very little energy in the defence of the loftiest moral achievements.

Not long ago the civilized world would have been outraged by the way in which average Europeans and Americans are often treated to-day. But, in view of all that we have witnessed of late years, it would be hard to find any one bold enough to deny the statement with which the previous paragraph ends. Noted University professors and celebrated authors may insist that "great ideas" are the motive forces of history; and in *The Philosophy of History* and *The Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel strenuously maintains this thesis. But "wise reality" has made mock of the idealists. Treaties have been torn up by those who found them inconvenient; and Americans organised bandits on behalf of their beloved whisky. In Russia, when the Soviet Government deprived the Russian people of its God (the Bolsheviks restored vodka after a brief period of Prohibition!), there was no movement strong enough to enforce concessions to the religious spirit. The Bolsheviks systematically destroyed churches, shot priests of all denominations—but the Russian people made no sign.

In Germany, following the Bolshevik example and animated by

the cynicism of Bethmann-Hollweg, the Government has declared war on Christianity. Hitler, having learned from Gobineau the supremacy of the Aryan race, has become rapidly anti-Semitic. Can a good German patriot be properly guided by the prophets and apostles who have delivered to the half of mankind the good tidings of the existence of the One All-Powerful God, Creator of Heaven and Earth? Why should he be thus guided? The Bible is a Jewish book. Jesus and Mary, Peter and Paul, were all Jews. Obviously, then, a good German patriot's first duty is to emancipate himself from Biblical doctrines which are alien to the German spirit.

It need hardly be said that anti-Semitism is not a new phenomenon. A few years ago I heard the following remark, uttered in German though not in Germany: "The devil take the two Jews, Jesus and Paul; what we need is pure Christianity, as we received it from the Greeks." But the modern German has no more use for the Greeks than he has for the Jews. He wants to dominate the world. Away, then, with God! Away with the Greek philosophers! It is likely enough that before long there will, to the applause of the crowd, begin another book-burning in Germany, when the Old Testament and New will be committed to the flames, and perhaps also the works of the Greek philosophers whom the Fathers of the Church regarded as the forerunners of the Christian prophets and apostles. The German is ready to sacrifice

his faith, and to jettison spiritual values as he has jettisoned liberty. The matter would not be so simple if he were asked to give up his beer. But no one is trying to deprive him of that!

What is going on in the contemporary world cannot but remind a reflective observer of the period of the barbarian invasions. There is this single difference, however. The barbarians who overthrew Roman civilization came from without; the barbarians who are menacing modern European civilization come from within. Yet it would be wrong to believe (as many believe) that this new "barbarian invasion" is in actual fact likely to sweep away our civilization. It is true that we learn from history and archaeology how civilizations, many civilizations, have disappeared almost without leaving a trace. But this happened very long ago, when the population of the world was widely dispersed over the continents in groups of various sizes having little or no connection with one another. Not many centuries ago, what we call the New World was, for practical purposes, as far away from the Europe-Asian mass of land as the moon is from the earth, or the earth is from the planet Mars. To-day, on the other hand, it would be difficult to find upon the surface of the globe a spot so isolated as not to be organically linked with all the rest. If, as the outcome of a geological or historical catastrophe, Europe were to be submerged or put out of action, European civilization would not

thereby be destroyed. There would be preserved in various other regions whatever that civilization has conferred on us. In distant, unimportant, and even backward lands, there are libraries, universities, and museums, etc., in which the acquirements of the human race are preserved and fostered. Not even the most widespread cataclysm could engulf civilization, if we include within the scope of that word the multifarious conquests achieved by man in the different domains of science and technique.

Furthermore, the "barbarians" of whom we are now thinking are by no means inclined to hinder or arrest the normal development of positive science and technique. They understand perfectly well that science and technique are not merely serviceable but are indispensable. Germany has expelled Einstein and many other famous scientists, but the Germans continue to make every possible use of scientific achievements without worrying as to their source. In Soviet Russia, such a man as Pavloff is tolerated though he makes no secret of his dislike for the present regime. Speaking generally, we may say that the more the Bolsheviks rail at bourgeois science and technique, the more busily do they gather honey from the West. It is an open secret that the most remarkable conquests or creations of the Bolsheviks, those with which simple-minded tourists and ostensibly simple-minded foreign statesmen are so much impressed, are effected with

the aid of foreign engineers, in accordance with plans drafted by foreigners, and even with the aid of foreign capital. All that the Soviet Government has contributed is the labour of Russian muzhiks, who were promised an earthly paradise, and have in fact been enslaved. There is, then, no reason for being afraid as to the fate of science and technique. The modern barbarians, like those of old days, will save and will even perfect whatever can contribute to the triumph of brute force.

But, the reader may ask, of what advantage will that be to mankind? Shall we benefit because brute force has constituted itself guardian of the advance of science and technique? Light can be thrown on this question by a very strange phenomenon in the history of nineteenth century thought. A hundred and thirty-six years ago, in Malthus's *Essay on the Principle of Population*, was launched the Malthusian doctrine that man was condemned to penury, and perhaps to extinction, because population tends to increase more rapidly than the means of subsistence. Even John Stuart Mill, an earnest and able economist, accepted Malthus's teaching as correct, and did much to promote the spread of the idea that the human birth rate must be controlled. At the present juncture, however, we are faced by a Malthusianism turned topsy-turvy, for we are told that there is a crisis of over-production, and that over-production is much worse than under-production. Consequently, production is restricted in

various ways, and what has actually been produced is destroyed instead of being used—cereals, coffee, etc., being burned or thrown into the sea in order to get rid of the surplus and to limit supply. This does not mean that all the inhabitants of the world have as much bread or coffee as they want. Far from it! Over-production notwithstanding, vast numbers of persons are in a state of destitution, and multitudes even die of hunger. Unemployment (the modern scourge) has not spared any land, whether in the Old World or the New. But producers continue to destroy grain and other crops, while the out-of-works who are willing to work and vainly seek jobs are fobbed off by being told that it is impossible to escape the iron laws of economics. Who are the would-be consolars, that voice such strange arguments? Who is entitled to disseminate the belief that poor humanity is at the mercy of such iron laws? At the mercy of laws which, in the best event, must lead to dependence and enslavement? The birth rate is so high that the increase in the means of subsistence cannot keep pace with the increase in population—man must be kept in bondage, in the bondage of birth control. Or, production has increased to such an extent that it has outrun the birth rate—the remedy is the same, and human beings must become slaves.

Now, what determines these various inferences? The answer is, I think, obvious, in view of what was written above. We are perpetually confronted with the Tar-

tar, whose only thought is to attain the one ideal he can understand—the triumph of brute force, of physical force, of material force. That is why he prostrates himself before the “iron laws of economics,” since these incorporate his own nature. He believes that what makes Truth true, or makes the Truth the Truth, is nothing but its desire to constrain and its power to exercise constraint.

Let us follow up this line of thought. “The Tartar” is conceived to be an Asiatic. The phrase, “Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar,” implies that Russians are thought of as Asiatic barbarians, and are stigmatised as such. But there is another Western apophthegm which bears a very different significance—“Ex Oriente lux.” Light has come from the East, that is to say from Asia to Europe. Europe has not bestowed upon the world either prophets or apostles. Asia has been the cradle of all the religions, and all the great prophets were born in the East. Historians have good reason for dwelling upon the magnitude of Oriental influence even as concerns the philosophers of ancient Greece. The works of Plotinus, the last of the great Greek thinkers, are a fervent appeal to the enlightened among his contemporaries, imploring them to modify the spiritual conditions of Europe, conditions which were the inevitable outcome of the developmental conditions of the Western world. Although Plotinus did not use the phrase “Ex Oriente lux,” his gaze was directed towards Asia as the source

of spiritual light. Zeller, the famous historian of Greek philosophy, said aptly of Plotinus that he had lost confidence in thought, the thought which the Neoplatonist's brilliant predecessors of all schools had been sedulously cultivating for nigh on a thousand years. Plotinus's celebrated formula, "Beyond reason and reasonable knowledge," and his Testament, in which he refers to the need for "outstripping knowledge," bear witness to the fact that in the middle of the third century of the Christian era European philosophers had become aware of the impossibility of advancing farther along the lines hitherto followed. Mere "thought" no longer sufficed. There was need for "something much more important, much greater, and much more indispensable than thought," something that "would transcend thought". Plotinus's body filled him with shame. He could not endure this reality which has been arbitrarily imposed upon man and which is perennially imposed by what we term daily experience. Already he had come to feel that what men regard as supremely real (that to which Hegel has given the benediction of reason by saying that all the real is rational) is in truth devoid of reality, and should neither be blessed nor loved, but should be cursed and hated.

Plotinus was irresistibly impelled towards liberty and independence of mind. He had come to look upon and to develop philosophy, not as a "discipline," not as "knowledge"—for these always

imply coercion, and coercion is fatal to the life of the spirit—but as a self-existent "absolute". He opened his soul to this truth which, several centuries earlier, had inspired the prophetic genius and the researches of the best incorporators of the spiritual power of Asia. Plotinus had eradicated the "Tartar" within himself. Philosophy signified that the moment had come when European mankind must at length grasp that life is to be maintained, not by brute force, not by visible and tangible coercion, but by liberty, which is an invisible good. The coming of Plotinus and his works coincide strangely (as if fore-ordained) with one of the most mysterious and inexplicable happenings in European history. The omnipotent Graeco-Roman world, the Imperium Romanum, a far more extensive State structure than had ever before existed, bringing numberless and widely diversified peoples under its yoke, was now to bow before the truth of a little people among its subjects, weak and universally despised. Europe, strong and civilized, renounced its strength, renounced the civilization founded and maintained by the strong hand, and put its trust in a truth that seemed to provide no safeguards, to be weak, inactive, even illusory—the truth revealed in the Holy Scriptures. Many, many attempts have been made to explain this page of history. Why did all-powerful Rome bow the knee before the feeble province of Judæa, why did glorious Athens abase herself before Jerusalem?

None of the alleged explanations explains anything. So inadequate are they that they leave us asking whether any explanation is possible. I shall not here attempt to solve this everlasting enigma, the fact being that no explanation is forthcoming since the demand for an explanation implies the belief that it is possible to discover a visible, tangible, and measurable force—the very thing which does not exist in the present case, and is therefore undiscoverable.

The mystery becomes intensified when we remember that the “powerless” Biblical revelation gained, not merely one victory over brute force, but two successive victories. The first victory was when the resistance of the Romans was broken, and the second was when the barbarian invasions were stayed. The barbarians, like the Romans, appeared to be all-powerful. They swept away whatever stood in their path, and it seemed as if nothing could resist them. Well, after a fashion the barbarians were victorious all along the line, but in the end the vanquished dictated laws and conditions to the victors. The “Light from the East” began to shine anew upon Europe; and brute force, if it did not lay down its arms, at least retired into the

background. European civilization went on developing under the ægis and in the spirit of Holy Writ.

To-day the “Tartar” hidden away beneath our European skins shows signs of reanimation. I have already said that this Tartar is making no attempt to invalidate the conquests of science and technique. He is instinctively aware that neither science nor technique is fundamentally hostile to him. On the contrary, they can both serve him as trusty allies. What is most dangerous to him, what he hates most, is neither science nor technique, but that which has been revealed to man in the Scriptures, that which has been bestowed on us by religion; the understanding and the love of liberty—the liberty of others no less than one’s own. The Tartar regards freedom as his undying and most formidable enemy, and he devotes all his strength to its suppression. Here, then, we reach the answer to the question: “what is worth saving in modern civilization?” We must save what is most seriously imperilled, must do so because it is imperilled, and because it forms the very essence of civilization.

We must save liberty.

L. CHESTOV

DIONYSUS IN MODERN LIFE

[Though issues of political economy are generally considered as of supreme importance, for by them civilization is said to be shaped, a growing number of thoughtful people regard the problem of our age to be psychological and moral. The effects of the nineteenth century materialism are not worn out, and their influence is visible on the ethical outlook of to-day. Shall the man of senses let himself go and live out his life as a candle, or shall he as a soul control and purify the flesh and transform his body into a Living Temple? These two extremes are represented in the Myth-Mystery of Dionysus—once a Pure God whose degradation was brought about by human frailty and weakness; this is described in the first of the following articles.

The dual application of this myth is represented by two articles which follow—one recommends the life of “free happiness” while the other expounds the view that “doing what we like” is a slave’s conception of freedom.

The fourth and final article of the Series offers help and guidance to the man in the street, whose intuitions warn him against sense-exuberance but whose mind somehow revolts against rigid asceticism, and who wants to tread the Middle Way.—Eds.]

I.—THE MYTH OF DIONYSUS-BACCHUS

[M. Oldfield Howey is the author of *The Horse in Magic and Myth*, *The Encircled Serpent*, and *The Cat in the Mysteries of Religion and Magic*.—Eds.]

To comprehend the occult significance of the Myth of Dionysus-Bacchus it is necessary to recall to our minds its ancient, storied past, commencing with that of its originators, the Chaldean astrologers and diviners who lived in Babylon during the earliest times of which we have record and taught the Babylonians the “Mysteries,” the sacerdotal language, and their religion.

The Chaldeans were a tribe of the Akkadians who descended from the Hindu-Brahmans, now known as Aryans. The nomad Akkadian tribes introduced the conception of Bacchus-Dionysus to the Western world from its birthplace in Indian thought. Dionysus is the god Dis from Mount Nysa, and when Bacchus is pictured as crowned with ivy, or *kissos*, the allusion to Christna,

one of whose names was *Kissen*, can easily be recognised. At least when enthroned as the omnipotent Dionysus Zagreus, “the highest of the gods,” Bacchus is unquestionably of Hindu origin. This is confirmed by the Grecian poet, Euripides (*circa* B. C. 480), who says that Dionysus came from India to Greece, where he was reverently regarded as second only to Zeus, whilst the Theban poet Pindar (*circa* B. C. 520) stresses his equality and harmony with the Father of the gods, asserting that “Father Zeus governs all things, and Bacchus he governs also”.

This lofty and mystical conception of Bacchus-Dionysus as identical with the abstract deity of Grecian thought, enables us further to realise his essential unity with Osiris, the great God of Egypt, Son of Seb, celestial fire, and

of Neith, primordial matter and infinite space; the self-created, self-existent God, the first manifesting deity, and in this we are again confirmed by Euripides. Of the many ideations of the Supreme God, the Egyptian is the grandest and most suggestive, for within it is contained the whole scope of physical and metaphysical thought. Osiris being imaged as a solar god, the twelve signs of the Zodiac were personified as minor gods who reigned beneath his sway. According to Diodorus, like Dionysus, Osiris was brought up in Nysa* and was the son of Zeus, and named after his father (nominative Zeus, genitive *Dios*,) and the place "Dio-Nysos," *i.e.*, the Zeus or Jove of Nysa.

The initiated Jews worshipped Bacchus-Dionysus-Osiris under the name of Jehovah, Yava, or Iao, the secret title of the Phœnician Mystery God, which the Chaldeans had used to designate the Creator: and we may read in "Exodus" xvii. 15, that "Moses built an altar and called the name of it Jehovah Nissi," which Kabalistically is "Dio-Iao-Nyssi," thus proving that the god of Sinai or Nyssi, was known indifferently by the titles of Bacchus, Osiris, and Jehovah.

But when "Osiris, the collective unit," is differentiated and personified, he assumes many apparently opposing aspects, and is seen not only as Horus, his radiant sun-god son, but also as Typhon, the black shadow of himself, the material realization of the universe projected by his creative thought. Thus,

if regarded as Bacchus, when viewed exoterically and superficially, he is the god of wine, and drunkenness, and licentious pleasure, whilst Jehovah is degraded to be the sensual, jealous, malignant, tribal god of the Jews.

It was the dark and exoteric aspect of the cult of the disintegrated, personified attributes of the Deity that appealed with special force to the masses of the Jewish people, and this differed so profoundly from the esoteric creed we have been considering, that we shall scarcely be open to controversy if we describe it as an antagonistic religion. The two aspects made their appeals respectively to the cultured and uncultured sections of the Jews. These were further divided by difference of descent. The plebeian Israelites were of Canaanite and Phœnician origin, and to them the dark aspect of Osiris as Typhon became identified with their limited, racial idea of the phallic sun-god whom their primitive forefathers had worshipped under the various titles of Bacchus, Baal or Adon, Iacchos-Iao or Jehovah.

The Chaldean initiates throughout the ages continued to hold the golden key of the symbology that veiled the religion of Bacchus-Dionysus-Osiris from irreverent eyes, and in spite of bitter persecution, continued ever faithful to its spirit. Though scattered in every nation, their headquarters always remained in Babylon and Chaldea. To their cult belonged the Chaldean kabalists known as the *Nazars* (*i.e.*,

* Diodorus places Nysa between Phœnicia and Egypt.

“set apart”) or “Sons of the Prophets,” the law-giver Moses, the theurgists, whose function it was to evoke the gods during the celebration of the Mysteries, and the initiated prophets. So strong was their opposition to the idolatrous and exoteric materialism that was the leading characteristic of the “chosen people” of Jehovah-Bacchus that they might easily be regarded by an outsider as an anti-Bacchus caste, but a closer investigation proved that they were followers of the esoteric and higher ideal of the ancient god. Their assemblies were held in secret in Nazara, the modern Nazareth, and at them they celebrated the initiation ritual which was named by them the “Mysteries of Life”. In this the spiritual significance of the symbolism was made apparent to accepted candidates by the hierophant initiator.

The law of the Nazarite who “separateth himself unto the Lord,” is described with much detail in the sixth chapter of Numbers, and we may recognize the ritual and laws of the Priests of Bacchus, and his feminine aspect Ceres, in the commandments given to Moses by the “Lord”. It is impossible to overlook the significance of the strict taboo of “the vine tree, from the kernels even to the husk,” and the offering that must be made of “a basket of unleavened bread, cakes of fine flour mingled with oil, and wafers of unleavened bread,” together with the permission that when the “wave offering” had been made “before the Lord after that the Naza-

rite may drink wine”. The identity of the Hebrew Nazars with the hierophants of Bacchus-Dionysus is yet further emphasized by the ritual abstinence and purity so strongly insisted upon by the latter before the celebration of the Mysteries wherein the wine represented Bacchus, and the bread Ceres. The goddess was the personification of the female productive principle which was conceived of as pervading the passive or material elements of the earth that, when united with the active or spiritual, became the cause of the organisation and vivification of its substance. The candidate partook of the wine and bread as token that within himself the Divine Spirit was about to quicken his lower nature through the revelation of the Sacred Doctrine. In the Eleusinian mysteries known as the Anthesteria, or Feast of Flowers, the necessity of purification was yet further stressed, and after the usual rite of Baptism had been performed in the temple lakes, the new initiates were made to pass through a gate which was known as “the gate of Dionysos,” and of “the purified”.

The sublimer scenes in the Mysteries were invariably enacted in the night time to emphasize that “the life of the interior spirit is the death of the external nature; and the night of the physical world denotes the day of the spiritual”. “The one Universal Light, which to Man is Darkness, is ever existent,” says the Chaldean Book of Numbers. Dionysus, the night-sun, is therefore the divinity adored, rather than Helios, lord of day.

But these mystic celebrations of initiation which unfolded the inner significance of the sacred doctrines to the reverent and adoring aspirant must not be confused with the popular Mysteries celebrated at Byblus in honour of Adonis. We may glean from "Ezekiel" (ch. viii) a vivid idea of the nature of these latter, orgiastic "abominations". He tells us that he was "brought in the visions of God to Jerusalem" from "the land of the Chaldeans" (i. 3), and there saw, standing before the idols "portrayed upon the wall," seventy of the senators of the house of Israel. The Lord enquired of him: "Son of man, hast thou seen what the ancients of the house of Israel do in the dark?" He also showed him how, at the gate of the Lord's house, "there sat women weeping for Tammuz" (Adonis), and—

at the door of the temple of the Lord, . . . were about five and twenty men, with their backs toward the temple of the Lord, and their faces toward the east; and they worshipped the sun toward the east. Then he said unto me, . . . Is it a light thing to the house of Judah that they commit the abominations which they commit here? for they have filled the land with violence. . . . (viii, 16-17)

Ezekiel was appalled by the degradation of the "chosen" people and it would be difficult to imagine that any "Pagan" cult had ever surpassed it. The prophet speaks guardedly, and often veils his meaning with allegory, but here his righteous indignation escapes, with tumultuous threatenings of the wrath to come: "Therefore will I also deal in fury: mine eye

shall not spare, neither will I have pity: and though they cry in mine ears with a loud voice, yet will I not hear them." (viii, 18).

David, the king of Israel, described as "a man after his (the Lord's) own heart" (I Sam. xiii, 14), also paid homage to the degraded phallic aspect of Jehovah-Bacchus, when he danced nude "with all his might" before the "ark of the Lord" that symbolised the *yoni*, or womb of Nature. His predecessor's daughter's sarcastic reproof: "How glorious was the king of Israel to-day, who uncovered himself to-day in the eyes of the handmaids of his servants," only caused him to exclaim:—

It was before the LORD, which chose me before thy father, and before all his house, to appoint me ruler over the people of the LORD, over Israel; therefore will I play before the LORD. And I will yet be more vile than thus, and will be base in mine own sight: and of the maidservants which thou hast spoken of, of them shall I be had in honour. (II Sam. vi, 21, 22).

The Ark, which David worshipped with Bacchic frenzy, was the Jewish representation of the Ark of the Chaldean Noah, "The Universal Mother," the Ship of Life, who carried in her fertile womb the germs of all that lived, throughout the boundless Sidereal Ocean. It was the sacred *Argha* of the Hindus, and was symbolised by the Ark of Noah, and the Ark of the Covenant; the oblong vessel used by the high priest as a sacrificial chalice in the worship of Isis, Astarte, and Venus Aphrodite (all of whom were goddesses of the generative powers of Nature) embodied the

same idea. From this it will be clear that the Jewish initiates had knowledge of the "Wisdom-Religion" and universal language, and its symbols. "With the ancient Aryans the meaning was grandiose, sublime, and poetical" but the "stiffnecked," "chosen," Semitic people dragged all down to their own low level of gross realism and sensuality.

We are now in a position to understand the contemptuous hatred of the Nazarenes, the descendants of the Old Testament Nazars, for the orthodox Jews, who adhered to the exoteric Law of Moses, and their bitter taunt that this sect of the "chosen" are actually the worshippers of Iurbo Adunai, or Bacchus-Jehovah, the impure, material and jealous god that Ezekiel had so scathingly denounced. This is the deity referred to in the prohibition in the Codex of the Nazarenes: "Thou shalt not worship the Sun who is named Adunai." The allusion is clearly painted by the prophecy that follows it:—

This Adunai will elect to himself a nation and congregate *in crowds* (*i. e.*, his worship will be exoteric) Jerusalem will become the refuge and city of the *Abortive*, who shall perfect themselves (circumcise) with a sword and shall adore Adunai (*Codex Nazareus*, i, 47,).

Madame Blavatsky says:—

Were we to suggest, that the Hebrew *nazars*, the railing prophets of the "Lord," had been initiated into the so-called Pagan mysteries, and belonged (or at least a majority of them) to the same Lodge or circle of adepts as those

who were considered idolaters; that their "circle of prophets" was but a collateral branch of a secret association, which we may well term "international," what a visitation of Christian wrath would we not incur! (*Isis*, II, 140)

Yet it is easy enough to demonstrate that the Christian fathers in their zeal to confine the new wine of their doctrine to the old wineskins of Judaism, and so avoid Paganism, but burst the worn bottles, and proved them to be already filled with the familiar mythology of the ancient faiths. The Christian of to-day is the inheritor of the semi-barbarous Israelites of ancient epic; not of the Hebrews of the period of Roman governance under the Herods, who, with all their shortcomings, remained strictly monotheistic and orthodox, but of the Jews, who under the title of Jehovah-Nissi worshipped Bacchus-Osiris, Dio-Nysos, and the multiform Jove of Mount Nyssa, the Sinai of Moses, in their debased exoteric, disintegrated and material aspects.

"All the gods of the nations are devils," (Psalm xcvi, 5), exclaimed David, and his own standard of theology makes his attitude comprehensible. The popular gods of exoteric cults, the Baal-Adonis or Jehovah-Bacchus, worshipped with impure rites in debased mysteries, are but the distorted shadows of the true Deity. The Christian churches, blindly adhering to the exoteric interpretation, like David transformed all the ancient gods into demons, and failed to realise that

* A. V. "idols".

in the Bacchus myth was concealed, not only the vindication of "the gods of the nations," but the clue to the enigma of their own lauded deity, Jehovah of Sinai, who required "the strong wine to be poured" in "the holy place" as a drink offering unto himself. (Numbers, xxviii, 7). "The great universal symbols were universally distorted," yet beneath the exoteric fables of Purānas and Bible is concealed more wisdom than in all the exoteric facts and science of the literature of the world, and H. P. Blavatsky writes that "once the *Jehovistic* portions are eliminated, the Mosaic Books are found full of purely occult and priceless knowledge." (*Secret Doctrine* I, 335-6)

It is possible to trace how the cult of Jehovah-Bacchus was prepared and adapted by Ezra, that "ready scribe in the law of Moses" who "went up from Babylon" (Ezra, vii, 6), from the Chaldeo-Akkadian account of sacred history for its later culmination in the Christian creed, but we have not space to follow the modifications of the intervening period here; suffice it that the centuries bring us to the Christian era.

Jesus was a Nazarene reformer and innovator who preached the philosophy of Buddha-Sakyamūni, and his doctrine constituted for the orthodox Jews a heresy within a heresy, since as we have seen even the older Nazars were not really followers of the Hebrew religion, but a class of Chaldean theurgists. The object of Jesus's teaching was clearly like that of Gautama-Buddha to bring about a religious

reformation that should bestow on mankind a true knowledge of ethical principles which before had been strictly confined within the esoteric sects. Accordingly he taught the ideal of a spiritual God whose temple is within the heart of man, in whom we live and move and have our being, and upbraided the lawyers with having "taken away the key of knowledge" (Luke xi, 52).

It is noteworthy that the Christian priesthood applied one of the most ancient names of Bacchus, ΙΗΣ, to Jesus, and, as if unaware of its true significance, actually misinterpreted it as *Iesus Hominum Salvator*, and *In hoc signo*. When Jesus took the wine-cup and said: "Drink ye all of it; for this is my blood" (Mathew xxvi, 27-28), he was speaking in the metaphorical language of the Mysteries. He assimilated himself with the vine that bore the grape, the juice or "blood" of which became the wine. In mystical terminology the priestly initiator was known as "Father," and Jesus wished to initiate others, as he himself had been initiated. His "Father" was the husbandman, himself the vine, his disciples the branches, but he warned them against taking his words in a literal sense, saying: "It is the Spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing."

Yet more and more does the weight of evidence adduced by comparative theology oblige us to realise that the consistent aim of Jesus, the initiate of the inner sanctuary, was to reveal to the ignorant and fanatical people the

gulf existing between the Great God, the mysterious and never-named Iao of the ancient Chaldean and later Neo-Platonic initiates, and the Hebrew Yahuh, or Yaho (Jehovah-Bacchus). Had time not been denied him to overcome the hardness of his hearers' hearts, the cruel era of Christian wars and bloody persecution of sect by sect need never have been. But fear of "the wine of the wrath of God" (Rev. xiv, 10) on one hand, and the "great wrath" of the devil (Rev. xii, 12) on the other, ever instigated Christians to new atrocities, and blinded their eyes to spiritual light, until the Church became fittingly symbolised as "the woman drunken with the blood of the saints, and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus" (Rev. xvii, 6).

Small wonder can we feel to-day that the vices attributed to Paganism by slanderous critics are everywhere current among Christian Fathers and Christian Churches who persist in the worship of Jehovah-Bacchus, the Lord whom David likened to "a mighty man that shouteth by reason of wine" (Psalms lxxviii, 65). From the devotees of this crassly material deity the mysteries are more and more deeply veiled. "Take the wine-cup of this fury at my hand," he commands Jeremiah, "and cause all the nations, to whom I send thee, to drink it. And they shall drink, and be moved, and be mad, because of the sword that I will send among

them. . . . Say unto them, thus saith the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel; Drink ye, and be drunken, and spue, and fall, and rise no more." (Jer. xxv, 15-16, 27)

The karmic results of the worship of Jehovah-Bacchus are overwhelming in chaos the material civilizations of to-day. Still must we lament with Isaiah that

The new wine [of the mysteries] mourneth, the vine languisheth. . . . There is a crying for wine in the streets; all joy is darkened, the mirth of the land is gone (Isaiah xxiv, 7, 11).

The unenlightened people remain an "evil and adulterous generation" whom even "the men of Nineveh" have the right to condemn (Matt. xii, 39, 41). The tragedy of Prometheus bound by the Olympic tyrant, sensual Zeus (Jehovah-Bacchus), is enacted daily by suffering humanity; the lower passions chain the higher aspirations to the rock of matter where the vulture of agony and remorse tears its very vitals. "Is there no way of escape?" we cry. "Yes" replies the Holy Spirit within the heart of man. Even in this terrific emergency, the eternal Law of Spiritual development is tending always to adjust contraries, and produce the final harmony of religious outlook, which shall reveal the uncorrupted, immaterial image of the Spirit of Being, Dionysus, the Pure, the Holy and the Good, and lead the peoples of the earth to the Golden Age of Love, and Joy, and Enlightenment.

M. OLDFIELD HOWEY

II.—THE DIONYSIAN RELIGION

[Llewelyn Powys, author of *The Pathetic Fallacy*, *Impassioned Clay*, and *Earth Memories*, recently said that "in New York I have been turned away as useless from employment bureaus, and know what it is to drink coffee out of a common mug". His article is a commentary on his faith: "For the sake of society we have need to curb our instinctive and natural wishes but this discipline has been carried to absurd lengths. The measure of our freedom is our consciousness. The great secret is to let our minds roam free over every aspect of life, and hold to poetry, to the poetry in life, for this is a religion that nobody can find untrue."—EDS.]

Not long ago an article of mine provoked the following protest from a friend :—

You say the churches stand between us and our vision of the true Jesus. I quite agree . . . Jesus forgave the woman taken in adultery, though the law of Moses condemned her. He broke Moses' law about the Sabbath. He may be said to have pointed out the impossibility of chastity by saying that every man that looketh on a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her. Jesus, like Dionysos, of whom he was probably another incarnation, was a Wine God. He turned water into wine at Cana, and the wine into God at the Last Supper. He was known as a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber, a friend of publicans and harlots. His sacrament is almost precisely the same as that left to his disciples by Dionysos, only more human. Why should we oppose him rather than try his teaching first, and secondly, try to make others understand it and so Christianize the unbelievers, and even those more difficult people the Christians.

This letter set me once more meditating upon the similarity and difference between the Christian and the Dionysian cults, between these two imaginative deities who have had so memorable an influence upon Europe. Out of the fecund earth the race of men arose rank protagonists, moon-mad, sun begotten, their fleeting stay above ground be-

wildered by the violence of their emotions, by the ineffectual ratiocinations of their leaf-light brains. Their distracting predicament quickened their spirits to invent dreams of redemption. In every race, in every land these religious interpretations have sprung up, and the figure of Jesus and the figure of Dionysos have undoubtedly represented centres of worship for two very significant streams of religious philosophy.

There exists a persistent legend that the mysterious Nysa where the nymph suckled Dionysos in a cave, is actually situated on the bank of a tributary of the river Jordan, not far from the city of Beisan in Palestine. It is possible, therefore, that not only on the spiritual plane, as my friend suggests, but on the physical plane as well, by a natal chance of actual geographical proximity, these two Gods of human liberation may be closely associated. I like to think it is so. I like to think that the wild sensitive spirit of Jesus, and the wild sensitive spirit of Dionysos were both of them incarnate upon the same parcel of Syrian soil, that they both saw the sun rise and set over a similar landscape as they played by day ; and after darkness

had fallen, lay in the arms of their mothers intent to listen to the voices of the night.

There is however very little that can really be said in support of my friend's contention. It is perhaps true that Jesus shared with Dionysos the gift of prophecy, shared with him an impatience with human bigotry, and like him could upon occasions display the unpredictable temper of a God. But there the convergence of the two ends. The teaching of Jesus in its ultimate essence is more subtle, more sophisticated, more decadent and, with all reverence be it said, more subversive to human happiness. The Apollonian ideal of moral order, of intellectual enlightenment, of sanity, has been less dangerous. One recalls the words of the Chinese philosopher: "It is necessary to respect spiritual beings and at the same time to keep out of their way." Jesus through his idealism, through the example of his personal heroism, sought to exorcise for ever the despair men feel on discovering that the grass-fields of their familiar earth hide cracks and gulfs of horror. He called upon his followers to bring redemption to life by denying life, to save their souls by losing them; and not only was earth-life repudiated by him on the score of its darker secrets, but also on account of its lure "of things too sweet".

The Dionysian guidance, the Dionysian art of life, was simpler and braver. This Aryan God, hailing ultimately from the far north and immediately from Thrace, taught that the recoil

from lurking terror can only be resolved by a still more abandoned acceptance of the vital principle. The true Dionysian spirit endeavours always to become one with the very Yggdrasil root of existence so greatly to be feared, so greatly to be adored. It does not attempt to undertake the impossible task of controlling life after the Apollonian tradition, still less does it turn aside from life after the Christian manner. It ratifies life, embraces life, and aims through ecstasy of worship to become identified with the reality behind matter, behind the shivering wave lengths of the objective universe; to become one with that mysterious stir that first troubled the inanimate. In those moments when the authentic transport, the true Dionysian rapture has taken possession of a man, all is forgotten. He is verily God-full and shares with the cat the glare of her green eyes, and with the mouse, already damp with her spittle, the ecstasy of martyrdom. Then when the madness is over, when the enthusiasm has passed, there follows in the lull, in the succeeding hush "of the silence of the Bacchae," the most strange, the most precious of all religious experiences, when in a state of mystic quietude the worshipper meditates with imagination, with compassion, upon the thronging irresponsible dream presented to his day-by-day senses. There exists always an undying antithesis between the regular and the irregular, between the ordered and the disordered; and although in practice it is incumbent upon all

civil spirits to engage in the hopeless struggle against stupidity, injustice and cruelty, we can still preserve with edification an area of secret conviction, an area of personal affirmation of the more oblique, the more implacable metaphysic.

Whenever we separate ourselves from nature we do so at our peril. The restrictions, however necessary they may be, imposed upon our free happiness by society are in themselves pernicious, and when we add to them the gratuitous restraints of ascetic persuasions the health and generosity of the strongest soul is in jeopardy. Any inordinate forcing of selflessness defeats its own end, for a stage is reached when the outraged person will turn upon himself, upon others. In the religion of Dionysos this tension finds relief. When the satyr train left "their brooms and cold mushrooms"; when the Bacchae, thyrsus in hand, danced with heads thrown back; when the wise Silenus was on foot behind the triumphant leopard-drawn chariot, civilized ceremony was annulled, discounted under a blithe and blessed dispensation. Once more the flood gates of nature were open and for a time within a time the world was happy. It was not for nothing that the ancients named India as the country of his most important conquest, India that more than any other earth-land has harboured thoughts recreant to the sun.

At any moment a Dionysian neophyte may in a state of exultant consciousness be in communion with the vital leap which exists

beyond and below all human commitments. Yesterday as I came along a lane in April sunshine I experienced the perennial thrill. It came to me with so common a spectacle as nettles growing in the ditch and smelling rough in the new heat of the spring, of nettles, unknown in heaven, thrusting themselves up through the cow parsley and Lords and Ladies with all the wilful assurance of the vegetable world at the approach of a new season.

Dionysos was essentially a vegetable God. His life, they used to say, was in "the sap and bark"; and in our time his unstable influence is still suggested by the more wanton growths of the open country, by the sprawling trailer of the blackberry, by the vigour of the throttling ivy, and by the gnarled and contorted vine stump out of which the images and idols of the God used to be carved. These vegetable growths, then, are his most apparent symbols suggesting the bountiful aspect of his religion that leads our minds to a comprehensive acceptance of a condition of intense poetic sensibility which recognises as sacramental the plain food of our nourishment—brown meat, yellow honey, bread, and above all wine.

It would seem that intoxication was not used by his followers as a substitute in the Freudian sense, but rather as a positive instrument of grace through the use of which life could be experienced more abundantly, all the manifestations of the physical world being then seen through "divine eyeballs".

We have here the highest reward of the Dionysian mood, the power it can exert to stir men out of their congenital lethargy, out of their gross habit of accepting existence with the blank unilluminated stare of the use-and-wont besotted.

Such blindness is not possible to those who follow in the train of "mad Dionysos" and his nurses, who follow in the train of him "who lives in the tree". For as that man of many mischiefs, Plato, said "the madness sent by God is better than the moderation of men". No higher function is possible to religion than to evoke an enraptured contemplation of the mystery of existence here on earth. During these inspired states dolour is dissipated and our petty pre-occupations are vanquished. True religion derives directly from the sense of awe natural in man at his first wakening to consciousness. "Shall things of dust the God's dark ways despise?"

There was and is a valuable secret in the orgiastic tradition of this God of the snake and of the bull. Civilized society has not been satisfied to subject our individual desires to its service, but apprehensive of the insubordinance of abstinence, it has set about deliberately to disparage sensuality, to belittle the delirium of carnal delight, wilfully coercing it to minister to its ideal of submissive domesticity. With this cardinal consummation of man's life decried, it is small wonder that the faces in our streets are careworn and bitter, so that it has come to seem almost a mockery to mention this deity of the gleam-

ing grape cluster. The Dionysian spirit gives its blessing to every declaration of freedom, it stands in stubborn opposition to all fine spun theories of idealistic teaching, in stubborn opposition to the machinations of every time imprisoned mind. Wherever two or three are gathered together in liberty, in happiness, there is present the God-like figure of Dionysos. He is the deity who brings to man the greatest wisdom, teaching him to turn back to nature, to turn again to natural joy, to drink, to laugh, to dance, with free mind. What can we do better than to cast ourselves before this great Nature God, accepting the presence of cruelty and ugliness as inseparable from being, recognising them for what they are, and yet continuing our laudations of life, of life for its own sake, with an infatuated trust? There is no more deadly enemy of the lust for power, of the lust for empire, that curse of the human race, than the Dionysian compassion, the Dionysian happiness, the Dionysian generosity and strength. This Dasyllios, the dweller in the thickets, this Agrionios, the ruthless one, puts us into a state to accept all the riot of the visible. With our sight purged by his exultation we can experience God-like excitement from the simplest spectacle, from the crafty look on the physiognomy of an owl peering down at us from its beam stool, from the feckless life of gaudy butterflies flitting from flower head to flower head.

To meditate continually upon the handiwork of the Sun, "whom

men call Dionysos," we can do nothing better. There is no cry that approximates more nearly to the voice of the spirit of the earth, to the voice of the spirit of all that moves over the face of the earth than the terrible "goat cry" of this suffering and debonair God. From the forests it rises, from the vineyards, from the rustling corn fields, reaching up to the furthest stars whose light has turned red with age. "O Dionysos, in no wise endured by mortals." It is a cry charged with thought beyond the scrupulous reason, with thought born of the senses, of the more errant emotions, the cry of the pagan body of the planet, explicit of terror, explicit of ecstasy. How in the height of summer, at the time of the solstice, the thick-grown hayfields, the tangled festooned hedges,—the most inconspicuous meadow corner decked as for a gala—put us in mind of this ancient adoration, fill us with the assurance that Dionysos will come again, will return to earth once more with his fox-maidens swarming about his triumphant car! To be utterly possessed by the delicacy and vigour of the vine, to surrender ourselves utterly to this consciousness that surpasses consciousness—this is our largest release. It is a religion that can never die. It has in it a natural solace for the yearning of the human heart. For this reason it was strong enough to force its acceptance upon the temperate Greeks. At first the Hellenic mind found difficulty in assimilating its wild rout. Eventually, however, it came to share equal honours

with the cult of Apollo, as is proved by the huge stone at Delphi with these words carved upon it "Here lieth the body of Dionysos the son of Semele." What trust can we have in priestcraft? It is not true. Dionysos, with his race of "worthless, idle satyrs," can never die.

By his own joy I vow

By the grape upon the bough.

This faith lies below Christianity, below science. It is as much opposed to transcendental values as it is to matter-of-fact values. Always it draws its indestructible power from the senses. It acclaims the glory of life as revealed to the flesh of man. In the face of all ultimate issues it is profoundly sceptical, profoundly disillusioned. At the best our difficult compromises are inconsequently ephemeral, comparable to the thriftless applications of gnats, which doomed instantly to an ignominious extinction whirl through a twilight air above a swiftly flowing river without dykes or weirs. What has happened to all those heroic causes of the past for which so much human blood has been shed, and for the achievement of which so much human passion has been expended? The most selfless magnanimities, together with the most despicable villainies, all have been swept away, all have been forgotten. The evening of the crucifixion did not stay for one single second the untiring procedure of manifold nature. The hyæna with hind-quarters slouched came slinking that night over the dusty hillside to sniff after the buried brown bones of a punctilious Pharisee;

the mangled Palm Sunday ass brayed at the Mount of Olives as indifferently she turned her grey head towards the heap of fodder piled high in the corner. On a battle-field where a thousand men lie dead or mutilated, the dandelions and buttercups patiently, punctually close their petals at the going down of the sun. The basic structure of earth life is subject to an appalling precipitation. The religion of Dionysos accepts this fact, makes no pretence that it is otherwise. Its votaries are content to celebrate existence without exacting reservations, to worship the unthinking omnipotent force with inebriate fervour as the red sap of

confident life pours through their veins.

If once we have given ourselves to this redeemed vision then we can afford to tamper with our preconceived moralities. For every day through an open window, in a city street, or on the high road, we shall hear the unmistakable immortal cry, fortifying our infirm bodies, scattering our ghostly mistrusts, and compelling us to acknowledge the triumph of disobedient life. In so far as we succeed in impressing each one of our experiences with the Dionysian spirit we shall be happy. This is the test, the ultimate loyalty.

LLEWELYN POWYS

III.—SELF-RESTRAINT VERSUS SELF-INDULGENCE

[**Claude Houghton** is a novelist with a message, about whom Mr. Geoffrey West wrote in our issue of August 1933.--EDS.]

That is the title of Mr. Gandhi's book.

Given another author, we should pick it up feeling that we could hazard a fairly accurate guess as to its contents. After all, most of us have heard quite a lot about Self-Restraint, and know quite a lot about Self-Indulgence. A book with this title, therefore, does not come to us in any questionable shape. It looks familiar enough. We feel there's no harm in glancing at it.

But the fact that Mr. Gandhi is its author gives Western readers pause. We have all heard of him. His lightest word, his most trivial act, is News—world News. Con-

sequently we all have very definite opinions concerning him. These opinions vary fantastically, it is true, but each is definite. We may regard him as an Agitator, or a Madman, or a Charlatan, or a Legend, or a Mahatma,—but, whatever it is, it starts with a capital letter.

And now we find that this great Figure has written a book. And he has called it Self-Restraint versus Self-Indulgence. We don't like the sound of that too much—particularly when we remember that he does not smoke, or drink, or eat meat; that he fasts frequently, and believes in the doctrine of non-resistance to evil.

So, if we pick up the book at all, we do so gingerly.

Even so, shocks await us, for—to most Western readers—this volume will seem more like a bomb than a book. And that statement is soon proved by summarizing certain of the Mahatma's contentions. Mr. Gandhi holds :—

A. that sexual indulgence for its own sake is not a human necessity.

B. that men must cease to indulge their animal passions after the need for progeny has ceased.

C. that sexual enjoyment is not only not necessary for, but is positively injurious to, health.

D. that a life of perfect continence in thought, speech, and action is necessary for reaching spiritual perfection.

E. that it is the force of habit which makes us think the sexual act to be necessary.

F. that most cases of irritability, hysteria, and even insanity which are wrongly ascribed to attempts at continence will in truth be found traceable to the incontinence of the other senses.

G. that birth control by contraceptives is race suicide.

It is mere butcher's work thus to hack to bits a subtle argument, but the method is adopted in order to indicate the nature and scope of the issues raised in this book, and to show, from the outset, how fundamentally Mr. Gandhi's creed conflicts with current, ignorant, Western ideas—especially with the modern conception of "freedom".

What is this freedom—actually, not theoretically? Was it obtained at a great price, or is it a pottage payment received for an abject surrender of our spiritual birth-right? Freedom is to serve. It is positive, not negative. It is not attained by abdication, by the re-

jection of responsibility; by the denial of any necessity for discipline; by "doing what we like". That is a slave's conception of freedom. And it is the one that is popular to-day.

Nothing reveals it so clearly as modern notions concerning sex. We can all say and do what we like. Any talk of discipline is nonsense—a survival of Puritanism. Most of our ills, psychic and physical, are direct results of "repression". The fact that now, at last, we have escaped from the tyranny of restraint is proof conclusive that we are free.

Those, roughly, are the tenets of the modern sex-creed. Nevertheless, the people who hold them would instantly admit the necessity for continence in the case of a boxer training for an important fight. They would admit it without realizing in the least the implications of their admission. Of course a man must conserve his strength to get "fit"! Such people readily understand the necessity for continence in order to become a champion. *That* they understand, but not the chastity of a Saint.

Anyhow, Mr. Gandhi's book is not for them. It blows self-satisfaction, self-delusion, and herd-beliefs sky-high. Whether you agree with all of it, or some of it, or none of it, you will discover that it turns your mind into an arena—and that it blocks all the exits.

There is space for only one example. Take Mr. Gandhi's statement, quoted above, that birth-control by contraceptives is race suicide—and let us assume that

you regard that statement as arrant nonsense. Well, instead of tossing the book aside, read its first section, "Towards Moral Bankruptcy," which is a review by Mr. Gandhi of a French work (*D'Indiscipline des Mœurs*) by M. Paul Bureau. Then, having read it, and having related it to your own personal experience and observations, ask yourself whether you are still quite certain that Mr. Gandhi's statement is arrant nonsense.

The fact remains, however, that only those will read this volume who have looked deep into the abyss of themselves, and who realize the world's chaos—and what it portends. It is not a book for the many, though it is possible that Mr. Gandhi would vigorously contest that assertion. Nevertheless, with respect, I submit that it is true, for, although his book deals with social, moral, and psychological problems, it is not concerned with them on their own level. *Mr. Gandhi's essential theme is the conquest of life by the spiritual will. Given the regeneration of man, the evils that threaten extermination will vanish. Lacking regeneration, they will triumph—and one more civilization will perish.* If this be the essential contention behind all the Mahatma's arguments, then his book will have substance only for those who, in some degree, have had a vision of the Kingdom. They, and they only, will have some understanding, however inadequate, of his statement that "he who has realized the misery of mankind in

all its magnitude will never be stirred by passion". And, to them, his first paragraph on page 15—and the four paragraphs that follow it—will be either a revelation, or a challenge. To read them is to discover, or to realize, the mystical facts that all are responsible for all, and that what happens to another happens to oneself.

The subject of Continence has been stressed in this article because Mr. Gandhi states, in the opening lines of his chapter on "The Necessity of Continence," that no other chapter is so important. In it, he tells us that there is one thing needful, above all others, and that is Brahmacharya.

Brahmacharya properly and fully understood means search after Brahma. As Brahma is present in every one of us, we must seek for it within with the help of meditation and consequent realization. Realization is impossible without complete control of all the senses . . . Brahmacharya means control of the senses in thought, word, and deed.

Finally, this book clearly reveals that India is no longer half-hypnotized by the West.

Let us beware of the strong wine of libertinism that the intoxicated West sends us under the guise of new truth and so-called human freedom. Let us, on the contrary, listen to the sober voice of the West that through the rich experience of its wise men at times percolates to us . . .

Such a warning is inevitable. The Western orgy of materialism is now revealed for what it is. We have pulled the house about our ears, and are now staring at ruin. We can continue to boast, if we

will—but the background is not impressive. People get bored by a bankrupt who keeps telling them how rich he used to be.

Let us not deceive ourselves by imagining that . . . Englishmen are to be despised as competitors in a race for personal virtue. Without making

any spiritual parade of the fundamental virtues, they practise them at least physically in an abundant measure.

It is such Englishmen that will continue to compel respect in India—not by the power of their arm, but by the might of their spirit.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

IV.—THE THEOSOPHICAL THEORY OF LIFE

[**William Kingsland, M. I. E. E.** is the author of *The Real H. P. Blavatsky, The Great Pyramid in Fact and in Theory* and other volumes.—EDS.]

Every man has, within the limits of his knowledge, and either consciously or unconsciously, his theory of life. It is his idea of what is *desirable*, of what he should strive to obtain or to accomplish or achieve.

It does not follow that every individual has formulated that theory to himself; indeed I think that there are comparatively very few who have done so. The great majority conform to the general standard of life of the community in which they live without asking whether there is any wider, deeper knowledge to be obtained. They accept life as it comes. As to whether there is any after-life or what it may hold for them—that is a question with which they never concern themselves.

To this class belong, not merely the great masses who unfortunately have to live from hand to mouth and whose whole energies are absorbed in doing that; not merely, either, the great criminal class which is such a problem for our modern civilization, but also a very

large proportion of well-educated men and women who have both the time and opportunity for reading and study. To this latter class belong the great bulk of what is known as “society,” which is very largely a feverish round of thoughtless excitement and “amusement,” and the great middle class community, whose spare time is taken up with less exciting but still trivial efforts to get “amusement”—theatres, cinemas, novel reading, bridge, etc. These in general have no theory of life beyond that which they can apply to the present time or to the immediate future. It has never occurred to them to ask whether there is any *reality* in such a life as they live—or perhaps we should say that they are absolute realists, the only things that are real for them being just these physical things which they can touch and which *are* to them just what they *seem*.

But in both these latter classes there are a small number for whom life has deeper and more serious

aspects. They are what we may term broadly the religious-minded. They have a theory of life which extends beyond the present material world, a theory which, stated broadly, recognises that man possesses or is an immortal soul or spirit, which survives his bodily death, and which will be rewarded or punished in after-death life for the deeds done in the body. Here we enter the troubled region of religious strife, of the conflict of creed and sects; and here we find that for the most part the individual has not thought out his own theory of life, but merely accepts, and conforms to, that of the race or community of which he is a member. He has not thought out his own theory because in general he has no wide and comprehensive knowledge, or perhaps more generally because his own theory or creed does seem to correspond with his very limited outlook on life and the world in general; or again, because that theory is placed before him with *authority* which he has not sufficient interest, intellect or courage to question or examine.

Doubtless there are in this whole class which I here specify broadly as the religious class, many who have deliberately thought out their adherence to this, that or the other form of belief; and if we question these as to the grounds of their acceptance of beliefs with which perhaps we ourselves are at variance, we find that there is always some primary premise, on which their beliefs are built. Granted that premise, the conclu-

sions may be logically true. For example, the Christian "faith" in its broad traditional and historical form is based on the theory that the Bible is literally the inspired word of a personal God; and whatever may be the modifications in this belief which are taking place to-day it is hardly a hundred years since in this England of ours it was considered a most shocking thing to question this, and one which branded a man as an *atheist*, not fit for respectable society. Only a little earlier still it meant torture and the stake.

If we ask why this traditional basis of Christian doctrine is so widely questioned and rejected to-day, it is quite evident that it is owing to our greatly extended knowledge, not merely of the structure of the Bible itself, but also of the nature and constitution of the world in which we live, of its relations to the larger universe around us, and of the biological history of life in general on this globe, and of man's history in particular. It is a matter of quite recent history that each step in this wider knowledge has been bitterly opposed by the upholders of the Christian theory. We have almost, but not quite, outlived this opposition to progressive knowledge on the part of this particular Western religion; but what of other religions?

Mahomadanism, based on the authority of the *Koran*, stands too near to the Christian type of belief to be free from the intolerance of dogma, though the Christian himself is regarded as an "infidel" by this religion.

We turn then to the Far East, and here, although we are not altogether free from religious strife, we discover theories which are profoundly philosophical in their premises, and which, indeed, are based on such a wide and comprehensive view of the nature of man, and of the universe in which he lives, that they not merely stand in no fear of being upset by any scientific or other discoveries, but they also serve to explain the evolution of religion in general. In other words, they are not *a* religion, but Religion itself in its very root and source.

It is these great comprehensive theories which constitute the basis of that teaching which was introduced to the Western world during the last quarter of last century by that great teacher and writer, Madame H. P. Blavatsky, under the term, *Theosophy*. Those of us who have studied these teachings are continually finding confirmation of them not merely in the great Scriptures of the world, in the teachings of the best and wisest men that the world has ever known, but also in the progressive discoveries of modern science. One could not desire a better basis than that for a working hypothesis or theory of life though, until we have each in some manner or other proved it in our own experience, the teaching must be considered to be merely a working hypothesis. No one is asked to accept it on any authority whatsoever.

Let us glance briefly at the fundamentals of the theory. Every

thinking man admits that there is some One great fundamental Principle which is the Root and Source of the whole Universe, no matter whether that Principle be thought of as a personal God, an abstract Principle such as the *Absolute* of philosophy, or merely as some unconscious root Substance-Force. Let us here, in accordance with theosophical theory, call it the One Life for we cannot imagine that what we know in ourselves as life and consciousness is a fortuitous product of *dead* matter and force, as some materialists have professed to believe. We might also call it Spirit-Substance, even as Jacob Boehme writes:—

All is through and from God himself, and it is his own substance, which is himself, and he hath created it out of himself.

We have then this One Life or Spirit-Substance as the Root and Source of everything that has been, is, or can be in the Universe, both subjective and objective ; and the fundamental teaching as to the nature of man is simply this : that the *self* in man is nothing less in its real essential nature than this One Life ; and that a real and true knowledge of what we are in the depths of our nature will disclose to us this oneness. As a matter of fact this is no mere philosophical postulate or deduction ; it is the universal *experience* of those who have sought by intense aspiration to penetrate the depths of their own nature, and who are more generally known as Mystics.

What then arises in a practical manner from this fundamental

principle? Simply this, that very evidently mankind as a whole has *lost* the knowledge of this unity! That ignorance of our true and rightful nature and powers, whereby we become subject to material and other conditions over which we ought rightfully to rule, results in the first place in a wholly false consciousness of *self*, and secondly in transgressions of the natural laws of our material nature, bringing about sin, sickness, and death. In a word, all the *evil* in the world is due to man's ignorance of his real nature, and of his rightful powers as a *spiritual* being.

What is it then that hinders that we as individuals and as a race should obtain a realisation of our true nature and powers? The vast majority of our fellow men never have heard and never can hear of these teachings: and indeed would not understand them if they did. Moreover, although this fundamental teaching of *the divine nature of Man* has been presented over and over again, as far back as we have any literary records, it has just as often been materialised and debased by reason of ignorance, superstition or priestcraft.

Yet surely we must grant to each individual, however low in the scale of evolution, the opportunity to rise to the highest. But how is that opportunity to be given? The reply which this teaching makes is, by *reincarnation*.

We see on every hand that nothing is ever learnt save by *experience*. It is by experience

that the individual, and through the individual the race, evolves from lower to higher types; but how much is accomplished by any one of us in one single incarnation of what there is to accomplish in the realisation of our true spiritual nature and powers, the powers of a "Son of God"? Therefore must we incarnate again and again, until happily we have acquired that knowledge and those powers which will free us from this recurring cycle of birth and death, and make of each a pillar (a Cosmic Power) in the temple of our God, so that we go out thence no more (into incarnation).

But even when we come to know of these deeper teachings, there is much to overcome, much to conquer of the atavism which remains in our nature, always tending to repeat automatically the *material* experiences and desires of the past. And thereby it has been the teaching of all great spiritual teachers that the way to liberation is by *non-attachment* to "the things of this world".

In all the essentials of the teaching I here so briefly present, the teachings of Jesus and of Paul differ in no wise from those of Krishna or of Gautama Buddha. It is only the *form* that differs. In the one case the teachings were addressed to a race and a community familiar only with a concept of an anthropomorphic personal God; and so Jesus endeavoured to purify that concept by presenting the One Life "in whom we live, and move, and have our being" in the guise of a heavenly "Father".

Knowing the deeper truth, and realising it very fully in his own nature, he did not hesitate to claim his spiritual oneness with "God"; and he taught also that we are all "Sons of God," however much the Church may have obscured this teaching.

Paul also, being an initiate, taught that that same Christ consciousness which was in Jesus must be "born" in each of us if we are to attain unto "the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ: that we henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine." (*Eph.* iv, 13-14.) Gautama Buddha, on the other hand, having to deal with a race and community already familiar with the deeply philosophical teachings of the *Vedas* and the *Upanishads*,—albeit hardened into a rigid caste system, and certain formal religious observances—had no teachings of any personal god or gods; and when questioned as to the nature of the one Absolute Principle, he remained silent, recognising only its action in the manifested universe as immutable Law—a moral law, the law of *Karma*, as well as what we commonly call *natural law*. But the core of his teaching, as also of the great Indian Scripture, the *Bhagavad-Gita*, is also *non-attachment*. It is simply the attachment to "the things of this world," the desire for sentient life (*Trishna*), which brings the individual back again and again into incarnation.

Here, then, very briefly, is the theory of life which Theosophy presents, and which lies at the root of all the various religions which we have had to reject in their mere conventional or *exoteric* form. The Bible, itself, when the mere letter of the narrative is rejected and its *symbolism* begins to be understood in the light of these principles, is seen to be a veritable storehouse of the Ancient Wisdom concerning man's essential nature, origin and destiny.

The narratives of the Doctrine are its cloak. The simple look only on the garment, that is, upon the narrative of the Doctrine; more they know not. The instructed, however, see not merely the cloak, but what the cloak covers.—*The Sohar*.

In *Theosophy* we have once more in the world a re-presentation of "what the cloak covers".

To sum up: the Theosophical theory of life is based on the fundamental premise that the Self in man is one with the Cosmic Self. The consciousness of that oneness having been lost, the great object in life, the only *desirable* thing is to regain it. This is possible only after the individual by bitter experience of the worthlessness of "the things of this world" in life after life, learns at last to cease to desire them, and turns his face towards his "spiritual home". The race as a whole can only regain its former spiritual status and glory as the individuals composing it achieve this conquest over their lower nature, and are "born again" (*Dwija*, twice born) into the "kingdom of heaven".

W. KINGSLAND

SPIRITUAL " VALUES OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICA

[C. E. M. Joad visited the United States of America in the first quarter of this year and writes of his impressions, which our readers will find it interesting to compare with those of Prof. Irwin Edman, published in our last issue.]

I

In the lounge of my hotel at Detroit there were enthroned two automobiles, surrounded by thronging crowds of worshippers. The speed, the beauty, the prowess of these cars were the themes of universal conversation. In a factory outside the town their fellows were being produced at the rate of six or seven hundred a day. I visited this factory, the famous Ford works, observed the sixty thousand cars of its employees parked outside them, and, having talked with their chief, the great man himself, came away with the feeling that here, indeed, was the heart and soul of modern America, and that of its gods of efficiency and speed the cars in the hotel lounge were the visible idols.

To say that cars are the idols of modern Americans is a quite literal statement of fact. A man in St. Louis told me that he had two weeks' holiday a year. Last year he had marked a place on the map just two thousand miles away which he wished to see. To this place he had driven with his family in his car, covering some three hundred miles a day. When he arrived he dined at his hotel, went to the movies, slept, and then got into his car to drive home again. He had, in fact, spent his holiday

in his automobile and nowhere else. A man at New Orleans told me that he had now attached a trailer caravan to his automobile in which he lived, thus at once saving his rent and having at his disposal perpetual motion. His house, in fact, had become a mere adjunct of his car; it was like the tail to the dog.

I wondered whether this mode of living might not be a signpost pointing to the future. The difficulties of parking cars are now very great, and it seems to me not impossible that Americans will presently take to living in them entirely, being born in them, married in them, carrying on their business from them, dying in them. Thus will they pass their lives entirely in, about, and in the service of cars.

The car is symbolical of the American worship of machines, which leads them to regard any mechanism as a good in itself. Most of all do they admire those machines that will save them time. Hence their worship of cars that transport them rapidly from place to place, and their almost ecstatic admiration of ingenious gadgets which will perform two functions at once. For example, I purchased a pencil. My dismay at its apparent costliness was only parti-

ally mitigated when, unscrewing the bottom, I discovered that it contained an automatic cigarette lighter. I sat down to play bridge, and was confronted with an ingenious mechanism which proceeded to deal the cards for me, turning on its axis like a top and ejecting one card at each player in turn. I drove in a taxi and my astonished ears were assailed with the strains of jazz proceeding from a radio set installed in the vehicle. Why? Presumably to save time and labour. The cigarette-lighter-cum-pencil was designed to prevent me from having to carry two gadgets when one would serve; the card dealer to save me the trouble of dealing for myself; the radio in the taxi on the assumption that the rider likes "music," yet has so little time at his disposal that he can spare none to listen to music in and for itself; he must take his music as an incidental to his ride.

But, the question inevitably presents itself, for what is time being saved? The answer is not clear. To win leisure for meditation? Apparently not, since nobody seems to have so little time to spare as those who are always saving it. No people, in fact, are so rushed as the Americans. To cultivate the spirit, or to pursue Beauty and Truth? This does not seem likely. America is not remarkable for the cultivation of the spirit; it produces few works of art and discovers little Truth. The only conclusion seems to be that machines are used to save

time in order to save more time in order to pursue . . . what?

But it is not only because they save time that ingenious mechanisms are admired. They are valued for their own sweet sakes irrespective of their effects. I was taken to the biggest music hall in New York, Radio City, where three—or was it four?—thousand people witnessed the same performance. The stage, of course, is incredibly remote, but the audience uses opera glasses and the voices of the players are heard over a microphone. After the wonders of this mammoth building had been duly exhibited I was taken to the basement in order to be shown what was described to me as "the cutest thing in the little old place". The basement was devoted to the provision of elaborate toilet arrangements. Solemnly we washed our hands, and I proceeded to look round for a towel. No towel was to be seen. "That's just where Radio City comes in," said my friend, and pressing a lever let loose from an aperture in the wall a stream of hot air. One held one's hands in the stream and very soon they were dry. This process took longer than using a towel, and was not in my view so pleasant—for my part, I like the feel of the coarse linen against the skin—but its virtue was nevertheless taken for granted. It was new; it was a gadget; and it did something for you that otherwise you would have had to do for yourself. It symbolised, in fact, the delegation to machines of one more function previously performed by human beings.

But, if we are to invent contrivances to save us the trouble of dealing at bridge, why not go further and save ourselves the trouble of playing bridge? If we cannot be at the trouble of lighting our cigarettes, why should we go to the trouble of smoking them? If we can delegate to cars more and more of the functions of living, why should we bother to live at all? It seems not inconceivable, if the tendencies observable in America continue, that Samuel Butler's prophecy will be realised and that Americans will come to cede the functions of life entirely to machines, so that just as men, whom the animals have evolved, have superseded them, so will the machines which mankind has evolved supersede human beings. Thus, having transferred all the functions of living to mechanisms, we shall find it unnecessary to live.

To an American the questions I have asked would seem meaningless. He takes it for granted that machines are goods in themselves. He is not concerned with them as means to ends beyond themselves. To me, and—for I do not wish to be alone in my scale of values—I hope to my readers, the questions seem inescapable, the perversion of values flagrant, the mistaking of means for ends as obvious as it is regrettable.

II

"But why discourse at such length, and with feelings of such apparent surprise upon this subordination of ends to means, upon this worship of false gods? The

tale of American eccentricities has been told often enough, and there is nothing particularly new in the telling." Precisely, that is just my point. There is nothing particularly new in the telling.

I had been led to expect that I should find America in the throes of a moral revolution. Nor was the expectation unreasonable. That human beings chastened by depression should be prepared to change their values and, finding that Mammon had so catastrophically let them down, should look to other gods—such things, after all, have happened to communities in the past; why not, then, to Americans in the present? The expectation was for the most part completely falsified. The gods of speed and efficiency are as firmly enthroned as ever, and why should they not be? They at least have not disappointed their worshippers; they have merely not been worshipped with sufficient zeal. Faster and ever faster cars, quicker and ever smoother elevators, labour-saving devices ever more efficient and ingenious. These things still are demanded by Americans. "Let us," they cry, "oxygenate the air of factories so that workers will be stimulated to greater output." Also and with the same breath, "Let us bribe planters to destroy cotton, manufacturers to curtail production, lest we be ruined by too much output."

As for Mammon, although it is now recognised that it is more than his feet that are of clay, the number of his worshippers shows no signs of falling off. Americans

are inveterate optimists. Even after four years of depression, the majority still believe prosperity to be just round the corner. They may starve and rot in idleness, but they do not agitate, riot, or even turn Socialist—the Socialist Party in the United States is still small, the Communist Party negligible—because each man hopes that with the return of prosperity he will "make good". Now a man is not likely to plan the overthrow of the capitalist system when he hopes himself to be a capitalist to-morrow, or to turn from the worship of Mammon when he believes that his services may at any moment be handsomely rewarded. In all these respects, then, the spiritual barometer shows no change.

In two respects only the indicators seem to be moving. The first of these is, I suspect, merely a passing phase, a testimony to the truth of the old adage that "when the devil was sick, the devil a saint would be". The second, however, is, I think, of fundamental importance. It is the outcome of a passionate indignation which has opened men's eyes to the evils of graft and corruption, which for years have been staring them in the face, and refuses to allow them to rest until the evils are mitigated if not removed. One of those secular stirrings of the human spirit which prompted the Puritan English to get rid of Charles I, the revolutionary French of the Government of Louis XVI, is now at work in America to produce a radical change in men's attitude

to public life. But of this more in a moment.

In the first place the slump is said to have engendered an increase of kindness as between one man and another, a kindness from the embarrassment of which the rich at any rate seem in the past fairly successfully to have escaped. At times it has seemed during the past four years that even the very rich have been sufficiently chastened to become human. People "have been so much nicer," a wealthy broker told me, enumerating the consolations, such as they were, which the depression had brought, in return for nearly ruining him. There is, then, a diminution of arrogance and conceit and an increase of humility and kindness even among the most arrogant. More important is the demand born of the stirring of the spirit to which I have already referred, the demand that American political and municipal life shall become clean. The lack of a disinterested public service is not only the outstanding defect of American public life; it is also the outstanding topic of American conversation. It is impossible to enter into conversation, however casual, in train, street car or hotel, without finding the talk coming round sooner or later to the corruption and graft of American politics. There is, it is pointed out to you, no permanent Civil Service in America, whose members hold their office independently of politics. Political and municipal jobs are the reward of service to party. Three evil consequences result.

First, those who wish to hold jobs must be prepared to bribe politicians. Secondly, the concern of politicians returned to office is not to put their policies into practice but their men into jobs. Thirdly, the best men keep out of politics. Upon all these evils friends and acquaintances would bitterly dilate, ending with the assertion that they had got to stop. There seems, in fact to be on all hands a determination to introduce the spirit of disinterested service into the administration of public affairs. I heard of young men of good qualifications and high academic distinction who were for the first time making politics and not business their objective. I heard of some of these young men who had begun service in Miss Perkins's Department of Labour whose morals are so strict, whose public conscience so austere, that they have been nicknamed the Early

Christians. "There are many things that I would like to do that I can't," the Head of the Department is said to complain with mock seriousness; "my Early Christians won't let me."

The gulf that in America separates public affairs from private is something of a mystery to the stranger. In the one sphere crookedness and graft have reigned supreme: these, one feels, are the affairs of knaves and rogues; the other is instinct with helpfulness, kindness and service: these, one feels, are the affairs of a friendly, a trusting and a good-natured people. If the depression should have helped to close this gulf it will not have occurred in vain. It should surely not be beyond the wit of Americans to imbue with the virtues of American private life, the public life, which, after all, individual Americans conduct.

C. E. M. JOAD

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

PLATO AS DICTATOR*

[D. L. Murray sees a similarity between the conditions of to-day and those of 350 B. C. when the *Laws* was written. This is, alas, an era of dictators whose philosophy of life and of government is not modelled on the wisdom of Plato.—EDS.]

The *Laws* of Plato, now translated with a wholly admirable Introduction by Prof. A. E. Taylor, may be reckoned his most important political treatise; for the better known *Republic*, while it plunges deeper into his thought on ethics, logic and the nature of the Ultimate Reality, is more frankly a Utopia, the pattern of a city not made with hands and scarcely to be realized among mortal men. But in the *Laws*, that imaginary dialogue between an Athenian, a Spartan and a Cretan — representatives of three great contrasting types of Hellenic culture — which was composed in its author's extreme old age, we get an idea of how Plato would have ruled had a dictatorship ever been put into his hands. There was need for practical guidance at the period when the *Laws* was written (between 360 and 347 B.C.); for, as a result of a series of great wars, the institutions and culture that had made the glory of Greece were breaking down on all hands, while the half-barbaric Macedonian Power was rising to overshadow them, and as with us in our rather similar position to-day the most radical political experiments were

advocated and received a hearing in the general despair with established institutions.

Work of old age as it is, the *Laws* is no work of failing power or senile obstinacy. Plato is still capable of revising his opinions and his mental flexibility is as remarkable as ever. As always he pierces to the core of the problems with which he has to deal; and while he is not afraid to prescribe in minutest detail—amusingly minute detail sometimes—the way of life on which he insists for his ideal city, he sees that these rules and customs must be founded on first principles of thought and conduct, without which any political organization will slowly or quickly fall to pieces. For Plato, now as when he wrote the *Republic*, the bases of man's life in community are two—religion and the preference of spiritual to material goods. In the Tenth Book of the *Laws* is expounded what Prof. Taylor calls

the foundation of all subsequent "natural" theology, the first attempt to demonstrate God's existence and moral government of the world from the known facts of the visible order.

It is a theology more conservative in structure than any

* *The Laws of Plato*. Translated into English by A. E. Taylor. (J. M. Dent & Co. Ltd., London. 10s. 6d. net.)

that is to be deduced from the *Republic*; but in this book Plato is, wherever possible, building on the ideas and institutions he already found to hand among his fellow-Greeks, and his argument for the spiritual origination of the universe, for soul as the source of all movement and life, can be adapted to the modern scientific view of things even more successfully than it could to the materialistic science (based on the speculations of the Ionian philosophers) which prevailed in Plato's own time. The laws of Plato's pattern State will be based on the recognition of the "gods"—on the acknowledgment we may say that the ground of Reality is spiritual—and just because his city is thus bathed in the radiance of religion it will be impossible for its citizens to prefer the accumulation of wealth or the exercise of tyranny and dominion to the pursuit of virtue as the aim of their corporate existence.

Plato is quite ruthless in the measures he propounds to guard his city against growing into one of the large commercial or imperial Powers of which his prophetic soul seems to have foreseen the rise in later ages. The size of the population is to be kept fixed; foreigners are not to be permitted to immigrate and swamp its character; it is to be self-sufficient economically, setting agriculture before industry in honour and importance; not too close (Plato hopes) to the sea, in order that it may be delivered from the temptation to give its soul to commerce

or to seek foreign empire. It is significant that Ruskin was a deep admirer of Plato's political thought with its opposition to a commercial and money-making civilization, and there are undoubted affinities between the imaginary city of the *Laws* and the Utopian land of William Morris's *News from Nowhere*. In the internal regulations he proposes for his State Plato anticipates with uncanny foresight much that has gradually been worked out by subsequent humanity in its historical process. He sees the need of a mixed government, as a safeguard against tyranny whether monarchical or democratical (a truth not the more assailable because the world has lately begun to forget it again), the desirability of separating civil from criminal law, the need of a general system of State education, the wisdom of educating men and women so far as possible in the same way both mentally and physically. In the abundance and dogmatic detail of the regulations he sketches on all these topics he reminds us of that other great Utopist of Humanity, Auguste Comte, and he reminds us of the rigour of that great modern admirer of medievalism in another way.

The *Laws* contains, in Professor Taylor's words,

the first proposal ever made, so far as we know, to treat erroneous beliefs about God and the unseen world as crimes and to erect an inquisition to suppress "heretical pravity".

Although he had seen his teacher Socrates martyred by the Athenians on a charge of impiety, Plato,

though he believed passionately in the importance of right thought, did not believe in the value of free thought. It is worth while to see how it came about that the greatest of philosophers thus made himself the apologist of persecution; indeed it is more than ever necessary to do this to-day when the ideal of intellectual repression has passed from those sections of the Christian Church which have inherited it and still hold it to the champions alike of nationalism and communism. For it is not so easy as often supposed to frame an argument for the toleration of what is believed to be deadly error. As Professor Taylor observes :—

It is difficult, if one grants his premises, that certain beliefs are known to be at once false and morally poisonous, to dispute his conclusion that the State is false to its duty if it allows the poison to be disseminated.

The basis of this whole position is really the denial or failure to recognize the fact that knowledge

is progressive. Evolution, though Greek thinkers before Plato had had an intuition of it, is alien to Plato's thought. He,

like Greek Philosophers in general, does not take *time* very seriously. He is not stirred, as a more modern thinker might be, by the vision of a people's life as an adventure, through an innumerable series of generations, into the unknown with the prospect of unending "progress" towards ends which cannot be discerned in advance.

That is why he hopes to lay down once for all the laws and size and destiny of his ideal city, even to the number of its inhabitants. His whole philosophy is static. And that is why he sees no purpose in free discussion and criticism. If we possess the final Truth, what madness to risk throwing it away! Only if it is believed that time and thought can add to our treasures and deepen our apprehensions can the plea for toleration be sustained. Philosophies that deny novelty are philosophies of the Inquisition.

D. L. MURRAY

CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICS*

[John Middleton Murry approaches from a different angle his favourite topic—the revolutionizing of the present social order through a proper blending of Christian Mysticism and Marxist Monism.—EDS.]

It is well, before discussing Reinhold Niebuhr's new book, to quote the summary of its purpose from the cover. This declares that "the basic conviction which runs through the book" is :—

That the liberal culture of modernity is quite unable to give guidance and direction to a confused generation which faces the disintegration of a social system and the task of building a new one... Adequate spiritual guidance can come only through a more

* *Reflections on the End of an Era.* By Reinhold Niebuhr (Charles Scribner's Sons, London, 10s. 6d.)

radical political orientation and more conservative religious convictions than are comprehended in the culture of our era.

I should be inclined to translate this slightly cumbersome profession into a declaration that in the Western world to-day the only faith that is adequate to guide men is a synthesis between Christianity and Marxism. That is, in fact, what Niebuhr means; and that synthesis he seeks to achieve. In the main, I am in deep agreement with him.

But there is at least a nuance of difference between his convictions and conclusions and my own. I may most quickly approach it by asking the question why he uses the adjective "conservative" for the religious convictions which he desires to see allied with "radical" political views. (It should be said that "radical," in American, means very nearly what we English call "revolutionary".) For, on Niebuhr's own showing, the form of the Christian religion which is most naturally reconcilable with revolutionary political convictions is not Christian orthodoxy at all, but the religion of Jesus. Niebuhr quotes the crucial words of Jesus concerning the divine tolerance to be shown by "the sons of God".

That thus ye may be the sons of your Father: for he maketh his sun to rise upon the evil and the good and his rain to fall upon the just and the unjust.

Nothing, Niebuhr very truly says, "in the conceptions of orthodox and conventional religion approaches this profundity". But

if that is so, and indeed it is so, what becomes of the demand for "more conservative religious convictions"? This religious conviction of Jesus is itself revolutionary in regard to any form of Christianity which finds general acceptance to-day. It looks as though what Niebuhr really desires is a synthesis of more revolutionary political and more revolutionary religious convictions than are customary in the modern world.

And if we examine carefully Niebuhr's various utterances concerning the nature of religion we find that there is nothing particularly "conservative" or "classical" in them. Thus he writes:—

An adequate view of human nature, which does justice to both the heights and depths of human life, and which sees the moral ideal in purest terms and judges historical realities in the light of that ideal is possible only to religion. *For the individual never comes to full self-consciousness, and therefore to a consciousness of what is nature and what is spirit in him, until he strains after the absolute and the unconditioned.* This yearning after the absolute is the very core of religion.

The italic is mine. The statement is profound. But this essential "religion" is not "conservative". In its purest forms it has always been heretical and subversive in respect of Christian orthodoxy.

That Niebuhr does not stress this point appears to be due to the fact that his hold on his own essential conception is precarious. He appears to believe that the antithesis between Nature and Spirit must be dualistic, in spite of the evi-

dent absence of dualism in the crucial saying of Jesus which, he recognises, surpasses for profundity anything in "the conceptions of orthodox or conventional religion". Only intermittently does he appear to grasp the simple but elusive conception that Spirit is the consciousness of Nature; and that for this reason there can be no ultimate conflict between them. The purest realisation of Spirit is inseparable from the most comprehensive realisation of Nature; and the most radical religious *katharsis* is that which attends upon the knowledge that the self is wholly immersed in the flux of animal existence.

No doubt this subtle conception is extremely difficult to express; and quite impossible to express save in the form of paradox. And it might be argued that religious dualism is itself a form of precisely this paradox. But it seems to me that it is a coarse and dangerous form, which always tends to degrade the conception of pure Spirit. For Spirit is "beyond Good and Evil," and can only be contaminated by any attempt to relate it directly to the Good in the world of Good and Evil. It may be, nay it is, the highest Good in the world of Existence to achieve the knowledge of Spirit; but that is precisely because Spirit is high above all the relative moralities of the world of existence, and cannot be involved in them.

In other words, Spirit is essentially the consciousness of Nature, including the self that is conscious, as a monism. Niebuhr is rather

scornful of Monism; and no doubt the facile Monism of modern liberal culture is an appallingly shoddy thing. He says:—

This superficial Monism is discarded whenever ethical passion rises to a pitch where prudence is discarded, or when philosophical and religious penetration discloses life in both its heights and depths.

And that is true; but it is not true to imply, as he does, that this "superficial Monism" is discarded for a Dualism. On the contrary, the Dualism which arises when the striving soul courageously confronts the seeming inertia of Nature, both in the outward world and in itself, though indubitably far nobler than the complacent Monism which it shatters, is itself untenable. The striving soul *cannot* stay there. Nor is it true to say, as Niebuhr does, that "if it is recognised or believed that the moral imagination conceives ideals for life which history in any immediate form or even in any conceivable form is unable to realise, a dualistic world-view will emerge". That condition is merely the beginning, not the end of the soul's journey. The soul cannot acquiesce in the finality of a sheer opposition between its desires and ideals and the nature of things. And it overcomes this fatal opposition not by the facile belief that somewhere, somehow, the nature of things will prove to be in accord with its desires and ideals—the belief which Christian orthodoxy with its dualism of the natural and the supernatural offers it—but by a devastating self-scepticism, a

slow and painful struggle towards the recognition that the desires and ideals of the soul, however noble and precious, are themselves animal desires and animal ideals. At this point, and not before, is the authentic birth of the Spirit. Spirit and what is called Spirituality or "idealism" have no relation with one another. Spirit is the concomitant of the most ruthless realism, applied both to the world and to oneself.

That is not to say that historically the Christian religion has not been for the Western world the husk in which the seed of true Spirit has been enwrapped. Indubitably, it has been. Christian mysticism, which had its perfect expression in Jesus himself, has always been profound as it is beautiful. But mysticism is not, and cannot be dualistic; it represents the conquest of dualism. To Christian mysticism, the doctrines of Marxism present no challenge at all. Marxism, with its revolutionary insistence that the "individual" man is totally involved in a nexus of social relations of which he is unconscious, has nothing to tell the mystic that he does not know essentially already, and nothing that he is not anxious and eager to learn. The man who has experience of the mystical "self-annihilation" does not shrink from it in a new form; on the contrary, it is a law of his being that he should seek it. Nor has the Marxist Monism any terrors for him. For such an one, Marxism is simply a necessary completion of the vision of Spirit. He is in no

danger of surrendering himself to a naïve faith that the social revolution will inaugurate a heaven on earth. It will do no more—and no less—than to give every individual the opportunity of the experiences out of which the religion of the Spirit is born. Nor is there any reason to suppose that Marx himself expected any more. His expectations were modest: the social revolution was for him the gateway into a new phase of human history,—a phase in which the more flagrant of the remediable injustices of modern society would be abolished, but the irremediable ones remain.

On this side, the defect of Niebuhr's book is that it treats of a kind of Marxism which is markedly inferior, in philosophic and religious content, to Marx's own. No doubt, this is fairly widespread; it is popular Marxism as it is generally retailed. But this popular Marxism will be quite deaf to his appeal for an alliance with "conservative" and orthodox Christianity; it is itself the new form taken by popular Christianity. Its millennium is the new form of the millennium of so popular a Christian writing as the Book of Revelation. While for those familiar with what may be called the "esoteric" aspects of Marxism—the philosophic and religious thought of Marx from which his revolutionary attitude directly derived,—the synthesis of Marxism and Christianity is both simpler and subtler than any Niebuhr suggests. The Marxian doctrine of "revolutionary Praxis" is the natural ally of any forthright

Christianity in the world of action; and though a moment may be imagined at which they would conflict, that moment is seen to be very far distant in a society in which, like the English, the political and economic evolution foretold by Marx has been most complete. Niebuhr, being an American, sees the situa-

tion more abstractly than an Englishman can. The Englishman knows that the moral factor is likely to be decisive in this conflict of power, and that the main effort in an effective socialist strategy, in England at any rate, is to ensure that the onus of violence is upon the enemies of Socialism.

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

Outline of Hinduism. By F. HAROLD SMITH, D. D. and

Confucianism and Taoism. By B. S. BONSALE, M. A., D. Lit., B. D.

(Great Religions of the East Series. Edited by Eric S. Waterhouse, M. A., D. D. The Epworth Press, London. 2s. 6d.)

Dr. Waterhouse and his co-workers have undertaken the task of describing God—not their own but other people's! In a series entitled "Great Religions of the East," they are seeking to give accurate descriptions of mighty philosophies. Though other men may not seek Him as they do, it is right and fitting to show "the way in which other faiths have faced the same spiritual issues—a contribution to the work of the Comparative Study of Religion". This is the aim, and a noble one, as set down by Dr. Waterhouse in the Editor's Foreword. Unfortunately there is no mention of the fact that in his mind as well as in that of the writers (if one may judge by the two volumes under review) the Christian God is the only righteous one. Dr. Bonsall sums up Confucianism (p. 76):—

It is obvious that there is much in the religion which has just been described which cannot survive contact with modern knowledge, but surely it is not a great step to the idea of the Christian God from the conception which has been preserved down

the centuries in the Confucian Classics of Shang-ti as a being exercising supreme moral rule.

Confucianism must evolve and reach the higher level of Christianity!*

In the publishers' announcement, as in the volumes, there are signs and omens which make us suspect the real object of the series to be a showing up of the Christian religion as superior to other faiths. It is not meant so much for converting the heathen as for assuring the decreasing numbers of church-going westerners that with Christianity came "The Dawn of Religion". All that went before in philosophy, ethics and metaphysics is made to look if not childish at least immature.

Narrowed down by the idea of a personal God, a being created on the pattern of man, the writers themselves seem unable to grasp the depth, the richness and the glory of eastern metaphysics. The conception of God as an impersonal Law, with the added responsibility it brings to man who finds himself the maker of his own destiny, turning to no outside deity for help or comfort, baffles them completely. Eastern philosophies have helped their people to realise the impersonality of Nature and the sublime grandeur of existence, while the western theologies have kept man tied to the apron strings of One who could at will curse them

Those westerners who desire to get a better idea of Confucianism than this volume gives are advised to study the quotations gathered in the brochure, *The Wisdom of Confucius*. (C. W. Daniel Co., London. 1s.) It contains ethical sayings of the Chinese sage and his disciples.—EDS.

with eternal damnation or bless them with the stupid blissfulness of heaven.

We do not go into the technical details and refute the statements and side remarks which twist and turn the main tenets and the detailed principles of the philosophies. It would really necessitate a whole book to correct adequately the misconceptions, to include the omitted. We are only concerned with the spirit of the books and of the Series, since it is on this point that Dr. Waterhouse lays the greatest stress. With a mask of benevolence and of erudition a distorted picture is presented for the benefit of the western public. The books are written in simple enough style to interest the layman. He will perhaps accept without question those erroneous ideas, feel himself superior, different, way above the low masses of the East, a condition which can hardly bring about the "closer sympathy and respect" of which Dr. Waterhouse so glibly speaks. The keynote of the whole Series is struck in the last paragraph of Dr. Smith's *Outline of Hinduism* (p. 132) :—

..... India still needs the healing touch, and the Christian is convinced that Christ alone can answer the prayers of her best reformers for the eradication of such evils as child-marriage, caste or purdah—but this task it is held, cannot be adequately accomplished by external methods of legislation or social reform, it involves a *moksha* or redemption from Hinduism itself and baptism into Christ, whose service, a spiritual *swaraj*, is perfect freedom, and a new birth of living and acting as becomes the children of God.

What has the Church, with its innumerable denominations, done for the entire West? Let Dr. Smith examine the West with an unbiased mind and maintain if he can that child-marriage is worse than the evil of immorality disclosed by thousands of cases brought before the juvenile courts; that caste is worse than the persecution of the Jew in Germany, the hate of the Negro in America and the coarse and brutal treatment of the dominated blacks and yellows by the fair skinned conqueror; that purdah is a greater evil than the craze for psychological self-expression, especially in night-clubs. Egotism and selfishness, immorality and sensuality, stupidity and cruelty—these prevail in every Christian country. Shall we judge the Christianity of Jesus by these? If 2,000 years of Christian promulgation has not wiped out these and other abominations, how can its acceptance "heal" the Orient? No, the educated oriental knows that the churches have been tried and found wanting; he also knows that the ethics which Jesus taught are the same as those of Lao Tzu and Confucius, Buddha and Krishna, and that the churches themselves have been false to the teachings of Jesus as orthodox Brahmins are false to those of Krishna. My prayer as a born Christian who reveres Jesus and therefore rejects the churches, is: May the East ever remain Heathen and free from the "healing touch" of Dr. Smith.

A FRENCH CHRISTIAN

The Living Religions of the Indian People. By NICOL MACNICOL, D. Litt., D. D. (Student Christian Movement Press, London. 10s. 6d.)

This book consists in an enlarged form of the Wilde lectures delivered by the author at the University of Oxford during 1932-34. As the title indicates, it deals with the religions of India at the present day—Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism, Islam and Christianity. There are thus six parts, and each is subdivided into historical and descriptive sections. The arrangement inevitably involves a good deal of repetition, for no hard and fast line can be drawn between the history of a religion and its spiritual values. The author tries to be impartial, but the old missionary spirit cannot be wholly suppressed. For instance, he says that the Hindu Bhakti is in many of its expressions "a prophecy and a forecast of the Christian revelation". And yet he speaks of his Indian fellow-Christians being dispersed among multitudes of Hindus and Muslims "who are dominated by ancient and *arrogant beliefs*". (The italics are ours).

No writer can ever take a correct view of Hinduism who cannot rise above mere theism. For it is one of the cherished beliefs of a very large majority of Hindus that theism is only a half-way house, that Bhakti leads to Jñana and that the human soul finds its fulfilment and consummation in the Absolute. Even such a popular theistic scripture as the *Gita* is not silent about the higher way. In fact in this great scripture we have a perfect combination of Karma, Bhakti and Jñana. Dr. Macnicol is not unaware of this. Only he ruefully exclaims that it is an uneasy balance between Bhakti and Jñana. And he notes with regret the presence of the same "uneasy balance" in Jñanesvar, Tulsi Das, Ramakrishna Paramahansa, Swami Vivekananda and Rabindranath Tagore.

There is no doubt that Vedantic Monism has been the bed-rock of Hinduism from the Upanishadic period

up to the present day. That is why the Samaj movements of the nineteenth century which owed their origin to the influence of Christian theism have languished and are gasping for breath, while the Ramakrishna movement based on a fuller Hindu religious experience is growing strong, day by day. "We have in this movement," says Dr. Macnicol, "a deeply interesting attempt to adjust the old Vedanta orthodoxy to the needs and the demands of a new world". Thus on his own showing, those who like Keshab Chandra Sen have responded to the call of Christian theism in this land and ignored the deeper truth of Vedanta, have gone to the wall; and the future lies with those, who, while loyal to the intuitions of the Upanishads, are trying their best to inculcate the ideals of devotion and service in the spirit of the *Bhagavad-Gita*.

Dr. Macnicol concludes his survey by saying that India may learn to ignore Jesus Christ, but it will only be "if India abandons her great tradition as a God-intoxicated people". We thank him for the compliment, though we wish that some of our people were more sober about God and "God's own words". We may also assure him that India will never ignore Jesus but give him his due place in the hierarchy of the Teachers of Mankind. An old Buddhist monk is reported to have said, "From all that I have heard of your Jesus Christ he appears to me to be a Bodhisattva and not a Buddha." That is the Hindu view also, though we express it in different terms. Jesus is a great Bhakta rather than a Jñani. He died comparatively young and did not grow to the full stature of his spiritual powers. His ethic was an interim ethic largely shaped by his Jewish apocalyptic visions which never came true. But that does not mean that he has no message for us. The religion that is named after him is strong where Hinduism is weak. It carries the gospel of love and hope to the homes of the oppressed and the down-trodden. It takes the sinner

by the hand and sets him on his feet once more, saying "Go thou and sin no more". It fires the heart of the missionary with courage and zeal so that he is prepared to forsake all to follow his Master. It teaches that all men are equal in the eyes of God, though in practice Islam has been far

more successful in establishing the brotherhood of man. It is these aspects of Christianity that appeal to us and that are really helpful to us in our great task of reconstruction and not the dualistic Christian theism which Dr. Macnicol holds up to our admiration.

D. S. SARMA

The Popular Background to Goethe's Hellenism. By HUMPHREY TREVELYAN. (Longmans, Green; London. 7s. 6d.)

The modern reader interested in the history of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries finds in them certain spiritual movements profoundly akin to those of his own time. But in the very midst of the study of revolutionary and libertarian tendencies he comes upon one of completely different nature: the Hellenistic revival. Not even the fact that its importance was sweeping and profound can stop him from feeling that it is utterly alien to the interests of his own day.

It has estranged many admirers of Goethe, for example, to see how this ruling spirit, after having carefully shaken off the bonds of eighteenth-century formalism and rationalism, could at the very summit of his development have surrendered his freedom and proclaimed his return to classic order. It has made them feel that at the time of its peak his art was suddenly blunted off and forced into a curious archæological formula. The same blunting-off and imitation took place throughout the fine arts of the turn of the century, when even Christian churches were built as Greek temples. Many students of the age, when surveying this reaction, can do little but register baffled disappointment.

Mr. Trevelyan's monograph on the popular background to Goethe's Hellenism does not attempt to fathom the founts from which this æsthetic counter-revolution sprang. Indeed, the author seems to shy off from any dealing with fundamental spiritual

issues and to take refuge in a mass of documents dealing with surface manifestations. But the theory which he presents, through a hundred pages of close scholarship, is one of great historical interest.

Mr. Trevelyan believes that at the time when Goethe—surely the most outstanding exponent of Hellenism in Europe—launched forth upon his study of the Greeks, there was very little knowledge of the Greeks available. Worse than that, the conception which literate people entertained of the nature of Greek life was abysmally confused. The major trends of German thinking in the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries had conspired to eliminate classic interest from the scene. German pietism stood against it; the utilitarianism of the *Aufklärung* could find no use for it; French taste found Homer irrational and vulgar. When Greek was taught in the schools, it was only for the sake of reading the New Testament—which was very bad Greek.

The classic world was no more than a sort of junk-shop for antiquarians; it was not until the middle of the eighteenth century that educators and scholars saw some real life in it. Scholars such as Gesner and Heine, writers such as Herder and Gottsched slowly awakened the German world to regard Hellas not as a dusty museum but as a fount of wisdom. After a century and a half of oblivion, the works of Greek dramatists and philosophers began again to appear in print—although, as Mr. Trevelyan is clear to state—with much confusion of choice and historical treatment.

Not until Winckelmann rediscovered and restated, through a study of ancient works of art, the beauty of Greek man and Greek life, did the revival become fully humanistic. And then the difficulty was that Winckelmann and the others of his belief were so ardent in their revolt against the old hostility to the Greek world that they went too far in their exuberance over it.

The whole Hellenistic revival, then, was cradled, when not in ignorance, then in confusion. Historical scholarship was incomplete and pedantic, and frigid disparagement varied with passionate enthusiasm. Goethe, says Mr. Trevelyan, grew up at the time when the confusion was at its worst; had he been born twenty years later, he might have had the advantage of more knowledge and more clarity. No wonder, then,

that his own Hellenism seems so alien to us; for his picture of Greek man was distorted and to a large degree sentimental.

While the book is a valuable addition to the literature of the movement it does not, of course, clear up its essential mystery. Perhaps the only man who has advanced any credible explanation of it is Spengler, for whom the whole mood of revival served to bear out his thesis of the exhaustion of Western cultural forms and the weary return of modern man, through an age of imitation, to "the womb of the mother". A person who is not Spenglerian in his viewpoint awaits with interest the appearance of a work which will give a less pessimistic and still credible explanation of it.

WILLIAM HARLAN HALE

The Archaeology of Herod's Temple, with a Commentary on the Tractate 'Middôth'. By F. J. HOLLIS, D. D. (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 18s.)

As its title indicates, Dr. Hollis's book is concerned mainly with archaeological and architectural questions regarding Herod's Temple. His aim is to locate the exact site of the Temple, involving as that does a consideration of the early significance of the Sacred Rock and its relation to the Mount of Olives and the Temple Hill, and to determine the extent of the buildings.

The data are obtained primarily from three sources, *viz.*, (1) the works of Josephus, who was born about fifty years after Herod's Temple was completed, (2) the *Middôth*, a Mishnic tractate embodying Jewish traditions regarding the Temple measurements, written about a century after the destruction of the Temple in 70 A. D., and (3) the results of excavations and exam-

ination of the site itself. Unfortunately the evidence from these sources is conflicting, and scholars differ widely as to the conclusions to be drawn from them. Our author is duly critical regarding his sources and it is on a very careful examination of them that he bases his conclusions.

The *Middôth* is given in English translation with a detailed commentary. Besides, there are three Appendices bearing on the *Middôth*, thirty full-page plans and diagrams, a bibliography and an index. The book is one which scholars working in this field cannot afford to ignore. The general reader may complain that the author enters into too much detail, but no work which seeks, by careful study and research, accurately to reconstruct what existed in the past can afford to neglect detail, and the author is to be congratulated on the results of his labours.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

Secret Ways of the Mind. By W. M. KRANEFELDT, Introduction by C. G. Jung. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd., London. 6s.)

Indian Psychology. By JADUNATH SINHA. (Kegan Paul, Trench Trübner and Co., Ltd., London. 15s.)

Secret Ways of the Mind is a book which the layman has been waiting for. It outlines with brilliant success the main contributions made to psychology by Freud, Jung, and Adler. There has been, as we know, a considerable amount of bickering between these leaders. That is not our business; we recognise that each has made a special and personal contribution.

Freud is, and will always remain, the master of sexual analysis. It is to him that we owe our practising recognition of the ocean of unconscious, unsublimated sexual urge that lies behind conscious action. It is to him that we owe our knowledge of the dangers of repression and the means of guarding against it. In short, after Freud sex is no longer a bogey. It can be faced and dealt with.

Jung's contribution is deeper. He is the philosopher, not to say mystic, of the movement. For him, as Mr. Ralph Eaton the brilliant translator says in his excellent Preface, "the facts of sex are not only physiological occurrences. They are also symbols, expressive of some of the deepest feelings that unite man with Nature. The cure for morbid sexuality is not sexual sophistication, or even a scientific knowledge of this morbidity; it lies in a restoration of the psychical overtones of sex buried in the unconscious." Jung's contribution is not a contradiction of Freud or a subtraction, it is an addition. Freud, the great sex doctor, the healer *par excellence* of sexual neurotics, mapped out a field of sexuality lying behind our feelings and acts; but Jung has enormously widened our conception of that field with his "Collective Unconscious," a sort of invisible ocean within everyone which harbours images, memories, mythical

motives, ancient personal wisdom, racial experience. He writes:—

The unconscious is for me not only the receptacle of all unclean spirits and other odious legacies of dead situations.....it is in particular the one ever-living and creative seed-ground which manifests itself through ancient symbolical images and yet by means of these points to a renewal of the spirit.

The difficulty about Freud and Jung for the ordinary person is that one is forced by them into the position of being treated as a patient. One is considered guilty unless otherwise proved innocent. We are not all abnormally neurotic and hysterical and do not want to be treated as such. Jung, of course, has some wonderfully stimulating things to say such as: "If I wish to effect a cure in my patients I am careful to recognise the significance of their Egotism; I would be blind indeed if I did not see in it the true Will of God." But the tendency is to make the reader feel he is in a consulting room. Adler, however, speaks more practically to the normal man. His chief contribution is with children—and therefore possibly his work is more far-reaching than the others.

There is a tendency to believe that these doctors are handmaids of religion, capable of "giving the patient a new set of values, a new religion". This seems to me to be going too far. Western Psychology is still a long way off from true Religion. Indian Psychology, on the other hand, is profoundly wedded to Indian Metaphysics. We are indebted to Professor Jadunath Sinha for making this abundantly clear. He is undertaking the task of making a constructive survey of Indian Psychology. This means that he has to go to Indian Metaphysics and disengage his material from the metaphysical setting of the different schools of the Philosophers—for there is no empirical psychology to be found, Indian psychology being based upon introspection and observation, not upon experiments. Professor Sinha has therefore set himself a formidable task. This is the first volume—dealing only with

Perception. It is a systematic exposition and interpretation of the most fundamental problems of Perception in their logical development and thought. As Perception is the very gateway to

Creative Understanding, the foundation of religious experience, Professor Sinha's first volume is of the greatest interest.

J. S. COLLIS

Orient and Occident. By HANS KOHN (The John Day Company, Inc., New York. \$1.75)

Modern Russia. By CICELY HAMILTON (J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

Friends of humanity like Norman Angell and Gilbert Murray continue to preach the gospel of Internationalism, but men of action lead willing peoples along the path of militant Nationalism. Mr. Kohn points out that the menace to world unity comes not only from a morbid Post-war Europe, but also from the Orient, which has developed "a consciousness of a common political destiny". The Oriental peoples are struggling against absolutism at home, whether native or foreign, and for "recognition of perfect equality of rights with Western nations". They are also determined "to secure an active participation in world economics," not to accept passively the part assigned to them by the West—to serve as a market for Western manufactures and as a depot of raw materials. Western culture no longer rules the Eastern mind, which is now aware of "the insufficiencies and contradictions of European culture," and cognisant of "the depth and beauty of its own inherited culture". All these have sharpened the conflict between Orient and Occident, and there is "opposition to a further advance of occidental power, and a growing attempt almost everywhere to regain the political and economic positions lost two centuries ago". Unless the conflict is warded off, Mr. Kohn apprehends "world-wide combats of unthinkable cruelty". He discerns the mantle of the peace-maker on the shoulders of Bolshevik Russia; for Russia has been a meeting place of

the East and the West, while Bolshevism is leading the re-awakening of the East, and has recognised in 1924 the claims of the Oriental peoples to equal rights in the new world order.

Miss Cicely Hamilton would certainly demur to this exaltation of Bolshevik Russia. In her bright and vivid account of modern Russia, she does not indeed set down aught in malice, but she is nothing if not critical. She disarms criticism, however, by a frank avowal of her political faith: She is a confirmed Individualist, to whom planning is "the negation of freedom". It follows that the failures and the shortcomings of Bolshevik Russia have caught her keen and condemnatory eye. She speaks, however, with warm approval of the Bolshevik doctrine of voluntary motherhood, and is not at all shocked by legalisation of abortion. Her only regret is that "the Marxian experiment was not first tried out in a country the size of the Irish Free State—or better still, in Andorra".

Miss Hamilton is not alone in holding the Marxian experiment in Russia to be a failure, but the case for Planned Economy would be hardly affected by the failure of the Russian experiment. We are emerging from the era of *laissez-faire* and the Sovereign National State into that of economic planning and International co-operation. But neither a world economic plan nor a scheme of International co-operation, towards which men's minds are turning, can afford to ignore the claims of the Eastern peoples to equal rights and equal responsibilities in the New Order. It will be perhaps the task of India to bring about the much needed rapprochement between Orient and Occident.

N. S. SUBBA RAO

Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism. By C. D. BROAD. (The University Press, Cambridge. 2s. 6d.)

The meaning of "ought" in ethical judgments is undoubtedly a very important problem in moral philosophy and that of free will is inseparably associated with it. In this book Dr. Broad gives a penetrating analysis of the notion of "ought". Determinism is defined as "the doctrine that every event is completely determined," while being completely determined is simply negatively interpreted as having zero range of indetermination. Indeterminism is described as the doctrine that some events are not completely determined, in the sense that they have finite range of indetermination. Libertarianism is understood as the doctrine that some voluntary actions have a causal ancestor containing the putting forth of an effort by a self. It will be noticed that this definition of Libertarianism amounts to a definition of self-determinism as it is usually understood.

Dr. Broad seems to advocate Determinism of a particular type. It is a Determinism of mental states as distin-

guished from a Determinism of substances, to borrow a distinction from his earlier work, *Five Types of Ethical Theory*. He vigorously argues against the belief in free will and in the determination of actions by a self, and regards "Reason," "Conscience" and "Moral Law" as "impressive names" which possess no causal efficacy. We find it difficult to go with Dr. Broad in this merely nominalistic interpretation of the guiding forces of our moral conduct. For, if an abiding self has no determining influence on the choice of actions, moral responsibility, we are afraid, will be a mere word without meaning. The doctrine of Karma in Indian Philosophy throws fullest moral responsibility on the agent. The Karma doctrine does not imply Determinism as it is sometimes supposed. For, though its rigorous logic allows no escape from the results of actions once performed, it provides fullest freedom at the initial stage. Moreover, in enjoying the fruits of our past deeds we are, as free agents, winding up the clock-work of our future states. It will thus be seen that the doctrine of Karma presents a unique reconciliation of free will and Determinism.

D. LONDHEEY

These Hurrying Years: An Historical Outline, 1900-1933. By GERALD HEARD. (Chatto & Windus, London. 1s. 6d.)

This is a book, and by an author, extraordinarily characteristic of the present Western "moment". It and he are alike time-conscious to the last degree. The quite arbitrary period of a century, the twentieth from a not very certainly established event, being one-third over (a generation by common estimate), there is nothing for it but a stock taking, a stop-press report to date. So we have an account of these past thirty-three years, in four parts, each of which is in three sections. The parts are time-dated: 1900-1910, 1910-1919, 1919-1929, and 1929-1933. The sections present in

turn first "The Outward Scene," a panoramic account of actual events of the years under review; next "The Forces Behind" which come to the surface in the period, as the Labour Movement and Women's Suffrage Campaign in 1900-1910, and in all such general activities as Research, Discovery, Literature, Philosophy and Hygiene; and last "The Trend," summarising "the profound subconscious drive" impelling these forces and events. It is all quite ably if at times rather sketchily done. Mr. Heard has real, even rare, intelligence, a penetrating eye for the essential. He "sees through" both individual and social pretences and pretensions. He contrives, in no small degree, to see through the limited "Western outlook" which was

the fruit of nineteenth-century scientific dogmatism. But it is, really, his attitude here which makes him so very characteristic. It is his book's continuous theme, summed up in his conclusion, that all our time is a phase of a new development of consciousness. First, the suggestion seems to be, men gain through science their extraordinary knowledge of the exterior universe. Next, in the fruits of psychology and psycho-analysis, they move forward in self-knowledge. But a third step is needed, to bring the two knowledges into a single and true relation, in "the discovery that not only is our most detached observation of the outer world an act of creative selection but that that selection is made because of and through a fundamental relatedness between inner consciousness and outward experience," in the understand-

ing that finally outer knowledge rests, is dependent, upon inner knowledge, that the two truly are one, and in a sense much more than merely individually subjective.

Just so—may we not all say: Agreed! But what is so typical in Mr. Heard of the Western intellectual is his instinctive effort to present this essentially and profoundly religious and mystical realisation in purely secular terms. More, he totally neglects the influence of Eastern thought and of its Western advocates in furthering—perhaps initiating—this awakening of wider consciousness. Nevertheless, his book is genuinely both instructive and illuminating, not least as a study of current world troubles as "all projections of inner conflict striving to avoid the crisis that must be fought out in itself".

GEOFFREY WEST

Essentials in the Development of Religion: A Philosophic and Psychological Study. By J. E. TURNER, Ph. D. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

This is a work on general metaphysics, dealing with different aspects of human experience, and especially with the problems of selfhood, good and evil, immortality and God, which are particularly connected with man's religious consciousness. The argument proceeds on familiar Hegelian lines and is maintained throughout at a high level.

The main emphasis seems to be on the fact that religion is inherent in human nature. All mystical elements appear to be eliminated from religion when it is defined as "man's total response to his *entire* realised universe" (p. 54). Our mind no doubt always works as a whole but ordinarily one of its aspects, knowing, feeling or willing, is explicit while the others remain implicit. But when, on comparatively rare occasions, these activities of the mind become simultaneously explicit and are "inextricably fused together into a completely unified experience, some

mode of religion arises and persists so long as unity is unimpaired" (p. 43).

I doubt whether this definition will be acceptable to all religious-minded people. It presupposes that there is only one type of spirituality, implying the simultaneous presence of knowing, feeling and willing. Cannot each of these modes of consciousness claim a religion of its own, *viz.*, that of *jñāna*, *bhakti* or *karma*? Moreover, though religion is a characteristic response to some reality, should that reality be one's whole universe so that the world of sense and thought cannot be excluded from it? In religion one often turns away from the world to some reality which, though highest in one's own estimation, need not be all-inclusive.

The book is interspersed with apposite quotations from contemporary writers on science and philosophy.

The work on the whole is a valuable addition to philosophical literature and although it may not convince the skeptic on many points, it will surely strengthen the beliefs of those who are already in sympathy with idealistic positions.

RASVIHARI DAS

The Great Design: Order and Progress in Nature. Edited by FRANCES MASON, with an introduction by Sir J. Arthur Thomson. (Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

It is no business of science to answer ultimate questions. Science is concerned with the observation of phenomena. Her first aim is accuracy in observation: her second the welding of accurate observations, as far as this may be possible, into a self-consistent whole. She vouchsafes no replies to the *Whys?* and *Wherefores?* which the human mind so persistently asks. But—and it is a rather important but—she undoubtedly points the way. She cannot rid herself of metaphysical implications.

And a few decades ago, the way seemed clear. Science was held to point most conclusively to the remarkable metaphysical system known as "materialism". The Cosmos was composed of material particles whose behaviour was ruled by an iron necessity. Given the positions, masses and motions of all these particles at any point in the history of the universe, and it was theoretically possible to predict the whole of its history. A certain arrangement of these particles had once occurred. How, it was not clear, but chance was invoked, although the concept of chance ran absolutely contrary to that of natural law as envisaged by the theory. And from this chance arrangement, by the operation of necessity, arose all the varied phenomena of life and inanimate nature.

During the past few years, a revolution has taken place. Modern physics has exposed the fundamental error of the older physics on which materialism was largely based, namely the attempt to explain the behaviour of individuals in terms of that of groups. The realm of group behaviour is that of natural law, or of seeming necessity. In the realm of individual behaviour chance

or freedom finds a place. Mechanical models have been forced to give place to mathematical equations.

The volume under review contains a number of essays by prominent men of science indicative of the metaphysical implications of modern science. As knowledge grows, so does the consciousness of purpose and design become more definite and secure.

I select Professor Hans Driesch's essay "The Breakdown of Materialism," for especial mention, because his biological researches have led him to conclusions so thoroughly in harmony with those of modern mathematical physics. "The structure of the world," he writes, "is decidedly *dualistic*. There is, as far as we *know*, plan and absence of plan or, to put it shortly, *design mingled with contingency*."

This dualism of design and contingency permeates all nature. There is design in relation to the whole; but every constituent element, whether electron, germ-cell or the entity which we call the soul of man, possesses a measure of freedom. Such a concept gives life a meaning which no other concept can do. There is a plan underlying the universe, a plan towards whose achievement we can co-operate, or which, if we so please, we can endeavour to frustrate.

The question of immortality is one on which Professor Driesch touches. As he points out, with the breakdown of materialism, this, together with the problem of free will, again becomes "discussable". Indeed, these are problems of the greatest importance and interest. Professor Driesch refers to *Psychical Research*, the youngest of all the sciences, which he says he appreciates and esteems very highly. "*Here and only here*," he adds, "there may some day be solved what might be called the problem of all problems, the question of immortality."

H. S. REDGROVE

FROM LONDON

With the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference again in session at Geneva, and the slowly increasing awareness in the public mind that vital issues are at stake, I feel that the subject of Peace again demands our first attention. Could there, indeed, be any social and political question of greater urgency at the present time? This, not because we fear a European war in the course of the next five or ten years, but because unless we can arrive at some means of determining the race for armaments, we shall be postponing the hope of release from the present economic stringency and be laying up the material that will inevitably lead, sooner or later, to the destruction of our present civilisation. Whether or no that destruction might eventually lead to a world of new thought and greater spiritual progress, is not a question for us to consider at the present moment. In this, at least, we may follow the words of Arjuna in the first book of the *Bhagavad-Gita** :—

How can we be happy if we slay our own kin? These would I not kill though they slay me . . . even for the kingdom of the three worlds, much less for this earth.

I have already written in *THE ARYAN PATH* of the obstacles and restrictions that beset the activities of the League of Nations; but a short further analysis is demanded by recent events. There can be no sort of question that the most

obvious impediment which still stands between us and the most tentative disarmament convention is provided by the mutual distrust and animosity of France and Germany. No further evidence of the truth of that assertion is needed than the report of the proceedings of the Conference to be found in *The Times* for May 31st. For after Sir John Simon, the British representative, had pointed out that Germany had made a step towards a possible convention, M. Barthou, in a brilliant but destructive speech, aspersed Germany's bona fides and cited the testimony of their last budget, which contained an admitted increase in armaments of over two thousand million francs.

Nevertheless, if this is for the general public the most obvious impediment, there is another of still greater weight which never appears in the public press. If I were to state this quite simply by saying that the great financial interests of Europe do not favour peace propaganda, I should run the risk of being misunderstood. That is certainly a very important factor. Very great wealth is sunk in private firms for the manufacture of armaments, and other huge financial interests would profit (temporarily), by an outbreak of war. But that fact must not be taken alone. What we must consider also is the gross inertia and restric-

* Charles Johnston's translation.

tions of the minds of those whose chief interest is the amassing of wealth. It is our unhappy custom to speak of such minds as being shrewd and practical and to attribute the worldly success of the millionaire to his gift for foresight. The truth is that the "shrewdness" is confined to the mere business of money-making,—often oblivious of the ruin and misery brought on hundreds of thousands of small speculators and investors*—and the "foresight" is limited to the anticipation of future profit, without regard to such larger issues as the possible destruction of a civilisation.

And we must not forget in this connection that it is the power of wealth which dominates and guides both statesmanship and politics, a power that is essentially conservative, self-seeking and, when the larger issues are taken into account, short-sighted. This is not to say that the true rulers of Europe and America are a group of financiers, but that they are the mass of those—a small numerical minority of the whole population—who, because they have the same interests and ambitions as the successful money-makers, think as they do in matters of International Policy.

This, I believe, is the true obstructive influence at Geneva, unrecognised by the general public and not even consciously in the minds of the majority of our politicians and statesmen. Wherefore

the outward parade of suggestion and counter-suggestion for a Disarmament Convention is carried on from month to month and year to year in order to "save the faces" of each country's delegates, but without any sincere belief in the various proposals being accepted and, worse still, without any real desire for peace. In my last letter, I wrote of the possibility that France might rise in a socialist revolution against the "capitalists who rule her from Paris. In my opinion, such a revolution would be conducive to the spiritual health of Europe.

Let us next consider, however, what is the chief force that puts a brake on this evil influence of wealth as the ruler of our destinies. This force is not, unhappily, an admirable one. It is not an uplifting spiritual power, inspired by faith and love, but that paralysing, restrictive force which we know as Fear. Is it not, for instance, fear that has driven Russia once more to make advances to the League? Is she not becoming increasingly conscious of the menace to her eastern borders provided by the establishment of the industrious, unethical Japanese in the heart of China? If Germany comes back into the League, will it be because she has abandoned her ambition to conquer Europe and desires peace, or because she is afraid of the jealous nations that encircle her, and is playing for time to perfect her own plans? In a

* "What work is begun without regard for consequences, for the loss it may cause, or injury to others, or waste of Power, through delusion, this is declared to be of Darkness." *Bhagavad-Gita*, Book XVIII.

word, is not one of our best arguments for peace the threat of all the horrors and disasters of war?

This is not a pleasant deduction. In the spiritual life, fear is an enemy that must be conquered, and there can be no advance in self-development until that victory is won. And since the spirit of a nation has a close analogy with that of an individual, we can never hope for any real progress towards international sympathy and understanding as a result of peace founded on so base a motive. But the dread of war haunting the thoughts of a large body of people, may serve a purpose by giving us more time to preach the gospel of international fellowship, and much is being done in that direction. There is, at the present time, a recognisably larger proportion of people who are able to think sanely on this subject.

Nevertheless, returning to that point of playing for time almost at any cost, we know so well that if a colourable pretext for war were found in the course of the next few years—such a pretext as the threat of German ambition, for example,—an enormous number of people who are now pacifist in principle would be submerged by a wave of patriotic emotion. They would not lack stimuli. The Press would see to that, because the Press is controlled by those financial interests which, as I have already said, are far-sighted enough to see a future profit, and short-sighted enough to look no further. Wherefore, even though we use the unworthy instrument of fear, we must do all

in our power to postpone any serious issue.

As an illustration of clear thinking and, at the same time, of its futility in the modern, money-ruled world, I may cite a recent suggestion put forward at a Congress of the Labour Party. This was that no Government should be permitted to declare war on another until it had taken a plebiscite of the whole adult population. Further it was suggested that every voter in favour of war should, *ipso facto*, become liable for active service, or to an immediate tax up to 25% of his or her income for the cost of maintenance. This suggestion is eminently reasonable. If the majority of the people desired war, the burden of it should be borne by them, rather than by the minority who voted for peace. Also, it may be safely inferred, the realisation of the price to be paid would considerably influence the nature of the vote. Much patriotic fervour would be checked by the consideration that it would entail an immediate personal penalty. No proposition could be more just and logical, yet we know that it has no chance whatever of becoming law, nor even of being made the issue of an election. Is it any wonder that, watching the political issues without prejudice, we realise that their surface values have little or no relation to their true intention? We are ruled ultimately by the agents of Mammon and those who hold the same faith.

One other little side light on this great problem has been provided by the reasonable suggestion that

we should cease to provide Bolivia and Paraguay with the munitions of war, all of which have to be imported. America took the lead in this connection, and the first reply was from Paraguay to the effect that if their munitions were cut off, they would cease to abide by the laws of "*civilised warfare*," a description that may give us food for thought. That threat has since been withdrawn; it was, in any case, a double-edged sword; but at present no fervent response has been made to the proposal,—nor will be, unless, as is quite possible, the armament firms begin to suspect that they are making a bad debt. It is still fresh in our memories that the suggested embargo on British ammunition to Japan was never carried into effect. Such gestures as these serve further to remind us that the spirit is sometimes willing but that it has no chance of practical expression in the national life.

In conclusion, I need hardly, in addressing readers of THE ARYAN PATH, underline the necessity for serving the Cause of Peace, in the only way it can be truly served, by inculcating the principle of Universal Brotherhood, by recognising and continually practising the truth that in every human being resides the spirit of which we are ourselves a member, and that every effort towards unity is positive and good, every effort towards separation, negative and an aspect of evil.

I had recently an opportunity to realise something of the effect that this spirit of brotherhood may

have upon a large audience. The meeting in question was at the Dome in Brighton, once the riding school of King George IV, a hall capable of accommodating 3,000 people, and on this occasion completely filled. The attraction was the names of two speakers, who had come to address this large audience on the text "Peace in Our Time". Both of them have a great reputation in England, as teachers who have sincerely endeavoured to put the principles of Christ into practice, to work by love and understanding without regard to such personal rewards as power, popularity or even gratitude. One of them was Dr. Maude Royden, a woman minister who has her own, slightly unorthodox, Church in London. The other was "Dick" Sheppard, for many years Vicar of St. Martin's, for a short time Dean of Canterbury, and at present not attached to any Church of England office. Both of them spoke very well, and were enthusiastically received, not for the dramatic effects they obtained, since neither of them is a great orator, but because all they said was inspired by the spirit of toleration and a sincere love for humanity of every degree.

Now what I wish to emphasize by citing this instance is the fact that the reputation of these two teachers was such that there was not enough room in the Dome for all those who wanted to hear them, although so notable a political figure as that of Sir John Simon had failed to fill the same building a few weeks earlier. What then, we must ask, was the

attraction exercised by the names of Dr. Royden and Dr. Sheppard? They are not, as I have said, particularly eloquent speakers. They have no new and exciting doctrine to preach. They have done nothing dramatic or unusual of the kind that would make them famous in the Press. I can find but one answer to my own rhetorical question. These two people stand

for that one aspect of universal truth, which is the basis of all true religions, the preaching and, more important still, the practice of love towards all men. And whenever a man or a woman is inspired by that spirit to such a degree as to regard all objects other than the service of humanity as worthless, he or she will become a power to move the crowd.

J. D. BERESFORD

CORRESPONDENCE

WAS BUDDHA A HINDU?

No! answers the orthodox zealous exponent of traditional Hindu thought. This literalist section which unfortunately is numerous in Hindu society resorts to a type of argument based on superficial study and thought. They tell us that Buddha attacked the three essential features of Hinduism, namely, (a) the Pantheon of Gods, (b) the scheme of rituals and (c) the rigid inflexible caste system. No catholic Hindu would admit that the above mentioned three principles constitute the basic essence of Hinduism. To a philosophically minded Hindu it would seem quite alien to the central teaching of Hinduism to worship a hundred thousand gods. The division of mankind into privileged and unprivileged classes and castes revolts the conscience of a humanitarian Hindu. The Sages of the Upanishads have declared that ritualism is futile if unlit by knowledge. The orthodox Hindu who professes to be the sole trustee of the Hindu scriptures, with exclusive authority for their interpretation, would hesitate to regard the greatest Hindu of modern times, Mahatma Gandhi, as being within the pale of Hinduism.

On the other hand, Western interpreters have concentrated on the negative implications of Buddha's teaching, which has led them to the

absolute conclusion that Buddha preached an arid and barren Nihilism. Some of the interpreters, among them Dr. Keith, seem to think that Buddha's philosophy was merely an unreasoned agnosticism. Even Mrs. Rhys-Davids until the other day strangely enough held the negative view common to her Western compeers. To reduce Buddha's teaching to mere agnosticism is to misconceive totally his true philosophical stature. Agnosticism is only surface deep. The great agnostics and sceptics of the world of thought have only used it as a method. "Descartes passed from a doubt to a dogma, Balfour defended the philosophical doubt only to lay the foundation of belief." Nāstika-Vāda (atheism) was looked upon as a Darsana and it was called a Samika Darsana by the Hindu philosophers.

Having ruled out all these interpretations we are obliged to resort to the positive interpretation of Buddha's teaching. If Buddha was agnostic were not the Upanishads agnostic? The Upanishadic doctrine of Brahman in negative terms is an illustration of the failure of the human mind to grasp a higher Reality which has to be intuited. What Buddha denied was not the fundamental Sat. He denied only the false view of the surface self.

The principal weapon of Buddha,

like that of the Upanishadic Sages, was an imperious intuition of the self-prolonged meditation on life and its problems—not the weapon of barren logic. Where Buddha pleaded for a suspension of judgment, his orthodox interpreters recklessly repudiated. Scientific students of Advaita would find much in common between Buddha and Sankara. Once we understand Buddha in this light we can without any damage to Advaitic thought call Sankara not a *Prachhanna* Buddha but a *Prakata* Buddha, a popular Buddha. The silence of Buddha is nothing but the *Anirvachaniya* of Sankara renamed. Sankara when pestered by a disciple constantly about the nature of Brahman said *Upasantoyam Brahma* (Silence is Brahman). So what Sankara castigated in his commentary on the Vedanta Sutras was only the misunderstood Buddhism of his day. Buddha did affirm the central Reality of the Absolute and denied only the empirical self. Buddha was a Hindu. He was a Hindu Protestant.

Madras

P. NAGA RAJA RAO

WHO WILL EXPLAIN?

I wonder if any reader of THE ARYAN PATH can offer an explanation of, or a parallel to, an experience which has often been mine, especially when I was younger. It is a state of consciousness into which I would sometimes find myself plunged quite suddenly—much as if I had fallen unawares into deep water, except that I could not float up to the surface again. The principal symptom is that all the sensorial perceptions seem to reach my consciousness with a considerable delay, and, as it were, at secondhand. If people are talking around me, I think "Aha! A has said this or that, and (I go on mentally noting) B has replied, but he must have said more than I can remember; and now C is speaking, but I shall never be able to keep time with them!" Sight seems to become restricted to a quite narrow field; I feel as if I must choose if I shall see

this or that object, just as I would have to focus a camera in this or that direction. The outside world then looks very much like a picture on the screen, much too quick and too intricate to be all taken in. My own words or actions I perceive with the same remoteness, as if they came from somebody else. The internal feeling we normally have of the weight of the body, tension of the muscles, etc., is completely numbed, so that I am in dread of losing my balance. Unfortunately I was never able to experiment what would have been the exact effect of a blow, a burn, or a pin-prick. I cannot understand how I am still standing; if I decide to move in a certain direction, and to a certain spot, I seem to get there by just wishing it (as sometimes in dreams), not by muscular action. This sort of trance usually lasts a few minutes and ceases as suddenly as it came on. It is probably some variety of sleep. I always found it decidedly unpleasant when it occurred at school, or in the army, or in crowded streets. The first instance I can remember, and quite vividly, happened when I was 14 or 15. I have never been able to connect it with digestion, or hunger, or fatigue, or any bodily or mental circumstances whatever. At such times I was always in the best of health, I had not smoked or taken tea or coffee, much less wine. I have not met anyone who has experienced the same phenomena. To be sure, there is nothing sensational about them but there may be as much to learn from them as from more spectacular abnormalities.

And by the way, is it not to be regretted that so-called "psychic" phenomena are always approached in their most intense and extraordinary forms, when the facts are probably far more intricate than we can imagine? A quite elementary abnormal, or super-normal phenomenon, however inconspicuous it may seem, would probably better repay earnest research.

Paris

J. B.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“----- ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS.

In the midst of the strife and tumult of the world, amongst articles of accusation and denunciation, predicting the downfall of common sense and morality, it is refreshing and delightful to come across an article like that of M. Guillet entitled “L'Elite de la Jeunesse en 1934” (*Revue des Deux Mondes*—June). M. Guillet is the director of L'Ecole Central, an engineering school, and is therefore in daily contact with youths of 19 to 23. He analyses impartially their qualities and faults, their tendencies and aspirations. Although they are more careless in their drawing-room manners and in their dress, are not so well versed in the art of writing, especially spelling, youth shows on the whole,

more simplicity, less bluff, less arrogance than thirty-five years ago. It is conscious of its worth, but never boasts of it. Less sensuous and more sportive, we insist on this last point, there are far fewer of those “liaisons” which cast a dark shadow over a whole life. Youth is frank, straightforward, it doesn't know how to lie. Very independent and, curiously enough, it can be guided, but it demands a great deal from those who are to command. It wants to come together, to help, to co-operate, to follow examples, but these must be clear, precise, pure. . . . Social spirit is very marked. . . . They are passionately interested in movements which will teach them to do good. . . . They turn to the poor to give them bread, clothing and consolation. . . . Groups cheer

the slums, bettering them, cleaning them, decorating them.

And all these young people want to marry young, to have a family, children, a home.

In two maxims, M. Guillet expresses all that the elders are trying to teach and that youth accepts, and more important, practises (p. 640) :

La vie ne vaut que par le bien que l'on peut faire en la traversant.

On n'est riche que de ce que l'on donne.

How is it then that the evil psychic after-effects of war are subsiding first in France, the land which suffered most next to Belgium? Is it because of the culture of many long years which forms part of the very atmosphere of France? There is a great deal of talk about Germanic culture, and because it is so much shouted about people are apt to overlook the more powerful and more refining influence of France. George Slocombe in his book just published, *The Heart of France*, says :—

I am convinced that France is the most highly civilized country in the world. Other nations may enjoy a greater literacy, a more enlightened Press, a system of education which reaches to the nethermost layers of the population. Other countries may enjoy a greater illusion of public liberty. . . . But nowhere in the world is the spirit of man more free, nowhere are men more conscious of their own rights and of the rights of others.

Some types of dreams escape the ordinary classifications of psychology, since they bring to light the powers latent in man and prove the existence in him of a soul whose knowledge and capacity are far above the ordinary reasoning consciousness. A case in point is noted in *The Observer* (6th May). Professor C. V. Boys, past president of the Physical Society of London, began to dream one night of the construction of an extraordinarily intricate machine for measuring the value of the gas used for domestic purposes, and on awakening started out at six o'clock in the morning to objectivise the dream. The result is a machine which is claimed to be fool-proof, designed to last forever, which costs little and needs only one gallon of water per year as against 300,000 gallons required by old-time machines.

"But don't let me be mixed up with any of this absurd spook nonsense," said the professor, yesterday. "It is nothing more than having the mind saturated with a subject and then — if your mind is on it — thoughts come to you, not by direct intention, but out of the sky, out of nowhere.

"At the time I had not been considering such a machine at all. I had been thinking for twenty years about the problem — but what came into my head in the dream was entirely apart from anything I had contemplated. Few can appreciate the mathematical processes that followed. They were so intricate that if I had not been inspired and impelled by that phenomenon I don't think I should ever have got through it at all. I think it is far more perfect than anything that is known in this direction."

Analogous cases are known of scientists who, after a long period of steady concentration on a problem, found the answer in a flash of intuition, not necessarily in dream, but certainly at a moment when the conscious mind was not occupied with the problem. What, then, is this "accurate discerning power" that leaps to the goal instead of slowly pacing out the distance? It is no explanation to say that the idea came out of the blue. Why should the process of conscious concentration only prepare the way? Make steady that aspect of the mind commonly called "wandering" so that it affords, in place of its usual protean modifications, a smooth surface, able to reflect the almost omniscient ideation of the spiritual mind. The passional mind, called in Hindu psychology Kama-Manas, being stilled, and mere intellect, Manas *per se*, allowed to drop into abeyance, the highest power of intellection, Buddhi-Manas, is able to manifest.

But few people have such dreams, since the memory of them depends on the clarification of the brain. Few people in their waking state feel arising spontaneously within them the clear insight of the highest mind. They are too much caught up in their own limited personal identity to be able to draw upon that inner storehouse of knowledge. By daily practice mind must be freed from passions and prides and trivialities and the brain made porous to the influences and the impacts of the spiritual-soul.



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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ON REVELATION

Christian theology has rendered numerous disservices to organized Christianity. Two major beliefs which it has imposed on the "faithful" are—(a) an anthropomorphized Personal God, and (b) His only begotten Son, the only Saviour. These two are philosophically absurd and ethically immoral propositions, and from them other false notions have sprung. Among these is the concept of Revelation, which has further estranged Christendom from the rest of the world. These impositions have produced their own reaction. With the spread of knowledge the concept that the Holy Bible is the word of God went overboard first; though the indirect influence of this view of the Bible persists, narrowing the lives of large numbers, still the claim that the Bible contains all truth and all wisdom would be made nowadays only by an hallucinated fanatic. But the reaction against these absurdities has been

extreme. Atheism and crass materialism would never have arisen with the birth and growth of modern science but for the behaviour and teachings of the churches—especially of the Roman Catholic. The swing from blind belief in religion to questioning and doubting materialism was not only natural; it was healthy and very necessary. But in the process unfortunately disappeared the truth underlying the words God, Saviour, Revelation. Not only was the bog of a Personal God dethroned but with it went the concept of Deity itself; not only was the scapegoat Saviour rejected but the very idea of salvation; not only was the stupid interpretation of Revelation brushed aside, but the very examination of what revelation might imply. And now before modern science has had time or opportunity to restore to knowledge the truths of these ideas, a world civilization is threatened and

in the confusion of the aftermath of the War some men of science themselves seem to be losing their independence and integrity and are being drawn churchwards—to justify to mortals not the ways of God but those of popes and bishops!

Nowadays it is recognized that the Christianity of Jesus is different from that of the churches; but it is not so fully recognized that the Christianity of the churches is not even according to the correct understanding of the scientific, philosophical and ethical propositions to be found in the Bible and cognate literature. These propositions, though corrupted, are themselves evolutions of earlier ones. The “higher criticism” of the Bible has done immense service to the cause of Truth but it, like modern science, has thrown away the grain with the chaff, and in rejecting the Bible as the revealed word of God, it also rejected a careful examination of what revelation means and implies.

Our esteemed contributor, Professor Hiriyan, offers in the article which follows the Hindu conception of revelation. The Vedas are revelation, not in the ordinary church sense, but in the peculiar sense explained by him. The truths of the Vedas are “acknowledged by the standard mind of the community” because they form a record, consistent in itself, which is made up of the visions of many sages whose reports do not conflict like those of the mediums and the psychics. These seers were scientists. Modern science applies

the method of checking and rechecking its own theories before they are accepted as final truths. Thus also did the ancient Seers. The difference between them and modern observers is that the universe of the former was vaster and grander, and their aids to observation were not only mechanical apparatus but unfolded vision—sight so clear that it penetrated to the soul of things and hearing so keen that it heard the chants of the shining gods. It is for this reason that these ancient scientists were called the “Seers of the Mantras” — holy words, aphorisms and hymns. Nevertheless the method of the Sruti is operating among the scientists, who have already a Sruti or Revelation of their own; no student of science questions that the earth is round or that it revolves round the sun; that water is H_2O or that CO_2 is what man breathes out. But by no means is that Sruti an elaborate one. The record of thoroughly established scientific facts is available in manuals and encyclopædias; the story of how they came to be so established is also available. But what about the record of religious experiences and of the facts of the religious science of the soul? Religion long ago passed out of the realm of science into that of belief and it is most difficult for the keen and impartial thinker of to-day even to consider the possibility that Religion may of yore have been science, the facts of which were verified once and are verifiable now. If we do not restrict Prof. Hiriyan's interpretation of re-

velation to the Vedas alone, but apply it to other similar records we shall serve the cause of religious culture constructively while we deal a blow to religious exclusiveness. His explanations deserve consideration at the hands of impartial students of comparative religion. Let them look for

the consistent record of facts and truths taught by the Sages and Seers of ancient civilizations—such as those of China, Egypt and India. If the modern scholar weighs such evidence, he will be able to present to the Western world the true view of Revelation.

TYPES OF INDIAN THOUGHT

[Professor M. Hiriyanna is a great scholar and thinker. In reviewing his *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* in THE ARYAN PATH for April, 1933, Max Plowman described him as "a wise and humane scholar whose thesis is also his deepest personal concern".—EDS.]

It is well known that there are several schools of Indian philosophy which differ from one another in some essential respect or other. If we judge from their attitude towards what is of fundamental importance in philosophy, viz., the relation of common experience to reality, they may all be classed under a very few heads. It is proposed to indicate this classification here, and to point out the difference in the general outlook upon reality which it brings to light in Indian thought.

I

It would be best to start with the theories that stand nearest to the common-sense notion of the world and may be grouped together as empiricism. According to current accounts of Indian philosophy the sole representative of this type

of thought is the materialistic system of Charvaka. It acknowledges only one *pramāṇa* or "source of knowledge," viz., sense-perception, and discards all the others, including inference. Since it denies the reality of whatever is not perceivable, it may be characterized as pure sensationalism. It may seem to be too superficial a view of reality to be held by any serious thinker; but there is no reason to question its historicity, especially as parallels to it are not lacking in the evolution of thought elsewhere. The doctrine, however, in the form in which it is recounted in extant Sanskrit works, is little more than a caricature because it appears there not merely as sensationalism but also as bare unqualified sensualism. It is supposed, for example, to have held forth self-indulgence as the sup-

reme aim of life. "One should live happily so long as he lives, and it matters not what means he adopts to that end." Its teaching besides, as pointed out long ago by Max Müller, is for the most part negative and suggests that, while its criticisms of other doctrines have survived, its constructive thought has for one reason or another all but disappeared. Though this is the only kind of empiricism now commonly recognised there is evidence, scattered here and there in old works, of the prevalence at one time of several other forms of it. The one, to which we have just referred and which refused to recognise anything other than matter, explained what is called "soul" as not an entity by itself but only a function or property of the physical body. There was another which identified the soul with *prāṇa* or the vital principle conceived as distinct from, and higher than, matter—thus avoiding the error, into which the previous school had fallen, of reducing "all nature's facts to the dead level of a single type". Not all Charvakas again appear to have repudiated reason, for we find references to a third school which, while denying the spiritual world like the other two, admitted inference* in general as a legitimate channel of valid knowledge and rejected only a certain variety of it, *viz.*, inference by analogy which was made use of by some to establish such important points as the existence of God and the survival of the self. The

exponents of this "higher materialism," as we may term it, would, in their refusal to accept—on the basis of mere analogy—that we can jump from a knowledge of the sensuous to that of the supersensuous, secure the whole-hearted support of many a modern rationalist. These and other similar schools represent the first type of Indian thought.

II

To suppose that the senses and reason are the only sources of knowledge is to restrict reality to what is ordinarily experienced by us. But such a restriction of the realm of being does not satisfy all. Though the human mind may not be definitely aware of what is beyond, we cannot say that it is altogether unconscious of it. The very statement that common experience exhausts reality implies, by placing a limit on it, that the mind has travelled beyond that limit. Our reach, as it is said, exceeds our grasp here. But it is obviously futile to postulate such a transcendental realm as merely an unknowable something. There is also need for an appropriate *pramāṇa* whereby we may know it or, at least, that part of it which is of significance to us. This *pramāṇa* is usually termed *yogi-pratyakṣa* or the intuitive vision of the *yogin*. It is conceived as fitted not merely to disclose extra-empirical facts to us, but also to make them known immediately. That is the reason why it is designated *pratyakṣa*,

* See *c.g.*, *Nyāya-manjarī*, p. 124.

although it does not involve the activity of the external senses and is therefore very different from common perception. This intuitive power is found in all men, but only in a latent form; and a good deal of practice in meditation is required to develop it properly. Meditative practice, however, is not the only condition for its development; a cleansing of the inner life is also needed. It means that until "the busy intellect and striving desires" are stilled, one cannot rise higher than mere reflective thought. The successful cultivation of this power is consequently not possible for ordinary men, and whatever knowledge they possess of truths attained through it is derived from others and is mediate. The association of moral purity with what is essentially a logical means of knowledge indicates, we may observe by the way, the close connection that has always subsisted in India between religion and philosophy. The schools that recognise this new source of knowledge form the second type of Indian thought. They are generally realistic; and we may take the Nyāya, the Sāṅkhya and Jainism as examples of it.

III

For a knowledge of the world which transcends common experience, we depend, according to the above view, entirely upon the authority of individual insight. In this appeal to the experience of

an individual, others see a risk; for, in their view, nobody's private insight can carry with it the guarantee of its own validity. As Kumārila has remarked* in discussing a similar topic, a vision that has unfolded itself to but one single person may after all be an illusion. This is not to impugn the good faith of the *yogin*; it only means that he might be self-deluded. To avoid this possible defect of subjectivity, the opponents of the above view postulate in the place of *yogic* perception another *pramāṇa*, viz., *śruti* or revelation—otherwise known as the Veda—which, it is claimed, will not mislead us because it has emanated from God or is supernatural in some other sense. But belief in such a knowledge may appear to be mere dogmatism, and it is therefore necessary to find out what in reality is signified by this term. As commonly explained, the *śruti* is immemorial tradition which, because its origin cannot be traced to any mortal being, is looked upon as supernatural in its character. There is the implication here, as contrasted with the previous view, that the realm of transcendental being is not directly accessible to man, however gifted he may be. But, theological considerations apart, it must be admitted that the truths for which the Veda stands, whether or not it is now possible to ascribe them to specific seers, should eventually be traced to some human source; and the fact seems to be implied in the

* *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 90.

description of those truths as having been seen by the rishis or inspired sages of old. If it be so, the Veda also must be reckoned as communicating to us the results of *yogic* perception. But there is a very important difference as may be gathered from a condition which is sometimes laid down as essential to all "revealed" teaching, *viz.*, that it should have proved acceptable to the best minds of the community (*mahājanaparigraha*). That is, the truths which the Veda records have been not merely intuited by great seers but also acknowledged by the standard mind of the community. Really, then, this *pramāṇa* reduces itself to what may be characterised as "race intuition"; and its deliverances, by virtue of the objective value they thus possess, acquire an authority which cannot belong to those of anybody's private intuition. Herein lies the superiority of *śruti* to *yogic* perception. The Mimamsa and the Vedānta are the systems that accept "revelation" in this sense as the means to a knowledge of supersensuous truth. They constitute the last type of Indian thought.

Indian schools of thought are thus broadly divisible into two groups—one, which assumes that reality is confined to what is

given in common experience and may, as we have already stated, be described as empiricism in the broad sense of the term; the other, which regards the realm of being as by no means exhausted by such experience and formulates a unique *pramāṇa* for comprehending what lies beyond. The latter group is again divisible into two classes—one, which believes that individual insight is adequate for a knowledge of the transcendental realm; and the other, which seeks the aid of revelation for it. These may together be described as intuitionism*, if we bear in mind the above interpretation of *śruti*. They differ in their estimate of the relative significance to life of the two realms of being, as also in their conception of the precise nature of the facts that may be intuited. But such details fall outside the scope of the present article. This classification indicates, by the way, the exact meaning of *śabda* or "verbal testimony" which so many schools reckon as a source of philosophical knowledge. In none of them is it to be taken as an addition to the *pramāṇas* mentioned thus far; it only stands for tradition which embodies the truths reached through intuition in the one or the other of its two senses alluded to above.†

M. HIRIYANNA

* It is this kinship which explains the alliance between the two as seen in the later history of the systems. Thus the Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya, as now known, combine a belief in the Veda with their recognition of the need for *yogic* perception.

† The Jaina and the Vedāntic conceptions of *Śabda* may be taken as instances of the two varieties of tradition.

LIGHT UPON LIFE : ACCORDING TO ZEN

[**Beatrice Lane Suzuki**, occidental by birth but an oriental by marital and spiritual affiliations is the author of *Japanese Nō-Plays*. She is well known as an earnest student of Mahayana Buddhism and contributes her fine quota in the work of Dr. Suzuki, the recognized authority on that school of thought.—Eds.]

It is well to look at Zen Buddhism because it has played a great part in the past of Japanese culture. Statesmen, soldiers, poets and artists who have helped to make Japan what she is now have been devoted to Zen.

The word Zen comes from the Chinese *Chan* which in turn is derived from the Sanskrit *Dhyana*, denoting contemplation or tranquillization. But Zen is not just contemplation or tranquillization. Through Zen runs the thought of enlightenment; the Buddha under the Bodhi tree is the symbol of Zen practice, and its watchword is, "Something is to be transmitted besides verbal teaching, independent of letters". This something refers to the attainment of realisation, and the attainment comes not through study and thought but through intuition and inner knowledge. It is the true teaching of the Buddha for in its practice it directly faces the Buddha revealing the illuminating Truth.

Zen passed from the Buddha to Mahakasyapa and then to many saints and sages and at last to Bodhidharma, the Indian priest who went to China and who there established Zen practice as a union of mysticism with esoteric tradition directly derived from the Buddha. The story goes that Brahmaraja came to a congregation

of Buddhists on the Mount of the Holy Vulture, and offering a bouquet of flowers to the Buddha, prostrated himself on the ground, and reverently asked the Master to preach the law for the benefit of sentient beings. The Buddha held out the flowers before the congregation. None could comprehend the meaning of this act except the venerable Mahakasyapa who softly smiled and nodded. Then exclaimed the Buddha :—

I am the owner of the eye of the good law, which is Nirvana, the mind, the mystery of reality and non-reality, and the gate of transcendental law. I now hand it over to Mahakasyapa.

The achievement of Reality in Zen is called *Satori* a new point of view—a glimpse of the world of Truth. As an aid to attaining *Satori* the Zen follower practises meditation. Yet the aim is to incorporate this meditation into one's daily life rather than to make it merely a formal practice. The student is given a problem by his teacher, to solve which it is necessary to have the mystic experience of awakening. This problem is called a *Koan*. It is nothing which can be taught by others: the teacher can only give hints and suggestions. It is an experience to be lived when the solution is revealed to the self by the Self. It is intuitive knowledge rising up

from the very depths of the Unconscious, uniting itself for an illuminating moment with the conscious self.

To the ordinary mind, the Koans have little or no meaning and indeed often seem absurd and illogical. For example, one of the Koans which is often given to beginners is "Sekishu," the sound of one hand.

When you clap your hands, a sound results. But what is the sound made by one hand? Listen for it.

Zen states itself in negative rather than in positive terms but by negative is not meant nothingness. Zen abhors objective descriptions and terms. "It is not this" is to Zen a wiser statement than "It is this". Zen is a bridge to Nirvana transcending all relativity; it jumps the bridge of uncertainty and plunges into Reality itself.

The practice of meditation in Zen is called *Zazen*. Even though the goal of full realisation is never reached nevertheless the attempt to do so has brought about, in the majority of cases, a wonderful power of self-control and the gift of serenity.

To practise *Zazen*, a quiet place should be sought, an erect position maintained, regular breathing held and then there is a sinking as it were into the Koan, a merging of the self with it. But by the practice of meditation progress in the Zen life can be made. Hand in hand with Zen contemplation goes activity. To live widely and deeply is the goal of Zen, and to live in the light of Truth.

Zen is often taken for systematic

mind-training alone. As we have seen this is indeed a part of Zen but not by any means the whole of it. Zen meditation is quite unlike what is generally thought of in connection with meditation. It does not aim at conscious unity with God as Christian mystics do, nor at cosmic consciousness, nor does it put as a goal the realisation of peace or beauty or love as many modern New Thought people would have it. Zen just says: Sit quietly, and with the problem which will be given you by the teacher strive to make yourself so at one that it will reveal its inner meaning to you and with that inner meaning will come the insight into the reality of all things including self.

In the Zen sect, the practice of meditation is a feature of the practical training of the Zen monk. When a young priest wishes to study Zen at one of the Meditation Halls belonging to a Zen temple, he comes with all his belongings strapped to his back and approaches the door of *Sōdō*, the monks' living quarters. He kneels down at the entrance with his head to the floor, states who he is and asks for admittance and to be allowed to practise. The attendant listens and then announces his arrival to the Head Monk who refuses to admit him. The young monk refuses to take "No" for an answer and continues all day in bent posture. He will be admitted at night but is treated as a stranger, and the next day he resumes his waiting, which is sometimes kept up for several days before admittance.

This treatment given to the entering monk is no doubt for the purpose of testing his sincerity and to teach him patience. This begging for admittance is called *Niwazume*.

The Meditation Hall (*Zendo*) is a rectangular building, varying in size but frequently 36 by 65 feet, though some are much larger. The floors eight feet wide and three feet high are raised along two sides of the building with a space in the middle. The space allotted to each monk on the *tatami* (straw) floor is one mat, three by six feet, and here he sits, meditates and sleeps.

The monk meditates upon the problem which has been given to him by the Abbot. Twice a day, he proceeds to the Master's quarters to present his views. Certain weeks, one in each month, are given up to special meditation and at these times there are four instead of two interviews in a day. The special meditation week is called *Sesshin*. During this period every morning the Master gives a lecture to the assembled monks.

The food is of the simplest. The principal meal is taken at ten o'clock in the morning, rice gruel and pickles being eaten in the very early morning and what is left over in the afternoon. The monks eat together but in silence.

The Zen monk does not spend by any means all his time in meditation. On the contrary he works hard. All the care is taken of the monastery by the monks—cooking, washing, sweeping, gardening, tilling the ground, in fact manual work of every kind.

Besides this manual work, at certain stated times, the monks go out for begging. As they walk through the streets, they give a peculiar cry that people may be aware of their approach. They are glad to receive anything and accept food or money. The Zen monastery is supported by the work and begging of the monks.

The Zen monks form an earnest, sincere, contented band of young men, who do not disdain to work with their hands while cultivating the spiritual life.

The layman is, however, not forgotten in Zen. The earnest lay follower is admitted to the *Sesshins* and sometimes special *Sesshins* are conducted entirely for their benefit. Every *Rōshi*, as the spiritual teacher of Zen Buddhism is called, has a following of lay disciples coming to him singly or in groups. From ancient times this has been going on and all kinds of men of the world—soldiers, teachers, artists, literary men, students—have been and still are studying Zen meditation.

Zen lies at the basis of much of Japanese taste and feeling. The inward movement of spirit is characteristic of Zen in all lines. In art this inner feeling is to be called out in the most direct way. When Zen expresses itself in art, we find simplicity united with directness, boldness, inwardness and a certain austerity. These characteristics are to be found in other forms of art as well as in painting.

The Japanese style of painting called *Sumiye* (black and white line sketches) is influenced by Zen, for

Sumiye wishes to make the spirit of any object rather than its copy move upon paper. *Sumiye* work is a creation, not a copy. As with *Sumiye* so it is with calligraphy. In the strokes of Chinese characters, the spirit and character of the writer can be seen.

Zen is also characterised by *Sabi* or *Shibumi*. What is this? One has called it "eternal loneliness," another "refined restraint," still another "austere and simple beauty". It appears in gardening, in the tea ceremony, in Nō dancing, in the art of fencing and in poetry. The seventeen-syllable poems called *Haiku*, the shortest of all poetical expression, are characterised by *sabi*. In the tea ceremony, we have perhaps one of the best examples of this *sabi* or *shibumi*. The tea-room from the outside is always a simple cottage, small, low and insignificant. Inside, simplicity is again supreme. There is one picture in the alcove, a flower arrangement containing only a few blooms, in fact, generally but one, and these with a boiling kettle on a brazier constitute all the furnishings of the room. How simple and bare!—yet the room gives out the influence of serene quietude which is not to be found in more elaborate and rich surroundings.

In the restrained dance of the Nō-drama, in the arrangements of house and garden, and in dress we can find this note of *sabi*. Even in personal character it is to be discerned and of some men we say, "He has something of *sabi* in him."

So far, I have dwelt upon the artistic expressions of Zen, but we must not forget to look into the past and see the part it played in the life of the Samurai and therefore in the shaping of Japanese national life. Zen has a close connection with *Bushido*, the Way of the Warrior, which emphasised serenity, self-control and simplicity. Everywhere we look we see how much Japan owes to Zen in its artistic and cultural and spiritual life.

It is a practical method by which one aims to grasp the mind directly and thereby attain Buddhahood. In the ideal Zen it is essential to be master of oneself and practise the secret virtues; this comprises its moral discipline. But the essence of Zen remains this—to get a new point of view, a light upon life in general and everything in particular, and it is by the awakening of the inner mind (*Satori*) that this is accomplished. Zen points the way.

BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI

FAITH-HEALING

[J. D. Beresford writes this article not merely on the basis of theoretical knowledge but out of actual experience.—EDS.]

The general principle of what is now commonly called faith or mental healing, is implicit in the teachings of Theosophy and the Ancient Wisdom-Religion. Madame Blavatsky has laid it down as an axiom that "the influence of mind over the body is so powerful that it has effected miracles at all ages."* But like so many other truths of the same order, it has been blindly neglected even when it has not been denied by Western civilisation. It may, therefore, be worth while to glance first at the evidence provided not by the records of any religion but by what may be termed the plain facts.

To begin with one of the simplest instances: in the Middle Ages when doctors were few and ignorant, the common people generally resorted to "wise-women" or "witch-doctors" for the healing of disease. The power attributed to these practitioners was that of "magic," and in those days it was not only the poor who had a profound belief in the potency of that influence. The technique of the healers in these cases was always the same in principle. The strange medicines that they ordered the patient to brew or the equally strange ritual ordained upon them, always involved sufficient effort and difficulty to concentrate his

attention upon the object in view. "Eye of newt and toe of frog," or whatever oddity it was that must be sought at a particular hour and place, played, in fact, precisely the same agency as did the fragment of the true cross or other sacred relic in the parallel religious ceremony. All of them represent the instrument employed to evoke what we call the "faith" of the sufferer, whether it were in a witch, an intercessory saint or the condescension of God.

We cannot doubt that many of these cures were successful. The multiplicity of recipes for the dispersal of warts (a growth that is curiously susceptible to suggestion of this kind) goes to show that there must have been abundant testimony to the efficacy of "charms" in this connection. Indeed, the facts are not disputed. Though it might be difficult to authenticate beyond all question the particulars of any single cure, the records of such cures are so numerous, that it is more scientific to presume a foundation of truth than to attempt a series of different explanations for various examples. In weighing evidence of this kind, the only safe guide is the balance of probability.

Coming from this to a modern instance we may consider briefly and from a purely secular point of

* *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. I, p. 216. The context enunciates all the more important truths of faith and mental-healing in this connection.

view the miracles of Lourdes. Here, also, we find a version of the same technique. The sense of anticipation is quickened by the preliminary difficulties to be overcome, all of them directed to a specific end. The peasant who has to undertake a long railway journey and to drag himself up a long flight of steps to reach the "sacred spring" is worked up to the emotional pitch at which a faith-cure becomes possible. And in this case, too, although some representatives of the medical profession in this country demand further evidence before they will admit the validity of these cures, the fact that many such cures have been effected at Lourdes will not be denied by any unprejudiced enquirer.

These examples are but two casually selected pieces of evidence from the great mass of material that might be brought forward to show that in certain conditions, even without the influence of any inspired healer, beneficial changes may be brought about in the physical body which far surpass the achievements of medical science. Yet so inert is the mass of public interest and so prejudiced and conservative the medical profession that this remarkable phenomenon has never been made the subject of any serious and sustained investigation. The average man or woman has accepted the probability that what they regard as a "miracle" may be worked by "faith," and has completely failed to draw the astounding but perfectly obvious inference that the

fact must be of transcendent importance in our regard of the potentialities of the human entity.

When I first began to think about this subject, I was greatly perplexed, as everyone must be, by the question of the nature of "faith" and by the part it played in influencing the physical reactions and processes. We use the word faith glibly enough, as we use so many other words, without the least understanding of what we really intend by it. "Faith" and many allied words such as belief, confidence or trust are merely so many labels that we attach to a recognisable state of mind, and that serve the common purposes of everyday speech. But if we are asked to assume that in certain conditions this state of mind is such that it may drastically influence the condition of the physical body, some explanation is demanded.

Now the first thing that must strike the enquirer in this connection is the apparent relation between faith and simplicity of understanding. The Lourdes cures are almost exclusively confined to peasants and people of what we commonly rate as low intelligence. There can be no question that the innumerable reported "miracles" of the Dark and Middle Ages were possible largely because the mass of the people was then uneducated and unsophisticated. The allied phenomenon of religious conversion at "revival meetings" is only possible with what by an intellectual standard we must regard as an ignorant audience. In short, we arrive at the psychological con-

clusion that the more complex and intellectual minds are the least "suggestible".

That last word, however, is only another instance of the snares that await the user of labels. For although the use of the word "suggestion" in this relation may very properly lead us to include the phenomena of hypnotism in the same category as that of faith-healing, it does nothing whatever to explain the process by which the emotional and mental attitude is related to the stimulation of a bodily function and the repair of a physical lesion. And what I would now suggest, as one further step towards this relation, is that the condition of faith involves without exception a unity, it may be only temporary, of the self.

Perfect faith connotes in the first place either a suspension of the judgment and the critical faculty, or their complete conversion to the article of belief;—the former being the less stable condition. In either case we must infer a resolution, whether lasting or not, of that antagonism within the personality which is our common experience. Whatever the contributory cause, the state of faith carries the implications of peace within the individual complex. For a time, at least, there is a perfect singleness of motive and desire, a cessation of all conflict between the judgment, the will and the various impulses that arise from the lower centres,—an integration, in short, of the personality.

Now for our present purposes it may appear irrelevant to consider

how far this state is factitious. We are not concerned for the moment with any ethical considerations nor as to whether or no the object of faith be a worthy one. For if the instances given are accepted, it is evident that the effects may be produced even when the object of faith has a purely secular significance. Nevertheless, although faith and mental cures can be effected without resort to any religious stimulus, the majority of them are undoubtedly due to this influence, and some explanation of that fact is essential.

The solution is not a difficult one. Through all historical time the belief in what has sometimes begun in "magic" and ended in religion has been a compelling force in humanity. As a consequence the associations that cluster about this ideal are very easily stimulated. The average man may need much persuasion before he can believe that he will be "miraculously" cured by what appears to him as a meaningless ritual, but if he has throughout childhood been taught to believe in an Omnipotent God, all these early associations will be readily awakened when he is told that faith in God is the single requisite for his cure. In the Christian religion more particularly, the teaching of this kind of faith is a primary essential.

And with that we may return to that explanation of the action of faith which I have put forward, finding new support for it in the consideration that the suspension of the intellectual judgment is, also, demanded of those who are asked

to believe in the dogmatic prescription of the Churches. There must be here, also, a complete submission of the whole personality, for without it there cannot be, even in the ordinary sense, perfect faith. The same contention is true, also, on other levels of conduct. Complete trust, complete confidence, imply either a cessation of judgment or an intellectual persuasion that the object, whatever it may be, is worthy of such trust and confidence. In every case the essential would still seem to be an absolute unanimity of all the influences that compose the self.

But if we may now assume that the first essential effect of faith is this unification of the self, we have still to enquire why that condition should be favourable to healing. The answer to that may be offered first in the terms of psychology. It is almost a truism now that in order to obtain results in such practices as those advocated by the late Dr. Coué, it was necessary to overcome the resistances of the subconscious self. The exercise of the will, according to his principle, creates an antagonism; and that principle receives abundant support from the evidence of modern psychologists. And it is this antagonism that interferes between the patient and his cure. Coué and his disciples sought to overcome this by what they termed auto-suggestion, which was in effect a kind of determined effort on the part of the subject to make friends with himself,—an object that in the majority of cases could not be

satisfactorily achieved without a fuller understanding of the self than is possessed by the majority of mankind. It is not surprising, therefore, that this principle of auto-suggestion, although it produces results in a few cases and so tends to confirm the hypothesis put forward in this article, has led to no important development in the general practice of psycho-therapy. Like the allied method of hypnotism, it does not pay sufficient attention to the possibly deep-rooted conflict within the individual.

It is not possible within the scope of this article to discuss the various aspects of this conflict, which offer some of the most intricate problems of abnormal psychology. But the simplest aspect of it is that already indicated between judgment and belief, a sufficient explanation of the reason for the failure of faith-cures in general among an educated, sophisticated people. For I think it will be evident that the attempt to convert the judgment by personal effort implies a further aspect of antagonism within the self, a taking of "sides" that can be overcome only in the case of those who have reached a high stage of spiritual development. For the others, the desired unity is attained in every instance by the withdrawal from the conflict of the critical faculty. The general awareness of the self must be temporarily suspended, an effect that is obtained by various methods in the practice of faith-healing,—the most efficacious being that in which there is a sub-

mission of the self to the personality of the healer, who if he has the great gift of love will be able to inspire trust and confidence in his patient.

A further element in the phenomenon of "faith," which must be touched upon, however briefly, is that of the emotion aroused in the "believer," an emotion that in some cases may amount to ecstasy. This emotion, however, follows and does not precede the desired state of unity. When the internal conflict is resolved, the subject becomes aware of the peace within himself. For a time, at least, he is a single being filled with a single desire, in a condition closely analogous to that of one who is suddenly released from physical pain. There is a sense of happiness, quiet and confidence, all the resistances are withdrawn, and, although this does not fall within the purview of the psychologist, the true ego is temporarily in control of the whole personality. No one in this state is capable of such feelings as those of hate, fear or anger. To be at peace with oneself means that we are, also, at peace with the world about us.

It may, nevertheless, be asked, pertinently enough, why the attainment of this condition should have any effect upon disease, and in answering that question I must begin by postulating that health is the natural state of mankind and is

only destroyed by various interferences arising from a quite large variety of causes. I would postulate further that the chief of these interferences arises from a personal misconception of the self, which is to say in the modern phrase that a very large percentage of our bodily ills is mental in origin. Hate, fear and anger, for example, are ills of the spirit and may lead to ills of the body. Indeed the physiologists tell us that these emotions directly affect the constitution of the blood, and may be regarded as temporary physical diseases in themselves. And beyond these flagrant examples there are very many mental attitudes that, for the most part unconsciously, influence our physical condition,—to name but one out of half-a-dozen others that could be cited, that attitude which ministering to some form of self-love, actually cherishes the pains that draw attention and sympathy to the sufferer.

And if we grant these two postulates (1) that health is our natural condition and (2) that it is upset by a failure of adjustment due largely to mental causes, it is not difficult to see why in that state of peace and unity, however induced, there is a strong tendency to revert to the natural condition. But this is, indeed, but one aspect of the whole subject to which I hope to return in a further article.

J. D. BERESFORD

EUROPE—WITH OR AGAINST ASIA?

[Aggressive nationalism is the disease of the era ; world-wide cultural unity is the remedy. The most thoughtful humanitarians and philosophers recognize these propositions. But there are intellectuals who befriend rabid nationalism, and some of these want to organize Europe against Asia. This will be seen from the first of the articles printed below.

J. B. is a Frenchman who writes from Paris and his report-review makes somewhat discouraging reading. Even the deadly situation created by nationalistic pride and greed which threatens the very life of the Occidental civilization has not brought home to the West the lesson that an individual cannot live and thrive at the expense of his fellow nor a State at that of its neighbour. Japan is driven by the pride of the white races to fight them with their own weapons, and Turkey and Persia are following in the wake of Japan. Europe itself is a divided house and it is evident that it cannot stand unless it visions itself as a part of an international kingdom in which Eastern peoples are accorded their rightful places. Neither Europe nor America can hoodwink Asia or Africa any longer. The entire structure—economic, religious, moral and cultural,—of the whole of Christendom is on the point of collapse and the Oriental, from Angora to Tokyo, knows about it. Mutual help, based on friendship and respect for each other, alone can save both East and West alike.

In the second article **Dr. J. M. Kumarappa**, an Indian patriot with Occidental training and experience, discusses the remedy as focused in the "hidden purpose in India's history". He writes about India:—

She has a mission to perform, a mission of peace and reconciliation. She has ever stood for a true and living harmony of toleration and discipline, of law and love, of restraint and freedom. At this age of international strife India must offer to the world her philosophy of life, of peace based on her conception of the spiritual unity of all human beings. If the world is to take cognizance of her never failing emphasis on the abiding values of the spirit, then she must demonstrate the superiority of her spiritual culture. And that is possible only when the masses of her people learn to live up to the high and noble ideals of her sages and saints.]

I.—THE SOUL OF EUROPE: ITS PRESENT PLIGHT

I have just been reading *Entretiens sur l'avenir de l'Esprit Européen*, the report of the proceedings of a Congress of "Intellectuals" which took place in Paris at the Institut de Coopération Intellectuelle (October 16-18, 1933), and which cannot be said to have aroused great public attention.

Yet the speeches delivered on that occasion provide food for thought, and the general conclusion the outsider will derive therefrom can hardly be an optimistic one. The speakers, numbering nearly thirty, were all men of the highest

culture, who, it should be noted, were not there as delegates from their respective countries, but on their own responsibility. Yet how few of them showed themselves entirely free from the nationalistic bias! Of course it might be said the whole debate turned on a false conception: why discuss the existence and possibilities of the *European* spirit? (For want of a better translation we will use "spirit" for *esprit* which means also "mind," "mentality," "attitude".) If we try to break the fetters of the national spirit

(and indeed it is high time that we should do so) why not look at once for the *human* spirit, for that which may make us feel one with all mankind? If there be people who are not ready to enter this vast community, the fact should not hinder us from aiming at such an ideal. Yet one of the speakers, *S. de Madariaga (Spanish)*, actually said that nationalism could not be a bad thing, since the purpose of the Congress was to create *a European nationalism*! And the next speaker, *Signor Francesco Coppola (Italian)*, declared that Europe could not face the *dangers that threaten her from Asia and from Africa* unless she stood united—preferably under the banner of Rome. This surely is a dangerous tendency which, I trust, few members of the Congress could have endorsed. But the tone of the debate remained so diplomatically polite throughout, that practically none of the opinions expressed were criticized. On the third day at last the French writer, *Jules Romains*, was quite outspoken:

Politics are banned from this assembly; well and good, but Academics seem to have taken their place. I call Academics the art of speaking on any subject without committing oneself in troublous times. . . . We are but Pharisees if we make-believe not to realize that the whole problem of the European spirit is subordinate to the actual existence of "Europe" and that the existence of Europe can neither be studied, nor defined, nor become an object of forethought and betterment if the Spirit cannot work in complete liberty and independence. What makes me uncomfortable is when the Intellectual (*l'homme de l'esprit*)

all of a sudden discovers that the barbaric rulers have come to fulfil a mission of the Spirit, and when he takes good care that the barbaric rulers shall be informed of this opinion, so that they may duly appreciate how very opportune it is. . . .

Nearly all the speeches deserve analysis, but as we cannot condense into an article the volume of 300 pages—not to mention the difficulty of rendering in English the very nice shades of meaning of the original papers, we will just pick out at random some opinions that may be worth noting for various reasons. The connection between the ideas successively expressed being often left out, may thus remain obscure, even more frequently than is the case in the full report.

The Chairman, *Paul Valéry*, the French poet and essayist, remarked in his opening speech that, in past centuries, a certain European spirit had been steadily growing in strength and reality, whereas at present that which was expected to unite was threatening to break asunder.

Count Hermann von Keyserling (German), playing with abstract entities of his own creation, which we will not attempt to explain or paraphrase, delivered a long (19 pages), adroit, and disquieting speech in defence of Hitlerism:—

The spirit of the age is that of the masses; leaders of masses have to be lion-tamers, not spiritual guides. Never has youth shown a stronger vitality. The young do not fear death; to eat up or to be eaten up is all one. Their passiveness derives from tellurian, not spiritual forces. As a spiritual manifestation,

the reawakening of a blind faith is superior to a blasé and dissolving intelligence. Spiritual imperatives should be obeyed, but the commands of Earth and Blood have an overwhelming force. They have too long been kept under by the influence of Christianity. Pre-War Europe, following as it did the teachings of the 18th century, was lacking in positive prospects, and her civilization was bound to end in dehumanization (life being crushed down under the machine etc.). We must rebuild. In order to rebuild, we put up with the present Destiny. Opposition or negative criticism can only exasperate the enmity between men and put traditional culture into a still worse predicament. "We Europeans are the Hands of God" (see *The Travel Diary of a Philosopher*). Orientals are much more spiritual than we are, but not so much interested in the works of the Age and of the Earth.

What pertains to politics, war, and economics is an expression, not of the Spirit, but of the lowest part of the human soul. The Spirit cannot change the specific character of such activities; the duty of the Spirit is to embody spiritual values in the historical contingencies. It were a vain attempt to idealize politics or *vice versa*, to embody spiritual truths in public life (*e. g.*, perpetual peace, disinterested human love). On the political plane, there is no such thing as Mankind; we find only nations at strife.

Julio Dantas (Portuguese) expressed the view that, whereas our nationality is a deep and permanent reality, our "Europeanity" is an unsteady, floating and superficial reality.

But surely a minority of people could already be found in the larger countries who feel exactly the reverse.

Julien Benda (French) replied to *I. Huizinga (Dutch)* who had suggested that "Europeanism" should

receive and preserve the variety of European cultures: "It is an old fallacy; you cannot make Europe unless you are ready to give up some of your national peculiarities."

Leon Brunschwig (French):—

It is characteristic of Europe that she was the strongest expression of the subordination of the "organic" substratum to the universal Law of the Spirit. In a drama of Sophocles, for instance, Antigone being forbidden by the laws of the City to pay homage to her dead brother, replies to King Kreon that certain *unwritten laws* oblige her to share love, not hatred. In the eyes of non-Europeans Europe generally stands for technique, machinery, etc.: "Ford *versus* Gandhi," as André Siegfried aptly puts it. We should create a *human*, all-mankind consciousness.

An open-minded *Catholic priest, Father de La Brière (French)*, asked

if the elements we all consider as superior are truly European. Do they not rather belong to a universal, just human, culture? No doubt the part played by Europe in fixing such elements remains an important one. Besides, there are really several Europes, at least as many as there are ethnic groups to be found on the Continent, and they all possess families out of Europe proper; these look up to Europe as endowed with a certain moral supremacy. European Christianity has been instrumental in transporting, preserving, or widening certain ideas (*e. g.*, the international law of the Red Cross).

Count Teleki (Hungarian) believes in educational effort, Scouting for instance. The State has taken possession of the Nation to an excessive degree. More importance should be given to countries which make a sort of transitional borderland between the several Europes.

Denis Parodi (French) replied that—

education is a favourite instrument of all those who wish to destroy the old European spirit and to form narrow and exclusive nationalisms. Perhaps the divergent forces may sooner than we think be brought to acknowledge themselves powerless and to harmonize in mutual respect, just as the idea of religious freedom was born of the impossibility of vanquishing adverse faiths. The European spirit would thus prove to be a sort of negative entity.

Jean Cantacuzène (Rumanian—since deceased) having observed that, in his experience, students were now far more steady, moral, and eager to learn than in the years immediately after the war, education was again referred to as a potent means of betterment, and *J. Duhamel (French)* remarked that Europe meant nothing to the man in the street; here then was a task for educators.

Aldous Huxley (English) showed that many "systems" such as Freudism, Behaviorism, etc., are really anti-intellectual and easily become subservient to Nationalism. Sound logic would destroy this anti-intellectualism; but the masses can only accept such logic when embodied in great works of art, and these are not produced to order. Our present age is essentially vulgar, the language itself is becoming corrupt.

William Martin (Swiss—since deceased):—

Nationalism is a quite modern phenomenon, a sort of intolerant neo-paganism. Nothing could be more absurd than the widespread confusion between nationality and language.

Men do not hate each other when they know each other. Educators should be appealed to, intellectuals must fight nationalism, they must attack it on the intellectual plane.

Emilio Bodrero (Italian):—

Ancient Greece had conceived the idea of the superior Man, but never actually produced the type. He came to life in Rome, in the Christian world, in the Renaissance. Nowadays I see men intoxicated with nationalism and others with internationalism, but nowhere can I find any enthusiasts for Humanity.

Salvador de Madariaga (Spanish) defined the European spirit as specially acquisitive, and considered nationalism and capitalism as essential to the development of the individual.

Francesco Coppola (Italian) admitted—

that Europe has an uncomfortable conscience; she feels no longer so sure that her existence and her domination over the whole world are quite legitimate. She wages wars of conquest with an official ideology that purports to be anti-imperialistic and pacific. Now the young in every country demand an ideology that shall correspond to reality. Rome alone can once more recover the lost harmony, just as she once absorbed the Christian movement [or danger] which came from the East [Communism of course is implied]. Unification must take place, if not by an act of reason, then by sheer force, *by the superior strength of one of the components.*

Viggo Broendal (Danish):—

A war-time régime (martial law, press censorship etc.) has been resumed in many countries. Intellectuals are persecuted, ideas are falsely distorted. No national superiority is absolute. The Nation should be regarded as an intermediate stage between the Individual and Mankind.

J. Benda (French):—

The old notions of Liberty, Equality and worse still, Truth, are now regarded as obsolete. Not to speak of other countries, we have in France a political party (*l'Action Française*) according to whose tenets Truth shall be what national interest requires that it should be! It has found many admirers in Italy.

F. Coppola (Italian):—

Do not believe that dictators impose themselves. They are loved, they embody the yearnings of their peoples.

The above summary, though of course incomplete, gives, I think, a fair idea of the exchange of opinions and of the various levels of thought which then found expression. It must have been greatly disconcerting to the French and British members of the Congress to perceive national prejudice and political authority so often peeping through the loftiest idealism. Perhaps the French contributions gave the same impression to the foreign

members. But even in France, public opinion has taken an alarming turn in the last few months. What is fascism in fact, if not always in name, is becoming loud and may take the upper hand through sheer force of arms.

For the remainder of the sitting, the Congress was occupied in the elaboration of an international "Society for European Studies" which "shall study questions of an intellectual order, and, particularly through personal intercourse between its members, shall promote in Europe a clearer consciousness of the unity of European culture".

The declaration is a mild one. "Academics" are likely to reign supreme in the transactions of the new Society, and it is to be regretted that this very distinguished *élite* of intellectuals did not take the opportunity of their meeting to commit themselves to some rather more drastic action.

J. B.

II.—A PLEA FOR CULTURAL READJUSTMENT

The surest test of the greatness of a nation is its literature; for literature is the embodiment of a nation's intellect, the depository of its wisdom and the sanctuary of its spirit. Judged by this standard, where does India stand among the cultured nations of the world? Abbé Dubois declared:—

India is the world's cradle; thence it is that that common mother, in sending forth her children even to the utmost West, has bequeathed to us the legacy of her language, her laws, her morals, her literature and her religion. Manu

inspired Egyptian, Hebrew, Greek and Roman legislation, and his spirit permeates the whole economy of our European laws.

Even in the realm of speculative thought, India has held her own. In fact, Indian philosophy is so comprehensive that counterparts of all systems of European philosophy are to be found in it. Every shade of opinion, every mode of thought, every school of philosophy has, says Dr. Alexander Duff, not only found expression in the philosophical writings of the Hindus but

received its full development. And if it is true that a great nation alone can produce great philosophers or complete systems of philosophy, the ancient Indians may without hesitation be pronounced to have been the greatest nation, ancient or modern.

When we turn our attention to Sanskrit as a language, we are told that it is the real source of those dialects of Europe known as the Indo-European languages. Their lingual affinity is so great that many scholars are led to claim a common racial origin for the peoples speaking them. Even those who deny such racial kinship are forced nevertheless to conclude that they all must have had at least a relationship of mind, a common culture. While from Sanskrit, the mother of all Indo-European languages, were derived the original roots and those essentially necessary words which form the basis of all those dialects, Sanskrit literature is the channel through which Indian philosophy and learning flowed towards the West, and, fertilizing the new and fresh ideas available there, produced such famous thinkers as Homer, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Virgil and numerous others. Is it any wonder then that Prof. Heeren maintains that India is the source from which not only the rest of Asia but the whole world derived their knowledge and religion?

Since our literature is the product of India's mental activity extending over a period of at least three thousand years, it embraces

practically every subject of human interest, and contains an accumulation of incalculable and priceless material. Such intellectual vivacity could not but exert immense influence over the mental life of other nations far beyond the boundaries of India. No one, of course, questions India's glorious past and her ancient learning. That which deeply concerns us is the place of Modern India in the world of culture. The most marked feature of the intellectual life of Modern India is the paucity of original thought and creative activity. And this, in view of our inestimable literary heritage, is most humiliating. In fact, the intellectual sterility of Modern India, her pitiful inability to contribute new and valuable ideas in the realms of literature and art, science and religion, and the dearth of noble ideals have made her a thing of shame and derision in the eyes of the cultured nations of the world.

If Modern India is barren of high aspirations and creative ideals, if she suffers from intellectual poverty and inertia, is the cause far to seek? By adopting foreign culture and ignoring her own, has she not lost touch with her real source of life and intellectual vigour? Indeed, by cutting off this source of vitality, she has reduced herself to a life of cultural parasitism in the very country which is the home of learning itself. This mental deterioration is certainly most debasing. And therefore our greatest concern must necessarily be, not material

want—bad as it is; not even political subjection—degrading as that is; but cultural poverty. At a time such as this when we are giving serious thought to the problems of reorganizing all our nation-building institutions, we can ill-afford to ignore this terrible state of our intellectual degeneracy. And the task of cultural readjustment must therefore be viewed by our leaders as most pressing and urgent.

If our education is to be truly Indian, it must be so reorganized as to develop the racial traits in each child till it makes him a perfect incarnation of the spirit of the race. Hence our first aim in educational reconstruction must be to meet the need of providing the children of India with a culture that is the product of India's own thought and creation. Only a knowledge of the great thoughts and ideas found in Sanskrit literature will generate in the minds of our youth a proud and living faith in their Motherland, and help them incidentally to get rid of their inferiority complex. Such a cultural foundation is necessary to enable them not only to take a legitimate pride in their own intellectual aristocracy but also to assimilate to greater advantage the best in western culture. Further, it must be noted that Sanskrit learning is necessary and invaluable for the preservation of our national or cultural individuality. Hitherto we have sadly overlooked the psychological fact that the individuality of a nation consists in its mass of tradition and historical memories. This principle is

most beautifully expressed by the poet Tagore. He points out :—

The physical organization of the race has certain vital memories which are persistent, and which fashion its nose and eyes in a particular shape, regulate its stature and deal with the pigment of its skin. In the ideal of the race there also run memories that remain constant or, in the case of alien mixture, come back repeatedly even after the lapse of long intervals. These are the compelling forces that secretly and inevitably fashion the future of a people and give characteristic shape to its civilization.

If this be so, is it not of paramount importance that the main lines of a people's education should be determined by the inner life, character and predisposition of the nation?

Since it is the living consciousness of the race's past ideals and achievements which differentiate one cultural group from another, it is imperative that such historical traditions and ideals should be made to form the intellectual equipment of not only every student but also every uncultured member of the race. If education is to realize this end, it must take full account of the genius and civilization of the people and the environment which influences them, just as surely as it must take account of the inborn qualities. Further, it must raise Sanskrit and the vernaculars to their lost but legitimate place in our scheme of studies. Though the Indian vernaculars are diverse, yet Sanskrit is not only the source of most of them but the fountain head of the social and religious culture which inspires and sustains them. Be-

cause the vernacular literatures contain, though it be in a limited measure, the supreme ethical and spiritual wisdom of the saints and sages of India, it has been possible to spread a common culture among the teeming millions of India. And now in order to develop the vernaculars to meet the demands of the present age, Sanskrit must be popularized. For, if the vernaculars are to be re-enforced, if their capacity to form abstract, scientific and literary terms is to be strengthened, the necessary element must be taken, as Tagore points out, from Sanskrit. Only when the vernaculars are thus re-enforced will they be in a position to respond to the need of the higher stages of study.

Besides its value in strengthening the vernaculars to meet modern demands of expression, a study of Sanskrit literature is important for promoting Indian national unity. The great thoughts contained in them would, if popularized, serve as a powerful antidote for our modern narrowness, exclusiveness and bigotry. Education must not only make each child esteem and prize as invaluable the privilege of being a member of this race but also contribute to the promotion of social solidarity. The cultural dualism of Modern India, brought about by the present system of education, is not conducive to social harmony and well-being. By practically severing the intellectual element of the nation from the historic traditions of Indian development, it has deprived us of that unifying influ-

ence which free nations draw from the living consciousness of their past achievements. And naturally, therefore, our contemporary intellectual life has become incongruous and full of conflicting tendencies. The literary classes have been successfully divorced from the illiterate masses, so much so, that to-day it would be difficult to find anywhere on earth a class of people so different in outlook from their own masses as the typical product of this educational system. Since the masses receive their intimate ideas and images, not from Burke and Shakespeare, Hume and Mill, but from the Vedas and the Purānas, from the writings of Kabir and Kalidasa, it has, in fact, made the natural irrigation of culture well-nigh impossible. Similarly, it has divorced the husband from the wife in thought and outlook. In most cases they live on two different social and intellectual planes. The language, ideals, beliefs and acts of the one are quite foreign to the other. But the real foundation of a well-regulated life is cultural unity. Therefore not merely for social cohesion but also for national solidarity, a common culture is essential. It is, in fact, even more important for national unity than a common language or religion or racial origin. If education is to weld together the masses and the classes, the husband and the wife, if it is to unify the different races and the various Provinces, it is of the utmost importance to make a study of national literature, and of the vernaculars,

an essential part of Indian education with ancient Sanskrit culture the very basis of such an education. Professor Max Müller declared :—

If I were to ask myself from what literature we here in Europe, — we who have been nurtured almost exclusively on the thoughts of the Greeks and the Romans and of one Semitic race, the Jewish, — may draw that corrective which is most wanted in order to make our inner life more perfect, more comprehensive, more universal, in fact, more truly human, a life, not for this life alone, but a transfigured and eternal life, again I should point to India.

This and such other well-considered statements based on a knowledge of the evolution of Indian culture, lead one to the conclusion that there is a hidden purpose in India's history. She has a mission to perform, a mission of peace and reconciliation. She has ever stood for a true and living harmony of toleration and discipline, of law and love of restraint and freedom. In this age of international strife India must offer to the world her philosophy of life, of peace based on her conception of the spiritual unity of all human beings. If the world is to take cognizance of her never-failing emphasis on the abiding values of the spirit, then she must demonstrate the superiority of her spiritual culture. And that is possible only when the masses of her people learn to live up to the high and noble ideals of her sages and saints.

In order, therefore, to make the best in our culture available to the peoples of the West, it is essential to revive Sanskrit learning and

make it widespread in India first. Our schools and colleges must really become saturated with our own indigenous culture. Then our seats of learning must be so organized as to enable them to extend the intellectual hospitality of the country to the research scholars of the West who are eager to come to India to specialize in Oriental learning, and to study Indian culture at its very source. But unfortunately no adequate facilities have been provided for them and, what is worse, for want of such centres of Indian culture our own students are even now obliged to go to the London School of Oriental Studies to learn Sanskrit, Indian Literature and Indian Philosophy, the very subjects for which India ought to be the greatest research centre in the world. We cannot long continue in this state of intellectual bankruptcy and remain as outcastes, deprived of our place among the cultured peoples of the world. India has had a glorious past and her future is not without promise. But we must not lose sight of the fact that the promise of the future depends on the education of the young in the true ideals and traditions of the race. In whatever way we Indianize education, it must be so as to revive our culture, and make Indian life seem as sublime as any the world has ever seen. It must make it possible for India to resume her place among the nations, not as a competitor in material production, but as a teacher of all that belongs to a true and radiant civilization.

J. M. KUMARAPPA

CHRIST AND KRISHNA

[**J. Frank Reed** of the Missouri (U. S. A.) Wesleyan College and Garrett Biblical Institute interprets in his own way two religious symbols. If we add that both Christ and Krishna are universal principles of Life imprisoned in the temples of flesh we will come still nearer to the aim which our contributor has in mind—bringing closer the Hindu and the Christian in the common service of man. The Divine in Man, Christ or Krishna, Ahuramazda or Avalokiteshwara, suffers the crucifixion because of Its own sacrifice to illumine the man of flesh ; It also enjoys the Bliss, *Ananda*, which that same sacrifice begets.—EDS.]

Yes, I am here, alive, at this moment, in this world. Of that I can have no doubt. Am I not conscious and, being conscious, can I doubt that I exist? I must say, with Descartes, *Cogito ergo sum*.

How to take this life of mine, then—that is my question.

How I shall take it depends on what I conclude its nature is, on what it seems to me this world is at heart.

Men have frequently packed their feeling for and understanding of life into a symbol. Symbols are rich in meaning. All the deeper and more significant reactions of a race or greater community of men are reflected in the symbols they adopt. To study their symbols is to learn their interpretation of the life that is the common inheritance of mankind.

Here are two symbols, Christ and Krishna, one belonging to Europe and America, the other to India. What do they say about life? How would they advise men to take it?

The Christ symbol reveals to us a man dying in agony upon a cross. The trunk of his body lined up against the trunk of the cross, his arms outstretched against its branching arms, nails through his

hands and feet, a crown of thorns upon his head, blood dripping from his brow, a wound in his side, he is the picture of uttermost, unendurable pain.

I have in my possession a print purchased for an anna in India at a bazaar in an inland town. It shows a lotus flower floating on the surface of the primeval sea and standing erect on the flower is the character that represents the sacred syllable Om, shaped something like the Arabic figure 3. Standing within the lotus flower and looking out through the sacred symbol are the dark-skinned Vishnu (of whom Krishna was an Incarnation) and his consort Luxmi. Both are dressed in garments of rare beauty and wear a profusion of the ornaments so dear to every Indian heart. Luxmi's left hand rests in the right hand of Vishnu, her right arm is around his waist while his left arm lightly surrounds her shoulders. Behind their heads is a golden radiance in the beams of which are seen the presiding deities of an ordered cosmos. The picture is entitled *Ananta Lila*, Eternal Play.

Those who accept this picture as correct, as rightly setting forth the nature of life and the world, obviously see things differently

from those whose understanding of things is represented by the Cross. Can we come closer to the difference to hear what the two peoples have to say?

The Christ symbol seems to be saying: Life is terribly serious; it must be lived with great earnestness; care must be taken to follow in the right way; see the tragedy that comes from indifference and wrong-doing, the pain that is necessary to return man to his proper course, the love that endures the pain that man may be redeemed from the consequences of his own folly.

Certain fixed convictions lie behind this advice as to the way to take life. Life, it is felt, has a meaning. There is a purpose in events. An end is being achieved, a glorious, happy end for man and for the Power that guides in all things. Because of this end life takes on significance. But men are stupid and wicked; they fail and involve others in failure; they would come short of the end were there no saviour who, at the cost of great personal suffering, opens their eyes and puts their feet again on the path that leads to the goal. The existence of the saviour reveals what is at the heart of the universe. It is love.

The Krishna symbol seems to be saying: Life consists of form and colour and beauty; it appears on the surface of the real; at the heart of it is a lover and his beloved; from their playfulness there springs a cosmos; life is not serious; it comes forth in sport; beneath it, within it, is the real,

the significant; find that, but as for life do not become attached to it.

Who is right, the Indian or the man of the West? Does Life move on towards an end, an end which men would miss were it not for the loving, costly self-giving of the Eternal, or is the appearance that it thus moves on only an illusion? Is life the great deceiver, ever holding out a joy that stirs the seeker after good, giving him faith and hope and courage, leading him on until the grave is reached and emptiness or else a new beginning as a soul reborn, subject to the old deception? Is the highest good of man attained through life or apart from life? Is there a perfect truth, a perfect goodness, a perfect beauty to be attained by man *via* life and by grace of the active agents of an eternal love, or is there rather for the spirit of man the ineffable bliss of an unending peace gained through separation from life and the immersion of the self in the real?

Better than an attempt to test the validity of these divergent interpretations of life is the observation that the Christ symbol enshrines a preachment to which the light-hearted, active, life-loving West feels obliged to listen while the Vishnu symbol serves the needs of the serious-minded, contemplative, world-weary East. Each tells its own constituency to be the opposite from what it is. Busy, thoughtless Westerners whose native, pagan spirit best expresses itself in the brightness and gaiety of an Easter or a

Christmas festival, need to be reminded that existence calls for serious and thoughtful consideration of pain and its meaning, while Easterners, given to preoccupation with pain, require that the beauty and goodness of life be shown to them. Vishnu in sport, from sheer *joie de vivre*, performs an endless round of acts of loving-kindness. Yet each symbol registers the conviction of its own protagonists upon the question of the *locus* of man's highest good. To the West this *locus* is still in life ; to the East it is still beyond life.

Taken all in all, therefore, the Christian and the Vaishnava way of taking life, especially if the

latter receives a Vedantist emphasis, remain different and irreconcilable. Yet, if the Christian will heed his Christ, though inclined to levity he will tend to become of a sober mind, and if the Vaishnava will heed his Vishnu in any form, though inclined to be over-serious he will tend to become cheerful, and the two, Christian and Vaishnava, though continuing to have opposite convictions on the ultimate abiding-place of value, will approximate to one another's spirit in their conduct of the daily round. Should they, then, not aim more and more to meet in common, earnest, helpful, loving service of all mankind ?

J. FRANK REED

Chrétos meant in the Temple vocabulary of the pagans a disciple on probation, a candidate for hierophantship. When he had attained to this through initiation, long trials, and suffering, and had been "*anointed*" (*i. e.*, "rubbed with oil", as were Initiates and even idols of the Gods, as the last touch of ritualistic observance), his name was changed into *Christos*, the "purified", in esoteric or mystery language. In mystic Symbology, indeed, *Chrétès*, or *Christos*, meant that the "Way", the *Path*, was already trodden and the goal reached ; when the fruits of the arduous labour, uniting the personality of evanescent clay with the indestructible INDIVIDUALITY, transformed it thereby into the immortal EGO. "At the end of the *Way* stands the *Chrétès*", the *Purifier*, and the union once accomplished, the *Chrestos*, the "man of sorrow", became *Christos* himself. Paul, the Initiate, knew this, and meant this precisely, when he is made to say, in bad translation : "I travail in birth again until Christ be formed in you" (Gal. iv. 19), the true rendering of which is "until ye form the *Christos* within yourselves". But the profane who knew only that *Chrétès* was in some way connected with priest and prophet, and knew nothing about the hidden meaning of *Christos*, insisted, as did Lactantius and Justin Martyr, on being called *Chrétians* instead of *Chrsitians*. Every good individual, therefore, may find Christ in his "inner man" as Paul expresses it (Ephes. iii. 16, 17), whether he be Jew, Mussulman, Hindu, or Christian.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Glossary*.

THE SCIENCE OF HINDU POLITY

SOME OLD IDEAS FOR THE PRESENT SITUATION

[Achintya Mukherjee, B.A., B.L., is lawyer by profession, but is greatly interested in journalism. This article has more than historical interest; its implications give it a practical value; it has a message for the maker of a constitution for the India of to-morrow.—Eds.]

The nature of civilisation of every nation is of a type of its own and has its conspicuous elements peculiar to itself. These peculiarities are ingrained in the nation. Eon after eon of different types of civilisations might pass over one nation and shed their telling influence on the make of the nation, but this admixture of different civilisations is never so strong as to completely wipe out that basic element, that pristine mould of the nation.

Every nation with its advance in civilisation builds up a polity of its own, which reflects its own distinctive type of culture. This nation too was born in the wake of its own political philosophy, grew under its all-permeating influence and carries to-day its indelible impress in its aspirations, inclinations, customs and activities.

At the present moment many complex questions are calling forth a complete recasting of the political system of the world. There is the problem of Labour and Capital which has given the shock of its life to the body-politic of the world. There is the nightmare of economic stagnation which has left the politicians of all lands bewildered. There is that clarion call of Demos for power which is taking its toll of time-worn mon-

archies. In the midst of it all India has to find her own solution in her venture at Reforms. *But whatever Reforms are introduced to meet the present problems, these Reforms must needs be congenial to the nature of the political evolution of the nation.* The problems of government are more or less the same in all climes, but we cannot remodel the universe and cast it in one mould, nor can we plant one type of civilisation on another and bring out a product to suit our own choice. It is bound to fail like the man-made creatures of Dr. Moreau—that supreme parody on Man's experiments at creation, the outcome of the prolific pen of H. G. Wells.

When we think of opening a new era in the whole political fabric of the country, a study of the real nature of the political evolution of the people is as much of importance to-day as the family history of a patient is to his physician.

THE ARYAN CONCEPTION OF KINGSHIP

The Indians of the present day have somehow or other got into their heads that the Hindu idea of kingship is co-equal to Divinity, the king being a sort of projection of the Divine Shakti—a supreme being

self-evolved out of the Divinity, above all laws and ruling the realm by the right of his Divine birth. If on the other hand we choose to read the ancient books with a view to studying the political philosophy of the people, we find that one idea stands out throughout, *viz.*, that from the first introduction of kingship in the body-politic of India, the king was elected by the Aristocracy of Intellect, and though the *Shāstras* clothed the king with a spectacular divinity, the Aryans never gave the king any Divine Right over the subjects. As early as the *Rig Veda* (X. 124, 8) we find mention of subjects choosing their own king, and by the time the Aryan civilisation reached the stage of the *Mahabharata* it was the recognised system of Aryan constitution. The Raja Dharma Anusasana Section of the *Shānti Parva* mentions in full detail the qualities which are to be sought in the king for election. In the Aryan polity, *Danda Neeti*, Constitutional Law of the land, was placed above everything, and the king was merely the officer administering this science of polity for the benefit of the people.

The king on his election was to take an oath of allegiance to the path of righteousness, to maintain the religion inculcated in the Vedas, to look upon all creatures with an equal eye, and further to swear that he would maintain the duties laid down in the Science of Polity and never act with caprice. (Sec. lix, Sl. 105-7)

The Aryans clothed their king with responsibilities, the

sovereign's supreme duty being protection of his subjects. It is said that the sin incurred by neglecting for a single day to protect his subjects is so grave that it cannot be atoned for by a thousand years' suffering in hell. (Sec. lxxi, Sl. 26) This was not a mere pious wish of the Aryan lawgivers. The laws assert that:—

Of all kingly duties there is no other eternal duty more obligatory than the protection of the subject. (Sec. lvii, Sl. 41)

Such is the conception of kingship under which the Indians have developed as a nation. We are hearing much to-day about the "safeguards" for the protection of the interests of the ruling class. We do not find in the Aryan Constitution any safeguard to protect the interests of the rulers. In it the ruler before he could aspire to be a ruler had to merge his individuality in the interests of his subjects. The only safeguard of the ruler, is the spontaneous love of the subjects for the king. It has been stated in the Books:—

Among the six citadels, indeed among every kind of citadel, that which consists in the willing service and love of the subjects is the most impregnable. (Sec. lvi, Sl. 43)

THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO PROTECTION

The Aryan Constitution was not content with only making it obligatory on the king to protect his subjects; it went so far as to make kingship co-extensive with the capacity of the king to protect his subjects. Thus we see that this ancient system gave the subjects a

constitutional right to set up a new and competent king, "when the ruler became incompetent to give proper protection to the people," and the Shastras have commended "the powerful subject, of whatever caste he might happen to be, who succeeds in protecting the people by righteously wielding the Rod of Chastisement, when robbers raise their heads and an admixture of orders begins to take place". The lawgivers demand: "What need is there of a king who is not competent to grant protection?" (Sec. lxxviii, Sl. 35-43)

Efficient protection of the subject being the supreme responsibility of the king, Aryan Polity made him responsible for all losses that the subject might incur in consequence of burglaries and robberies. It was ordained that

if on account of inefficiency of the administration the subjects incur any loss and if the king fails to restore the subject the wealth that has been stolen by thieves, he should compensate the injured man from his own treasury or with money obtained from his officers. (Sec. lxxv, Sl. 10)

It will be interesting for the politicians to note that this effective measure was adopted by Emperor Shah Jehan with great success, as observed by Manouchi, the Venetian physician at the court of Emperor Aurangzeb, who stated in his valuable memoirs that by rendering the city magistrates and governors accountable for all losses incurred by the subjects in consequence of robberies, the Emperor cleared the country of robbers. We wonder what would be the fate of

the much-eulogised department entrusted by the State with the protection of the lives and properties of the subjects if this system were in practice to-day. It is no recompense to the robbed subjects to be told that robberies and burglaries are on the increase in consequence of the economic troubles. Since the days of Rob Roy all people know the primeval cause of robberies—the Law of Need and the Law of Might. When the lawmakers are deeply concerned as to the safeguards for the protection of the interests of the ruling class, the subjects have a right to ask what safeguards they can expect for the protection of their elementary rights of security of their lives and property.

CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

It has been seriously contended that India is used to a patriarchal form of monarchy and never knew of the constitutional form, which is a Western product, and it is questioned if the latter system is at all suitable for the soil. A study of the ancient Aryan Polity leaves no room for doubt that this nation was used to Constitutional Monarchy from its earliest days.

From the frequent use of significant words like *Vidatha*, *Sabha* and *Samiti*, in the *Rig Veda* (x. 71, 10.), in reference to assemblies for secular, religious and war purposes, Prof. Lüdwig came to the conclusion that the word *Sabha* referred to the Assembly of *Brahmins* and *Maghabans*, while the word *Samiti* referred to the

Assembly of the People. In the period of the *Mahabharata*, it is certain that Constitutional Monarchy was thoroughly well established and we find rules of classification of members of the assembly of counsellors, the formation of the Ministry and distribution of portfolios. There was no elective system in those days, the members of the assembly of counsellors being nominated by the king, but the number of members from each class or caste was fixed by the Constitutional Law of the Realm, *Danda Neeti*.

The assembly of counsellors was composed of four Brahmins, eight Kshatriyas, twenty-one Vaisyas, three Shudras and one member of the Soota caste. (Sec. lxxxv, 7,12)

We see from this composition that all the main classes were represented according to their importance in the realm and not according to their percentage in the population. The Shudras undoubtedly formed the bulk of the population but had only three representatives; the Brahmins, their supreme culture and position in society notwithstanding, had only four members, the Kshatriyas who formed the ruling class had only eight members, while the Vaisyas who had the greatest stake in the realm had 21 representatives and the Artisans, whose number in that period must have been quite insignificant, still were given a seat in view of the public utility of their calling. The purpose of administration being the common good of the nation as

a whole, and not merely to secure the separate interest of each class, the country smoothly advanced in progress under this system and did not give birth to any separate class interest.

In the formation of the Ministry, the Aryan Polity did not take any consideration of class or caste and that for very sound reasons. The ministry was composed of five ministers with a prime minister who was the king's preceptor. (Sec. lxxxiii, Sl. 18-20) These ministers were in charge of the different portfolios and as they were the heads of all the affairs of the State, the supreme concern of the lawgivers was for their fitness for the offices that were to be left in their charge. It was laid down as a standing rule for nomination of ministers that—

Ministers should be appointed in offices for which they are fit and should possess such qualifications as are needed for their respective occupations. (Sec. cxix, Sl. 3-7)

There is another aspect of the Aryan Constitution which calls for careful consideration when we think of introducing reforms in the present system. The Lawgivers never approved of arbitrary rule and we do not find any power given to the ruler to veto the counsels of the representatives. It is definitely stated for the guidance of the rulers:—

That king is obeyed in the world, who having listened to the counsels of wisdom accepts them abandoning his own opinion. The king who does not listen to the counsels in opposition to his own views contravenes the duties of the Kshatriyas.

And that eternal truth of all monarchies is reiterated :—

The rash king who disregarding the injunctions of the Sacred Books of the Constitution, acts with high-handedness in the kingdom, very soon meets with destruction. (Sec. xciii, Sl. 28-32)

Such are the ideals on which this nation has been nurtured from its birth.

APPOINTMENTS IN STATE SERVICE

The interest of the people being the sole concern of the lawgivers, they were very keen on a proper selection of the officers of the State, and as such all appointments were strictly according to fitness. There was nothing, as in the present system of administration, in the way of a reserved number of appointments for any class according to the percentage of population. It has been stated :—

There is no treasure more valuable to the king than the civil service composed of properly selected servants. (Sec. lvi, Sl. 34)

It was laid down as the principle underlying appointments in State Service :—

The ruler who wishes to achieve success should never appoint servants in situations higher than they deserve.

The foolish ruler who transgressing this law appoints servants in offices for which they are not fit fails to gratify the people. (Sec. cxix, Sl. 6-7)

To enable the rulers to select proper men the Books set forth the characteristic qualifications necessary for the different branches of the administration. Thus we see that for appointments in the Judiciary it was laid down :—

For hearing complaints and answers to disputants the rulers should appoint persons possessed of wisdom and a knowledge of the affairs of the world, for the State really rests upon a proper administration of Justice. (Sec. cxix, Sl. 3. 7)

It is not the purpose of these paragraphs to set forth any scheme of Reforms, nor are they intended as a criticism of any of the schemes that have been suggested from different quarters. As indicated at the outset, the only purpose of publication of these lines is to place before the reader an idea of the line of thought of the Aryans upon the questions which are in the melting pot to-day. The history of the world if it has taught anything has taught that—What is good for one land at some time is not always good for all climes in all ages.

ACHINTYA MUKHERJEE

THE NEXT STEP FOR MAN

[The modern man should search the soul—this is the theme of these two articles one by an Englishman, the other by an American.—EDS.]

I.—SPIRITUAL DISHARMONY IN MODERN MAN

[George Godwin is the author of *Cain: The Future of Crime, Discovery* and other books.—EDS.]

On the evidence of biology, the physical evolution of man cannot be represented by the concrete image of a straight ascending line. It would be nearer the truth to represent his upward progress by the figure of a vast spiral set at an inclination, like the leaning tower of Pisa. Sometimes when man has been advancing in the evolutionary scale, he has had the appearance of descending: the curve of the spiral has been downward; but the downward path has been, in reality, the path of ascent.

Physically considered, the problem of all creation is the obvious one of striving for harmony with the changing conditions of the external world we know only from appearances.

In his early years man was a creature of conditioned reflexes, responding automatically to external stimuli, probably incapable of intellectual reasoning processes. At some time reason was born in him: he became a Thinking Animal, and the first and last of them. The emergence of intelligence placed in man's hands a mighty weapon for survival in a world peopled by visible enemies and enemies beyond the range of his vision.

But intelligence did more than that for him: it brought curiosity as to the nature of existence and the purpose of life itself. Thus came into being the first ethical concepts and the challenge of the other-regarding instinct to his purely self-regarding philosophy.

He became, in a word, both a religious and a social being. Perhaps, with the first altruistic act, the first noble impulse, selfless and pure, the soul of man was born. He became a trinity: body, mind and spirit. But his troubles were far from over. The old disharmonies still entangled him. He had acquired the power of thought, had related himself to the external world: but the past pursued him. Expressed in the terms of modern psychology, man had become psycho-physical, a being in which body, mind and soul contend for domination.

The story of man's conquest of his physical environment, the vast powers of his machines to produce the necessities of life and to transport them about the earth, his conquest of the great scourges and his vision, now cast across interstellar space, needs no stressing here.

There remained yet to be explor.

ed one central mystery : himself. Here, upon the upper coils of his vast spiral he now encounters the frosted mirror in which, vaguely, he sees the form of his essential self—the self of the mind and spirit.

The next phase of his evolutionary journey, then, is the conquest of himself, for no other problem, by comparison, presses so hard upon him.

Consider the world that is of his own creation, the world of hostile nations, of social injustice, of intolerance, bigotry, ignorance and fear, and the uses to which man has put his mind.

With vast power to his hand, with wealth of technical, scientific and political knowledge, all he has done is to extend the sphere of the hostile external world to embrace his own kind. The spirit of Cain has descended upon him, a fratricidal frenzy that takes him upon the inevitable path of self destruction. Having evolved from the silt of the sea-bed to become the earth lord, he now sets about the destruction of his dominion. That is the human tragedy, or some great part of it.

To the hand of man lies ready the instrument of his economic, political and spiritual salvation. The world groans under its burden of problems, not because man strives impotently towards their solution, but because he sets himself resolutely to intensify and multiply them.

Intellect without spirit is an unlit lamp. In the spiritual gloom man conjures from every shadow

the monstrous shapes of his haggard fancy, sees everywhere enemies and malign influences. Where shall one find the key to this tragic mystery if not in the latent possibilities of man's neglected spiritual force?

For, just as throughout geological and biological time he has effected by instinctual processes adjustment and adaptation, so now he faces his last great problem: it is, in a word, to overcome the soul-lag which to-day leaves his intellect without the direction of wisdom and blind to the eternal values behind the shifting scene of the world kaleidoscope. *All man's political and economic ills to-day derive from his folly. He has learnt the use of his intellectual apparatus, but he has failed to consult his spirit.*

There are modern minds that question the blessedness of an age dominated by action, an age that has set up for itself gods of ferro-concrete and burnished steel. The multiplication of desires, the objective of our age, is but the multiplication of evils, for the gifts of life lie in the fulfillment of the spirit of man.

Will man's lagging soul, the restless prisoner of his blind intellect, free itself in the fullness of time? Will he, armed by the new knowledge of the nature of his mind, apply it to both self-adjustment and his relations with his fellows?

We do not know. All we do apprehend is the core of this vast problem of human conduct.

To-day, the nations of the world are self-regarding, just as are the countless units that compose them.

It is with the first signs of the coming of the other-regarding impulse that one may see some faint hope of salvation for a world groaning in a self-imposed captivity.

GEORGE GODWIN

II.—ASCETICISM: FALSE AND TRUE

[In the following article **Dr. Irl Goldwin Whitchurch** develops further the analysis of asceticism which appeared in his *Philosophical Basis of Asceticism in the Platonic Writings and in Pre-Platonic Tradition*. For the past thirteen years Dr. Whitchurch has been Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Ethics at the Garrett Biblical Institute at Evanston (Illinois), U. S. A.—Eps.]

Through the centuries the story of moral development yields scant consolation for the mind that would dismiss the problems of asceticism by reading them out of court. Wherever men have lived nobly or thought deeply on the problems of the moral life, the issues of asceticism inevitably have presented themselves for consideration. Plato tells us that the real issue of the *Republic* is the contrast between existence (*to tsên*) and living well (*to eu tsên*). The distinction points directly toward (*asketê*), an exercise, training, or discipline in the moral life. In this Plato is but speaking the language of mankind. Every people give some practical expression to the moral gymnastic. In simple truth, the problems of asceticism are nourished in a central and permanent feature of the moral consciousness. Interest in them is inseparable from man's resurgent quest of the good life. To that fact history bears direct testimony. On this plane East and West are one. Neither in theory nor in practice has asceticism any simple or single historical setting.

Moral experience has two sides :

An inner and an outer, the self and its environing world. From this duality springs an unresolved conflict between *becoming* and *having*, a battleground of claims and counterclaims, between character and its accessory conditions. The tension growing out of this duality of the moral life has been greatly intensified under modern conditions. The greatest single factor in modern life is the development of the natural sciences. To some degree practically every people has felt the influence of the so-called scientific method. Bacon framed its motto : " Knowledge is power. " By this he meant that a fuller understanding of the processes of the natural world would give man control over its resources.

The extent and the rate with which nature's powers have been transferred into the hands of man constitute a standing marvel. Famine and flood, pestilence and disease, no longer ravage without intelligent human resistance. We know how to create abundance and want. As a complement to this transfer of nature's powers, however, an unforeseen situation has arisen. While modern man was

becoming lord over nature, modern men were slowly enmeshed within nature as its unwitting victims. Of us, more truly than of men in any previous epoch, is it written that life consists in things created by the magic of the applied sciences. What began as a method for gaining power over nature "for the relief of man's estate" is on the way toward developing into a network of invisible controls over men.

Scientific intelligence has joined hands with untutored common sense in stressing the dependence of the good life upon external conditions. The task of sifting moral values is now unspeakably complex. In our situation there is less exposure to the dangers of a false asceticism, our surroundings are so well adapted to the satisfactions of the sensuous self. In this direction the magic of a scientific intelligence has builded an earthly paradise. Physical nature's wealth has been uncovered. We are in love with it. It seems like a real home. And unquestionably, under proper conditions, the values which a scientific intelligence places at our disposal do contribute to the enrichment of moral living.

But the sensuous self, left to its uncontrolled and unguided satisfactions, in time reaches a saturation point. Its satisfactions are not only tantalizingly transient, but positively self-destructive. When this is realized, a violent reaction usually sets in. As men discover that many good things may get out of perspective and so constitute a moral peril, they fear and

then despise them. Traditional moralists set out this moral tension as a contest of flesh against spirit. Along the road of self-gratification one became a satyr; on the way of self-denial, a saint. Not knowing the body's proper functions in the good life, many have fled the body and its satisfactions. The only safeguard they could devise was to abolish all relationships with the sentient self, to annihilate its values. Partly as a recoil from disillusionment, these persons have determined to seek the good life over "the dead body". In this way rightful means to wholeness of life become falsely regarded as ends. When self-sacrifice is taken as a goal, it fails to hold out a worthy end *for* which to surrender the lesser values. Such a false asceticism is a degrading form of moral aberration.

An eternal restlessness haunts the soul. That restlessness is not of negation alone, or primarily. Self-sacrifice is its language, but the process is a double one. Living involves giving up something one might have, because such surrender is indispensable to any kind of willing whatsoever, and more especially to the solid attainment of a higher goodness. Self-sacrifice is, accordingly, inevitable. Only a part of its nature can be read in that ancient virtue of self-control. In genuine self-sacrifice is found a superior achievement of moral disinterestedness, a level of life from which all the flavour of self-seeking has vanished. Here is seen the central feature of a completely moral will. It is a jewel, as

Kant said, that shines by its own light. No extraneous interest mars its motive.

Just at this peak of goodness a critical exposure to a false asceticism occurs through a subtle form of self-deception. The conditions most favourable to the recognition of a fact may be confused with the fact itself. *Because self-sacrifice is the window through which disinterestedness in willing is most clearly seen, self-sacrifice is sometimes mistaken for the whole of good will.* Thus the positive side of goodness falls into obscurity and a distorted self-sacrifice becomes an end in itself. A blighting pessimism inevitably follows such a perversion of moral values. Self-sacrifice is no longer rightly understood as an indispensable concomitant of a finite will on its way toward moral maturity. Living has broken its sense of unity and reconciliation with the spirit of reality within and beyond the self, and it sinks into a futile and self-defeating round of activity.

Disaster to the moral life is imminent, either from an asceticism blind to the conditions of moral growth or from a degenerate hedonism. Modern intelligence has shown that man is organic to nature; the sciences

have naturalized him. In one direction, this formula points to a naturalistic reductionism in which man is nothing but a highly socialized animal. On the other hand, it sets a new task for the moralist. He must learn so to co-ordinate the values of the new "natural" man that they may serve the ends of the spiritual man. The natural values must acquire in Plato's phrase, a "measure," a reasoned proportion—and so become part of a harmonious whole. Here is the principle of a true asceticism. As a moral quality, goodness is neither an endowment of nature nor an undisciplined natural growth. Slowly and laboriously the stature of moral maturity is attained. The good life is a perpetual *askesis*, a training in denial for the sake of an intrinsically worthy end.

The genius of a true asceticism lies in its concept of the self. The genuine ascetic knows himself as a dynamic will that finds satisfaction in a unique system of values; not as a thing, but as an individualized spiritual process that lives and has its destiny in the attainment of a higher and more rational kind of willing. Self-transformation and self-transcendence are its law of life, the maturity of its spiritual potentialities its central principle.

IRL GOLDWIN WHITCHURCH

UNDERSTANDING THE CHINESE THROUGH THE TÀO TEH KING

[Merton S. Yewdale is a musician and a journalist, and he here indicates the influence of the Taoist thought on China. *The Tào Teh King* is one of those rare books which have attained immortality ; its wisdom is for all men, but our civilization has not yet risen to the altitude necessary for a real and full appreciation of its doctrines.—EDS.]

Although China has been influenced by Confucianism, Buddhism, Mohammedanism and Christianity, fundamentally she has been guided throughout her history by the doctrines of Taoism, both in her national and in her personal life. Nor is this strange: China has always lived in the past and revered it; and it is only natural that she should be influenced most by her earliest religion. True it is, that Lâu-Tsze wrote his *Tào Teh King* in the sixth century, B. C.; but his references to "the men of old," from whose writings he quotes, indicate that there was a Taoism much older than his, but by how many centuries we have no means of knowing. That Taoism is deeply embedded in the very essence of Chinese life and forms the basis of it, can hardly be disputed.

When we view the Chinese people, we observe a huge mass that presents all the appearance of a solidarity, so close that only rarely does an individual emerge from it and stand out for any conspicuous merit or achievement. Yet that solidarity is an illusion; for no people were ever more individual than the Chinese. Deep in the heart of each one of them is a feeling of being attached more to

the universal than to the individual life—tethered to the Tào. Consequently, though they live and work in the mass, they are personally detached and are not dependent upon each other. They do pool themselves or their interests; but dealing with them *en masse*—as a government, for instance—is merely treating with so many individuals whom the teaching of centuries has made sensitive about assuming the leadership and imposing their mind on that of others. Lâu-Tsze writes:—

Therefore the sage holds fast in his embrace
The Unity, and its example shows,
From self-display is free, and therefore shines,
From self-assertion, so distinguished grows,
From self-praise free, his merit is confessed,
From self-exalting, so will standing gain,
And since he strives not, none with him can strive.

Likewise, living more in the world of the universal—the Tào—and detached from his fellow-men, the Chinese does not fear death, but views it with philosophical calm and resignation. "The going forth is life; the coming home is death," says Lâu-Tsze simply.

In their readiness to die is reflected another cardinal trait—patience with life, which arises out of their dependence upon the Tào for guidance. Lâu-Tsze taught that if man surrendered himself to the Tào, the way of Heaven, he

would be told what to do and when to do it, and all would be well. But if he depended upon his own reasoning mind—the Way of Man—he would certainly go wrong. Chinese patience is therefore but the confident waiting upon the Tão for light and for the command to act. It is not the patience of the Western world which too often is a self-imposed restraint, frequently fretful and unsettling, but a cosmic calm of certitude, that what is to come will be right and in the appointed time.

Great Tão is all pervading,
At once on left and right.
It may be found, and all things wait
On it for life and light.

To be in harmony with the Tão, one must have no selfish desires. When the Chinese in general have acquired the necessities of life, they have no further desires. As a people, they have no imperialistic aims, no desire to bargain for international advantages. If things are upset, all they wish is to put them right so that they can again withdraw back into themselves. "When the work is done. . . is the time to withdraw and disappear, and that is Heaven's Way." The Chinese are like water, Lâu-Tsze's favourite illustration of the Tão: it seeks the lowest place and draws down the higher streams into it. The ocean, like the Chinese, is, in its depths, calm, quiet, peaceful, contented, leisurely. If it is rough, it is only on the surface; and it is not the ocean itself that has raised the waves, but the wind, which does not last. "A violent wind will not outlast the morning." The ocean waits for

the wind to subside so that it can return to its state of peace and rest and quiet. Likewise, even when the sun draws up the water into the clouds, the ocean finally forces them open and the water returns in the form of rain. The water has been disturbed and taken from its home in the ocean which it loves and to which it seeks to return.

The highest goodness that we know has water
for its type,
It benefits all things, yet ever flows
To the spot which men disdain, the gutter and
the plain,
And so is near the Tão, its archetype.

Just as water strives to get back to its home in the ocean, so do the Chinese who are far from home look forward to returning and being buried in Chinese soil.

But there are comparatively few Chinese abroad; for they are not curious about other lands and other peoples, and they seldom travel for pleasure or information.

Without going beyond his doorway
One may know all beneath the sky.
Without peeping out from his window
See the Tão of Heaven go by:
And the farther he goes from home he finds
That knowledge becomes less nigh.

So the sages did not travel
To acquire a knowledge of things,
They named them aright without wasting
Their life in vain journeyings;
And, striving not, accomplished ends
By the power which quietude brings.

The Chinese are like monks who, because they live widely in the universal spirit, can live narrowly and contentedly in a restricted life on earth—and they live long because they are satisfied.

And he who knows contentment has the all-sufficient cure,
And, satisfied, will evermore endure.

Lâu-Tsze promised longevity as a reward to those who lived in the light of the Tão—which is

prophetic; for China, after thousands of years still lives strongly, and individual Chinese have been known to live beyond the age of one hundred and fifty.

"He who loses not his place lives long"; and therein lies another Chinese principle: the necessity for preserving one's honour—saving one's face, as we term it in the West. Living amid huge masses of people, the individual Chinese holds his position among his fellow-men, not by any special achievement of renown, but by the honour in which he as a person is held. He may not be entirely successful in dealing, he may be defeated on the field of battle, he may lose his possessions; but he has not lost caste if he is still held in honour by his fellows:—

Which is nearer you,
Your name or yourself?
Which is more to you,
Your person or your pelf?

And is your loss or gain
The more malicious elf?
Extreme love's price
Must be paid with sacrifice.

China is both masculine and feminine: thinking and reasoning as a man, and acting and feeling as a woman. "He who knows the masculine, and yet retains the feminine, will be the whole world's channel."

Consider the female, the woman
Overcomes by her quietude wholly,
Some make themselves lowly to conquer,
Some conquer because they are lowly.

Like a womanly woman, China makes no advances to the rest of the world. China waits—quiet, calm, expectant, but unwilling to give or to receive unless the request is in harmony with the spirit of the Chinese ritual. China is still an enigma, which the rest of the world will never completely understand until it knows that book which so penetratingly reveals the Chinese—*The Tao Teh King*.

MERTON S. YEWDALE

It is recorded that during a visit Lao Tzu said to Confucius—"The men about whom you talk are dead, and their bones are mouldered to dust; only their words are left. Moreover, when the superior man gets his opportunity, he mounts aloft; but when the time is against him, he is carried along by the force of circumstances. I have heard that a good merchant, though he have rich treasures safely stored, appears as if he were poor; and that the superior man, though his virtue be complete, is yet to outward seeming stupid. Put away your proud air and many desires, your insinuating habit and wild will. They are of no advantage to you;—this is all I have to tell you. Why do you not obtain the Tao? This is the reason—because you do not give it an asylum in your heart."

When Confucius returned he said to his disciples:—

"I know how birds can fly, fishes swim, and animals run. But the runner may be snared, the swimmer hooked, and the flyer shot by the arrow. But there is the dragon—I cannot tell how he mounts on the wind through the clouds, and rises to heaven. To-day I have seen Lao Tzu, and can only compare him to the dragon."

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE RENAISSANCE OF PERSIAN POETRY*

[Dr. Reynold A. Nicholson is Professor of Arabic and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; he has also served as Professor of Persian in the University College, London. He is the recognized authority on Arabic and Persian lore, and his respected name appears on several volumes, some originally written by him—others, Persian and Arabic Texts, most ably edited and annotated by him. Among his critical works are *The Mystics of Islam*, *Studies in Islamic Poetry*, and *The Idea of Personality in Sufism*. Since 1925 he has been working on Jalaluddin Rumi's *Mathnawi* which is to be completed in six volumes; four are already published and have been reviewed in THE ARYAN PATH for July, 1933.—EDS.]

Mr. Irani and the friends who assisted him in compiling this excellent anthology of Persian verse (with numerous English translations) have earned the gratitude of all interested in Persian literature and not indifferent to its development in modern times. Since the twentieth century has finally exploded the myth of "the unchanging East," such indifference can no longer shelter itself under the plea that the new Persian poetry is merely an inferior imitation of the old. Not that it is altogether unlike: in its form and diction there is, of course, much that recalls Firdausi, Sa'di, and Hafiz. One still finds the lover's burning heart described as "roast-meat" and his sighs as "black smoke"; the familiar images and allusions are still there, side by side with references to radium, motors, trains, and Longfellow's *Psalm of Life*. It must be allowed that these incongruities are somewhat disenchanting, at any rate to European readers who have delighted in the opulent beauty and harmony of the masterpieces of

Persian literary art. But in order to appreciate the poems collected in this volume we must lay prepossessions and comparisons aside and try to judge the achievement of the youngest generation on its own merits. What are the qualities by which it is especially distinguished? In the first place, I should say, by its vitality. Whatever else the writers may be, they are thoroughly alive to the needs of their time, eager to play a man's part in shaping the destinies of their race, and animated by the resolve to build up a spiritual and intellectual culture worthy of the great traditions of Iran—a culture founded on self-control rather than self-assertion, self-respect that respects the rights of others, patriotism that is neither arrogant nor inhumane. Eshqi lays the scene of his operetta, *Rastakhiz* (the Resurrection) in the ruined palace of the Sasanian emperors at Ctesiphon. Cyrus, Darius and the rest, one by one, rise from their graves to mourn for Iran, till in response to their invocation the Spirit of Zoroaster appears, bidding his

* *Poets of The Pahlavi Regime*. By DINSHAH J. IRANI. The Pestonji D. Patel, Memorial Iranian Series, Vol. IV. (H. T. Anklesaria, Bombay.)

people learn again the ancient Wisdom.

Good deeds, good words, good thoughts—the Iranians cared not for this Message, and headlong have they fallen in woe to-day.

O East, arise and by your Righteousness put to shame the West.

I hope and pray that when the East shall find power in its hands, it will use its strength only to bring rest and happiness to the world. May it not act like the West driving men hither and thither; may it not bring shame on mankind and humanity!

Henceforth let none ever remain in bondage! Henceforth let all who breathe, live freely their lives!

These poets take themselves seriously; they preach a gospel in which they ardently believe and which makes a powerful appeal to Persian youth. The former scepticism, hedonism, pessimism and fatalism are gone.

Lay thy hands on thy own knees and raise thy stature straight; bend not thy back of lofty spirit by accepting the supporting arm of someone else.

Where the *utile*, however exalted, is the mainspring of poetry, one cannot as a rule expect that much attention will be paid to the claims of its charming sister. Aesthetically considered, the average is not very high, but since the authors are Persians they never fall below a certain artistic standard, and often show remarkable skill in adapting time-honoured models to new themes and ideas or in creating fresh forms of expression. Eshqi, Pour-e-Davoud and Iraj may be singled out as examples of this. *The Ideal* of the first-named, a tragic and moving story of innocence betrayed, leaves no doubt as to the genius of its author, who

was only thirty years old when he died. It is represented here by ample selections, which must be read in their entirety. From Iraj, a poet equally gifted in his way, I may quote Mr. Irani's translation of a few lines, almost Greek in their exquisite grace and simplicity.

MY MOTHER

They tell me that when my mother gave birth to me, she taught me to suckle her with my lips.

For nights and nights beside my cradle she sat wakeful and taught me to sleep.

She held my hand and took me step by step, so that she taught me how to walk about.

She placed her smiling lips on mine and taught the rose-bud to blossom (i. e., smile).

One letter and two letters she placed on my tongue, in the shape of words, and taught me to speak.

Thus my very existence is all due to her; while my life endures, therefore, I will always love her.

What has been said, little though it is, may serve to indicate the general character of the collection and its value for anyone who wishes to understand the thoughts and ideals of the modern Persian nation. From this point of view it will repay careful study, while it also provides students of literature with copious materials for investigating the problems in which they are interested and for judging the work of about a hundred representative poets of the period. I should add that the editor, to whose energy and devotion the bulky volume owes its existence, has introduced it with an essay on the study of Persian poetry, extending from the Gathas to the Pahlavi renaissance.

R. A. NICHOLSON

WHEN EUROPE WAS NOT*

[G. D. H. Cole recommends a change in our educational curricula so that the ancients may teach the moderns.—EDS.]

It is not yet fully realised how immensely the recognised scope of human history has altered during the last hundred, and even during the last twenty years. It was the geologists who took the first hand and altered chronology based upon the Old Testament almost beyond recognition, so that there are few now who would not smile at Archbishop Usher's careful dating of the Creation at 4004 B. C. It was realised early in the nineteenth century that the appearance of a human species on the earth must have taken place at a considerably earlier date. These early species, however, whose very existence was for some time a matter of such bitter dispute between "religious" and "scientific" minds, were not "history"; they were primitive people, savages, "noble savages" perhaps, but still, savages more like the Polynesians or the Andaman Islanders than even medieval Europeans, and as such they were the concern of anthropological specialists rather than historians or students of history. History, as a subject of study, was still bounded by the twin influences of classical education and the Bible; there were ancient Greece and ancient Rome, known from Herodotus, Thucydides, and their kin; there was an Egyptian civilisation which was known to be older, and which, since the deciphering of the Rosetta Stone and the calculations of Egyptologists, was gradually appearing to be much older; and there was a curious pool of history relating to Syria and Palestine, of which the earlier parts were beginning to seem a little doubtful. Outside these oases was legend, like the writings of Homer and the sacred books of Indians and Chinese, and "primitive peoples".

Then came Schliemann, that inspired shop-boy, who, refusing to

accept the current rejection of anything that sounded romantic in historical narrative, went to dig up the site of Troy, and found, not one Troy, but seven, and not Troy only, but the first traces of the lost and high civilisation which we know now as Minoan; and following him Sir Arthur Evans and his colleagues elevated the age of Crete and Mycenae almost to the dignity of true history. Meantime the golden age of the excavators was beginning; the story of Egypt was being filled in and dated, and diggings in Asia Minor revealed one of the dim tribes with whom Joshua fought as a Hittite empire with a wide culture and dominion reaching to the confines of Babylonia. In Mesopotamia itself progress was rapid. Quite early Hammurabi's stone yielded up its secrets, and an excited employee of the British Museum rushed in to tell his colleagues that he had just read the original report of the Flood; but it was not until this century was well advanced that Mr. Leonard Woolley's startling discoveries unearthed the whole unsuspected civilisation of Ur of the Chaldees and Sir John Marshall described the pre-Aryan communities of the Indus valley. And now comes Professor Childe, whose book on *The Most Ancient East* was published only in 1928, with the confession that the new material which has been dug up since then is so vast and so important that no revision of his earlier volume will serve, and telling us of civilisations in Babylonia earlier than the dynasties of Ur and far earlier than Sargon and in Egypt earlier even than the pre-dynastic discoveries of Sir Flinders Petrie, linked up with the communities of Anam and Mohenjo-daro by way of strange new excavations in Waziristan and Baluchistan.

The point on which emphasis should

* *New Light on the Most Ancient East: The Oriental Prelude to European Prehistory*. By V. GORDON CHILDE. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, London. 15s.)

be laid is that these excavations are concerned with historical peoples, real civilisations, and not in any sense with primitive tribes. The men of Ur were not savages, far less so, indeed, than some of the peoples of the Old Testament or of medieval Europe; they wrote and traded, built and governed, and their civilisation endured far longer than some which have had much more pretension. It is true that their history is not likely to pass into the history read and studied in schools, owing largely to the difficulty of language and dating. Even where the language can be read or will be read, the perusal of inscriptions conveys little to the general reader, and archaeology remains a specialised subject. One pot, and one gold ornament, look very like the next to the uninstructed. The enormous advantage which the evolution of the Greek language gave to Greece and to those countries and persons whose luck it was to be visited by Herodotus, cannot easily be outweighed, and their effect is that the reconstruction of Minoan or Sumerian civilization needs an imaginative effort of which few are capable.

Nevertheless, it would be a great pity if the effort were not made and if the new knowledge which Professor Childe and his colleagues are now studying were not at any rate partly absorbed into modern educational

curricula. For the result of their work is that within the last few decades the beginnings of human civilisation, in the sense in which all would understand it, have been put back at least three and probably four thousand years in this corner of the world alone, quite apart from what further excavations in China, India and elsewhere may disclose, and surely this doubling of the age of civilisation should have some effect on the perspective of teachers and taught? It may be rather more difficult to envisage the habits of Shubbiluliuma and A-anni-padda than those of Themistocles, but surely it is not quite impossible?

Professor Childe's book is not one for the layman to criticise in detail, the less so as it is based of necessity largely on material which is still only available in specialist journals. Suffice it to say that it is an admirably clear, documented and fully illustrated account, which brings out not merely the civilised character of these civilisations but the wide differences between them, so that Mohenjo-daro, for example, clearly did not resemble Ur or Eridu in social and political structure. We hope that the next five years' excavations may provide Professor Childe with material for another volume as valuable.

G. D. IL. COLE

WHAT IS MECHANISM?*

[C. Delisle Burns is a keen Rationalist and here examines the visions of an idealist.—EDS.]

It would be absurd to argue against a poet because his metaphors were not connected; and probably a prophet is a sort of poet. His different visions at different moments may lead to statements which are contradictory and, if taken in their usual sense, false. But Shelley meant to express his emotions when he said to a skylark—"Bird thou never wert." And so Dr. Jacks, in his attempt to express his reaction to mech-

anism and to theories of the universe derived from mechanism, may be useful to many who feel a similar reaction. He says that there is a revolt against mechanism, which was led by Bergson. The revolt is a sign of the creative impulse in the "mind," or perhaps the impulse is "mind". In Religion the revolt is to be found nowadays as an effort against a resisting medium, normally a creed. And Dr. Jacks's

The Revolt Against Mechanism. By L. P. JACKS, Hibbert Lectures, 1933. (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. 2s. 6d.)

argument concludes with some reference to "the intellectual confusion of our time". The remedy suggested appears to be an emotional state in which one chants a creed, because it is not as obviously true as the multiplication table.

In the course of these Hibbert Lectures, many interesting analogies are pointed out: and there is the play upon words which preachers of sermons often practise. Thus Dr. Jacks finds it interesting that George Fox spoke of an "ocean of light" and that Sir William Bragg wrote a book called *The Universe of Light*, although there is not the smallest connection between them. The preacher of sermons is a good example of what the old psychologists used to call the association of ideas, for one word reminds him of another in some other book; and he drags in the new idea following upon the use of the same word in another sense. As sermons, however, Dr. Jacks's Hibbert Lectures are typical of the attempt to modernise the habit of preachers; and probably some readers need that kind of "philosophy" which contains the latest terms in a sort of emotional unity.

The real difficulty, however, is that Dr. Jacks's ideas in these Lectures have no connection one with another. All the ideas may be good; but their presentation is like that of a string of beads. Mechanism, for example, may refer to motor-cars and automatic production machines. It is said by sentimentalists that there is a revolt against these; but if so, the revolt must be singularly ineffectual, for everyone uses the results of modern transport and production. Dr. Jacks then refers to armaments. In what sense they are misuses of mechanism, it is difficult to see. They are useful means for very bad ends: but aeroplanes are no more wicked than spears or Roman catapults. However, no conclusion is reached in this matter. On the other hand, "mechanism" may mean a theory of nature. The word so used

implies a metaphor. It is a pity that machines became popular just at the time that exact and invariable concomitance of certain aspects of nature was recognised to be important; and Scientists who are bad philosophers, such as Eddington and Jeans, become confused when they speak of the logic of the sciences. Some people are said to be worried by the idea that we can have an exact knowledge of causal connections. Predestination drives some people mad. But it is no argument either for or against a theory that acceptance of it makes one uncomfortable.

Dr. Jacks says that "creative thinking has little use for the world's problem and solution". But what about Plato? Perhaps Dr. Jacks has not understood that the chief task of thought is not the solution of a problem but the statement of it: very great creative thinking is required for that. The book speaks of the "confusion of thought" and the "mood of bewilderment" which are supposed to occur to-day. But these phrases are never explained. Some people are not confused: and the confession of ignorance is not bewilderment. Perhaps Dr. Jacks is thinking of the differences between different people's thought, for there are many who disagree entirely with him. But that is not "confusion". We are no longer in the Middle Ages, when everyone thought alike. The words really refer to an emotional state of uncertainty, which has affected those who try to retain their old beliefs in spite of the evidence against them. And Dr. Jacks proposes to restore certainty by an emotional effort, like chanting a creed. This may succeed. Every creed is believed more "firmly," in that way, in proportion as the logical grounds for believing it are felt to be wanting. But the result is hardly a philosophy. Why indeed should it be? There are many who would be better without too great a strain on their intelligence; and these can find satisfaction in an emotional ecstasy.

Religion and The Sciences of Life.
BY WILLIAM McDUGALL. (Methuen
and Co., Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

Sir Oliver Lodge is reported to have stated the other day that the modern world knows too much of science for its own safety and that unless scientific knowledge is directed into channels of universal benefit the crash of civilization into ruin must be considered imminent. Prof. William McDougall has now recorded his conviction in a fine collection of fifteen essays devoted to a discussion of the relation between religion and the sciences of life (psychology and biology in particular), that the evidence furnished by the latter is quite adequate and sufficient to vindicate religion and religious values. The main arguments emphasised by Dr. McDougall are three: I. With the rejection of the mechanistic view of life, through "resolute purposing," "wise planning," and "vigorous action," collective man, "may make himself master of his destiny" (p. 35). II. Through the instrumentality of his scheme of family allowances and the adoption of positive eugenic measures (of course side by side with the negative measures) Prof. McDougall envisages social and national reorganization on the basis of increased civic worth of individuals in general. This eugenic reform is expected to lead on to an uninterrupted and perennial supply of the proper form of leadership in every walk of life. The author complains that at present "the supply is far from equal to the need" (p. 155). III. Biology and psychology "show that the living being is more than a concatenation of physical forces," and support the affirmation that "man is a spiritual being whose proper work is to make the spiritual prevail over the material or physical aspects of the world" (p. 10).

Let me consider the third first. If Dr. McDougall believes that the life-mission of man is to make the spiritual prevail over the material he is already a Vedantin who desires to see the

ultimate triumph of the *Adhyatma* over the *Adhibhautika*. A biologist or psychologist who tells students of Hindu thought that man is more than a machine or a concatenation of physical forces just carries coal to Newcastle. Indian ethics, logic, psychology and metaphysics (the *Darshanas*) are grounded on the basic fact of the existence of a spiritual entity encased in a subtle body (*Linga-Sarira*) that determines and regulates its trans-migratory career, and in a gross body (*Sthula-Sarira*) with its nervous or neuro-muscular system or mechanism which is the weapon of adjustment to environment.

Dr. McDougall's scheme of family allowances and the Utopia that is hoped to be ushered in by its application smack too much of behaviorism. I am afraid Dr. McDougall's scheme may not be able to "condition" this or that individual into a leader or politician. Notwithstanding the Lamarckian doctrine of transmission in which Dr. McDougall appears to have implicit faith, it is hazardous to claim that competent leaders will be almost automatically supplied when once the scheme of family allowances has been standardized and rendered amenable to fool-proof working. Dr. Watson himself, the leader of the behavioristic movement, was good enough to write to me in answer to my critical notice of his *New Behaviorism* that conditioning had very obvious limits and that he regarded behaviorism only as a method and not as a doctrine. Whether the conditioning occurs, or is stage-managed under laboratory conditions or under the conditions contemplated in respect of the scheme of family allowances, it should be borne in mind that the concrete application of the scheme is not likely to work wonders.

Dr. McDougall's emphasis on the rejection of the mechanistic view of life, and on the ability of the collective man to make himself master of his destiny, formed and reinforced in the light of the evidence furnished by biology and psychology, does not guarantee that

such ability will not be used in the gigantic game of exploitation of the weak by the strong.

From the standpoint of Indian thought in general and of the Vedānta in particular, the conclusion arrived at by Prof. McDougall does not afford any help to earnest enquirers. If the sciences of life stop with only the vague indication that man is more than a mere concatenation of physical or biochemical forces, it is obvious they cannot render any significant service to pilgrims on the Aryan Path. Dr. McDougall seeks to maintain that the causal efficacy of man's spiritual ideas and the possibility and certainty of man's participation in the life of a realm of spirit (p. 6), which constitute the fundamental postulates of all religions, are not only not denied by biology and psychology, but the advancement of psychical research has demonstrated that man is an individualized ripple of the mighty ocean of spirit (p. 16). In the chapter on "World Chaos" again, Prof. McDougall emphatically asserts that if he were dictator, he would direct the powerful intellects to turn their attention away from the physical sciences and concentrate it on the human and the social sciences (p. 208). In other words, he desires to see the sciences of life function as exactly and accurately in regard to their subject-matter—men and minds—as the physical sciences in regard to theirs—matter. If he hopes to achieve such an exact knowledge of the imponderables as that of an astronomer about eclipses, he is crying for the moon.

Realization of the truth that man is

more than a concatenation of physical forces, and a study of the human and the social sciences, will not produce cosmos out of the chaos which Dr. McDougall and others deplore. Competition and exploitation are still the moving forces of the scientific civilization which cannot but culminate in chaos. An anthropological survey of school children (p. 111), intelligence tests, psychical research, will not save the crashing civilization. In the concluding chapter, "Whither America?" McDougall arraigns the attractive American civilization for certain characteristic defects none of which, as far as I am able to see, could be got rid of by means of anthropological and psychical research.

There is the path of scientific civilization and progress grounded on exploitation and competition. There is the Aryan Path grounded on *Dharma* (Duty), *Satya* (Truth), *Daya* (Pity), *Dana* (Charity), *Paschat-tapa* (repentance) and *Sarvabhootahita* (guarding the interest of all). *Quo vadis?* The *Karma* of individuals and nations will determine the choice,—not anthropological research. If Prof. McDougall wants me to be a researcher in biology and anthropology with a view to securing the qualitative advancement of my nation, I would, in my turn, invite him to walk the Aryan Path to save his civilization. Dr. McDougall may or may not convince you. He is a master of a particular type of thought and expression that challenge your attention. He leaves you refreshed and reinvigorated.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Ādarsha Sīdhu: An Ideal Monk. By A. J. SUNAVALA, B.A., LL.B. (Cambridge University Press, London. 5s.)

Mr. Sunavala has written the life of Vijaya Dharma Suri as a devoted friend. If one who did so much to revive Jainism and make it a living force in India to-day possessed faults, we are not told about them. The biographer

refrains from criticism. He is presenting a holy man: devout, learned, most gracious in manner—and in recording the monk's many good qualities he occasionally rises to heights of almost lyrical adulation. If he is partisan, we cannot escape the fact that he is dealing with a man of extraordinary nobility of character. There was so much

compelling sweetness about him that Mr. Sunavala frankly confesses that "to come under his spell was to be his for ever and ever". He claims, too, that the *Āchārya* resembled St. Francis of Assisi, "the tender brother of all who live and die".

Mūla Chandra was born in 1868 at Mahuvā in Kāthiāwār. Of humble parentage, the child showed no sign of his future vocation. He was idle at school, the despair of his master, and succumbed to gambling. It was when he had lost a considerable sum of money that he began to realise that his weakness was an "odious and debasing vice". He accordingly sought out a *Guru*, one Vṛiddhi Chandra, who later "initiated him into the holy Order of Monks," and in his nineteenth year was known as Dharma Vijaya. He succeeded his master, and with unfailing courage and devotion spread Jainism far and wide. He founded a school for that purpose and engaged in literary work, which included editing a series of sacred books of the Jains, almost to the hour of his death. Everything he did was directly or indirectly concerned with the Jain sect, and no one more faithfully served its founder, Mahāvira. Honours were conferred upon him in India and elsewhere. Among his friends were notable English, German, and Italian savants who never sought

in vain his rare wisdom. He was in a very real sense a link between East and West.

Jainism is one of the oldest religions that survives in India to-day, and it may be inferred that one whose main object in life was to restore its ancient Wisdom was a somewhat narrow-minded zealot. On the contrary no one could have been more free from bigotry and intolerance. Not only did he think that "intellectually and morally the Jains ran shoulder to shoulder with their Brahman and Buddhist brethren," but also that "Religion is One and Eternal".

Those long missionary travels, the preaching of countless sermons, succour for all who came to him, his fame as a scholar, are insignificant compared with the man himself. He was not a worker of wonders. The miracle, there for all to see, was his own goodness. There have been many saints in India, but few in modern times more worthy of the name. Tortured towards the end of his life by intense physical suffering, only able to speak in a whisper, his spiritual endurance never failed, nor did he withhold in suffering words of cheer for others. He taught "peace between man and man, peace between man and animal, peace everywhere and in all things, a perfect brotherhood of all that lives".

HADLAND DAVIS

Gilgamesh: Epic of Old Babylonia.

By WILLIAM ELLERY LEONARD. (The Viking Press, New York. \$2.)

Gilgamesh, central figure of more than one Sumerian myth, has been proven by archaeological discovery to have had actual historical existence as a Babylonian monarch, doubtless the fourth king of the first dynasty of Erech. Of his many remarkable feats and adventures, the best known and most elaborate account was unearthed at Nineveh, during the middle of the nineteenth century, in the form of twelve large, fragmentary clay tablets. Written in cuneiform script, these

comprise what is to-day known as the epic of Gilgamesh.

Following Professor Ranke's German free-verse version of the original translations of the ancient poem, aided by other, later, research work on the part of English and American scholars, William Ellery Leonard has rendered in very readable English verse the trials and struggles of Gilgamesh, ruler of Uruk (Erech). In pleasing, rhythmic fashion—interrupted at numerous points by regrettable gaps in the narrative, resulting necessarily from the fragmentary nature of the original tablets—

are set forth the battle and then friendship between Gilgamesh and the animal-like Engidu, their victory over the monster Khumbaba, their adventures culminating in the death of Engidu, and Gilgamesh's subsequent peregrinations in quest of the solution to the overbearing mystery of life and death.

Gilgamesh, "two thirds of him is god, one third of him is man," journeys to the mystic mountain Mashu, at the end of the earth, resisting all dissuasions, until he finds the god, Utnapishtim, whose counsel he seeks. Tormented and weary, Gilgamesh secures the plant of life, secret of immortal youth, only to have it taken from him, in a moment of laxity, by the sudden stealth of a serpent.

Furnishing further evidence of the universality of the traditions of the flood—a vivid account of which, bearing resemblances to the Biblical version, is included—and revealing the antiquity of such symbols as the serpent and the tree of life, *Gilgamesh*, is of more than passing interest to students of history, archaeology and folklore.

By modern scholars the poem is popularly held to be a depiction of the persistency but final futility of man's

efforts to escape his eternal fate. But in interpreting *Gilgamesh*, as well the myths and sagas of every land and race, those who will invoke what is known in the East as the *Heart Doctrine* will perceive a far more subtle and purposeful meaning than is evident to the devotees of the solely intellectual *Eye Doctrine*. And, unquestionably, there are many portions of *Gilgamesh* replete with suggestive material in support of the theosophical contention that the sagas and legends of the ancients represent the employment of historic data to symbolize the fierce struggle which goes on *within* the soul of man, once he sets out to control and subdue his animalistic, selfish nature, and rise to a realization of his true, inner, divine Self, or Reality.

In any event, Mr. Leonard's volume, maintaining scientifically accurate consistency with the original poem, along with an English free-verse rendition which of itself merits commendation, should find a welcome reception from all students of archaeology and ancient art and history, as well as all who desire a reliable, highly intelligible introduction to the Babylonian epic of *Gilgamesh*.

DAVID B. ROSENBERG

The Unknown God. By ALFRED NOYES. (Sheed and Ward, London. 7s. 6d.)

This book is an account of the processes of thought and emotion by which Mr. Alfred Noyes found his way from the Anglicanism in which he was brought up, through Agnosticism of the nineteenth century type, into the Roman Catholic Church; and it is at the same time an attempt to state some of the leading Roman Catholic doctrines in terms acceptable to the educated modern mind.

At least three quarters of the work is devoted to a vindication of the spiritual against materialism, which, save for an occasional passage of

sectarian tendency, may be read with edification and delight by all seekers for truth whatever religious label they may wear. Many of Mr. Noyes's arguments are set forth in passages of great beauty—whether of prose or poetry, as for example the following, which sounds most musically the authentic note of universal mysticism:—

Man is himself
The key to all he seeks.
He is not exiled from this majesty,
But is himself a part of it. To know
Himself, and read this Book of Earth aright,
Were to discover music that out-soars
His plodding thought, and all his fables, too.

How should man find it? Only through those
doors
Which, opening inward, in each separate soul,

Give each man access to that Soul of all
Living within each life, not to be found
Or known, till, looking inward, each alone
Meets the unknowable and eternal God.

which reminds one of those other words: "Look inward, thou art Buddha."

That Mr. Noyes, having posited the One Reality which underlies all the changes of the phenomenal universe, inscrutable to the intellect and knowable only through and in man's own Higher Self, proceeds to identify it with the personal deity of Catholic orthodoxy, does not detract from the splendour of his original conception.

When he tells us that

If by any chance this world were a place of gradual education where a process of soul-making was being carried on, it is obvious how much would be gained by beginning at the beginning and working up through every grade of the difficult ascent, learning all its laws by experience at first hand, and assimilating what we had learnt into the very fabric of our life,

an Eastern reader might be justified in assuming that he would go on to add that such a process of education could not possibly be completed in a single life on earth—could be completed only in a long series of incarnations. But in this matter Mr. Noyes seems to be blind to the only logical conclusion to be drawn from his premises. He nowhere mentions re-incarnation, that master-key to so many of the mysteries of life; and although he quotes freely from Plato and Plotinus, as well as Western writers both Christian and Agnostic, he entirely ignores the great religious philosophies of India. Were it otherwise, he might have discovered that many of the loftier elements in Christianity, which appear to him unique, are also to be found in systems far antedating the life of Jesus.

Mr. Noyes is under the impression, for instance, that Jesus alone among

sane men ever dared to speak as God, when he used such expressions as "I am the resurrection and the life," "I am the way, the truth, and the life," and therefore he must either be rejected as a blasphemous liar, or accepted as God incarnate in the peculiar sense ascribed to him by dogmatic Christianity. But the *Bhagavad-Gita* is full of parallel sayings in the mouth of Krishna, who identifies himself with the Supreme in precisely the same way as Jesus does.

So too, when he quotes Napoleon's words contrasting the still living influence of Jesus among men with the mere empty names that alone survive of such mighty statesmen as Caesar or Alexander, Mr. Noyes leaves out of his reckoning those other sublime Teachers—Krishna and the Buddha—whose words and lives, like those of Jesus, have come down through the centuries as vital influences, inspiring, uplifting and comforting countless millions of souls.

The last 100 pages, or so, of *The Unknown God* are given up to an attempted vindication of some of the doctrines peculiar to Christianity, e.g., original sin and the "incarnation," which Mr. Noyes sets forth in an idealised form, and defends with eloquent and lyrical rhetoric. It would be interesting to read what he might have to say about some of the more repulsive tenets of his Church, such as eternal damnation and the refusal of salvation to unbaptized infants. These famous—or infamous—teachings Mr. Noyes passes over without mention, although they must perforce be accepted by all Catholics; for the Church does not allow its members to pick and choose their beliefs; and regards it as equally guilty and equally heretical to reject one single item of its defined creeds as to reject the whole system.

R. A. V. M.

Forty-five Years in India: Memoir and Reminiscences of Principal Mackichan, D. D., LL. D. Edited by DAVID WILLIAMSON. (Ivor Nicholson & Watson, Ltd., London. 5s.)

Dr. Mackichan is one of the few Christian missionaries who have devoted the best part of their lives to the cause of education in India. He was the Principal of Wilson College, Bombay, and one of the foremost educationists in India. He will be remembered longest as the translator of the Bible into Marathi.

As the title indicates, this volume of 115 pages records in 13 chapters interesting recollections of the learned divine. Dr. Mackichan's regrettable remarks about the Indians expose his shallow understanding of India. He says impertinently:—

The Indians are a sensitive people and a single word or act which wounds their self-respect will consign to oblivion a life of generous benevolence. Three centuries of benevolent association between the British and the Indian races have left us to-day not only with a gulf between the peoples unbridged but with an antagonism that is threatening revolution continually.

He observes that the failure of British rule in India is due solely to this fact alone. If this be so it must be said that his study of India during forty-five years has been wholly on wrong lines. This is how the Christian padres fail to understand India, only because they are overwhelmed with deep-rooted predilections and selfish motives. The book, we are afraid, will interest only the admirers and friends of the author.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

Yoga for the West. By FELIX GUYOT. (Rider & Co., London. 3s. 6d.)

Yoga and Western Psychology. By GIRALDINE COSTER. (Oxford University Press, London. 5s.)

Both these books propound some very quaint and erroneous views about practices of Yoga taught by ancient Indian seers. Mr. Guyot's book especially, from beginning to end, contains the sorriest twaddle imaginable, and one cannot help wondering from what sources he has gathered all that he has dished up "for the West". The exercises laid down if seriously practised will produce mental and moral wrecks.

Miss Coster's book is not so hopeless, but clearly she has written it without understanding what true Yoga is. As the title of her book shows, she has had the presumption to compare what she miscalls "Yoga" with "Western Psychology" as understood by her. By "Western Psychology," however, she means only the system of psycho-analysis or what she calls "Analytical therapy" associated with the name of Freud, of whom she appears to be an enthusiastic admirer. Her main thesis appears to be that from the fusion of these two—"Yoga" and "analytical therapy"—

will result "an enlargement and intensification of consciousness". She maintains that the Yoga system by itself cannot achieve this result, which is enough to show her ignorance of the achievements of the true Yogis.

Miss Coster has in one chapter attempted to translate and elucidate the *Yoga Sutras* of Patanjali on the plea that the existing translations by Indians and by Englishmen are misleading and unreliable. Her bibliography indeed tells its own tale and affords an interesting commentary on the nature of Miss Coster's study. She appears to be unaware of several important renderings, including Mr. Judge's excellent edition. A study of Mr. Judge's introduction and his notes will go a long way towards bringing home to Miss Coster that she has totally misunderstood the great philosophy of Yoga.

Of late there has been a plentiful crop of books on Yoga which are gross travesties of the true teachings. Such books—among which we have to include the two under consideration—constitute a very grave danger to unwary readers.

J. P. W.

Reality and Illusion: A New Framework of Values. By RICHARD ROTHSCHILD. (Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York. \$3-50).

Mr. Richard Rothschild gives us in this book a concept of values in terms of ultimate reality or what he calls the individual's "Oneness of All Things". He thinks that the Western world representing the chief progressive element of modern civilisation has come to a state of chaos.

Aesthetic, political and ethical beliefs, such as there are, are unintegrated, unrelated, representing mere irrational elements, defended by sentiment or dogma, espoused haphazardly by special cliques of devotees.

To resolve the conflict and bring order into chaos, he undertakes a new framework of values in which physical science will be recognised as a significant realm of meanings but will not dominate the whole intellectual scene. His central thesis appears to be that reality is a realm of meanings; that every meaning is dependent to a large extent upon the maturity of the totality of a man's past experience as organised into his self; and that there is no virtue greater than insight or wisdom which alone can raise man to a higher level of being or give him inner peace. He examines different aspects of human experience, aesthetics, ethics, religion, organics, politics, mathematics, etc.,—in order to show how all our values are ultimately derived from the need for an integrated personality. Man cannot live by bread alone; so neither can he live by machines.

Without a larger world of values than that comprised within the framework of quantitative science, man contracts an intellectual or cultural scurvy no less real than that caused by physical food deficiencies. For deep down within himself man knows that there are other values.

The book is written simply and contains many valuable suggestions. But the metaphysical basis of his concept of values or his notion of ultimate reality is very unsatisfactory. We are told that there is an organisation of experiences at different levels the top of which represents the absolute. This

absolute alone has full reality. "All else is merely symbolic, tentative, incomplete, partly illusory." But this absolute that "gives everything else its meaning and reality" must at least be realised in some experience. Who has that experience? If no one has it, the absolute is quite unrealised and therefore unreal. If anybody has it, it is wrong to say, as our author says, that it is "the one thing which can never be known". The truth is that while we can only conceive of the absolute in terms of experience of some kind, we must either admit a non-human or superhuman form of experience as a present fact or give up the notion of the absolute altogether as present reality. The author never even hints at the possibility of an experience that is not human experience as ordinarily understood. The absolute for him should therefore only be a name for a certain possibility that can never be actualised. How can it be the only real thing?

The author rightly attacks realism as a philosophical creed in so far as it regards matter and mind as independent realities. He asks, "How it is possible that the individual can ever attain sufficient contact with that world to know *what* it is, or even *that* it is?" His view is that reality, even objectivity, must be thought of in terms of human values. But he himself does not seriously attempt to solve the philosophical problem which realism has to face. For all that he means is that the individual and his world are not separated by an uncrossable chasm, that interaction between them is possible and that matter and mind are not so very different as is often supposed. Indeed he goes to the opposite extreme when he says, "we see things as we do because we *tend*, *incline*, or *will* to see them so Every experience re-enacts the fiat 'Let there be light.'" But this raises more difficulties than it solves. His whole position on this philosophical issue is anything but clear.

All our knowledge of things, accord-

ing to him, consists of generalities and abstractions. We never know the particular or the unique and can never know it. This is certainly true. From this he proceeds to argue:—

To wonder at a thing as unknowable is to see it for what it is, to know it truly; to attempt to know it through the forms of reason is to shut oneself off forever from anything but a mere man-made concept or image.

But is this not paradoxical? Can agnosticism, the position that reality is not knowable as it is in itself, be very satisfactory or amount to right knowledge of a thing? Indeed in Vedanta, the *Ātman*, the only true reality, is said to be never knowable. But that is because it is so very immediate, and so fully and completely known that it cannot be made the object of thought and therefore of knowledge in general. The uniqueness of an object is not

similarly known. Can we then be satisfied with our ignorance?

The author rightly interprets the position of man in the universe as being all-important; deplores the lack of faith of the modern man; criticises the commonly held belief that modern life is too strenuous; blames all aimless activity as the real cause of our ills; identifies morality with true wisdom; argues that the real strength of the will consists not in withstanding temptation in brute force, so to say, but in "seeing the entire problem in so clear a light that temptation itself disappears"; shows how the culture of any age brings about a balance of forces, giving a new meaning to every custom and institution; and points out what is essential and what is unessential in any religion. The book gives a synoptic view of the entire field of human interests and deserves to be widely known.

G. R. MALKANI

Thomas More. By DANIEL SARGENT. (Sheed and Ward, London. 7s. 6d.)

When a great historical figure is named, usually we think first of the achievement, then of the man. Sir Thomas More is an exception. And he is an exception because his achievements occupied the circumference of his life, not its centre. He was, first and foremost, a spiritual being—and it is as such that Mr. Sargent presents him in this vivid and provocative book.

For More, there was the Kingdom of God and there were the kingdoms of the world—and never, for a single second, was the priority of the former's claim challenged by that of the latter. It was More's destiny to live in an age which transferred its allegiance from the spiritual to the temporal. He went to execution because his allegiance had been given, once and irrevocably, to the former.

It matters nothing that, for many of us to-day, the terms in which the issue presented itself to him have little relevance. Each age has its own symbols—and every age is revealed by its symbols. For More, the issue was definite.

The Pope represented the Spiritual; the King the Temporal. Symbols change, but for every man to-day, in his degree, the issue still stands—be the manner of its presentation what it may.

Character has been defined as the most permanent aspect of a man. More's most permanent aspect was his integrity. High office, fame, the friendship of the great, left that integrity unimpaired. He was immune to the contagion of the world's slow stain—and he possessed immunity because he held the world but as the world.

To "hold the world but as the world" is not difficult if it offers one little. More was a statesman, a diplomat and royal envoy, the friend of Erasmus and of Henry. His wit was such that his tongue was known from Scotland to Hungary. He was the one humanist of whom other humanists were not jealous—the only humanist who loved, or was loved by, an evil-smelling mob. Wherever he went he was remarked and remembered by all whom he met. He was serenely happy in his home. His house in Chelsea

"greeted all men: poor, rich, wise, foolish, kin, and stranger, as not outsiders". He wrote a book which has given the word, Utopia, to every European language. He could guide the intellectual life of the nation. He was the legal light of Tudor England. And he became Lord Chancellor.

It follows that if More held the world but as the world, it was not because it offered him little.

On Monday, in Holy Week, March 30th 1534, the Act of Succession was passed. Anyone who opposed the new succession was guilty of high treason. An oath was demanded from those whom the King or his inheritors might designate.

Saints of Chaos. By PETER OLIVER. (William Farquhar Payson, New York.)

Many have been the attempts to analyse the development of modern man and to explain the strange enigma of modern civilization. Mr. Oliver's book is just such an attempt. He explains modernism in the light of three great aspects of life: Truth, Beauty, Goodness, represented by three movements and three personalities responsible for the change wrought in the medieval Christian world. These are the Reformation represented by Martin Luther, Romanticism by Beethoven, and Science by Galileo. For Mr. Oliver, medieval Christianity was a complete unity which embraced truth, beauty and goodness; as it slowly degenerated it lost its power, its grandeur. Great men like Luther and others undertook to reform it but succeeded in touching only a side of it, and thus shattered its unity and prestige.

Following this line of thought, Mr. Oliver analyses the industrial revolution, the economic system, capitalism, socialism, communism. He gives remedies for economic evils, but comes back again and again to the ideal of unity. He feels that if we could only gather goodness from Luther, truth from

More refused to take the oath because, attached to it, was a preamble asserting the supremacy of the King over Spirituality.

In 1535, after fifteen months' imprisonment, More was beheaded by the order of Henry VIII.

He who touches Mr. Sargent's book touches a man—perhaps a saint.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

[The martyr often has something of the fanatic in him. The attitude of Thomas More towards those who thought differently from him in religious matters was merciless. He faced execution holding to his own belief, but in the epitaph which he wrote he describes himself as *hereticis molestus*. The theologian overpowered the philosopher in Sir Thomas More.—EDS.]

Galileo, and beauty from Beethoven, combining them with the practicability of Watts and modern scientific discoveries, and steering clear of the pitfalls pointed out by Hobbes, we could turn chaos into order once more and restore the lost unity. And that unity is contained, says Mr. Oliver, within the Credo (or Apostles' Creed) of the Christian Church. But he seems to disregard the fact that medieval Christianity was based on the Credo and that nevertheless it failed and was not strong enough to withstand the rise of reformers. The failure of Christianity based on the Credo is only too apparent, and a return to its dogmas cannot make men saints and the earth a paradise. Science is an improvement on orthodox and organized Christianity even though it has not succeeded in controlling the havoc wrought by its materialism. It has at least freed men and women from the bondage of belief demanded by the Credo of the Church which destroyed the real Ideals of the True, the Good and the Beautiful preached by the Greeks many centuries before the birth of Jesus. Moreover, if the Church Credo is the way out of the present impasse, what is to become of the non-Christian world of to-day?

D. C.

Franz Anton Mesmer : The History of an Idea. By MARGARET GOLDSMITH. (Arthur Barker, Ltd., London. 10s.)

There are some men who, whatever the shortcomings of their ideas, whatever the opinions entertained of them by their contemporaries or by posterity, have given a direction to human thought, have played an essential part in its evolution, and cannot be ignored.

Dr. Franz Anton Mesmer emphatically belongs to this category.

Yet, as Miss Goldsmith remarks at the beginning of her study of his life and work :—

Mesmer, who was born two hundred years ago, is not remembered except by specialists in his own field of work. Most people who think about it at all believe that the noun "mesmerism" and the verb "to mesmerise" are words of some obscure classical origin; for, as Claude Bernard, the greatest French physiologist of the nineteenth century, said : "The names of the prime movers of science disappear gradually in a general fusion, and the more a science advances, the more impersonal and detached it becomes."

Mesmer's importance lies in the fact that he bridged the gap between ancient superstitions and modern psychotherapy. To appreciate Mesmer's work at its full worth, it must be seen in proper perspective, against the background of the work of such men as Paracelsus who preceded him and probably influenced the direction of his thought, and in relation to its various developments, both worthy and otherwise, of more modern times. Spiritualism, Christian Science, psychoanalysis and modern scientific psychotherapy, all have their roots in the work of Mesmer.

These developments have been adequately traced in Miss Goldsmith's very readable book, which, indeed, as the publishers claim, is more than a biography of a remarkable man. Its sub-title "The History of an Idea" is well substantiated.

In spite of the many remarkable

cures effected by Mesmer, he completely failed to win the scientific world of his day round to his point of view, and the bulk of his scientific contemporaries came as near to regarding him as a charlatan as his unquestionable qualifications permitted.

This has been a common fate of innovators; but it has to be confessed that, in the case of Mesmer, theory lagged behind practice, and his own explanations of the *modus operandi* of his cures lacked coherence.

The work of many investigators—Puységur, Braid and others—was necessary to establish the truth underlying mesmerism, which is, in short, the power of suggestion, the power of mind over matter. This, it will be understood, is the view of the author of the book under review. It is also the view of the present writer. In fairness, however, to both sides, it should be said that the conflict between what Miss Goldsmith calls the "animists" and the "fluidists" is not dead, though modern scientific thought is strongly on the side of the former.

Mme. Blavatsky, as Miss Goldsmith points out, in spite of her spiritualist background and mystical outlook, was "the most uncompromising Fluidist of the nineteenth century," and there are those to-day who hold that she was correct in this attitude.

At any rate, here is not only told the story of Mesmer's life and work, his triumphs and failures, but the conflict between animists and fluidists also receives adequate portrayal. As I have intimated, Miss Goldsmith makes no secret of which of the opposing schools of thought she regards as holding that true key to the understanding of mesmerism; but even those who disagree with her can hardly accuse her of unfairness in her treatment.

It should be finally noted that the book is provided with an index and an excellent bibliography.

H. S. REDGROVE

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

[A. E. Waite is well-known for his many valuable books—veritable flames of old knowledge which are worth an exchange with more than one modern bulb. Every quarter he will give to our readers the benefit of his researches and reading of the many periodicals containing matter of interest.—Eds.]

It would seem that some short time since one well-known protagonist of Spiritism had the courage to suggest that the hall-mark of scientific approval is not such a matter of living importance to the cause in question as the rank and file or the headships of psychic movements appear to think. A second protagonist, also well-known, intervened forthwith and counter-affirmed strongly that "Science must corroborate the beliefs of Spiritualism before they could become universal".* At this point the issue has fallen asleep, for the criticism was ignored on the one hand by him who had occasioned it, while the Spiritistic Press on the other has taken no notice. It collapses also, as incautiously worded, because if the psychic subject is a matter of "belief," Science is not concerned therein. But if it is a question whether given abnormal phenomena are veridic or the result of fraud and trickery, there is no reason to presume that the scientist as such is more qualified to express an opinion than any expert conjurer. In fine, if it is a question whether or not the dead return to testify, the only court of appeal is he or she who stands in the relation of friend or kinsman to the al-

leged communicating intelligence. Now it is from this point of fact that there arises the whole difficulty which hinders and will hinder the "universal" acceptance of Spiritism. The allegation that X has received a test message cannot in the reason of things be agreed to decisively by any third person who does not know X, not to dwell on the many cases in which such knowledge would itself involve a positive negation, X being the last person whose judgment could be accepted on any important issue. Conviction must remain therefore an individual matter, *plus* the concurrence of a reputable few who have made the records of the past a study and may regard the affirmative evidence as satisfactory hereupon. Under all due reserves, some of us may consent to be included in this category.

Independently of debates like this, various voices of Science continue to be heard at intervals. We know that for Sir Oliver Lodge the veil is thin between the so-called dead and living: it is thought to be wearing thinner. In his most recent testimony†—an extension of some previous utterances—he speaks of an "animating, controlling and dominat-

* See *Light*, June 15, 1934, the protagonists referred to being Mr. Hannen Swaffer and Mrs. St. Clair Stobart.

† *The Two Worlds*, June 8, 1934.

ing spirit" within us, which is not subject to mortality, does not decay or wear out, never enters the tomb, but continues an uninterrupted existence after the death of the body. Prof. William McDougall, F. R. S., has affirmed, also recently,* (1) that man is a spiritual being and (2) that his activities are not restricted to this mortal plane. Here are two among many current intimations; and one tends to think that a book of golden witness might be compiled in paragraphs on man and the eternal subject, from the dicta of scientists during these last ten years. It would say nothing of Spiritism or of its handmaid, Psychical Research: but the highest aspect of survival would shine forth therein, because of that eternal subject just mentioned and its living relation to humanity as paramount spokesman thereupon. It might also remind those who remain of the old materialistic school how Sir John Herschel warned his fellow-astronomers that they should "pay attention to the things that ought not to happen," if they want to "discover new facts".

As forecast in our last reference to the Margery embroilment, the Walter finger-prints and the rest of the Crandon charges are again to the front in the precise form expected. The Boston Society for Psychical Research has issued its rejoinder at length to the twenty-second volume of the American S. P. R. "Proceedings," devoted to the rehabilitation of the famous

medium. The five contributors are Dr. Harold Cummings, a finger-print expert apparently, writing as an impartial investigator; Mr. E. E. Dudley, who is said to have attended many Margery *séances* and to have accepted their supernatural character, till he made the alleged discovery that the Walter prints were identical with those of a certain Dr. X; Mr. Hereward Carrington, well known in Psychical Research; Mr. A. Goadby, who offers an analysis of the evidence, for and against; and Mr. W. F. Prince, a hostile critic from the beginning, who now sums up on the subject, whether or not he is to be regarded as the judge thereon. In any case, the general standpoint is represented adequately by his last paragraph on p. 85 of the "Bulletin," as follows: "The Walter thumbprints, right and left, had their origin in the thumbprints of Margery's dentist"—who is Dr. X. So stands the case at the moment, bristling with charges and counter-charges, contaminated also by personal accusations and denials. There is of course yet more to follow; and in the end—when there are no more stones to fling—the contending parties will doubtless each arrogate to itself the palm of triumph. Meanwhile, we agree with Miss C. Walker, an English lady who has dedicated her life to Psychical Research, that the raging controversy is bringing the whole subject into "serious disrepute". We do not agree, however, with the proposed remedy, that there should

* *Ibid.*, June, 22nd.

be an "impartial re-examination of the facts" by persons—five in number—who have so far taken no part in the case. It has to be remembered that—as Mr. Carrington reminds us—some six Scientific Committees have sat already on the Margery phenomena and that "the verdicts of every one of them have been unfavourable". What is to be hoped of the seventh?

—

A writer who knows his Spain from more than one political and intellectual point of view, affirms that "every true Spaniard is at heart a mystic" and remains therefore at this day much the same as the Spaniard always was. The prevalent note of the great sixteenth-century Spanish *Theosophia* is said to be one of "agony"; and—true to the postulated type—"Spain is an agonising country," at once racked and crucified by "the outer agony of Mysticism *versus* Rationalism" and by "the agony *within* his inbred Mysticism". Such is the diagnosis, and as such it is proffered for our contemplation only, since no prescription follows. The essay proceeds thereafter to what may be termed a pictorial presentation of current political issues and counter-issues, a seething mass.* Almost the last words affirm that the martyrdom continues, and is in fact so much the worse "because there is no one to act as a holocaust," no one to absorb the nation's passion in his

own person. Left as we are to our own devices in respect of inference, the majority will turn down another street of speculation, leaving the land of San Juan de la Cruz and the other Mystics—of whom Don Quixote is seemingly one—to work out its own salvation. But it may occur to a few among many (1) that on the writer's own shewing God may be still in His Heaven and things fundamentally right for Spain in the long succession of its ordeals; while so far as a broader and less tintured Mysticism is concerned (2) that we who are Mystics ourselves of another School may be consoled in remembering that the dolour and crucifixion, beyond the Grand Passes of the Pyrenees, may be endured in old Castile and Aragon, but *passus et sepultus est* elsewhere. As regards the first point, the Way of the Cross in Spain is identified by a contemporary Spanish writer, Miguel de Unamuno,† with the sense of the Greek *agōnia*, that contest or struggle for life which he describes as "life itself," adding significantly that the end thereof is to make "an immortal soul". It may be thought therefore that somehow, we know not how, the internecine war-work is a toil and struggle of Spain for the attainment of its own soulhood, and that we who stand and watch successive crises from very far away need only say in our hearts: God speed the work. On the other hand, the greatest of Spanish

* *The Nineteenth Century*, July, 1934, pp. 53-64, *sub voce* "The Agony of Spain," by Philip Robinson.

† *La Agonia del Cristianismo*.

Mystics, cited at length in the essay, describes the Descent of Divine Light into the Soul as discovering all its impurities and exhibiting itself unto itself as "so unclean and wretched that it seems as if God is fighting against it—that it has become the adversary of God".* Now, it calls to be said that this mode of torturing self-analysis has passed utterly out of being, except perhaps in a few holes and corners of monastic life and convents of the "dead-alive". We do not invoke now a God who is without in a world of separation, but explore the Divine within us in the world of union. We do not search out and number the wounds of our perishable part, but having taken into our hearts and lives the One, the Good, the Endless, we leave that which is of death within us to die of its own accord, as it must and will. It follows that the disease of Spain is that of a false Mysticism and that if there is capacity for no other its healing may be far to seek.

It is said that "every student of elementary physics," including "most secondary school children," are well acquainted with the Hon. Robert Boyle, seeing that he was the discoverer of Boyle's gas law. We are reminded, however, of his name in another connection, and it is one about which no such student and no child in the classes is in the least likely to have heard. This

is the existence of a book on "Seraphic Love," which Boyle wrote at the age of twenty-one, though it did not happen to be published till 1648, and then only to forestall an unauthorised version.† Having regard to the period, its rabid strife of sects and the strange mystical by-ways which were followed therein and extended also therefrom, a discourse on Seraphic Love suggests almost inevitably one of the flaming exotics of Francis Rouse, though he belongs to a slightly later decade. Boyle, however, is addressing a personal friend, who is possibly of his own age, and who has been disappointed in human love. He seeks to persuade him that all the vastness of frustrated affection can and should be transferred and consecrated to God, which is the way of Seraphic Love and is "desirable to the highest degree of intensity". The fruits of its experience are the proof thereof, and are an "uncloudedness of the eye" of mind and the most perfect "illustration" of its "Object". The last word is significant: we are dealing with a young man's sense of beauty and devotion to a Deity without and one also who, as the text shews otherwise, has revealed his will to the world in Holy Scripture. The Divine is in the universe and perhaps also is transcendently beyond the universe; but there is no sense of God who is within. It came about later on that Boyle

* The translation used by Mr. Robinson is that of Prof. Alison Peers, but without more special reference to text and place.

† The full title, characteristic as such of the period, is "Some Motives and Incentives to the Love of God, pathetically discoursed of in a letter to a Friend". A brief and not very critical account of its contents will be found in *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1934., pp. 564-571.

unfolded as an "experimental philosopher" of his period and that he discovered a "gas law". He did not become a Mystic. His

work remains interesting, is quaint also in expression, and may fall one of these days into the hands of a discerning editor.

A. E. WAITE

CORRESPONDENCE

GERMANY AND THE SWASTIKA

I was rather surprised to read Dr. Schrader's "Nazi Position" in *THE ARYAN PATH* (p. 60) of January last. I am not concerned with his views about Nazi policy and politics but his iterations about the Swastika are far from true. Correspondents like S. V. Viswanatha and Sam Aélion respectively in the April and the May issues have already written against both his viewpoints. I wish to add here a few words more particularly about the Swastika.

As the word in Sanskrit Swastika signifies good luck, the Nazis have every right to adopt it as their symbol as it is general human property. But the Nazi claims to its European origin with a traditional Christian significance and as a historic property and special characteristic of the Indo-Europeans and of the Germans in particular are unfounded. Dr. W. Norman Brown, Professor of Sanskrit at the University of Pennsylvania, in his recently published book on the Swastika, observes that this claim is baseless and is contrary to all available evidence.

That racial purity is no better than a myth is almost the decision of modern ethnologists. A purely German or English people is a misnomer unless we take language as the sole criterion of national purity. Everywhere there is now and has always been race mixture or Varna-Sankar. So when the Nazis claim that the Swastika is a pure Aryo-Christian symbol they are indulging in childish fancy. The term Indo-European (or Aryan as the Nazis use it) "affirms practically nothing in respect to physical stock," "signifies nothing

of race integrity" and even "culturally it does not indicate absolute uniformity"—in the opinion of Dr. Norman Brown. Few original religious Indo-Europeanisms remain in India or elsewhere. Hence the Nazi theory of Aryan racial purity is not only untenable but arbitrary and even absurd. The Swastika is a pre-Aryan symbol as Dr. Schrader also says. The origin and early migration of the Swastika is lost in the mist of antiquity. Luckily Dr. Thomas Wilson gives in his voluminous book on the Swastika almost an exhaustive treatment to the later history of the symbol.

The first recorded instance of the Swastika in the West is fully two thousand years later than the earliest known Indian example of the symbol. The Indus Valley is perhaps its earliest known habitat. The symbol had for over two thousand years a frequency and variety of usage in India not paralleled elsewhere. It appears among Indian remains as early as 2500 B. C. or possibly 3000 B. C. and appears in forms perfectly developed. It existed in Prehistoric India too before the arrival of the Aryans who gave it the Sanskrit name, Swastika. This word occurs in the oldest of the Vedas.

Among the finds at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa there are many seals with splendid representations of the Swastika. In the volumes published by the Archaeological Survey of India in 1931 fifteen of them are reproduced. Recent cursory excavations in Baluchistan have discovered seals bearing the Swastika possibly as old as those of the Indus Valley. Still further to the west in Susa,

Persia, and other countries known as the Japhetic region, seals have been found from around 3000 B. C. showing several varieties of the Swastika including the most primitive yet identified. In Hissarlik, the site of Homer's Troy and in other older cities in Asia Minor, dated from 2000 to 1100 B. C., the Swastika has been frequently found on terra cotta and pottery ornamented with geometrical designs, and on other objects. In Asia Minor the Indo-Europeans might have for the first time met the Swastika in the second century B. C. and from Asia Minor it has spread most probably to Europe through Greece.

From the 7th century B. C. it appears upon vases of Cyprus, Rhodes, and Athens. It is depicted on funeral cars and on the figure of the goddess Artemis and other Asiatic deities. It also reached Northern Italy where it has been found on certain urns often regarded as funerary. When late in the bronze period ornamented objects appear in the Lower Danube region the Swastika is among the designs. The Celts who were proficient workers in bronze and gold also used it. Thus it has acquired different names such as Gammadion, Fylfot, Haken, Kreuz and others in different countries but the Swastika is the commonest.

Finally the Germans [says Dr. Norman Brown] acquired it and used it abundantly. They were employing it for ornaments at the end of the bronze period and after their contact with the Romans. They decorated elaborate plaques with it. In at least one instance the Swastika and other symbols appear with a male figure, who is possibly a god but certainly not the Christian God. Both Gallic and Germanic peoples employed it and during the Gallico-Roman period in Aquitania and Britain it is found on altars where it is associated with the thunderbolt, a fact which recalls the asso-

ciation of the Swastika in Scandinavia with the God Thor.

But emphatically it was not invented by the Indo-Europeans as the Nazis assert. The Indo-Europeans as far as the evidence indicates did not know the Swastika until two thousand years after the time of its earliest preserved specimens. Germans seem not to have had the symbol until the first century B. C. Hence Dr. Schrader's claim that it was known in Germany since prehistoric times is unfounded.

The Swastika was known in ancient America before the time of Columbus. It is frequent in North, Central, and South America and has many variant forms. It must have travelled from Asia as early contacts between Asia and America are now accepted. Dr. Herman Walde-Waldeg, a young Austrian scholar of the National Library, Bogota, Colombia (South America) claims to have discovered definite proofs of the Asian origin of ancient American or Mayan civilization. He testifies that the ancient American Mixtec writings bear definite relations to Chinese, Japanese and Sanskrit.

With Buddhism the Swastika spread from India to Central Asia, Tibet, China, Japan and other countries. As the cultures of Greece, Rome and Byzantium and then later of Arabia were taken abroad by various conquerors the Swastika became popularised in Northern and other parts of Africa. It was and still is a very important symbol in almost all Indian religions and possibly so in certain Western Asiatic religions too. But it has held no great value in Christian symbolism where its occurrence is only incidental and relatively late.

Mysore. SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“————— *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS,

The French have always taken pride in the clearness and precision of their language; even in poetry, so often elusive and indefinite, they have stressed “la netteté”. But in the Symbolist Movement of the last half of the nineteenth century as well as among the more modern disciples of that movement, we find a strong desire to be vague, indefinite and often incomprehensible. But this later tendency had already shown itself clearly in the works of Stéphane Mallarmé (1842-1898). Many books have been written about him; many interpretations of his poems have been printed; but there is still something about his poetry which has up to now remained indefinable and unknown. Even his greatest admirers and disciples have failed to understand him completely. In *The Nineteenth Century* of July Randolph Hughes analyses rather well the æsthetic symbolism of Mallarmé, but although the sub-title is “A Study in Esoteric Symbolism,” he has not really given any light on the philosophy or the esotericism of Mallarmé.

The very word Symbolism has lost its true, real meaning. As Mr. Hughes points out, it has been used to describe simile and metaphor when used on a large scale, as in the case of Alfred de Vigny. It is to differentiate this latter type

of symbology from Mallarmé's more subjective and introspective symbolism that Mr. Hughes chose the word “esoteric”. It is, however, esoteric in more than that sense. Mallarmé uses the symbol to recreate that which he is pursuing, be it an idea, a sensation, or the Infinite which can be felt but not known. He is conscious of the existence of Something beyond him, another world, his Eden; but to describe it concretely, to give it common attributes would be to lessen and destroy it. It can only be recreated by symbols and sometimes can only be expressed by silence or by a blank page. This is strangely reminiscent of the Absolute of Eastern philosophies, about which it is best to say nothing because It is indescribable in words and unknowable by the ordinary human mind.

The value of things lies not so much in themselves, as in the fact that they are interwoven and interchangeable, one thing corresponding to another in the material world and to other things, to spiritual prototypes, which eventually merge in the one Reality or Infinity. The theory of correspondences, the symbology of nature and the close relationship of all things, Baudelaire had already recorded for French poetry: “Les parfums, les couleurs et les sons se répondent.” But it was

Mallarmé who brought out the fact that things are really but the symbols of transcendental realities. Mr. Hughes explains that very clearly, but he does not see that this is but another way of putting the theory of Maya, Illusion, and of the prototypal, model world of Ideas generally associated with Plato but which existed as a belief long before his era.

Symbols do not only express the reality of material things and of their transcendental aspect and the reality of the vision of the Absolute ; but as symbols, in themselves, as sounds creating sounds and vibrations, they are also a reality. In ancient days language had a dual significance. Primarily it meant the expression of ideas by human speech, but it could also mean the expression of ideas by any other instrumentality.

Perhaps Mallarmé was seeking unconsciously for that language of ancient days which could be interpreted in different ways. Mr. J. Ralston Skinner, author of *The Source of Measures*, states that this language " sets forth, under a veil, series of ideas, copies in imagination of things sensible, which may be pictured, and of things which may be classed as real without being sensible ; A picture of something natural may give rise to ideas of co-ordinative subject-matter, radiating out in various and even opposing directions, like the spokes of a wheel, and producing natural realities in departments very foreign to the apparent tendency of the reading of the first or starting picture."

It is common knowledge that very often poets and men of genius have flashes of intuition with which comes a knowledge however vague and fleeting of the mysteries of life and nature. Mallarmé has not been considered in the same category as the mystic poets such as Coleridge. His life was uneventful. A simple and kind English teacher, he expounded his theories of art and philosophy to his few and devoted friends at his Tuesday evening at-homes. But he never put himself forward primarily as a philosopher or as a prophet. He was above all an artist and a steady worker. It was probably quite unconsciously that his outlook and the bases for his symbolism took a faint eastern colouring, or at least that that particular interpretation may be derived from both his prose and poetic works. Just as divine symbolism may be read in different ways, so too his poems may be interpreted differently, and the esoteric and occult reading is deeper than Mr. Hughes realises.

Dr. Venkatrao, the new President of the Bombay Buddha Society, delivered an interesting lecture on " Buddha and Sankara " in which he showed how the two great Indian teachers promulgated an identical doctrine. He made out an excellent case by showing the similarity of their teachings on the subjects of God, the Soul, post-mortem conditions, Karma and Reincarnation. The orthodox Hindus of certain sects speak of Sankara as a disguised Buddha ;

on the other hand, Buddhists who try to expound Gautama's teachings as pure rationalism deny that there can be any intimate connection between the doctrines of these two philosophers. Dr. Venkatrao, therefore, has done a service to the Buddha Society by taking this theme for his first lecture since he was elected in the place of the late Dr. Nair. He, however, did not touch upon the still debatable problem of the age of Sankara. Orientalists, generally speaking, assign the eighth century of the Christian era to Sankara. Orthodox Hindu opinion, believing in the records of various maths and especially of the Sringeri Math, are able to hold that he lived in the fourth and fifth centuries B. C. As Dr. Venkatrao pointed out, both the sages were preachers of Arya Dharma, the Religion of the Noble Ones, but addressing themselves to two different sets of people in two different parts of the great country of India, they used different modes of expression.

This however is not a solitary instance of its kind in the history of religions. The orthodox of every creed, supported by their priests, emphasise the apparent differences in the expositions of great teachers, claiming superiority for their own. The real unity of ideas which actually subsists is not merely overlooked—its very existence is not known. For example, how many rites and festivals has not Christianity borrowed from the pagans? Or, how many

know of the direct influence of Buddhist missionaries on the pre-Christian and early Christian religious movements? The comparative study of religions, has thrown considerable light on the similarity of teachings in many creeds. But in that field philologists are more active than philosophers; and discussion about words and etymology is more to the fore than examination of ideas and their evolution. Again, the modern scholar, in every department, starts with the conviction that human history began with the savage and that the roots of civilization are in barbarism. Therefore, every time ancient thoughts and institutions are studied they are viewed as mental babblings of child-humanity, albeit possessing the rude strength of the muscular giant. It is difficult, nay almost impossible, for the modern researcher to take the view that ancient Egyptians, Indians or Chinese may have been builders of cultures superior to our own; and that in the rise and fall of civilizations we may be encountering the remnants of some state or social order greater and better than twentieth century Europe and America. Not in common savagery did civilization commence but sages and thinkers have flourished in every age and cultured races have lived on earth at the same time as savage tribes, just as they do to-day. The study of ancient civilizations and of old religious and philosophical texts needs this new attitude—which implies a more reverential approach.

AUM

Point out the "Way"—however dimly;
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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THE LEADER OF TO-MORROW

World conditions to-day are topsy-turvy: The State should exist for the well-being of the citizen but it enchains him. Nationalism, which should provide a basis of education and broaden men's sympathies for and appreciation of his fellow-men abroad, erects boundaries, physical, economic and psychological, which produce greed, jealousy, hatred and war. The doctor who heals the body earns more than the teacher who educates the mind; but while the nature and habit of the mind are at least considered, the very existence of the Soul is ignored.

It is taken for granted that politico-economic problems are fundamental and causal, and therefore it is believed that human difficulties can be overcome and social diseases can be cured by legislation. "Practical" people do not realise that food, clothes, houses, etc., are not fundamental but secondary; are not in them-

selves the cause of human happiness and progress, but really effects of the unfoldment of soul-peace and expression of culture. Who dares to preach to-day, "Seek ye *first* the Kingdom of God, and His righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you"? Asia, hypnotized and glamoured by the Occident, copies it, boldly and on a grand scale as Japan does, or as India, sheepishly but resentfully accepting her Westernization as if there were no way out.

Politics, economics and sociology represent realities of life, though in modern times they have been valued at too high a premium. The monks of Christendom and the faquirs of Asia, however, undervalue these realities—often they think them to be unreal and therefore valueless. Great Souls like Buddha and Plato or Tsongkhapa and Marcus Aurelius were truly spiritual, for

they possessed the primary yogic virtues of Viveka-discrimination and of Vairagya-detachment. Because they were Vairagis, souls who had freed their minds from the lure of desires and passions, they were able to evaluate correctly the things of this world. Events and objects of the material universe to them were concrete idols of ideal images. The material world, the historical events, were neither soulless shadows nor mere objective manifestations. The physical cosmos was valued as a reflection of the spiritual. Material objects were projections of spiritual ideas. Nations and races, states and kingdoms, were verities because of the spiritual reality within and behind them.

This view formed the very basis of the great philosophies of China, India and Greece—themselves but systems of thought rooted in what must have been once the universal Wisdom-Religion of the civilized world of the ancients. The restoration of this view would produce a mental revolution of the first magnitude. Materialism in science has received its deathblow, but materialism in philosophy is not an uncommon manifestation. Spiritual idealism is not yet clearly defined for practical application. Desire for religion—some kind of rational religion—is gathering force, which means desire for an idealistic philosophy which must give a new value since those given by organized religions have proven false or been found wanting. Who can produce this revolution save intellectuals who are also idealists?

We are not among those who see as imminent the collapse of Western civilization in the sense that savagery will follow the dark age which seems to be fast descending upon Europe. The decay and disintegration of civilizations take time, just as do their rise and growth. But the West is facing to-day a cataclysm due to persistence in old policies and programmes. These are now being abandoned; their substitutes are in the melting pot; liberalism in politics is almost drowned in the ocean of violence; and racial pride and national greed and class claims have produced autocracies. For all that, the still small voice of Spirit has not ceased its immortal action. The future is with the Idealist. He who ideates, creates. Ratiocination picks out the flaws, a very necessary task, and there is a marked manifestation of that faculty in these days. In a variety of ways people are taught how their civilization of machine-made plenty is breaking down. But not many are the creators and constructors of patterns for the new order.

The most important movement of the day for social reconstruction and the saving of civilization is that of education of the adult masses. Reformation of the schools of to-day will not much avail, because the dangers threatening civilization are imminent. The radio, the cinema, and the press are among the most important engines for the furthering of adult education, but these are run by the power of materialism. These

wonderful engines are put to ignoble uses. M. Edouard Herriot, former Prime Minister of France, whose work for many years as the Mayor of Lyons is well known, wrote about them thus:—

The news that is given to the public is itself coloured and doctored. How many Frenchmen are there to-day who have any accurate knowledge of the essential elements in what has been called "the Roosevelt experiment"? It is a sad thing to note that the powerful instruments that have been devised by science for the dissemination of knowledge have at times tended to serve and strengthen falsehood rather than truth.

Most poets, philosophers and art teachers are dependent upon these engines and often fall under their, at present, baneful influence.

The new teacher of the adult masses must ensoul himself with the pure spirit of idealism. Unless a sufficient number do that, the future of civilization will continue to be in danger.

Because of the general belief that adjustment from outside is the remedy, the real task of changing oneself within is grossly neglected. People shirk their own individual responsibility to life, to the state, to humanity, looking to governmental and other agencies to do something.

The Roman Church, typical of the embodiment of religious cunning and fanaticism, the Russian Soviets as representative of the reign of matter and machines, the Italian and German dictatorships, each standing for selfish nationalism and blatant race-pride, and other such agencies—all enslave

the mind, corrupt the heart and kill the soul of man. Therefore this era needs a few practical philosophers who will courageously strike at the root vice of competition in every department; for this they need to break their own fetters—personal ambition, class prejudice, nationalistic patriotism and racial pride; purifying their own lives they must act as priests of the Religion of Universal Brotherhood—instructors and friends of people the world over.

But they themselves will need models and patterns after which they may shape themselves. Archetypal Leaders called in the East Dhyani Buddhas are taken as models and patterns by Manushya or Human Buddhas; every Bodhisattva in endeavouring to become a Buddha, it is said, copies the example of a previous Buddha. Our new leaders cannot but fail if by groping in the dark they hope to muddle through into the light. They have to assimilate and embody wisdom and virtue, and one necessary way to self-training is contemplation on Ideal Leaders, Archetypal Leaders and their Ideal and Archetypal Knowledge. In the annals of humanity such Leaders shine like stars of the first magnitude in the firmament. Such leaders were Krishna, the Spiritual Director; Rama, the Ideal King; Gotama, the Supreme Teacher; Confucius, the Inspired Codifier; Jesus the Virile Reformer. In the words and examples of such Men the leader of to-morrow must seek guidance and nourishment.

THE NAZI DELUSION

ARYAN VERSUS SEMITIC

[Cecil Roth is a historian, and author of *The History of the Jews in Venice* and *A History of the Marranos*. In the following article he writes with intimate knowledge of his subject.

The impress of religious beliefs on racial characteristics is a fascinating problem which has not yet been solved by the modern anthropologist or ethnologist. It is not, however, touched upon in this historical survey, which is convincing in its accurately logical deductions. We are here shown that a pure race—Aryan, Semitic, or any other—does not exist to-day. The *Gita* taught five thousand years ago that, in this Kali-yuga, caste is no longer pure; this is true of the Brahmanas and Chandalas of East and West alike. As the *Gita* points out, the true Aryan is distinguishable not by birth but by character.]

I

The Middle Ages were nothing if not logical. Mediæval Anti-Semitism was based, with unimpeachable rationalism, on religious grounds. The average European hated the Jew because he was an unbeliever: and, generally speaking, the Jew could escape the dislike and the discrimination to which he was subjected by the simple process of adopting Christianity. The "scientific" anti-Semitism which was born in Germany at the close of the nineteenth century, on the other hand, and which has reached its culminating point with the triumph of "Nazism," is based essentially on race (even though it may still be rooted, if one examines its origins sufficiently closely, in religion). It assumes a fundamental difference between the Jews (who belong to a "Semitic" stock, physically and morally inferior to the rest of the inhabitants of Europe) and their "Aryan" neighbours. Hence, as a natural

corollary, religion has nothing to do with the question. A Jew may be baptised, but he remains racially the same inferior being as he was before. A man with a single Jewish parent, or grandparent, or an even more remote intermixture of blood, is *ipso facto* contaminated, inferior to his "Nordic" neighbours, and thus unsuited for public employment. The attempts made to justify the new policy in the eyes of the world have resulted in the spread of this conception to other countries, where it was hitherto quite unknown.

Let us assume the validity of the Nazi diagnosis, of the fundamental difference between Jews and "Aryans". Even upon this assumption it is impossible to carry the theory to its logical extremity, for one simple reason: that (notwithstanding the current conception) the degree of admixture of blood in the course of the past generations has been so considerable that *there can be no German in whose*

veins Jewish blood does not run, and few Jews who are absolutely free from any Gentile admixture.

II

At the period of the decline of the Roman Empire, from which date the history of the Jews in Europe is continuous, their number throughout the whole world is estimated at a couple of million. Up to the beginning of the eighteenth century, as far as our statistical knowledge goes, this figure was virtually unchanged. This was in part due to the long succession of massacres and persecutions. But all Jews were not heroic: and some, when confronted with the alternatives of baptism or martyrdom, chose the former course. Every wave of oppression left in its train large numbers of Jewish converts to Christianity: unwilling and insincere, perhaps, in the first generation, but ultimately intermarrying with and becoming utterly assimilated in the general population. Nor was there lacking, in all countries and in all ages, a steady stream of converts who entered the dominant faith willingly, whether from conviction or from a lively sense of interest. At the time of the expulsion from England, for example, upwards of one hundred Jews and Jewesses sought refuge from the storm in the *Domus Conversorum* in London, ultimately intermingling with their Christian neighbours. There can be few Cockneys to-day in whose veins some tiny strain of the blood of these timid thirteenth-century Semites does not run.

The case was similar in Italy. In Apulia, entire Jewish communities were baptised by force at the close of the thirteenth century. Their descendants remained distinguishable for many generations, but in the end became completely absorbed. In Rome, thanks to the delicate conversionist machinery perfected by the Popes, no less than 2,500 Jews and Jewesses were forced to enter the Church in the single century 1650-1750. In other cities, the phenomenon was similar, though not quite so marked. Every precaution was taken to ensure that these apostates did not marry amongst themselves, and thus perpetuate the taint of disbelief.

In Spain, the wave of persecutions in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries drove tens—perhaps hundreds—of thousands into the dominant faith. I have described at length in my *History of the Marranos* the romance and the vicissitudes of the descendants of these unwilling converts. By the middle of the fifteenth century, there was barely a single aristocratic family of Aragon, from the royal house downwards, which was free from the taint of Jewish blood: and a certain jurist employed his leisure during a period of pestilence by drawing up genealogical lists demonstrating the precise Jewish antecedents of a very large proportion of contemporary notables—the so-called *Libro Verde de Aragon*. Conditions in Castile and, a little later, in Portugal were very similar. For a long time, some of the most aristocratic families did their best to maintain a pretence at

least of unsullied *limpieza*, or purity of blood "from any admixture of Jew or Moor," such as was boasted by Sancho Panza. The attempt was given up in Portugal at the close of the eighteenth century, when the Marquis de Pombal, with Oriental peremptoriness, gave orders privately to the heads of all the so-called "Puritan" houses that, within four months, they were to arrange matches for their daughters of marriageable age with members of families hitherto excluded from their circle, as being contaminated with Jewish blood!

A similar process is sometimes traceable in the most unexpected quarters. The British Museum and the John Rylands Library in Manchester both contain copies of a MS. entitled: *Critique du nobilaire de Provence . . . contenant l'épurement de la noblesse du pays*, in which the author (a certain Abbé Barcilon de Mouvens) traces in some outstanding noble families, two hundred years after the expulsion of the Jews from France, the blood of those who had preferred to remain in the country as professing Catholics. In Poland, the descendants of the followers of the rococo pseudo-Messiah, Jacob Frank, who embraced Christianity in the eighteenth century, may be discerned in the highest strata of Warsaw Society.

With the beginning of the age of tolerance, the process was accentuated rather than otherwise. Reference has hitherto been made in this article only obliquely to Germany where, the settlement of the

Jews having been continuous since classical times and their treatment peculiarly harsh, the number of conversions in the Middle Ages was probably greater than in any other country of northern Europe. In more recent times, long after other European nations had abandoned the practice, official Germany continued attempting to secure the highest possible number of conversions among the Jews—the only gate which opened for them the possibilities of a University or an official career. From the era of Frederick the Great to that of William the Small, there was a constant procession of wealthy Jews to the baptismal font. In Berlin, at the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, under the influence of the temporising philosophy of the Mendelssohnian school, the defections took on the proportions of a veritable debacle, implicating according to some estimates one-third of the total Jewish population—some thousands of souls in all. Subsequent generations knew very little falling off. It is said that the total number of "half" and "quarter" New Christians (to adopt the Inquisitional nomenclature) who are affected by Herr Hitler's "Aryan" Law amounts to millions. Were the Inquisitional precedent to be followed to its extreme, and genealogies traced back a generation or two further, it is doubtful whether there would be enough pure-blooded Germans left to man even the S. A.

The admixture of blood, accor-

ding to report, is greater in the nobility and officer classes than in the ordinary *bourgeois*: for under the Empire it was a recognised practice for embryo Field Marshalls to recuperate the family fortunes by espousing the daughter of a wealthy Jewish banker. This, it is said, is the reason why the application of the "Aryan" paragraph to the Army was so long delayed. The account may perhaps seem exaggerated. Yet comparison with England, where the Jewish settlement is so much more recent, the Jewish population so much less numerous, and the inducements to baptism so much less pressing, shews that this is not the case. In the middle of the eighteenth century, intermarriage started on a small scale. It never became general: yet, to-day, it may be said that there are few families of the older nobility without some Jewish admixture or alliance. It is sufficient to instance the Dukes of Norfolk, Grafton, St. Albans, and Northumberland; the Marquesses of Crewe and of Winchester; Viscount Galway; the Earl of Rosebery, and so on, almost indefinitely. Families of the French nobility which contracted Jewish intermarriages include those of the Prince de Wagram, the Duc de Gramont, and the Prince de Richelieu: while the independent princely houses of Monaco and Liechtenstein are in the same category.

It is amazing in what unexpected quarters Jewish blood may be encountered. To illustrate the ubiquity of this "Semitic" ad-

mixture, one may mention persons so utterly dissimilar as Sir Henry Newbolt, the poet; William Booth, the Salvationist; and Erskine Childers, the Irish patriot. In the United States of America, conditions are very similar. A majority of the families who figure in the records of the handful of communities which existed in Colonial days have long since ceased to play any part in Jewish life: yet their descendants have not entirely died out. Later generations, too, contributed their quota to the melting-pot's alloy: and both Bret Harte and John Howard Payne were of comparatively recent Jewish extraction.

III

Thus far, we have been dealing only with the question of Semitic admixture among the so-called "Aryans". But there is another side to the medal.

It is generally imagined that, with the growth of Christianity, proselytisation on the part of the Jews entirely ceased. This is not by any means correct. It slackened, indeed: but it continued uninterruptedly—sometimes, on a large scale. The eighth century witnessed the conversion to Judaism of the ruler, nobility and part at least of the people, of the Khazar State, situated in what is now the Ukraine and adjacent areas. For two centuries and more, they were a powerful element in European politics: and the Byzantine Emperor, Leon IV, was the son of a Khazar princess. It is conjectured that the quasi-Mongol-

ian features so common among the Jews of Eastern Europe even to-day denote descent from Khazar ancestors.

In the Western World, there were indeed no mass-conversions to Judaism. Nevertheless, there was a slow but steady infiltration; and earnest Churchmen never ceased complaining at the insidious influence which Judaism exerted upon simple Christian minds. In England, a "community of proselytes" is said to have been among the victims of the massacres of 1190. The statement is perhaps based upon a scribal error (*Gerim*, or proselytes, having been read for *Garim*, sojourners): but the fact that it obtained credence is in itself significant. In 1215, a Deacon was burned alive at Oxford for having simultaneously embraced Judaism and a Jewish wife. In 1275, a Dominican Friar joined the Jewish fold, causing great scandal and proving one of the immediate pretexts for the Expulsion of 1290. Notorious, too, was the case of Jurnet, the Jew of Norwich, who in the reign of Henry II espoused a Christian heiress, the daughter of Robert de Haville. Considering that apostasy from Catholicism was at that time, and long after, a capital offence, it stands to reason that there must have been many more converts, even in England, who managed to conceal their crime—particularly among the ordinary people.

So also on the Continent. Jewish history preserves the names of a long succession of proselytes, who even in the Middle Ages dared all,

and sometimes lost all, for the sake of the God of Abraham. In Carolingian France, much scandal was caused by the conduct of the Deacon Bodo, who, having received permission from the Empress to go on pilgrimage to Rome, retired instead with his nephew to Saragossa, where he embraced Judaism, assumed the name Eleazar, and espoused a Jewess. At the beginning of the eleventh century, a persecution was caused on the Rhineland through the conversion of a priest named Wecelin. When the age of massacre started in Germany, with the First Crusade, quite a number of the victims were recent proselytes. Thus, among those killed in Cologne in the outbreak on the eve of Pentecost, 1096, there was included (according to the detailed lists preserved in the *Memorbuch* of Nuremberg) an unnamed proselyte, besides Hezecha, daughter of Mar Judah, and their two daughters. There is abundant proof that these were not by any means the only converts to Judaism living in Germany at the time.

So also in later history. Not all of the Marranos who escaped to declare their Judaism in Amsterdam, London, or New York were of pure Jewish descent. Names like those of Nicholas Antoine and of Johann Peter Spaeth, who became whole-hearted adherents of the Jewish faith, continually recur in Jewish history. Finally, with the growth of tolerance and of social intercourse, mixed marriage became more and more common. In most cases, the offspring was

probably lost to Judaism: but in many instances it was the Gentile partner who succumbed to the attraction.

Once more, let us take England as typical. Even before the re-admission of the Jews under the Commonwealth, a few Englishmen and women, who had carried their Bible-loving Puritanism to its logical extreme, went over to Amsterdam and entered the Jewish fold. In the registers of the cemetery of the Spanish and Portuguese community in Amsterdam there are recorded between 1623 and 1625 alone the burials of the wife and three children of English proselytes. John Evelyn, when he was in Holland in 1641, encountered an Englishwoman married to a Burgundian Jew, "a merry-drunken fellow," who had translated the liturgy into English for her benefit. In the London Jewry of the Restoration, quite a number of proselytes figured—Belamy, the wine-cooper of Seething Lane; Deborah Israel, who left her property to the Synagogue in 1669; and others. Late in the eighteenth century, the community received its most illustrious son by adoption in the eccentric Lord George Gordon, formerly head of the Protestant Association. In the provinces, conditions must have been very similar: it is sufficient to recall the romantic match between Moses Abrahams of Poole, and the buxom Martha Haynes, daughter of a Dorset farmer, from which the Right Honourable Sir Herbert Samuel, M. P., is said to be descended. Outstanding proselytes

of the nineteenth century included Ada Isaacs Menken the friend of Swinburne and of Dickens and of Charles Reade—and, *mirabile dictu*, the Countess of Charlemont.

IV

I have paid particular attention to England in this connexion simply because the ground to be examined is comparatively small and the records easily accessible. A case more imposing by far could be made out for many continental countries, where the residence of the Jew has been more protracted and his numbers are greater. In Russia, for example, the last few years have witnessed the conversion to Judaism of thousands of the *subbotnikow* who started as Sabbatarians and ended as whole-hearted followers of the Mosaic code. These have done no more than continue the tradition of the Judaising Heretics, who in the fifteenth century threatened the existence of the Russian Church. In America, India and Africa there are large numbers of dark skinned Jews who are plainly of non-Semitic origin.

It is not suggested for one moment that these proselytes to Judaism ever attained really considerable numbers, save in one or two exceptional cases. But the numerical importance is beside the point, in an age when a responsible European government insists on probing the ancestry of its subjects for many generations back. The question is, after all, one of arithmetical progression. A single individual born a century ago may to-

day have upwards of a hundred descendants: the blood of a couple who lived a thousand years ago may to-day run in the veins of millions. The Jews are comparatively a pure race. Yet there can be few among them who do not count among their ancestry some "proselyte of righteousness" of four, or ten, or twenty generations ago: and the blood of the converts who suffered at Cologne in 1096 may to-day permeate the whole of German Jewry.

Conversely, an enormously high proportion of the German people—certainly no less than ten per cent—could boast, if they desired it, some traceable Jewish strain; while, save in the most remote country

districts, there can be few individuals in the country who are entirely free from such an admixture. Nature, with her usual quiet humour, reminds us forcibly of this fact by the blond "Nordic" types which abound among the German Jews and by the swarthy, dark-skinned types who may be encountered in the general population of the country—even among those who stand highest in the counsels of the Nazi party. General Goering should beware against pushing his genealogical enquiries too far. One of these days it may perhaps be discovered that Adolf Hitler and Albert Einstein have a common ancestor! And what will the Nazi party do then?

CECIL ROTH

How, O Krishna, can we be happy hereafter, when we have been the murderers of our race? What if they, whose minds are depraved by the lust of power, see no sin in the extirpation of their race, no crime in the murder of their friends, is that a reason why we should not resolve to turn away from such a crime—we who abhor the sin of extirpating our own kindred? On the destruction of a tribe the ancient virtue of the tribe and family is lost; with the loss of virtue, vice and impiety overwhelm the whole of a race. From the influence of impiety the females of a family grow vicious; and from women that are become vicious are born the spurious caste called Varna Sankar. Corruption of caste is a gate of hell, both for these destroyers of a tribe and for those who survive.—BHAGAVAD-GITA, I, 37-42.

JULIAN THE APOSTATE

A THEOSOPHIST OF THE FOURTH CENTURY

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That Julian was a man of remarkable gifts both of mind and character is conceded by all who have studied his career. Says Cardinal Newman :—

Take him all in all, and I cannot but recognize in him a spacious beauty and nobleness of moral deportment which combines in it the rude greatness of Fabricius or Regulus with the accomplishments of Pliny or Antoninus. His simplicity of manners, his frugality, his austerity of life, his singular disdain of sensual pleasure, his military heroism, his application to business, his literary diligence, his modesty, his clemency, his accomplishments, as I view them, go to make him one of the most eminent specimens of Pagan virtue which the world has ever seen.

Nevertheless, to Newman, Julian is an evil name in history, because he renounced his allegiance to Christianity. To Gibbon, who does full justice to Julian as ruler, the blend of Greek philosophy and Eastern mysteries, which the emperor endeavoured to substitute in the place of Christianity, was an unnatural alliance between philosophy and superstition. Even Cotter Morison, a writer of rare discrimination and sympathy, finds it difficult to avoid a certain intellectual disdain for the reactionary emperor. And yet, as Dill says, it was no ordinary man who dreamt of regenerating the ancient wor-

ship by borrowing dogmatic theology from Alexandria, an ecstatic devotion from Persia, and a moral ideal from Galilee.* Nor is it difficult to find rational grounds for the apostasy of Julian from the Christian religion and for his partiality for the Eastern systems of worship. It is the object of this paper to indicate briefly these grounds and to note a few of the essential features of Julian's religious reform, which is not without significance and interest at the present day.

Born in 332, A. D., Julian had the good fortune of having as his teacher Mardonius. Mardonius imbued his pupil with his own passion for Greek poets and philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle, and further impressed on him the value of not merely strenuous thinking but of purity of living. In his seventeenth year, Julian came under the influence of Libanius, who introduced him to Neoplatonism. A few years later he was allowed to spend some time in Athens, where he renewed his study of Greek philosophy and was probably initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries. It may also be noted that in Athens Julian made the acquaintance of Basil and Gregory, later eminent as Saints and Fathers

* *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, p. 101.

of the Church, yet Platonists at heart.

In his twenty-fifth year, Julian was declared Cæsar by the Emperor, and sent to Gaul which had been overrun by fierce hordes of Germans. In this new task Julian proved to the world that his devotion to Plato and the Greek poets had not rendered him unfit for practical life. He soon cleared the land of its invaders and then applied himself to the more congenial work of restoring order and peace in the half-ruined land. The scanty harvests were made good by the importation of corn from abroad. An impetus was given to agriculture, manufactures and commerce. The spirit of industry revived again. Julian personally revised the proceedings of the provincial governors. The rigour of the law was mitigated. Taxes were made both lighter and easier to collect, and the rapacity of inferior agents was checked. Civil corporations became again active. Public and private festivals were celebrated with due pomp and splendour.

The same spirit of beneficent reform continued to inspire Julian when he became sole emperor. The imperial court was thoroughly reformed. Corruption was put down. The Senate was treated with marked respect and consideration and, as far as possible, not merely the form but the spirit of republican tradition was maintained. Unjust and pernicious exemptions enjoyed by certain classes of citizens were abolished, and they were made to feel that the service of the state was binding

on all. In his private life which was a model of purity and severe self-denial, and in his unceasing application to public business, the Emperor himself set an example for others to follow. What, however, mattered most to Julian was the great truth of "the presence and the glory of the gods" which are ultimately one, and he spared himself no pains to bring home this truth to his subjects.

As might have been expected from one who was steeped in the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, all "partisans of the One,"—Julian was a decided monotheist. Though denounced as an apostate, he sympathized with Christianity in so far as its monotheism coincided with his own. Nor did he fail to appreciate the beauty of its moral teaching. His hostility was not to Christianity, as such, but to the other-worldliness of its followers, which, to borrow the words of T. H. Green, in its aspiration after heaven, left earth to its chance. The chief representatives of this religion regarded citizenship as inconsistent with Christian obedience, and it could hardly be expected that the ruler of a mighty state and the student of Plato and Aristotle, with whom good life was synonymous with citizenship, should look with favour on a creed which prevented men of ability and virtue from engaging themselves in the service of the commonwealth. In the second place, believing as he did that God is the common King and Father of all, and that He reveals Himself as

much in the political and social institutions of mankind as in the soul of man, Julian could not but regard as at once narrow and unphilosophical the Christian conception of a God who consulted only the interests of a particular race, and took no providential care for human interests like those of political and social order.*

Julian's partiality for the Eastern religions which found their way into the Empire can also be easily explained. When Rome expanded from a city-state into an empire, the inadequacy of the old national religion to meet the new conditions made itself felt, and its place was taken by Stoicism, which, by its emphasis on the unity and equality of mankind, suited very well the cosmopolitan character of the Empire. Stoicism, however, in its turn, was found wanting when it was confronted with the striking revival of religious sentiment in the second and third centuries. Consequent on this religious awakening, there was both among the cultivated minds and the masses an intense longing for mystic communion with the divine and for the continuance of life beyond the grave. This spiritual craving Stoicism found itself unable to satisfy, and this for two reasons. In the first place it was too severely critical of all emotional displays. Its key-note was not so much one of exaltation as of renunciation, and even in the famous hymn† of

Cleanthes to Zeus, there is more of sublime resignation than of the spiritual rapture which one finds in a Plotinus or a St. Paul. Secondly, the loftiest exponents of Stoicism either, like Epictetus, denied the immortality of the soul, or, like Marcus Aurelius, wavered in their attitude towards it. Thus it came about that men turned for spiritual satisfaction to the Eastern cults which aroused and cultivated ecstatic devotion and held out the hope of future life. It is undoubtedly true that these cults were in their earlier stages tinged with superstition and loose magic practices. But, as it has been well observed, the idealism of humanity, by a strange alchemy, can transmute even the most unpromising materials.‡ The Eastern faiths, when brought into contact with the higher influences of the time, purged themselves of their impure associations and, helped by the syncretism of the time, developed a distinct tendency to monotheism, stressed the kinship of the human with the divine, and in their mysteries, which were permeated by the ideas of purification and communion, embodied the finest side of the old pagan piety. And fortified and interpreted by Neoplatonism, the dominant philosophy, they made an irresistible appeal to high and low. The purest and most powerful of these faiths was that of Mithra, the Sun-God.§ It was imported into the empire from

* Whittaker: *Neo-Platonists* (Second Ed.) Chap. VIII.

† There is a translation of this beautiful hymn in *Vitality of Platonism* by J. Adam.

‡ Dill—*Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*.

§ "It was a fine and manly religion," says Dean Inge in his *Philosophy of Plotinus* (Vol. I. p. 45), "spurring men to action, guiding them by its discipline, and teaching them to live honourably, cleanly, and even holily."

Cilicia, and as the religion specially favoured by the Roman army, it spread throughout the empire and proved to be the most formidable rival of Christianity. It laid hold on Julian and became the vital centre of his religious system.

Julian was not the only ruler who felt the fascination of Sun-worship. Our own Akbar offered, as is well known, his homage to the Sun and there is evidence to show that he knew the *Sūrya-sahasranāma* very well.* Seventeen hundred years before Julian, the Egyptian king, Ikhanaton, made solar monotheism the religion of the state and sang the praises of the Sun-God, Aton: "the sole God, beside whom there is no other, the Creator of all lands, of all mankind, and solely beneficent." What, however, is characteristic of Julian is that he supplies a philosophical basis to his creed. The summit is pure theism, based on the Plotinian conception of God as the absolute One, "who in His hidden nature as source, is a unity of all Reality, and who by an overflow of His superabundant riches is manifested through the thought-forms, or mind-aspects, of the universe, and secondly, through the energies of life and love and will that are summed up in the Over-Soul".† The "gods" of different religions are the manifestations of the One under conditions of form, time and personality and, as such,

are worthy of reverence. The world of sense is a manifestation, or phenomenal expression, of the One, and the sun is worthy of homage, partly because he is the source of life and light in the visible universe and, chiefly, because he is the most fitting symbol of the One who is the source of all existence and all knowledge. And Julian distinctly suggests that worship offered to the sun is in reality worship offered to the Spiritual Sun of whom the solar orb is the symbol or image.‡ Lastly, the sun, though it is the source of life and light in this universe, is not to be identified with either. In like manner, Plato, Julian's favourite master, bids us regard the supreme Idea or Idea of the Good as "beyond existence" and "above knowledge," though it is the source of all existence and all knowledge.§

The myths, associated with the old systems of worship were to be allegorized in an edifying and philosophical manner. To borrow an illustration from the book "On the Gods and the World," by Sallustius, the friend of Julian, the myth of Kronos swallowing his children is to be interpreted as follows:— Since God is intellectual, and all intellect returns unto itself, this myth expresses the true essence of God,§ The interpretation of these myths was to be the work of a separate class of priests who

* See the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, May 1933.

† Rufus M. Jones: *Pathway to the Reality of God*, p. 230.

‡ It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the Hindus' sacred prayer, *Gayatri* is addressed to the "Light that enlightens our understandings".

§ In his *Republic*.

§ See Gilbert Murray, *Five Stages of the Greek Religion*.

were also expected to conduct regular services, administer sacraments and generally offer spiritual counsel to their flock. Definite instructions are laid down for their guidance. They should be pure in body and mind. Their conversation should be chaste, their diet temperate, their friends of honourable reputation. Since their learning should be suited to their sacred profession, they should devote themselves to the study of the systems of Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics. They should be unceasing in doing works of charity and beneficence. It will be observed how closely this ideal corresponds with the ancient Hindu and Buddhist ideal of priesthood. In the ideal city of Sri Ramachandra, as depicted by Valmiki, the Brahmins are represented as men who had subdued their senses and were devoted to the study and teaching of the sacred books and zealous in the performance of their regular duties which included the duty of helping others. The Buddhist monk was expected not only to perfect himself, but to send out thoughts of love in all directions, and to pro-

mote the good of others whenever opportunity presented itself.

Ikhanaton, to whom reference has already been made, abounded in zeal but lacked tolerance. When he established Sun-worship in the land he abolished the existing cults and erased even the names of all other deities, and he did this, it must be said to his honour, without shedding blood. Julian, on the other hand, conceded the widest possible toleration to other faiths, and forbade the use of violence. Thus he showed a true philosophic spirit not merely in the convictions which he held, but in the temper with which he held them.

Above all, religion was not to be divorced from politics. The monarchy was to be that of the Antonines, working in as republican a spirit as possible and having for its fundamental principle the good of the governed. How manfully Julian strove to act up to this ideal has already been pointed out, and it is no exaggeration to say that of all later Roman emperors Julian comes nearest to Marcus Aurelius in realizing on the throne Plato's ideal of philosopher-king.

N. NARASIMHA MOORTHY

YOUTH AT THE CROSSROADS

[The Hon. Franklin Chase Hoyt possesses an intimate knowledge of his subject. He is Presiding Justice of the New York City Children's Court, which he was instrumental in organizing, and has been prominent in many movements for the benefit of American youth, including the Big Brother Movement, which he served as President for fourteen years.]

One solution which he proposes for the problem of youthful lawlessness—the inculcation through the schools of the principles of ethical culture, divorced from sectarianism—has a wider application than to the U.S.A. Everywhere the demand for ethical, *i. e.*, religious culture freed from the control of the priest, is growing. More and more it is being recognized that the nearer a youth is to church or temple, the further away from spiritual verities he is likely to be. Not the temple but the *Gita*, not the church but the poems of Shelley, not the mosque but the mystical writings of Rūmi. The youth should be taught, and he is eager to learn, the lessons not of any infallible Bible, but of such books which inspire him to be soul-reliant, and an intelligent lover not of any sect or section of the people but of the race as a whole. The cause of Religion as against religions needs active and sagacious missionaries, and such unsectarian religious education constitutes the very first step towards lasting peace and good will among the nations of the world.—EDS.]

Is American youth more lawless to-day than it was in the past, and is it becoming more anti-social in its attitude and conduct? Is there a definite increase of crime among the younger generation, and are our modern criminals more youthful than those of bygone days? These are questions which are being asked insistently throughout our land and which are raising the gravest apprehensions among all who have the future welfare of our country at heart. Yet like many other questions and problems they seem rather to suggest a situation or condition which calls for consideration than to present a definite query susceptible of a direct answer. For, if the subject were approached from one particular angle based upon statistics and past experience, the response, I believe, would be an emphatic "No". If, on the other hand, the problem

were considered from the viewpoint of the general social situation and the existing collapse of former standards and restraints, a different verdict might be rendered; for no one can gainsay that the present generation is treading new and precarious paths and that it is rapidly breaking away from the conventions and traditions of the past.

As to the specific assertion which is so often made these days that crime is on the increase among youth in America, let us consider such evidence as is available. It must be confessed that no one really knows whether the average age of all those convicted of crime has increased or decreased during the past twenty-five, fifty or one hundred years, as unfortunately there were no records kept in past times which might afford a satisfactory means of comparison with

those of the present day. The only competent survey of the subject of which I know is one recently made by a bureau of the Federal Government which showed that between ten given years the average age of youthful offenders incarcerated in our prisons and penitentiaries had slightly increased or, in other words, that the young delinquent of to-day is a trifle older than his prototype of ten years ago. From my own experience I can say this: during the past twenty-five years I have handled over sixty thousand cases of juvenile delinquency (as well as about forty thousand cases of neglected children), and I know from the carefully compiled records of the Children's Court of New York City that there has been a decided falling off during that period in the numbers arraigned before the court for offences which, if committed by adults, would have been crimes. The "curve of delinquency" has not always been constant—it has varied from time to time for certain reasons—but it shows conclusively that delinquency was at a far lower ebb in 1933 than it was in 1908. The reports of other juvenile courts in the country evince the same trend, and all the data which we possess on the subject definitely indicate a decline of anti-social conduct on the part of the adolescent offender during the past ten or twenty years.

As against these encouraging records the pessimists point to the large number of youthful criminals in our prisons and claim that this fact in itself proves that the younger

generation has cast all regard and respect for law and order to the winds. But does this fact really prove any decided moral retrogression on its part? It is true that our prisons are full of young people and it is a deplorable situation which every thoughtful person deprecates. Nevertheless, it is hardly a novel condition or one which has been engendered only during the present era. Throughout the ages, youth has ever been an attribute and distinctive trait of the criminal. The convicts of a hundred years ago were probably as young if not younger than are the prisoners of to-day. The highwayman, the footpad and the desperado of the past were no older than the gunman, the gangster and the racketeer of 1934. Over a century ago commentators were deploring the prevalence of youthful criminals. The mere fact, therefore, that our criminal population at present includes so many youthful offenders, unfortunate and disturbing though it be, hardly proves in itself that the youth of to-day is more lawless than were their prototypes of long ago. The only real evidence which we have, shows that actual law-breaking by the adolescent offender has declined in recent years; and upon the specific charge that there has been a marked increase of criminality, our younger generation would seem to be entitled to a verdict of acquittal.

This, then, is one side of the picture. There unfortunately is another which is considerably more perplexing and less reassuring.

There can be no question but that American youth is being affected by the tremendous changes which the world has experienced since the beginning of the century, and especially by the upheavals, the unrest and the depression since the War. Old barriers have fallen and new standards have been set up; old safeguards have been wiped out and new codes of independence and licence have taken their place. Parental authority is becoming atrophied, and religious education and training are not the force for restraint and discipline that they once were. The effect of modern inventions such as the automobile, the movie and the radio has been to transform family life completely, while the disappearance of rural simplicity, the congestion of the cities and the exigencies of the machine age have well-nigh obliterated the old fashioned home of former years. As a result of all these things the young people of to-day have an entirely different point of view from that of the children of the previous age. They are more independent, more self-reliant and less tolerant of all authority and discipline. It is too early as yet to appraise the effect of all these changes and upheavals upon their development but a situation is presented which already is surcharged with foreboding and uncertainty and which calls for immediate attention if the morale of the younger generation is to be upheld.

Never in our history has there been greater need than there is at present for a reconsideration of the

objectives which are essential and vital in the proper training of youth and in developing and conserving its moral sense. The great trouble with past methods has been that they have failed to counteract lawlessness and anti-social conduct in their early stages. We are now beginning to realize that habit formation begins with infancy and that character is developed to a great degree in the tenderest years of life. If a child is to be taught self-control and respect for authority such training should not be delayed until its tendencies and impulses have become firmly established and its habits and proclivities deeply rooted. In other words, our programme must stress the need of prevention as paramount to the problem of correction and punishment. This, of course, does not mean that we should neglect the latter; society is now trying out various ways and means of correcting the actual offender and should, and probably will, improve its methods by degrees in the future. But in social therapy, as in medicine, preventive measures to establish general sanitary conditions and to halt the spread of disease and contagion are more important than the cure of an individual.

The first agency upon which dependence must be placed to train and guide the child in the right direction from its very infancy is naturally the parent. Good or bad, strong or weak, reliable or incompetent, the parents cannot be ignored for they are entrusted by nature with both the

opportunity and the duty of controlling the child in the first instance by their authority, and of moulding the child's earliest mental and moral development by their guidance. Modern parents are none too well equipped for this task but they are not altogether to blame for being disconcerted and distraught by the upset conditions of the times. In reality they are today almost as much in need of training and instruction as are the children, but much can be done to help them to discharge their duties intelligently and to fit them to take their proper place as the vanguard in the fight against the maladjustment of youth. Parent-leagues, community centres and other educational agencies have done something in this direction and their influence should be greatly broadened and extended. Mental clinics and child-guidance bureaus should be established in every community so that problem and difficult children can be properly studied and their parents instructed in the methods to be followed in their training. The State should insist on a thorough physical examination of children at frequent intervals and not wait, as at present, until they are actually suffering from neglect before taking remedial measures. Indeed, when we come to consider the subject of the improvement and supervision of parental guidance, innumerable plans and suggestions spring to mind, some radical and others conservative, some of which have already been started and others of which still belong to the

realm of speculation. Space naturally forbids any detailed discussion of these absorbing topics, but it is obvious that the steps which we may take in this direction in the future will have a tremendous influence upon the mettle of the coming generation.

The second agency which must be relied on to train our future citizens is the school, and it is here that new concepts and objectives are imperatively needed. Through the schools must march all children on their road to maturity, and if all such institutions would only remodel their systems, as some to their great credit are already doing, they could accomplish more than any other factor in stamping out lawlessness in its early stages and in successfully preparing the men and women of to-morrow for the battles of life. To this end they should all adopt a new psychology of education which should concern itself not so much with the acquisition of book-learning as with the development of social efficiency. They should provide for the vocational guidance of their pupils and pay special attention to the needs of the backward, the unadjusted and the unsuccessful. They should see that the problem child is given the benefit of psychiatric study and that every available agency is invoked which can assist in its readjustment, for it has been proven beyond question that the problem child of the school becomes the delinquent of the future. They should keep in active touch with the child's experiences and activ-

ities outside of school, its home and its environment, to the end that the child's attitude and reactions may be understood and a proper programme adopted for its guidance. In short, education should be regarded as a scientific controller of human behaviour and accordingly the whole school curriculum should be directed towards moulding the child into a happy, useful and reliable member of the social order.

There is one thing more that schools should do—and that is to establish courses of ethical training in order that the morals and ideals of the coming generation may be developed and conserved. It is in this connection that something concrete and specific could be inaugurated to guide the thoughts and impulses of youth in the right direction and to combat loose thinking and anti-social conduct. In the past, America has depended on the various re-

ligious agencies, through their Sunday-schools and the like, to give moral instruction to the young, and when these agencies have failed to reach the children as a whole, no substitute has been supplied to carry on the work. Sectarianism has been banished from our public schools and there is no suggestion of its revival, but there is a crying need for something which we lack to-day by which every child may be privileged to receive some kind of education in morality and may be taught how to think rightly and to act honourably. It is only through the schools that this may be accomplished comprehensively, and if they would but rise to the situation and revise their concepts of education so as to include the principles of ethical culture, America would have less cause to worry about the lawlessness of the coming generation.

FRANKLIN CHASE HOYT

WILL AND WISH

[J. D. Beresford writes about the type of yoga which would suit the Westerner, with the assumption that the path of the Eastern yogi is not suitable. There prevails a great deal of confusion about Eastern and Western occultism and mysticism. The human soul is neither Oriental nor Occidental, any more than it is male or female. Two systems of yoga have been generally known and their variants are numerous. Hatha Yoga is not exclusively bodily asceticism, much less bodily torture; concentration on the body can take many forms—the eating of certain kinds of food only, breathing exercises of particular types, exercise of muscle and nerve through posture and movement, etc. Thus Eurythmics may be described as a form of Hatha Yoga.]

Raja Yoga has as its central aim purification and development of soul qualities, which naturally produce, without special effort, bodily rhythm and poise. A poised body does not necessarily mean a poised mind, but a poised mind in course of time is bound to produce poise of body. Four books may be recommended to the aspirant for Raja Yoga—*The Voice of the Silence*, *Light on the Path*, *The Bhagavad-Gita* and *The Dhammapada*. The first two are likely to appeal most to the modern man—be he Easterner or Westerner. True Raja Yoga deals with the whole of man and advocates training of the inner members first. Another way of distinguishing between Hatha and Raja Yoga is this: the former advocates separation of soul from the body, of the human individual from the social order to which he belongs; Raja Yoga advocates the assuming of responsibility towards its vehicles of mind and body by the Inner Soul, and to his family, nation and race by the man. Hatha Yoga involves running away from the world; Raja Yoga transforms it into a Garden of Eden.—EDS.]

Anyone who continually turns his attention to seeking the manifestations of the spirit through matter will inevitably meet with indications that may be made the basis of a broad generalisation. Ultimately such generalisations will fail, giving place before a deeper understanding of the mysteries. But on this temporal, spatial plane of being the recognition of these relative truths as embracing symbols, serves a practical and instructive purpose.

That this should be so is an inevitable deduction from the simple premise that spirit is the only reality, an immanent, transcendent unity which cannot be directly apprehended by the intellect, but whose existence may be

inferred as the single cause of all material phenomena. From that premise we must draw the inevitable inference that however diverse may be the phenomena, they must exhibit some points of likeness since all of them are representations of the same moulding force proceeding from spirit through life and consciousness. Our search for unity must be prosecuted by way of tortuous and perplexing paths, and in the earlier stages of the ardent ascent we are warranted in accepting indications that serve to point a direction, even if they must finally be left behind us. And one such indication has recently forced itself upon my attention in the guise of a differentiation between will and wish.

Now like all abstract terms carrying a significance of which we grasp only the more superficial aspects, these two words are very loosely used in ordinary speech. They are, indeed, sometimes accepted as being practically synonymous. Wherefore I propose in the first place to indicate as clearly as possible the definition I must impose upon them in what follows, beginning with "will" as being the more intellectual concept.

It is obvious in the first place that "will" is only a derivative of "wish," and is a function of the mind consciously exercised for a definite and clearly visualised purpose. It may be creative or merely resistant, the former being the more productive, the latter the more circumscribing form. But in either aspect its general effect is produced by the deliberate inhibition of those sides of the personality which are recognised as offering obstruction to the achievement of the desired purpose. To take an extreme case, a man greatly ambitious of worldly success will inhibit all those tendencies the expression of which would handicap him in the achievement of his career, no matter whether those tendencies are representative of natural affection, conformation to an accepted code of ethics, or such bodily desires as those for the common satisfaction of the senses by eating, drinking, sexual indulgence, or even relaxation of effort. The direction of all such inhibitions is towards a kind of asceticism attained by the dominating power of the reason. Whatever part wish

may have played in the conception of the original purpose, it is not the chief instrument by which such purpose will be attained. The mind is in supreme control; and of the many wishes that will necessarily come into consciousness, only one is accepted and the remainder rejected. Wherefore "will" as here defined is a function of the conscious mind, the agent of reason.

"Wish" is a far more subtle essence, and assumes a multitude of disguises. It is closely allied with consciousness, not only that of which we are aware, but also of those consciousnesses that derive from other bodily centres, of which we have little or no personal realisation. And this generative impulse may either use the reason or subdue it, since it represents not a function of the mind but of the personality. Thus it may support the will's control, as in the example cited above, or may undermine it. In any case "wish" is always primary and "will" secondary. We do not will that for which we have no desire. As the old Hermetists say, "Behind will stands desire."

The difference in action of these two forces has been very clearly illuminated for me, recently, in the study I have been making of mental healing. It is a commonplace that mind has control of the body, but that is a very misleading statement. Mind in its relation with will has, in fact, exceedingly limited powers over the functions and almost none over the organs of the body. As a subject for faith or

mental healing, the man of considerable intellect and determination is an almost hopeless case. Reason is necessarily a fallible guide in almost any connection, and when we are dealing with matters of the spirit, which has been assumed as inhabiting every cell of the body, the highest intelligence is hopelessly inefficient. Indeed, it may be laid down almost as an axiom, founded not only upon inner knowledge but upon observed and recorded fact, that a faith held only by the conscious mind can never work any of those "miracles" of healing, which are being so frequently performed in the West at the present time.

Perhaps the chief reason for this is that such a faith, whether religious or not, involves an element of contradiction, since it is not shared by the other components of the personality. As a consequence these unincluded elements must be sternly inhibited by an act of will, an act that stimulates opposition in the repressed desires and produces a separation of the personality. And as it is only by winning the co-operation of the subconsciousness that any remarkable cure can be obtained, the purely intellectual faith that cannot admit such co-operation offers an almost insuperable bar to the healer.

On the other hand "wish," if it be pure in origin, works not by opposing other elements of the personality but by absorbing them, and thus, reinforced and single, it will find expression. Reason and

will cannot stand for a moment before this alliance. We see aspects of the working of this principle in obsession and religious conversion. In the former case, the wish is not "pure in origin," and does not represent the whole personality, achieving manifestation because the intelligence and will are comparatively feeble. In the second case the subliminal uprush is often due to earlier repressions by the will, and rarely flows from the true fount of wisdom.

To define that source would take me beyond the scope of Western psychology, but I have, personally, no shadow of doubt that it is to be found in the true ego, the experienced individual spirit which becomes all powerful by development, although it finds so weak an expression in the average European of to-day. Nevertheless, we can make an application of the principle involved, in relation to an object so impure in origin as success in business. This can never be an expression of the whole personality, even as it is known to the psychologist. The "unconscious," (I use the word as commonly understood in psycho-analysis), cannot be interested in success of this kind. That strange, suggestible entity, Maeterlinck's "Unknown Guest," can be induced to collaborate for some purposes but not for others; and it knows nothing of, and cannot be educated in, the technique of money-making. This is not to say that this assum-

* See in this connection Jung's masterly analysis of the Chinese Tao in *The Secret of the Golden Flower*.

ed "unconscious mind" exhibits a general ethical tendency. We find in it the sexual, unsocial and feral desires that spring from the lower centres. It is sometimes regarded as a wild beast that must be tamed by cage and whip. But it does not, and cannot be made to, understand the language of worldly ambition.

Now the wider application I have been seeking from these comparatively simple deductions is to the two most easily recognisable ways of Yoga. I speak of them as two only, because although the methods employed may subdivide them so that they follow recognisably different paths, fundamentally they fall into those two categories that I have here headed—Will and Wish.

The first works by way of the mind. The impulse to development, as I have assumed above, necessarily lies deeper than the intelligence, but the expression of that impulse is sought by the mastery of the mind over the body. This is the common way of the Fakir, as it was, also, of the mediæval ascetic. By the steady development of the power of thought, through meditation and intense concentration, every desire of the body is subdued and ultimately killed. Usually this is done by way of self-torture of a purely physical order, and the whole training is rigidly anti-social. There need be no hate for humanity as a whole, there may be a relative tolerance, but the Yogi of this order seeks his development within the microcosm of his own being, and makes no contact with the crowd.

His purpose is self-development and he may attain it in a very high degree.

This form of Yoga is utterly beyond the powers of the contemporary European. A variation of it, known as "The Fourth Way," has found a few disciples, but its methods are handicapped on the one hand by the need for ordinary contacts with the world, and on the other by the indifference to that world, which the disciple is taught to practise. Within my experience, no follower of this "Fourth Way" has attained any such abilities as the power to separate his consciousness from his living body. On a more primitive, less effective plane, the business-man of my earlier instance may be said to practise this form of Yoga, when he sets his mind to the achievement of worldly success by denying the lure of the senses.

Self-development by wish is of an entirely different order and leads to a different goal. The soul-wish in this case is generated by love and compassion, and if it is to be kept pure these qualities must be spent on the antithetic desires arising from the lower centres not less than on humanity at large. A man cannot love God unless he first loves his neighbour, and how shall he love his neighbour if he despise himself? The means to the purification of the desires, therefore, must not in this case be by the cage and the whip. The single aim of him who practises this form of Yoga is the unification of the self. And since unification can never be attained in this or other connec-

tions by tyranny, he must win it by the realisation, education and conversion (sublimation), of the various consciousnesses arising from the lower centres. In this task the disciple has but one steady hold-fast, the power of the generative wish. If it be urgent enough it will gradually take complete control, influencing the antithetic desires until they assume the same direction as the dominant wish and are ultimately absorbed by it.

Lastly, in this connection, it should be clearly realised that the ideals of these two forms of Yoga are completely opposed. In the former case the ideal is that of the development and magnification of the self by separation. In the latter case the ideal is selflessness, and just as we desire that the lower selves should become merged in the higher, so also the ultimate aim is the mergence of that higher self into the universal.

I have not attempted so far to indicate which of these alternatives should be preferred by the followers of the way, but the final implication of the last paragraph should be sufficient. Very great

powers may be attained by those who follow the direction of will, but at the last these separated souls will be those who come to the "feast without the wedding garment" of love, and through a further immense cycle they will have to re-tread the path that leads to the Great Sacrifice.

In conclusion it must be said that the way of "wish" is more consonant with the ethical and humanitarian tendencies of the European than that of "will". The latter very seldom derives in contemporary civilisation from a purely religious desire, but rather from the wish for a far more personal gratification; and even so, its exercise is crude and uninformed. But although the second path is more acceptable to the average civilised man and woman, since it is essentially social in its practice, the winning of unity within the self by this means, involving as it does the sacrifice of wealth and of all personal ambitions save this ideal of integrity, involves a discipline no easier to follow than that of self-mastery by the exercise of the will.

J. D. BERESFORD

THE MEANING OF "SVARA" IN INDIAN MUSIC

[It is the fashion nowadays for Indian scholars to accept docilely, in all departments of knowledge, the theories and hypotheses of Western savants. Very few Hindus aid their Occidental peers by presenting the strictly traditional view, thus enabling them not only to learn but also to help the cause of Old-World knowledge. In anthropology, for example, the Puranic view is never taken into account and Western theory is accepted as fact—man's animal ancestry, though the missing link between ape and man has not been found nor ever will be. The old Puranic view, the same as that of the still more ancient Esoteric Philosophy, held that early child-humanity was descended from lunar and solar pitris and was taught sublime arts and crafts by dynasties of kings and of teachers. This view is not even presented for consideration. The evidence in favour of such a "theory" is more formidable than all that is available to the contrary in the works of even such a celebrated and painstaking scholar as Sir James Frazer.

Thus in this article our learned author, **S. V. Viswanatha**, seems to assume that Music as an art and a science was evolved by the proximity of early jungle-man to the animal kingdom. Though he refers to Music as a science originally imparted by Mahadeva and Narada, he does not test the view nor try to throw light on what this could really mean. He forthwith proceeds to show how the savage learnt the rhythm of sounds, and in doing so endows him with extraordinary capacities such as our own humanity possesses not. He makes primitive man not only highly observant but a deft logician capable of deducing a wonderful science from hearing nature sounds and of so applying it as to make it a divine art.

Not only does the Brahmanical tradition propound the view of music as a gift of the "gods"; the old Egyptian view also taught that "Isis-Osiris built cities in Egypt, stopped the overflowing of the Nile; invented agriculture and the use of the vine, music, astronomy and geometry." Again, Pythagoras taught that the world had been called forth out of Chaos by Sound or Harmony which can be heard as the music of the spheres.

Has not the time yet come for some Hindu scholars fearlessly to expound the actual views and teachings of their ancient sires? Compared with the ever-changing theories and hypotheses of the modern men of science, geologists and anthropologists, ethnologists and psychologists alike, the old doctrines will shine by their own stability and profundity.—EDS.]

"The savage brute, the untaught child and the hooded cobra—all appreciate the charm of a song."

The origin of music is lost in obscurity. It should have, in fact, arisen with the spoken word; for language as a vehicle of thought and expression of ideas is itself musical. The ideas conveyed in conversation are, of necessity, an index of one or the other of the humours that are contained in

man's physical frame, and are therefore expressive of particular moods of his thoughts and emotions.

In India, these are supposed to be circumscribed in the comprehensive term *navarasa* or feeling of nine kinds, which include love, anger, pride, hostility, etc. All communications between human beings are indeed resonant of one or more of these *rasas*; thus the sounds used by man in speech while in an angry

mood are different from those uttered in a friendly conversation.

But the "grammar" of the music of the spoken word was not noticed by man, until the idea was brought home to his mind by the natural voices of birds and beasts, the rustle of the leaves of trees and the rumble of the running brook. Primitive man was always in communion with Nature—was in close contact with the innumerable objects and phenomena of nature. So he was fitted by habit and temperament to be the best exponent of the music of Nature. His senses were so developed as not to leave unfelt, unseen or unheard, any of the objects, sights or sounds that wild Nature presented to him in her gorgeously beautiful array. This is the modern view.

The Hindu idea is that music originated with the Gandharvas, a class of celestial beings, and music, therefore, was known as the Gandharva-vidyā. It was believed that the best exponents of this science and art were the goddess Sarasvati and the divine sages Nārada and Tumburu. Music flowed down to the earth through these celestial agents. It was an accepted belief that the tunes were, some of them, masculine and others feminine in nature; that these *rāgas* and *rāgiṇīs* which were created by the Mahādeva were badly treated by the sage Nārada and, while lamenting over their fate, they were rescued and consoled by Viṣṇu. This allegorical story means that Nārada was the first to introduce changes in the

methods of singing that were current previous to his age. Nārada was an innovator in the history of Indian musical art and holds a unique place.

"The voice is prior to the instrument. This is *prima facie* so probable that it can hardly be said to need proof. It is implied in the statement of Aristoxenus that the natural laws of harmony cannot be deduced from instruments." It is clear that some of the elementary principles of the science of vocal music should have already been in existence at the period of the *Rig Veda Samhitā*. The two outstanding musical qualities required by the texts themselves in the recitation of the Vedic hymns are, first, knowledge of the *śruti* or drone which compelled the reciters to repeat their *mantras* in unison and in the same tone; and secondly, of pitch or scale which was of three kinds—high, middle, low, known by the terms *udātta*, *svarita* and *anudātta*, which must have forerun the expressions *āroha*, *sañchārī* and *avaroha* of modern musical technology. Moreover, several musical instruments are mentioned in the Veda, such as *duṇḍubhi* (war drum) and *āḍambara* (drum used in [royal] proclamation); the *kāṇḍa-vīṇa* and the *vīṇa* (varieties of the lute); and the *nāḍī* and *tūṇava* (varieties of the flute).

From the manner in which the *Sāman* is sung at the present day, it is possible to say that the original hymnists of the *Sāma Veda* had knowledge of at least a few tunes (*rāgas*) made up of some of or all

the gamut of the seven *svaras*. Two *rāgas* are easily distinguishable in the *Sāman* chant, as it is practised now, viz. *Ābhogi* and *Śrīrāga* made up of the notes S. R. g. M. D., and S. R. g. M. P. D. n. respectively.*

The musical sense of man was developed by his contact with nature. With his ears keenly trained to trace the track of wild animals, he could distinguish clearly the various sounds produced by them. The bleat of the goat, the trumpeting of the elephant, the cooing of the cuckoo, all differed widely. This was perhaps the first musical discovery that man made. He found by experience that the crow of the peacock resembled *sa* in sound; the low of the cow sounded the note *ri*; the bleat of the goat like *ga*; the sound of a waterfall resembled *ma*; the sweet note of the kokila was much like *pa*; the horse neighed like *dha* and the elephant trumpeted in rage to produce the sound *ni*.

Next came the application of this principle to his own speech by comparison with the sounds produced by the birds and beasts about him. The knowledge was not long in coming to him that he could reduce the tones of his language used in conversation to the same notes that were produced by the sounds of his companions in the forest. Thus originated the five or seven tones of the human voice (*svara*). Tradition is to the effect that at first the scale of Indian music was pentatonic only, the seven tones being a development of a later age.

The imitation of the voices of birds and beasts to which man was accustomed led him to some remarkable results. These different sounds could be produced only by the special exercise of particular organs of speech. Primitive man found by practice that the goat while bleating exercised its throat in full; the horse made full use of its tongue, while neighing, to produce a sound similar to *dha*; the kokila used the palate to produce the music of the note *pa*; the *ri* sound which the cow produced when summoning her calf touched the head; the trumpet of the elephant which caused the *ni* note affected his forehead, the peacock exercised the pharynx fully and crowed *sa*; while the sound *ma* which resembled a waterfall could be produced only if the nose also was exercised.

Next arose, perhaps, the consideration as to what faculty of the mind or the heart was most affected by the production of these various notes. It has been a recognized fact in the world of music that every *rāga* engenders a peculiar feeling in the hearer and stirs a particular emotion of his. A *rāga*, to define simply, resulted from the melodious permutation and combination of some or all of the seven notes of the musical gamut. Every *rāga* may be divided into three parts, each with its distinctive note or notes. The most important of these is the central or predominant portion called the *amśa*, while the others at the start and towards the close are known as the *graha*

* The Hindi gamut (*sa, ri, ga, ma, pa, dha, ni*) corresponds with the Western gamut (*do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si*).—Eds.

and *nyāsa* respectively. The characteristic feature of a *rāga* is thus determined by its *amśa* which is the *jīva* or the soul of the *rāga*.

From the exercise of the faculties of his mind and body with reference to the voices of birds and beasts, even the savage with an ear for music could understand that the crow of the peacock evoked pity and sorrow; the low of the cow, compassion and sympathy; the bleat of the goat denoted boldness and calmness; the sound of the waterfall, sublimity and spirituality; the note of the kokila, love and joy, the neigh of the horse indicated strength and vigour; and the elephant while trumpeting looked as if pleading and debating with his master.

As the *amśa* is the predominant part of a *rāga*, the nature of the feeling or emotion provoked by it will depend mostly on this central note. Thus it may be stated in general that all the *rāgas* that have *pa* as the *amśa* note are likely to stir the erotic sense; those where the prominent note is *ma* will affect the spiritual side of man's nature; those that have *ri* as the prominent note are likely to create a feeling of affection and concord; the tunes that have *ga* as the key-note are characterised by fullness and calmness; those with

sa will engender a sense of sadness and sorrow; if *ni* appears as the *amśa*, pleading and entreaty are indicated; while strength and vigour characterise the *rāgas* where *dha* figures as the most prominent note.

A few *rāgas* may be cited here which illustrate the general principles outlined above. The *rāga* *Punnāgavarālī* has *sa* as the *amśa*, and it is known to cause melancholy; *Devamanohari* as well as *Śrīrāga* have *ri* as the key-note, and engender a feeling of affection and attachment; the *rāgas* *Ānandabhairavi*, *Harikāmbodhi*, *Śaṅkoraḥaraṇa* and *Bhūpāla* have *ga* as the central note and are tunes of calm devotion; *Madhyamāvati* has two notes *ri* and *ma* as the *amśa*, and has therefore the mixed quality of spiritual sympathy; *Nāḍanāmakriya* and *Ārabhi* have *ma* as the key-note, and these raise the hearer to spiritual altitudes; *Ham-sadhvani*, *Kharaharapriya* and *Bilahari* have their *amśa* in *pa*, and are characterised by the loving appeal they make; *dha* is the chief note in the *Toḍi rāga*, and imparts to it its majesty and grandeur; *Māyāmālavagaula* as well as *Dhanyāsi* have *ni* as the predominant note and are usually sung early in the morning pleading to the Lord for His grace.

THE ORIENTALISM OF SIDNEY LANIER

[Arthur Christy here continues his study of oriental influence on American transcendentalists—EDS.]

It is reported that several decades ago, as Josiah Royce passed the home of a Cambridge matron who had invited her friends to hear a Hindu swami, he remarked jocosely to his companion: "Here do the heathen rage and the women imagine a vain thing." To-day there are few metropolitan newspapers that do not print notices of meetings of numerous Oriental cults. The transition from the supercilious contempt of Royce's contemporaries, none the less real because it was so good-naturedly described by the tolerant professor, to the widespread Oriental cultism of modern America has indeed been sudden.

As one studies the subject, he finds its roots in some of the classic pages of American literature, and its popular expression often in the mentally unemployed hordes who seek mere novelty, or the religious vagrants who fortnightly cross the threshold of a new faith. The historian of American Orientalism will be obliged to deal with both the sublime and the ridiculous.

In the realm of literature he will soon encounter the work of Sidney Lanier, unique popularizer of Oriental lore and the author of "Nirvana," a poem which is a beautiful expression of Buddhistic world-weariness and second only to Emerson's "Brahma" as an epitome of the teaching of ancient India.

Knowledge of the sources of Lanier's Orientalism is not so extensive as in Emerson's case. There is not available to scholars material which records the origin and growth of his enthusiasm. Furthermore, definite information on the Oriental books which Lanier actually read is extremely scarce. Until such a time as more definitive material is available, it will be necessary to limit one's self to the evidence of the published works.

The poem "Nirvana," written in 1869, was probably the result of the Civil War, which left Lanier desolate of health, the profession he most preferred, youthful dreams of study at Heidelberg, and the slight security of the inheritance that might have come from his family. That this is the personal element in the poem cannot be doubted; that the poem is, in the words of Lanier's latest biographer, "a veritable patchwork of ideas and phrases gathered from heaven knows where" is also true. The opening stanza suggests the temper:—

Through seas of dreams and seas of phantasies,
Through seas of solitudes and vacancies
And through my Self, the deepest of the seas,
I strive to thee, Nirvana.

The second stanza clearly echoes the true Buddhistic concern with the fetters of sense and disillusionment:—

Oh long ago the billow-flow of sense
Aroused by passion's windy vehemence,

Upbore me out of depths to heights intense,
But not to thee, Nirvana.

The stanzas describing the varied struggles of mortal experience may be omitted, but that depicting the moment of enlightenment is worthy of note :—

The silence ground my soul keen like a spear.
The bare thought, whetted as a sword,
cut sheer

Through time and life and flesh and death,
to clear

My way unto Nirvana.

After reaching this spiritual stage, Lanier, never able to shake off the haunting memories of the war, describes a common aspect of human life :—

I saw two lovers sitting on a star.
He kissed her lips, she kissed his battle scar.
They quarrelled soon, and went two ways,
afar.

O Life ! I laughed, Nirvana.

Piecemeal quotation cannot serve as a substitute for the complete poem, which cannot be reproduced for want of space. But the following pregnant stanzas demand inclusion in our sampling, for they describe the final deliverance from the bitter, fratricidal war and Lanier's ecstasy.

I slew gross bodies of old ethnic hates.
That stirred long race-wars betwixt States
and States.

I stood and scorned these foolish dead
debates,

Calmly, calmly, Nirvana.

• • • • •

The storms of Self below me rage and die.
On the still bosom of mine ecstasy,
A lotus on a lake of balm, I lie
Forever in Nirvana.

The informed reader will be quite aware that there are apparent inconsistencies in Lanier's understanding of the meaning of Nirvana. In the note which accompanied the first printing of the poem, Lanier explained that Nirvana was "the Highest

Paradise of Buddha, attainable only by long contemplation, and by perfect superiority to all passions of men and all vicissitudes of Time". The adequacy of this definition need not concern us, nor the distinction between ecstasy and non-existence. That Lanier entertained confused notions of certain similarities between Christianity and Buddhism is also probable. On the other hand, the poem was never intended to be read for its theology. As an expression of an Occidental's soul-crisis in Buddhistic terms, it is eloquent. And it should be considered a much briefer, but worthy companion piece to Edwin Arnold's "Light of Asia". There can be no doubt that it is a landmark in American Orientalism.

I do not pause to discuss other allusions to Buddha or Buddhism in Lanier's poetry. They will be found in the poems "Clover," "The Crystal," and "The Stirrup Cup". Even in *The English Novel* one finds an eclectic interpretation of the influence of a Platonic idea in the light of Buddhism. Lanier has explained that Plato wished to crush the desire for property by destroying the possibility of its exercise. He then writes :—

And what is this in its outcome but the Nirvana of the Buddhist? My passions keep me in fear and hope ; therefore I will annihilate them : when I neither think nor desire, then I shall rest, then I shall enjoy Nirvana. Plato institutes a Nirvana for the ills of marriage, of offspring, of property : and he realizes it by the slow death through inanition of the desire for love, for children, for property.

Extensive disquisition is not our province here, so I pass on to the "Sketches of India".

The story of the reasons why Lanier was commissioned by the editors of *Lippincott's Magazine* to write the "Sketches of India" is not known. It is said that while he was in Philadelphia, seeing his *Florida* through the press, he read widely at the Free Library and gathered his material. Perhaps with his earlier interest in Buddhism as an incentive, and the public interest in Oriental travel-literature of the type produced by Bayard Taylor and G. W. Curtis as some assurance of an audience, he broached the scheme to the publisher and received the commission for the articles. They appeared in four numbers of *Lippincott's*, from January to April, 1876, and contained information on Indian art and religion, history and folklore, architecture and geography. Of these, our discussion will be limited to religion.

The setting of the papers is simple. Lanier is travelling in India with an acquaintance named Bhima Gandharva. He explained later that "Bhima Gandharva . . . is only another name for *Imagination*—which is certainly the only Hindu friend I have." In the first paper the friends are sight-seeing in Bombay. They discuss innumerable topics, and Gandharva tells of a recently presented play in which appeared an Englishman who, every time an Oriental happened to be in leg-reach, would give him a lusty kick and cry out, "Damn fool!" Then Gandharva

asks, "Why is the whole world like this Englishman?—upon what does it found its opinion that the Hindu is a fool? Is it upon our religion? Listen! I will recite you some matters out of our scriptures." Whereupon follows a synopsis of the *Bhagavadgita*, with paraphrase and quotation alternating.

It is obvious that Lanier's exposition of the *Gita* was a deliberate attempt to secure a sympathetic hearing for the book among uninformed Americans. Notice the selections he chose:—

He into whom all desires enter in the same manner as rivers enter the ocean, which is always full, yet does not change its bed, can obtain tranquillity. . . . Love or hate exists toward the object of each sense. One should not fall into the power of these two passions, for they are one's adversaries. . . . Know that passion is hostile to man in this world.

Bhima Gandharva concludes with this beautiful passage:—

They who know me to be the God of this universe, the God of gods and the God of worship . . . yea, they who know me to be these things, in the hour of death they know me indeed.

Completely awed after listening to a synopsis of almost the entire book, Lanier asks his friend, "When were these things written?" The answer comes: "At least nineteen hundred and seventy-five years ago, we feel sure. How much earlier we do not know."

The friends visit a Buddhist temple and emerging, seat themselves by a hillside stream. "Tell me something of Gotama Buddha," Lanier requests. "Recite some of his deliverances." His Hindu com

panion responds in perhaps too great detail to be colloquial, but nevertheless informingly:—

I will recite to you from the "Sutta Nipata" It professes to give the conversation of Buddha, who died five hundred and forty-three years before Christ lived on earth; and these utterances are believed by scholars to have been brought together at least more than two hundred years before the Christian era.

As one reads through the commentaries of the "Sketches of India" on the religions of the Hindus, one is impressed by Lanier's constant emphasis on their antiquity. That the high moral tone of the scriptures he quotes will be accepted by his American readers, he does not doubt; that such an elevated spiritual note was uttered by men before the advent of Christ, he seems to have regarded as his business to emphasize. His work in this respect is one of the interesting phases of early American Orientalism. It is obviously propaganda.

Lanier does not ignore the perversions which have crept into the religions of India through the centuries. He gives particular attention to the subject of caste, probably because Americans were under the illusion that the Buddhist scriptures sanctioned it. After a general description of the various castes, Gandharva quotes:—

53. I call him alone a Brahman who is fearless, eminent, heroic, a great sage, a conqueror, freed from attachments—one who has bathed in the waters of wisdom, and is a Buddha.

55. What is called "name" or "tribe" in the world arises from usage only. It is adopted here and there by common consent.

57. One is not a Brahman nor a non-Brahman by birth: by his conduct alone is he a Brahman, and by his conduct alone is he a non-Brahman.

62. One is a Brahman from penance, charity, observance of the moral precepts and the subjugation of the passions. Such is the best kind of Brahmanism.

When Gandharva had concluded his recitation, only a small portion of which has been quoted, Lanier answered: "That would pass for very good republican doctrine in Jonesville." If he had lived in the era of Babbitt he might have said "Main Street".

As one reads the "Sketches of India," one receives the impression of an innocent travel account, mixed with anecdotes of foreign custom and not too bald commendation of the Hindu religions. The latter was mildly tempered, possibly by the editors, for fear that the subscribers to *Lippincott's* might be offended and cancel their subscriptions. But the impression is definite that Buddhism in its first bloom might not have been inspired by the devil. This was perhaps all the American magazine-reading public could stand in 1876. In the light of Lanier's subjective poem "Nirvana," however, the sketches offer prolific suggestions of hidden meanings and amazingly wide information, only a limited phase of which has been intimated in this paper.

ARTHUR CHRISTY

THE FOUR OBLATIONS

[Nolini Kanta Gupta offers some interesting results of his study on a mystical verse of the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*. Vâch, the personification of Speech, is pictured as a goddess; our author translates it as "the Word". His interpretation of the verse deserves study; to facilitate the careful student's work we append in a footnote an extract on "Pitris"—meditation on which will throw great additional light on the verse which forms the text of the article.—EDS.]

"The Word has four breasts. The Gods feed on two, SWAHAKAR and VASHATKAR, men upon the third, HANTAKAR, and the Ancestors upon the fourth, SWADHA".—(BRIHADARANYAKA UPANISHAD. V. 8. 1.)

Ritualistically these four terms are the formulae for oblation to four Deities, Powers or Presences, whom the sacrificer wishes to please and propitiate in order to have their help and blessing and in order thereby to discharge his dharma or duty of life. *Swaha* is the offering especially dedicated to Agni, the foremost of the Gods, for he is the divine messenger who carries men's offering to the Gods and brings their blessing to men. *Vashatkar* is the offering to the Gods generally. *Hantakar* is the offering to mankind, to our kin, an especial form of it being the worship of the guests, *sarvadevamayo'tithi*. *Swadha* is the offering to the departed Fathers (*Pitris*).

The duty of life consists, it is said, in the repaying of three debts which every man contracts as soon as he takes birth upon earth—the debt to the Gods, to Men and to the Ancestors. This threefold debt or duty has, in other terms, reference to the three fields or domains wherein an embodied being lives and moves and to which he must adjust and react rightly if

he is to secure for his life an integral fulfilment. These are the family, society and the world and beyond-world. The Gods are the Powers that rule the world and beyond, they are the forms and forces of the One Spirit underlying the universe, the varied expressions of divine Truth and Reality. To worship the Gods, to do one's duty by them, means to come into contact and to be united—in being, consciousness and activity—with the universal and spiritual existence, which is the supreme end and purpose of human life. The second—a more circumscribed field—is the society to which one belongs, the particular group of humanity in which he functions as a limb. The service to society or good citizenship entails the worship of humanity, of Man as a god. Lastly, man belongs to the family, which is the unit of society; and the backbone of the family is the continuous line of ancestors, who are its presiding deity and represent the norm of a living dharma, the ethic of an ideal life.

From the psychological stand-

point, the four oblations are movements or reactions of consciousness in its urge towards the utterance and expression of Divine Truth. Like some other elements in the cosmic play, these also form a quartet—*chaturvyûha*—and work together for a common purpose in view of a perfect and all-round result.

Swaha is the offering and invocation. One must dedicate everything to the Divine, cast all one has or does into the Fire of Aspiration that blazes up towards the Most High, and through the tongue of that one-pointed flame call on the Divinity.

In doing so, in invoking the Truth and consecrating oneself to it, one begins to ascend to it step by step; and each step means a tearing of another veil and a further opening of the passage. This graded mounting is *vashatkara*.

Hantakara is the appearance, the manifestation of the Divinity—that which makes the worshipper cry in delight, "Hail!" It is the coming of the Dawn—*ahana*—when the night has been traversed and the lid rent open, the appearance of the Divine to a human vision, for the human consciousness to seize, almost in a human form.

Finally, once the Truth is reached, it is to be held fast, firmly established, embodied and fixed in its inherent nature here in life and the waking consciousness. This is *Swadha*.

The Gods feed upon *Swaha* and *Vashat*, as these represent the ascending movement of human

consciousness: it is man's self-giving and aspiration and the upward urge of his heart and soul that reach to the Gods, and it is that which the immortals take into themselves and are, as it were, nourished by, since it is something that appertains to their own nature.

And in response they descend and approach and enter into the aspiring human soul—this descent and revelation and near and concrete presence of Divinity, this *Hanta* is man's food, for by it his consciousness is nourished.

This interchange, or mutual giving, the High Covenant between the Gods and Men, to which the *Gita* too refers—

देवान्भावयताने ते देवा भावयन्तु वः ।

परस्परं भावयन्तः श्रेयः परमवाप्स्यथ ॥

With this sacrifice nourish the Gods, that the Gods may nourish you; thus mutually nourishing ye shall obtain the highest felicity (iii, 11)

is the very secret of the cosmic play, the basis of the spiritual evolution in the universal existence.

The Gods are the formations or particularisations of the Truth-consciousness, the multiple individualisations of the One Spirit. The Pitris are the Divine Fathers, that is to say, souls that once laboured and realised here below, and now have passed beyond. They dwell in another world, not too far removed from the earth, and from there, with the force of their realisation, lend a more concrete help and guidance to the destiny that is being worked out upon earth. They are forces and form-

ations of consciousness in an intermediate region between Here and There (*antahriksha*), and serve to bring men and gods nearer to each other, inasmuch as they belong to both the categories, being a divinised humanity or a humanised divinity. Each fixation of the Truth-consciousness in an earthly mould is a thing of joy to the Pitris*; it is the *Swadha* or food by which they live and grow, for it is the consolidation and also the resultant of their own realisation. The achievements of the sons are more easily and securely reared and grounded upon those of the forefathers, whose formative powers we have to invoke, so that we may pass on to the realisation, the firm embodiment of higher and greater destinies.

NOLINI KANTA GUPTA

*In Esoteric philosophy the functions of the different classes of Pitris is given. Thus in her *Secret Doctrine* (II,88), H. P. Blavatsky explains :—

The Progenitors of Man, called in India " Fathers," Pitara or Pitris, are the creators of our bodies and lower principles. They are ourselves as the *first personalities*, and *we are they*. Primeval man would be " the bone of their bone and the flesh of their flesh," if they had body and flesh. As stated, they were " *lunar* Beings."

The Endowers of man with his conscious, immortal EGO, are the " Solar Angels"—whether so regarded metaphorically or literally. The mysteries of the Conscious EGO or human Soul are great. The esoteric name of these " Solar Angels " is, literally, the " Lords " (*Nath*) of " persevering ceaseless devotion " (*pranidhāna*). Therefore they of the *fifth* principle (*Manas*) seem to be connected with, or to have originated the system of the Yogis who make of *pranidhāna* their *fifth* observance.

MY NOTE BOOK

The Myth of Progress—Understanding and Attainment—The Self Is or Is Not—Men on Earth and Divine Purpose—Free Will, Fact or Fiction?—Physicists and Psychologists.

In an essay "The Myth of Progress" published in the *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, my old friend, Mr. M. D. Eder, undertakes his usual rôle of *enfant terrible*. There is no Progress; the idea is simply a myth created to make life tolerable; and the realistic objective fact is that "we are born mad, acquire morality, become stupid and unhappy, and then die". "This natural history of man under domestication," he says, "is so little agreeable to our self-love" that we devise a myth of Progress as a refuge. But if it comes to a question of devices and refuges, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander: the "myth" of Progress for the one, and the "myth" of No Progress for the other. And even though Mr. Eder may appeal to the "objective" criterion of "natural history" it is obvious that his reading of natural history may be as subjective as that of the subjectivists themselves; and who is to decide between them? The truth appears to me that we are literally not wise enough to settle any such question at present. Save for a few rare individuals in every age, mankind, as a whole, even in its most developed members, is scarcely beginning to be able to *state* such questions with exactitude; and as for answering them objectively, scientifically, and, therefore, *meas-*

urably, neither the men nor the means as yet exist. Mankind, in short, (always excepting the few who, again, are out of court for lack of a competent jury), is trying, in the person of its intellectuals, to solve problems in algebra before it has mastered arithmetic.

* * *

I agree with the editorial writer in *THE ARYAN PATH* for June (1934) that of the three lines of evolution perceptible to man (and hence attributed by him to Nature), the highest, because the most inclusive, is spiritual evolution defined as the Self-perception of Self. But between, first, this verbal definition and the realisation of its meaning; and, secondly, the realisation of its meaning and its actualisation in being—there may be æons of difference. From merely understanding that the highest value is self-objectivity (the ability, that is to say, to see everything thought of as self exactly as if it were not-self) it does not follow that we have it, any more than it follows that if we understand that gold is of more value than silver, we necessarily possess gold. The attainment of the state of Self-objectivity is something totally different from its understanding just as acquiring gold is something totally different from the appreciation of its value. What I am there-

fore disposed to say of the problems already referred to is that their understanding and appreciation need to be supplemented by something entirely different before they can be solved; and that, in fact, the modern mind, even when as desirous of objectivity as I know Mr. Eder's to be, is incapable of solving such problems for the simple reason that the modern mind is not, in actuality, self-objective. I beg myself as well as my readers not to mistake understanding for attainment; and not to imagine, on the strength of their realisation of certain truths, that they possess them, or, still less, that they can use them. Our being, in which alone truth is possessed, is still a long, long way behind our understanding. Is, then, Progress a "myth"? I do not know. Is it, on the other hand, a fact in Nature? Again, I do not know. Nor do I find it necessary to settle the question one way or the other for my peace of mind. To understand what the question implies, to be satisfied that one cannot answer it now, but to *hope* to be able one day to answer it, that, I think, is enough for arithmeticians not yet really capable of algebra. The attitude is not favourable to the rôle of *enfant terrible* on the positive or the negative side; but it leaves one actively contented.

* * *

There is no doubt that, long before such questions can be finally settled, sides in their discussion are taken according to temperament and experience; and a species of partisanship arises, in

the course of which heads are knocked together, or, possibly, counted. There is, of course, a value in the discussion from the mere exercise of the muscles and limbs of the mind; but it is a great mistake, in my opinion, to imagine that there is any more. To repeat myself, I would say as follows:—

In the first place, things are as they are and not otherwise. This is to say that truths exist. Progress, for example, is a fact or it is not a fact; it is not a matter of opinion.

In the second place, there either is or is not a means of proving them. This is to say that discussion, in the absence of the means of proof, is merely partisanship.

In the third place, the proof, if any, cannot be confined to simple understanding; it must be part of our being.

And, finally, without this state of being, not only the proof cannot be realised, but even the question of the possibility of proof is one for faith, rather than for reason.

I am led to say this by the excursion into algebra of another of my greatly esteemed friends, Professor Denis Saurat of the French Institute, and author of a recent stimulating work: the *History of Religions*. Professor Saurat appears to me to have adopted a "side" in the controversy on the subject of the "self," *le Moi*; and to be as diligent and conscientious in the defence of his case as if he were briefed in honour to support it. He even looks for confirmatory evidence among witnesses of repute with the jury, and occasionally strains the facts to secure their support, as in the case of Valéry, for example, whom he declares, after cross-examination,

to be as destructive of "*le Moi*" as Proust, who broke the self into innumerable pieces and denied they had ever made a whole. I can certainly not myself settle the question one way or the other; but I can certainly say (without offence) that neither can my friend Professor Saurat, with all his witnesses. The existence of the self, is, I agree, a question of fact; the self is or it is not. But the distance from this logical statement to the proven conclusion that the self exists or does not exist, is all the distance from understanding to being; and, in default of being, the understanding, even at its best, is liable to change. Once again I implore myself not to be tempted to hope to arrive at truth by discussion. Only when self-objectivity is a fact of our being, and of the same unquestioned validity as any of our senses—only then can arithmetic safely pass into algebra. Only then can we know even as we are known.

* * *

An attempt has been made in a recent novel entitled *Proud Man* (by Mr. "Constantine") to pass an "objective" criticism on the human species, as examined and judged by superior beings—namely, by men who have, on another planet, completed a later phase of human evolution than our own. The idea has, of course, been used before, by Utopians, like Butler; by imaginative sociologists, like Wells; and by moralists, like Mark Twain. But *Proud Man* is the first *published* attempt of which I am aware

to evaluate humanity on Earth from the stand-point of his divine purpose, as a creature in process of becoming that which he is designed to be. It must be admitted that the attempt, in the hands of anybody not already developed past our present stage, is somewhat temerarious (mere premature algebra, in short); and, from certain unmistakable signs, it is clear that the author is still human, all too human. On the other hand, I confess that I found the book stimulating, since it provoked in me precisely that kind of effort which it is the chief aim of Culture to arouse—the effort to see myself *as I see others*. As the narrative proceeds—being chiefly the report of an "angel" of his observations of Man on Earth—the reader is gradually made aware that *he himself* is one of them. I do not know by what trick of fence the author manages to turn the mirror round and to make the reader see himself in it; but the trick is accomplished; and from a somewhat self-satisfied superiority over the defects of our humanity as portrayed, the reader is made to pass through the stages of apprehension that he may be one of the creatures described, growing belief that he probably is, to, finally, the shocking certainty of it. The experience is salutary, but not, I fear, lasting; for, here again, the difference is abysmal between realisation and *being*. It is possible that if one could continue to look at one's self as if one were somebody else, the cumulative effect would be transforming; but an occasional

glimpse, however poignant, is sooner or later forgotten.

* * *

"The Principle of Uncertainty," that affirms that it is impossible to increase the accuracy of measurement of velocity without introducing uncertainty into determination of position, is a weak straw for the doctrine of Free Will to cling to, though a considerable number of people have clutched at it. In the first place, the indeterminable (by any means) is not necessarily the indeterminated; and, in the second place, the mode of proof of Free Will or otherwise is not and never will be a matter of measurement. The range and quality of any one of our senses can be measured, but vision itself, hearing itself, taste itself, is subject to no possible proof but direct experience, or what I have called *fact*. Now it *may* be the case that Free Will is not a fact in the same sense. It may be that we are like a blind race talking of "vision" without the least experience of what it means. Again, it may be that from time to time—like a blind man who occasionally sees—we experience the possession of a unique sense which we call Free Will. But, in the absence of its normal possession by ourselves, and in the absence of its normal possession by others than ourselves, it is impossible, I think, to do more than either to "discuss" it, or to speak of it without "proof". Those who see can "prove" what they see to those who can see; but they can prove nothing of sight to the blind. And similarly (at least presumably) those with "free will"

can prove their possession of it to those who have it. As for the rest even evidence is not evidence.

* * *

It is a pity that modern physicists are not also psychologists, or modern psychologists also physicists, since the conceptions now current among physicists would be very useful to psychologists. The difficulty of modern physics, as everybody knows, lies in the unimaginability of its conceptions; they cannot be pictured, but exist only as operations in process. Even Einstein or Jeans is incapable of imagining curved space, let us say; but any competent modern physicist can not only take the curvature of space as proved, but act as if it were so, with complete confidence that the facts will bear him out. Now if the Universe, in respect of Space and Time, has become for the physicist a construct of his mind that is non-picturable, but at the same time is valid for practical no less than theoretical purposes—what is to prevent the psychologist from taking the "psyche" as proved, and proceeding to treat it *as if* it were the reality of the actual physical body? The universe for the physicist is something entirely different from the Universe for the "sensualist"; the latter makes pictures where the former realises processes. At the same time, though both universes are valid in their own terms, there cannot be the smallest doubt that the former conditions the latter; and that, in this sense, the physicists are nearer the source of reality than

the "sensualists". In the same way, the psychologist who deals with "psyche" is nearer the source of reality than the physiologist who deals with pictures. It is true that he is concerned with processes; it is also true that they are non-picturable; but, exactly as the physicist is capable of more accurate measurements of the Universe than the "sensualist," it is my conviction that a psychology that considered "psyche" alone would arrive at greater truth than

our physio-psychologists to-day who insist upon pictures. It is unfortunately the case, however, that, in Europe at any rate, no Einstein among psychologists has yet arisen. The physical Universe has been resolved into a system of operations unimaginable and non-picturable; our sensible Universe is only a shadow cast by it. Physicists have become psychologists on the grand scale, while psychologists have remained physicists on the small scale.

A. R. ORAGE

CLASH OF CULTURES

One of the most significant addresses at the International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, which recently met in London was that by Prof. Arnold J. Toynbee on "Psychological Problems which Arise from the Contact of Cultures". Prof. Toynbee, as quoted in *The Manchester Guardian* for August 2nd, brought out the havoc wrought in the Near East by the wholesale adoption of Western political institutions foreign to the geographical and historical background and the social heritage of the people. He remarked that "the destructiveness of such a process might be thought to be providing its own safeguard," and pertinently demanded :—

Why is it, then, that the non-Western peoples in recent times, when once they have embarked upon the course of adopting our Western political institutions, have tended to go on to the bitter end, notwithstanding the terrible sufferings and loss which this course has imposed upon them ?

It is not foreign political institutions alone or chiefly which the Near-Eastern

nations and the Far-Eastern as well have shown a disposition to adopt blindly. The East in general, some countries more than others of course, is suffering from ill-assimilated alien culture, adopted uncritically without adaptation to indigenous customs or the native culture pattern. The result in many cases is as fantastic as would be a silk hat and formal dinner coat worn with a *dhoti* and sandals. The Occidentalized Easterner is a man without a background, a misfit everywhere.

The consequences are far-reaching. The overvaluing of foreign manners and customs, attitudes and viewpoints, in itself is far less serious than the attendant disprizing of ancestral culture. THE ARYAN PATH is constantly stressing the fact that when Indians, for example, leave untapped the philosophical and spiritual resources of their mighty heritage to seek abroad their mental sustenance, the whole world is the poorer.

PH. D.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE SAGE OF CHELSEA

[At this hour it is not only appropriate but necessary to describe **Dr. L. P. Jacks** as a great Christian. A broad-minded Unitarian, he has served the cause of humanism and, as author and well-known Editor of *The Hibbert Journal* for over thirty years, he has contributed substantially towards liberalizing religious thought in Christian countries.—EDS.]

Mr. Froude's biography of Carlyle, published soon after his death in four large volumes, evoked, as is well known, a storm of indignation from his family and many of his personal friends, the echoes of which have by no means wholly subsided. The work was denounced as belittling, and even dishonouring, to one of the greatest men of his age; in particular, for having misrepresented him at a point where even an angel-biographer must tread with caution, that, namely, of his relations with his wife—"unhappy" according to Froude, "happy" according to his opponents, though Carlyle himself would not have accepted either adjective as a final valuation of a marriage or of anything else. The effect of the controversy was to produce, at intervals, a multitude of biographies, studies, and monographs, many of them consciously designed to counter Froude's misrepresentation at this point as well as at others. Of biographies subsequent to Froude's the most interesting and fully documented is Mr. David Alec Wilson's work in six volumes, of which the sixth, owing to Mr.

Wilson's death in 1933, has now been most faithfully and competently completed by his nephew Mr. D. Wilson MacArthur.

The present writer, who never knew or even saw Carlyle, but has been a diligent reader of him from youth upwards, and never so full of admiration for his genius as now, has to confess that he finds himself unable to share fully in the indignation provoked by Froude's biography. He is aware of its many inaccuracies and deplors them; he is persuaded that Froude did not catch the secret (who has?) of Carlyle's relations with his wife, but, all the same, Froude's portrait remains (for the present writer), the figure, in all essentials, of the great man whom Carlyle's writings declare him to have been, and none the less great, but perhaps rather the greater, for the faults of his character, faults unquestionably over-emphasized by Froude at certain points, but hardly to be treated as non-existent.

Mr. Wilson's work enables us to correct these errors, with good evidence to support the correction, though with occasional

Carlyle in Old Age. By D. A. Wilson and D. Wilson MacArthur. (Kegan Paul, Trench Trübner & Co. Ltd., London, 15s.)

traces of an animus against Froude, which it might have been better to avoid. It is a lovable man whose doings and sayings are here recorded, and never more lovable than in old age. And yet, after reading all Mr. Wilson has collected and written, one cannot but feel that the Carlyle he presents and the Carlyle presented by Froude are, in essentials, the same Carlyle. The two biographical portraits differ in much the same way as the canvas portraits painted by various artists during his lifetime, some representing him as a man of harsh, forbidding and aggressive countenance, others (notably that of Mrs. Allingham in the Scottish National Portrait Gallery) as serene, gentle, lovable and wholly at peace. It is perhaps a tribute to the greatness of Carlyle that he needs *both* types of biography, *both* types of portrait, to represent him as he really was. One has only to look steadily at either type to realize how readily it might pass into the other, reminding us of "the wrath of the Lamb". The key to his relations with his wife may possibly lie in that. And of hers with him. For hers, too, was a nature large enough for an immense distance between its best and its worst. Such natures are not easily belittled by the exhibition of their faults nor easily exalted by the praise of their excellence. In themselves they are greater than both. Neither

Carlyle nor his wife were saints after the conventional model. But both were souls tried in the fire and heroic in differing ways.

Unless he were otherwise informed of it, the reader would hardly suspect that the sixth volume of this monumental record was not the work of the hand which had produced the preceding five. In the arrangement, the method, the restraint and the carefulness there is no break of continuity, and the *obiter dicta*, always interesting, might have come from the same source in the last volume as in the others. Mr. Wilson knew what he was about when he entrusted his nephew with the continuation of his work. In its unbroken totality it is the fullest in authentic detail of all the Carlyle biographies yet written, resembling in some respects the work of those Dutch artists in which every hair in the sitter's beard is separately represented, not perhaps the greatest portraits when judged as works of art, but full of information for the student of character who can read the significance of little things as well as of great. Should the day ever come, and it seems not unlikely, when the name of Carlyle will gather to itself a fame and a splendour, greater even than it now has, or has had, in the past, Mr. Wilson's immense and pious labours so admirably completed by his nephew will not go unrecognized by the gratitude of posterity.

L. P. JACKS

DAYANANDA SARASWATI*

[Franklin Edgerton, Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at Yale University, examines the Vedic interpretation of the great founder of the Arya Samaj—EDS.]

"It is well known fact that 5000 years ago, in the whole world there existed no other religion but the Vedic. All its teachings are unopposed to the dictum of knowledge . . . The Pauranic [i. e. popular Hindu], the Jain (or the Buddhistic), the Christian and the Mohammadan [religions] are all opposed to the Vedic religion, and are the root of all other religions that are extant in the world" (p. 307). "Since the beginning of the world till 5000 years back, the Aryas [people of India] were the sovereign rulers of the whole earth" (p. 309). "All the knowledge that is extant in the world originated is Aryavarta (India). Thence it spread to Egypt, thence to Greece, thence to the Continent of Europe, thence to America and other countries" (p. 312). "Take for example the case of Egypt, Greece, or the Continent of Europe. The people of all these countries were without a trace of learning before the spread of knowledge from India" (p. 222). "Sanskrit . . . is the mother of all other languages"; that is why God revealed the Veda in Sanskrit rather than in the language of "some particular country," which would have shown partiality to that country (p. 221). What is the proof of the divine origin of the Vedas? "The book in which God is described as He is . . . and in which nothing is said that is opposed to the laws of nature, reason, the evidence of direct cognisance, etc., the teachings of the highly learned and altruistic teachers of humanity, and the intuitions of pure souls, and in which the laws, nature and properties of matter and the soul are propounded in just accordance with what they really are, is the book of Divine revelation.

Now the Vedas alone fulfil all the above conditions" (p. 221). Do the Vedas sanction animal sacrifices? Only in passages which have been maliciously interpolated by wicked heretics (p. 321). If a plurality of gods seems to be mentioned in the Veda, this refers only to *devatās*, that is, natural powers; thus the Vedic god Indra is "the all-pervading electricity" (p. 191); "it is nowhere said that it [a *devatā*] is God or is the object of our adoration" (p. 190).

These are literal quotations (but for the correction of misspellings for which the original author cannot be blamed), or fair summaries, of statements made by Swami Dayanand Saraswati, according to this official translation. Dayanand was the founder of the Arya Samaj, which includes in its membership many intelligent and enlightened people, and which has done a great deal of work which this reviewer admires and respects. To what extent the Samaj now accepts the religious and intellectual views of its founder, I cannot say. But it is difficult to see how the publication in English form of this book of his, containing such statements as the above, can do anything but harm to the organization. I have no desire to ridicule the Arya Samaj, nor the good Dayanand himself. I have not the slightest doubt that he was a sincere, earnest and morally worthy person. He was also not without learning; but his learning was limited to what could be read in Indian languages in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. He was inspired by a very natural and, in my opinion, just resentment against the attacks made on his native religion

* *The Light of Truth*. By Swami Dayananda Saraswati. Trans. by Dr. Chiranjiva Bharadwaja. (The Arya Samaj, Madras, Re. 1-8).

and culture by foreigners, especially Christian missionaries. He held, rightly as I think, that many of these attacks were due to mere ignorance and prejudice. Unfortunately I cannot feel that the way to combat ignorance and prejudice on one side is by equal ignorance and prejudice on the other. The way to convince intelligent people, in or out of India, that the Christian missionaries are wrong, is not to state as "well known facts" such grotesque absurdities as that five thousand years ago there existed no other religion than the Vedic, that all the world's learning originated in India, that Sanskrit is the mother of all languages, etc. That the Vedic poets meant "electricity" by the god Indra, or even that they knew anything about electricity as scientists of to-day understand that term, could be believed only by the aid of the blindest faith. Whatever the nature of the Vedic *devatās*, they are "objects of adoration" in almost every Vedic hymn. If references to animal sacrifices in the Veda are "interpolations," a very large part of the Vedic texts must be interpolations. The sad truth, which this book makes only too clear, is that Swami Dayanand strikingly resembled his missionary adversaries in mentality and degree of information.

A large part of the book is devoted to polemics against other religions,—not only foreign cults, but also all Indian philosophical and religious sects known to Dayanand, except strict Vedism as interpreted by him. The admirable tolerance which has, on the whole, characterized Indian religious thought was certainly not one of Dayanand's virtues. One wishes that he might have known and pondered Asoka's great Edict on Toleration, which says that one who thinks to glorify his own sect by vilifying the religious beliefs of others, in reality does serious injury to his own sect. To be sure, no Christian or Mohammedan can afford to throw stones at him on this score; their own houses have too much glass.

Though his main slogan is "back to the Vedas," the author was in some re-

spects an innovator; whether consciously or unconsciously one is not always sure. He modifies or rejects some of the traditional orthodox beliefs of the Vedic religion. So, for instance, he refuses to accept the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads as truly "Vedic"; he admits only the hymns (*Saṁhitās*) as canonical. Even they, at least as commonly interpreted, whether by Hindu pandits or western scholars, contain of course much that goes counter to his views. But here Dayanand can always fall back on one of the two escapes noted above. Either the disturbing passages are "interpolations," deliberately foisted upon the Vedas by evil and designing heretics; or else such passages are to be interpreted in some figurative way. Pious adherents of other religions have also made use of these two methods; especially the latter is very familiar in historic Christianity.

Besides the dogmatic parts, the book contains more or less full instructions for the conduct of ordinary life. Such subjects as the education of children, marriage, dietary regulations, and even the duties of rulers and persons in authority, are set forth in considerable detail. Broadly speaking Dayanand follows the traditions of orthodox Hinduism in such matters. But occasionally he modifies them, justifying himself by the assertion that the Vedas contain no such prescriptions as orthodoxy lays down. In addition to the Vedic texts, his most respected authority is Manu, the only "law-book" which he is willing to accept. Even this, of course, is not "inspired".

From the book as a whole one gets the impression of a very vivid, colourful, and forceful personality, such as is appropriate to the founder of a new religious organization. That organization may with perfect propriety continue to derive inspiration from his rugged strength, honesty, and patriotism. It is not necessary to accept his opinions on matters of scientific fact. But since these opinions are now presented publicly, and officially, to the whole

world in English dress, might it not be well for the leaders of the Arya Samaj to make it clear at the same time, (if such is the case, as I suppose it is) that while they are pursuing the broad

aims laid down by the founder, they do not necessarily defend his scholarly or scientific views, nor even, perhaps, his dialectic methods?

FRANKLIN EDGERTON

The Art of Life. By WILLIAM KINGSLAND, M. I. E. E. (The C. W. Daniel Co., London. 3s. 6d.)

Mr. Kingsland believes that humanity is *en route* for godhead. This book makes that very clear. It is, in facts, its central theme. But, as Mr. Kingsland also believes that the race will be millions of years on the road, it will be seen that his is no easy optimism. On the contrary, his book is not a signpost indicating the primrose path. It is a challenge, for it asserts that only by discipline, devotion and dedication can the race attain the full stature of its potentiality.

This is essentially a practical book. Its first part is concerned wholly with the body but, unlike many modern writers on health, Mr. Kingsland does not regard "fitness" as an end in itself. For him, the body is an instrument. In somewhat the same way, in Part II, he is more interested in the supraconscious than the subconscious mind. And that is very refreshing. After all, the basement isn't the whole of the house. Mr. Kingsland invites us to look at the view from the turret. Also, in Part III, he begs us to disassociate the word, spirit, from the parish-pump dogmas of antagonistic creeds. He asks us to regard the spiritual as the reality of our daily lives, and not merely as a vague something which may become operative in "eternity".

Also, he tells us that in all ages there have been those—Initiates, Adepts, Masters, Mahatmas—who have entered into their spiritual birthright. And that, by so doing, they have

"forestalled the race". That is, by developing their spiritual faculties and powers, they have achieved, as individuals, that which will take millions of years for the race, as a whole, to attain. These men and women were prophecies. We remain ego-centric: they became cosmo-centric.

This book, therefore, is concerned with the *whole nature* of man. It indicates a synthesis of man's potentialities—physical, mental, and spiritual. It asserts that, essentially, the religions of the world are one; and—by a number of quotations from Eastern and Western mystics—it reveals the spiritual kinship between the utterances of those for whom religion is not a rite but a reality.

Above all, there is recognition of the fact that "the Bible was written by mystics for mystics, and has been interpreted by materialists for materialists". To Mr. Kingsland, the "second coming" and the "crucifixion" are inner continual processes. "Salvation" is a living ordeal—not a pat on the back, in the next world, for those who swallow dogmas in this one. The religious life is the development of our "spiritual nature and powers *here and now*". It is that, or it is nothing. It is to enter the interior world of principalities and powers—and to gain dominion. It is not a series of set observances. It is not a kind of celestial sweepstake. It is not an opium dream for those who are afraid of life, or those who are afraid of death.

It is a Deed—made flesh.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

Buddha's Teachings, being the Sutta-Nipāta, edited with an English Version by LORD CHALMERS, Volume 37, Harvard Oriental Series, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A., Humphrey Milford, London).

The appearance of a new volume in the Harvard Oriental Series is an event in the world of Oriental Scholarship. This noble Series of texts and translations, founded by Henry Clarke Warren and Charles Rockwell Lanman in 1891, and continued by the latter since Warren's death in 1899, now embraces 40 volumes, 31 of which are actually issued and most of the others are nearly ready or in an advanced state of preparation.*

In the volume under review Lord Chalmers, a distinguished Pāli scholar and sometime Governor of Ceylon,† gives a metrical rendering of the *Sutta-Nipāta* which contains some of the most ancient parts of the Buddhist Scriptures in the Pāli tradition. The original text and the English rendering are printed facing each other, and it is instructive to see how, without sacrificing the essential tone and sentiment of the original, Lord Chalmers has contrived to present here in chaste and polished English verse some of the most remarkable utterances of the great World-Teacher. It is verily a monument to the translator's art. We have read the Pāli by itself and the English by itself and enjoyed doing both without being tempted, for a clearer understanding of the sense, to turn from the English to the Pāli. Indeed, in several passages, by reason of eschewing the redundant and condensing the rest, the effect produced by Lord Chalmers's English version was found by us to be much more agreeable and enrapturing, reminding us every now and then of Edwin Arnold's poetic masterpiece, "The Light of

Asia". Lord Chalmers is a Pāli scholar of no mean pretensions, possessing as he does thirty years of high-class scholarly activity to his credit.

The work is singularly free from any woodenness or pedantry. Take for example a common Pāli word like *Samkhāra* (Sk. *Samskāra*). It is often rendered by "latent or subliminal impressions," a rendering which emphasises one aspect of the original word, but does not bring out the part which the "latent impressions" play in the building of newer things or forms. "Confection" is a horrid, shall we say, *trans-vocabulation* for the word affected by some scholars. Lord Chalmers's "plastic-forms" is just right. It is a genuine English expression that everybody can understand, and it brings out quite adequately all the implications of the original word. There are many passages in the translation that can be looked upon as distinctive contributions to English literature. We feel we must confess that although we have studied considerable portions of the *Sutta-Nipāta* in the original, we never felt tempted to read the text through at a sitting. But Lord Chalmers's translation, into which we at first intended to dip here and there merely with a view to quiet the reviewer's conscience, we could not, and did not, lay aside until we had gone to the end. We are accordingly convinced that volumes like the one before us are bound to go a long way in fulfilling the noble aim of the Harvard Oriental Series in promoting mutual understanding and mutual good will amongst the Nations of the East and the West.

A short Introduction discussing the place of the *Sutta-Nipāta* in the Buddhist Canon and a serviceable Index add largely to the usefulness of the volume.

S. K. BELVALKAR

* As the writer of this review has been responsible for one or two lacunæ in the Series, it gives him great pleasure to announce—now that he is freed from service—that Vol. 22 will be issued in 1935, while the press-copy of Vol. 23, *Deo volente*, he hopes to be able to place at the feet of his *Guru* in 1936, or even earlier.

† One would wish that such a combination of the scholar and the statesman—of the king and the philosopher—were more frequent!

The Garden of the Prophet. By KAHLIL GIBRAN. (Alfred A. Knopf, New York. \$ 2.50.)

Kahlil Gibran, who died in 1931 at the age of 28, was born in Mt. Lebanon, and is regarded by the Arabic speaking peoples as the genius of his time. His poetry has been translated into more than twenty different languages. Auguste Rodin, whose sculpture inspired Mr. Bernard Shaw's new play, "Six of Calais," compared Gibran's drawings and paintings with the work of William Blake. Gibran's latest works, including *The Garden of the Prophet*, were written in English, in which his style has been described as "majestic and beautiful," and "cadenced and vibrant with feeling, bringing to one's ears the majestic rhythm of Ecclesiastes". In *The Garden of the Prophet*, the master, Almustafa, returns from his seafaring, teaches his disciples and answers their questions, and finally departs from his garden again. "Life," the prophet tells his followers, "is older than all things living, even as beauty was winged ere the beautiful was born on earth, and even as truth was truth before it was uttered." Indeed, the ecstatic awareness of the essential unity of all that exists is the leading motive of the entire prose-poem, and the experience is altered again and again, each time with the freshness of a new Spring. "Death changes nothing," Almustafa says, "but the masks that cover our faces."

Yet, for whatever reason, it is the very insistence of Gibran's heart and mind on this unquestionable truth that breaks the spell cast upon the reader both by the meaning of the poem, and by the simple, often cantative, but never monotonous language. The inquisitive disciple, Mannus, who "saw plants in flower cleaving to sycamore trees," asked "what of the parasites?" The prophet's answer is a fundamental truth: "All there is lives on all there is, and all there is lives in the faith, shoreless, upon the bounty of the Most High." Does that, however, prove, "My friend we are all parasites" to be equally true? We have to answer

that it does not, for the reason that while the first statement is true, the second is useless for deciding upon the best conduct of life.

Asked why he never spoke of ugliness, Almustafa answers, "Call nothing ugly, my friend, save the fear of a soul in the presence of its own memories." It is impossible, in the presence of so many observations of this tenor, to avoid the sensation of being in the presence of a spirit teaching how to solve the problems of this world while too remote from them to know them. Rodin notwithstanding, the seven mystical drawings by the author which illustrate *The Garden of the Prophet* confirm this impression. In meditating upon the unity of all things Gibran appears to be at peace with himself, yet it is not the peace of life. Blake was at war with himself because he was as determined to live in this world as in the Heaven within.

This is not to say that *The Garden of the Prophet* is of no value to the human spirit of to-day. On the contrary, it has a high value arising almost from its defects as a work of prophecy or poetry. In the world of speed and sensation in which most people now live, many of them fear that inner life is rapidly perishing while man becomes a puppet operated by reaction to his environment. For such a disease Gibran's poem is more than an anodyne. It is a tonic adventure in meditation, and a means of true repose. For, while the mind is not stilled, there is much beauty to experience, and occasionally a noble appreciation of the treasure that is consciousness, and that alone makes the awareness of either beauty or truth possible. "Being," the prophet says, "is to be a weaver with seeing fingers, a builder mindful of light and space, to be a ploughman and feel that you are hiding a treasure with every seed you sow"... Six days, Emerson said, for action; is one too many for meditation? I am grateful for the meditation vouchsafed to me in *The Garden of the Prophet*.

A. NEWSOME

A New Argument for God and Survival, and a Solution to the Problem of Supernatural Events. By MALCOLM GRANT. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

As his title suggests, Mr. Malcolm Grant claims to have discovered a new and conclusive proof of theism. His line of argument may be roughly summarised as follows: extraordinary events, including psychic, occult, and spiritualistic phenomena, are undoubtedly real and of frequent occurrence. Such events have been carefully and systematically investigated during the last fifty years and more by a number of highly qualified men of science and others, who have established the facts, but have failed to find any hypotheses which satisfactorily explain them. Every theory that has been advanced comes up against whole categories of happenings which contravene it. Now, if the phenomena were in accordance with natural laws, these laws would necessarily by this time have been discovered and formulated. The fact that this is not the case proves—so Mr. Grant contends—that the phenomena are not governed by law at all, but are caused by the free volition of an all-powerful personal God, are in fact miracles. Incidentally Mr. Grant dismisses with a gesture of contempt the explanations, based on immemorial occult tradition, which were re-introduced to the Western world by H. P. Blavatsky.

Having thus defined his premises, Mr. Grant proceeds with a show of logic of the scholastic order to erect on them a structure of theological theory, much of which, we imagine, will shock his more orthodox theistic brethren. God is the cause of all miracles good and bad alike of every religion and cult; and is the fountain of all revelations, whether true or false. He has his own high purposes

to serve by them; and in furthering his ends, Mr. Grant writes:—

Clearly God will not hesitate to use the harshest, basest, and most unscrupulous means (as we count baseness, etc.) to further certain of his aims. To put it briefly, God not only can, but does, act the part of Satan. . . .

It seems to me impossible that any criticism which takes the right view of revelations can come to any other conclusion than that Jesus was a human being, chosen, inspired, guided, exploited, and in part deceived, by God, as have been many other religious leaders before and since.

If Mr. Grant had really succeeded in establishing the existence and attributes of a personal God on these lines, one would be justified in thinking that such a deity would be better *disestablished*; but the whole of his elaborate and ingenious theorising fails because it is based on the fallacious assumption that, because occult phenomena have not been satisfactorily explained by psychical researchers, they are therefore miracles. Inasmuch as these psychical researchers, able and industrious as many of them undoubtedly are, are unable to explore the phenomena on the plane of their causation, or to produce them at will for purposes of experiment, but can only contact such sporadic and irregular effects as are manifested in the physical world, their inability to explain is easy to understand. How could the natural history of fishes have been formulated by observers limited to watching the occasional signs of subaqueous life that show themselves on the surface of sea or river—the blowing of a whale, the swift flash through the air of a flying fish, or a trout leaping at a may-fly? You might measure, count, and classify such occurrences indefinitely, and even take precautions to make sure they were not being fraudulently produced by human agency; but your eventual contribution to ichthyology would be of very little value.

R. A. V. M.

The Origin and Development of Religion in Vedic Literature. By P. S. DESHMUKH, M. A., D. Phil., with Foreword by A. Berriedale Keith. (Oxford University Press. 22s. 6d.)

This book is an excellent example of the type of scholarship that dominates our centres of academic learning. Accurate, careful, well documented, exhibiting first-hand acquaintanceship, not only with the original texts, but with all the mass of "recognised" scholarship in the principal European languages, the book plays the scholarly game according to all the rules laid down by the best "authorities". To those who like that sort of thing it may be confidently recommended. The Vedic Gods are lucidly classified and "explained," the Vedic religion is linked up with the earlier Indo-Iranian religion, and that with the still earlier (somewhat conjectural) Indo-European religion. Perhaps the most original contribution is the author's contention that the Indo-European religion was "religious" from the very beginning and was not, as has often been maintained, a development out of more primitive "magical" beliefs, arising out of the breakdown of the latter in experience. The author brings a good deal of evidence to support his contention, and holds that the Vedic religion was from the outset a "poetic" worship of deified natural forces vaguely anthropomorphised and almost entirely beneficent. All this is very capably done, though it is perhaps a little irritating to be told that "Keith has established" or "Macdonnell has demonstrated" this or that point, without being given any chance to check the "demonstration". They may be the author's gurus but they aren't necessarily everybody's.

Apart, however, from the scholarly game with its fixed but unproved axioms such as that all religion originated out of primitive notions, whether "poetic" or otherwise, that all philosophical conceptions are certainly "late," that magic and religion had no other basis than childishly faulty

reasoning, and its apparent belief that in the ancient world men went about like the character in Dickens saying "here's a hill, let's worship it!"—apart from all this, the book has little interest. Anyone who had hoped that an Indian scholar, at least, would be able to give us some real insight into the Vedic literature will be sadly disappointed, though he will find some interesting facts here and there if he is prepared to supply the necessary insight himself. The author's utter lack of perception of the real inner meanings of the Vedic hymns is clearly "established" (as he might say) by his confessed failure to understand why the Gāyatri mantra should have been selected for such especial veneration and be considered to contain the essence of all the Vedas. Ability to account for the unique importance of Gāyatri may be regarded as a critical test of an expositor's power to penetrate beyond the letter of the Vedic texts and to reveal something of their inner meaning. From this point of view this book fails lamentably.

One other instance will suffice. We read a great deal about the worship of sky-gods such as Dyaus, and are invited to admire the picture of early Aryans contemplating the beneficent light of the sky in rapt (if slightly stupid) adoration. It doesn't appear even to occur to the author that the reason the Aryan Rishis worshipped the "sky-god" was not because they were wonder-struck by the beneficent daylight but because the expanse of luminous blue was to them a symbol of an even more beneficent Light, a Light "which never was on sea or land," a Light which the few, the Rishis, have seen in all ages but to represent which to the unseeing many they have always been forced to employ more or less material symbols. No doubt it is true that Keith has not demonstrated nor Macdonnell established this Light, nor has it been explained *Brahmasutrapadaishchaiva hetumadbhir vinischitaih*, "in decisive Brahmasutra words, full of reasonings," by Griswold, Oldenberg or Kaegi; nevertheless, as

Galileo might have said, "It shines for all that"! Perhaps too, Sri Krishna (or the author of the *Gita* if preferred) knew more about the real meaning of the Veda than our modern teachers and was not merely trying to support a new creed by appealing to ancient authority when he said: "*Vedaischa sarvair aham eva vedya*"—"I am that which is to be known in all the Vedas."

Readers must judge for themselves.

Kinkinīmālā. By Y. MAHALINGA SASTRI M.A., B.L., Advocate (Madras Rs. 2-0-0.)

Sanskrit is said to be a dead language. If a dead language means a language that is no longer used as a mother-tongue, then Sanskrit is certainly dead. For, nowhere is it used as a mother-tongue proper. But Sanskritists resent the epithet "dead" being applied to their language. And there are some very cogent reasons for it. Sanskrit is still the medium of expression for Pandits of the old school in the different parts of the country. It is still being used as a conveyance of thought by Sanskritists of both the old and the new school in the many publications that are issued year after year. Commentaries on different works, dissertations on various Darśanic topics and especially on Vedānta, poems and even dramas, are being published in Sanskrit. But above all, the literature in this "language of the gods," (the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata, the Bhagavadgītā, the Rāmāyana and the Puranas, and the vast mass falling under the convenient term classical), is even in this century as much a source of inspiration to a large majority of Hindus in their secular and religious life as it was in ancient times. To the Hindus, therefore, Sanskrit has never been and will never be a lifeless tongue.

The publication under review is a

It is useless to criticise the learned author of the book for not building a temple when all he intended to give us was a museum. It is quite a good museum. I have tried to indicate to which class of visitors it will be interesting and to which class it will not.

SRI KRISHNA PREM

[The reviewer is an Englishman and a Cambridge graduate who has retired to a life of study and meditation in the Himalayas. —Eds.]

welcome indication of the life that pulsates in this "dead" language. It is a collection of short poems in Sanskrit by a man, who, in addition to holding University degrees, possesses hereditary Sanskrit learning in him. For, he is a descendant of the great Appaya Dīkṣita, whose eminence in more than one department of Sanskrit learning is so well known.

The poems in this book deal with varied subjects. They fall under ten different groups such as salutations to various gods; poems dealing with love; descriptions of nature; and addresses to a cuckoo, an owl etc. In some of these the author's close observation of nature is evident. Some of the poems are translations of well-known passages in English and these have been very well done indeed.

Mr. Māhalinga Śāstri wields great command over the language and writes in an easy flowing style. Some of the poems can be set to music with the proper *Rāga* and *Tāla*, which have been duly pointed out in an Appendix. Yatibhaṅgas are met with in a few places such as 2a on p. 57, 4a on p. 68, 4b on p. 73 and 5a on p. 100. Those could perhaps have been avoided.

The book is altogether a creditable performance and we eagerly await the publication of the other volumes in the Series and of the other works of the author mentioned in Appendix D.

A. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

The Story of Kalaka : Texts, History, Legends and Miniature Paintings of the Svetambara Jain Hagiographical work, The Kālakācāryakathā (with 15 plates). By W. NORMAN BROWN (Smithsonian Institution, Washington D. C., Freer Gallery of Art, Oriental Studies, No. 1).

We have great pleasure in welcoming the story of Kalaka. The casual purchase of a MS. by Prof. W. Norman Brown at Benares has resulted in this beautiful edition—Oriental Studies, No. I—which we hope is the first of an important series of publications.

We give below the story of Kalakacarya in short :

There was a king named Vajrasimha in the city of Dhāravāsa. His queen was Surasundari. She had a son Kalaka and a daughter Saraswati. One day the prince Kalaka, while returning from horse-riding met Gunākara Acarya with his retinue of noble monks. The Acharya was preaching the religion of the Jinās—the noble doctrine of *Ahimsa*. The prince attracted by the noble truth offered himself as a disciple, and got initiated as a monk after obtaining permission from his parents. The prince succeeded his master, Gunākara as the chief of the Sanga. Kalaka, as Acharya over 500 monks, arrived at Ujjaini and stayed in a park. People from the city went in large numbers to offer worship and to listen to the Acharya's preaching. Kalaka's sister, Saraswati, who had become a nun, was also one of the female disciples of Suri Kalaka. King Gardabhilla of Ujjaini happened to see the nun Saraswati and was attracted by her beauty. Being a wicked king, Gardabhilla had her abducted and cast her into his seraglio against her will. Her cries for help were of no avail. When the master Kalaka advised the king to release the nun and not to besmirch the royal family, the king would not yield. Then the Acharya took a vow that he would uproot this king, violater of Dharma.

The learned Suri leaving the city went beyond the Indus to the land of

Sākakula. There the nobles were called the Sahis and the overlord Sāhanu-Sāhi. There Suri Kalaka stayed with a certain Sahi who became his good friend. One day a messenger from the overlord appeared before the Sahi and presented a sword. It was the practice of the Sahanu-Sahi to send a sword to a subordinate Chief whenever he was angry with the latter. This meant a sign of wrath and the recipient of the sword must kill himself with it, for otherwise the whole family would be annihilated by the overlord. Hence, when the sword was presented to the Sahi, Suri Kalaka observed a change in his friend's countenance and wanted to know the reason for his grief. When the matter was explained to the Suri, the latter advised the Sahi to escape from the tyranny of the overlord by migrating to the Hindukadesa with his friends, 95 in number, who also were ordered to be destroyed by the overlord. Kalaka thought that by this arrangement he could save his friend and punish the wicked king Gardabhilla. This marks the invasion of India by the Sākas. All the Sahis led by the Suri crossed the Indus and went to Surāstra and settled down there for some time. Then they were asked to take Ujjaini, the key to the splendid land of Mālava. But they complained that they had not enough supplies to undertake the campaign. The Suri obtained for them the sinews of war by working a miracle. He sprinkled a pinch of magic powder over a burning brick-kiln and turned the bricks into gold and said "Take this as your supplies". Thus equipped with supplies they set out for Ujjaini. Gardabhilla hearing of the approach of the enemies went out to meet them. As his army was routed in battle he hastily returned to his capital and stayed there with the remnants of his army prepared for a siege and depending upon his magic She-Ass. When this magic She-Ass brayed every biped or quadruped belonging to the hostile army within hearing would fall down,

vomiting blood. Therefore the Suri advised the Sahis to withdraw to a distance of two leagues, and he himself with 108 sharp-shooters waited for the appearance of the She-Ass. They were to stand alert, each with arrow drawn to the ear so that when the She-Ass opened her mouth to bray, her mouth should be filled with arrows before she could make a single sound. They did everything as planned. The magic She-Ass was thwarted. They entered the city and took Gardabhilla prisoner; he was brought in chains and offered at the Suri's feet. The nun Saraswati was liberated and the congregation was restored. The king Gardabhilla was banished from the country by the merciful Suri. The Sahi, the Suri's friend, was chosen as their overlord by the other Sahis. Thus arose the Saka line of Kings. They ruled happily the land of Malawa, honouring the teaching of Jinas and being disciples of the great Suri till they were uprooted by Vikramaditya who became the king of Malawa. He established his own era called the Vikrama Era beginning with 58-57 B. C. When 135 years of the Vikrama Era had elapsed, this line was in its turn destroyed by a powerful Saka king who established his own era—the Saka Era—(78 A. D.)

This is the first and the most important episode of Kalaka's career. The second relates to the events at the city of the kings Balamitra and Bhānumitra and of the change of the date of Paryushana, and the third relates to his reproof of Sagaradatta; the fourth to his expounding the *Nigoda* doctrine. Professor Brown is of opinion that the episode relating to the change of Paryushana date is probably the last to be included in the Kalaka legend. There are various recensions of the Kalaka legend and some of these are published in this volume. Further the stories associated with Kalaka are not "confined to a single person, but relate to three, who are separated from one another by appreciable periods of time". Prof. Brown emphasises this as a very important fact and he criticises Mr.

Jayaswal that "he nowhere distinguishes between the three Kalakas". He agrees with Prof. Konow as to the value of the Kalakacarya Kathanaka of the Jinas for he quotes with approval Prof. Konow's opinion as to the tradition.

I cannot see the slightest reason for discrediting this account, as is usually done, because most scholars are a priori disinclined to believe in Indian tradition and sometimes prefer the most marvellous accounts of foreign authors to Indian lore. Almost every detail can be verified from other sources. A Saka Empire in the Indus country is known from classical sources. Ptolemy speaks of the extension of Saka power to Kathiawar and the use of the imperial title "King of Kings" among the Sakas, is attested by coins. And the Puranas speak of "Saka Kings" as the successors of the Gardabhilla dynasty.

The history of the first Saka Empire in India can accordingly be reconstructed as follows: Shortly after the death of Mithradates II in 88 B. C. [The Sahanusahi of the Kalaka legend] the Sakas of Seistan made themselves independent of Parthia and started on a career of conquest which took them to the Indus country. ... Later on, about 60 B.C. Sakas had extended their domain to what the Kalakacarya Kathanaka calls Hindukadesa, i.e., the lower Indus country, and thence to Kathiawar and Malawa, where they probably introduced their national era. In 57-56 B. C. they were here ousted by Vikramaditya, who celebrated his victory by establishing an era of his own.....

On this array of evidence, Prof. Brown suggests:—

We may accept the tradition of Saka invasion of the lower Indus country, Kach, Surat, and Malwa, with the capture of Ujjaini, until evidence is adduced to contradict it. The fact that the legend contains fairy-tale elements need not make us reject its kernel.

The texts after recounting the defeat of Gardabhilla refer to the establishment of the Vikrama Era in 57 B. C. and to the restoration of the Saka ascendancy marked by the Saka Era in 78 A. D. It is a pity that Prof. Brown does not want to discuss the origin of these two Eras, for he is of opinion that it is "impossible to extract any solid information on these eras from our texts". In a footnote he explains why he does not accept the conclusions obtained by K. P. Jayaswal. The matter is of such vital importance to historical research that it

appears quite unfair to dismiss it in a footnote.

Though this is not the place to discuss the problems of the eras, still we need make no apology for stating the salient points in Jayaswal's position. He agrees with Konow on many points. But as to the date of "the Earlier Saka Era" he differs from him. Dr. Konow puts the origin after the reign of Mithradates II, *i. e.*, after 88 B. C., "when the power of Parthia had declined and kingdoms once subordinate had become independent". But according to Jayaswal, who relies on the Kalakacharya story, the invasion was due to pressure at home; it was not due to the weakening of the Suzerain power; but to its crushing weight which could not be borne. Whether we take the successful revolt against Artabanus and the national self-assertion of the Sakas or the migration due to the tyranny of Mithradates II as marking the national Era, it will not be far off from 123 B. C.

Another interesting point to be noted is Jayaswal's identification of Vikramaditya with Gautamiputra Satakarni. He accepts Dr. Konow's conclusion that Vikramaditya of 58 B. C. was a historical figure and a national hero. The Jaina chronology connects the Saka defeat in 58 B. C. with Gautamiputra.

The Jaina chronological gathas if properly understood have yielded almost accurate chronology and history. Their date for Nāhapāna and Vikrama or Gautami Satakarni is one of the best contributions of that chronology.

Let us turn to the second section

dealing with art—miniature painting in Western India. The reproductions are not confined to the Kalakacharya-MSS. paintings. The illustrations are arranged according to the chronological order—first the reproduction from palm-leaf manuscripts and then from paper manuscripts. The former consists of three plates and the latter, seven, altogether ten plates. Important incidents from the Kalaka legend illustrated in the paintings reproduced in this book are:—

Kalaka — as prince on horseback.

Kalaka — hearing Gunakara preach.

Abduction of the nun Saraswati.

King Gardabhilla in court.

Kalaka and the Sahi.

The Siege of Ujjaini and defeat of the She-Ass.

Gardabhilla — a captive.

Kalaka and Indra.

In the second chapter devoted to the history of miniature paintings Prof. Brown has contributed in a short chapter a useful history of the "Western Indian School" of art—which is of great importance in the history of Indian painting. In these miniatures of the Kalakacharya Katha we see the first small intrusion into Indian painting of Persian elements. Gradually the Persian influence upon the Indian style became more and more felt until the "combination of the two brought into existence the Rajaput and Mughal schools".

Prof. Brown can very well claim that "no one but myself has yet endeavoured to outline even tentatively, the history of this Art". He deserves to be congratulated for the splendid edition of this story of Kalaka.

A. CHAKRAVARTI

The Jewish Foundation of Islam. By CHARLES CUTLER TORREY. (Jewish Institute of Religion Press. Block Publishing Co., New York. \$ 1, 50).

Many theories have been advanced by European Orientalists to account for the phenomenon of the Qur'ân—almost as many as were put forward by opponents in the Prophet's own day.

Formerly it was treated as imposture—a theory which has not been able to withstand the ordeal of research. But until now the abundant historical details found in Islamic Tradition have been accepted as authoritative. It has been left for Dr. Torrey, Professor of Semitic languages in Yale University, to reject the whole of the

available historic data and, on the total void thus created, to launch a new and staggering hypothesis, which is that the Prophet was, if not a learned rabbi, at least profoundly versed in rabbinical lore, which he had studied in "the Israelite colony in Mekka".

We have not the slightest evidence, historical or traditional, of the existence of an Israelite colony in Mecca *at any time*, nor have we record of a single Jewish *resident*. On the other hand, tradition tells us that, when the Meccan disbelievers wished to annoy the Prophet with posers on the kind of subjects about which he preached to them, some of them went to Yathrib (Al-Madinah), the nearest place at which there was a Jewish colony, and got the rabbis there to prime them with conundrums which they propounded to the Prophet on their return; the revealed answers to which are contained in Surahs XVII and XVIII and also (I think) in Surah XXVII (the story of Solomon and the ants and the Queen of Sheba)—passages which stand in contrast to the rest of the Qur'ân and are entirely rabbinical.

The Prophet's known and reported intercourse with Christians led the Meccans in his day to think that he had learnt from them—a claim made by the Christian Arabs and supported by the great majority of Orientalists. But Prof. Torrey finding—as he states—in the Qur'ân only a very superficial knowledge of Christianity (he seems to have ignored the Gnostic version), but a profound knowledge of Judaism, cannot accept the facts as handed down to us.

The author insists too much upon the evidences of direct borrowing from Jewish sources, which he thinks he finds in the Qur'ân itself, and forgets altogether the strong Jewish influence which we know to have been exercised on Muslim interpretation of the Qur'ân in early days. The Arabs, wishing for elucidation of certain passages and further information with regard to Hebrew prophets, turned naturally to the

Jewish convert for an explanation, which in many cases changed the import of the text. For example, in the story of Joseph, Prof. Torrey writes:—

Thereupon follows the attempt of the man's wife to entice Joseph Joseph refused at first, but was at last ready to yield when he saw a vision which deterred him. (The nature of this is not told in the Koran, but we know from the Jewish Midrash that it was the vision of his father with Rachel and Leah).

There is no mention of a vision in the Qur'ânic account of the incident:—

And she, in whose house he was, asked of him an evil act. She bolted the doors and said: Come! He said: Allah forbid! He is my lord who hath treated me honourably. Wrong-doers never prosper.

She verily desired him, and he would have desired her if it had not been that *he saw the argument of his lord*. Thus it was that We might ward off from him evil and lewdness. Lo! he was one of our chosen slaves.

Here the word "lord" (*rabb*) in both cases refers to Joseph's absent master. The same word is used in the same Surah with reference to the King. Elsewhere in the Qur'ân the word (*rabb*) is applied only to Allah. It was thus easy for the Jewish exponent, in all good faith, to put in his Hebrew legend at this point as explaining the nature of "the argument of his Lord," though the text of the Qur'ân implies no more than Joseph's foreseeing what his master, who had treated him most kindly, would have the right to think of him in certain circumstances.

The author fails to note the difference in the Qur'ânic narration of the old Semitic stories, though they are noteworthy. There is no snake in the story of the fall of Adam; the Flood is for the destruction of "the folk of Noah" only, not of all mankind: Lot's wife is not turned into a pillar of salt, but simply "left behind" in the doomed township. The narrative parts of the Qur'ân were given for instruction and warning, to make a strong impression on an audience which delighted in the marvellous and the grotesque. How, then, was so much of the marvellous and all the grotesque omitted from the narratives if these were taken whole-

sale, as the author thinks, from Hebrew Scriptures?

One cannot help perceiving that Prof. Torrey could never have evolved his theory, much less developed it, if he had studied Muslim Scripture and

Tradition as closely as he has studied Jewish. As it is, these lectures, delivered before the Jewish Institute of Religion, New York, must rank among the curiosities of Orientalism.

MARMADUKE PICKTHALL

Religion and History. By JAMES CLARK MCKERROW, M. B. (Longmans, Grech and Co., London. 6s.)

Dr. McKerrow's book comprises two separate essays, entitled respectively, *Principles of Sociology* (73 pp.) and *Evolution in the Light of Religion* (113 pp.) It is particularly difficult to do justice to the first of these essays in a brief review, for the author, whose style is not of the easiest, has compressed into his 73 pages a vast amount of varied fact, comment and speculation about the evolution of social institutions and social consciousness, past and future. Many of his conclusions are highly controversial, but it is clear that they have been arrived at as the result of wide reading and reflection on what he has read. Like nearly everyone else in the modern world, Dr. McKerrow is a strong advocate of peace; but he appears to think that war can be abolished by a sort of act of the general reason, failing to recognise that, so long as the vast majority of men as individuals continue to pursue selfish aims, so long will conflict be endemic in the human race, and will break out at intervals in one form of violence or another. Selfishness and lack of emotional control are the diseases of which war is one of the symptoms; and in sociology, as in medicine, a real permanent cure can be effected only by removing the causes of the trouble.

In his second essay Dr. McKerrow propounds an exceedingly interesting and, we believe, original theory of Christian origins. Christianity, he holds, made its first appearance as Gnostic Christianity, which arose latish in the first century A. D. as

the result of the infusion of Jewish messianic ideas into Gnosticism, which was an eclectic system or movement springing out of the whole religious past of the Western world. Among the Gnostic Christians, whose hey-day was roughly from 70-135 A. D., there was, as elsewhere, a division into "full-grown men and babes"; and the Christ, which was understood by the first as a divine saviour-principle, was given an historical embodiment by the second and identified with Jesus. From this externalised Gnostic Christianity of the spiritual "babes" was gradually developed Catholic Christianity, of which, Dr. McKerrow insists, there is no evidence at all in history prior to about 140 A. D. Our author thus entirely reverses the orthodox theory, which makes Gnosticism an heretical movement that diverged from primitive Catholicism. He holds no strong view either way as to the historicity of Jesus, but contends that his theory will hold good whether the gospel narrative be regarded as history or as myth. Of that narrative, he writes:—

The New Testament is the expression of the writers' religious experience; it conveys spiritual, not historical truth, and no one with ears to hear the former will care about the latter.

Dr. McKerrow has given us only the bare outline of his theory, for which however he makes out a case which is at least plausible and suggestive. We venture to hope that he will work it out in fuller detail in a future book, and meet by anticipation some of the many counter-arguments that will certainly be advanced on the orthodox side.

R. A. V. M.

THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1934 IN THE U. S. A.

The End of a Season—The Scholar in Politics—Philosophy for Modern Man—A New Synthesis—"New York Intellectuals"—Music in American Life—Thomas Mann—His Olympian Detachment.

In London and Paris the "season," artistic and intellectual as well as social, is still at its height in June. Not so in New York. Short periods of terrific heat in a temperate zone affect the inhabitants more than they do those of more tropical regions. By the end of May the season here in the theatre, in publishing, in education, is almost over. Only music has of late years come to have a vital summer incarnation. There is a two months season of open air concerts by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra that has become one of the remarkable features of summer life in New York.

One good way of noting the signs of the times intellectually is to note the things that are said by distinguished university presidents at the Commencement (or Graduation) ceremonies of our leading universities. Some of these pronouncements, it is true, tend to be routine, but even the routine is symptomatic. The leaders in American academic society have a rather special place in our civilization. They are a kind of lay priests and public prophets. Some of them, like Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, have for a generation spoken to a wide public attention. The older order of university presidents is passing away; Dr. Butler is

indeed the only survivor. But younger ones, Hutchins of Chicago, Conant of Harvard, Angell of Yale, are beginning to acquire something of the same authoritative status.

As one looks over the Commencement addresses this year, there is, it must be confessed, very little new or striking to report. Dr. Butler contented himself with pleading once more for the nineteenth-century ideal—or idol—of liberty which he thinks threatened by the increasing socialization of American and of European life. Some university orators urged for the importance of trained intelligence in American political life, a plea as old, of course, as Plato, but rendered particularly timely by arguments pro and con as to the competence and service rendered by the so-called "brain trust," a group of university economists and legal professors high in the councils of the Roosevelt Administration. On this theme President Roosevelt himself had vigorous things to say at the Yale Commencement, where he received an honorary degree. The President stands firmly by his professorial adjutants, and not Woodrow Wilson, himself a scholar and professor, could more firmly have defended the scholar in politics.

There have been no new books of the first order, though there have been three or four extremely important as symptoms. One of those is a volume* by Richard Rothschild, a non-professional, self-avowed but earnest amateur in philosophy. His book *Illusion and Reality* is, for all its scholarly limitations, a really significant contribution. It breaks no new ground but it traverses ground only recently broken. It is an attempt to make a philosophy for modern man. The author, whose identity and history are unknown to me, is obviously particularly influenced by that group of recent thinkers, including Eddington and Whitehead, who find inadequate the measurable facts of physics, and the whole biological theory of "Reality," made so popular, especially in France, Germany, and America in the late nineteenth century. Whitehead has made clear, as also Mr. Rothschild, that an adequate knowledge would include—as an adequate theory of knowledge would have to include and as an adequate metaphysics would have to deal with and render—values as well as facts, ideals as well as things. A complete philosophy would have to include the moral as well as the physical order. Spirit, too, is a fact, and a philosophy that attempts to give the meaning of things and to ignore the fact of meaning, is a false philosophy indeed. Mr. Rothschild is to be commended for his attempt to indicate the general outlines of a philosophy that would incorporate moral and spiritual as well as

physical "facts" into its vision of a "coherent" reality. The time is obviously passing when billiard-ball physics was the dogma and the superstition of the supposedly enlightened and when the physics laboratory was the unconscious temple of a new and narrow theology of matter.

There is another book that deserves mention in something like the same connection. It is called *The Horizon of Experience* by C. Delisle Burns, a humane and cultivated writer on philosophical themes of a broadly moral type and interest. The book has, as a matter of fact, not attracted very much attention here. It is a little too obvious for the trained student, and possibly too advanced for anyone but the already quite well educated layman. It is a pity, for I have not in a long time seen a volume that combined a more decent and understanding respect for the past and a sense of the new horizons opened up by experiments in art, education, and politics and personal life and the new doctrines of physics. Professor Burns points out the oscillation in intellectual history between periods of intellectual synthesis when, as among the Greeks, and in the Middle Ages, there was a fixed synthesis in the light of which experience was regarded, and those periods, like those of the Renaissance and our own, when the materials of a new synthesis were beginning to appear on "the

* Reviewed in our last issue.

horizon and in the midst of the debris of the old".

There is still another book, in no explicit sense philosophical, that, though by no means a masterpiece, has significance as a peculiarly accurate symptom of some of the *malaise* specific to American intellectuals. It is called *The Unpossessed*. It is by a young writer named Tess Slesinger. It has attracted considerable attention among the metropolitan critics, and is a discomfiting picture of the neurotic "young intellectuals" in New York during the last few years. These young men and women in Miss Slesinger's novel are "unpossessed" by anything. They have no roots and no traditions, for they question all traditions, and deny all roots. They are full of the latest verbal clichés about revolution and the new society, but they are engaged in talk rather than in revolution, and in words far more than in ideas. There is a kind of "heartbreak house" atmosphere about the book for it is written with compassion. There is the romantic irony of a wit that perceives the illusions of its own loves and ideals. These young rootless people are looking for something, they know not what, and are sceptical of everything no matter what. The talkative being, the repressed New Englander and his wife denied a child, the weak and sensitive student and the brasher Six Black Sheep eager for the Revolution, the Park Avenue (the New York Mayfair) hostess and patron of literary and revolu-

tionary movements—all these are strikingly etched. But the book has a deeper point, a point possibly deeper than the one the author intended and certainly not explicitly made by her. There is probably not a city in the world where there is a group quite resembling the New York "intellectuals". They are the group to be met at literary teas and at semi-literary, semi-political symposia. They are not at ease in a society given over so largely to non-intellectual matters. They are not at ease really in the intellectual life. They have no such long tradition to feel nourished by, as the intellectual class in Europe and the Orient. And they are naturally taken up with every new wind of doctrine that comes along. Of late the fashionable thing among the intellectuals has been Revolution, though, as one of the characters in *The Unpossessed* points out, none of them would know a real working man if they saw one, or, one may add, be understood or known by the latter. What bedevils most of them, too, is a sense of sophisticated doubts of their hopes and aspirations. They are unconsciously haunted by the echoes of a materialistic psychology and theory of nature that they do not realize has ceased to be authoritative among scientists.

And finally while they describe themselves as intellectuals there is not in them the inner peace that makes for contemplation or, since the depression, the economic security that would help to make it possible. Miss Slesinger is to be

thanked for making the picture of this group so vivid. She has made clear also how little genuine contemplation goes on in much that passes for the intellectual life in this Western metropolis and how provincial and nineteenth-century much of its intellectual life is.

In an earlier letter, I had occasion to remark on the peculiar place music has in the life of America. The wireless has of course had much to do with making it available. But the passion for music in this country is coming to be a really extraordinary phenomenon. One of its interesting manifestations is in the summer concert series, already referred to, of the New York Philharmonic, which in an open air stadium, under distinguished conductors, plays nightly through our very hot summer season, to audiences of eight thousand or more. The opening programme consisted more than half of Beethoven. There is no concession to popular taste, for popular taste in music in this city is very high.

One of the striking features of the life of mind and imagination in this country is its colonialism to Europe. There is, of course, a rich and growing American tradition,

but part of the American tradition is its hospitality to the best that has been said and thought in the world. This is especially evident on those occasions when a distinguished foreign writer or thinker comes to these shores. Recently Thomas Mann, the great German novelist, now a voluntary exile from his own country, came for a brief visit to these shores. He was greeted with a large testimonial dinner at which many of the most distinguished writers and educators in the country were present. One of the great appeals of Mann to readers in this country is his Olympian detachment, his universal human sympathies and his sense of a spirit more deep than words, more permanent than time, more significant than fact and matter, which seems to inform life and the cosmos. His novel, *The Magic Mountain*, an allegory (laid in a tuberculosis sanitarium) of the whole mind of pre-war Europe and the whole decay of materialistic nineteenth-century European civilization, has gradually attained a wide popularity here. He is one of the few minds in the West that sees through the West altogether, and through its favourite dogmas and presumptions.

IRWIN EDMAN

CORRESPONDENCE

LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY

Dr. R. Naga Raja Sarma has been doing some useful work with regard to Indian Philosophy. He has revealed the value and significance of some ancient Hindu doctrines, which had not received sufficient attention from modern scholars. He is also trying to make Hindu philosophy a living factor in the present-day life of the Hindus. Being a vital thinker, he expresses his views forcibly but sometimes falls into exaggeration. Delivering the inaugural address at the Philosophical Association of Pachaiyappa's College (*The Hindu* 10th August), he made some observations which call for notice. His subject was: "What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy". The mark of living philosophy, according to him, is its power to influence the conduct of the people. He seems to hold that indigenous philosophy is the best philosophy for every nation; that Indian philosophy has not influenced the West at all and that the Darsanas are a dead weight upon the Hindu mind of to-day.

If the West earnestly requires spirituality Dr. Sarma thinks that Christianity is sufficient for the West and the Vedantic inspiration is superfluous. "Even so, the Darsanas and the Vedanta were quite sufficient for the satisfaction of the deepest spiritual demands of the Hindus." This sounds like preaching a kind of spiritual insularism. In the universe of Spirit, physical geography is eminently meaningless. Buddhism which was born in India has prospered much better in China and Tibet. Even Christianity, purified of all its churchianity, will not be "sufficient" for the West. It needs to be supplemented by the Wisdom of the East. A comparative study of religions should make it clear that no one religious system can satisfy fully the inner needs and

aspirations of the human mind. Religion which "transmutes the apparently base metal of every ritualistic and dogmatic creed (Christianity included) into the gold of fact and truth"* can alone meet the situation. Dr. Sarma's insularism will feed religious pride and selfishness. This attitude might bring in once more an era of crusades. International contact is growing both in extent and intensity and if religious egotism is encouraged it will only fan the flame of mutual enmity and distrust. "Religious Patriotism," as Prof. C. E. M. Joad describes this attitude, "which encourages each creed to flaunt the flag of its exclusive particularity in order the more effectively to damn its rivals, would be comic, if it were not for the volume of human suffering which it has entailed."

Is it, then, altogether beside the mark, . . . to suggest that the only way to transcend the legacy of hatred, bigotry and conceit . . . is to abolish the creeds; the only way to make man religious, to eliminate religions?" (*Is Christianity True?* p. 321).

A return to Religion *per se* will solve the problem and this cannot be found in any single creed like Christianity. In all aspects of human life, the law of Interdependence holds good.

Dr. Sarma calls it "the merest moonshine" to hold that the West has received spiritual inspiration from India, during the last twenty-five years and more. This may be true so far as the research scholars are concerned. But as a matter of historical fact, attention may be drawn to the work of H. P. Blavatsky who was the first to introduce the West, in the right spirit, to the Eastern lore. She was Eastern Wisdom in flesh; she lived and died for the cause of its vindication. The spirit of Indian Philosophy as incarnated in *The Secret Doctrine* by Madame Blavatsky has influenced Western life and thought to a degree not yet within the

pale of recognition by scholars.

With regard to the Indian metaphysical systems or *Darsanas*, Dr. Sarma's view is correct. The *Darsanas* have ceased to influence the conduct of the people; the little influence they have is either of dogmatic or of unenlightened kind. The Pandits, of course there may be exceptions, have reduced to philosophical dogmas what were originally living spiritual perspectives. The mass mind, on the other hand, shows up the *Darsanic* influence only to its disadvantage; lacking the living intellectual basis this teaching has become a sort of mental ritual which is more harmful than the outer. Dr. Sarma's exhortation to study the original Sanskrit *Darsanas* is good, but without the necessary key such study might only add to the dead matter of word scholarship.

Ketki

D. G. V.

TIME AND SUBJECTIVITY

Apropos of the thoughtful editorial footnote to Mr. L. A. G. Strong's article on Reincarnation, on page 484 of the August number of THE ARYAN PATH, I am puzzled a good deal by the observation made therein, namely,

We must not overlook that the condition of the soul after death is entirely *subjective* and therefore it has no knowledge of the passage of time.

It is one of the axioms of Vedantic philosophy that "Aham" and "Idam," the subject and object of knowledge, cannot be conceived of as existing separately from each other. "Entirely subjective," therefore, appears to involve some element of contradiction. If, even, the expression has been used in a relative sense only and intends to convey that the soul's conception of time "after death" is entirely different, as in the dream-state, then also it is difficult to follow. Is one's consciousness of time during the waking hours really so "entirely different" from that during the dream-state? The difference that there is, is only of degree and not of kind.

The development of the sense of

time in human beings has been the work of evolution. In the savage it is far less developed than in his civilized brother. Among the civilized themselves time-sense differs in accordance with their national and cultural peculiarities. Time passes much "quicker" with the hustling American than with the lotus-eating Chinese or the Hindu. The former is obsessed by his "precious" hours, minutes, and even seconds; everything around him is in a terrible flux, and new and ever new things confront him at every turn. The lotus-eater hardly notices how years and even ages pass by, for these do not affect his mode of life and bring little change into his surroundings. The consciousness of time in the dream-state is only a little more removed in degree than that of the lotus-eater—but in point of quality there is no difference, between the two.

As to our experiencing, in a moment of dream-state, events lasting hours and days, do not such things happen to us even in the waking state during our "brown studies"? Also, do we not lose time-consciousness when our attention is absorbed in any particular object? On the other hand, it cannot be contended that the time-consciousness is altogether absent in the dream-state. On careful analysis it should be found that the time-sense, in however vague a measure, does enter into the composition of our consciousness during the dream-state, and by analogy, during the post-mortem condition.

Taking all the circumstances into consideration, it appears to me that the editorial suggestion that the "soul after death has no knowledge of the passage of time" cannot be sustained in our present knowledge or rather ignorance of the exact pass to which it comes, after death. If Vedantic philosophy is any guide in this connection, it would appear that the entire elimination of the consciousness of time as well as of space can only come about in a state of *Mukti* or Self-realization.

Bombay

R. K. P.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

-ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

The question "Who is a Christian?" has yet to be satisfactorily answered. The Dean of Durham, Dr. C. A. Alington, writes in *The Daily Telegraph* of August 4th, that "there is nothing to be gained by calling people 'Christian' who themselves definitely reject the membership of the Christian Church". But this restriction of Dr. Alington is perhaps rather for the sake of convenience and clarity than to uphold a narrow outlook. For the Dean admits with astonishing broadmindedness, and has evidently pleasure in so admitting, the performance of Christian acts and the profession of Christian sentiments "by those who, for any reason, stand outside the Christian society". Dr. Alington's view of Shelley, of whom he writes sympathetically, is as astonishing from a Churchman as it is refreshing:—

It is permissible for a Christian to feel that he would rather stand at Shelley's side at the Day of Judgment than with many of his "respectable" contemporaries.

Religious thought in Christendom is taking many strange forms in these days; one of them is the proposed new German-Religion. In formulating this new religion the leaders of advanced religious thought in Nazi Germany offer an improvement on the worship of the State and its heroes of the St.

Lenin school and, it must be admitted, an improvement, no less, upon effete orthodoxy. A curiously anomalous situation presents itself: Protestant orthodoxy is resisting political domination while the forces working to break the moulds of orthodox thought are playing into the hands of a Government more autocratic than the Church itself.

Disregarding the menacing political possibilities of any ardently embraced State cult, much of what the leaders of the German-Nordic Faith Movement are promulgating certainly comes closer to the basic principles of the once universal Wisdom-Religion than does the churchianity it would supplant. This is apparent from the catechism, *Die 25 Thesen der Deutsch-Religion*, recently published by Prof. Ferdinand Hirt of Leipzig University, a leader in the movement for a new national faith. It denies having dogmas or being based on "revelation". It repudiates the idea of an extra-cosmic God:—

God is a moral idea, which we recognise in the eternal creative power of nature working in the world and in man . . .

Within the being of God, alive in the world, the cognisant mind or spirit grows. Spirit is a thing which grows naturally in this world of reality. It does not exist in perfection at the beginning, but is the ripe fruit of the world's development at the end . . .

The German Religion is not a revealed religion in the Christian sense. It is based on a natural "revelation" of Divine powers in the world and in the human spirit.

The doctrine of inherent sinfulness is condemned in the Catechism as "not only un-German but immoral and non-religious. Those who preach it endanger the morals of the people." Other most hopeful features of the new religion are its rejection of the pernicious doctrine of vicarious atonement and its sturdy insistence on salvation by individual efforts.

Those who forgive sins, sanction sins. The forgiving of sins undermines religious ethics and destroys the morals of the people No longer do we want merely to believe in Christ, but we want to be Christ ourselves and act like Christ, for ourselves, for our people, and for humanity.

It would be understandable if, in their revulsion of feeling against the Churches, the leaders of the German-Nordic Faith Movement had uprooted some of the wheat of Christianity along with the tares, but fundamentally these tenets are in harmony with the Christian teachings in their original statement, no less than with those of the other great mystic philosophers. The Churches have departed so widely, however, from the teachings of Jesus, that it is not surprising that at the Convocation of Canterbury early in June the Bishop of Chichester, Dr. Bell, should have characterised the present religious conflict in Germany as a struggle between "the forces of Christianity and the

forces of paganism".

The Catechism of the German Religion breathes, naturally, an anti-Semitic spirit; also an aggressive nationalism that negates brotherhood and is not without its menace to world peace. And it has other weaknesses. There is, for example, one thesis which ascribes will, reason and personality to God, without attempting to reconcile this with the concept of God as a moral idea. There is, also, an over-emphasis on the heroic qualities. After all, not all of ethics is comprehended in "the three old German virtues: Courage, Chivalry, and Faithfulness" even when supplemented by the "womanly-motherly" qualities which the Catechism offers as complement to the "manly-heroic" ones.

With all its shortcomings, however, the proposed German Religion as set forth in Prof. Hirt's "25 Theses" represents a significant step away from the crudities of organized religion.

The main difficulty is that any State-enforced religious creed in the long run fails. Even the obedient German temperament which could be utilized through discipline to form an army for the Kaiser cannot be harnessed to produce an army for Christ. The body and man's carnal nature have to be controlled and disciplined; man's spiritual soul can grow only in the atmosphere of pure freedom. In trying to impose a religion from without the German leaders are un-Aryan, not-noble.



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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ON PROPAGANDA

It might seem curious at first blush that the modern apotheosis of advertising should have left propaganda still in ill repute. The distinction between advertisement and propaganda, however, is real, if somewhat subtle. Roughly we may differentiate between them thus: Propaganda as generally understood is the deliberate dissemination of ideas, tenets, doctrines. Advertisement in the usual sense is giving public notice of the availability, for a consideration, of goods or services. In general the lines are clearly drawn.

The instinctive popular reaction is friendly to advertising, hostile to propaganda. Why? Even otherwise intelligent people are guilelessly susceptible to advertising craft. They read advertisements with an indulgent eye and let their minds toy with alluring and extravagant rival claims of dentifrices, soaps, and travel routes. They may be vexed to see fair

landscapes marred by advertising bill-boards, but subconsciously they register the products advertised, and perhaps purchase them.

An advertisement is selfish, but it is frankly so. Even Simple Simon can read in it, "Show me first your penny." He can understand and appreciate the Pieman's motives in advertising his wares. The average man tacitly accepts as a working hypothesis Mark Twain's composite picture of the human race as "a man with an axe on his shoulder proceeding toward a grindstone". A claim to disinterested motives arouses his suspicion at once; the offer of anything free evokes his contempt. He may never have heard of the Eastern doctrine of Karma but he has seen the moral law in action all his life; something for nothing is outside his ken. The instinctive reaction to a gift out of season or disproportionate to the mutual relationship is to question the

underlying motive—"What does the giver want from me?" *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*

Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, and he that hath no money; come ye, buy, and eat; yea, come, buy wine and milk without money and without price (*Isaiah* lv, 1).

It is not of record that the invitation of the old Hebrew prophet was accepted with more alacrity than it would be to-day. Suspicion of propaganda is not a modern trait—it is innate in man.

We are all open to currents of ideas. They flow through the mind and colour the thoughts of the sturdiest independent. But there is a difference between, for example, a country's welcoming an occasional foreign cruiser that touches at its shores and acquiescing in the permanent occupation of its waters by an alien fleet.

Resistance to propaganda is not inspired primarily by the urge to safeguard ideas already harboured, for frank agnostics are no less resentful than bigots at any attempt to rush their defences. It springs from each man's instinct to defend the right to think for himself. An advertisement does not arouse it. No advertisement can make us lifetime converts to a particular breakfast food or toilet preparation. If we try what it offers and do not like it, we are proof against advertisements of that preparation in future. No penalty attaches to its rejection.

"Embrace Islam or die!" That was propaganda *pur sang*, undis-

guised and to the point. A child offered that choice could grasp the desirability of turning Muslim. The Christian missionaries disguise the sword, but fundamentally their message is, "Believe or be damned." Accept the premise and the conclusion is inevitable that blind belief is the lesser of two evils. Hence the general wariness of propagandists' premises.

The sincerity of the propagandist is often in inverse ratio to his personal stake in the success of his efforts, but quite apart from that, implicit in all propaganda proper is a threat of violence to mental integrity. "We alone have the truth. Our teacher is unique. Everything outside our doctrines is lies and delusion"—thus the dogmatists in every faith, the followers of this, that, or the other leader. "Do as we do. Accept our pet cranks and practices or you can never become pure, never reach the heights"—thus the food faddists. Propaganda is deservedly suspect. The popular instinct to shy at it is sound.

But if the name of propaganda be given to proselytizing activities, where the attempt is to force beliefs on others willy-nilly, some other designation must be found for the disinterested effort to let those who will share what has been tried and found good by some. The propagandist hammers the seed into reluctant soil. The wise man lets his seeds of truth fall gently where he finds the soil prepared.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND

[B. M. is an old-world man living by his old-world methods in our era. We are fortunate in having secured a few reports of his talks to his intimate friends. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is the book he has mastered through long years of study and meditation ; but further, having lived according to its tenets more successfully than is generally possible, his thoughts breathe a peculiar fragrance. The papers have been translated from the vernacular : it should be understood that they are not literal translations, and the translator has adhered more to ideas and principles than to words. Although B. M. knows English, his inspiration becomes impeded in employing that medium of expression and so he prefers not to use it.—EDS.]

संकल्पप्रभवान्कामास्त्यक्त्वा सर्वानशेषतः ।

Abandoning every desire arising from imagination.

—*Bhagavad-Gita*, VI. 24.

The sixth song of the Great Master contains the first of the lessons in Yoga—control of the senses, desires, thoughts. In verses 24-25 the beginner is told what to do, how to start on that long ascent which ultimately brings him to the summit from which the entire universe is seen. It will take him some time to catch the first view which will convince him beyond doubt that the climb is worth it ; it will take him numerous lives before he comes to experience the dazzling splendour of the Universe of Light ; and then, acclimatizing himself to it he will realize the radiance and the glory which is the source of that Light Itself. But a beginning has to be made and the earlier we start the better for us.

One of the main difficulties in the control of the senses and the mind is our fanciful imagination. The sights and the sounds from outside are easily shut out when the Soul takes hold of the mind and begins to use it for his own

purposes. But sights and sounds also arise within ourselves and disturb the work of the Soul with the mind, and these are formidable. They are memory pictures which have deposited in the mind, during the course of work and play since the body was born, and as we go on we find out that they are even of previous lives. The mind is called the sixth sense and its threads and fibres are interwoven with and in the five senses. All the sense functions, trivial or important, colour the mind and affect its texture. Sense impressions are of the nature of images : every impression produces an image and changes the structure of the mind ; every new image affects the old ones—some are wiped out, others fade out, and so on. Now these images result from the five senses and therefore possess the properties of each of them—they have colour, tone or note, smell, feel and taste. A similar but second class of images inhere in us as a result of the

function of the organs of action. Between these two sets of images there is difference, but for our purposes it is sufficient to say that they affect the mind—refine or coarsen its texture, brighten or dull its stuff, make for melody or discord. Now, these images are also vehicles of karma. Just as we have the whole complex machinery we call the brain, which is a unit, but every thought, will, feeling and deed changes it by affecting particularly one part or another, so also all these images compose a unit which represents karma. In esoteric language karma is compared to a lotus—it grows out of mud and water; its stem and leaves belong to the earthly part of man; the bud with its capacity to drink the dew of night, to inhale the light of dawn, to absorb the morning sun, represents the celestial part of man.

Therefore these images are the old soil from which new karma, new images come forth. Our ripe or *prārabdha* karma is a natural product of our past; but our present outlook, our discrimination, our inclinations and choices acted out, give each man a chance to improve himself, the slowly blossoming lotus bud. But for the aspirant who has chosen to tread the path and climb the mountain a new factor arises: he is called upon to abjure from creating new images; neither to dwell with past memory-pictures, nor to create by fancy, imagination, anticipation, new images, thereby strengthening his inner world of mirage. This is real renunciation; it is not the

actions which are to be renounced but the force which compels actions. Similarly, our verse does not say that *sankalpa*-imagination is to be renounced, but that the desires (*kāma*) arising from it must be abandoned. This is important; for, just as a man renouncing action falls into the path of passivity, so also the man who refuses to treat his imagination correctly, and will not use it, believing that thus his desires will vanish, takes a wrong course.

We possess the power of imagination (*kalpana-tarka-shakti*). It is the highest power of man, because it is a compound power in which desire, thought, resolve, and will, all function. These others create partially but imagination creates completely. The other forces create in one state (*loka*) or another, but imagination is *kriya-shakti*, creative power, in every *loka*. Only one or other aspect of imagination is functioning at present; the true Magician alone uses to the full his faculty to build living images. Human evolution may be described as the process by which the Soul who is man recreates himself in order, in symmetry, in harmony, in beauty. This can only be done by imagination—*sankalpa*, not that fanciful tendency of *Shaikh-chilli*, but that faculty by which the Soul makes a matrix in matter and builds an image by filling up that matrix with the life-essence of his own being. This is *utpatti*, emanation.

Now if you go to our mythology you will find that *sankalpa* is called one of the *Prajapatis*, Creators of a

whole race of beings. This power ignorantly used, or misused is but a shadow of real Sankalpa, which is personified as a Prajapati. Again it is said that Sankalpa is one of the daughters of Daksha. Now Daksha is ability, dexterity and creativeness personified, and is the title of the parent-creator, lord of creatures, the father of celestial and terrestrial progeny, one of whom is Sankalpa, Imagination—a daughter who is married to Dharma, Law, Order, Wisdom. When Dharma, knowledge and wisdom, woos and weds Sankalpa, Imagination, then are born Dhyanis, true contemplators, who are also called Sankalpa-Siddhas, perfect makers or builders of Living Images. Just

as our artists make pictures and statues, so these Dhyanis fill Akasha with pictures and portraits, idols and images, and we by ceasing to create our own pictures of kama—passionate sense, learn first to see and understand, and then to copy within ourselves, these images. Just as we see constellations in the night-sky, so do we see shining-pictures in the soul-sky, and gazing at them, contemplating them, we become like unto them. The Akasha is the real Temple of the Universe in which all Powers of Nature are Living Idols or Statues and if we worship our parents, Dharma-Wisdom and Sankalpa-Imagination, we will become an Idol in that Temple.

B. M.

The following is the closing paragraph of a summary-report of a paper on "Co-operative Research in Geography" by Prof. Alan G. Ogilvie read before the British Association for the Advancement of Science last September :—

"Take India as an example. In spite of voluminous official and other literature, we have still a great deal to learn of the geography of man in the sub-continent. Although the task of gathering the information there would be much more complex than in the case of Africa, there would be certain offsetting advantages. Among these are: the accuracy of the map of India, the existence of a great body of data created by the various scientific services, and a wonderful census organisation. In addition, there is the likelihood that men of science could be found on the spot who would be able to fill in the gaps in the picture of the physical environment. These might be asked to deal with the numerous connecting links which are not usually required for official departmental reports but are nevertheless essential to the geographer."

THE DILEMMA OF WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY

[In the following article the American psychologist and author, C. Daly King, stresses Western psychology's lack of philosophical background. It is precisely the possession of an adequate philosophical background that gives such richness and depth to Eastern psychology, which, in addition, is based upon, not decades, but millennia, of controlled experiments. May we carry Mr. King's suggestion one step farther, and point out that an adequate survey of the field is a quite indispensable preliminary to "the initial selection of the correct questions to be addressed"? Western experimenters are wasting much valuable time and energy in setting forth after psychological knowledge as if upon uncharted seas, instead of utilizing the careful and accurate maps drawn by their Oriental predecessors.—Eds.]

The field of Western psychology presents a most confusing picture to the newcomer. Is this a science at all, he wonders, when confronted by the controversies between behaviorists, Gestaltists, reflexologists, purposivists and many other so-called "schools". The impression given by these contending cliques, taken *in toto*, is that they are going nowhere; it is not that individually they are not progressing experimentally and continuing to adduce more and more "proofs" for their respective positions; it is that the implications contained in the advance of one "school" are cancelled by the implications contained in the advance of an opposing "school". The general inquirer need offer no apologies for his natural bewilderment.

Beneath all this confusion is the matrix of the conservative middle-grounders, condemning no clique, espousing none, continuing its own work in the hope that out of all the haphazard endeavour there will come, eventually, a mass of established data sufficient to indicate the limits and direction of the

science. This hope is hopeless. It is not by directing general or random questions to "nature" that illuminating answers may be expected. All scientific work depends upon selection, and the initial selection of the correct questions to be addressed is essential to the prosecution of any successful research. A botanist who proceeds across country blindfolded and collects whatever his groping hands may chance to touch, is unlikely to return with valuable specimens.

It becomes plain that what is lacking is a philosophical background or any philosophical critique. The psychologist in general shies away from philosophy because he has a scientific technique of experiment which is utterly different from speculation or even from mere logic unsupported by objective evidence. In this attitude he is undoubtedly correct; which does not alter the fact that before he can make use of his special technique to any real purpose, he must needs possess a purely philosophical judgment as to the necessary direction for his researches to take. Modern Western psychol-

ogy has omitted this indispensable preliminary; such philosophy as is possessed by the reflexologists and similar "schools" is really too crude to merit the name; and the backgrounds of such sects as the Gestaltists are, to say the least of it, amorphous.

But all scientific work demands a definite philosophical basis. Physics, for example, has always had one, historically. Led recently into the cul-de-sac of a hasty hyper-dimensionality, it is true that this basis has been lost, with the result that physicists to-day are uneasily seeking either to regain their old background or to develop a new one. It is to be hoped, and even expected, that those physicists who remain concerned with physics rather than with the far-fetched abstractions of higher-higher mathematics, will soon discover the firmness of new ground beneath their wandering feet. Only so can they continue to contribute to further physical knowledge. And only so can psychology, in its own field, progress toward a definite goal instead of creeping in a circle. For progress is progress *in a given direction*; it is not mere movement for its own sake.

Focusing our eyes again upon the present, we may observe that, in fact, there are only two real schools in Western psychology at present. We may call these the Spiritualists and the Materialists. As examples of the former we see purposivists, both hedonistic and hormic, psychoanalysts, panpsychists, Gestaltists; among the Materialists are to be noted behavior-

ists, reflexologists, response psychologists—to mention but a few. And of course we have the Confusionists, or middle-grounders, of whom it is impossible to say to which side they belong, since we find them now here, now there, sometimes on one side, sometimes on the other, frequently nowhere.

This split within the body of Western psychological science bodes ill for its future progress, but carries with it, nevertheless, a certain fallacious justification. The Spiritualists evidently are primarily interested in subjective experience, while the Materialists' attention is focused entirely upon objective behaviour. The truth, however, is that psychology must deal with *both* these aspects of human life. Obviously there can be no objection to a division of the task among specialists, but the fallacy, for Spiritualists and Materialists alike, lies in this: that they have converted a specialization of research into a comprehensive dogma for the science as a whole, with the result that they are no longer engaged in a real psychology at all but simply in a distorted and crippled imitation of psychology. These distorted views of the fundamental background of psychology, with their characteristic over-emphasis on research problems of small psychological importance although of vital interest to disputants in a controversy, render much otherwise competent work of little value.

The Spiritualists, with their emphasis upon experience, have for the most part remained content

with the naïve assumption of some central entity which does the experiencing ; when they attempt to go beyond this, they become immersed in irrational absurdities of the Jamesian "the-thoughts-themselves-are-the-thinkers " variety. The "souls," "minds," "egos," believed in by the Spiritualists, are shadowy and unknowable ; and researches that assume the existence of quite imaginary "instincts" and "repressions" are unlikely to establish anything except that, when the literary but unscientific label, instinct, appears in the premise, it will also appear in the conclusion. But if "minds" and "souls" exist, it is up to the Spiritualists to adduce some scientific evidence to that effect ; worse than anything else is their bland avoidance of their own first problem and their absorption in problems based upon an assumption that is entirely arbitrary and certainly primitive.

The Materialists base themselves upon physiology, and in numerous instances appear to lack sufficient knowledge of this sister science. After all, there is a difference between the physiology of man and of jelly-fish, or even of tape-worm. Physiological psychology concerns itself with researches upon mechanisms that are neither distinctively human nor physiologically important ; and one may reasonably hazard the guess that it does so because it prefers ammunition for its battle with the Spiritualists to its proper task of carrying forward psychological discovery. The behavioristic "reflex" is a case in

point ; the reflex itself is no more than a logical, but untrue, abstraction from the actual fact of reflex arc conduction. A "reflex" is every bit as imaginary as a "soul," with even less excuse ; but heaven knows how many behavioristic experiments are still being made in which the unscientific label, reflex, continues to appear in the conclusion only because it appears in the premise. The action of the central nervous system is undoubtedly the most important single physiological datum for psychology ; and yet the reflexologists, who certainly ought to know better, appear to remain ignorant of the fact that the chief concern of the central nervous system (which they treat fragmentarily as a mere transmission device) is the supremely important phenomenon of integration. It is almost as if physiologists like Sherrington, Herrick and Cannon had never lived.

Both Spiritualists and Materialists omit any serious consideration of consciousness. The Spiritualists make the amazing assumption that the nature of consciousness is self-evident, when in plain fact it is almost impossible to think of anything less self-evident than the nature of consciousness. Yet here is a problem, not only prior to that of "minds" or "souls" but central to the whole science of psychology. If one is interested in experience, the final common denominator of all experience is consciousness of some type or other. The Materialists, on the other hand, offer only denials either of the existence or of the importance of consciousness,

and thus raise the intriguing mystery as to how, in its absence, there can be any psychology at all. It is, certainly, a brand new addition to scientific technique, this solution of a basic problem by the simple expedient of denying its existence.

And both the contending schools in Western psychology, when occasionally forced to make some passing reference to consciousness, fail to distinguish in any way between consciousness and conscious content, which they definitely assert to be synonymous terms. That is a stumbling-block which is final, unless demolished. It would be difficult indeed for a physicist to experiment upon the nature of light, if he persisted in confusing it with that of a lighted object.

Here is the dilemma of a psychology split between the two crude philosophic viewpoints of materialism and spiritual idealism. Nor is it resolved by the activities of the middle-grounders who, at their best, attempt no more than a tolerant reconciliation that is in fact impossible. The resolution of dualism is not to be found either in a tolerance that avoids the real issue or in the artificial forcing of real phenomena into the inadequate terms of either party. It is only to be achieved by the inauguration of another view, equally distinct from both prior ones, which incorporates their legitimate findings and discloses their theoretical fallacies.

Such a new and distinct envisagement of the psychological field can only be attained by a psy-

chology that places prime importance upon the initial and crucial problem of consciousness. There are many other legitimate problems for psychology, but not one of them can be properly solved or even correctly evaluated in the scale of psychological worth until a rigidly scientific definition of consciousness and strictly objective evidence therefor are obtained.

So far as is known, there is but one small school in Western psychology that possesses a scientific, rather than a sentimental, interest in the consciousness problem. This is the school of Integrative Psychology, founded by Dr. William M. Marston during the last decade—and unfortunately its originator is not, for the time being, carrying forward those essential researches upon which its firm establishment must rest. The integrative viewpoint is not spiritualistic nor necessarily materialistic. It asserts that objective behaviour is determined at the synapses of the central nervous system where those integrations of nerve impulse groups take place which in fact originate and shape the subsequent behaviour, both explicit and implicit, of the organism. It further asserts that the energy generated upon the psychons of these synapses, when the impulse groups cross and combine, furnishes the conscious content of subjective experience. Thus in psychonic phenomena behaviour and passive experience meet; and when they are studied together in these phenomena we find a starting point for a *complete* psychology, that lends

itself, furthermore, to objective scientific measurement.

It is suggested that here is to be found a remedy for the materialistic fallacy. The strength of the Materialist position lies precisely in its insistence upon the investigation of definite, physiological actualities; its mistake is that it investigates relatively unimportant ones before achieving any basic relation between the phenomena of physiology and those of psychology—bad selection, due to an axe to grind against the Spiritualists, in conjunction with a surprising philosophic naïveté. Let the Materialists select from physiology the psychologically important, integrative phenomena of the central nervous system and they will find themselves, perhaps to their own astonishment, able to formulate *scientific* laws of experience that will remain forever beyond the abilities of their spiritualistic rivals.

Likewise in this approach we may not only see the fallacies of the Spiritualists laid bare but may even discern the first outlines of a possible remedy also. For this outlook possesses its own strength no less than does the materialistic view—its unshakable assertion of the reality of experience and experiencer. To go beyond this assertion only by inventing literary terms and using such

non-objective inventions in the construction of experiments and theories that thus possess almost no scientific value at all, is its weakness. Its integrity will only find justification when it is willing to face the harsh truth which resides in the fact that psychonic energy furnishes the conscious content of a thoroughly passive experiencer. Here it will have need of a philosophy, not primitive but subtly searching. For even now it is possible to demonstrate that the “minds” or “souls” of which the Spiritualists so unthinkingly speak, are actually non-existent even if potentially actual. If but one-tenth of the researches now being carried forward by the Spiritualists upon quite unscientific “Gestalts,” “incentives” and “complexes” were to be directed toward controlled experiment on the nature of the experiencer, it might well eventuate that before very long we should have some rational indications of the experiencer’s potentiality and his eventual nature.

Only when the Materialists turn their attention to psychologically significant problems, only when the Spiritualists adopt an objective, instead of a subjectively speculative technique, shall we have arrived in the West at the threshold of a genuinely *scientific* psychology.

C. DALY KING

THE PHILOSOPHY OF A. N. WHITEHEAD

["Mankind is now in one of its rare moods of shifting its outlook. The mere compulsion of tradition has lost its force. It is our business—philosophers, students, and practical men—to re-create and re-enact a vision of the world, including those elements of reverence and order without which society lapses into riot and penetrated through and through with unflinching rationality."

"We stand at a moment when the course of history depends upon the calm reasonableness arising from a religious public opinion."

These two quotations are from *Adventures of Ideas* by A. N. Whitehead. To what extent has the great mathematician-philosopher succeeded in making his own contribution towards that work of re-creation to which he calls his peers and others? J. D. Beresford's survey mentions that Professor Whitehead says very little about Eastern religions; to which many an Asiatic reader of the volume will add that it suffers from a limitation inasmuch as it considers the race development with the Greeks and Plato as the starting point and neglects to weigh the influence of Buddhism and other earlier faiths along with that of Christianity which is taken for granted as supreme. The new world to be is not going to begin at Vienna and extend westwards to stop at Los Angeles. The re-creators of the Occidental culture will fail unless they look for the Light of the East, and recognize that Asia is not there only for exploitation.—EDS.]

Professor A. N. Whitehead has a peculiarly interesting mind, and one that differs in unexpected ways from the minds of those great mathematical contemporaries of his, with which we should, rather automatically perhaps, be inclined to class it. Einstein is predominantly a mathematician, and such of his pronouncements as have been published on speculative philosophical thought exhibit little more originality than those of his great predecessor Isaac Newton, when he left the realm of calculation for that of Biblical exegesis. Eddington's queer mixture of imagination and simple Quaker faith does not inspire great trust in his metaphysic—if he has one? He is capable of making such profound deductions as the suggestion that the ultimate constituent of matter is consciousness, but he has never, to my knowledge, drawn any deduction of value from that revolution-

ary premise. Jeans, with a slight effect of negligence, has elevated the vague concept of a mathematical God as a possible Totem; but he has probably no more respect for it than the pupil has for the master. And although we might hesitate longer in our assessment of Max Planck as a philosopher, he has not stated his beliefs in a form that permits a critical analysis.

Whitehead, although he began as a mathematician and physicist, has been intrigued by the mysteries of Being and Becoming. It may be that quite early in his mental life he had a tendency to follow the principle suggested by the aphorism, "Free men obey the rules which they themselves have made," taken from the last page of his book on *Symbolism*, (1927), the final passage of which is, also, worth quoting, namely, "Those societies which cannot combine

reverence to their symbols with freedom for revision, must ultimately decay either from anarchy, or by the slow atrophy of a life, stifled by useless shadows." And however dangerous it may be to generalise from a single statement, it is tempting to find a kind of summary here of our philosopher's general attitude.

We see in him, for instance, the thinker who having postulated the necessity for original thought, still hesitates before the anticipation of anarchy. He may have felt that those rules he was making for himself could have no ultimate validity unless they were based on some respected authority. He was, we infer, too modest, too fearful, or possibly too closely restricted by the mathematician's reverence for the inductive process, to make a final declaration of independence and seek the explanation of the universe within his own mind. On the other hand, he realised from the outset that the "symbols" obtaining in the twentieth century, whether social or philosophical, must never be regarded as static, but need constant revision. And on that basis he has, so far, founded an acceptable system of evolutionary thought. He is, in short, a Platonist rather than an Aristotelian despite the fact that his original mathematical, scientific bent would, one might have thought, have been to take Aristotle rather than Plato as his chief authority.

This general attitude of Whitehead's may serve as an explanation for the criticisms I have dared

to make in the examination of his *Adventures of Ideas*. So often he appears to be on the verge of the great discovery, but his reverence for the accepted symbols of the past two thousand years or so, restrains him from making the great refusal. I do not propose to use this test of hesitation between anarchy and observance as a criterion in what follows, since to do that would be an indication of personal prejudice, and unfair to Professor Whitehead. But in my further examination of these adventures of ideas, I have indicated here and there his failure to push his deductions to that length at which, loosed from the restraints of Platonism and Christianity, they would come into a near accord with the teachings of the Ancient Wisdom.

The following quotation, for instance, taken from the concluding lines of the chapter on "Aspects of Freedom," may serve as a preliminary instance:—

There is a freedom lying beyond circumstance, derived from the direct intuition that life can be grounded upon its absorption in what is changeless amid change. This is the freedom at which Plato was groping It is the freedom of that virtue directly derived from the source of all harmony. For it is conditioned only by the adequacy of understanding. And understanding has this quality that, however it be led up to, it issues in the soul freely conforming its nature to the supremacy of insight. It is the reconciliation of freedom with the compulsion of truth. In this sense the captive can be free, taking as his own the supreme insight, the indwelling persuasion towards the harmony which is the height of existence.

This passage occurs early in the

book, but the important conclusion to be derived from it does not very noticeably colour the further argument. It might seem that Professor Whitehead, pausing for a moment in his more objective survey, had stumbled upon what could have been the directing theme of his work, almost inadvertently—as if, perhaps, in this single instance he was not fully aware of what he knew. Moreover his reversion to other aspects of this reliance on the inner wisdom and to the resultant harmony that may follow is incidental to, rather than the main outcome of, his line of reasoning. For instance, he applauds as one of the “greatest intellectual discoveries in the history of religion,” Plato’s final conviction that the divine element in the world is to be conceived as “a persuasive agency and not as a coercive agency” (p. 213), but regrets that Plato failed to co-ordinate this doctrine systematically with the rest of his metaphysical theory. He adds: “Indeed, Plato always failed in his attempts at systematization, and always succeeded in displaying depth of metaphysical intuition—the greatest metaphysician, the poorest systematic thinker.” And we may perhaps wonder whether Professor Whitehead, surely an unusually gifted “systematic thinker,” has himself fully succeeded in co-ordinating his recognition of the inner wisdom with “the rest of his metaphysical theory”.

The book is divided into four sections, Sociological, Cosmological, Philosophical and Civilisation. On the first of these the author

makes a fairly inclusive survey of the bias shown by Society in the course of the historical period, and demonstrates quite conclusively the astonishing quickening of the *tempo* in the last two or three generations. The yeast that has been slowly working throughout the last nineteen hundred years is, he believes, “the impracticable ethics of Christianity,” but how slowly they have worked may be deduced from the further statement that “as society is now constituted, a literal adherence to the moral precepts scattered through the Gospels would mean sudden death”. With that passage we may compare a comment in a later chapter in the Cosmological section, where he writes:—

Profound flashes of insight remain ineffective for centuries, not because they are unknown, but by reason of dominant interests which inhibit reaction to that type of generality. The history of religion is the history of the countless generations required for interest to attach itself to profound ideas.

Of Eastern religion, Professor Whitehead says very little. Great scholar as he is, he appears to have given little attention to that ancient Source from which all the truths of subsequent rediscoveries have been derived. And almost the only passage in which he dwells thoughtfully for a moment on this source follows his reflection on the contention of Plato that “the joy of heaven is realisable on earth: the wise are happy.” He sees this as an expression of mysticism and continues:—

The mystical religion which most whole-heartedly adopts this attitude is

Buddhism. In it despair of this world is conjoined with a programme for the world's abolition by a mystic tranquillity. Christianity has wavered between Buddhistic renunciation, and its own impracticable ideals culminating in a crude Millennium within the temporal flux.... I hazard the prophecy that that religion will conquer which can render clear to popular understanding some eternal greatness incarnate in the passage of temporal fact.

That last sentence has a hint of profundity, but a little consideration will show that this is not a prophecy, but a statement of fact which becomes obvious as soon as it is paraphrased and elaborated. For example, "eternal greatness" might be written "spiritual truth," and the religion that can bring home to the popular understanding the realisation that such a truth permeates and is primarily responsible for the phenomena of physical life, must inevitably conquer, since this principle and this alone is the single excuse for every religion that has ever been; religion as such being concerned to substitute eternal for temporal values. And if we shift the emphasis to accentuate *some* eternal greatness, that is to say one particular aspect of it which will penetrate the popular mind, we are left to choose between a physical demonstration such as the miracles of Christ, or such a statement as the world must accept as irrefutable. Neither can be finally effective. Christ, himself, summed up the first method when he said: "If they believe not Moses and the prophets, neither will they believe though one rose from the dead." And so far as the second

method is concerned, we know that our "irrefutable statement" can only be some rendering of that inner wisdom which can be understood only by those who can find it in their own spirits. It cannot be taught in the ordinary sense, although it is possible within limits to help a few individuals to find it in themselves, and it must be for ever beyond the grasp of the "popular understanding".

The religious teacher, therefore, is, and has always been, ultimately driven back upon example and precept for the general good of mankind, a point emphasised, though possibly not fully realised by Professor Whitehead, in the last chapter of his cosmological section, on "The New Reformation". Here, after pointing out that Protestant Christianity is "shewing all the signs of a steady decay," he suggests that "the religious spirit as an effective element in the affairs of men has just obtained [April, 1931] one of its most signal triumphs." His instance is that of "the moral authority of religious conviction," successfully exerted by Mahatma Gandhi (and Lord Irwin), in dealing with the forces in India which threatened "to overwhelm with violence hundreds of millions of mankind".

We may accept the instance without any contingent, but it is not one that fundamentally affects the essential question. It is perfectly true that when such a rare spirit as that of Gandhiji is able to demonstrate to the world the wonders of single-hearted devotion and self-abnega-

tion, the popular imagination is touched and there may follow a wave of feeling comparable to some kind of religious conversion. By this the immediate purpose of the devotee will be served for the good of mankind, but it is doubtful whether the general spiritual level of *understanding* of the masses is permanently raised.

I have dwelt more particularly on these aspects of Professor Whitehead's book because I believe them to be those of primary interest to readers of *THE ARYAN PATH*. But however vital and essential his underlying intuition of spiritual truth may be, (and that it is vital and essential is suggested by the fact that passages of this tenor recur in every section), his general purpose has been to write the "adventures of ideas" in the history of mankind and in his own "speculative scheme," submitting the necessary deductions to our own reason.

And if I may be allowed in conclusion to present my own reactions in reading rather than any critical commentary, I would say first that I was chiefly impressed by the remarkable freedom from prejudice evident throughout the work. One of his texts might have been taken from his favourite Plato's "Sophist": "We must be well content if we can provide an

account not less likely than another's. We must remember that I who speak, and you who are my audience, are but men and should be satisfied to ask for no more than the likely story." He has in fact taken his own warning to the effect that "All advanced thinkers, sceptical or otherwise, are apt to be intolerant," and has brought his scholarship, his scientific insight and his lucid intelligence to the presentation of a case that can offend only the convinced dogmatist.

As to the summary finally suggested rather than presented, I cannot do better than quote his concluding words:—

The Adventure of the Universe starts with the dream and reaps tragic Beauty. This is the secret of the union of Zest with Peace—That the suffering attains its end in a Harmony of Harmonies. The immediate experience of this Final Fact, with its union of Youth and Tragedy, is the sense of Peace. In this way the World receives its persuasion towards such perfections as are possible for its diverse individual occasions.

This is a summary that no reader of *THE ARYAN PATH* would dispute. It contains a truth of the Ancient Wisdom. But the road is a long one and there are many paths through conflict to the satisfaction of that final Peace.

J. D. BERESFORD

ARYAN SYNTHESIS AND DRAVIDIAN CULTURE

[Professor S. V. Venkateswara is the author of *Indian Culture Through the Ages*. In the following article he evaluates the Dravidian contribution to the ancient Aryan Culture.—Eds.]

It is now generally accepted that the Dravidians cannot be considered as immigrants. The Brahuists of Baluchistan, who are Iranian in ethnic traits, but speak a Dravidian language, are accounted for as a cultural drift. The submerged Afro-Indo-Austral continent,* the home of primitive man, should have been the habitat of peoples who were pre-Dravidian rather than Dravidian. The Dravidians may have always been in India. South India is the heart and centre of the Dravidian Zone from the anthropological as well as the philological standpoint. There we have the most representative and vital specimens of Dravidian culture and stocks. In many respects this culture was independent of Aryan influences.

In social life the Dravidians had a strong and vital communal organisation, a matriarchal family and a system of inheritance in the female line. These survive to this day on the West Coast as at Marumakkathayam in Malabar and Aliya Santhanam in Canara, and form a

contrast to the Aryan systems of family and society, based on agnate succession and primogeniture. Aryan funeral observances disclose the strength of agnate relationship, a cousin of the seventh remove being much closer of kin than a sister or other cognate relations. Aryan exogamy spares no cater-cousin on the paternal side, but is very lax on the side of maternal relationship. But the Dravidian family recognises relationship primarily on the maternal side. Its joint family system with impartible estates contrasts with that of the Aryan where, as early as the *Yajur Veda*, the individual was recognised as having an economic and social status of his own.

The Dravidians buried their dead, whereas the Aryans had them cremated. From ancient sites like Adichanallur (Tinnevely District) have come numerous funeral urns containing dead bodies buried in the doubled-up embryonic position. The foreheads are bound with fillets of gold, and figurines of domestic animals, such as the dog and

* Those interested in the subject of this continent will do well to compare it with the Lemuria of H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine* (II, pp. 323-24) thus described:—

" 'Lemuria,' as we have called the continent of the Third Race, was then a gigantic land. It covered the whole area of space from the foot of the Himalayas, which separated it from the inland sea rolling its waves over what is now Tibet, Mongolia, and the great desert of Schamo (Gobi); from Chittagong, westward to Hardwar, and eastward to Assam. From thence, it stretched South across what is known to us as Southern India, Ceylon, and Sumatra; then embracing on its way, as we go South, Madagascar on its right hand and Australia and Tasmania on its left, it ran down to within a few degrees of the Antarctic Circle; when, from Australia, an inland region on the Mother Continent in those ages, it extended far into the Pacific Ocean, not only beyond Rapa-nui (Teapy, or Easter Island) which now lies in latitude 26 S., and longitude 110 W. "—Eds.

the buffalo, are found placed near them. Apparently it was thought that these favourite animals, and the domestic utensils likewise placed near the body, would accompany the deceased to the other world. These very animals were considered unclean by the Aryans in India, whose preference for the cow and the bull is world-known. Similar burial urns are found in Babylonia and in ancient Crete. Dravidian peoples also raised megaliths which are analogous to those near the Pacific Ocean and the Caspian and Black Seas.

The ground plan of a Dravidian house compares with the Minoan in having cell-like basements built round a central court. It was Cyclopean in structure, whereas the Aryan house was usually of brick and wood. The huge stone houses of the non-Aryan peoples are mentioned in the *Rig-Veda*. Later Vedic texts speak of the use of iron among them, and of their extensive use of pots and earthenware. Aryan utensils were of copper or wood, and earthenware was rigorously excluded from religious ceremonies. Dravidians excelled in the ceramic art. Dr. Hall is in favour of tracing the pre-Sumerian pottery of Mesopotamia (Fifth Millennium B. C.) to India. The incised marks and symbols on the prehistoric pottery unearthed in Hyderabad (Deccan) point to Dravidian connection with the Minoan culture of ancient Crete. The mouths of the jars are hermetically sealed with bitumen, which again points to a Dravidian connection with Babylonia, as bitumen

was not native to India.

Dravidians excelled in metallurgy and the mechanical arts. The earliest Vedic texts have no native word for iron. *Ayas* meant copper, and iron was described as black (*śyāma*) *ayas*. The smelting and casting of iron are unmentioned, and unknown, in Vedic times; and, even in later times, these occupations were relegated to inferior castes. On the other hand, in South Indian sites, artifacts of iron are found in succession to those of stone (neoliths). In fact no copper implements dissociated from iron ones have yet been discovered in an ancient site here. Iron was so popular in South India that the Nicobar Islanders as late as the first century A. D. continued their piratical quest for iron, as mentioned in Ptolemy's *Geography*. Mandeville mentions an ancient tradition to the effect that the Indian seas were so full of loadstone or adamant that no ship with iron bonds or nails ventured into the Indian Ocean.

But the greatest achievement of the Dravidian was in the art of navigation. Here were some things distinctively Dravidian. There are native words for "sail" and "mast" (*Pāy* and *Pāy-Muram*) and for boats of all sizes—dug-out (*doni*), raft (*teppam*) and decked vessel (*Kalam* and *Kappal*). The Dravidian paddle (*Chattakam*) was round or circular, not spade-like in form as in ancient China, or very long as in ancient Egypt. The vessels were built with prows at either end, so as to obviate the need for turning round in the narrow canals. The Aryan

words for boat (*nāva*), dug-out (*dāru*) and oar (*aritra*) occur only in the latest books (1 and 10) of the *Rig-Veda*, and there are no words for mast or sail or rudder. Nor is there any word for the *sea* common to the various branches of the Indo-European family of languages.

As regards religion and letters, we find the cult of the Mother Goddess developed among the Dravidians, agreeably to their high conception of the status of woman in society. There is no Earth Goddess traceable in Indo-European society or in the early Vedic texts. The first reference (*Prithvi*) is in a late book of the *Rig-Veda* (x. 18) and in the archaeological ruins near Belliah in Bengal. In South Indian villages she appears as *Pidāri* or *Kāji*, the Goddess of Divine Wrath, irate at the iniquities of human beings. And the worship of the Goddess appears in Western countries as well. But there were Goddesses peculiar to the South Indians. Mention may be made in particular of the Goddess of the Pox, of pestilence and of cholera. Special festivals were organised in unhealthy seasons when the hearts of men were struck with melancholy or their brains subject to evil humours and hypochondria. Tom-tom and music, dancing and pantomime were used to chase away these.

In mathematics Aryans used the decimal system of reckoning. In Vedic texts we have multiples of numbers by ten, and the 'teens reckoned on the decimal basis. But among the primitive peoples of the Minicoy Islands the duo-

decimal system is found prevailing to this day, as it prevailed among the ancient Sumerians. According to this system, 15 is $12 + 3$, not $10 + 5$. In music the Dravidians had peculiar modes like *Thullal* and *Jhampa*. In poetry they had distinctive metres like the *Vemba*. Among the musical instruments peculiar to them was the *Yal*; they had also their own modes—*paṇ* and *tiram*, and *śindu*.

Aryan talent for synthesis is evidenced by the incorporation of these elements. Baudhayana and Apastamba, among the early givers of sacred laws, relax the rigour of Aryan exogamy and permit cousin marriage in South India, copying the Dravidian system. They also introduce new kinds of marriage; among them is marriage by capture, which is distinctly Dravidian. Burial was allowed to the Brahmins of Malabar, and was preferred in cases of contagious diseases like the pox. The dog was permitted within the sacred enclosure at the *Vaiśvadeva* rite. The prejudice against the use of mud pots died away and these found their way into temples and near images. Evidence of a duodecimal reckoning is found in the *Panchavimśa Brāhmaṇa*, with multiples carried 32 times. The Aryan and the Dravidian peacefully co-operated in the foreign commerce of India by sea. Some of the Indian exports had Aryan, while others bore the Dravidian, names assigned to them in India. If muslin (*sindhu* in Babylonian) and axe (*parasu*, *pilakku* in Assyria) belong to the former category, the peacock (*tohai*,

tugheim in Hebrew) and rice (*arisi*, *oryza* in Greek) belong to the latter. Lastly, the worship of the goddess crystallised into *Durga Pūjā* and *Srī Vidyā*.

Aryan genius for sublimation and transvaluation of values is evidenced by the philosophical and symbolical significance attached to crude conceptions in iconography. One principle of Aryan ethics is the extirpation of vice or misfortune, not by combating it but by meditating on the contrary virtue or benevolence. The Dravidian Goddess of the Pox was therefore renamed *Śītaḷā* (Goddess of Coolness); coolness in contemplation served to mitigate the rigour of the heat and dryness which is felt by the pox-stricken patient. To the Goddess of Divine Wrath, who was Dravidian, was attributed a mild and milky aspect as of the mother who appeased the hunger of *Sambandha* and *Thāyumanavar* in Aryo-Dravidian hagiology. Aryan emphasis on the spirit and on the transitory nature of the body, relaxed the attention bestowed on the burial, as evident from a contrast of the simple burial of historical times with the meticulous preservation of the corpse in hermetically sealed earthen jars of the prehistoric period. Dravidian festivals were retained, but they were affiliated to the Aryan ones founded on astronomical or plane-

tary mythology. Non-Aryan cults based on the phallus were sublimated into the encyclopædic system of rite religion and philosophy known as Śaivism. Dravidian scripture in the Vernacular (*Nalayira prabandham*) was recognised by Vaishnavism as a mere translation of the essence of the Vedas. The tantric cults were endowed with symbolic content and made to yield high philosophy.

The strains of the Tamil poet *Māṇikka Vāchakar* are a good instance in point, describing the village beauty sporting on the green with her wooden balls (*ammānai*). Her sensuousness turns into a mystic delight. Her love and longing for earthly pleasures sublimate into the ineffable ecstasy of a beatific vision and flashes of the Infinite. I would render the passages as follows :—

When the bangles yield their tinkling and the
ear-rings swing and wave,
And the raven locks dishevelled stray forth in
artless curls,
And the coloured ball respondeth to her
bosom's rise and fall;
Leaps her heart to flowing Ayyār, rose-hued
for the sight divine.
"I know not him I seek for, wandering in the
forest glade,
Mind and wood are thick with thought-trees
all with sensuous fire ablaze;
In my braided hair the honied buds are sucked
by wanton bees,
Oh! for lingering perfumed sweetness, for my
Lord and Heaven's King!"
Ashy pale she turns to Śiva, decked in white
of burnt desires :
"Him I see not whom I long for, Oh! Ammā-
nai, sigh and see!"

S. V. VENKATESWARA

SILENCE

[In this article **Lady Vyvyan**, author and traveller, sounds, but as she herself indicates, naturally fails to plumb, the depths of her mysterious subject. The ancient Indian philosophy recognizes neither dead matter nor empty space ; it describes the manifested universe as the plenum and it is full of Sound and Speech. The whole Kosmos in its objective form is Vaikhari Vach, uttered speech, whose soul is Madhyama, whose spirit is Pashyanti and whose rootless root is Para, which is the soundless sound, the Voice of the Silence. Krishna, the Hindu Logos, has among his Vibhutis or Excellencies—Silence. He says: " Among the Wise of Secret Knowledge I am Their Silence."—EDS.]

Ever since the first echo of human speech rang and died upon the air, man must have recognized, if he did not actually define, the worth of silence. Before ever a poet scanned his rhymes, interpolating syllables, marking a *cæsura*, silence alternating with sound had beat out the universal rhythm to whose law all natural forces are forever subject.

Groaning of the ice-pack, falling of a leaf, thunder's reverberation, backwash of a broken wave, howling of the storm-wind and whisper of a breeze, all are intermittent with the force that is credited, in the kingdom of sound, with a merely negative existence, the force that men have dowered with the strange, elusive name of Silence.

There are many, assuredly, for whom silence is only the flat-faced negation of sound, carrying *per se* no more significance than the mere absence of any of the other senses might carry, the absence of taste or touch or scent. They would join Robert Browning in his curt dismissal of silence as existing only to imply sound ; only a deep intimacy with silence will lead one to realise that it has a quality and

indeed a force of its own. Moreover, there is an experience connected with one of our five senses that goes far to strengthen such a theory ; the absence of colour, interpreted in human phrase as the quality of whiteness, owns the strange power of absorbing into itself every ray of the sun, and it is possible that silence may operate in ways analogous ; in other words, it is possible that silence, while appearing to be devoid of positive attributes may be unobtrusively the storehouse of great power.

It is perhaps easier to apprehend the meaning and scope of silence after considering what is the meaning and scope of sound. Every sound is a form of self-expression, every sound of nature and humanity is but a cry, uttered in plaint or growl or croon or alleluia, of " Me, me ". So it happens that the part of any listener is nothing more than surrender, in the guise of a victim, to the world-wide clamour of individuality, while the oratory of a tub-thumper is in truth no more insistent in its demand for a hearing, no more egocentric in its disregard for other personalities, only perhaps a little more

self-conscious, than bird-song or the sigh of wind or the roar of breaking waves or the ripple of a stream.

We are bound as listeners to suffer partial disintegration from the sounds that impinge upon us, and that no doubt is the explanation why those who sought to possess at least their own souls withdrew as hermits into places where no sound could touch them. Moreover in speech or sound there is always a triple journey to be made before one being can reach another; a journey from the soul of the speaker into the thing uttered, from the thing uttered across a great gulf into the thing heard, from the thing heard down into the soul of the listener. Seeing that this triple journey is inevitable before the act of listening, even of deliberate willing earnest listening, can reach its consummation, speech or sound as means of intercourse must needs be imperfect; a conclusion that inclines one readily to contemplate the rival merits of silence.

In such contemplation we shall become aware that there are more far-reaching effects of silence than the enabling of a man to possess his own soul. First of all there is in silence a means of direct communion with some individual, human or inanimate, a means quite independent of the clumsy action of the senses. The human spirit may, in deep surrender to the emanations of silence, achieve communion with a rock, a tree, a friend, a cloud. But that phrase "emanations of silence" has inter-

posed a veil between us and the truth. If silence be indeed, as Carlyle said, the element in which great things fashion themselves, then silence is but a medium through which the emanations reach us. Imagination need not travel far to picture silence as a bridge between unknown worlds and the more receptive beings in our own universe. There is no reason to believe that such emanations come only from the human and inanimate individuals to which we have referred, and it may even be possible for men of fine perceptions, on entering a quiet place, to achieve communion with the very spirit of love, of mercy, of courage, of pity. At the mere thought of such a possibility veil after veil is lifted and we are carried far beyond the range of our senses into regions nearer abstract truth. For myself, I know not such experience, but even in this short lifetime I have once known direct communion with the spirit of Time. I knew it in an ancient Spanish town, in the dim aisle of a Romanesque cathedral some eight hundred years old.

The heavy, very ancient leather door fell softly to its jamb and I stepped down into twilight that flooded nave and aisles to the roof. My first impression was a vivid sense or memory of the sunshine in that square I had just left, of the noises in the city all now completely muffled by the leather door, the honking of cars, the shouting of urchins, the shrill talk of women; they seemed to die away reluctantly in that dim silent

place, like the reverberations of an echo. A moment later I had lost all memory of sound and sunlight, in contemplation of the massy pillars, for they, it seemed to me, were self-appointed guardians of the silence that hung within this building like a presence. So vivid was my sense of a living presence within the cathedral that I held my breath, apprehending that in another moment I would hear a voice or feel a touch. But after a while this restless feeling of expectation died away, consciousness of physical things was blotted out, and I was wrapt into the very spirit of Time that had gathered all the worship, prayer and praise which in eight hundred years men had offered to their God.

There is however another silence that may hardly be defined, that never may be sought and found at will. When we say that there is a silence wherein one human soul achieves contact with the spirit at the back of all things, our words are but fumbling round things inexpressible. If we should attempt to represent this silence in pictorial fashion, we should draw first, for the sake of contrast, a man in the act of speech, and our picture would be that of a little bipèd radiating spokes from his own person, these spokes forming a shield or veil so that the light of the sun can never fall directly on him, nor the wind's breath shake his equilibrium, nor any emanation reach him from the soil. Then there would be the same figure, now mute, clear in outline, and upon him fall gigantic rays from

the far spaces of earth and sky ; he is in communication with all the world ; in such a pose, at such a moment, an ant's movement and the roar of an avalanche may awaken similar echoes, for, in the clarity of his own silence, vibrations indescribably faint and inexpressibly far may be enhanced, enshrined, perpetuated.

It is clear then that all those, whether they be hermits or world-listeners or other-world listeners, who recognize that silence is something other than and something greater than the negation of sound, will own that all through the ages the powers and products of silence have been innumerable. Some, like the leader of the Chorus in Agamemnon, have " learnt to drug all woes by silence ". Some, like Savonarola, have prescribed it as an aid to devotion, while Street and other writers have advocated its use as a stepping-stone to fortitude. Thoreau, Maeterlinck and others characterize it as a prelude to friendship, and to Carlyle it is the sole repository of greatness. For Oliver Wendell Holmes it has a healing property after the blows of sound.

Moreover, in epic, history and drama, silence has played a notable rather than a negative part, for there has always been momentary experience of joy and anguish that would cut deep across the path of accustomed life, evoking not a cry of gladness nor a wail of sorrow, but the silence wherein feeling glows like molten fire ; experience when perhaps the struggle of a lifetime comes face to face with

failure or success, when despair turns feeling to stone and expression of feeling to muteness, when resolution must be sealed with something stronger than speech, when joy emerging from the fetters of language can only reach the greatest heights in silence. Such was the silence of Cortez on that peak in Darien; of Clytemnestra before and after she committed murder that fulfilled the House of Atreus' doom; of Eliphaz and Bildad and Zophar who sat upon the ground seven days and seven nights by the side of their unhappy friend; of Niobe wordless at the tomb of her children, transformed into a stone that she might be through the ages a symbol of dumb grief; of Captain Macwhirr and Cordelia and Chryses the priest and many another famed in history or fiction. And always such a silence would prolong the action or heighten the emotion, being poignant as the reverberation of a deep-toned bell.

So much for silence as a medium of understanding and silence as a force directed to some end and silence as a form of self-expression more eloquent than speech; but what of silence as integral part of nature, a property of stones, an efflux of the stars?

Many human beings, without adhering to a pantheistic or any other creed, have sought these silent aspects of nature as flowers turn to the sun. It is not possible to define the character of man's communion with a silence of nature that, like some clear jewel in ornate setting, is often to be found encircled by earth's multifarious

voices. Among animate forms the tribes of butterflies and fishes are mute exceptions to creatures that express themselves in tones ranging from nightingale melody to the squeak of rodents. As for inanimate forms, nearly every one is subject sooner or later to that lord of nature's music, who has been dowered with power to awaken the very stones; the forest with a million leaves and branches will lend itself as a single harpstring to his touch, and the little grasses whisper to each other under his caress, and the billows gathering momentum at his command will be hurried with a roar to dissolution. Yet there are times and places in which the wind will neither roar nor wail nor whisper, and there are more-over the stars that from ancient days have kept their counsel in serenity, and the mountain tops that hold inviolate silence as in some cloud-defended sanctuary.

It was no doubt the silence of the hills that inspired the Psalmist to lift his eyes thither for help, and, ever since his day, silence has drawn to the heights men of every calibre; the mystic, the adventurer, the man of action and the man of thought, the man who sought escape from self and the man who sought to find himself. Archdeacon Hudson Stuck on the summit of Mount Denali and Seton Gordon in his well-loved Hebrides, Robert Service with phrases hard-bitten as the features of a Klondike pioneer, Obermann the plaintive pessimist and Miguel de Unamuno from the sanctuary of Nuestra Señora de la Peña de Francia,

these are a few among the mountain-lovers who have borne witness to the spell of mountain silence.

As for those poets who celebrate the silence of the stars, they are innumerable. Wordsworth in quiet communion with the "silence that is in the starry sky" stormed a citadel impregnable to all man's restless questioning. Heine read in the many-thousand-year-long silence of the stars what he also read in the face of his beloved. Matthew Arnold went so far as to hold up the quiet stars for a moral example:—

These demand not that the things without
them
Yield them love, amusement, sympathy.

In truth those who have paid homage to silence as integral part of nature have done so in every attitude and manner, ranging from Walt Whitman's boisterous fellowship with the sun—"Give me the splendid silent sun"—to Pascal's timorous recognition of the silence of space: "*Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m'effraie.*" Yet every one of those to whom we have referred has done nothing more than express his own emotional reaction to one form or another of nature's silence.

In the world of men who have won dominion over steam and electricity, where mechanism is the doorway to their Paradise of speed, what part can silence play save a Devil's negation of their new-found deity? But there are others who have never sought nor won dominion over things that we can see. What can the silence of a

Quakers' meeting say to them? Or the owl's mysterious flight? Or the quiet shining of the stars? Or the stillness of new-fallen snow? Or the movement of a tide "too full for sound or foam"? It may be that for them these soundless things express life's deepest meaning.

Yet, as our words go probing, pushing, circling, with denial or definition or eulogy, we are still far from the heart of silence. In this world of every day that we call Life, it sometimes seems as if silence were no more than a little star pricking the universal background of sound and movement. It may be that in some other world silence is the universal background and every sound but a Devil's whispered protest to the God that said "Be still." Or it may be, in that other world, that silence is an element which will never for a moment project one particle of itself in sound or movement, but for ever in quietude will absorb into its own stillness the sounds that break against it.

Imagine what we may about the silence in worlds heretofore and worlds hereafter, we can never change surmise for certainty, but in our world to-day we may well believe that each man finds in silence his deepest need which is his own ideal. Certain it is that man has nearly always found in silence exactly what he sought; the wanderer has found rest, the troubled spirit power to endure, the lonely man his friend, the worshipper his deity.

C. C. VYVYAN

A DEFENDER OF THE PHLOGISTON THEORY

[Dorothy Turner, M. A., B. Sc., Ph. D. (London) wrote for us in August 1933 on Joseph Priestley, the discoverer of oxygen. Here she briefly surveys the history of the Phlogiston theory held by Priestley and shows how it came to be discarded by later scientists.—Eds.]

The Phlogiston Theory which was used by chemists of the eighteenth century to account for the behaviour of burning substances marks the transition from alchemy to modern chemistry. The theory underwent several modifications and survived in a corrupted form until the early nineteenth century. But its originator would scarcely have recognized the misinterpretations of later times.

In a previous article, we discussed how Joseph Priestley adopted the language of the Phlogiston Theory in naming his compounds and in explaining their reactions. The significance of the theory in the work of Priestley and other chemists of the eighteenth century is brought out clearly in the writings of Richard Kirwan who was born in Ireland in 1733, the year which also witnessed the birth of Joseph Priestley. Like many another philosopher of the eighteenth century, Kirwan possessed wealth and leisure. His early studies in chemistry were made during a sojourn in France and the experiments he made in his private laboratory in Ireland soon made him familiar with the main results of chemistry available in his day. His most formative years were spent in London where he made the acquaintance of Priestley, Cavendish and other Fellows of the

Royal Society. Throughout his life he kept in touch with men of science in England and on the Continent, carrying on a wide correspondence and continually enriching his library with scientific publications. After ten years spent in London, Kirwan published his most important work, *An Essay on Phlogiston and the Constitution of Acids* (1787). In this book he discusses the origins of the Phlogiston Theory and shows how the chemists of his day sought to interpret the results of their experiments in terms of that theory. Kirwan tells us how among the alchemists, sulphur was regarded as having the "quality of inflammability" but that the German metallurgist Becher (1635-82), recognizing that sulphur was not present in many inflammable substances, had to suppose the existence of an "inflammable principle" common to sulphur and to other combustible substances.

The Phlogiston Theory thus grew out of the beliefs about combustion current at a time when the confused notions of the alchemists still echoed through men's thoughts. The doctrine of Phlogiston, which was first clearly stated by Becher's disciple, Ernst Stahl (1660-1734), indeed contains many remnants of alchemistic thought.

Stahl, for instance, defined Phlogiston as the Principle of Fire (*materia et principium ignis, non ipse ignis, Ego Phlogiston appellare coepi*). The distinction between a substance and its principle was entirely in the tradition of alchemy. Again, the alchemists had believed that fire is a purifier of bodies, the burning of a substance always resulting in a splitting up into simpler constituents. So we find Stahl and his immediate followers picturing Phlogiston as escaping from the burning substance. This notion of a *loss* of something during combustion became so fixed in men's minds that it was long before they became convinced that burning involves the *addition* of something.

The belief that burning involves a loss is readily understood when we bear in mind that the products of the burning of common substances such as wood, sulphur, charcoal, oil and fats are all gaseous, the substances thus "burning away," leaving but a slight residue. Consequently, at a time when chemists were concerned with changes in appearance rather than with exact measurements, they were ready enough to believe that the burning substance had lost something, namely Phlogiston, which had escaped into the surrounding air. Again we must remember that in the days of Stahl, notions about gases were very hazy. It is true that experimenters of the seventeenth century had shown that air has weight, and Boyle's experiments had led him to suspect that only part of the

air is necessary for breathing and burning—the air far from being a homogeneous substance being actually a mixture of gases. But Boyle's views had not received general recognition in the time of Stahl; indeed many chemists still thought of the air as one of the four "elements," and the existence of other gases was as yet not generally recognized.

By the time Kirwan came to write his *Essay on Phlogiston*, however, chemists knew far more about gases than in the days of Stahl. Thus "fixed air" (now known as carbon dioxide) had been obtained by Black, "dephlogisticated air" (oxygen) had been isolated by Priestley, "inflammable air" (hydrogen) had been prepared by Cavendish and "dephlogisticated marine acid" (chlorine) had been investigated by the Swedish chemist, Scheele. Each of the experimenters we have named endeavoured to interpret his results according to the Phlogiston Theory. The explanations seemed plausible enough at first. But it was in the very attempts to make the theory fit the facts of later experience that the real confusion began.

It was known, for instance, that lead, when heated in a strong fire for a considerable time, became converted into a yellow powder which was called the calx. The lead was supposed to have lost its Phlogiston in the process. If the calx was heated with charcoal, the original lead was obtained once more. This was interpreted by supposing that the charcoal was very rich in Phlogiston and so had

restored the lost Phlogiston to the calx, thus giving lead once more. So far, if the premise be granted, the reasoning is unassailable. But when the metallic calx was found to weigh more than the original metal, chemists were forced to the conclusion that a loss of Phlogiston causes a gain in weight. This conclusion, according to Kirwan, "did not shake the credit of this favourite hypothesis," the gain being attributed to an "accession of igneous particles" or to the fact that Phlogiston was a "principle of levity".

When the Phlogiston Theory was adopted to explain certain reactions of acids and the production of "dephlogisticated marine acid" by the action of heat on a mixture of "marine acid" (hydrochloric acid) and pyrolusite, the function ascribed to Phlogiston became that which later results showed to be played by "inflammable air" or hydrogen. Indeed Kirwan, together with Priestley, Cavendish and other chemists of the time, came to regard Phlogiston as identical with "inflammable air". Thus Phlogiston, at one time regarded as an intangible principle, at last became identified with a gas which could be weighed and examined, having thus all the properties ascribed to a substance. Here, then, was a complete change in the basic conception of the nature of the illusive Phlogiston.

When Kirwan defended the Phlogiston Theory, the results of Lavoisier (1743-94) had become known. Lavoisier's crucial experiment consisted in heating a known

weight of mercury in contact with a measured volume of air for twelve days. At the end of that time, he noted the diminution of the volume of the air and weighed the resulting calx of mercury. He found that the residual air did not support burning. He then heated the red calx, and obtained from it the exact volume of air previously absorbed and the exact weight of mercury he had originally. On these results, Lavoisier based his theory of combustion, by which he concluded that the air consists of at least two gases, one of which combines with metals to produce a calx, thus causing an increase in weight. His conclusion was, therefore, just the opposite of the opinions held by the Phlogistonists of the time.

Lavoisier's views were not accepted immediately by the scientific world. Kirwan endeavoured to balance the arguments on both sides and to adjudge their value. But he betrays his partizanship for the Phlogiston Theory at the outset when he says that though many arguments favour the new views (that is, Lavoisier's) yet the old system "though it originated in a less enlightened age, yet it originated in a country in which chemical knowledge then was and still is more advanced than in any other part of Europe. For it is to Germany that all modern nations must resort, to improve in mineralogy and metallurgy as the ancients did to Greece to improve in oratory."

Such an argument in favour of the Phlogiston Theory is rather naïve but it is certainly free

from the exaggerated national pride which has, alas, sometimes obtruded itself into scientific discussions in an age which should be more enlightened than that of Kirwan. In spite of his predilection in favour of German theories, however, Kirwan goes on to say:—

Prejudices of all kinds should certainly be laid aside in all scientific enquiries; truth if it can *evidently* be traced, or if not, the *internal probability* of any principle, should be the only motive of our attachment to it. Now that doctrine must be accounted the least probable which fails oftenest in explaining the phenomena. . . . this is the case of the anti-phlogistic hypothesis.

Kirwan then explains how Lavoisier, the champion of the anti-phlogistic hypothesis—

was undoubtedly the first who proved by direct and indirect experiments, that the weight which metals gain by calcination corresponds to that of the air which they absorb. He was also the first who published that the air consists of two fluids, the one which he calls vital air and the other foul or mephitic air . . . On these grounds, Mr. Lavoisier reversed the ancient hypothesis . . . He supposes that inflammable bodies are such as have in a certain degree of heat, a strong affinity to pure air and he proved by experiment that the remains of these bodies after inflammation contain a substance which they did not contain before.

The above extract shows that Kirwan appreciated the significance of Lavoisier's results. Nevertheless he still had leanings to-

wards the Phlogiston Theory, for he goes on to say that the whole controversy narrows itself down "to deciding whether the *inflammable principle* is found in the phlogisticated acids, vegetable acids, fixed air, sulphur, phosphorus, sugar, charcoal and metals". Further, we learn that, although Kirwan is convinced of the compound nature of water, he thinks it is not yet proved whether in the solution of a metal in an acid, the "inflammable air" comes from the acid, the water or the metal itself.

A year after the publication of Kirwan's *Essay*, a French edition appeared, translated by Mme. Lavoisier and with comments by Lavoisier himself. In 1789 a second English edition was published with the criticisms of Lavoisier and others printed *in extenso*. Still Kirwan continued to defend the older theory. It was not until three years later that he became convinced that the results of Lavoisier could not be reconciled with the Phlogiston Theory. He then realized that the old theory was of no further use to the chemist and he openly acknowledged himself a convert to Lavoisier's views.

Kirwan was a prolific writer and honours were conferred on him from the learned societies of Great Britain and the Continent. He died in Ireland in 1812, an active President of the Royal Irish Academy until his last days.

DOROTHY TURNER

THE MOTHERS OF INDIA'S SAINTS

[Many of our readers will recall the article on "Indian Women" which appeared in our second volume, in which Dr. N. B. Parulekar called woman "the heart of Indian civilization". He wrote:—"As I look around for a clue to the happiness in Indian homes, and the loving hospitality present everywhere in the country, lives of self-effacing women stand out before me." A few such lives are sketched for us below, by Mrs. A. J. Appasamy, B. A.—EDS.]

It is very difficult to get facts concerning the childhood of our great men. Many biographers omit their childhood altogether and only write at length about their work and influence, while some make but a passing reference to childhood. Often there are nothing but legends to tell us of their childhood and we are at a loss to sift facts from fiction. Where an autobiography of the saint himself exists it is a great help. Here the soul speaks for itself, revealing its inner experiences and its early recollections, and tells lovingly of persons who helped its spiritual growth.

The part played by their mother or grandmother in moulding the spiritual lives of our great men has come as a revelation to me, accustomed as I have been to the criticism made of the Indian mother, that she is illiterate and without any capacity for bringing up her children. The books written about Indian women, mostly by outsiders, contain either undeserved criticism or sentimental praise. The real Indian woman does not deserve either. It is true that many Indian women do not know the language of modern psychology. They may be unlettered but they are the product of centuries of our

own civilization and culture. Though ignorant of letters they are steeped in the religious ideas and the literature of the country. I know of a lady who belonged to the last century. Though she did not even know how to read, she was familiar with the Hindu Scriptures. She knew the Tamil *Ramayana* by heart and explained its stanzas to her two sons. Years afterwards her sons became well-known for their piety and learning. She lived in one of India's insignificant villages in the Tamil country.

An Indian writer says, "Nobility in women does not depend upon race, but upon ideals; it is the outcome of a certain view of life."* The Indian mother does not lack high ideals. On the contrary she has a keen sense of values. Those who nurtured the saints put into the minds of their children very early that the search for God was the only worth-while pursuit in life.

The women of India are indeed confined to their homes with no opportunities for presiding at meetings or lecturing on platforms, but in the home they are most capable, loving and devoted. That is why the very name of mother is sacred

* Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *The Dance of Siva*, p. 94.

to every Indian. Men in India often speak of God as their Mother, a term full of vivid memories and associations. This way of addressing God is peculiar to Indian saints. Tukaram sings :—

A babe goes to his mother for comfort
without any further thought
His mother knows exactly what he wants
and rushes to him with fond delight.
A babe sees no difference between a rope
or snake,
He will touch fire or anything else.
He knows nothing about anything but his
mother.*

Ramakrishna Paramahansa invariably used the term Mother to describe God.

Behold, a mother hath several children, and to each one of them sweet-something she giveth,

To one she giveth a pop-gun, to another she giveth a cake; to one a gim-crack, to another a doll,

And sweetly they play and seek not the mother, and the mother, unhindered, doeth her works.

And one of them throweth away his toy and crieth, My Mother, O Mother, where art thou, O Mother? :—

To him she runneth with haste and taketh him up and kisseth and fondleth him and sootheth him to rest :

Ah, Man, even so thou art engrossed in playing with the gew-gaws, the toys of the world :

Ah, know them : they are toys ! ah, throw them away, and call, crying for the Mother, the Lord.

And verily, the Mother, the Lord, will come to thee, running and smiling, and bring thee Peace and Rest for ever !†

Ramprasad says, "My mind is firm, and my gift to the priest well made. Mother, my Mother, my all is finished. I have offered my gift".‡

Mahatma Gandhi speaks of his mother thus : "The outstanding impression that my mother has left on my memory is one of saintliness."§ She was deeply religious and after

her daily prayers only she took her meals. She visited the temple every day and kept her religious fasts. Sometimes she made very difficult vows and kept them without flinching. Even illness was not allowed to interfere with the fulfilling of them. She fasted for two or three days in succession. During her fasts she had only one meal a day or went without any. Sometimes she made a vow that she would not take food without seeing the sun. On those days her children would go out, watching the sky anxiously for the sun to appear. During the rainy season the fugitive sun would hide itself under a cloud before their mother came out to see for herself. But she would cheerfully go back saying that God did not mean that she should eat that day. Gandhiji also speaks of her as a very intelligent woman with strong common sense and a knowledge of the affairs of the state of which her husband was the Prime Minister. Her friends and acquaintances thought very highly of her. Mahatma Gandhi has some treasured recollections of his mother's lively discussions with her friends. When we read the Mahatma's account of his mother we find that mother and son are very much alike. Her capacity for self-control and her spirit of self-sacrifice she has given in full measure to her illustrious son. It seemed a small thing when she observed religious fasts for her own sake ;

* Deming, *Selections from Tukaram*, p. 122.

† Ramkrishna, *Studies in Universal Religion*, p. 464.

‡ E. J. Thompson and A. M. Spencer, *Bengali Religious Lyrics, Sakta*, p. 69.

§ C. F. Andrews, *Mahatma Gandhi : His Own Story*, p. 21.

but when the Mahatma fasts for his countrymen that they may realize the sin of untouchability we realize the full significance of such a sacrifice. The critic may speak lightly of it, but it appeals to our deepest nature and criticism cannot touch it.

Maharishi Devandranath Tagore begins his Autobiography thus: "My grandmother was very fond of me. To me, also she was all in all during the days of my childhood. My sleeping, my sitting, eating, all were at her side."* His grandmother was the head of the household and managed all things efficiently. Early in the morning she bathed in the Ganges and made a garland for the family shrine with her own hands. She also made vows for worshipping the sun. On those days she remained on the terrace saying her prayers from sunrise to sunset. These prayers became very familiar to the child Devandranath. She often went on pilgrimages and arranged for religious music parties in the house. Devandranath used to keep awake in his bed listening to the music. His grandmother's skill in managing the house was so great that in that large joint-family household everything went on smoothly and without a hitch. She was very industrious and did most of the work herself. After all the people had taken their meals she went to take hers which she prepared with her own hands. It was the food prescribed in the sacred book for religious persons

and consisted of rice and vegetables cooked with ghee. Her grandson writes of her :—

She was as lovely in appearance as she was skilled in her work, and steadfast in her religious faith. There was a certain freedom of mind in her, together with her blind faith in religion.†

The next picture we get of her is as she lay dying near the banks of the Ganges. It is thought to be a merit to die on the banks of the Ganges. She got seriously ill, but she did not want to die yet. Still despite her protests she was taken to the banks of the Ganges and kept in a thatched shed. On the night of her death the full moon lit the sky and the musicians were singing that it was sweet to die uttering the name of God. She died with the name of her God on her lips and one finger pointing upwards. When Devandranath saw her thus it seemed as if she pointed out to him God and the Hereafter. A strange peace filled him and a knowledge of the futility of a worldly life gripped him. He writes, "As Didima was my friend in this life so was she my guide to the next".‡

Later in life he preached strongly against idolatry, but the spirit in which religion was practised by his grandmother made a deep impression on him. It was she who first impressed on his mind the need for God.

Devandranath's only reference to his mother is very significant. When his father died he had to perform the funeral ceremony.

* Maharishi Devandranath Tagore, *Autobiography*, p. 35.

† *Ibid.*, p. 36.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

Long before that he had given up idolatrous practices, as his conscience told him they were wrong. Without the family idol the ceremony could not be performed. If he did not allow the family idol to be brought there he would seriously offend his relations and friends. He was very troubled about this and went to bed wondering whether he was brave enough to face the ordeal. Presently he had a vision of his mother who gave him the courage he needed. He writes,

My mother appeared. Her hair was loose, just as I had seen it on the day of her death. When she died I never thought she was dead. Even when I came back from the burning ground after performing her funeral ceremonies, I could not believe that she was dead. I felt that she was still alive. Now I saw that living mother of mine before me.*

She said that she came now to see her son to tell him that she approved of the progress he was making in his spiritual life. His mother's words filled him with great courage and joy. When the time came he performed the ceremony without the idol, and his friends and relations left the place in a body before the ceremony began. The Maharishi's protest against idolatry has had far-flung consequences. The Brahmo Samaj has from that day steadily set its face against idolatry.

The home of Ramakrishna Paramahansa was deeply religious. Both his parents were wholly devoted to God. His father was an upright man and refused to bear false witness in favour of his land-

owner, who immediately deprived him of his home and lands; the family became quite poor and went to live in another place. His father was other-worldly minded and did not care to earn much money. The family had always to be satisfied with the bare necessities of life. The facts concerning the childhood of Ramakrishna are very few. But we find some references to his mother. She was simple, kind and religious. She and her husband kept up a high standard of religious life in the home. Later in life when Ramakrishna became famous, one of his disciples came to see her. He begged her to take a thousand rupees from him as a small offering for the spiritual help he had received from the saint. She was poor and in great need, but she would not take a single rupee from him.

Ramakrishna as a boy was married to a girl four years old. When he saw her again she was fourteen. He told her frankly that he was not interested in the life of a householder but was attracted beyond measure to the religious life. But he was willing to abide by her decision as he owed her a duty. She allowed him generously to have his own way, and chose the religious life for herself also. At fourteen she was called upon to make a great decision and she did it wisely and well.

The mother of Sadhu Sunder Singh had a wonderful influence over him. He says that when he was a child she refused to give him food before he had said his prayers.

* *Ibid.*, p. 117.

He resented this very often, but the practice took a great hold on him. In after years he always spoke with the deepest affection and respect of his mother. His face lighted up whenever he spoke of her. His talks to mothers were always based upon his own experience of his mother's influence over him. A minister once asked him to take a course in a theological seminary, but he replied that he had been to the best theological seminary—the bosom of his mother. He told the Archbishop of Canterbury: "If I do not see my mother in heaven I shall ask God to send me to hell so that I may be with her."*

It was she who constantly held before him the life of a sadhu, and asked him to seek for the inner peace. She took him to priests and sadhus so that they might show him the way to attain the inner peace. "You must not," she used to say, "be careless and worldly like your brothers. You must seek peace of soul and love

religion, and some day you must become a holy sadhu." "It was the Holy Ghost," he said once, "who made me a Christian, but it was my mother who made me a sadhu."†

A word in conclusion. New ideals have transformed women considerably during the last few years. Many women, both educated and uneducated, are full of a passionate desire for social service and political freedom. One of the leading women of India, remarkable for the work she is doing for women and children, said to me, "We must be free or die." She is very religious too. Another left her husband and three children and went to prison twice. When asked about her religion she replied, "My country is my religion." Along with these modern women with new ideas brought out by changing conditions there will always be in India, I think, the old-time mother with religion as her primary object in life.

G. R. APPASWAMY

* Streeter and Appasamy, *The Sadhu*, p. 3. † *Ibid*, p. 243.

THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH IN JAPANESE BUDDHISM

[For many years the means to salvation was a prominent *casus belli* in Christian lands. From Luther's repudiation of faith without works sprang the Protestant Reformation, which has so profoundly affected every field of human thought. Mr. M. G. Mori, author of *Buddhism and Faith*, who has contributed several articles on Buddhism to THE ARYAN PATH, here describes the reverse tendency as manifested in some heretical Buddhist sects in Japan.—EDS.]

Buddhism is based on the doctrine of ethical causation. It teaches that man must help himself. The Buddha said to His disciples as they gathered around His death-bed: "Work out your own salvation with diligence!" This cardinal principle of self-reliance as essential to the attainment of Supreme Enlightenment is accepted and followed by Hinayana, or Thera Vada Buddhism, and by all those sects of Mahayana, or Developed Buddhism, which are called in Japan by the collective name of Shōdō-mon, *i. e.*, "the Gate of the Noble Way". Having apprehended the "Four Great Truths," a Buddhist following any of these schools must tread assiduously the "Noble Eightfold Path," practising the precepts in daily life and working his way up to Nirvana. In the terminology of the Mahayanist, he must pursue the Bodhisattva course as best he can.

Buddhism has been aptly likened to a colossal edifice with many portals suitable for different types of men. The Noble Way is the difficult path, running through a mountainous region of rugged peaks and dark valleys. It is full of healthy adventure and beautiful scenery for the sturdy mountaineers who choose that way; but not all of the pilgrims of life pos-

sess such robust souls. Many are of a delicate constitution. Must Buddhism leave these behind as beyond hope of redemption?

Moral excellence is insisted upon in the Buddha's teaching as an indispensable condition of progress towards Nirvana, but some sects to-day enjoin it rather as an expression of gratitude. For example, the Pure Land School of Mahayana Buddhism, while according the highest reverence and praise to all who have attained enlightenment, or who strive for it, by following the Noble Way, refuses to admit virtuous living as being absolutely essential to the realization of perfect knowledge, or, as they prefer to express it, to birth in the Buddha Country of Amitabha. This attitude is not to be taken as implying any disregard or scorn for moral perfection or good deeds. On the contrary, the Pure Land sects (so called by way of contrast to the Shōdō-mon or "Gate of the Noble Way") encourage virtue as the noblest expression of gratitude to the Buddha of Eternal Life and Immeasurable Light—Amitabha—whom they look up to as their Saviour. No other offering, they believe, not even the greatest material sacrifice imaginable, can ever equal that of a life well lived in a thankful spirit.

If, then, a virtuous life is not to be their means of attaining eternal bliss, but only a token of their gratitude, how are the followers of these sects to obtain that bliss? By putting complete faith in Amitabha Buddha. According to the sutras recited daily by the Pure Land sects, Amitabha (then called Dharma-kara), while he was yet a *bhikṣu*, determined to spend kalpas in Gargantuan self-denying service, that he might accumulate enough merit to be able to construct a paradise or Pure Land of his own, thither to welcome all deserving ones and also all who should have perfect faith in him. But faith or trust is a condition that cannot always be evoked at will, and this psychological fact renders this creed, called by its advocates the "Easier Way," often really more difficult of acceptance than the so-called "Difficult Way" of self-reliance.

St. Hōnen (1133-1212 A. D.), founder of the Jōdo-shū sect in Japan, taught concentration upon, and repetition of, the holy name of Amitabha Buddha (*Amida Butsu* in Japanese) as the chief means of securing this faith for oneself. His disciple, St. Shinran (1173-1262), who, after his teacher's death, founded a new sect of his own called the Jōdo-shin-shū, took a further bold step away from the path of works by declaring even this repetition of the holy name—*Nembutsu*—to be unnecessary. Not that he discouraged *Nembutsu* altogether; he only held that it was not indispensable to the gaining of pure faith in Amitabha,

inasmuch as, in his view, Amitabha himself inspires this very faith in those who are in need of it. Here, then, we have a religion of pure faith which, though it claims to be based on the teachings of Gautama Buddha as embodied in certain of the sutras, bears a striking, albeit perhaps a superficial, resemblance to the Roman Catholic branch of Christianity.

But Shinran went farther than his teacher, not merely in the free interpretation of the sutras, but in his very mode of life. At the recommendation of Hōnen, Shinran abandoned celibacy and had a home and family, though he continued to call himself a priest, a member of the Sangha. Shinran, however, was not indifferent to rules of daily conduct. Not only did he encourage *Nembutsu* as a spontaneous expression of thankfulness, but he even formulated, for the communal life of his followers, rather strict rules, now known as the "Seventeen Articles of Prohibition". In his letters to his pupils, too, both priests and laymen, he dwelt frequently on the value of good behaviour and on the duty of all believers in Amitabha to lead clean, unselfish lives. Nevertheless, Shinran was no moralist in the ordinary sense. Like his master, Hōnen, he never wearied of assuring his pupils and friends of the boundless mercy of Amitabha, who had made his wonderful vow to find a way of deliverance even for those commonly looked upon as the most incorrigible of sinners.

Naturally, this creed was denounced by the traditional schools of

Buddhism as doing violence to the cardinal principles upon which those schools were founded, and specially as being calculated to produce the most adverse effects on the morals of the people. And indeed, this objection is still often raised against the tenets of the Pure Land sects, and, from the viewpoint of utilitarian ethics, the objection may be valid. But the exponent of that creed contends that the self-righteous man is the hardest to help, because pride stands in the way of spiritual awakening. It is the humble man, keenly conscious of his shortcomings, who, by his very humility of heart, opens his mind to the voice of Eternal Truth and so wins his way to lasting beatitude. "Who that is truly conscious of his own sins and sincerely repentant of them," he asks, "will coolly persist in committing more, even though he be assured of divine forgiveness, or told that no effort for atonement is demanded of him? On the other hand, what supreme magnanimity, what infinite mercy, is exemplified by the struggle of Dharma-kara Bhiksu (afterwards Amitabha Buddha) to save all beings that come to him for succour, barring always those who commit the Five Deadly Sins, or speak evil of the Good Law!" No one who meditates upon such superhuman compassion, he believes, can fail to be uplifted to

ever higher planes of moral excellence.

The life histories of Hōnen and Shinran, master and disciple, who in a sense revolutionized Japanese Buddhism, have much in common. Hōnen lost his father at the tender age of eight, while Shinran, fatherless at three, became an orphan when only seven years old. One was a warrior's son; the other the son of a nobleman. Both joined the priesthood before they were ten years old and spent a number of years in monastic life. Both obtained positions of dignity on Mt. Hiyei, but became disgusted with the hypocritical mock-asceticism of monasteries. They had too great humility to think themselves worthy of deliverance through the disciplinary life which they had undertaken; and seeking a way of refuge and relief, they found it in the doctrine of faith in Amitabha. Both master and pupil were denounced by their opponents as traitors to the school they had forsaken, and were banished, by official decree, to provinces remote from the capital, though both were pardoned later and allowed to return to Kyoto before their death. Their respective sects are still flourishing to-day, though that of Shinran, in spite of many schisms, is much more prosperous and influential than the sect inaugurated by his master Hōnen.

MASATOSHI GENSEN MORI

MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

[Dr. K. C. Varadachari has lectured to various colleges of the Madras University on Indian Philosophy. As to his literary work, he tells us that since 1929, "being more interested in discovering a way of life I had resisted from writing for the journals, and now I thought I could break the self-imposed silence." He is at present occupied in working out "a synthesis of Vedantic and mystical thought".—EDS.]

It is a well-established fact that philosophy in early times was the business of the religious. It was an intellectual statement of the nature of the world, a statement that had its origin in their realization of Spirit or Reality. In other words, it was an intellectual restatement of what they knew in Spirit. Such an intellectual restatement was not satisfactory to those who worked entirely on the intellectual plane of thought. To them intuitive knowing was primitive, poetic, psychological, subjective; as against the objective definiteness of intellectual thought. Thus the philosophy of the religious was forced to yield its place to the philosophy of the intellectual. Instead of philosophy becoming an intellectual restatement of intuitively realized truth, it became the philosophy of intellect which relied entirely upon the senses for its facts. It finally became a philosophy of the intellect (or logic), divested from spiritual value and life, and divorced from the objective world of sensations; for its way was abstraction from them in order to discover their interrelations.

Thus it is that all present philosophizing, when strictly intellectual, moves along mathematical

and physical lines towards grander and greater constructions of the world. The men who have a hearing these days are Sir James Jeans and Einstein. Their constructions, marvellous and titanic in their range, are of the abstract kind, in which the individual sinks into nothingness—a matter of utter insignificance to them, but a fact of infinite importance to true religion. Wrestling with formulae and scientific phraseology, philosophy seems to get some meaning and life.

But does it? Can a painted figure reveal the throb of youth? Can brilliant explorations of material structures lead to the understanding of value and meaning? Philosophy, so long as it confines itself to an inductive treatment of objective facts, can lead to nothing except a static idealism—an abstraction—or to an equally irrational materialism (realism).

If we make our approach through mere principles of identity and causality (which is supremely the way of equational science which has set the pace for modern philosophy), we end either in abstractions or in contradictions.* If we prefer pluralism and recognize the many, we find ourselves in a world

* Cf. Emile Meyerson, *Identity and Reality*, p. 252.

of interconnected formulae of the mathematics of space and time to which all phenomena may be reduced. To make it still more real, however, we can even deify space-time as capable of having an end.* In all these efforts of philosophers, absolutistic or pluralistic, we behold a phantom structure, wherefrom life has fled and in which individual existence has no meaning. Rightly and trenchantly has it been expressed that these moderns who cater to absolutistic and pluralistic fantasies are "unrealists," irrational philosophers who, in ruling out the individual, rule out the supreme factor relevant to their study.

A geographical planning of interconnections in the internally distinguished Absolute of Bosanquet, no less than Jeans's speculative tabulation of physical and galactic myriads in infinite-finite space, or even the excellent researches in the configurative physical chemistry of matter, only leads to abstract materialism. This is the natural consummation of intellectual metaphysics. When Dr. Radhakrishnan summarises the results of the Western intellectual constructions and passes judgment, he is fully aware of the initial defect of all intellectual speculation. Even he should agree that the much looked for and anxiously explored "triumph over scholasticism" cannot take place unless and until there is an orientation of consciousness from its objective phase.

Intellect, by promising objectiv-

ity to its metaphysical constructions, devoured everything by making them fictions. Matter escaped through the meshes of the categorical constructions, and intellect despite its lameness tried to fashion a Hegelian movement in thought, to simulate the movement in life. Reality having refused to repeat the dialectic throbs of Hegel was felt to be something "more". Hegel's metaphysics, even when modified by the Italians Croce and Gentile, refused to make the history of the concrete and the particular, and remained and remain but an intellectual construction—a scheme through which Reality *ought* to flow. Only reality overflowed! Bradley was aware of the utter futility of intellectual schemes, and counselled a "more". Thus the finest master of intellectual thought came out with a confession of his failure to plot out reality. Philosophy came to a halt—it had become impossible.

Synchronous with this confession, there was a revolt against all intellect. Constructions of irrational systems became plentiful. Intuition, an old word, with sufficiently vague meaning, plastic and spiritual, was borrowed from the archives of ancient thinkers. This mystic and romantic word was a charm to conjure with. It *must* grasp the "more". Endowed with superintellectual powers and "spiritual energy," it could do the work of intellect more wisely. It knew the "more," it could construct the "more". But a new species of thinkers, psychologists, who had

entered laboratories to demonstrate the actions of the mind in an objective manner, protested. Man, they said, has not been understood. It may be that intellect has failed in its attempt to know. However, there is no need to bring in a new entity till the least known entity has been completely demonstrated to be incapable of doing the work required of it. New non-laboratory methods are unscientific. "Let mystics come in when psychologists fail."

Vitalism, psycho-analysis, and creative evolutionism began interpreting the world. They sketched the world of evolution. Intellect dissected experience and looked at it by arresting its movement or withdrawing it from its place in the process. The "more," the X, was also here. The group spoke of it with awe and spiritual reverence. The whole make-up of man, his dreams, emotions, sensations, intellect, personality, all these were "explained" with the aid of intellectual instruments, now modified to suit the circumstances. But the theory of emergency in evolution rested entirely on objective experience, covering innumerable cases within and without the laboratory, for objects now included the subjective, such as dreams and imaginations. All thought was focused on states of consciousness, and the permanent behind the changing became a nullity. Whilst Hume said that the permanent behind the changing is a myth, Bergson expressed the same positively as "Spirit is Change," recalling the great Heraclitean dictum. Thus to

catch change with intellectual instruments however modified is impossible; to snatch is to distort, to make it unreal. One should live instead to understand, feel internally and sympathetically and be holy. Bergson more than anyone else challenged the intellect. All moderns are more or less followers of Bergson. To have shown not only that intellect cannot understand life, cannot represent it correctly, but that it positively distorts reality, is his greatest contribution. He gave excellence to Life and redeemed it.

Close on the heels of Bergson came the Modern Realists who hold that there must be some kind of real relation between change (or process) and Reality. The features of their thought in general are that this reality emerges constantly in and through change or process. For reality to be, it must be process; the values of reality can be and are exemplified only in its process, wherein each event is a unique and valuable feature of the Reality. In so far as an intellectual interpretation of individual events is concerned, they may be considered to be eternal forms, relations, or configurations. As to their being mental or material, they may be (Russell) neuter, a third type which like the hermaphrodite may change its sex this way and that. Thus by accepting the emotional, imaginal and process character of reality, the realists gave back life to philosophy; intellect was forced to accept an equal share, but not the whole share; and Bergson's effort was

not wasted, though not fulfilled.

Thus life was restored, but where was value? The dogmatic assertion of value of the Absolute was followed by a more insistent dogmatism of the *élan vital* and the self-identical entities. The individual Life has nowhere been included in the survey; rather it has been sacrificed. For that is Western philosophy. Philosophy's inveterate search for cosmic order has made it impossible for it to uphold the significance of each individual. And all philosophical Religion is at bottom objectively bent, dependent upon the quantity of external experience. If philosophy experiences "religion," the Nous, the "noumenal" consciousness, it is that awe and wonder which, undoubtedly, as Rudolf Otto says, compose religious consciousness, but which, however, are not themselves religion.

There is an element in religion of which the psychological attempt can be least aware, the internal experience of an integral "moreness" proceeding from the subject, not from the object. It is not an element of the experience of the weird expanse of the starry heavens, or even the frightening grandeur of its beauty. It is the inner experience of true creative delight, which, because it is integral, is "more" than any state of experience subjective or objective. Psychological laboratory methods may gain some knowledge of the strange worlds of "be-

yond body" or death, and even know and experiment upon the powers of the mind, but can never know this through objective search in test tubes and galvanometers.

All modern philosophy is materialism in a sense. It seeks the knowledge of extension and relationship with the many; it seeks an order, not value, whatever be the value of the experience of order. Value is of the individual and proceeds from the subject, a self, not a series of states. Religion is truly of the individual. It seeks the value of the individual. Its knowledge is truly of the self. Nor should the self be considered to be anything which may be seen by the eye, heard by the ear; from it everything proceeds. The rest are merely series of states.

Idealism is right when it strives to know the order through the subjective consciousness, but the subject of idealism unfortunately is James's superficial continuity of consciousness or Hume's isolated states, suffused with feeling. Indian idealism, on the other hand, dared to go behind the states of consciousness and instead of viewing the states as objective effects, knew them as subjective configurations of the self behind. Hence all Western idealism ends in scepticism and materialism (abstractionism), whilst Indian idealism triumphs over materialism and ends in religion which discovers the value and meaning of the individual.

K. C. VARADACHARI

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE UNDISCOVERED BOURNE*

[**E. F. Benson** has ranked for many years as a novelist of distinction. He comes of a family noted for its literary ability.]

It is taken for granted, for which there is no warrant, that at the dawn of civilization humanity was composed of savages. A careful comparative study of the earliest texts, *e. g.*, the Vedas of India, the Papyri of Egypt, etc., reveal that the ancients did possess knowledge now lost to us. Among other things they knew the nature of man psychical and spiritual as well as physical, and the state of his various constituents after the death of the body. As Mr. Benson points out, in this book we have facts of the experiences of its sincere author which we can accept, but where are the explanations which satisfy? We say, search the Wisdom of the Ancients.—EDS.]

Mrs. de Crespigny's book deserves to be read with the respect we must always accord to the work of an author, whether or no we agree with his conclusions, who writes of his subject with such sincerity and conviction. It takes the form of a psychical autobiography, and its general scope is to relate how from being a complete sceptic she became, owing to certain experiences here set forth, a whole-hearted believer in spiritualism. Mrs. de Crespigny defines spiritualism as having for its main aim the proof that the human spirit survives the death of the body, retains its individuality and the consciousness of its life on earth, and, by means of "mediums," can communicate with friends and relations, thus testifying to its continued existence. To most of us, perhaps because we have not sufficient knowledge of the subject, these communications do not seem to have as yet established definite proof, but any open-minded person must read

such manifestations as are here related with intense interest.

The subject is of enormous significance. If it can be proved that the human spirit after death passes on to a new phase of individual existence, with the same certainty as we can prove that water, when subjected to a fixed degree of cold, becomes ice, it may safely be said that no scientific discovery of any age approaches this in importance; the sting of death would vanish, and the miseries and raptures of our brief human life on earth, apparently distributed with so fortuitous a hand, would seem of small account. But, in order to be certain that these communications actually come from the other side of the grave, we must rule out all instances in which natural laws or a reasonable extension of them could provide an explanation. If, for example, a medium tells a sitter facts concerning the dead which are already known to him, this cannot be taken as evidential,

* *This World and Beyond*. By MRS. PHILIP CHAMPION de CRESPIGNY. (Cassell and Co., Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

for telepathy, our knowledge of which is still in its infancy, might conceivably account for such a communication. I do not see how it would cover all the experiences which Mrs. de Crespigny relates, and these are of extreme interest to everybody.

Mrs. de Crespigny's theories to account for some of these supernatural phenomena are not so convincing as her statement of them. She gives us a very remarkable story of a *poltergeist* (that "intelligence" which throws furniture about in a baffling but idiotic manner) which she personally experienced. But when she tells us that "Feda," Mrs. Leonard's control, informed her that all physical phenomena of the sort are produced from the other side "by what you would call navvies," who sometimes go out on strike (in which case there are no manifestations at *séances*), we feel unconvinced. Again, she admits that a medium in trance may hold forth in a very boring and platitudinous manner, but her explanation that such an address "appears to be the tiresome self-exploitation of some self-centred would-be orator in the other world, who, failing to induce anyone to listen to him in that sphere, dumps his pious platitudes and tedious exhortations on long-suffering audiences in this," is an unsupported assumption. Sometimes we find ourselves in frank disagreement with her. Certain people, she tells us, claim to have had direct communication with Christ himself. This she says is impossible "for the

rate and power of the attendant vibrations would be absolutely disintegrating to any physical body on so low a level as the earth". But how can this be? When Christ was incarnate on the earth He did not disintegrate those with whom He associated. He bade them take His yoke upon them, and He healed the sick. . . . Again she accounts for the curious fact that a very large percentage of well-known mediums are women by suggesting that Adam being formed out of the dust, according to one version of the creation of man in Genesis, was "matter without modification," and did not afford a suitable medium for the functioning of spirit. That is hardly satisfactory, and becomes even less so when she adds "in terms of to-day," that "the gaps between the wavelengths were too wide to make any form of synchronization possible between spirit in its higher forms and matter".

But when Mrs. de Crespigny comes to her experiences, we listen, we read entranced. Outstanding among them is one concerning a "fire medium," Mrs. Annie Hunter, who, when under the control of an ancient fire-worshipper, could handle with impunity live coals or other incandescent matter. On this occasion a log was put on the fire, and turned about till all the surface was burning embers. Mrs. Hunter then went into trance and took this log from the fire and passed it from one hand to the other. The log was then re-heated several times and, at the medium's invitation, Mrs. de Crespigny picked

it up in her bare hand and carried it about till her hand should have been burned to the bone, but remained unsinged and unreddened. All this passed in broad daylight, and three witnesses testified to the literal truth of it. Whether Mrs. de Crespigny is right in attributing her immunity from burning to the function of an "etheric sheath" that protected her hand is almost beside the point. The phenomenon was well-supported by recorded evidence, and the only conclusion is that some law, unknown to us, intervened.

"Faith is the substance of things hoped for," and no excursion into uncharted realms, whether physical or psychical can progress a single step without it. It is for this reason that Mrs. de Crespigny's book is valuable, for it is the psychical history of one who continually pushed forward in the sure expectation of finding. Quite early in the history of civilization man conceived the notion of the survival of the spirit after death, but this appears to be not so much a venture of faith as his inability to conceive

of annihilation. Centuries later, Socrates, one of the most enlightened of philosophical speculators, discoursing to his disciples an hour or two before, at sunset, the executioner brought him the lethal draught, spoke of conscious survival as being about an even chance. Perhaps he would go through death into life, perhaps an eternal and dreamless sleep awaited him. Others, like Saul, consulting the witch of Endor, thought that spells could raise the dead. Since then science has made huge inroads into the domain of superstition: witchcraft has paled before the sunrise of fresh discoveries of natural law; but, as far as science is concerned, the conundrum concerning a future life still broods, like pavilions of dark water, over the coasts of the unknown. It is into these darkneses that pioneers like Mrs. de Crespigny are penetrating. Mirages and plausible spectres, not very strictly investigated, may perhaps seem more real than they are, and faith is the only lantern, shining like a lighthouse over perilous seas.

E. F. BENSON

In his paper before the International Philosophical Congress on "Contacts and Conflicts of Eastern and Western Philosophies" Professor G. P. Conger says:—

"In the West we now have vigorous psychologies which bring incisive critiques of mysticism, which have little or no confidence in intuitionism, and which, although compelled to acknowledge the uniqueness of mind, do not recognize its priority or supremacy. Studies in logic indicate the aptness of mind, but not its ubiquity. Epistemological discussions about mind and the world are inconclusive, and perhaps gain nothing which is not tacitly assumed at the outset. The result is that while the assumption of a Cosmic Mind may still be made, the difficulties appear from the Western side more and more formidable."

MYSTICISM: NATURAL VERSUS SPIRITUAL

[These two contributions treat of the problem of natural and spiritual mysticism about which Mr. D. L. Murray wrote in our pages for August 1932. The first is from the pen of a Westerner, Mr. J. S. Collis; the second from that of an Indian, Mr. Saroj Kumar Das. Both articles are based on the views propounded by Mr. Hugh I'A. Fausset.—Eds.]

I.—WORDSWORTHIAN PANTHEISM

The work of Mr. Hugh I'A. Fausset has always been important, and becomes increasingly more so. His work is *modern* and does not belong either to pre-War Utopianism or to post-War despair. He is one of the very few who see in the War something not only terrible but hopeful—a climax of selfishness, an explosion of individualism, clearing the way for a more selfless era. In his hands literary criticism is nothing less than religion, philosophy and psychology drawn together dynamically. Unless literary criticism aims at that, it is not very important. But few critics are capable of the task; Middleton Murry was capable of it but has given it up; so Fausset has the field very nearly to himself. He gives his undivided attention to the science of growth. His work fulfils the hope put forward by General Smuts in his *Holism and Evolution* that a New Biography would appear and deal with the achievement of Personality and the making of the Soul. This has always been Fausset's aim. The development, the discord, the inner drama of a Tolstoy, a Coleridge, a Keats has always been his theme. In *The Proving of Psyche* he gathered together his view in the form of an attack on Humanism, in which

he insisted all the time that the religious life is an *art* and cannot submit itself to humanists like Professor Babbitt in America—or, he might have added, like Gandhi in India. Only those who are unfamiliar with moralists and humanists will fail to realise that this means a relentless fight against dualism and an incessant championing of monism. Nor is that all; it means holding up Imagination as the faculty of apprehension that points to the best method of advance.

In *The Lost Leader* Mr. Fausset addresses himself to the same problems with even greater skill than before. This book of his is remarkable; it has so very much in it that I must confine myself severely within the limits of its essential theme. The tragedy of Wordsworth, according to Mr. Fausset and to all who regard his life as a tragedy, is that not only did he not grow forward, he degenerated. And if we hold that there is nothing in life more precious than growth we must consider the life of Wordsworth tragic indeed.

We have no record of a happier childhood and adolescence having been spent on earth. It was perfect—he had perfect parents, a perfect schooling, a perfect sister,

a perfect brother, and perfect environment. These fantastically marvellous gifts were given to a boy fantastically suited to receive them. There never was such a boy! A few readings of the *Prelude* convinces one that here in Westmoreland something unique had occurred. Here, in this place, amongst these mountains, a *perfect* human being roamed for many years: a child, a boy, a youth, a young man at one with himself, at one with Nature. There are no words strong enough to convey such unity. He was as much a piece of Nature, as innocent and undivided as a daffodil or a deer. But he was much more than an animal; he was conscious of his joy in nature; his ecstatic touch with life solved all problems for him—neither death, nor deity, nor evil perturbed him in the least.

Life has a way of exacting payment for too much happiness as often as in rewarding too much suffering. While reading *The Prelude* we feel that Wordsworth later will have to pay for such a childhood—the transition into manhood will be more difficult for him than for any other. And pay he did. *He failed to make the transition successfully from his instinctive faith in Nature to the conscious faith in which the intellect plays so great a part.* His destiny as a human being forced him into intellectuality—he couldn't help it—but he was not favoured by the gods in the second stage. He was too strong intuitively for his inferior intellect. He never used his mind to advantage. Mr. Fausset states that so tremen-

dous was his youthful joy among the hills that "he could hardly credit nature with destructive force". And the author draws attention to a passage when the poet speaks of the Cross at La Grande Chartreuse which "The storm full surely revered". The passage is quoted to exemplify "the credulity in his worship of Nature for which he was to pay bitterly enough". We cannot help feeling that Mr. Fausset is here stretching a point too far—Wordsworth could not have been blind to the destructive forces of nature. Nevertheless the essential fact about him is that he did not succeed in erecting a satisfactory philosophy based on his gigantic intuitive joys. He was at the mercy of sensation.

At the mercy of sensation. It is necessary to be sure of our ground here—at any rate, honest and sincere. The Editors of this Periodical, commenting in October 1932 on an article by Mr. Fausset on Wordsworth, wrote:—

Not only excuses are made but explanations are offered justifying the sense-indulgence and even sense-orgies of creative artists—a view not acceptable to Yoga-Vidya or Occultism.

I am anxious not to evade the issue here. It seems to me a question of avoiding extremities. We must have sensation. We must start with sensation. Because we must start with experience. The opening words of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* provide the formulation which many of us must find corresponds exactly with our own and only method of advance.

That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses ?

Then he adds :—

But, though all our knowledge begins *with* experience, it by no means follows that all arises *out of* experience.

I perceive an object of Nature and experience a feeling of joy : this experience and intuition, *creatively understood*, can lead me ultimately to the grace of vision. If it is not creatively understood, it will not lead me anywhere. What is got *out of* the experience depends upon Imagination, upon "Reason in her most exalted mood". But I do not see how we can get on without sensation.

Wordsworth had overwhelming intuitions of the *numinous*. But he was incapable of erecting a philosophy of living out of his experience. In consequence he was always at the mercy of his sensations; and his sensations were literally at the mercy of his geographical position. So long as he was in a place where Nature smiled on him, all was well; but when he was somewhere where Nature did not inspire him, he was terrified, feeling, *I have lost my faith*. Mr. Aldous Huxley has written an essay suggesting that had Wordsworth visited the Indian Tropics his enraptured view of Nature would have been undermined, and he would have been overcome with horror instead of joy. This is no doubt true, for he had only to go as far as Germany in the cold

winter to be utterly cast down. Mr. Fausset makes it abundantly clear that his pantheism was not a thorough pantheism, for he never learnt to accept life in its fullness, nor suffering, nor death. His was not a real mysticism nor a real pantheism but was simply "love of nature" when nature was easy to love. But to suggest, as Huxley does, that a true mystic and pantheist is in any more danger of losing his vision in a jungle than in a bluebell wood in England, is absurd. The difference between those two places is one of degree only. In both there is beauty, in both struggle, suffering and death. In both the pantheist must accept the at first frightful thought that God exists by a process of eating Himself. And in both there is really only one solution: to accept the scene with vision and in humility and without personal anxiety. To find an expression of such acceptance we turn immediately to Emerson who, echoing the *Bhagavad-Gita*, cried:—

If the red slayer thinks he slays,
And if the slain thinks he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep, and pass, and turn again.

The weakness of Wordsworth's pantheism and of much Western pantheism is that it is sentimental and sensational and not thorough. It is superficial because Nature in the West is superficially more attractive. It is in the East, in the Tropics, that we find the profoundest expressions of pantheism which teach, logically and scientifically, a philosophy of life in which the individual's task is to

identify himself with the cosmic growth. The theme, fully sustained, of Mr. Fausset's significant book is to show how Wordsworth in not knowing how to identify himself with the cosmic growth after his maturity, on longer felt at home in the universe, and looked towards other worlds and a transcendent God. He shows how Wordsworth wanted to take the adventure of Love but was held back by his prudence, his anxiety, his egoism, his stubbornness, and his pride. He believed in Love as the key, but he was cut off from understanding the ultimate fashion of Love.

Wordsworth is one of our greatest champions of Imagination, of "Reason in her most exalted mood," of Intellectual Love rising from Intuition. He speaks of "the deep lesson of Love" which he,

Whom Nature, by whatever means, has taught
To feel intensely, cannot but receive.

And of the days gone by he
cries:—

O then how beautiful, how bright, appeared
The written promise!

But we have to ask, how was it that the lesson of love did so little for him when he needed it most, how came it that he was for ever intent upon *recapturing* that sense of miraculous promise, and wrote his best work out of the agony of what he had *lost*? Mr. Fausset replies that he was poisoned by prudence and by fear. He points out the stultifying evasion in his Principle of Love. It was far too safe a love. You are to love, he says, in *The Excursion*, such objects as excite

No morbid passions, no disquietude,
No vengeance, and no hatred.

There lies the essential weakness of Wordsworth—the incompleteness of his love and the incompleteness of his thought. Just as he was at the mercy of his geographical situation, likewise he dared not contemplate any objects that he might not instinctively like. But real love is infinitely more complete and leads to a complete philosophy. It endureth all things, it suffereth all things, and is still kind. And more, it sees Beauty where few see her; where, perhaps, none else can see her. But the exercise of that love calls for an acceptance of life and for a renunciation of selfish anxiety.

Mr. Fausset makes it plain that prudence, fear, pride, and self-regard undermined Wordsworth's imagination and love. At one time he had faith in Nature, he had faith in the perfectibility of Man, and faith in himself. But because he did not creatively and courageously face and understand his faithful intuitions and grew to be afraid of his self-abandonment, Life in the end abandoned him and he lost all that he had hoped to save. From the marvellous youth who received overwhelming intimations of the *numinous*, of the divine, of the self-sufficing, utterly unintelligible but obviously trustworthy universe, to the man who complained through the mouth of the Solitary that he could find no *assurance* whatsoever in Nature; from the idealist who assisted at the French Revolution to the conservative who urged war and slaughter against France—

there is the most extraordinary division.

Wordsworth has given us what are probably the most gorgeous expressions of pantheism in the literature of the world. It takes away something of the force of Mr. Fausset's volume when we fully realise that these expressions were due to the poet's inability to make the best of his experience. We are glad he was thus foolish and thus frustrated and thus destined; and in so far as the author laments over a lost leader he misses a final profundity. But his book has a deeper claim to our attention. He rightly sees in Wordsworth a severe symbol of the pilgrimage of the human race. We are now far enough on in history to see that that pilgrimage

should be from primitive consciousness when men lived in a state of unconscious animism, to the inbreak of the intellect when individuality, selfishness, dualism and discord finally lead to a third stage when men shall live in a state of conscious monism, and the purged intellect shall be presided over by Imagination. Wordsworth illustrates the first stage with amazing fidelity, and his Fall into the second stage, from which he did not emerge, is equally striking. He teaches us by his own burning example what *not* to do in order to reach the third stage. And what, according to Mr. Fausset, should be done, the affirmative spirit required for making towards that third stage, is the theme of his remarkable study.

J. S. COLLIS

II.—A PILGRIM OF THE MYSTIC WAY

If the universe is, in the ultimate analysis, "the vale of soul-making," Hugh I'Anson Fausset is undoubtedly a mystic in the making—a prophet of the New Humanism. Apart from the autobiographical interest of his search "for a true religion of the Spirit," recorded in *A Modern Prelude*, his commentary on his personal experience has a universality of appeal.

Although all mystics speak the same language, their accents differ. The mystic way is not a standardised one suitable for all alike—the *sadhana* of every mystic having an individuality all its own.

Indeed, this is just the point in human nature where individualism is at its strongest and deserves to be cherished as a priceless legacy. Hence it is altogether futile to search for a common measure of mystic disciplines (*sadhana*), when there is no common measure of minds. As a matter of fact the mystics themselves have no preconception of the way that is pursued by them: they are truly people that live forwards but understand backwards. Under the controlling lead of Spirit—the *Atman*—of a fullness lying within, the mystics carve out their respective pathways to the blessed goal of mystical

illumination. That being the case, it is unnecessary to enquire whether Mr. Fausset's "progress through the conflicts and disillusionments of egoism towards the unity of a real self-hood" fits in with the traditional stratification of the mystical Life into the Purgative, the Illuminative, and the Unitive stage.

Perhaps no word in the whole range of English literature has been more grossly abused than "mysticism". But this degradation surely belies the original purity and sanctity associated with the etymological meaning of the word. Without trying to trace its antiquity, all that we may conveniently note here is that it had already acquired currency among the Greeks, specially in connection with the Dionysian and Eleusinian Mysteries, when it was taken over and popularised by the Neo-Platonists. The name "*Mystēs*" applied to "one initiated" or a priest of secret rites of divine worship. We can usefully compare the Sanskrit word "*Upanishad*," which, as derived from the stem "sad" (= to sit) with the prefixes of "Upa" and "Ni," means etymologically "that which is imparted to the (initiated) disciple when he sits close to his preceptor"—hence, "a secret doctrine or mystery," *Parā Vidya* or Esoteric Wisdom. The word *mysterion* in Greek is, again, cognate with *muein*, meaning "closing of lips or eyes"—perhaps as being symbolic and suggestive of withdrawal of the senses from their natural outgoing activity in the world and their

concentration within. This is astonishingly similar to the literal as well as symbolic meaning of *avritta-chakshuḥ* or "closed eyes" that we have in the opening verse of the second chapter of the *Katha Upanishad*.

With the derivative meaning of the word as a lever to raise it from its degrading associations, it is not difficult to differentiate it clearly from its past as well as present-day aberrations. In the first place, the association of mysticism with the acquisition of certain occult powers has been construed, from the standpoint of spiritual realisation, whether in the East or in the West, as the betrayal of the spiritual task. Secondly, mystical experiences are not to be indiscriminately classed with "pathological" phenomena and thus explained away merely as cases of auto-suggestion or self-hypnotization. Things may not after all be what they seem, and in fact may differ from what they seem by the whole diameter of being. Finally, in view of the eroto-mania which has seized the modern psycho-analysts in their typical attempt to account for "the whole choir of heaven and the entire furniture of earth" as cases of Freudian "complex," it is of extreme urgency and importance, in the interest of scientific study itself, to stand up in "defence of a philosophic doubt" which stoutly refuses to cater to a popular craze or pay homage to the "Idols of the Market-place". Such an attitude of suspense of judgment is the more necessary as one is confronted with the task of inter-

preting mystical experiences.

Mysticism is not a creed, doctrine or dogma, but is an art—the almost “lost art of worship”. Hence its value is largely, if not wholly, practical. Indeed, Mysticism is religion in its most concentrated and exclusive form: it is religion viewed from within. With a truly prophetic insight Mr. Fausset announces his solution of the “Modern Dilemma”: “What, therefore, we need to-day most is to cultivate a true inwardness.” (*The Modern Dilemma*, p. 16) And from “the sustained depth of his self-knowledge”—for “all true knowledge is necessarily self-knowledge” (*Ibid.*, p. 18)—will yet emerge for the modern man “the true religion of the Spirit”.

On this track of endless pilgrimage *The Modern Dilemma* serves as the conning-tower from the top of which Mr. Fausset commands a full survey of the situation that confronts the modern man. His reading of it is as accurate as it is appalling: we are in the tentacled grip of a steadily increasing mechanisation of life and its values.

Standardization, with its levelling effects, is everywhere apparent, so that not only motor cars and objects of use are assuming a uniform appearance, but human beings are more and more conforming to type, which may be physically and mentally efficient, but which lacks individual expressiveness or soul. (*Ibid.*, pp. 2-3)

This has for its necessary counterpart a morbid “individualism,” which has been taught to seize individuality on the wrong side—as a “finished and finite clod untroubled by a spark” of ideality.

It is no wonder that this superstitious idolatry of personality has led to a “self-assertion” which “is not only being generally practised, but is being preached as a gospel” (p. 3). In this respect the original sin lies with the Renaissance, “the index of the modern Western World. For it is from the Renaissance that we may date the pronounced emergence of critical and self-conscious individualism” (p. 5).

The canker that is eating into the very vitals of modern life is, as Mr. Fausset correctly diagnoses, the direct legacy of the Renaissance mentality that liberated and made an apotheosis of the intellectual impulse. To quote his very words on the point:—

Knowledge pursued as an end in itself, instead of as a means to self-knowledge and the good life, and the brain exercised as an end in itself instead of as the means to an enriched and heightened consciousness, have not only disturbed throughout the world the whole order of human mentality, but impoverished or even paralysed the soul. And by the soul I mean that organic singleness of being, that creative core in which all the faculties of an individual should be centred, through which he acts in accord with the universal principle of life, and without which no one can be an individual in a really vital and inevitable sense. (pp. 46-47)

This “creative wholeness of being,” represents

a true reconciliation of heart and head in imaginative understanding, a true at-one-ment with the spiritual source and reality of all being, by virtue of which all nature is perceived as supernatural and the life of a flower is in its degree as beautiful and inevi-

table a mystery as the life of Jesus. (pp. 26-27)

Mr. Fausset is convinced that the only way "to save the soul from mechanization" is "to subordinate both our rationalism and our ethics to æsthetic imagination" (*Ibid.*, p. 76). He has definitely rescued "imagination" from its position of obscurity, and invested it with a constitutive validity and importance. It means for him "a shaping spirit, which does not argue or analyse, but which disinterestedly creates what it perceives, and perceives what it creates" (p. 56); and like Keats, he closes this trend of reflection on the sublime note: "What the Imagination seizes as Beauty must be Truth." (p. 81)

The "dominion of the Understanding" as divorced from Imagination has been the prolific source of all the distempers that the modern civilization is suffering from. To recover the creative integrity of our personal life from the domination of a divided consciousness—that has been the chief preoccupation of Mr. Fausset's writings. In *The Lost Leader: A Study of Wordsworth*, he endeavours to substantiate his main thesis with special reference to Wordsworth's mind and art. Mr. Fausset lays down that to discover

how the rational and the instinctive may be creatively harmonised is . . . the most fundamental problem which faces us to-day. And since the cardinal importance of Wordsworth is that he tried and failed to solve this problem as a man, although he came near solving it in moments of divin-

ation as a poet, he has, I believe, a very vital meaning for us to-day. (p. 11)

Wordsworth has a special appeal for him inasmuch as Mr. Fausset thinks that "No one shows more clearly than Wordsworth that the problem of reconciling the spiritual and the natural man is ultimately a problem of achieving a true individuality." (*loc. cit.*)

The same theme comes in for a negative justification in *Tolstoy: The Inner Drama*. Tolstoy interests him particularly because—

he served humanity more notably as an indicter of a false civilisation than as the prophet of a true one, as the champion of a moral conception of human life than as the discoverer of a really creative morality. (p. 8)

But Mr. Fausset is convinced—

that Tolstoy erred in his moral judgment only in so far as he was unable to realize that identity of moral and æsthetic values in which art and life may ultimately become one. (p. 8)

We may observe in the growth of individuals and to a less degree in that of peoples three stages of Consciousness; the first primitive or animal, in which the self is still undifferentiated; the second self-conscious, in which the critical intelligence has separated itself from instinct; the third ideally human, in which intelligence is again reconciled with instinct as in the first stage but without a sacrifice of the individual consciousness achieved at the cost of dislocation in the second. (p. 15)

As against the aberrations of the sentimental cry of a "return to nature" or a "Renaissance of instinct," Mr. Fausset lays a justified emphasis on the point that "to sanctify the instinctive is as great an error as to sanctify the rational. The savage may be more natural,

may be more virtuous than the pseudo-civilised man, but he is further removed from the possibilities of a completely realized humanity" (p. 20). Although Tolstoy "erred in trying to divorce the spiritual from the physical, he thereby did a better service to mankind than by sentimentalizing animalism and calling it love, and sentimentalizing naturalism and calling it mysticism" (p. 24). Fortunately, however, "all his life he refused to conclude a sentimental peace between the two forces of his nature" without pretending "to reconcile them emotionally" (p. 25).

The dualistic or divided consciousness, then, has served only to intensify our miseries; and the way to redemption lies in the dis-

covery of the plane of the Spirit above and beyond the plane of the Mind. *The Proving of Psyche* gives the redemptive warning that "the Western world has reached a point in its history when creative imagination is more necessary to its salvation than a critical ethic" (p. 192). The modern problem is one of "creative co-ordination," demanding "the concentration necessary to true inwardness" (p. 144). Quoting with approval from Mr. Middleton Murry, he concludes:—

What we have to do is to regain the spontaneity of the animal or the child, and sacrifice nothing of our human faculties. *This can be done*. This is the eternal re-birth which is the secret of true mysticism and of the teaching of Jesus himself. It and nothing else is the "mystery of the Kingdom of God".

SAROJ KUMAR DAS

Manifesto : The Book of the F. P. S. I. Ed. By C. E. M. JOAD. (Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.)

Mr. Joad apprehends that our civilisation is disintegrating and drifting towards destruction, and mankind seems to be incapable of averting the disaster. There are, however, some who do not despair of the Commonwealth, and believe that "reason still counts in human affairs". They are determined to "fight the sombre destiny that hangs over humanity". The present volume is the objective embodiment of their hopes and beliefs. Though addressed to readers in Great Britain, the work has a wider appeal. It is at once a declaration of faith, a programme of action, and an appeal to the scattered forces of world construction to close up their ranks and march in the common cause of humanity,

The basis of the "Federation of

Progressive Societies and Individuals," which the volume expounds, is comprehensive; in addition to the primary programme of world reorganisation, it includes a number of subsidiary reforms. Thus, it is contended that "in the sexual sphere the communal effort . . . [should be] confined . . . to the negative task of removing tyrannical coercions and destructive restrictions" based on "guess work, illusion, or superstition". The reform of Criminal Law should include the separation of the trial from the sentence:—

The task of allotting sentences should be entrusted to some persons selected for their experience of private life and administration, and their knowledge of the prison population, of social conditions, and of the causes of crime.

The State should be secularised not only to secure "for the individual the most complete freedom of conduct and

self-expression that is consistent with the common welfare," but also because it will "render possible a wholesale recasting of our legal system on a utilitarian basis". Town and country planning is advocated to embody "some graciousness in life's physical pattern".

The programme of subsidiary reforms will both command assent and rouse violent disagreement, but it does not stir the imagination as is the case with the proposals for the reconstruction of the economic and political framework of society. Economic reorganisation must seek to realise "the ideal economic condition, . . . in which every factor of production is most effectively employed to give the maximum human satisfaction in the supply of goods and service with the minimum demand upon the leisure of people". This can only be achieved by planning, but planning will have to be on a national basis, though the national Plan should be so framed "as to harmonise with an international system in which chaos of competition will give place to ordered economic co-operation between the peoples of the world".

International Co-operation, economic and political, is opposed by the glaring anachronism of the sovereign National State. Nations speak the language of Disarmament but tread the path of militarism. They "are like a lunatic family whose members starve themselves to fill their cellars with dynamite". But the madness will pass, and "presently, if not soon, the world Commonwealth will be founded sufficiently securely to ensure that wars between the nations of to-day are ruled out". How this is to be achieved is explain-

ed in some detail, but "our business now is to concentrate effort on securing for the first time a World Disarmament Treaty in which the armaments of the World will be recognised as the world's concern".

"The real obstacles are in men's minds," and the will to organise for peace, the will to cooperate for common welfare, is lacking. "At present the majority of human beings are mental cripples whose judgment and will have been distorted," among other causes, "by faulty education". Accordingly the problems of Education are reviewed rapidly, and education is visualised against a background of world Citizenship. "Education should turn every boy and girl in the world not only into a complete individual personality but also a good citizen of the World." The individual should be freed from clerical and militarist influences, and enabled "to play his part in the age-long adventure of humanity . . . to subordinate all lesser sentiments to the supreme sentiment of loyalty to the enterprise of the human species".

The volume is illumined, in Morley's noble phrase, by "the lamp of devotion to Reason," and it closes appropriately with an adjuration to the individual to fight against "the internal oppressors that enslave the human mind." The control of the conscious personality over the other elements in our mental life needs to be strengthened, so that the problems of life can be dealt with by reason and discrimination. In the battle of Kurukshetra that goes on in every human soul, the gospel of the *Gita* must triumph before the new era dawns on the world.

N. S. SUBBA RAO

A Search in Secret India. By PAUL BRUNTON, with a Foreword by Sir Francis Younghusband. (Rider and Co., London. 15s.)

Ever since the days of Apollonius of Tyana and even earlier, a few in the West have known and many have believed in the existence of the Wise Men of India. Out of India has come the wisdom of the ages and also the fantastic cults of a day. This book is a record of a search for those Wise Men made, apparently a few years ago, by an English journalist who, as he puts it, "combined within his complex nature the two elements of scientific scepticism and spiritual sensitivity".

Considering that he had to "cram investigations into a minimum time since he could not afford to spend years out of life upon a single quest," he has been singularly fortunate, for it is seldom to such impatient knockers that the gates of wisdom swing open. As it is, he has met many of the better known and some, too, of the less known sadhus and yogis of this country. To all these he went with his hard, but not ignoble, scepticism which, if it inevitably shut him out from some of the deeper things, yet enabled him to keep his balance amidst the mass of imposture and folly that lives parasitically upon the wisdom of the few and which has engulfed many and disgusted more.

Among those he met were a Hatha Yogi who demonstrated some remarkable physiological feats such as voluntary stoppage of the heart and breathing; Meher Bābā, the celebrated Parsi Messiah; Sri Shankarāchārya, the Pontiff of Kumbakonam Math and spiritual descendant of the great Shankara; Sāhabji Maharāj, the guru of the Rādhāswāmi sect, whose attempt to combine yoga with the running of a model industrial community aroused his admiration; Sudhei Babu, an astrologer of Benares who seriously shook his proud faith in free-will; Vishuddhānanda, the yogi of Benares, whose power of making magical scents

out of the solar rays has been described by several writers; and, to pass over a number of other figures, some interesting, others amusing, the "Mahārishee," a saintly recluse living with his disciples in Arunachala in the South, whom our author visited early in his tour and to whom he came back in the end as "the one man who impressed me more than any other man I had ever met".

This sage, claiming no occult powers or hierophantic knowledge, impressed him profoundly and, despite barriers of language, his brief sojourn in the "sublime spirituality" of the Mahārishee's atmosphere brought him a spiritual experience which enabled him to leave India "quietly content because the battle for spiritual certitude had been won and won without sacrificing my dearly loved rationalism for a blind credulity".

Are these men the genuine Sages of whom tradition speaks? This question must be left for the reader to answer according to his own light. Different people have different ideas as to what constitutes a Mahatma, and will judge accordingly. One thing at least is certain, namely, that the book contains genuine accounts of remarkable men and should be sufficient to dispel the delusion that the wisdom and magic of the East are an empty legend traded on by knaves and believed in by fools.

One mistake, however, our author makes, and that is in speaking more than once of the Mahārishee as "one of the last of India's race of spiritual supermen". More than once, too, he voices the thought that the yoga is a dying science, the yogis, a dying race, destined, unless they descend from their mountain heights and take a more "practical" view of life, to inevitable extinction. "We shall roughly turn our heads away," he says, and India will follow suit. Perhaps so; perhaps not. Anyway, as Blake would have said, "Hear a plain fact!":—The Wisdom is Eternal and the Race of its Teachers lasts from Eternity to

Eternity. The insolent scepticism of the modern age can no more affect that Race than the making of an underground railway can affect the sun. The Yogi does descend from his world to ours but he does it at his own time, not at ours, and whether we "turn our heads roughly away" or not, though a matter of considerable consequence to us, is of no importance to him at all.

Our friend's values on this point are quite wrong. What he calls the "musty lore" of the East does not exist in order that Europeans, after "poking about," may "add a few pebbles of knowledge to our heap"! If this is all he has learnt from his sages then we can scarcely consider his search to have been very successful. Perhaps, how-

ever, these sentences are meant as mere concessions to contemporary folly. Let us therefore allow him to conclude in his own words:—

What I did arrive at was a new acceptance of the Divine. This may seem quite an insignificant and personal thing to do but, as a child of this modern generation which relies on hard facts and cold reason and which lacks enthusiasm for things religious, I regard it as quite an achievement. This faith was restored in the only way a sceptic could have it restored, not by argument but by the witness of an overwhelming experience.

To this we need only add that if one wishes more than that he must emulate that merchant who, when he had found one pearl of great price, went and sold all that he had and bought it.

SRI KRISHNA PREM

The Endless Quest—3000 Years of Science. By F. W. WESTAWAY. (Blackie & Son Ltd., London and Glasgow. 21s.)

No serious student denies that modern science has failed to explain the major problems pertaining to the origin and goal of life and of the Universe—the apologists of science taking shelter under the plea that it is not the function of science to deal with such matters! On the other hand an increasing number of men and women of culture find that the great sages and seers of yore successfully tackled the problems which science is finding insoluble. They therefore relegate science to a subordinate position, and derive their inspiration in life from the immemorial teachings which are to-day collectively known under the name of the Wisdom-Religion or Theosophy.

Mr. Westaway, the author of this splendid and most interesting volume, has already to his credit other scientific books which have received high encomiums in responsible quarters. But even he is constrained to make admissions which are none too flattering to modern science. Here are a few citations which speak for themselves:—

When we come to the region of *cosmogony* we are necessarily in a region which is full of doubt and is necessarily of a highly speculative character. Hypothesis is built on hypothesis; imagination is sometimes allowed to run riot; and not infrequently the most fantastic nonsense is served up with an apparent seriousness of purpose which is likely to deceive all but the very elect. If the cosmogonist happens to be an astronomer of recognized standing, as is sometimes the case, his speculations may be received as if they were of the nature of a fifth gospel. (p. 606)

All the universe makers seem to have built up their systems on the assumption that radiation from the sun or a star is uniformly propagated in space. Professor F. Soddy, professor of chemistry at Oxford, pertinently asks (*Nature*, 21st February, 1931, 5th September 1931) whether there is any evidence whatever for such an assumption. It is strange how many unverified assumptions underlie many of the basic theories of science. (p. 655)

What were the successive happenings between the time of the earth's birth and the first appearance of life? Scores of volumes have been written in reply to this question and many ingenious explanatory hypotheses have been put forward, but we are still without definite answers either to that main question or to other questions closely associated with it. (p. 674)

How the physical and psychical are related we do not know, but that they *are* related is

certain. . . . The relationship is, however, an unsolved mystery. (p. 732)

The neo-Lamarckians and the neo-Darwinians form two rather hostile camps. Each is striving to convert the other, and there are certain rather impatient individuals who sigh for the good old days of the Spanish inquisition. Meanwhile the search for more facts continues, and the undisputed truth may therefore emerge some day. (p. 747)

How did life originate? *We do not know.* All hypotheses concerning it are simply airy speculations. (p. 760)

In view of the above, who will wax enthusiastic over modern science? It is interesting to recall that in the seventies and eighties of the last century H. P. Blavatsky wrote about modern science in similar terms. She also spoke of "the glaring contradictions, the mutually destructive hypotheses of world-renowned scientists, their mutual accusations, denunciations and disputes," and it was by way of a solution of what she called the "scientific fallacies and gaps" that she gave to the world the ancient esoteric teachings which, she urged, had "as much right to a hearing as any of the so-called learned and academical hypotheses". Madame Blavatsky was, however, like one crying in the wilderness. Confining ourselves to the six problems referred to in the above six extracts from Mr. Westaway's book, we may state that practically all of them are satisfactorily answered in her writings.

In a very interesting article in THE ARYAN PATH for January 1933, Mr. J. D. Beresford, while pointing out the immense superiority of the teachings regarding human evolution given by H. P. Blavatsky to the theories advocated by the Darwinians, stated that he was by no means alone in his belief that the general average of Western intelligence was ready to accept the teachings of the Old Wisdom. We cannot say whether Mr. Westaway belongs to this increasing class of Westerners, but at any rate there is much in his book which goes to show that although he may not be quite conscious of the fact, his study and reflection have led him far in the

direction of the Esoteric philosophy. We shall give one or two illustrations. It is refreshing to find Mr. Westaway urging that in view of the entirely new turn which radioactivity in the twentieth century has given to the ideas of transmutation, it is not right to "scoff at the hope which inspired the work of the alchemist." (p. 115). A study of *Isis Unveiled* and of *The Secret Doctrine* will furnish Mr. Westaway with still more cogent reasons why ancient alchemy should not be scoffed at.

Students of Theosophy will be particularly interested in the presentment of the Law of Cycles on pages 1012 *et seq.* by Mr. Westaway who, following the lead of Sir W. M. Flinders Petrie, shows that civilization is a *recurrent* phenomenon, his conclusion about Western civilization being as follows:—

That European civilization has crossed its peak and is definitely declining seems to be probably true, for its wealth is being slowly squandered away, and the craving for leisure and pleasure by some of its peoples is vividly reminiscent of decadent ancient Rome.

This statement is reminiscent of warnings repeatedly given by H. P. Blavatsky in the seventies and eighties of the last century. (cf. *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I.)

Then every one knows her famous prediction in *The Secret Doctrine* that in the course of about a decade "there will be a large rent made in the Veil of Nature, and materialistic science will receive a death-blow". Subsequent research and developments in science have proved the truth of this prediction, and the position taken by present-day scientists is thus depicted:—

. . . most men of science are not only ceasing to be materialists but are now rather shy of proclaiming aloud their allegiance to any form of dogmatic philosophy. . . . More and more eminent men of science are nowadays increasingly willing to admit that *they do not know*. . . . Despite the few surviving dogmatists, there is a refreshing humility about modern science. Omniscience now seldom finds a claimant. Intellectual integrity now

much more willingly admits that, in the light of newly discovered facts, many old theories and creeds have ceased to be useful and must be abandoned. The same thing applies to the sphere of religion. (pp. 1027-8.)

Mr. Westaway's excellent book, however, is not free from one or two serious defects. He says in the Preface that his book "presents to the layman the main facts of science as they have come down to us through the ages," but in tracing this history he has practically ignored the wonderful contribution to different sciences made by ancient India, disposing of the subject in less than twenty lines (p. 99) while to ancient Greece are devoted forty-six pages. Some fifty years ago, the late Sir William Hunter, the great historian of India, very clearly showed the high proficiency in various sciences attained by India in ancient times, and since then different scholars have thrown further light on the subject. A book like Sir Brajendranath Seal's *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* or Sir P. C. Ray's *History of Indian Chemistry* should convince any impartial man that ancient India had made tremendous headway with various sciences

and was far in advance of Greece in this respect.

What is perhaps more indefensible is that our author has also overlooked the claims of the great Indian scientists who have achieved an international reputation in our day. By common consent Sir Jagadis Chandra Bose is one of the world's greatest authorities on plant life, but although fully five pages have been devoted to "Plant Physiology" his name is not even mentioned. Similarly, Sir P. C. Ray's name is omitted, and the name of Sir C. V. Raman appears only in the list of Nobel Prizemen! (p. 1011)

On the whole, however, we have nothing but praise for Mr. Westaway's splendid book, in which he has given us a fine panoramic view of the growth and development of various sciences in the Western world. Mr. Westaway has done good work in having collected such a mass of facts in a compact volume, and in pointing out how even many of the Scientists of to-day are realising the limitations of their knowledge.

J. P. W.

Religion and the European Mind. By ADOLF KELLER, D. D., LL. D. (The Lutterworth Press, London. 6s.)

First published in the United States of America under the title *Religion and Revolution*, Adolf Keller's Stone Lectures delivered at the Theological Seminary in Princeton, New Jersey, in 1933, which have now been issued in an English Edition as Volume IV of the Lutterworth Library, are devoted to a discussion of the permanently persistent and persistently permanent problem of the conflict between the truths that emanate from man and the truth that proceeds from God, which has taken an acute turn in Soviet Russia, Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. In a brief "Introduction"

the author brings into the focus of the attention of his readers the central theme of his discussion which is "the struggle of secular religion against the Christian Gospel" (p. 17). The vicissitudes of the great doctrine of "justification by faith" as reflected in Neo-Calvinism and Neo-Lutheranism are sketched in the second and third chapters. Who understands the Reformation correctly? Adherents of the Neo-Lutheran movement, or those of the Neo-Calvinistic? This and allied topics of the continental theological Revolution like "Is God hidden or manifest?" "Bible or History?" "Concrete or Abstract Theology?" etc., are dealt with in the fourth chapter. The fight of German Protestantism with Secularism, *i. e.*, the fight of the

Christian Faith based on God's revelation against man-made religions forms the subject-matter of the fifth chapter. In the concluding chapter the destiny of the Church in a changing world is foreshadowed. Important documents relating to the German Church movement are published in the shape of Appendices.

Dr. Adolf Keller's powerful advocacy of the claims of evangelical life and ethics, evangelical truth and religious liberty, will be readily endorsed by the Vedanta in general and by Theistic, Realistic, and Pluralistic systems in particular. If political Absolutism has been repugnant to the thinking section of mankind, philosophical Absolutism is bound to be more so. There is no need to repeat or perpetuate the amusing mistake that Sankara's monistic Idealism is the only fashionable philosophy of life. The Realism and the Pluralistic Theism of Madhva or Anandatirtha emphasize the doctrine of Divine Grace.

Dr. Keller has pointed out that the religion based on revelation is now obliged to fight a battle royal with man-made religions, such as those implied by nationalism, communism, and similar secularisms. If the Vedas and the Upanishads could be substituted for the Bible, one wonders if Dr. Keller would have become a convert to Vedanta.

In India, I mean the Hindu India, there has always been a keen and acute conflict between a make-believe religious and theological programme, the practical applicability of which is confined to all relevant matters viewed *sub specie temporis*, and a programme grounded on the most intense spiritual awareness of the reality of Divine

Grace as the only means of deliverance from the transmigratory cycle.

Modern Europe and America are by no means anxious to translate into practical politics the programme of evangelical ethics, and thinkers like Dean Inge have a formidable task before them when they attempt to effect a synthesis between the man-made religion of an astronomical picture of the world and the revealed religion based on the authority of the Bible.

The Theistic schools of the Vedanta maintained long ago what Karl Barth proclaims, that men are all "sinners and in need of the pardon of God" (p. 164). Monistic Absolutism relegated this pardoning God to the limbo of a lesser degree of reality. A conflict between the two must be inevitable.

Attempts are everywhere visible in modern India to have the man-made religions of nationalism, communism, etc., which have undoubtedly achieved marked success in the West, transplanted to the indigenous soil, and I feel that Dr. Adolf Keller's survey of the theological situation in Europe must convey a significant lesson to those who, acting under the urge of secular, political, and economic enthusiasm, take pride in glorifying the deeds and achievements of men and mankind. Those who are intent on emphasising the well-known parallelism between Christianity and the Theistic systems of the Vedanta will find Dr. Keller's lectures exceedingly interesting. Centuries ago, the Theistic systems of Indian thought emphasised the victory of the word of God over words of men, of the truth of God over truths of men, and of the deed of God over the deeds of men—the deed manifest in His Supreme Grace without which *Moksha* or *Apavarga* cannot be secured.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Scientific Research and Social Needs.

By JULIAN HUXLEY. With an Introductory Chapter by Sir William Bragg, and Discussions with Prof. H. Levy, Sir Thomas D. Barlow, K. B. E., and Prof. P. M. S. Blackett (Watts, London, 7s.6d.)

There was a time, well within the memories of the middle-aged, when every new scientific discovery or invention was hailed with general enthusiasm as one more step on the road to Utopia; but now we are not so sure of this. Never has Science, both theoretical and practical, made such swift progress as it is making to-day; and yet, despite its majestic achievements and the almost complete mastery of physical nature which it has placed in human hands, the world is in a state of political and economic chaos, and humanity resembles nothing so much as a fever patient with a high temperature and slightly delirious.

That Men of Science themselves are not without misgivings about the effect of scientific discovery on social conditions, is indicated by the words of Sir William Bragg, whose introductory chapter is significantly headed "Science: Friend or Enemy?"

Mr. Julian Huxley has undertaken a very remarkable tour in this country. He is studying, broadly speaking, the influence which scientific discovery is exerting upon our lives. He has examined the methods by which research is carried on in various places and for various purposes. He will tell us of the results. And especially he will consider the relations of science to social questions: questions that we are all asking to-day. Is scientific research drawing us together or forcing us apart? Is it to be commended for supplying our needs or blamed for causing unemployment? Does it help to bring peace between the nations, or war? Does it add to mankind's vision, or restrict it? If it is solving some problems, is it perhaps raising others still more difficult and troublesome?

Mr. Huxley's book is an attempt to solve the problem thus outlined by Sir William Bragg; and, if he does not entirely succeed in doing so, he has at least collected a mass of valuable data relating to the subject, which will assist his readers in thinking it out for themselves. In the course of his journeyings Mr. Huxley has investigated the

research work which is being done in various places in connection with the production of foodstuffs and other essential raw materials, and with the industrial processes by which these materials are converted into commodities for human use in peace, or human destruction in war. The story he has to tell is of intense interest, and the lay reader will have no difficulty whatever in following his very clear and succinct explanations. His final verdict is, as might be anticipated, favourable to scientific research; and he suggests that what the world needs is not less, but more science, especially in the form of research in psychology and sociology and the application of its results in practical affairs. With this opinion there can be no quarrel, provided that psychologists, in their preoccupation with the subconscious and the emotional, do not lose sight of the spiritual and superconscious factors in man.

There are certain questions of vital importance, suggested by Mr. Huxley's work, which urgently demand a solution if our civilisation is not to drift on blindly without goal or purpose. Many of us take pride in the fact that we are moving rapidly, and are heedless *whither*, forgetting the fate of the Gadarene swine, who also were swift movers and did not pause to consider where their course was leading them. If our civilisation is to acquire a direction—to become an ordered movement instead of a blind drift—we have to make up our minds what things promote, and what mar, the real well-being of a human community; to what extent this essential well-being can be furthered by causes other than the ethical condition of the individuals composing the community, *e. g.*, by the accumulation of objective knowledge or the progress of mechanical invention; and finally whether it is not inevitable that both knowledge and invention, without a concomitant ethical advance, must bring with them a compensating disadvantage for every benefit they bestow upon us.

R. A. V. M.

The Mystical Life. By ROGER BASTIDE (Jonathan Cape, London. 7s. 6d.)

This remarkably scientific study of the Laws of Mysticism is divided into two parts. The first deals with the psychological state of the mystics, their experiences and sentiments. The second is devoted to an explanation of these processes from the view-points of pathology, psychology and sociology. It gives the threefold classification of the mystical state—the prayer of quiet, the prayer of union, and ecstasy; meditation, contemplation and asceticism being processes towards the last state (compare Patañjali's *Yoga*). Real Mysticism is the permanent and joyous union, the "Spiritual Marriage," of the soul with God. The "graces" such as visions, locutions, power to prophesy, gift of languages, levitation and stigmata, which usually are recognized as Mysticism by the crowd are only external phenomena and are of secondary importance. The author admits that the Mystical constitution is no doubt "psychasthenic" and "pithiatic," characterised by scruples, aboulia, obsessions, anguish, self-delusion and even dementia. But psychiatry cannot offer a satisfactory explanation. There is all the difference between the two that there is between "Genius" and "Madness". Nor is Mysticism a disease of the attention, of the will or of the religious feeling. The author classifies Mystics into four distinct

groups—the Enthusiast or Illuminate, the Quietist, the Constructive and the Prophet.

The book displays, in general, insufficient knowledge of Hindu Mysticism, which is defined as "suicide," "a preparation for Death". The state of "Spiritual Marriage" is reached not only in Christianity and Islam, but is largely in evidence in the *Nāyaki-Nāyaka Bhāva* of the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava saints. The author misses a point when he understands "*Dhyāna*" to mean "Ecstasy". It is only a state of meditation, prayer and contemplation. Ecstasy is *Ānanda*, and denotes the joyous and enduring union with the Infinite. "*Ānanda is Brahman*". Graces, such as locutions (*āśarīra vāk*) and visions are deemed low in the scale of Mystical values. But can the "Vision" (*Dīvyadr̥ṣṭi*) of the "Supreme Personality" (*Vēśvarūpa*) be classed with the other imperfect forms as a mere external phenomenon?

So far as it goes, however, this book is characterised by clarity of thought and consistent sanity of judgment; and provides a working ground for distinguishing fact from fiction in Mystical experience. The metaphysical aspect is outside its province; but here rather would seem to lie much of the explanation sought for mystical phenomena. The mystery of Mysticism lies beyond the battery of physical sciences.

S. V. VISWANATHA

Eranos-Jahrbuch 1933: Yoga und Meditation im Osten und im Westen. Ed. by OLGA FROBE-KAPTEYN.

The objective of the Ascona Conference of August, 1933, is plain from the sub-title of this symposium of quite uneven interest and value. The East is not directly represented and the attitude towards its wisdom ranges widely. The distinguished psychologist, Dr. C. G. Jung, admits that "In the West, despite our so-called culture, we are still barbarians and children in regard to the psychic."

Mrs. Rhys Davids makes a significant contribution on the *Dhyāna* cult of early Buddhism.

In *Dhyāna* we see man hastening the work of becoming by entering into relations with those fellow men who, since they have already passed beyond the veil, have advanced farther in knowledge than himself, and from them he learns.

Several of the other lectures leave the uneasy impression of children playing happily with dynamite and inviting others to join their game.

Ph. D.

CORRESPONDENCE

ANCIENT AND MODERN IDEAS OF PRALAYA

Madame Blavatsky was perhaps the first and foremost thinker to point out the epochal confirmations of ancient Eastern Wisdom by modern Western science. Using the material supplied by her, Dr. Hart wrote in *THE ARYAN PATH* of May 1934 (p. 296) to show that the old conceptions of Pralaya are being accepted by modern science. These few words are just to support Dr. Hart's view.

According to Hindu thinkers there are four kinds of Pralaya—Nitya, Naimittika, Prakritika and Atyantika. The first one is the "perpetual" Pralaya, the constant imperceptible changes undergone by the atoms, the stages of growth and decay; it is subjective, corresponding to bodily changes which take place in sleep. The second is described in *Manu Samhita* and the *Puranas*. It is the dissolution of the Universe at the end of one Day of Brahmā. According to the *Gita*, (vii 17), Brahma's Day is equal to one thousand yugas of human calculation. The fact of Prakritika Pralaya is borne out by the developments of modern physics. According to this view all the worlds dissolve into Primordial Substance or Mulaprakriti at the end of a Life of Brahmā.

Dr. Jeans, says in his *Eos* that the universe will ultimately dissolve into radiation. He says, "There will be neither sunlight neither starlight but only a cool glow of radiation uniformly diffused through space." Both Sir James Jeans and Sir Oliver Lodge believe that a reverse process will commence. They incline to the belief in another cycle of creation, or rather projection (as the Sanskrit word "Sristi" really means). This Prakritika or Cyclic Pralaya is thus scientific as well as scriptural. Sristi is Anādi or changelessly eternal,

according to Hindu philosophy. Out of the womb of infinite space universes are projected and that they again merge into the same is the view supported by science and the *Shastras*.

There are three kinds of Sristi also—Arambhavada, Parinamavada and Vivartavada. In the phraseology of modern thought they may be termed creationism, evolutionism and illusionism. The last is the theory propounded by Advaita Vedanta, in the view of which the world is a mirage. Sir James Jeans concludes *Eos* by making a close approach to this Hindu position. He suggests towards the end of the book that "the Universe after all may be a dream, a creation of our own mind in which nothing exists except itself".

Closely related to Pralaya is Manvantara, the age cycle between two Manus. In Hindu mythology there is mention of fourteen Manus. It is interesting to note that the idea of Manu or the First Man is found in many nations. The roots of this word in other languages prove it. In Sanskrit it is called Manu; in English man; in Anglo-Saxon, man; in German, Mann; in Swedish, man; in Icelandic, mann; in Danish, mand; etc. One human year is said to be a day of the Gods. In such calculations 71 Maha Yugas of 306,720,000 mortal years make one Manvantara.

The late Charles Johnston in his article on "The Destiny of Man" in *The Atlantic Monthly*, 1931, observed that "India is far closer to the most modern cosmological conceptions than Hellas ever was." "The noteworthy fact of the most recent results as embodied in the splendidly imaginative writings of Sir J. Jeans and Sir A. Eddington, is that they are singularly like the views taught milleniums back in Ancient India. Buddha teaching 2500 years ago speaks of a million million worlds."

ENDS AND SAYINGS

*- ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."*

HUDIBRAS.

The Presidential Address of Sir James Jeans delivered last September in Aberdeen before the British Association for the Advancement of Science contains several striking ideas to which the attention of students, not only of Physics, but even of Philosophy, may be drawn. To-day we have space for a few remarks on the point raised by Sir James at the end of his address on science, morality and religion. He said :—

We cannot ignore the tragic fact that, as our President of two years ago told us, science has given man control over Nature before he has gained control over himself. This is only one chapter of a long story—human nature changes very slowly, and so for ever lags behind human knowledge, which accumulates very rapidly.

The statement naturally raises the question—how does this happen? Moreover, has it been ever and always so? Sir James further said :—

Thus, in respect of knowledge, each generation stands on the shoulders of its predecessor, but in respect of human nature, both stand on the same ground.

Shall we take it for granted that the builders of Mohenjo Daro, the Chaldees of Ur, the teachers of Egypt, did not possess the knowledge we possess—nay, even more wisdom than our scholars carry in their heads? Next, if scientific knowledge is not capable

of elevating morality, of inspiring noble living, then surely its value must be counted as meagre. Sir James continued :—

These are hard facts which we cannot hope to alter, and which—we may as well admit—may wreck civilization. If there is an avenue of escape, it does not, as I see it, lie in the direction of less science, but of more science—psychology, which holds out hopes that, for the first time in his long history, man may be enabled to obey the command "Know thyself"; to which, I, for one, would like to see adjoined a morality and, if possible, even a religion, consistent with our new psychological knowledge and the established facts of science.

But ages before the Delphic Oracle enjoined man to self-study there were minds who had sought and found Wisdom and there were hearts touched by nobility so profound that they were able to translate that knowledge into action. Sir James desires a morality and a religion founded on scientific facts and he mentions "eugenics and birth-control," etc. But does up-to-date science *know* facts in such matters? Can Sir James say that psychologists and psycho-analysts and eugenists know, positively know, a sufficient number of facts to use them for constructing a morality and a religion? We trow not. Science has yet to go a great way before it can evolve a code of morality which would inspire the

race of mortals as do the Sermon on the Mount, the sermons of the Buddha, and those of Krishna in the *Gita*.

To-day mass-morality is not high, and is shot through and through with pornographic themes. Various factors have combined to force on the public attention the different problems connected with sex. Psycho-analysis, eugenics, marriage-hygiene, etc., are freely discussed not only by experts possessing knowledge, but by pseudo-experts who are a danger to public morality and education. One of the phases of this general talk is round the problem of sterilization; and it is more than mere talk. Several states have tried to maintain their moral health by sterilizing some of their prisoners—as in some parts of the U. S. A. Nazi Germany obsessed by the devil of race-purity has rushed into sterilizing large numbers; we might describe it as an act of childish conceit, but it must be characterized more strongly because of the grave injury to the masses. Dr. Lawenthal of Nice in *Mercur de France* (1st April) examines the whole problem in an illuminating article on “Eugenics, Prenuptial Examination and Sterilization”. Sterilization is most intimately connected with the problem of heredity and the article offers striking instances from which we take the following:—

D'Alembert was the illegitimate son of a courtier of average intelligence,

a libertine, a gambler and a *gourmand*. His mother was one of the most immorally shameless and abject women of that time. Brought up in such an atmosphere the child had numerous chances to become corrupted. Luck made his mother abandon him and a family of honest labourers then adopted him. He became the greatest mathematician of his era, with a remarkable literary talent and a great encyclopædic knowledge, a man of rare modesty and integrity. . . .

Michel-Angelo was son of a brute of a father who harboured an instinctive hatred against art and who tried to kill all taste for it in his genius-child by beating him atrociously, so much so that he rendered him infirm.

It is to a drunkard suffering from *delirium tremens* and probably a wreck, that we owe Beethoven, the creator of modern music. . . .

The father of Goethe, one of the greatest poets and thinkers, was a *psychopathe*, *heredo-avare* and brother to an idiot—a triple claim to sterilization. . . .

Leonardo da Vinci...was the illegitimate son of a female servant and a clerk.

Imagine these parents sterilized! Poorer the world would be without D'Alembert, Michel-Angelo, Beethoven, Goethe, and Leonardo da Vinci.

Not only on the score of sane morality and of sound health of body and mind is sterilization wrong, but also in the light of heredity the Germans are frustrating their very object of producing a pure race of immortals by hastily adopting sterilization.

As ethics and morality are intimately connected with religious beliefs they have lost caste; effete theological dogmas and vain religious rites and ceremonies are being brushed aside by the thoughtful everywhere, but they do not like to see the foundations of the moral edifice weakening. There is a general desire for right philosophy as an aid to daily life. While many are looking to science for such aid, a growing number recognize that science has not sufficient knowledge to offer a noble line of correct conduct for decent living. What about philosophy? The International Congress of Philosophy recently held at Prague offered little consolation.* Of the many papers read there most dealt with metaphysical speculations of interest to the academician; hardly any offered substantial aid to the earnest enquirer to acquire a new attitude to life and to reshape his own mode of existence. However the difference between the philosophy that is a means to culture or a political weapon and the philosophy that is a power in life was emphasised by Herr Paul Feldkeller of Berlin.

The first philosophers were what true philosophers at all times have been: *men who lived, not men who taught*. The occasional teaching was in response to the wishes of eventual

pupils. The endeavour to make proselytes and found schools arose only with the Sophists. The philosophy of a thinker did not record itself in speeches and books but in his actions, his conduct of life. The ancient itinerant philosophers of India, China and the Near East, the Pythagoreans, the Socratics and Cynics, the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Renaissance philosophers...*they all lived philosophy*...The time is coming when philosophy will once more be lived. Philosophy that is lived, however, knows how to keep silence. And the ages of political dictators and despotism have been by no means always unfruitful periods for truth. They worked selectively; they strengthened character. For genuine philosophy is neither a department of instruction nor a means to culture; it does not make the life of its follower easier but more difficult. It prepares him inwardly for martyrdom. *But the philosophy that helps mankind can only be the esoteric.*

Herr Feldkeller here puts his finger on a great truth. The only philosophy worthy of the name is that which does express itself in life. Intellectual subtleties and metaphysical abstractions in themselves can save no man from sin and suffering. It is otherwise when high concepts are grasped and put to use in life of every day. The application of philosophy is ethics which do not relate alone to his material and evanescent part, but sink into and take hold of the real man within.

